TheHornbookSeries '. of ElementaryTreatisesonallthePrincipalSubject softheLaw Arant onSuretyship andGuaranty. AtkinsononWills. BlackonBankruptcy(2dEd.). BlackonConstructionandInterpretationofLaws(2dEd.). BlackonJudicialPrecedents. BogertonTrusts. BowmanonIntroductiontothe CommonLaw. BurdickonRealProperty. OhapinonTorts. OlarkonCodePleading. Clark on Contracts (4th Ed.). Clark on Criminal Procedure (2dEd.). Clephane onEquityPleading. CooleyonMunicipalCorporations. CraneonPartnershipandOtherUnincorporatedAssocia-tions. OroswellonExecutorsandAdministrators. Dobie onBailments andCarriers. Dobie on Federal Jurisdiction andProcedure. GoodrichonConflictofLaws(2dEd.). McClintock on Equity. McCormickonDamages. McKelveyonEvidence(4thEd.). Maddenon PersonsandDomesticRelations. MilleronCriminalLaw. Norton on Billsand Notes(4thEd.). RadinonAnglo-AmericanLegalHistory. RadinonRomanLaw. RobinsononAdmiralty. RottschaeferonConstitutionalLaw. Shipman onCommon-LawPleading(3dEd.). Smith on ElementaryLaw(2dEd.). Stevens on Corporations. Tiffany onAgency(2dEd.). Tiffany onBanksa.ndBanking. Vanceon Insurance (2dEd.). VoidonSales. WilsononInternationalLaw(3rdEd.). Published and for "sale by WESTPUBLISHINGCO.,ST.PAUL,MINli. P7542d HANDBOOK OF ELEMENTARYLAW ByWALTERDENTONSMITH SECONDEDITION ByARCHIEHARTMcGRAY-INSTRUCTORINST.PAUL"COLLEGEOFLAW HORNBOOKSERIES ST.PAUL,MINN. WESTPUBLISHINGCO. 1939 SMITH EL.LAw 2d COPYRIGHT,1896 BY WESTPUBLISHINGCO. COPYRIGHT,1939 BY WESTPUBLISHINGCO. Thiseditionisaffectionately dedicatedtothereviser's fatherand mother PREFACETOTHESECONDEDITION The purposeof thisrevisionhas been to bring the contentsof the first edition up-to-date without deviating from the plan of the originaleditionany more than necessarY.Thispurposehasre-quiredtherewritingorre-editingofthematerialinthefirst editionbutthevarioustopicsdiscussedandtheorderoftheir treatmentremainthesameexceptforthefollowingchanges: MaritimeLawand.MartialLawareclassifiedanddiscussed asdivisionsoflawillchapter10,ratherthanassystemsof lawinchapter1;corporealandincorporealhereditamentsare discussedinchapter9("Property"),ofpart1,ratherthan inaseparatechapterofpart2;andthesubjectofAgencyis madeasectioninchapter19("BusinessDevices"),insteadof aseparatechapterofpart2.Theonlyotherprincipalchange hasbeeninthedividingofthematerialintosections.The numberofthesedivisionshasbeengreatlyreducedandtop-icsthat werecontained in separatesectionsnowconstitutesub-divisionsoflargersections.Thishasmadepossibleanexten-sionofthematerialonvarioustopicswithoutincreasingthe book'sbulk.Inotherrespects,thesubstanceandformofthe volumeare unchanged. BecauseoftheirimportanceinAmericanlaw,anappendix has been added whichtreats ofthe AmericanLaw Instituteand theNationalConferenceofCommissionersonUniformState 'Laws.Thisappendixalsoincludesalistofthejurisdictions whichhave adopted the Uniform State Laws cited and quotedin the text. The fir:stedition has been popular with laymen as wellas with thefirst-yearlaw students for whomit wasintended and the re-questsofbothoftheseclassesofreadershavedeterminedthe additionsmadetothematerialincluded.However,thereader iswarned that this bookisintended primarily as an introduction to thestudy oflaw anddoesnot pretend to beconclusiveor ex-haustive.Itsobjectismerelytodeclarethemoreimportant fundamentalprinciplesoflawandthebasicsubdivisionsthere-vii viii PREFACE of,and it isanalyticaland historicalonlytothe extent .requi.red bythisobject,forpurposesofexplanation. andclassl.ficatlOn. It isabookofgeneralprinciplestheexceptionsofwhIchmay or may not be set forth. GratitudeisextendedtotheAmericanLawInstituteforits consent tothe useofmaterialfromitsRestatement;to~ o s c o ePound and The Harvard Law ReviewAssocia,tion fortheIrcon-sent to the use of aquotation from ail article by Mr.Pound pub-lished in theHarvard Law Review;andgratitude isextendedto theauthorsoftheothervolumesinthepublisher'sHornbook Series for the use made of their materials. ST.PAuL,MINNESOTA, June,1939. ARCHIEHARTMCGRAY. PREFACETOTHEFIRSTEDITION Thefollowingpagesareintendedasanintroductiontothe study of the law.Their aim is simply to take the student across thethreshold,andgivehimageneralviewofthetreasuresof learningwhichliebeyond.TheAnglo-Americanlegalsystem may be compared withoneof tlioseoldFeudal castlesstillto be seeninpartsofBritain.Essentiallyanancientstructure,yet having been constantly added to and repaired as the yearsrolled by,itpresen,tsanappearancemuchdifferentfromtheFeudal original.Hereandthereanewwinghasbeenbuilt;and,side by 'sidewiththe modernelements,standingruggedandstrong, somepartsoftheoldbuildingarecrumblingintodust. In the, firstpart of the present work the writer hasattempted to present an outside view of this legal edifice.In parts 2and3 he has tried to classify its contents,and explain briefly their gen-eral character. It ishopedthatthebookmaybefoundnotwhollyunsuited forthepurposeit isintendedtoaccomplish. Al\"'NARBOR,MICH., May1,1896. W.D.S. Section ,TABLEOFCONTENTS PART1 ELEMENTARYJURISPRUDENCE CHAPTER1 THENATUREOFLAW 1.Law in General............. .. ........... 2.ScientificLaw. . .................................. 3.RulesofHumanAction......... ......................... 4.DivineLaw.. '.................... . .... . ... . ...... 5.MoralLaw.. . ......................... . .............. 6.CustomaryLaw........................................ 7.Jural or Positive Law................... '......... , ...... 8.InternationalLaw...............................,.... , 9.MunicipalLaw........ ...................... 10.NaturalLaw.................................................................... :; .......... ..CHAPTER2 LAW,THESTATE,ANDGOVERNMENT Page 1-2 2 2-3 3 4 4-5 6 6-9 9--10 10--11 11.TheState............................12 12.TheMembersofaState........ .......... ,...................12-13 13.Sovereignty.. ...................................13-14 14.TheConstitution.................................15-16 15.The Government............................................16-18 16.UnitaryandFederalGovernments... ...........18 CHAPTER3 'GOVERNMENTINTHEUNITEDSTATES 17.GeneralNature ofthe Union........... . ................... . 