How Do I Love Thee - Keller

North American Philosophical Publications

How Do I Love Thee? Let Me Count the PropertiesAuthor(s): Simon KellerSource: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Apr., 2000), pp. 163-173Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical PublicationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009994 .Accessed: 11/10/2011 03:10

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

University of Illinois Press and North American Philosophical Publications are collaborating with JSTOR todigitize, preserve and extend access to American Philosophical Quarterly.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=illinois

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=napp

http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009994?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

American Philosophical Quarterly Volume 37, Number 2, April 2000

HOW DO I LOVE THEE? LET ME COUNT THE PROPERTIES

Simon Keller

Xf someone I love romantically loves me

back, then that's a reason for me to feel

good about myself. Among the most valu?

able of rewards that I can gain from

romantic love is the personal affirmation

that comes from the knowledge that some?

one whom I love romantically has chosen

me as a worthy recipient of her own ro?

mantic love. Of all the people she could

love, she chooses to love me. That suggests that the reason why she loves me should

be to do with the things that set me apart from others. She should love me because

of properties that I have and others lack.1

But wait. Love should not be given con?

ditionally. What if I change, and lose the

properties that my partner finds attractive?

I wouldn't like to think that there would

then be nothing left for her to love. And

what if someone comes along whose prop? erties are more attractive than mine?

Wouldn't she then love him instead of me?

So perhaps my partner's romantic love

should not be grounded in the properties that set me apart from others. Perhaps she

should love me just for being me, however

I am and however I will be.

Call the view flagged in the first para?

graph the properties view?romantic love

should be for properties. This is the view

that I want to defend. I will argue that be?

ing loved romantically should give us a

reason to feel good about ourselves and that

we need not be uncomfortable with the

consequence that romantic love is given

conditionally. In the first section of this

paper, I'll try to get clearer on what the

view is, and what question it is trying to

answer. The second section will explain the

virtues of the properties view, and say why these virtues are not to be found elsewhere.

Section three will contain a criticism of one

formulation of the view, and a suggestion as to how the view should be revised so as

to deal with the criticism. Revised view in

hand, the fourth section will deal with some

objections.

I. The Properties View

The question that I am addressing is this.

What, to the modern Western mind, makes

for an ideal romantic relationship? To put it another way, what do we modern West?

erners want from romantic love? The

guiding thought is that most people (in our

culture, now) share a schematic view of

what an ideal romantic relationship is like.

An ideal romantic relationship holds be?

tween two people who care for each other

163

164 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

very much, probably live and sleep to?

gether, have sex with each other if they have sex with anyone, share secrets and

dreams, are committed to maintaining the

relationship, and so on. Some will pro? nounce "ideal" with a sneer; the "ideal"

romantic relationship, they will say, is op?

pressive, unnatural, or boring. But I think

that most everyone is aware of the ideal, and many are intent upon achieving it. The

goal of this paper is to articulate one as?

pect of the ideal.2

The question that this paper addresses is

specifically a question about romantic love.

I'm not exactly sure what sets romantic

love apart from other sorts of love, but I

think that romantic love can be adequately characterized as that type of love that nec?

essarily involves a strong desire to share

with the beloved a romantic relationship. Part of what it is to love someone romanti?

cally is to desire to share with him a loving

relationship that is intimate, mutual, exclu?

sive, and possibly sexual. This desire, of

course, may be outweighed by others?a

romantic lover may prefer, on the whole, not to be in a romantic relationship with

the beloved?but if her love is really ro?

mantic love then the desire must be present and must be rather strong. You can love

someone without wanting to spend time

with him, without caring whether he loves

anyone else, and without caring whether

or not your love is reciprocated, but this

cannot qualify as romantic love.

My task is to say something interesting about ideal romantic love, as understood

by contemporary Westerners. My claim is

that ideal romantic love is love for proper? ties. But what does this mean?

