Household entitlements during wartime: The experience of Sri Lanka

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    Household entitlements duringwartime: The experience of SriLankaMeghan O'Sullivan a ba Brasenose College , Oxford , OX1 4AJ , UKb International Development Centre , University of Oxford ,Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford , OX1 3LA , UKPublished online: 26 Nov 2007.

    To cite this article: Meghan O'Sullivan (1997) Household entitlements during wartime:The experience of Sri Lanka, Oxford Development Studies, 25:1, 95-121, DOI:10.1080/13600819708424124

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  • Oxford Development Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1997 95

    Household Entitlements During Wartime: TheExperience of Sri Lanka

    MEGHAN O'SULLIVAN

    ABSTRACT Conventional ways of viewing conflict as destructive and irrational have con-strained the thinking of policy makers about the possibility of constructive intervention anddevelopment strategies during wartime. This paper, in looking at the experience of Sri Lanka,considers various policy choices, as well as their costs, open to some governments during timesof strife. Evidence from Sri Lanka refutes the notion that government services cannot beeffective in wartime while simultaneously drawing attention to the role that alternative societalstructures play in alleviating human costs. This paper demonstrates that a complex network ofproviders of market, public, and civil entitlements can evolve in certain wartime contexts andidentifies how the mode of warfare employed can create or destroy such a possibility. The studyconcludes that the opportunities for constructive policy making during wartime are greaterand the responsibilities of the agents at war broaderthan is commonly thought.

    1. Introduction

    A meaningful inquiry into the interrelationships between war and economic change, ordevelopment, would explore not only the mechanisms through which war inflicts costs,but also the ways that people have altered their behaviour in order to cope with thechanging realities of war. By identifying such transformations, we will be betterequipped to formulate policies most likely to limit the costs of war and, where possible,encourage continued development even during periods of conflict.

    Like other changes in economic incentives, war does not arrest all economictransactions, but alters the environment in which they take place. Some economicprocesses viable in peace-time are no longer profitable or even possible in a war contextbecause conflict changes the parameters of the marketplace. However, for the very samereason that some opportunities are destroyed, others are created. A macro-analysis ofa country at war would demonstrate this by revealing the varied trends behind theanticipated decline in production. Given the change in incentives created by the war,

    M. L. O'Sullivan, Brasenose College, Oxford OX1 4AJ, and University of Oxford, International DevelopmentCentre, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford OX1 3LA, UK.

    I am grateful for the help and information provided by many people whom I interviewed, including: Mr K.Ponnampalam, former Jaffna Government Agent; Mr Varadakumar of the Tamil Information Centre; Ms R.Sebastian, Journalist; Mr A. Arudpragasam, former head of the LTTE Industrial Development Organization; MsM. Dharmadasa of the American Embassy as well as others from Jaffna Teaching Hospital, Eastern University,University Grants Commission, Commissioner of Essential Services Offices, various political parties and NGOs,and private individuals wishing to remain unnamed. Without the assistance of these people, it would have beenimpossible to piece together the picture presented in Section 4.

    1360-0818/97/010095-27 1997 International Development Centre, Oxford

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  • 96 M. O'Sullivan

    certain sectors may be predictably more afflicted, while others may prosper, eventhough the net outcome may be a decline in GDP. Linkages between war and economicchange can also be analysed at the household level. There, we generally associateconflict situations with increased poverty and deteriorating physical conditions. Often,the reasons behind the worsened household situation are evident. However, as we areresolved to look at war not simply as a destructive force, we recognize that conflict mustchange peoples' strategies for survival, not simply render the old ones ineffective.

    This paper will focus on the impact of war at the household leveland therefore onhuman welfareby using a modified entitlements approach. Sen first wrote of "marketentitlements", the income secured by direct production which is used to purchasecommodities (Sen, 1981). Stewart, in developing the basic needs literature, added toSen's framework by introducing the concept of "public entitlements", the services suchas education, health care and food rations normally associated with governmentresponsibility (Stewart, 1985). This sum of purchasing power made possible by privateincomes earned on the market and social benefits is referred to as "household entitle-ments", the loss of which obviously leads to human costs and suffering. This paper willmaintain this framework with the addition of the concept of "civil entitlements", theassistance provided to the population by non-governmental institutions to supplementmarket and public entitlements. Public and civil entitlements, although dealt withseparately, together comprise "non-market entitlements". War, in influencing macroand meso situations, alters the way in which people procure both market and non-market entitlements. Of course, the most tragic case would be when each person failedto secure these entitlements at all. However, as this, is rarely the case, the mostimportant questions become how do people change their economic behaviour in orderto maintain market entitlements? What structures arise to meet human needs anddeliver non-market entitlements as old structures fail?

    An investigation of war and development would be incomplete without one furtheranalytical category. Development costs are those caused by destruction of existingcapital (physical as well as social), diminishing new investment, and destruction orreduction of human resources. These costs can be shaped by the macro and mesosituations, such as when funds needed to enlarge the army provokes the termination ofa public works project. Yet, at the same time, development costs, such as the disinte-gration of trust, can likewise shape the macro and meso environments to the extent thatthey erode the basis for many economic transactions and the development of institu-tions. During wartime, with the destruction of institutions and the shortened timehorizons for building reputations and economic relationships that insecurity brings,opportunistic behaviour can become more profitable. In these conditions, a society canmove from "a trust equilibrium" to "an opportunistic equilibrium".1 Needless to say,this bodes badly for society and the economy.2

    This paper uses the framework developed above to examine the experience of SriLanka, a country long engulfed in violent conflict. Although this study incorporatesboth quantitative and qualitative information, the usual problems of the counterfactualprevail. Comparing the situation in Sri Lanka before the conflict and over the war yearshas limitations, as "non-conflict" effects from Sri Lanka's changing economic circum-stances are incorporated in the trends, making it difficult to separate out the effects ofwar. Comparing Sri Lanka to other countries in the region can illuminate how SriLanka may have fared had it not been faced with conflict, but, again, one must beconscious of the many specific elements that affect country developments. Still, bylooking at absolute changes, inter-country comparisons and changes in trends, we hopeto obtain an indication of the impact of the war on Sri Lanka.

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  • Household Entitlements During Wartime 97

    The paper will identify notable ways in which Sri Lanka's experience has departedfrom conventional expectations about countries undergoing war. These departures maybe better interpreted when certain qualifications are made about the war in Sri Lanka.Due to the distribution of economic assets and the resilience of Sri Lanka's institutionsof government, the war, while unquestionably damaging the economy in some respects,has not led to a breakdown in growth. In fact, with the exception of 1987-89 whengrowth was slow (but still positive), Sri Lanka's growth rates exceeded 4% throughoutthe entire war period. Another distinguishing feature of the Sri Lankan war is its relativegeographic concentration: the violence has been largely confined to the north-east.3

    Therefore, when assessing human welfare in Sri Lanka, it is essential to consider theregion in the war zone (the north-east) separately from that outside military activities(the south-west). This distinction is important not only because the opportunities forsecuring entitlements differ tremendously in the two areas, but also because thecollection of information used in formulating "national" human indicators has almostwithout exception excluded households from the north-east since the mid-1980s. Aftera brief look at human welfare in the peaceful regions, this paper concentrates on thehousehold situation in the area of conflict.

    2. Overview of the Sri Lankan Conflict

    Since independence, the relationship between Sri Lanka's two main ethnic groups, theSinhalese (74% of the population) and the Sri Lankan Tamils (12%), has been marredby ethnic tension, sometimes flaring up into race riots and, more recently, into civil war.Strains between the communities can be traced to legislation favouring the Sinhalese inlinguistic, economic and political^spheres. The subsequent alienation of the Tamilsfrom the state eventually led their main political representatives, the Tamil UnitedLiberation Front (TULF), to advocate a separate Tamil state in the Northern andEastern Provinces in 1976.

    Earlier educational reforms discriminating against the Tamils and a stagnatingeconomy had ensured that by the late 1970s a large number of estranged, unemployedTamil youths were available to be targeted by militant separatist groups like theLiberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), particularly as the TULF's peacefultechniques proved largely ineffective in establishing a satisfactory measure of devolutionfor Tamil areas. This disaffection, coupled with an increasingly repressive army pres-ence in Tamil areas, erupted into violence with the killing of 13 Sinhalese soldiers inJaffna in July 1983. This event triggered week-long, island-wide, anti-Tamil riotsleaving hundreds of Tamils dead and tens of thousands homeless.

    Despite sporadic negotiations, violence, which eventually brought governmentforces into full conflict with Tamil militant groups, has continued to wrack the islanduntil the present day. A peace accord between the Sri Lankan and Indian governmentsas well as many Tamil militant groups (although not the LTTE) was signed in 1987.Yet it only brought more violence to the island, both in the form of sustained fightingbetween the LTTE and an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) and an uprising led bya radical left wing Sinhalese organization, the JVP, opposing Indian involvement.