18.ConstitutionsintheUnion................... ; ......... 19.GovernmentsintheUnion.... . ............... 20.SovereigntyintheUnion............... . ............... 21.CitizenshipandNaturalization............................. . CHAPTER4 FORMSANDLEADINGSYSTEMSOFLAW 19-23 24-26 26-33 33 34-35 22.Forms of Law..............................................36-37 23.RomanCivilLaw.. : ..............................37-40 24.TheCommonLaw............... . ..........................41-50 25.CommonLaw in theStates..................................50--54 SMITH EL.LAW 2D xi xll TABLEOFCONTENTS CHAPTER5 EQUITY Sectiol! 26.TheGeneralNatureofEquity..... ; ........ ................ . Page 55-60 6(}-{l6 66-67 67-68 27.The Maximsof Equity..... 28.Equityin theColoniesand theUnitedStates............... 29.TheFusionof Lawand Equity..... ............ CHAPTER6 ENACTEDLA,W 30.InGeneral ................................................. 6&-74 74-77 31.Classification ofStatutes...... CHAPTER7 THE- RANKANDINTERPRETATIONOFLAWS 32.LawasSupreme...................... 78-79 79-82 83-87 87-94 33.Laws and Their Rank...... 34.Rules forConstructionofStatutes....... . .............. 35.The Authority and Interpretation of JudicialDecisions, 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. CHAPTER8 PERSONSANDRIGHTS TheFunctionof MunicipalLaw............................ . Interests. . ... ............ LegalRights........................................ Persons........ . Acts...... . ObjeCts or Things.......................' ..... , ........ Facts. '.' ............................ CHAPTER9 PROPERTY 95 96-97 97-102 18Z-103 103- 104 104 104 105 In General ................................................. TheFeudalSystem....................................... 105-111 Ownership..........................................111- 112 Possession.............................................112-113 CorporealandIncorporealProperty....... . .......113-114 Realand PersonalProperty.............. .. .. .. ..114-123 CHAPTER10 DIVISIONSOFLAW 124-125 49.In General ................................................. 125-127 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. SubstantiveLaw................................. Adjective Law............................................. . Military Law......................................... MartialLaw... , ......... MaritimeLaw............................................ . ConfiictofLaws... 127- 128 129-130 130-131 131' 132-133 Section 56.InGeneral TABLEOFCONTENTS PART2 THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW CHAPTER11 CONSTITUTIONALLAW . ................................................. . 57. 58. Taxation............................... . PolicePower................. . In General .......................... .................... . CHAPTER12 CRIMINALLAW xiii Page 135-144 145-146 146-147 148-15159. 60. 61. 62. Elements Specific................. . ............. 152-155 . ........................... . ..155-168 Purpose.......... .... .. .......168 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. CHAPTER13 PERSONSANDDOMESTICRELATIONS MarriageinGeneral Common-Law . . ............. '. . .. ...... TerminatiQnof the............ ParentandChild.............................. Infants............. . ............................ . '1 GuardianandWard............... .. M.asterand Servant............. 11> .. ........ . ............... ......................................... . CHAPTER14 REALPROPERTY 70.Estates71.Titles.................... ..................................................... . CHAPTER15 PERSONALPROPERTY 72.In General73.Sales............................ 74. .................................................. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. Pledges.................................... : .............. . CHAPTER16 SUCCESSION InGeneral..................................... Intestacy................................................. . Testacy......................... Property Passing bySucc-ession.. ............... .............................. 169-173 173-175 175- 17-6 177-'179 179-181 181-185 185- 186 187- 208 208-220 221-229 229-238 238-243 243- 244 245-247 247-253 253-256 256-259 xiv TABLEOF CONTENTS CHAPTER17 CONTRACTS SectionPage 80.InGeneral... .260-275 81.QuasiContracts...275-276 CHAPTER18 SPECIALCONTRACTS 82.NegotiableInstruments.......................277-285 83.Suretyship and Guaranty.................... .........285-289 . 84.Insurance.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289-298 CHAPTER19 BUSINESSDEVICES 85.Agency.............:299-305 86.Partnerships..................305-315 87.Private Corporations 315-324 CHAPTER20 TORTS 88.In General........................,............ 325-340 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. PART3 THE ADJECTIVE LAW CHAPTER21 REMEDIES Scope 01'the Adjective Law............. RemediesinGeneral.............................. LegalRemedies................. . . : ......... .- ... CommonLawRemedies............................... Equitable Remedies........ CHAPTER22 COURTSANDTHEIRJURISDICTION 841 34i- 348 349 35()-353 354-362 94.Courts in General. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363-364 95.Jurisdiction................................... 96.CourtsofRecord................ ... ............. 364-367 367 97.English Courts of Original Jurisdiction before1873............368-370 98.English Courts of Intermediate Appealbefore1873............371- 372 99.English Courts of Final Appeal before 1873.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372 100.EnglishCourts since1873..........................373-375 101.UnitedStatesCourts..............................375-382 102.StateCourts......................382-383 Section TABLEOF CONTENTS CHAPTER23 PROCEDURE 103.InGeneral 104. 105.Common-Law Procedure................. .............. 106.Equity Procedure'"....................................... . 107.Code Procedure............................................ 108.Criminal Proc-edure...................... 