"Why?" asked her companion. "Why do you love him when you ought not to?"

Edna, with a motion or two, dragged herself on her knees before Mademoiselle Reisz,

who took the glowing face between her two

hands.

"Why? Because his hair is brown and grows

away from his temples; because he opens and

shuts his eyes, and his nose is a little out of

drawing; because he has two lips and a

square chin, and a little finger which he can't

straighten from having played baseball too

energetically in his youth. Because?"

"Because you do, in short," laughed Made?

moiselle.3

I'm not much interested in Edna's an?

swer, but I am interested in the way in

which she understands the question. She

doesn't tell a causal story about how she

got to be in her present state?"I love him

because he was the most handsome and

charming man at the party on the night that

I realized that I was fed up with my hus?

band"?nor does she explain what it is

about herself that makes her a romantic

lover?"I love him because, perhaps for

biological or cultural reasons, I need to

love someone." Instead, Edna tries (with? out much success) to rationalize, or justify, or make intelligible, her loving him. Forget?

ting about the circumstances that led to her

falling in love, forgetting about the psycho?

logical and sociological features that

contribute to making her a lover, and forget?

ting that she might be unable to stop loving him even if she tried, Edna tries to explain

why it makes sense for her to love him.

The properties view says that the ques?

tion, "What justifies your choosing to make

her the object of your romantic love?" is a

sensible question to ask, and that ideal ro?

mantic lovers can, in principle, answer it

by appealing to a set of the beloved's prop? erties. I say, "in principle," because the

view is not intended to imply that ideal

lovers should always have the relevant list

of properties ready to hand. Often, we don't

know exactly what it is that we love about

HOW DO I LOVE THEE? LET ME COUNT THE PROPERTIES / 165

someone, and often we don't have reason

to care. The idea is just that the continuing love of the ideal romantic lover is justi? fied by the beloved's possession of a

certain set of properties, whether or not the

lover knows what they are. That's what it

means to say that ideal romantic love is

love for properties. Nor does the properties view imply that

ideal lovers love properties rather than

people. If I tell you that I love you for your

graceful dancing, your sensible conversa?

tion, and your strong will, then you might be moved to respond by saying, "You're

only in love with graceful dancing, sensible

conversation, and strength of will; you're not really in love with me." Your claim

might be that my infatuation with your

dancing, conversation, and willpower leads

me to ignore the more central aspects of

your character. That is a substantial com?

plaint, but it raises no problems for the

properties view. If, on the other hand, you are lodging the more general protest that I

love your properties instead of loving you, then your worry is misconceived. The re?

lata of the love relation are you and me.

My love for you holds in virtue of, or is

justified by, your having certain properties, but this does not at all imply that I love

your properties instead of loving you

(whatever that would mean).4 Another worry that some may have about

the properties view is that it makes roman?

tic love look too cerebral. I said that the

properties view tries to say how an ideal

romantic lover could, in principle, answer

the question, "What justifies your choos?

ing to love her?" and I will speak of

romantic love as love that is given freely. None of this, however, is intended to over?

state the extent to which we can choose

who we love. As it happens, I think that

we can, to some extent, decide whether or

not to love someone; I think that romantic

love, to some extent, deserves to be intel

lectualized. All should agree, however, that

we can ask ourselves whether our love is

justified?we can decide whether it should

be embraced or resisted. When I find my? self in love with someone, I can decide

whether it would be better for me to send

him flowers or to move to another city. I

can make this judgment even if I know that

I will be incapable of acting upon it. If you feel uncomfortable with my talk of choos?

ing to love, then hear it as talk about

choosing to embrace love. The properties view says that an ideal romantic lover freely chooses to embrace his love for his partner, and that his choice is justified by his partner's

possession of a certain set of properties. To make the properties view interesting,

I need to say something about which sorts

of properties should be the ones that moti?

vate romantic love. Here are some

guidelines. First, the properties for which

someone is romantically loved should be

properties that the beloved might not have

had, where this means that he could have

existed without instantiating those proper? ties. So it is not enough to love him for his

property of being him, or of instantiating his haecceity. Next, the beloved should not

be loved for properties of his that make

essential reference to achievements or

events that are in the too distant past. He

should not be loved for his property of hav?

ing saved your life ten years ago, or of having been the one who used to send you flowers.