    After the IPKF departed from Sri Lanka in June 1990, something of a stalematedeveloped. The LTTE maintained exclusive control over much of the NorthernProvince, including Jaffna city, running a de facto state there. The government wasunable or unwilling to challenge this, and its response was limited to occasional shellingand an economic blockade of the Jaffna peninsula. Although the early 1990s were

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  • Table 1. Human indicators for countries at war O00Sri Lanka Afghanistan Ethiopia Mozambique Uganda

    Indicator 1975 1985 1991 1975 1985 1991 1980 1985 1990 1980 1985 1990 1980 1985 1990

    life

    expectancy" 65/68 68/72 69/74 47/45c 50/51 53/52 43 45 48 45 47 49 46 47 49

    Infantmortalityrateb 48 (1970) 34 (1980) 19 na na na 155 146 131 156 146 135 171 159 146

    Caloriesper capita 2020 2423 2286C 2010 1970 1710' 1777 1550 1658s 1797 1614 1632s 2098 2081 2013e

    Adultliteracyrate"(%) 86/69 91/82d 93/84e 19/4 30/5d 44/14* na na na 44/23 39/16 45/21h 65/40 57/29 62/35h

    Primaryschoolenrolmentratio* (%) 81/74 104/101 110/106f 41/8 27/13 32/17f 45/25 40/27 44/28 115/84 97/75 76/59 56/43 na 66/50

    r Secondary ,schoolenrolmentratio" (%) 47/49 60/66 71/77f 13/2 12/6 ll/6 f 11/6 16/11 17/12 8/3 10/4 7/4 , 7 / 3 na na

    Sources: Asian Development Bank (1994) and UNDP/World Bank (1992) African Development Indicators, Collier, P. (1995)."Male/female. ,bDeaths per 1000 live births."Refers to period centring on 1975.dRelated to years 1980-87.M990, not 1991.Related to years 1987-90.g1988, not 1990.h1989, not 1990.na, not available.

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  • Indicator 1975

    Sri Lanka

    1985

    Table 2.

    , 1990

    Human

    1975

    indicators

    Malaysia

    1985

    for Sri

    1990

    Lanka compared with other

    Philippines

    1975 1985 1990

    Asian

    1975

    countries

    India

    1985 1990 1975

    Nepal

    1985 1990

    Lifeexpectancy" 65/68 68/72 69/74e 63/66 66/70 68/73e 57/60 61/65 63/66' 50/51 57/56 60/60' 46/44 47/46 54/538

    Infantmortalityrateb 48 (1970) 34 (1980) 19 29 (1981) 25 (1987) 16 na 51 (1981) 41 92 121

    Caloriesper capita 2020 2423 2286 2540 2688 2697 2050 2182 2452 1790 2179 2243 2030 1950 2246

    Adultliteracyrate' (%) 86/69 91/82d 93/84f 69/47 80/60d 87/70f 84/81 84/83d 94/93f 48/20 55/26d 62/34f 33/5 32/9d 38/13f

    Primaryschoolenrolment ,ratio" (%) 81/74 104/101 110/106f 97/92 101/100 93/93f na 105/107 11J/110' 96/64 111/80 112/84f 86/16 111/51 108/54f

    Secondaryschoolenrolmentratio' (%) 47/49 60/66 71/77f 53/39 53/53 57/59f na 62/65 71/75f 37/18 48/26 54/32f 23/4 38/12 43/17f

    Sources: Asian Development Bank (1994) and World Bank (1992) World Development Reporf, World Bank (1991-92) Social Indicators of Development."Male/female.bDeaths per 1000 births.'Refers to period centring on 1975.dRelated to years 1980-87.'Refers to 1991, not 1990.Related to years 1987-90.defers to the period 1955-91.na, not available.

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  • 100 M. O'Sullivan

    were marred by assassinations of prominent political figures, the violence remainedmostly confined to the north-east.

    This situation was altered shortly after the People's Alliance came to power in the1994 elections on a platform calling for peace. Soon after the new government wasformed, a cease-fire was negotiated, only to be broken by the LTTE several monthsafter its commencement. Since that time, the security forces and the LTTE have foughtfiercely and the ground situation has changed dramatically in the final months of 1995and early 1996. As of May 1996, the government had regained control of most of theJafma Peninsula for the first time in many years. Meanwhile, LTTE forces hadrelocated to parts of the Northern Province in the mainland. While the significance ofthese recent military happenings is critical, this paper is concerned with the situation inthe north-east up until November 1995, that is, before the LTTE's control of Jaffnawas challenged successfully.

    3. Household Impact: Human Welfare Outside the War Region (theSouth-west)

    This section considers the impact of the war on human welfare outside the war zoneusing the "national" statistics available to gauge household well-being in the south-west. As shown in Tables 1-3, human indicators corresponding to the situation in SriLanka's south-west defy expectation by comparing favourably not only to other coun-tries at war, but also to other Asian countries as well as with the averages forlow-income, low-middle income and middle-income economies. This is true both interms of the absolute levels of the indicators as well as their trends. For example, bothin terms of health and education, Sri Lanka matched the best efforts of two Asiancountries, the Philippines and Malaysia, who began the 1970s with levels of humandevelopment similar to Sri Lanka's.4 Moreover, Sri Lanka has consistently shownimprovement from its own pre-war levels, as a look at the incidence of povertyconfirms. Table 4 reveals that not only the incidence of poverty in Sri Lanka, but also

    Table 3. Sri Lanka in comparison to various groups of economies

    IndicatorSri Lanka

    1990

    Low-middle MiddleLow-income income income

    economies economies economies1990 1990 1990

    life expectancy" 71 62 65 66

    Infant mortality >rate* 19 69 51 48

    Adult literacyrate (%)

    Female: 83 Female: 48 Female: 68 Female: 73Total: 88 Total: 60 Total: 75 Total: 78

    Primary schoolenrolment ratiob (%) 100 68C 86 89

    Secondary schoolenrolment ratiob (%) 74 38 54 55

    Source: World Development Report (various years)."Deaths per 1000 live births.b1989, not 1990.'Excluding China and India.

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  • Household Entitlements During Wartime 101

    Table 4. Poverty in Sri Lanka

    Measure 1985/86 1990/91

    Reference poverty line Rs. 471 per person per month

    Headcount index 27.33 22.36Poverty gap index 6.54 4.82Squared poverty gap index 2.31 1.62

    Reference poverty line Rs. 565.44 per person per month

    Headcount index 40.60 35.34Poverty gap index 11.09 8.80Squared poverty gap index 4.30 3.20

    Source: World Bank (1995) Sri Lanka Poverty Assessment,_p.7.The headcount index measures the incidence of poverty,the poverty gap index measures the "depth" of poverty andthe squared poverty gap index measures the 'severity' ofpoverty."Data excludes the North and East Provinces.

    the depth and severity of it, have decreased considerably from 1985/86 to 1990/91despite the pressures of the war. Understandably, one wonders how Sri Lanka was notonly able to maintain high human indicators outside the war zone, but also to improvethem,during war time. The following analysis examines how household entitlementsand therefore human welfare were maintained in the face of conflict.

    3.1 Market Entitlements

    In order for the stagnation in private consumption between 1985 and 1990 (Table 5)to be compatible with the notable declines in poverty, a significant redistribution ofwealth must have occurred during this period. Nationwide Gini coefficientsmoving to0.30 in 1990/91 from 0.32 in 1985/86do indicate such a redistribution.5 Moreover,a sectoral analysis reveals that the decline in the incidence of poverty is attributablelargely to diminishing poverty in the rural sector. A considerable rise in consumptionmet with a notable decrease in inequality to lessen rural poverty. In contrast, the urbansector experienced an absolute decline in consumption and relatively little redistribu-tion, bringing about an increase in urban poverty over the same period.

    Growth in consumption in rural areas during these years seems consist-

    Table 5. Annual growth of private consumption andGDP per capita (percentage)

    1953-651965-701970-771977-851985-901990-93

    Consumption per capita(CPI deflator)

    0.64.07.45.30.01.7

    Consumption per capita(GDP deflator)

    0.45.32.64.61.42.3

    Source: World Bank (1995) Sri Lanka Poverty Assessment, p. 5.

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  • 102 M. O'Sullivan

    ent with available information about agricultural wages and employment (World Bank,1995, p. 10). Yet reasons for improved distribution of rural consumption are morespeculative.6 Certainly one possibility is the influence of government transfers, mostnotably Janasaviya, a programme involving cash transfers to households in the hopethat they would redirect some expenditure into training or entrepreneurial activities,thereby allowing families to 'exit poverty'. Whether Janasaviya achieved its aims is amatter for debate and further study.7 However, for the purpose of explaining whydistribution of rural consumption became more equitable from 1985/86 to 1990/91,Janasaviya holds some clues. Although the programme only started in 1989, byDecember 1990 it is possible that over 11% of rural households,8 the poorest ones atthat, were receiving cash benefits of Rs. 1458 per household per month. This wouldhave had a notable impact on the distribution of consumption, leading to a lesseningof rural poverty.

    Market entitlements in the 1990-93 period are harder to analyse given the lack ofdata. Nevertheless, established growth in consumption levels was probably ac-companied by a more equitable distribution of consumption given that growth wasdriven by labour-intensive industries (World Bank, 1995, p. 11). A large percentage ofthese new employment opportunities was in garment manufacturing, a sector whichflourished partially due to liberalization measures, but also due to active governmentencouragement.9 The combination of these factors seems likely to have decreasedpoverty further during the 1990-93 period.

    3.2 Public Entitlements

    Although Sri Lanka's historical commitment to universal provision of health andeducation services must be considered when assessing the levels of current humanindicators, its continued impressive performance suggests that public entitlements wer6preserved throughout the period of social turbulence. An examination of governmentexpenditure indicates that while other countries at war have been forced to curtail theirexpenditure on health and education services, Sri Lanka maintained health and socialexpenditures during wartime in excess of pre-war levels (Table 6).10 The increasingproportion of GDP devoted to public social spending represents absolute increases inoutlays given the positive growth rate of GDP over the war years.