109.In General CHAPTER24 TRIALS e ' APPENDIX xv Page 384 385-392 393-399 399-403 403-409 410-414 415-421 .A..The American LawInstitute and the Restatement422-423 B.TheConferenceofCommissionersonUniformState Laws..423-427 TABLEOFCASESCITED...... 429 INDEX.......................................................... 481 ELEMENTARYLAW PART 1 ELEMENTARYJURISPRUDENCE CHAPTER1 THENATUREOFLAW 1.LawinGeneraI. 2.ScientificLaw. 3.RulesofHumanAction. 4.DivineLaw. 5.MoralLaw. 6.CustomaryLaw. 7.Juralor Positive Law. 8.InternationalLaw. 9.MunicipalLaw. 10.NaturalLaw. LAW IN GENERAL 1.Theterm"law"isused in two general senses to designate: fa)An order or uniformity of nature, (b)A rule of human action.1 The orders of nature which,to the extent that they have been discovered and expressed in general formulas,constitute the laws ofscience,or scientificlaw,differinherently fromtherulesap-1 Etymologically,theword"law" isderivedfromtheword"lie"and signifies"that whichlies"oris"fix-ed." AccordingtoBlackstone,"Inits broadestsense,lawsignifiesarule ofaction.It embracesallkindsof actions,animate or inanimate,ration-SMITH EL.LAW 2d-l alorirrational.Thuswesay:the lawsofmotion,ofgravitation,ofop-tics, of mechanics,as wellas the laws ofnatureandofnations.It isthat ruleofaction,whichisprescribed bysomesuperior,andwhichthein-feriorisboundtoobey."Browne's Blackstone'sCommentaries,p.7. 2 THENATUREOFLAW Ch.l plicabletohumanactiononly.Theformeraremethodsand results of natural phenomena about which man has reached con-clusionsfromhisobservationandstudyofnatureandthe uni-verse,butwhichwouldexistthoughmandidnot;whilethe rulesof human action exist because of man and would terminate uponthe extinction of mankind. SCIENTIFIC LAW 2.Thelawsofscienceconsistoftheuniformitiesof phe-nomena as observed and described by men. Such alaw is astatement that, under conditions within human experience,certaineventsinnaturehavebeenfoundinvariably toaccompanyorfollowcertainotherevents,anditoperates whetherornotthe thingsinvolvedinthe eventsare capableof makingachoice,andwhetheror not the thingsinvolvedinthe eventsare animateor inanimate.Suchalaw is imniutableand cannotbedisobeyedbecauseitisapartofnatureitself.lawsofsciencemay be dividedinto(a)the lawsof the physical and naturalsciences;and(b)the lawsof the. mental andsocial sciences.Thelawsofthephysicaland natural sciencesare the uniformitiesofnatureascertainedandstudiedinsuchsciences asAstronomy,Geology,Physics,Chemistry,andBiology.Ex-amplesofsuchlawstraditionallylisted 'are:the lawof gravita-tion,thelawsofthetides,andthelawsofchemicalcombina-tion.Thelawsofthementalandsocialsciencesconsistofthe uniformfeaturesobservedinthebehaviorofhumans,andare studied in suchsciencesasPsychology,Ethics,History,Sociolo-gy,Economics,and PoliticalScience. RULESOF HUMANACTION 3.Therulesofhumanaction consistof preceptsforthe controlof thebehaviorofmenandwhichareenforcedbysomeform of sanction.These precepts include: (a)Divinelaw, (b)Moral law, (c)Customary law,and (d)Jural or Positive law. SMITH EL.LAW 2drld.It prevails in Ireland, and Wales, the United States(except Louisiana,PuertoRico,thePanamaCanalZone,andHawaii), Canada(exceptQuebec),Australia,NewZealand,India(except Ceylon),Gibralter, 'and in many islands.In theexceptedplaces listed the existing Roman civil law isgradually undergoing modi-ficationby modern legislation and by the administrationof com-mon-lawjudges. COMMONLAW IN THE STATES 25.ThebasisofthelawineveryStateoftheUnion,exceptLou-isiana,consistsoftheEnglishcommonlaw,equity,and statutesin effectatthetimeofthecolonization ofAmerica andtheirinterpretationbytheEnglishcourts,withsuch modificationashasbeendeemedwiseandnecessaryto meetlocal needs andconditions.36 ' InGeneral ThelawsoftheStatesandoftheUnitedStateshavebeen erected by legislation and decisionsupon the foundationfurnish-ed by English law,as the colonies that formedthe UnitedStates weresubject,generally,tosuchlaw,but"thecommonlawof Englandisnot to be taken in. allrespectsto be that of America. Ourancestorsbroughtwiththemitsgeneralprinciples,and claimedthemastheirbirthright;buttheybroughtwiththem and adopted only that portion which was applicable to their situ-ation."37 The constitutions of many of the states contain provisions spe-cificallyadoptingthecommonlaw"andindoingsofrequently refer to the'Common Law of England'asit existedat acertain date.ThisdateisusuallythedateoftheDeclarationofInde-pendence.But in many instances the date set isthe 'fourth year ofreignofJamesI,'i.e.,1607,thedateofthefoundingofthe firstpermanentEnglishcolonyinNorthAmerica.Thisisthe 36 Thecommonlawisthebasisofsamereasonswhichledtotheadop-thecriminallawinLouisiana,buttionofthecommonlawintheother thecivill awofsuchstateisbasedstatesinducedtheadoptionofthe uponRomanlawasmodifiedbycivillaw ofFrance asthebasisofits France."As that state wasaFrenchlegalsystem."Bowman,p.208. provinceatthetimeofitsacquisi-tion,andthereforesubjectto theRo- 37VanNessv.Pacard,2Pet.137, mancivill awinitsFrenchform,the144,7L.Ed.374,1829. EL.LAw2d 25COMMONLAWINTHESTATES 51 caseinVirginia,Illinois,Indiana,Coloradoandotherjurisdic-tions.Usually,thestatementisqualified.TheCommonLaw isadoptedonly'sofarasit isnotrepugnanttoor inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws'of the particular states/'38In some states Englishstatutes enacted after J.uly 4,1776,are rejected;inother states,statutes enactedinEnglandafter1607,arerejected;inothers,nosuch date is Those states whichhave not adopted the common lawwiththeirconstitutionshavedonesoeitherbystatuteor judicial decision."These variations,however,seem tohavepro-ducednosubstantialdifferenceintheactualcourseofjudicial decisions.Inallstates,theacceptanceorrejectionofspecific ' provisionsas' applicable-or notapplicableto localconditionshas , been the work of the courts;in all states, English decisions,from the most ancient to themost recent,are treatedwithrespectas enunciationsof the law whichhasbeenadopted,thoughnotre-gardedasabsolutelybinding;inallstates,mostoftheEnglish statutesineffectatthebeginningofcolonization,andfewor nonepassedsubsequently,areinforcewithoutreenactmentby thestatelegislature;andinallstates,theoriginalinheritance of English law has been profoundly modified by legislation or ju-dicialdecisions.There are thus as many state systemsofcom-monlawastherearestates,allmanifestingagenerallikeness becauseoftheircommonoriginandextensiveborrowingfrom other,yetdivergingfromEnglishlawandfromonean-other in many particulars."39 Admiralty Vice-admiraltycourtscommissioned' bythe ' kingexercised jurisdiction over maritime cases in the colonies prior to the Dec-larationofIndependence,butthisjurisdictionwasdelegatedto thefederalcourtswhentheUnionwasestablished,theConsti-tution of the United States40 providingthat,"The judicial Power shallextend< **toall ofadmiraltyandmaritime Jurisdiction."Therefore the admiralty law of theUnitedStates isadministeredbythefederal ' courtsuniformlythroughoutthe nationasadistinct,independentlegalsystem.41 , 38RadinonAnglo-AmericanLegal40 Art.3,2,U.S.C:-A:Const. History,pp.341,342. 