Third, the beloved should be loved for

properties that are not overly extrinsic. He

shouldn't be loved for his property of be?

ing the person of whom your mother

approves. (This rule has one important class

of exceptions.) Finally, a romantic lover

should be loved for properties that his part? ner takes to be intrinsically, or objectively, attractive, meaning that she doesn't appre? ciate these properties just because they are


attached to her beloved. She finds those

properties attractive in anyone.

Underlying this list of guidelines is the idea that the properties for which we are

loved should be of such a nature as to give us a reason to feel good about ourselves, to think that we are attractive, admirable,

valuable people. Someone might feel good about herself because she believes herself

to be a good painter, a good teacher, or a

good leg-spin bowler. But there are some

properties, I think, that play a central (but not exclusive) role in ideal romantic love.

These are the properties that make us good romantic partners?properties like being a

good listener, being caring and sensitive,

being generous. Some of these properties will be relational properties. One reason

why someone might find you attractive as

a romantic partner is that you know exactly how to treat him when he is in a bad mood.

(This is the class of exceptions to the rule

that the properties for which we are loved

should not be too extrinsic.) Just which

properties make us good romantic partners

depends upon what we and our partners are

like, so there's no list of the properties for

which every romantic partner should be

loved. When I speak of romantic love for

properties, I am thinking especially (but not only) of the properties that make some?

one a good romantic partner, in the context

of the particular relationship. Neil Delaney has defended a view simi?

lar to mine, and he thinks that the

properties for which someone wants to be

loved can be summarized as those that he

takes to be central to his self-conception.5 When I offer my revision to the properties

view in section three, I'll explain why I

don't quite agree with Delaney's position. Before offering a defense of the proper?

ties view, let me outline the grounds upon which an alternative position might be

based. Robert Nozick says that "you can

fall in love with someone because of cer?

tain characteristics and you can continue

to delight in these; but eventually you must

love the person himself, and not for the

characteristics, not, at any rate, for any delimited list of them."6 He suggests two

ways of developing this idea. First, we

might think of falling in love as being like

imprinting in ducks, with the devotion

caused initially by characteristics but then

sustained without reference to them. Sec?

ond, we might take a perspective related

to economics, seeking to show that, once

part of a relationship, it is to our advan?

tage to stay in it regardless of the

characteristics of our partner.7 In articulating his Kantian theory about

the nature of (not just romantic) love, J.

David Velleman suggests that to love some?

one is to perceive and appreciate the value

that he possesses "solely by virtue of his

being a person." "All that is essential to

love," says Velleman, "is that it disarms

our emotional defenses toward an object in response to its incomparable value as a

self-existent end." "When the object of our

love is a person ... we are responding to

the value that he possesses by virtue of

being a person or, as Kant would say, an

instance of rational nature."8 While all sorts

of things may trigger our love for a per?

son, it is our recognition of his intrinsic

value as a person?a property that he could

not have done without?that underlies our

continuing love. In theory, although maybe not in spirit, Velleman's theory is consis?

tent with Nozick's comparison of falling in love with imprinting.9 It is positions like

these that we will have to consider if we

decide to reject the properties view.

II. Should I be Loved for Properties?

Being loved romantically should give us

a reason to feel good about ourselves. The

great difference between the love received


from a parent and the love received from a

romantic partner, says Nozick, is that "in

receiving adult love, we are held worthy of being the primary object of the most

intense love."10 I think that the love be?

tween parents and children can be pretty

intense, and I think that parents and children

are, ideally, held to be worthy of the love that

they receive. Still, there is something spe? cial about romantic love between adults.