    How did Sri Lanka maintain these expenditure levels in the face of war? The answerlies partially in Sri Lanka's increasing GDP together with an increasing ratio of revenue

    Table 6. Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP

    Year

    198219861989199019931994"

    Health

    1.171.251.841.531.411.59

    Education

    2.952.803.032.782.813.06 >

    Socialsecurity

    and ^welfare

    3.632.943.883.734.254.53

    Defenceand

    publicorder

    0.973.423.304.74 -4.154.56

    Economicservices

    14.811.47.65.35.64.4

    Housing

    0.570.440.290.220.38

    Source: IMF (1995) Government Statistical Financial Yearbook."Provisional.

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  • Household Entitlements During Wartime 103

    to GDP which sustained revenue significantly above pre-war 1982 percentages. Still,this cannot account fully for the increase in social expenditures as defence and publicorder expenditures soared, averaging well over 4.6% of GDP between 1990 and 1993(up from 1.0% in 1982). A rising deficit forced the government to cut spending in thelate 1980s and 1990s. Yet, while the government chose to preserve increases in defenceand public order spending, it also sought to protect spending in health, education,social security and welfare. Additional resources to maintain these priorities were freedup by a decline in government expenditure on economic services. This category ofgovernment spending decreased to 5.3% in 1990 from 14.8% in 1982 and droppedeven lower in subsequent years. This reduction in economic services is responsible fora decline in capital accumulation and constitutes a significant developmental cost."

    While aggregate expenditure on health and education confirms that Sri Lankaprotected spending on public entitlements, the composition of spending in these sectorsreveals how efficiently and equitably this expenditure was distributed. In the case ofeducation, we find expenditure was increasingly concentrated in the primary andsecondary sectors over the war period;12 spending on university education as a percent-age of total educational expenditure declined steadily throughout the war period. Afurther breakdown of expenditure on university education illustrates that recurrentuniversity spending was maintained or increased while capital expenditure was severelycut (University Grants Commission, various years). So while overall education spend-ing was channelled towards maintaining the universal free primary and secondaryeducation that has generated high literacy rates and average years of schooling acrosssocio-economic levels, it was done so at a longer term cost for development.

    Of course, achievements in education have spill-over benefits for public health. Thecombination of well-educated mothers, Sri Lanka's network of easily accessible healthinstitutions and the easy dissemination of information through the media has kept thecountry's mortality rates low. Yet, recent evidence pointing to little improvement in theincidence of morbidity from preventable diseases possibly reflects a poor allocation ofresources within the health sector throughout the war period (World Bank, 1995, p.57). Instead of focusing spending on preventive health care and primary level facilities,Sri Lanka's health budget during the 1980s exhibited just the opposite trends. Whilecapital health expenditure has not been neglected, it has been overwhelmingly concen-trated in the higher level sectors. Other expenditure choices, such as cut backs ingovernment spending on housing, may also have negative implications for publichealth.

    3.3 Civil Entitlements

    The role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and informal networks in sustain-ing household entitlements is also significant despite widespread government involve-ment. It is estimated that close to 30 000 NGOs operate in Sri Lanka. Many of theseare community level groups, approximately 300 are domestic NGOs claiming multiplebranches nationwide and dozens more are branches of international institutions (WorldBank, 1995, p. 129).

    Sometimes, an NGO works with the government to complement public entitlementsas is the case with a joint government/UNICEF/WHO immunization programme.Despite the poor allocation of government expenditure within the health sector, thisprogramme has enabled the country to make impressive progress in one of the mostimportant areas of preventive health care during the period the civil conflict intensified.Most often, domestic NGOs work independent of the government to supplement

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  • 104 M. O'Sullivan

    market and public entitlements by providing functions ranging from financial servicesto maternal health care.

    Like other Asian societies, the family network is an invaluable support structure inSri Lanka. No study on private inter-household transfers in Sri Lanka has been carriedout, yet there is evidence that these transfers are substantial and widespread. In fact, itwas estimated that in the mid-1980s close to 90% of the unemployed were supportedby their families (Department of Census and Statistics, 1988). Similarly, as poorhouseholds whose heads are disabled, elderly, or widowed would be unable to surviveon government transfers alone, these households must have additional ways of boostingtheir market entitlements, most probably through the support of relatives (World Bank,1995, p. 71).

    4. Household Impact: Human Welfare inside the War Zone

    Evaluating human welfare inside the war zone is clearly a more challenging task thanassessing welfare in peaceful areas. Information is less public and harder to verify; whathuman indicators do exist are less reliable; informal mechanisms are more important instabilizing society. Despite these difficulties, it is possible to establish how peoples'private economic activities have altered and providers of non-market entitlements havechanged.

    While the region of military activity in Sri Lanka is the north-east, the situation inthe Northern Province differs significantly from that in the Eastern Province.13 Largeparts of Jaffna District had been almost exclusively under the control of the LTTE from1990 until November 1995. Because of this, beginning in 1990, the government usedits armed forces to blockade Jaffna14 from the rest of the island.15 Not only werevirtually all connections with the rest of the country severed, but there were also strictlimitations on the type of commoditiesfrom fuel to umbrellasallowed into thedistrict (Tamil Information Centre, 1993, p. 21). In contrast, the Eastern Province, formost of the war period, was not under exclusive command of either the government orLTTE forces. While some war-induced shortages were not uncommon, no officialblockade of the east existed at any time. Naturally, these varying ground situations haveinfluenced the provinces' respective economic situations and households' ability tomaintain their entitlements. For this reason, the Northern Province is examinedseparately from the Eastern Province.

    4.1 The Northern Province: Jaffna District

    Although there are some significant discrepancies among sources reporting humanindicators for Jaffna, we can often use government figures and Tamil estimates to definethe probable limits within which the reality lies. In this way, it is possible to get a senseof the infant mortality rate (IMR) in Jaffna. While Jaffna had by far the lowest rate ofSri Lanka's 24 districts in the 1970s, it began to increase slowly with the onset ofconflict in the mid-1980s and much more dramatically in the 1990s after the blockadebecame effective. The most recent estimates (1993) vary from 33.2 to 41.2 (Sivarajah,1994, p. 41). Nevertheless, if we take this worst estimate, which is almost doubleJaffna's IMR of 1974, it still compares favourably with other countries at war, and otherAsian and developing countries (Tables 1-3).

    Statistics on immunization coverage by district allow us to examine the absolutelevels and trends in vaccination rates in the Northern Province (Table 7). In 1990,immunization coverage in this area was close to national averages, yet by 1994 a

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  • Household Entitlements During Wartime 105

    Table 7. Immunization coverage of 1 year old children (percentage) by district, 1990 and1994

    District

    Colombo

    Northern ProvinceJaffnaVavuniya

    Eastern ProvinceBatticaloaAmparaTrinco.

    Sri Lanka

    BCGvaccine

    1990

    103

    8629

    502584

    84

    1994

    68

    7795

    9258

    115

    86

    Diptheriapertussis

    andtetanusvaccine

    1990 1994

    84 61

    81 6632 84

    34 8823 6459 106

    86 88

    Oralpolio

    vaccine

    1990 1994

    84

    8130

    342356

    86

    65

    6579

    8865

    106

    88

    Measlesvaccine

    1990

    72

    7826

    342056

    80

    1994

    57

    6473

    7060

    112

    84

    Pregnantwomen

    immunizedwith

    tetanustoxoidvaccine

    1990 1994

    53 49

    59 6622 62

    19 9415 4158 137

    58 79

    Source: Ministry of Finance, Planning, Ethnic Affairs and National Integration and the Unicef (1995), p. 51.Note: Jaffna includes Kilinochchi district. Vavuniya includes Mannar and Mullaitivu districts. For some districts,the immunization coverage is over 100%. This is because of the deviations of the child population from the actualvalue at district level.

    significant decline in the rates for Jaffna is notable. However, doctors and NGOworkers agree that this drop is probably a reflection of how the statistics are collected,rather than a significant decrease in coverage.16 Yet, even if we reject this interpretationand contend that the trend is downward in Jaffna, absolutely, vaccination statisticssuggest coverage is still more comprehensive in Jaffna than in Colombo.

    Undergraduate university admissions statistics are the most revealing of the humanindicators regarding education. Tamils in Jaffna have long placed an emphasis oneducation. The historical success of the Tamils in attaining university places, and thesubsequent legislation introduced to curtail their admittance, have been issues ofconflict between the Sinhalese and the Tamils for decades. Today, we can look at thesuccess of students in the north in securing university places by merit as a reflection ofthe quality of primary and secondary education in the district (Table 8).17 In the Jaffnadistrict, while 30% of all students nationwide admitted under the merit quota werefrom Jaffna in 1982 (despite the fact that Jaffna pupils only comprised 6% of thenation's total students), this number had dropped to 15% by 1991/92. Yet even withthis decline, students entering university in 1991/92 by merit were three times as likelyto be from Jaffna as mere district student ratios would, suggest. Moreover, next toColombo, Jaffna remained the district with by far the largest number of merit entrances(University Grants Commission, various years).