39 Bowman,pp.207,208.See,also, Pope,EnglishCommonLawinthe 'CnitedStates,24Harv.LawRev.6, 1910. 41 "Article 3, 2,of the Constitution extends the judicial power of the Unit-edStates'Toallcasesofadmiralty and maritime jurisdiction';andArti-cle1,8,confersupontheCongress 52 FORMSANDLEADINGSYSTEMSOF LAWCh.4 Ecclesiastical Thecanonlawhasneverbeenin forceinanyStatebecause of the totalseparation ofchurch andstateinthe UnitedStates andthelackofecclesiasticaltribunalstoadministersuchlaw. However,varioussubjectswhichwereoriginallyadjudicatedin ecclesiasticalcourts,particularlymatterssuchasprobate,mar-riage,anddivorce,havebeenplacedbystatuteswithintheju-risdictionof courtsoftheStates andthecourtshaveconstrued thesestatutesasauthorizingthemtoadoptsuchoftheprin-ciples and practices of the English ecclesiastical courts as are not inconsistentwithAmerican lawandFederal . Afederal statute provides,"The laws of the several States,ex- . ceptwheretheConstitution,treaties,orstatutesoftheUnited Statesotherwiserequireorprovide,shallberegardedasrules ofdecisionintrialsat commonlaw,inthecourtsoftheUnited States, in cases where they apply;"43 and,in construing this stat-ute, the Supreme Court of the United States has said,"Except in power 'To make all laws which may be necessary and proper for ca.rrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other 'powers vestedbythisConstitu-tioninthegovernmentoftheUnited States or in anydepartment or officer thereof.'Consideringourformer opinions,it mustnowbeacceptedas settleddoctrinethatinconsequence of theseprovisionsCongresshaspar-amountpowertofixanddetermine the maritimelawwhichshallprevail throughoutthecountry."Southern PacificCo.v.Jensen,244U.S.205,37 S.Ot.524,61L.Ed.1086,L.R.A.1918C, 451,Ann.Cas.1917E,900,1917. 42"IntheAmericancolonies,the EnglishCanonLawasregulatedby the statutes of Henry VIII and subse-quentamendingactshadacertain limitedvalidityinthesecoloniesin which,likeVirginia,theAnglican communionwasofficiallyrecognized. It had,ofcourse,novalidityinthe PuritancoloniesofNewEngland . whereanattempthadbeenmadeto create anewlawbasedontheBible as interpreted bythe Puritan divines. ***EchoesofCanonLaw phrases,suchasthefamousdistinc-tionofPetertheLombardbetween marriages'perv erbadepraesenti' [bywordsofthepresenttense]and 'perverbadefuturo,'[bywordsof thefuturetense]aswellassuchex-pressionsas'treatingaspousewith conjugalkindness,'surviveinour familylaw.'Benefitofclergy'sur-vivedbrieflyinafewstates,andre-mainedintheformulasofstatutes afterIthadbeenabrogatedinfact. But,outsideofthesematters,the Canon. Lawcanbediscoveredinthe UnitedStatesonlyinthoseinstitu-tionswhichhadbeenalmostwholly absorbedbytheCommonLaw."Ra-dinonAnglo-AmericanLegalHis-tory,pp.109,110. 431Stat.92,R.S.721,28U.S.C.A. 725.Thisstatutewasenactedin 1789,as 34of the originalJudiciary Actbywhichthesystemoffederal courtswasorganized. 25COMMONLAWINTHESTATES 53 matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Con"' gress,the law to be appliedinanycaseisthe lawofthestate. And whether the law ofthe state shall be declaredby itsLegis-latureinastatute or by itshighestcourtinadecisionisnota matter of federalconcern.There isno federalgeneralcommon law.Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of com-monlawapplicableinastatewhethertheybelocalintheir nature or 'general,'be they commercial law or apart ofthe law oftorts.AndnoclauseintheConstitutionpurportstoconfer suchapoweruponthefederalcourts."44Therefore,theinitial phrase of the statute,"The laws of the severalStates,"refers to both the statutoryanddecisionallawsoftheStates,and"there isnofederalgeneralcommon law." Summary Thehighestcourtofastateincasespresentedtoithasthe responsibilityandpowerofmakingthefinaldeterminationof what the controlling rule of the state is,whether the process in-volvesthe interpretationandadministrationofastatuteor the selectionandapplicationofcommon-lawprinciples,andinre-solvingcontroversiesnot withintheambitoffederalregulation, the federalcourts apply the governingrule of the state in which the caseoriginates,whether itbeaconstitutional,statutory,or decisionalrule;and,subject to finalreview and correction by the Supreme Court of the United States, the courtsof theStates ap-ply the Constitution, laws,and treaties of the United States in all' 44 ErieR.Co.v.Tompkins,304U. S.64,58S.Ot.817,82L.Ed.1188,114 A.L.R.1487,1938.Thiscasedisap-provedandoverruledtheconstruc-tiongiventhestatuteinthecaseof Rwiftv.Tyson,16Pet.1,10L.Ed. 865,1842,intheopinionofwhich Mr.JusticeStorywrote:"Inallthe variouscases,whichhavehitherto comebeforeusfordeciSion,this courthave(sic)uniformlysupposed, thatthetrueinterpretationofthe 34thsectionlimiteditsapplicationto statelaws,strictlylocal,thatisto say,tothepositivestatutesofthe state,andtheconstructionthereof adoptedbythelocaltribunals,and torightsandtitlestothingshaving apermanentlocality,suchasthe rightsandtitlestorealestate,and othermattersimmovableandintra-territorialintheirnatureandchar-acter.It neverhasbeensupposed byus,thatthesectiondidapply,or was designedto apply,to questionsof amoregeneralnature,notat allde-pendentuponlocalstatutesorlocal usagesofafixedandpermanentop-eration,as,forexample,theconstruc tionofordinarycontractsorother written instruments,and especially to