Romantic love is given freely. We are not

obliged to fall in love with anyone, and we

are not obliged to stay in love with any? one. We can choose our romantic lovers in

a way that we cannot choose our parents or children. Further, to give someone your romantic love is to offer to make her one

of the most important people in your life.

An enduring romantic partnership, in West?

ern culture, is thought of as one in which

the partners live together, know each other

intimately, take on each other's interests,

share hopes and fears, support each other

through good and bad times, spend more

time together than with anyone else, form

a shared identity. That someone you love

should offer you such a place in her life

can, and ideally does, make you feel good about being you. You, of all people, are

seen by the lover as someone who can share

her life at the most intimate level, can make

her life happier and more fulfilling. One

of the great goods you can receive in adult

life is the knowledge that the person you love sees in you the qualities of a desir?

able romantic partner. Part of the good of being loved, of

course, is just the knowledge that, for what?

ever reason, you are loved. Ideally, however, the fact that you are loved also

serves as a reason to think that you are

worthy of his love, that it makes sense for

him to want to share a romantic relation?

ship with you. If you have a romantic

partner, then he is probably forever telling

you how wonderful you are. In an ideal re?

lationship, you should have reason to

believe him; when other things are going

poorly, the fact that he chooses to love you

gives you a reason to think that you are

not such a bad person after all. Being loved

romantically should give you a reason to

feel good about yourself. On any account of romantic love, this is

easy to explain with regard to the early

stages of a relationship. When Alan falls

in love with Ellen, his love is directed at

her, rather than at anyone else, because of

his appreciation of certain characteristics

that she possesses. He might be attracted

to her because of her strong will, her sen?

sible conversation, and the grace with

which she dances. If Ellen loves Alan for

some similar set of attributes, then each of

them can be affirmed by the knowledge that their qualities are valued by someone

whose opinion is important. This is con?

sistent both with the claim that love should

always be for properties and with the op?

posing claim that love should be for

properties only in the first instance.

Let us consider the way in which this

relationship might proceed. Quite possibly, the properties that Alan and Ellen admire

in each other will, over time, be lost or

subsumed. After a year, Ellen might have

given up dancing. After two years, she

might have developed an irreverent sense

of humor that makes her conversation any?

thing but sensible. After ten years, she

might have become less intense in her ap?

proach to life and relaxed her strong will.

By now, it will be of little comfort to her

that, ten years ago, Alan wanted to share

his life with a strong-willed, graceful dancer who offered sensible conversation.

If she is to have his romantic love as a rea?

son to believe that she is still his worthy and chosen companion, then that love must

have some reference to properties that she


possesses in the present. If Alan's love is

sustained by something other than an appre? ciation of Ellen's present characteristics, then

she will have no justification for taking his

love as any indication that she is now wor?

thy of being loved. The way to avoid this

result is to require that Alan continue to

have an objective appreciation for Ellen's

properties, such that he might now be de?

lighted by her humor and her easy-going nature. Then, she will have good reason to

be continually affirmed by his love.

It can also be suspected that a relation?

ship which does not proceed with a

continuing mutual appreciation of the

other's properties will cease to be one that

is governed by free choice. How might Alan justify his involvement in the rela?

tionship ten years after it has begun? If he

loves Ellen "just because she's Ellen" or

because it is his interests to remain in the

relationship now that he has entered it, then

his love is controlled by a decision he made

ten years ago, when he and Ellen were both

very different people. He no longer loves her

(as opposed to anyone else) because he freely chooses to do so, but because he has no prac? tical choice but to do so. Where he loves Ellen

for the properties that she possesses in the

present, however, these properties can be the

basis for his continuing free choice to remain

a part of the relationship. Let's think about how an alternative view

might try to show that being loved roman?

tically gives you a reason to feel good about yourself. It might be argued that lov?