    Unquestionably, the situation suggested by human indicators, while certainly worsethan the high standards enjoyed in Jaffna in the 1970s and early 1980s, remains farsuperior to that found in other war zones. Although the trends of indicators in theNorthern Province seem to be downward, in many cases their absolute level, remark-ably, is comparable to indicators for the nation overall. Not to belittle the deteriorationthat has occurred or to suggest that the suffering there has not been significant,18 the

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  • 106 M. O'Sullivan

    Table 8. University entrants from Jaffna district

    Total number of universitystudents admitted from Jaffna

    1982/83

    647

    PercentageSri Lankan

    total forthat

    category1982/83

    12.7

    1988/89

    452

    PercentageSri Lankan

    total forthat

    category1988/89

    8.8

    1991/92

    963

    PercentageSri Lankan

    total forthat

    categoiy1991/92

    12.2

    Number of university studentsadmitted by merit from Jaffna 419 30.0 270 18.1 586 15.1

    Number of university studentsadmitted by district quotafromjafma 228 6.2 182 5.0 377 9.4

    Percentage of Sri Lanka's highschool students who are fromJaffna In 1982 6.0 In 1988 5.1 In 1991 5.1

    Source: University Grants Commission (various years).

    question naturally arises, "Why are these figures not worse?" Their maintenance, evenat deteriorated levels, indicates that the decline in human welfare was somehowmitigated. How was this the case in a situation of war and economic blockade?

    4.1.1 Market entitlements. Due to the war, many Jaffna residents who were formerlygainfully employed lost their primary source of income. The vast majority of Jaffna's65 000 cultivators (Tamil Information Centre, 1993, p. 5) were forced to abandon theirfields once the economic embargo took effect. Although the army did occupy someagricultural areas, the main reason for dramatic reductions in the area cultivated wasthe lack of fuel for irrigating,19 ploughing, harvesting and transporting crops. Essentialfertilizers used in the rest of the island also were not available to the Jaffna farmerbecause of the ban on chemicals. Similarly, the district's fishermen, estimated tosupport 25 000 families at one time, lost their livelihood when the implementation ofa security zone prohibited fishing. Although some continued to fish illegally, manyfishing families were forced to live in welfare centres (Manickavasagar, 1994, p. 12).

    The economic blockade, by banning or placing strict limits on the entrance ofbuilding materials, fuel, vehicles and all sorts of machinery into Jaflha, caused countlesssmall factories and workshops to shut, rendering more than 11 000 skilled workersunemployed. Not only did large state industries suffer, but local industries thatcomplemented fishing and agriculture also ground to a halt. The blockade meant thatall but the most well-connected traders were put out of business. Professionals, whoused to comprise 10% of Jaffna's population, have figured highly among those whohave left the district for abroad or other parts of Sri Lanka.

    In the face of the destruction of long-standing employment opportunities, someresidents of Jaffna maintained important sources of income while others developedentirely new ones. Surprisingly, the Sri Lankan central government remained the majoremployer and most important source of income in the Jaffiia district. The governmentpaid monthly tax-free wages20 of approximately 5200 teachers and close to 1000 peopleworking at Jaffna Teaching Hospital as well as paying pensions to over 18 000 Jafma

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  • Household Entitlements During Wartime 107

    . 0C~^SA\

    \ KILINOCHCHI ^T^ \

    7~~T MUULAITIVU

    Y'^ ^ i VAVUNIYA \) MANNAR > J^ -J

    i j \ ANURADHAPURA

    \

    V\) TRINCOMALEE

    \ \ j J V /TOLONNARUWA I A.\PUTTALAM/ V. / I _J) Sj\ / y ^ ) ( BATTICALOA

    1 / V MATALE^C ' ^O' Nv ^ ? KI I KURUNEGAUA 1 A \ V^\

    X^J-^X^r *-\ KANDY

    (VAMPAHAT^ y C

    / -< ^ / UNUWARA J

    \ K A U T A R A \ RATNAPURA

    u \ (

    } VA A- ^ / J / AMPARAI I

    ^BADULLA

    \ MONARAQALA/

    ^J HAMBANTOTA S

    Figure 1. Districts of Sri Lanka.

    pensioners (Hodson, 1995). The total amount of government wages, salaries andpensions paid to people in LTTE controlled areas in the Northern Province was saidto equal Rs. 753m in 1992 (US$15m), with 80% of this going to the Jaffna district.21

    Furthermore, Ceylon Electricity Board and Sri Lanka Telecom continued to pay theirformer employees, although for years there was neither electricity nor telecommunica-tions in Jaffna. In 1993 alone, these two organizations reportedly paid 317 people inJafma Rs. 15m (US$300 000).22

    The LTTE itself became an important source of employment, not only for armed

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  • 108 M. O'Sullivan

    combatants, but also to many others in "non-military" positions.23 Besides paymentsmade to families of LTTE, the LTTE paid salaries to its own civil service workers whostaffed courts, police stations, health posts and administration offices. SpecializedLTTE organizations, beyond providing employment themselves, opened new avenuesto earn income. The most prominent example of such an organization is the TamilEelam Economic Development Organization (TEEDO), the economic wing of theLTTE. Said to have had a budget of Rs. 250m collected from Tamil expatriates,TEEDO is reported to have employed 1500 paid workers and 6000 volunteers (5>ris-hanmugarajah, 1994, p. 10). The Industrial Development Organization, the arm ofTEEDO charged with "formulating industrial policy for Eelam", played a role indeveloping new industries and in supplying raw materials to remaining industries.24

    Through TEEDO, the LTTE encouraged the diversification of crops and the inventionof technologies to overcome supply shortages.25

    Unquestionably, remittances from abroad and transfers from other parts of SriLanka constituted an invaluable source of income for Jaffna residents. Sri Lankan banksplayed a significant role in moving these remittances although they are unwilling toprovide information on the extent of the inflows. The Tamil Information Centre inLondon estimates that there are approximately 400 000 Tamils living abroad (withclose to half of them living in India), and surmizes that the majority send some sort ofremittances back to Jaffna. While it is impossible to appraise the value of these inflows,some sources have estimated that they could reach tens of millions of US dollars eachyear.

    Several Tamil sources estimated that the majority of families in Jaffna city had someform of income from government transfers, LTTE salaries or handouts, and/or remit-tances. Even so, there were many without a direct share of one of these resources orsome other form of direct employment (such as in services). Nevertheless, while the warrendered senseless many more conventional professions, it created opportunities in theinformal economy which enabled some to make a living. The blockade created short-ages, allowing some to profit from smuggling and hawking goods. Others stayed aliveby activities such as taking commissions for waiting in queues and cashing salary checksor by charging fees for typing letters to the government demanding compensation.26

    Still more gained from the lack of fuel which forced people to rely on alternative modesof transportation.

    In assessing market entitlements, it is important not only to examine sources ofincome, but also to establish whether goods, particularly food, are available forpurchase. Trade between Jaffna and the rest of the country began to suffer in themid-1980s due to increased risks of transporting stock (Seabright, 1986), but wasvirtually halted after the imposition of the government blockade. As most internalindustrial and agricultural production was also suspended, food and other consumercommodities became scarce. However, after the government imposed the blockade, itprovided the Northern Province with shipments of food and essential items under theguidance of the Commissioner of Essential Services. The stated aim of this relief effortwas to meet people's basic needs by supplying shipments of rice, sugar, milk powder,kerosene and some agricultural inputs to multipurpose co-operatives (MPCs) in thenorth. Displaced people were supplied with coupons which allowed them to secure freerations at the MPCs while the rest of the population was allowed to purchase the itemsat a price equivalent to the Colombo price plus shipping costs. The governmentclaimed to supply around 65% of the food requirement for Jaffna through thesechannels. In 1993, the government maintained that in Jaffna alone it supplied over Rs.700m ($15m) in essential items. In addition to direct government supplies, the

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  • Household Entitlements During Wartime 109

    Commissioner of Essential Services authorized boats to carry shipments of privatetraders to Jaffna. The food and other goods supplied by these traders in 1993 werevalued at over Rs. 800m (US$17m).27

    There are three important things to note about this transfer of commodities fromthe government and sanctioned private traders to LTTE areas. First, the scarcity ofessential goods in the north caused primarily by the economic blockade opened upopportunities for enormous profit to anyone engaged in trading with the north.Allegations of corruption involving government officials and army officers overseeingthe shipment of these goods were rampant, although difficult to confirm. Secondly,these government shipments greatly benefited the LTTE. The LTTE was said tocommand one-third of every private shipment landing in Jaffna, although it is unclearwhether the Tigers were paying a nominal price for the goods or considering theirappropriation a tax. Also, the MPCs in Jaffna, although not under direct LTTEcontrol, were heavily influenced by the organization. The LTTE was able to direct thedisbursement of food as well as to buy food directly from the MPCs to use for theircadres or for resale later. Lastly, delays in the shipments were inevitable. The TamilInformation Centre, given information by the Jaffna Citizens Committee, claimed thatmuch of the food sent by the government did not reach the north, particularly in timesof major conflict between the LTTE and the army.

    In addition to government efforts, the LTTE played an important role in maintain-ing the availability of commodities in Jaffna through its smuggling networks. It is saidthat any item banned by the blockade could be secured through the LTTE, althoughoften at an exorbitant price. An estimated two-thirds of the supply of rice to the Jaffnapeninsula came from the other districts in the north and was controlled by the LTTE.Other items were smuggled in from the rest of the country at night. Moreover, suppliesfrom South India reportedly continued to play a large role in providing LTTE areaswith food, fuel and even medicine. The extent of the LTTE's involvement in con-trolling supplies could be seen in 1995 when difficulties between the LTTE, the centralgovernment and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) prevented theshipment of food to the north for several months. Despite the absence of governmentsupplies, the price of rice remained close to Rs. 30 per kilo (compared to Rs. 17 inColombo) (Hodson, 1995, p. 5). The LTTE was also heavily involved in distributingsupplies. In doing so, it influenced the distribution of wealth by engaging in discretion-ary pricing of food. Better off families often paid steep prices for food, while the poor,and families of LTTE cadre would receive food at no cost.