questionsofgeneralcommerciallaw, wherethestatetribunalsarecalled upontoperformthelikefunctions asourselves,that is,toascertain,up-ongeneralreasoningandlegalanal-ogies,whatisthe trueexpositionof thecontractorinstrument,orwhat is the just rule furnishedby the prin-ciplesofcommerciallawtogovern 54-FORMSANDLEADINGSYSTEMSOF LAW casespresentillgquestionsthereunderandnotdeclaredbythe federalconstitutionoractsofCongresstobewithintheex-clusivejurisdiction of the federalcourts. thecase.Andwehavenotnowthe slightestdifficultyinholding,that thissection,uponitstrue intendment andconstruction,isstrictlylimited tolocalstatutesandlocalusagesof thecharacter beforestated,anddoes not exte:J.dtocontractsanllotherin-strumentsofacommercialnature, thetrueinterpretationandeffect whereofaretobesought, . notinthe decisionsofthelocaltribunals,but inthegeneralprinciplesanddoc-trinesofcommercialjurisprudence." Foradiscussionoftheactualand probableeffectofErieR.Co.v. Tompkins,anditsoverrulingofthe doctrineofSwift v.Tysonwhichhad stoodforninety-sixyears,see"The Collapseof'General'Law in the Fed-eralCourts,"byCharlesT.McCor-mickandElvinHaleHewins,33TIL LawRev.126,1938. CHAPTER5 EQUITY 26.TheGeneralNatureofEquity. 27.TheMaximsofEquity. 28.EquityintheColoniesandtheUnitedStates. 29.TheFusion of Law andEquity. THE GENERAL NATUREOF EQUITY 26.Equity,inAnglo-Americanlaw,constitutesthestructureof legalmaterialssupplementaryofthecommon-lawsystem thatwasdevelopedandappliedbytheEnglishCourtof Chanceryandthecourtssucceedingtoitspowersinthe British Empire and the United States.1 Origin In England,powertoalleviatethestrictrulesoflawwhere their application would result in injustice,origUlally vested in the king,became d e l e ~ a t e d to hischancellor and forthisreasonthe preceptsofequityinAnglo-Americanlawwereqevelopedasa systemdistinct fromthe commonlawproperadministeredbya separatetribunalunder thechancellor.AsfarbackasEnglish legalhistory can be traced the king exercisedtheprerogativeof interfering with the ordinary legal procedure in specialcases pre-senting needs requiring such interference, and consequently, after thecommon-lawsystemhadbecomequitesettled,itsoriginal writs limited,and its remedies inadequate to meet the necessities ofnew circumstances,the council,as representative of theking, would often intervene in extraordinary cases upon being petition-ed by thesubjectsaffected.However,inthelatter part ofthe fourteenth century, these petitions became too numerous for con-sideration by theentirecounciland thecustomdevelopedofre-ferring them to the chancellor,the king's personal representative in the council,with the result that this functionof the chancellor gradually developed into and became a separate institution recog-nizedastheCourtofChancery.Thus,althoughseparate,the 1"Inthegeneraljuristicsense, equitymeansthepowertomitigate therigidityoftheapplicationof strict rulesoflawbyatribunalhav-ingdiscretiontoadaptthereliefto 55 thecircumstancesoftheparticular case."McClintockonEquity,(here-inaftercited"McClintock"),1(a), p.1. 56 EQUITY Ch.1'> common-lawandequitysystemshadacommonoriginandthe authority ofthecommon-lawjudges andthepowerslater exer-cisedby the chancellorwere derivedfromthesame source,the king.2 Development of Equity into a System The early chancellors were usually ecclesiastics educated in the canonlawwhoprofessedtobasetheirdecisionsonthelawof Godorconscience,butafterthefallofCardinalWolseyinthe reignofHenryVIII,mostofthechancellorswerelawyers.3 Trained in the relativelyrigidtraditions ofthecommon lawand its stare decisisdoctrine,theinclinationsoftheselaterchancel-lorscaused the moldingof equityinto astructure withprecepts almost as definiteasthoseoftheoldersystem.Reportsofthe decisionsin chancery began to be published,andalthough equity precedents never obtained the binding forceof thoseinthe com-mon-lawsystem,chancellorstendedtofollowthecoursesde-scribedandascertainable in the recordsoftheirpredecessors. Quite naturally the common-lawjudges became jealousofand opposedtotheextraordinarypowersofthechancery,and"as equitycame to be moreclearlyrecognizedasaseparatesystem oflaw,andnotmerelyanexerciseoftheking'sprerogativeof grace,theoppositionofthecommon-lawjudgestoit increased, 2"Thekingisthefountainofjus-tice,andgeneralconservatorofthe peaceofthekingdom.Heisnotthe authorororiginal,butonlythedis-tributorofjustice.Heisthestew-ardofthepublic,todispensejustice towhomitisdue.Theoriginal pr;werofjudicature,bythefunda-mentalprinciplesofsociety,islodg-edinthesocietyatlarge,butasit wouldbeimpracticableforthepeo-pleintheircollectivecapacityto renderjusticetoindividuals,there-foreeverynationhas committedthat powertomagistrates,whowithmore expeditioncanhearanddetermine complaints,andinEnglandthispow-eriswiththekingandhissubsti-tutes.He,therefore,hasalonethe rightoferecting courts ofjudicature, ashepossessesthesoleexecutive power,inwhichheisassistedby courtsactingunderhisauthority. Hencealljurisdictionsofcourtsare derivedfromthecrown;theirpro-ceedingsweregenerallyintheking's name;theypassunderhisseal,and fireexecutedbyhisofficers." Browne'sBlackstone'sCommentaries, pp.86,87. 3Concerningtheearlychancellors, Bowmanhaswritten ,thatthey"bas-edtheir equityupon theidea that the courtshouldcompeleachindividual litigant todothatwhich'reason'and 'conscience'wouldd i c t a t ~ toaper-soninhissituation.Inaccordance withthisidea,thechancellor,asthe purveyorofthe king'sroyalpreroga-tiveofjustice,was the 'keeperofthe king'sconscience,'!'and,hence,dur-ing itsearlystages,the chancery was a"courtofconscience."Elementary Law,Part I,p.278. 