ers should have a subjective appreciation of each other's properties, so that Alan's

love will be such that he always delights in whatever features Ellen develops. Once

seen in his lover, he may even come to

admire these qualities in others. Such

wildly indiscriminate love, however, does

not offer the affirmation that we seek from a

romantic partner. Just as we are skeptical of

someone's insistence that her grandson is

the best football player in the school, you would have little reason to be convinced

by a lover's confidence that you are a won?

derful person when you know that he would

believe that regardless of your qualities. Velleman's Kantian theory looks as

though it might be able to explain why be?

ing loved romantically should make you feel good about yourself. On this view,

your lover perceives and appreciates the

value that you possess solely by virtue of

being a person. This value is of such a type as not to be replaceable or susceptible to

comparisons; to be a person is to be spe?

cial, regardless of how many others there

are who possess the same sort of value.11

Having someone love you in this way gives

you a perfectly good reason to feel good about yourself. It reminds you of how spe? cial and valuable you are, just in virtue of

being a person.

Perhaps persons do possess such a value, and perhaps it is recognized in us by our

romantic partners. Our value as persons,

however, is not what makes most of us feel

that we are valuable, admirable people in

the way in which I am interested. It's nice

to remember that we are special in virtue

of being persons, but we also like to think

of ourselves as possessing the types of

value that are replaceable and subject to

comparison; we like to think of ourselves

as people of admirable character, as good friends and lovers, and so on. Ideal roman?

tic love should give us reason to think that

our value stretches some way beyond the

value that we possess purely in virtue of

our personhood.

III. Love and Change

Delaney thinks that a romantic lover

wants to be loved for properties that she

takes to be central to her self-conception.12 He says that we usually have a fairly clear

idea of who we are and what we value, and


that we hope to find a lover who will ap?

preciate us for these aspects of ourselves.

It would not be a good sign for their rela?

tionship, says Delaney, if Alan and Ellen

were to make separate lists, Ellen's of the

properties that she takes to be central to

her self-conception and Alan's of the prop? erties for which he loves Ellen, and for

there to be little correlation between them.

In such a situation, Ellen might worry that

her lover does not truly know who she is.

To Delaney, "one of the functions our clos?

est relationships can serve is to stabilize

and reinforce our ways of thinking about

ourselves; to help us maintain our belief

that we have the properties we highly value

about ourselves."13

Imagine that the relationship between

Ellen and Alan conforms to the romantic

ideal as presented by Delaney. Let us ask

Ellen about her self-conception, and have

her say, "I have a strong will, and I am a

graceful dancer and a sensible conversa?

tionalist." Ask Alan why he loves her, and

he says, "I love her for her strong will, her

graceful dancing, and her sensible conver?

sation." Such a situation would surely reinforce Ellen's self-conception and en?

courage her to further strengthen her will

and to become an even better conversa?

tionalist and an even more graceful dancer, but it does not, I think, represent the kind of

relationship in which we would hope to find

ourselves. The missing element is change.

Many sorts of discrepancies between the

set of properties central to our self-concep? tions and the set of properties for which

we are loved will not be considered favor?

ably. If one of the attributes that I take to

be central to my self-conception is my pas? sion for political causes, then I would be

annoyed to hear my lover say that she loves

me for my cute self-righteousness. Con?

sider Ellen's reaction, though, if Alan were

to cite her quietly subversive sense of hu?

mor as a reason for his love. Ellen may

never have thought that anyone would be

attracted to her for such a reason, but she

could be imagined to find the revelation

quite exciting. It will give her a new and

thoroughly pleasant way of thinking about

herself, and will encourage her to develop that aspect to her character. In this instance,

being loved for a property peripheral to her

self-conception is preferable to being loved

purely for those of her properties that she

already takes to be important, because as

well as affirming her value as a partner it

encourages her to develop in a new, posi? tive direction.