    4.1.2 Public entitlements. Government educational institutions in the north came underserious stress, particularly due to lack of facilities. The Tamil Information Centreestimates that as many as 79 of the original 561 primary and secondary schools in Jaffnadistrict were damaged by the fighting and another 100 were occupied by the army atsome point in the last decade (Tamil Information Centre, 1993, p. 11). Shortages ofschool supplies and the lack of electricity decreased student productivity. The Univer-sity of Jaffna suffered even more severe problems with facilities; blockade restrictions oncomputers, chemicals, electrical equipment, printing paper and the like hamperedteaching as well as brought research efforts to a halt. Given this situation, it was difficultfor the university to retain academic staff, adding to the cycle of under-utilization.

    Certainly, educational standards suffered under such strains, a grievous occurrencefor a people like the Tamils who greatly value education. Yet, it is remarkable that thesegovernment institutions continued to function at all in an area almost entirely under the

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  • 110 M. O'Sullivan^

    ^domination of a group against whom the government was waging a long, bloody war.As of August 1995, 186 000 primary and secondary students were enrolled in 485government schools in Jaffiia (Hodson, 1995, p. 6). Moreover, the government annu-ally made provisions for Jaffiia school students to take the Sri Lankan equivalent of theA-level exams.28 While the physical facilities of schools were poor, a higher percentageof teachers in Jaffiia had either teacher training or university qualifications than in anyother district in Sri Lanka outside the Western Province (Colombo area). At the tertiarylevel, the government continued to fund the University of Jaffna and its 2500 students(although expenditure was primarily recurrent) despite increasing influence of theLTTE on the institution (University Grants Commission, various years). Officials fromthe University Grants Commission in Colombo asserted that the standards of universityeducation were maintained by relying on external examiners, although privately somenorth-eastern academics admitted that this process was open to political manipulation.

    The strains on public health and government health institutions resulting from thewar were even more severe than in the education sector. The impact of the economicblockade on public health can be seen directly in some instances. The mortality raterose due to the increasing incidence of malaria (a reflection of bans on mosquito killingsprays) and the lack of antibiotics and rabies vaccines. Shortages of psychiatric drugs,anaesthetics, pain killers, oxygen, medical equipment and generators were acute. Staffvacancies at Jaffiia Teaching Hospital were estimated in 1995 to be close to 40% andconcentrated in the more skilled levels; whereas in the mid-1980s there were six t-surgeons, in 1995 there was only one. These constraints, coupled with significantwar-related increases in health care needsboth physical and psychiatricobstructedhealth practitioners from effectively treating those requiring medical attention.29

    Still, the continuation of government health services in Tiger-held territory wasimpressive. The main health facility in the Northern Province, the Jaffna TeachingHospital, functioned almost continuously with the support of government funds,although at a very basic level. While the condition of health institutions in Jaffna wasunsatisfactory by any standard and government expenditure on medical supplies forJaffna Hospital was significantly below that of other government teaching hospitalsnationwide, the continued application of some government resources enabled adedicated staff to maintain at least a basic structure of health services.

    4.1.3 Civil entitlements. Certainly, the government was surprisingly involved in main-taining both the market and public entitlements of those living in LTTE controlledJaffiia beyond what we would expect to find in a war situation. Nevertheless, continuedgovernment involvement cannot explain fully the sustenance of household entitlementsrelative to other war zones. The importance of civil institutions in Jaffna soared after theonset of the conflict. While the role of the family was considered earlier, this section willconcentrate on three types of NGOs that became essential in bolstering householdentitlements in Jaffna.

    The international NGOs working in Jaffna played several critical roles in easing thehardships associated with war. Perhaps most importantly, they facilitated relief efforts.Generally, this meant administrating and supplying welfare centres where many of thedisplaced live.30 Yet the ICRC claimed a much broader role, going beyond their usualactivities to escort essential supplies to Jaffiia and maintain a protection zone aroundJaffna Teaching Hospital. Additionally, international NGOs complemented thegovernment services, particularly in the healdi sphere. Medecins Sans Frontiers ran a

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  • Household Entitlements During Wartime 111

    small hospital in Point Pedro staffed with international surgeons while other NGOsfacilitated the delivery of emergency medical supplies to remote areas. Lastly, inter-national NGOs took the initiative in areas where the government lacked either theresources or the ability to implement basic needs programmes. For instance, Savethe Children ran schemes to train midwives and health workers while UNICEFconcentrated its efforts on improving sanitation supplies and providing schoolequipment.

    The second type of NGOs heavily involved in Jaffna were local organizationsgroups organized by citizens of Jaffna with no affiliation with international NGOs, thegovernment, or the LTTE, although often reliant on expatriate or foreign funds. Theirfocus was understandably much narrower, yet together, their activities spanned manyareas to provide specific services to the disadvantaged of Jaffna. For instance, manygroups, such as The Mental Health Society, worked with those suffering psychologicaltrauma. Others helped people to augment their market entitlements through trainingfor income generation projects. Organizations like The Centre for Women and Devel-opment sought to bolster public entitlements by complementing basic health careservices with education programmes for women. Some organizations' activities weremore research oriented, developing general educational projects and researching theeffects of war.

    LTTE-run organizations were the last type of non-governmental groups influentialin promoting household entitlements in the north. Just as the LTTE played asignificant role in maintaining people's market entitlements, it was heavily involved inrelief, rehabilitation and development. Most of this work was done through the TamilRehabilitation Organization (TRO). Statements of expenditure of TRO reveal anannual budget over Rs. 50m (US$lm), about 30% of which was said to come fromTamils living abroad. One-third of these resources was channelled towards displacedpeople and an additional third was devoted to families who had lost their breadwinnerin the war. The remaining 33% was allotted to projects in one of seven areas:education, health and nutrition, housing, agriculture, income generation, rehabilitationand general community development (Information Bulletin, Tamil Rehabilitation Orga-nization, June 1994). Specific programmes included LTTE feeding centres whichdistributed milk and nutritional supplements to over 2000 pregnant women and smallchildren, a Self-Employment Fund which granted loans for productive purposes toclose to 5000 families in its first year, and the Child Rehabilitation Programme whichoversaw initiatives including orphanages, foster parent schemes, and the running of 74pre-schools district wide (Future Quarterly Newsletter, Tamil Rehabilitation Organiza-tion, undated). The LTTE even tried to address doctor shortages in the districtthrough the creation of its own medical school.31

    While LTTE programmes helped at least a segment of the Jaffna populationaugment household entitlements, few people disagree that the LTTE's biggest contri-bution to the normalization of living in a war zone was its ability to make Jaffna a"crime-free society". While government institutions that previously used to enforce law,contracts and disputes no longer operated in Jaffna while it was under LTTE control,the LTTE provided a new set of its own institutionsa fully functioning judicial andpolice system independent of the LTTE combat forcesto do the same jobs. Althoughit seems certain this order was built on a foundation of fear, opportunistic behaviourreflective of a breakdown in social capital which might be expected in many countriesat war certainly would not have been tolerated in Jaffna. In this environment, mosttypes of civil institutions were able to flourish,32 providing an important supportnetwork for the destitute and suffering.

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  • 112 M. O'Sullivan

    4.2 The Eastern Province

    Tamil politicians have long claimed the Eastern Province as part of the Tamil Home-land; the LTTE has consistently regarded the Eastern Province as an inalienable partof Tamil Eelam. This is despite the fact that the area, in contrast to Jaffna,33 isethnically mixed, being home to substantial communities from Sri Lanka's Tamil,Muslim and Sinhalese populations.34 This demographic situation, and the 1987 agree-ment with India that promised a referendum in the Eastern Province to determinewhether the area should be joined with the north, opened the way for extremely divisivepatterns of warfare in the east. The actions of both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan forcesintentionally pitted the communities living there against one another. The LTTE isgenerally held responsible for the massacre of hundreds of Muslims in 1990 and1992an attempt to drive the Muslim population out of the east. For its part, thegovernment contributed to violence between communities both in its provision of armsto small groups (called "homeguards") of Muslims and Sinhalese and in its use ofMuslims in identifying Tamils associated with the LTTE. Largely as a result of thesetactics, violence in the east wa not limited to fighting between the security forces andthe LTTE, but also involved sporadic clashes between the Tamil and Muslim popula-tions. While the problems suffered by the people of trie north were largely due to theeconomic blockade, people in the east endured repeated massacres, round ups, disap-pearances and identifications. Perhaps because of the divergent allegiances of thepeople in the Eastern Province, the area has not entirely been under the control ofthe LTTE or the Sri Lankan forces. While the security forces have for the mostpart controlled the urban areas, many rural areas have swung between LTTE andgovernment control for years.35

    Reliable human indicators for the east are even more scarce than for the north.Available indicators on maternal mortality, immunization rates and educational per-formance in the east suggest that the east has remained at a level of development lowerthan most areas of Sri Lanka, including the north, as had been the case before the war.Yet, in contrast to the north, it appears that in many cases the indicators haveimproved. Nevertheless, it should be noted that what statistics do exist are believed tomask severe discrepancies between urban and rural areas. Many NGO workers anddoctors believe that remote rural areas which repeatedly passed from LTTE to govern-ment control and back again suffered the most. Some even maintain that the eastactually fared worse than the north (Ratneswaran, 1995). Despite our inability to assesshuman welfare in the east definitively, it is possible to address some interestingquestions. To what extent was the struggle to maintain household entitlements in theeast similar to what happened in the north? What sorts of new economic patterns andcivil institutions evolved in response to changed realities?