26THEGENERALNATUREOFEQUITY 57 especiallywhenthechancellorsbegantoenjointheprosecution ofactionsatcommonlawortheenforcementofcommon-law judgments.Thisoppositioncametoaheadinthecontroversy betweenCokeandEllesmere,thechancellor,inthereignof James I, when the common-law courts released. on habeas corpus menimprisonedforcontemptinviolatinganinjunctionagainst enforcementof ' ajudgment,andeventhreatenedthechancellor, as well as the parties who sought his help,with indictment under astatuteforbiddinganyonetocallinquestionajudgmentof theking'scourt.Thekingappointedacommission,headedby Francis Bacon,todeterminethequestion,andthereportofHie commission to the effect that the chancellor could enjoinaparty fromenforcing .ajudgment,butcouldnotaffectthejudgment itself,nor the court which rendered it,furnished the formulaun-der which the two systems were able to exist side by side in Eng-landuntilthepowersofboththecommon-lawcourtsandthe chancellors were vested in the high court of justice by the Judica-ture Acts.'" Characteristics of Equitable Jurisdiction and Relief "Jurisdiction" ordinarily means the power conferred on acourt by sovereign authority to consideranddeterminecausesaccord-ingto lawandto enforceitsdecisions,but"equityjurisdiction" ordinarily means,notthepowerofacourtofequitytoadjudi-cateaparticularcontroversy,buttheaggregateofthecontro-versiesinwhichthecourtmayproperlyexerciseitspowerto grant equitable relief."If thecontroversyisonewithintheju-risdictionofthesovereign,theexistenceof ' jurisdictionovera particular controversy dependson the presence of twoelements: Jurisdictio:r;toverthesubject-matter;andjurisdictionoverthe object of the controversy, if the court is to act in rem,or over the personsof the parties, if it istoact inpersonam.Courtsofeq-uity,like allother courts,must possessjurisdictionin thissense or their decrees are nullities and may be disregarded with impun-ity or collaterally questioned in any subsequent proceeding."5 The jurisdiction of equity may attach in almost any branchof the law where the circumstancescallfortheexerciseofitssup-plementarypowers,butbecauseofitsrelationshiptothe .com-mon law the jurisdiction of equity is ordinarily divided into three classes:concurrentjurisdiction;auxiliaryjurisdiction;and,ex-clusive jurisdiction.Its concurrent jurisdiction includes all those cases in which the court of equity grants relief for the protection 'McClintock,p.6.5 McClintock,p.57. EQUITYCh.5 ofcommon-lawrightswherethecommon-lawremediesforthe protectionofthoserightsarenotadequate.Examplesofsuch cases are suits for specificperformanceofcontractsandforthe prevention of torts to common-law property rights.Its auxiliary jurisdictionisavailablewhereequitablereliefisneededtoob--viatesomecommon-lawruleofprocedurewhichpreventsthe proofofarightinfringed;althoughsuchrightisrecognizedat common law and the common-law remedy for its violation isade-quate.Examples are billsfordiscoveryand toperpetuate testi-mony.The exclusivejurisdiction of equityincludesthosecases in which it recognizes and protects rights which are not recogniz-ed at common law;in other words,those cases involving so-called "equitable"asdistinguished from"common-law"rights,suchas trusts, equitable liens,and various otherestates and in-terests. As it was administered by the chancellors,equitablerelief may bedistinguished fromcommon-law reliefin that the formerwas extraordinary,wasgrantedonlyinthediscretionofthechan-cellor,and waseffectuatedin personamandnotinrem.These distinguishingfeatureswerethechiefcharacteristicsofequity relief.The historicalprinciple that equitable reliefcouldbeob-tainedonlyinspecialcaseswherethecommon-lawremedywas inadequatefurnishedthebaseforthethatsuch reliefwas"extraordinary."Common-lawremedieswerechar-acterizedby their lackof variety,their fixednessandunchange-ability,their IC!-ckof adaptability to newcircumstances,andpre-ciseandtechnicalruleswhichgovernedtheiruse.Ordinarily they were confined to the recovery of asum of money or the re-covery of the possession of land or chattels.Thus,the common-lawremedycouldbe inadequateeitherbecausethereliefwhich the court was empowered to grant was not of the kind demanded by the situation; the amount of damages could not be determined withreasonableaccuracysothatit couldnotbeknownifthe recoverywouldbejust;or,theprocedureatlawcouldnotbe adaptedtomeettheneedsofthecircumstances.Incontrast, the equitable remedies were characterized by their almost unlim-ited varietyandadaptabilityto differentsituations.Wherethe common-law court could allow only damages in money to aplain-tifffortherefusalofthedefendanttoperformacontract,the chancellorcouldcompelthedefendanttoperformorcarryout. his promise;where the law court could only order adefendant to surrender hispossession of atract of land or achattel,the chan-cellor couldcompelhim to do variousother actsor restrain him fromcertainconduct.I 26THEGENERALNATUREOFEQUITY 59 That equitable relief was granted only "in the discretionof the chancellor"andcouldnotbedemandedasamatterofright, meanta"judicialdiscretion"tobeexercisedbytheapplication of established principles of equity, and the adaptation of the rem-edysoasto accomplishthemostequitablereliefpossibleunder thecircumstances.Thus,thechancellorcouldnotwithholdor administer relief merely according to the dictates of hisown con-science.Thehistoricaloriginof 'theequitablepowersofthe chancellorintheking'sprerogativeofgraceconstitutesthe backgroundofthecharacteristicthatthegrantingofequitable reliefwas"discretionary"withthechancellor. By theprinciplethat equityacted"inpersonam"andnot"in rem," was meant that adecree of the chancellor would direct the variousparties in asuittoperform such actsaswerenecessary fortheaccomplishmentofjusticeunderthecircumstances,and ifthepartiesdisobeyedthedecreetheywouldbepunishedper-sonally for contempt; whereas acourt of law would have entered ajudgmentwhichwouldhavebeenavailableagainstadefend-ant's property rather than against the defendant personally."In modern times,the maxim that equity actsinpersonamhas been usedparticularlyindeterminingtheterritorialjurisdictionof courts acting as courts of equity, but there is amanifest tendency today to acknowledge the power of acourt of equity to act in rem, evenwhere it has not been expressly authorized by statute to do so.Thedoctrine,nowapparentlywellestablishedinthiscoun-try, that a decree in equity on the merits is res judicata in acourt oflaw,givesawideeffecttosuchdecreesuponthepurelylegal rightsoftheparties.Othercourtshavedirectlyheldthatthe power to molddecreesto meet theneedsofthepartiesjustifies an in rem decree where that alone can give ad,equate relief."6 