Some attention is paid by Delaney to the

effect that changes to a person's character

may have upon his romantic relationship, and he presents the case of a football player

who retires and becomes a minister to lep? ers in India. Obviously, the grounds of the

romantic relationship in which the retired

football player is involved would have to

be significantly revised. To account for

such transformations, Delaney introduces

the notion of love which is "plastic, where

this just means that your lover's feelings towards you will be flexible and respon? sive ... to (significant) modifications to

your self-conception."14 In the ideal roman?

tic relationship, the love that is held for me

will track my evolution as a person. Fur?

ther, Delaney states, this tracking should

be reciprocal, such that no changes will

occur in my partner that would make it dif?

ficult for me to objectively appreciate the

properties she possesses.

Again, there is something missing from

Delaney's account. While we might hope that our love will be flexible to changes in

our partner, we don't want this tracking to

be purely coincidental. If I do not want to

go to live in India, and do not want to be

away from my partner for long periods, then why should I love him for his deci?

sion to become a minister? What reason is

there for me to believe that my partner will


continue to love me as my properties

change? Love is meant to be motivated by an objective appreciation of the other's

properties, and Delaney's view offers no

reason to presume that changes in the prop? erties of one lover will be such as can be

objectively loved by the other. The track?

ing seems to be happening just by chance,

and the confidence that we expect to have

in our partners' continuing love seems to

have been lost.

Romantic relationships are dynamic. The

partners to a romantic relationship will

change over time, and an ideal romantic

relationship should survive such change. Is this aspect to romantic love consistent

with the properties view? It is, once we con?

sider the role that the relationship itself will

play in the change that lovers undergo. The love of a romantic partner can be a

source of personal transformation. The way in which your partner sees you will prob?

ably not be the same as the way in which

you see yourself. He will love you for prop? erties that you did not know you had?not

properties that are central to your self-con?

ception?and this love will cause you to

imagine new possibilities for yourself and

to grow in a new direction.15 And becom?

ing a romantic partner can itself be

expected to be a transforming experience. As a partner in a romantic relationship, I

might change into someone who can com?

promise, who thinks of others before he

acts, and who is able to engage in construc?

tive argument. In addition to being romantic partners,

people are friends, workers, readers, and

internet surfers, and they are changed by all

sorts of experiences that do not arise directly from their romantic relationships. An impor? tant part of the romantic ideal, however, is

the idea that changes in a romantic lover - at

any rate, changes to the properties upon which his partner's love is built - should

come about through experiences which are

shared with his partner. If a workmate of

Ellen encourages her to attend bible study

meetings, and if this activity becomes a

source of change in Ellen's character, then

Allan can be expected, in one way or another,

to share in the activity. That might involve

Ellen convincing Alan to join her at the meet?

ings, or explaining what it means to her and

seeking out his opinion and support, or dis?

cussing how to rearrange their life together in light of their religious differences. The

point is that changes to Ellen cannot come

about in isolation from Allan's needs and

opinions. In an ideal romantic relation?

ship, all transforming experiences are

shared experiences. When romantic lovers change, they do

not change alone. They take on new val?

ues and goals through shared experiences,

through gaining self-knowledge through the eyes of the other, through learning to?

gether to maintain a romantic relationship. This is part of what we mean when we say that lovers forge a shared identity. To

choose to love someone romantically is to

see in him properties that make him some?

one who you would like to influence your life over time, someone who you would

like to have lead your life in unforeseeable

directions. The question of whether we

love someone is the same as the question that we ask in the rooms at a public swim?

ming pool: "Is this a person with whom I

would like to change?"

IV. Responses to Objections

a) Trading up To trade up is to leave your romantic

partner for someone better. Such behavior

is not thought desirable in a loved one. In?

deed, we don't just want to avoid being abandoned for someone better, we don't

want our romantic partners to even be on

the lookout. But doesn't the properties view imply that a romantic partner should


always be prepared to trade up? If Alan and

Ellen are loving happily when Alan meets

Helen, who is a better dancer than Ellen, has a stronger will than Ellen, and whose

conversation is even more sensible, then why should Alan's objective love for these prop? erties not make him fall in love with Helen?