    4.2.1 Market entitlements. The pre-conflict economy of the Eastern Province wasdominated much more by agriculture than that of Jaffna. Although no recent statisticsexist, it is estimated that the vast majority of those employed worked in agriculture; thefishing sector was the next largest employer. Small traders catered to local needs but thelarge retailers and exporters of the south-west were generally absent from easterntowns.

    Like Jaffna, agricultural production in the east was disrupted as is suggested bydramatic drops in paddy production and the virtual elimination of paddy purchased bythe government (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, various years). Yet, while agriculture inJaffna was disrupted primarily due to a lack of fuel, in the east, the problem was one

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  • Household Entitlements During Wartime 113

    of insecurity and fear of cultivation. Most paddy fields in the province lie in the lesspopulated rural areas where the LTTE was most active. Moreover, many Muslimpaddy lands lie in Tamil areas and vice versa. Throughout the late 1980s and early1990s, people from all communities in the eastern province were frequently killed orabducted while tending to their fields (Daily News (Colombo), 10 April 1985, 7 January1988, 1 August 1990, 11 September 1992). At times, Muslim farmers who wereallowed to cultivate were reportedly forced to pay the LTTE for this right (Daily News(Colombo), 11 September 1992, 14 March 1993). Muslims often sought governmentsecurity forces to safeguard them as they worked in the fields while Tamils requestedthe protection of the LTTE to do the same. Reportedly, paddy lands were appropri-ated, livestock killed and harvests destroyed by both security forces and the LTTE. Asa result of these difficulties, some estimate as much as half of the paddy land in the eastremained uncultivated during the worst years in the past decade (Sunday Island(Colombo), 8 November 1992). Barriers to agricultural production were not foundexclusively at the paddy field itself. In one district, the army required licenses to proveownership of fields before they were harvested (Sunday Island (Colombo), 8 November1992). Moreover, both the army and the LTTE often demanded portions of theharvest, with government soldiers frequently extracting a share at checkpoints (Srishan-mugarajah, 1994, pp. 8-9). With all these impediments to securing their livelihood,farmers were often forced to enter welfare centres in order to survive.

    Trade in Jaffna was disrupted largely because of the government-imposed blockadewhich isolated the peninsula. In contrast, disruption of trade in the east reflected theinsecure situation of the area. Numerous army check pointsas many as 14 in a 50mile stretch requiring passengers to dismount and display their packagescomplicatedefforts to bring goods to markets not only in terms of time, but also in the bribes thatwere often necessary to obtain army clearance. Hostility between communities alsoconstrained travel. Until mid-1993, Muslims reportedly could only travel 3 days a weekwith security escorts to the towns (Srishanmugarajah, 1994). Tamils could not travelthrough Muslim villages or in Muslim vehicles and vice versa, creating a real impedi-ment to free movement as Muslim and Tamil villages often border one another in theeast. Economic activity was further dampened after massacres of Muslims forced manyof the traditional money lenders, who often were Muslims, to flee their homes (SundayIsland (Colombo), 8 November 1992). Nevertheless, while the net effect of the conflicton trade was undoubtedly negative, there is evidence of some new patterns of trade. AsMuslims and Tamils avoided travelling to areas where the other community wasdominant, Muslim traders brought goods to the edges of Muslim areas and Tamils setup service shops on the borders of Tamil villages, as if in recognition that the twocommunities were economically interdependent.

    In the midst of this breakdown of much income earning activity, the governmentcontinued to pay the salaries of almost 14 000 teachers and medical workers and thepensions of over 10 000 pensioners, a transfer which equalled Rs. 565m in 1992.36 Thefertility of eastern land, in contrast to the aridity of the north, meant that the potentialfor serious food shortages was much less than in the north. Nevertheless, the govern-ment provided substantial amounts of food relief to the large displaced population fromthe east.37

    4.2.2 Public entitlements. The government worked to maintain the educational institu-tions in the east, funding 830 schools there and one university, the Eastern Universityin Batticaloa (Ministry of Education and Higher Education, 1993, p. 6). Yet in contrast

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  • 114 M. O'Sullivan

    to Jaffna where the lack of facilities was one of the major factors impeding education,the schools and university in the Eastern Province suffered more from numerousdisruptions reflecting the on-going violence between the government, the LTTE andvarious communities in the east. Massacres and round-ups often led to populationshifts as people fled out of fear or desperation. Although much of this displacement wastemporary, it was often on a large scale, requiring many school buildings to house thedislocated. For instance, the Eastern University was closed for the last 6 months of1990 as refugees sought protection there. Schools located in rural areas, where almosttwo-thirds of the children in the east study, often suffered high absentee rates of bothstudents and teachers who were frequently afraid to attend school. One reason for thiswas that the LTTE was known forcibly to recruit from schools; similarly security forcesat times searched schools and took students into custody.

    Almost as a reflection of the society it was supposed to serve, the university in theeast became ethnically polarized. After 1985/86, no Sinhalese students were allocatedplaces at the Eastern University, and from 1990/91 until 1995, Muslim students weretransferred to other universities, leading many of them to fail their degrees.38 In1982, Eastern University (then Batticaloa College) was 17% Sinhala, 60% Tamil and23% Muslim. In 1991/92, it was 97% Tamil (University Grants Commission, variousyears). To make tensions worse, the poor school education in the east meant that theEastern University was incapable of filling its "merit places" with easterners,39 so it hadto accept northern students who could not be accommodated at the University ofJaffna.

    While some of the inadequacy of eastern education was in part an effect of wardisturbances, it also remains a reflection of educational institutions historically lessdeveloped than the rest of the island. According to the 1981 census, literacy rates in theeastern districts were the lowest in the nation, falling considerably below all northerndistricts. Moreover, the east had many fewer schools equipped to teach A-level classes(particularly in the sciences) than other regions and had the highest percentage ofuntrained teachers in the island. Clearly, the war exacerbated a situation already inneed of improvement; schools will not be upgraded and more qualified teachers will notbe attracted to the east while the war persists.

    The government also maintained health institutions in the east during the conflict,but like the schools and university, their effectiveness was compromised by the natureof the war in the east as well as their initially low levels of development. Personnel andfacilities remained limited as they had been for decades. The east ranks among thelowest in the country in terms of beds and doctors per 1000 people and the percentageof specialist positions filled (Natchinarkinian, 1994, pp. 15-18). However, the relativeavailability of medicines and equipment in the east meant that both doctors andfacilities there were more productively utilized than in the north.

    As we have seen, tensions impeded travel, making it difficult for many to reachhealth facilities, particularly in times of crises. Others avoided health facilities becauseof their close proximity to army camps. The Department of Community Medicine atthe University of Jaffna estimates almost half of Batticaloa's health facilities, and aquarter of those in Trincomalee and Amparai, were not in use for this reason (Natchi-narkinian, 1994, p. 24). While the Jaffna Teaching Hospital treated any unarmedpersongovernment soldier or Tigerin need of medical care, eastern health institu-tions were not always bastions of impartiality. Stories about the army or the LTTEtaking prisoners from hospitals were widespread and it was not uncommon to hearnarratives about a Tamil or Muslim being refused medical assistance from apractitioner of the other community during the worst periods of violence.

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  • Household Entitlements During Wartime 115

    4.2.3 Civil entitlements. The number of NGOs and the assistance they collectivelyprovide is far less significant in the east than in the north. The situation in the EasternProvince varies from district to district with Batticaloa having relatively more NGOsfunctioning than Trincomalee or Amparai.40 Those operating concentrate primarily onrelief work targeting the displaced populations; very few are involved in developmentand rehabilitation work despite the clear need to supplement government health andeducation facilities and to develop income earning skills of the population.

    While some international NGOs function in the east, their involvement is lesscomprehensive than in the north. A number of national organizations also work in theeast, many of them with communal affiliations. Local organizations have also croppedup, although not anywhere on the scale of north, yet they remain poorly funded andorganized in many cases. Lastly, the LTTE organizations, which played a substantialrole in padding household entitlements in the north, have been unable to function inthe east due to the dominance of the security forces and the volatility of the groundsituation there.

    Several factors help explain the absence of a major rejuvenation of institutions ofcivil society and alternative structures in the east which is so noticeable when comparedto the situation in Jaffna. First, it must be noted that the east was historically the leastdeveloped region of the country (outside the plantation area). The east's low literacyrates and standards of education, and its highly patron-client based political culture,contrasts greatly with the highly developed civil society of the north pre-dating the war.While this environment would not necessarily be expected to breed large numbers ofcivil institutions, it also did not produce many easterners qualified to obtain jobsabroad. Consequently, the majority of those emigrating out of Sri Lanka have theirroots in the north with few originating from the east. Given the ties of the expatriateTamil community, it is not surprising that international concern and internationalNGO activity focused on the north, not the east. Furthermore, the lack of easternersabroad inhibited the development of expatriate networks to fund local easternorganizations or to pressure international organizations into doing so.

    Perhaps the greatest impediment to the growth of NGOs in the east was the way thewar was fought there. By pitting citizens of the east against one another, and byinvolving frequent battles between the security forces and the LTTE in many areas, thewar bred deep distrust, fear and suspicion among different segments of the communi-ties. In short, there was a breakdown in social capital. The sort of organizations thisclimate gave rise to were not institutions of civil society dedicated to helping peoplecope with the hardships of poverty and war. Rather, it encouraged militant organiza-tions, gangs, and "homeguards" which are only accountable to their leader, or at best,their village or community. Moreover, the frequent fluctuations of many rural areasbetween army and LTTE control not only hampered the growth of these institutions,but, where they did develop, constrained their ability to function properly.