6McClintock,pp.48,49. "Inmanycases,courtsof havebeenempoweredbystatuteto renderdecreeswhichshalloperatein rem,especiallywithreferencetoti-tlesto land;in other cases thispow-erhasbeenassumedwithoutauthor-ityfromastatute. "Whileordinarilythepowersof theequitycourtstogiveeffectto theirdecreesbyactioninpersonam weremoreeffectivethanactionin remwouldbe,situationsdeveloped whereit was .ineffective.The firstof thesesituationsto demandlegislative reliefwaswherethelegaltitleofa trusteebecamevestedinoneincom-petentto actastrusteeortoconvey thelegaltitletoasuccessor.The courtofequitycouldappOinta suc-cessortoactastrustee,butitcould notvestthelegaltitleinhim,nor coulditorderthetitletobeconvey-ed,sincetheholderhadnopowerto convey.Tomeetthissituation,stat-uteswereenactedinEnglandand thiscountryempoweringthecourt tomaketheconveyance,eitherbyan officerappointedforthatpurpose,or 60 EQUITYCh.5 Equitable Doctrines In granting equitableremedies,whether forequitableor legal rights, and in enforcing equitable rights,courts exercising equity jurisdictionbasetheiractionsupondistjnctivelyequitableprin ciples,rulesandstandardscollectivelycalled"doctrines,"which are peculiar to equity and are not employed by courts exercising common-law jurisdiction except by imitation or unless they have beenextendedtosuchcourtsbystatute.Amongthese"doc-trines" are theequity maxims. THE MAXIMSOF EQUITY 27.Themaximsofequityarefundamentalprincipleswhichhave beenformulatedanddeclaredbythecourtsofchancery andusedbythemasguidesintheexerciseoftheirdiscre-tion. In General The maxims are "historical expressions of the spirit and meth-odbywhich,whenthechancerywasliterallya'courtofcon-science,'equitywasextendedtonewspeciesofwrongandin-jury.'"However, "the main branches of equity jurisdiction were wellestablished before the first attempt was made to statemax-imsofequity,andthelistasthengivendifferedgreatlyfrom the listascommonlygiventoday."8Theauthoritiesarenotin accordastojustwhatequitableshouldbeconsidered asmaxims,but thereissubstantialagreementuponthefollow-ing statements which,by reason of their nature,are divided into "enabling" maxims or those that impel the court to grant equita-directlybyitsdecree.Similardif-ficultiesarosein othercases,particu-larlywithreferencetocontractsfor thesaleoflandbynonresidentven-dors,sothatgeneralstatuteswere passedempoweringthecourtto transferlandtitlesgenerallybyac-tioninrem,andalsototerminate adverseclaimstheretobydecreesin rem. "Solongascourtsofequityandof lawrema,inedseparate,theformer couldnotactinrem,inthesenseof affectingbytheirdecreestherights ()f .parties which would be given effect incommon-lawcourts,unlessthat powerwasconferredby, astatuteor thecommon-lawcourtshadvoluntar-ilyextendedrecognition.But,when thetwosystemsareadministeredby the samecourts,andespeciallywhen theyareadministeredinthesame proceedingunderthecodes,therea-sonfordenyingtocourtsofequity thepowertoactinremnolonger exists,andwefindthemundertaking sotoactinavarietyofsituations." McClintock,37,PP.55,56. ,Bowman,p.285. 8McClintock,p.29. 27THEMAXIMSOFEQUITY 61 ble relief,and "restrictive" maxims or those that cause the court todenyequitablereliefortodealwithamatterinthesame manner as acommon-law court would deal with it. THE ENABLING MAXIMS:9 (1)Equity will not Suffer a Wrong to be Without a RemedylO This maxim is akey to the early equity system as the chancery court arose because of the inability of the common-law system to givefulljustice._It hasoperated toprotectinterestssimilarto interests previously recognized and protected by the judiciary but for which there was no exact precedent.In such caseschancery hasgiven the reliefrequiredby thesituation,wherepossible. (13)EquityRegardsthatasDonewhichOughttobeDone This precept is most often used "in connection with theprinci-ple of equitable conversion, by which equity adjusts the rights and obligationsof persons with reference to aparticular thing to con-form to what they would have been had the direction of awill or contractforitssalebeenperformed."11Generally,itapplies "when theholder of the legalestate[in land]owesaduty,or equitable, to convey it to another or to hold it for his useand benefit.By treating what ought to be doneby him as if it were alreadydone,chancerygivesthepersontowhomthedutyis owed all the substantial advantages,and incidentally the burdens, of ownership, with the exception, of course, that he does not have thelegaltitle.Thus,inthecaseofa ' contractforthesaleof land,ofsuchnaturethat eachpartyisentitledtospecificper-formanceasagainsttheother,thepurchaser isregarded,from the momentthecontract ismade,astheequitable(thoughnot thelegal)owner of theland,andthevelJdorisregardedasthe 9 The proverbsthat "Equityactsin personamandnotinrem,"and "Equityactsspecifically,andnotby wayofcompensation,"arelistedby slJmecommentatorsasenabling max-ims,butaccordingtootherstheyare meredescriptionsoftheusualproc-essesof equity rather thanprinciples toqeappliedinthedecisionofcon-troversies.SeeMcOlintock,p.29, Dote. 10 Theordinarymeaningofthis maxim"mustbegreatlyqualifiedif it is tobeacceptedasastatementof principleonwhichcourtsofequity act.Equitydoesnotundertaketo redresswrongswhichareviolations of moral,asdistinguishedfromlegal, obligations,butthefinaltesttodis-tinguishalegalfromamoralobliga-tioniswhetheritwillbeenforced, oratleastrecognizedasbinding,by courts."McClintock,p.42. 11 McClintock,p.30. 