The properties view is consistent with the

claim that ideal romantic relationships are

essentially dynamic. You can love some?

one for his properties, while expecting that

the properties for which you love him now

will not be the properties for which you will

love him in a few years' time. This allows

the proponent of the properties view to offer

two reasons why a partner to an ideal roman?

tic relationship would not seek to trade up.

First, a romantic lover would see that his

being prepared to trade up would be dam?

aging to the present relationship. Romantic

partners open themselves, and want to open

themselves, to the changes that their rela?

tionship will bring. It is exciting to throw

in your lot with someone, to agree that

whatever happens to us will probably be

for the best. And it is not psychologically

possible to in this way disarm yourself to

your beloved while at the same time look?

ing around for someone better.

Second, as romantic partners change to?

gether, they come to share a system of

values and a way of looking at the world.

The process of shared change is such that

your beloved will come to have the prop? erties that you value, and you will come to

value the properties that she has. Further, some of those properties will be proper? ties that could only be had by someone who

has shared part of your history?knowing when you are joking and when you are be?

ing serious, knowing how to treat you when

you get stroppy, understanding why you do

what you do. In an ideal romantic relation?

ship, the lovers will know that there is no

better partner to be found.

b) But doesn't everyone deserve to be

loved?

If we are loved for properties that set us

aside from others, then is that to say that

there are some people?those who do not

have the right properties?who do not de?

serve to be loved? It is surely misguided to imagine that there is some threshold

quantity of desirable properties that we

must exceed in order to become appropri? ate objects of romantic love.16

I don't think that anyone deserves to be

loved, not romantically anyway. To be

loved romantically is to be loved romanti?

cally by someone, and different properties are attractive to different people. For any

given person, there are some people who

are more appropriate objects of that

person's love than others. We all think that

there are some properties which any ro?

mantic partner of ours must have, and it

makes you feel good about yourself to

know that your properties are such that

your partner takes you to be an appropri? ate object of her love. But there are no

properties such that anyone who instanti?

ates them and is not loved romantically has

been done an injustice. The properties view

does not divide people into those who should

and shouldn't be loved. Any view that did, even if it placed everyone in the lovable

camp, would be implausible. We are only ever lovable relative to a certain lover.

c) Fetishism

Velleman thinks that if we knew that we

were being loved for our distinguishing

characteristics, then we would feel

trivialized. "Someone who loved you for

your quirks would have to be a quirk-lover, on the way to being a fetishist."17 But

someone does not become a fetishist just because she loves people for characteris?

tics that distinguish them from others. A

fetishist is someone whose love (or some

other attitude) attaches itself to things in


virtue of certain properties, where those

properties are not the sorts of properties

upon which love (or some other attitude) is appropriately based. You are a fetishist

if you enjoy all football games in which someone gets taken off on a stretcher, but

not if you enjoy all football games in which

there is a high degree of skill and competi? tiveness. You are a fetishist if you love

someone because he has an outward-poking

navel, but not if you love someone because

he is caring, honest, and fun to be around.

d) Properties are temporary, but love

should be forever Nozick points out that, ideally, "love

places a floor under your well-being; it

provides insurance in the face of fate's

blows."18 Love can initially be motivated

by properties, but "if we continue to be

loved for the characteristics then the love

seems conditional, something that might

change or disappear as the characteristics

do."19 Love should be something that we

can count on, regardless of how the world

treats us and especially when we are at our

lowest points. It is when we are most in

need of the support and reassurance of a

romantic lover that we are, from an objec? tive point of view, at our least lovable. If

love is for properties, then it sounds as

though we must be always at our best in

order to be loved, and this is not at all what

we seek in a romantic relationship. On the

surface, this objection is quite compelling. Let us consider the possibility that, due

perhaps to some physical or emotional

trauma, the properties for which we are

loved are lost. To deal with such situations,

Delaney distinguishes romantic love from

a loving commitment, which is "an endur?