    5. Conclusion

    Sri Lanka has done a commendable job in improving household entitlements (and byimplication, human welfare) outside the war area and in limiting damage to entitle-ments within the region of military activities. Mindful of the specific circumstancessurrounding every country at war, can we come to any broad conclusions from SriLanka's experience?

    Clearly, the actions of the government played a significant role in maintaininghousehold entitlements, to different degrees, both outside and inside the war zone. In

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  • 116 M. O 'Sullivan

    the region outside military activities, the government influenced market entitlementsthrough its promotion of manufacturing as well as government cash transfers throughprogrammes like Janasaviya.41 Public entitlements were maintained by devoting steadyproportions of government expenditure to education and health. In the wartornnorth-east, the government tactics at first glance seem contradictory. By blockading thenorth, the government obviously increased the human costs of the war. Yet, theextensive relief programme of the governmentaimed at propping up market entitle-ments and maintaining basic public oneswas clearly an effort to control these humancosts, even at the expense of aiding the LTTE indirectly. These seemingly conflictingobjectives are understandable when we consider the political implications behindgovernment expenditure. By buttressing household entitlements of Jaffna citizens, thecentral government was underlining their status as citizens of Sri Lanka, not TamilEelam. If the government were to let the Tamil people in Jaffna waste away behind the

    ^blockade it imposed, not only would international pressure be great, but the claims ofthe government to be at war with the LTTE, not the Tamil people, would lackcredibility.

    Of course, government involvement at this level both in the south-west and thenorth-east necessitated large, and increasing, social expenditures in the face of simul-taneously rising defence expenditures. Even bearing in mind Sri Lanka's continuedpositive growth, so unusual for a country at war, we can draw two sets of policyimplications relevant even for countries with significantly differing macro situations.

    First, the experience of Sri Lanka demonstrates that liberalization and adjustmentprogrammes are not necessarily incompatible with war. Nevertheless, it is equally clearthat such programmes, if intended for countries at war, must embody a different set ofobjectives than the conventional sort. There should be more of a focus on liberalizationand deregulation measures, and much less of an emphasis on decreasing governmentabsorption, because plainly, the preservation of social spending is especially needed inwartime.42 The market should not be allowed exclusively to determine the allocation ofresources, but there may be a role for the government to encourage the placement ofresources in labour intensive industries that will provide broad based growth and boostmarket entitlements for the poor.43

    Secondly, in maintaining social expenditures, Sri Lanka did incur longer termdevelopment costs through decreased capital accumulation. This willingness to sacrificecapital expenditure was exhibited not only in the government's choices to allocatespending among sectors, but also within sectors. This decline in capital accumulationwill continue to hamper the growth of the economy even after the conflict there hasbeen resolved. Wherever possible, spending on development should be maintainedthroughout the war years, although its form should be altered to reflect the realities ofthe war.

    Nevertheless, given that the government was forced to cut back on capital formation(and incur development costs) in order to fund social spending (and prevent furtherhuman costs), we should ask whether this was a good tradeoff. While the government'schoice is not surprising in light of Sri Lanka's history as a welfare state, it is also apolitically astute decision. Loss of household entitlements is felt immediately and canencourage dissatisfaction with the government and prolong instability. Furthermore, aslong-term growth is reliant on a healthy and well-educated workforce as much as it ison capital formation,44 cutbacks in social expenditurea form of capital expenditure inhuman resourceswould have also resulted in development costs in the long term (inaddition to human costs).

    The conflict has not only affected how people secure entitlements, but the type of

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  • Household Entitlements During Wartime 117

    warfare adopted was equally influential in the maintenance of entitlements. In thenorth, the costs of the war were more an effect of the blockade than a reflection of acomplete reversion to a situation where social capital has broken down, makingopportunistic behaviour profitable. This reversion to an "opportunistic equilibrium" inthe north was prevented, in part, by the development of non-government institutionsand alternative structures which came to serve the purposes that weakened or destroyedgovernment institutions were no longer able to fulfil.

    In contrast, the type of warfare employed in the east, involving massacres, disap-pearances and identifications, seriously affected entitlements by breaking down theintangible element necessary for economic relations and the fair provision of publicservicestrust. This destruction of trust and the widespread suspicion and hostilityaccompanying it both reflected the dearth of civil institutions in the east and preventedtheir further evolution. So, on the one hand, the mode of warfare affects the costs ofwar by affecting the development or regeneration of institutions of civil society whichcan help supplement non-market entitlements. On the other hand, the mode of warfarealso has implications for the costs of war if it causes economic dislocation by movingthe society from a "trust equilibrium" to an "opportunistic equilibrium"a situation inwhich it is much harder to maintain entitlements. Such a movement has importantimplications for peace because a society whose foundations of trust are shattered hasthe most difficulty in restoring economic production, even after hostilities have sub-sided.

    Ultimately, the experience of Sri Lanka has important implications for othercountries at war, as well as for those in the international community who seek to aidthem. As the above conclusions reveal, the government maintains an important re-sponsibility in supporting household entitlements, even in the face of difficult policychoices. Furthermore, government responsibility goes beyond fiscal matters and ex-tends to the means by which the war is conducted. Perhaps while the internationalcommunity pressures countries at war to structure their expenditure in such a way asto limit human and developmental costs where possible, it can also influence govern-ments to employ modes of warfare that are less destructive of the trust which ties asociety together, both economically and socially.45

    Sadly, these conclusions suggest that Sri Lanka, in light of the most recent (mid-1996) developments, is headed towards the most costly stage of its war. The LTTEeviction from Jaffna and the subsequent huge influxes of refugees has renderedineffective the well-developed network provided by both the government and alterna-tive structures to buttress entitlements in the north. Reportedly, intense fighting andpolitical manceuvering on both sides has in some cases halted efforts to supply even themost basic relief to the hundreds of thousands of displaced people. Furthermore, theshift in LTTE activity to the east promises much more of the divisive type of warfarewe have observed to be the most damaging. Lastly, recent announcements by thepresident that the exploding costs of the war46 will necessitate sharp cuts in Sri Lanka'ssocial spending indicate that human welfare outside the war area may soon also beharshly affected by the war.

    Notes

    1. Collier (1995), in seeing institutions as essential in lowering transaction costs, also links abreakdown in social capital to the economic costs of war.

    2. Stewart (1995) finds that organizations which function on what she terms a "trust/reciprocitymode" of operation instead of a "market" or "hierarchical" mode are the ones achieving thegreatest successes.

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  • 118 M. O'Sullivan

    3. The exception to this is the years 1987-89 when the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)insurgency terrorized the south. For the most part, this paper will be limited to assessing theimpact of the conflict between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

    4. These statements must be qualified by noting that Sri Lanka actually experienced anabsolute decline in the average calories per capita between 1985 and 1990. This is a resultof a cutback in the policy of food subsidies instituted in the late 1970s as part of the initialadjustment programme. Instead of direct rice rations, the government distributed coupons tohouseholds that were judged to be most in need. The value of these coupons remainednominally constant in the face of high inflation throughout the 1980s, explaining, at least insome part, the decline in average calories consumed (Edirisinghe, 1987).

    5. Incidentally, these Gini coefficients are on par with other South Asian countries and, on thewhole, compare favourably with other developing countries.

    6. The World Bank suggests that the new patterns of distribution may have to do with thebreakdown of private transfers or with a changing propensity to save (World Bank, 1995,p. 10).

    7. Mr Susil Sirivardana, the former commissioner of the Janasaviya programme, points out thewide coverage of the scheme, the creation of private assets and personal savings, andcommunities' sense of self-sufficiency when speaking of the successes of Janasaviya (S.Sirivardana, interview by author, Sri Lanka, November 1995). On the other hand, the WorldBank is less confident of the results of the programme (World Bank, 1995, pp. 71-73).

    8. By the end of 1990, Janasaviya was disbursing cash grants to over 230 000 of the pooresthouseholds (or 8% of the total) in the south-west. As poverty in Sri Lankan is largely a ruralphenomenon, we can assume these household were disproportionately rural.

    9. The most important form of government encouragement was the 200 Garment FactoryProgramme, a scheme which increased employment in the garment sector by nearly 50% inits first year (1992-93) (Kelegama, 1994, p. 11).

    10. It should be noted that expenditure on public entitlements, particularly in welfare spending(reflective of spending on food rations), suffered significant reductions with the initiation ofthe liberalization and adjustment programmes in the late 1970s; so while governmentexpenditure in many areas rose from pre-war (1982) levels, in many cases they still reflect acutback from levels in the mid-1970s.

    11. Estimation of the development cost brought about by the decline in government expenditureon economic services has been estimated to be close to Rs. 16b (1985 values) (O'Sullivan,1994).

    12. The World Bank argues for even greater efficiency in educational expenditure in Sri Lanka,criticizing the allocation of funds for university educationalthough decreasing as a percent-age of expenditure on total educationfor rising too quickly (given that overall educationexpenditure is rising) (World Bank, 1995, pp. 52-53).

    13. Districts, shown in Figure 1 on p. 107, in the Northern Province include: Jaffna District,Vavuniya, Kilinochchi and Mannar. Districts in the Eastern Province include: Ampara,Trincomalee and Batticaloa. The two provinces were joined under the treaty with India in1990.

    14. From here on "Jaffna" will refer to Jaffna District except where qualified.15. While the embargo was officially imposed in August 1991, Tamil sources claim it was

    effectively imposed in 1990.16. As the rates are based on the number of births in the district, a declining rate in Jaffna could

    reflect the reality that more people in the surrounding areas of the north are coming to Jaffnato deliver their children. This is likely as health facilities in Jafiha have been maintained incomparison with many facilities in other parts of the Northern Province. This interpretationwould be consistent with the dramatic increases in immunization coverage in the rest of thenorth (Vavuniya) as well as serving to explain decline in the percentage of those vaccinatedin Colombo.