ing interpersonal commitment that is both

grounded in and sustained by the lover's

romantic attachment to the beloved."20

When we are stricken by an accident, dis?

ease or old age, our lovable properties may

be lost, but we hope that our lover will still

be around to care for us. Such a commit?

ment would indeed be a type of love, says

Delaney, but it would, when called upon,

represent the end of the relationship as a

romantic one. Romantic love for proper? ties may include a voluntary commitment

to care for the beloved even if the proper? ties are lost, but a relationship in which one

person is not loved for the properties that

he presently displays falls short of the ro?

mantic ideal.

A version of the objection that is less

easily dismissed points to the possibility that our loved properties may be tempo?

rarily or permanently lost, not in a single traumatic episode, but through our normal

development as we grow and change. What

security are we offered against losing our

lovable properties? I've already offered reasons why we

should expect our partners to influence us

over time and to love us for the new prop? erties that we acquire. Perhaps, though, it

is overly optimistic to assume that all

changes that we undergo within an ideal

romantic relationship will be of no threat

to the relationship itself. Romantic lovers

might be affected in different ways by the

process of loving, or might react in differ?

ent ways to shared experiences, or might be changed by the other into something that

the other cannot love. As Ellen develops the subversive sense of humor that Alan

has brought to the surface, the empathy that

she once shared with Alan may be lost.

Outcomes like this are not of the sort that I

think would be likely in an ideal romantic

relationship, but they are made possible when a relationship is truly open-ended. In

a love that is discerning enough to affirm

your worth as a person and in which both

partners are open to change, the end of love

is unlikely, but by no means impossible.21

Princeton University


NOTES

1. The view presented in this paper is supposed to be applicable to the love of a woman or a man

for a man or a woman. In an effort to avoid any suggestion to the contrary, my use of pronouns is

neither consistent nor systematic.

2. My project is the same as that described by Neil Delaney in his "Romantic Love and Loving Commitment: Articulating a Modern Ideal," American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 33 (1996),

pp. 338-340. As will become clear, I owe much to Delaney's discussion.

3. Kate Chopin, The Awakening (London: Penguin Classics, 1986), pp. 136-137.

4. See Delaney, p. 343, for more discussion of this point.

5. Delaney, pp. 343-347.

6. Robert Nozick, "Love's Bond," in The Examined Life ( New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989),

p. 75.

7. Nozick, p. 75-77.

8. J. David Velleman, "Love as a Moral Emotion," Ethics, vol. 109 (1999), p. 365.

9. Michael Nelson has convinced me that Velleman's view may also be compatible, in theory if

not in spirit, with my properties view. It might be thought that to love someone is to respond to

her value as a self-sufficient end, but that you are justified in loving her because she possesses such properties as allow you to see through to her intrinsic value. An axe-murderer, you might think, has incomparable value as a self-sufficient end, but his contingent properties are such as to

make that value very hard to discern.

10. Nozick, p. 74.

11. Velleman, pp. 365-370.

12. Delaney, p. 343.



15. The idea that close personal relationships can be seen as sources of personal transformation is

explored by Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett in "Friendship and the Self," Ethics, vol. 108

(1998), pp. 502-527. The account of romantic love that I offer in this section shares much with

Cocking and Kennett's theory of friendship.

16. See Nozick's footnote on p. 76.

17. Velleman, p. 370.

18. Nozick, p. 71.

19. Nozick, p. 75.


21. Thanks to Stuart Brock, Harry Frankfurt, Jeanette Kennett, Michael Nelson, and David Sussman

for helpful comments.

Documents

How Do I Love Thee - Keller