    17. The Sri Lankan system of university admissions involves three components: a district quotawhich is linked to the district's population as a per cent of national population, a merit quotawhich absorbs the students exhibiting the best performance regardless of their district oforigin and a disadvantaged quota which makes special provisions for students coming fromdistricts that are regarded as having inferior educational facilities. Given these three cate-gories of admission, the merit entrances are the best reflection of the performance of thestudents and, therefore, of the quality of their schools.

    18. The Medical Institute of Tamils (1994) estimates that in Jaffna alone close to 8000 civilians

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  • Household Entitlements During Wartime 119

    were killed and 2600 maimed for life. This human misery is compounded by large numbersof semi-permanent refugees: in Jaffna there were recently estimated to be over 250 000displaced people living with friends and family or in "welfare centres". In the north-eastaltogether, this number more than doubles.

    19. Very little land in Jaffna is cultivable without some sort of man-made irrigation system. Mostwater pumps in Jaffna were electrically operated.

    20. Ironically, while the government did not tax the wages it disbursed in Jaffna, the LTTE didtax these people.

    21. Estimates made from reports from the Education Ministry, Pensions Department, Ministryof Health, Government of Sri Lanka Budget Estimates.

    22. Ceylon Electricity Board, Sri Lanka Telecom.23. One of the main source of funds used by the LTTE to pay employees and run programmes

    is contributions from abroad. Foreign Minister Laksham Kadirgamar said that he had beentold as much as US$3-4m was being raised by the LTTE in Canada a month and 250 000a month in Britain (Reuters News Service, courtesy of SLNet, 14 June 1996). The LTTEalso relied heavily on taxes of all kindsdowry taxes, sales taxes, transportation taxes. TheUnited States State Department Annual Report on Patterns of Global Terrorism (1995) reportedindications that some Tamil communities have been involved in narcotics smuggling,possibly adding to LTTE coffers.

    24. These industries include sweets and soft drinks manufacturing, natural curation of leather,and salt pans (A. Arudpragasam, former head of the LTTE Industrial Development Organi-zation, interview by author, Sri Lanka, October 1995). Interestingly, Mr Arudpragasamreported constant battles with the military wing of LTTE over resources.

    25. Some of these inventions include radios which can be operated by sewing machine andvehicles which run on kerosene and vegetable oil.

    26. Reuters, courtesy of SLNet, June 1996.27. Commissioner of Essential Services.28. Although the government does make these arrangements, the Tamil Information Centre

    complains that exams are often disrupted (Tamil Information Centre, 1993, p. 11).29. Despite an increase in the number of operations performed in Jaffna Teaching Hospital by

    40% between 1982 and 1993, the number of oxygen cylinders provided by governmentdeclined to just 9% of what was supplied in 1982. The need for psychiatric care has similarlyincreased dramatically. Sanitation problems have increased both the need for preventivehealth care and the incidence of morbidity (Kanagaratnam, 1994, pp. 81-83).

    30. The number of those living in welfare centres fluctuates greatly, mostly depending onmilitary operations. The Medical Institute of Tamils (1994) estimated 38 000 lived in suchcentres in 1993; the UN Humanitarian advisor, on a visit to Jaffna in the summer of 1995,estimated 16 000.

    31. The LTTE reportedly began their own medical school as a reaction to the very lowpercentages (10%) of doctors staying in the north-east after being educated at JaffnaTeaching Hospital.

    32. An exception is local organizations that would be critical of LTTE rule. While the south-westof Sri Lanka has a large number of human rights/advocacy groups critical of the government,similar organizations would not be permitted by LTTE in Jaffna.

    33. Jaffna is virtually homogeneously populated by Tamil. Formerly, there was a small butimportant Muslim trading community living in Jaffna town, but in 1990 the LTTE evictedall Muslims from Jaffna by force.

    34. According to the last census (1981), 40.9% of the Eastern Province is Sri Lankan Tamil,32.5% Muslim, 24.9% Sinhalese and the remainder Indian Tamil. The bulk of this substan-tial Sinhalese population was settled in the east as part of a government colonizationprogramme aimed at distributing land to the landless from the (Sinhalese dominated) wetzone. Despite this stated objective, there was a political motive to dilute the Tamil popula-tions of the east with Sinhalese colonies, a policy that became one of the roots of Tamildiscontent.

    35. This is particularly true in Trincomalee, and to a lesser extent in Batticaloa.36. Estimates made from reports from the Education Ministry, Pensions Department, Ministry

    of Health, Government of Sri Lanka Budget Estimates.37. Approximately Rs. 270m worth of food was delivered to the east in 1993.38. Reportedly, the percentage of those passing their degrees fell from 75% to approximately

    50% in 1991, 1992 and 1993.

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  • 120 M. O'Sullivan

    39. Only students from the Eastern Province would be willing to attend Eastern University dueto the security situation there and the relatively undeveloped facilities. For these reasons,students with the best connectionsoften the "merit" studentstransfer elsewhere. Thisdamages the university by not only keeping bright students away, but because funding for theuniversity is partially based on the number of students in attendance.

    40. It is estimated that about 20 NGOs operate in Batticaloa, a handful in Trincomalee andperhaps only a few in Amparai (Srishnamugarajah, 1994).

    41. Although not discussed here, the government's investment projects also sustained marketentitlements by providing employment while simultaneously increasing the productivity ofparticular industries, notably agriculture.

    42. While a combination of these measures may be problematic, such as for a country that gleansmuch of its government revenue through trade taxes, such imbalances can be evened outwith foreign aid.

    43. This does not need to be done through state corporations, but can simply involve certaingovernment programmes directing private investmentsuch as the 200 Garment FactoryProgramme in Sri Lanka.

    44. See the New Growth Theory literature such as that written by Lucas (1988) or Barro (1990).45. This could involve a variety of measuresfrom discouraging the use of land mines to

    encouraging combatants to honour international treaties concerning warfare and humanrights.

    46. By July 1996, war expenditures had already exceeded the amount budgeted for 1996 defencespending (Rs. 38b or US$690m) by Rp. 10b (US$181m).

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    Countries (Manila, Asian Development Bank).Barro, R.J. (1990) Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth, Journal of

    Political Economy, 98, pp. 103-125.Central Bank of Sri Lanka (Various years) Annual Report on the Economy (Colombo, Central

    Bank).Collier, P. (1995) Civil War and the Economics of the Peace Dividend, Working Paper Series 8,

    Oxford University, Centre for the Study of African Economies.Daily News, years 1981-96.Department of Census and Statistics (Various years) Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka

    (Colombo, Central Bank).Department of Census and Statistics (Various years) Labour Force and Socio-economic Survey, Sri

    Lanka (Colombo, Central Bank).Edirisinghe, N. (1987) The Food Stamp Scheme in Sri Lanka: Costs, Benefits, and Options for

    Modification (Washington, DC, International Food Policy Research Institute).Hodson, R. (1995) Report on the Visit to Jaffna District by the Humanitarian Advisor to the United

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    op. cit.Kelegama, S. (1994) The Impact of the Two Hundred Garment Factory Programme on the Sri Lankan

    Economy (Colombo, Institute of Policy Studies).Kelegama, S. (1995) The Economic Cost of the North-East Conflict in Sri Lanka (Colombo, Institute

    of Policy Studies).Lucas, R.E. (1988) On the mechanics of economic development, Journal of Monetary Economics,

    99, pp. 3-42.Manickavasagar, K. (1994) Special report on the situation in the Jaffna district, in: Medical

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    Ministry of Education and Higher Education (1993) Educational Statistics of Sri Lanka (Colombo,Ministry of Education).

    Ministry of Finance, Planning, Ethnic Affairs and National Integration and the UNICEF (1995)Progress Towards Mid-decade Goals in Sri Lanka, 1995 (Colombo, UNICEF).

    Ministry of Health (Various years) Annual Health Bulletin (Colombo, Ministry of Health).Natchinarkinian, C.S. (1994) Current patterns of health care and resource allocation, in: Medical

    Institute of Tamils, op. cit.North-East Provincial Secretariat (1994) Statistical Information of the North-East Province

    (Trincomalee, North-East Provincial Council).O'Sullivan, M.L. (1994) Economics and ethnic strife: the case of Sri Lanka, MSc Thesis, Oxford

    University.Ratneswaran, S. (1995) Health Care in the Northeast Province Area: Notes from a Visit to Jaffna

    (London, Tamil Information Centre).Reuters News Service, courtesy of SLNet (Internet Service), 1995-96.Seabright, P. (1986) Effects of conflict on the economy in northern Sri Lanka, Economic and

    Political Weekly, 21, pp. 78-83.Sen, A.K. (1981) Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford, Claren-

    don Press).Sivarajah, N. (1992) Report on the Current Nutritional Status of the People of the Jaffna District

    (Jaffna, Council of Non-Governmental Organisations).Sivarajah, N. (1994) Maternal and child care, in: Medical Institute of Tamils.Srishnamugarajah, M. (1994) An overview of the effects of war in North East Sri Lanka, in:

    Medical Institute of Tamils.Stewart, F. (1985) Planning to Meet Basic Needs (London, Macmillan).Stewart, F. (1995) Groups for good or ill, Oxford Development Studies, 24, pp. 9-25.Sunday Island, years 1981-96.Tamil Information Centre (1993) Economic Blockade (London, Tamil Information Centre).Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (Various issues) Information Bulletin; and Future Quarterly

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