62EQUITYCh.5 equitable owner of the money;the latter holding title to the land merely as asecurity for the payment of the money, and the form-er holding the money as security for the delivery of adeed to the land.Thisisoneofthetwoformsofwhatisknownasthe 'equitableconversion'oflandintomoneyandofmoneyinto land.Theinterestofeachpartyisregardedassubjecttothe rulesgoverningthekindofpropertywhichheisentitled. tore-ceive from the other.In the absence of an agreement to the con-trary,thepurchaseristothepossessionofthelandor tothe rentsand profitsderivedfromit,andthe vendorisenti-tledtointerestontheunpaidmoney.If thepurchasershould diebefore receiving the deed,hisright to obtain title to the land passesasrealproperty tohisheiror devisee;andifthevendor shoulddiebeforehereceivesthemoney,hisrighttodemand payment passesas personalproperty to hisexecutor or adminis-trat or.Thesecondkindof equitableconversionoccurswhena . deed or will directs that land be sold for money, or that money be expended for land.Here, as in the previous case,the land in the handsof thetrusteeor executorisgovernedbyrulesapplicable topersonalproperty,andthemoneytobeexpendedforlandis governed by the rulespertaining to realproperty."12 (3)Equity Looks tothe SubstanceRatherThantotheForm In other words, an equity court in determining the rights of the partiesto atransactiondoesnottaketheformthereofascon-clusivebut goestothe substanceofit andadministersreliefon thebasisof whatthepartiesactuallyintendedtheirrelationto be."Thus,amortgage,atcommonlaw,isinformaconvey-ance,but courts of equity,lookingtothe substance,holdthat it is merely asecurity, and that inconsequencethemortgagor has an equity of redemption. ,An agreement under seal isbinding at commonlawwit houtconsideration,butequityrefusestogive specificperformance of asealed agreement unless there isacon-sideration.Adeed defective at common law from lack of aseal or otherwisemaybet reatedinequityasacontracttoconvey; and similarly adefectivemortgage may be treatedasanequita-blelien.Agreementsformoneypenaltiesandforfeituresof property for failure to pay money are enforced according to their letter at common law,but equity givesreliefagainstthemupon payment,with interest,ofthe amountactuallydue."13 12Bowman,pp.290,291._13 Bowman,p.292. 27 THEMAXIMSOFEQUITY 63 (4)Equity Imputes anIntention to FUlfill anObligation -Hence,when aperson promisestodosome act,equity willas-sumethat heintendsto doit until the contrary isshownandif hedoessomething which may be regardedasapartialperform-anceof his promise equity willso treat it."It isapoliteway of saying that, whenever aperson isunder obligation to appropriate property to aparticular use,and haspropertywhichmay beso appropriated,ef],uitywillcompelhimtomaketheappropria-tion."14 (5)Equalityis Equity Thatistosay,whereeitherassessmentsor benefitsmustbe distributed among several,equity will apportionthem equally so far as possible.For example,inthe settlement of the affairsof an insolvent partnership or corporation, surplus assetsremaining after payment of secured or preferred creditors will be divided by equityamongtheunsecuredcreditorsinproportiontothe amounts due them; and if the estate left by adecedent isnot suf-ficientto pay the debts and legaciesin full,legaciesofthesame class will be reduced proportionately toprovide for the payment ofthe debts.The principle has beenincorporated in modern in-SOlvencyand bankruptcy acts. THERESTRICTIVEMAXIMS: (6)Equity Aidsthe notThoseWhoSlumberonTheir Rights(' \ Thisprincipleapplieswhereapersonhasdelayedassertinga claim against another person until the circumstances have chang-edor the latter has acted soas to be prejudicially affected by the delay.Insuchacaseequitywillholdtheclaimantguiltyof lachesand denyhim relief.Wherethereisnoapplicable"stat-uteoflimitations,"thatisastatutelimitingtheperiodwithin whichaclaim may beassertedor sued uponafter it hasarisen, theeffectofadelaybyaplaintiffincommencingsuitisdeter-mined in equity,not by adefinite rule specifying the time within which such suit must be brought, but by the principle that apro-ceeding must be instituted within atime whichisreasonableun-derallofthecircumstances,themostdeterminativefactorbe-ingtheprejudicethatmayresulttothedefendantbecauseof thedelay.Consequentlytheperiodexpiringfromthetimea 14 McClintock,p.31. 64 EQUITYCh.5 right to sue originates until the time when suit is brought and the effectofsuchperiodupontherightoftheplaintifftosue,will vary with the facts of different cases.However, where an equita-bleclaimhasnotbeenassertedwithinaperiodequaltothat limited by astatute applicableto common-law actions,thedelay willgenerallybeheldtoconstitutelaches,whetherornotthe adverse party hasbeenprejudicedthereby.I5 (7)HeWhoComesintoEquityMustComewithCleanHands This maxim meansthat aplaintiffwhohasbeenguiltyofin-equitableconduct inthe samematterconcerninghe relief against inequitable conduct of the defendant willbe demed remedy.No person can obtain affirmative, equitable relief in re-gard to atransaction in whichhehashimselfbeenguiltyofin-equitableconduct.Thus,aplaintiffseekingrelieffromafraud committed by defendant must not have committed any inequity in the same affair, or equity will not aid him. (8)He WhoSeeksEquity Must doEquity Consequently, aperson seeking the affirmative aid of an equity courtmayberequiredasaconditionofhisobtainingequitable reliefto dosuchactsaschancerydeemsjustandthereforere-quiredwithrespect' tothematteralthoughotherwisehecould not be compelled to perform such acts.Plaintiff coming intoeq-uity must not only have "clean hands,"or be free frominequita-ble conduct, but he must also doall that equity may consider on his part as right and fair in the transaction.l6 15 "Theoriginalstatuteoflimita-tionsdidnotapplyto suitsinequity. Butincaseswherethechancellors wereaskedtogiveequitableprotec-tionto alegalright,theyadoptedthe practiceofholdingthatadelayin theassertionoftherightwhich wouldbaranactionatlawthereon underthestatuteof , limitations wouldordinarilyamounttolaches \.hichprecludedreliefinequity. Theeffectofthepracticewasthat, incaseswherethedelaywasless thanthat whichwouldbaranaction , at law, tliedefendant must show that itwasunreasonableunderthe.cir-cumstances;delayof alonger Ileriod wouldbarrelief,unlessplaintiff 'Xluldaffirmativelyshowthatitwas reasonable.,Laterstatutesoflimi tationsapplytosuitsinequityas wellastoactionsatlaw.While equitycourtscannotdisregardthese statutesbyentertainingasuitafter thetermfixedbythestatutehasex-pired,theystillmayfindadelayless thanthetimefixedbythestatuteto beunreasonableandprejudicial,and thereforeto precluderecovery."Mc-Clintock,pp.40,41. 16 "The mostcommonclass of cases wherethemaximisappliediswhere theplaintiffseekstorecoverprop-erty,quiettitlethereto,orcancelan instrument,anditappearsthathe hasreceivedinconnectionwiththe transactionsomebenefitwhichwill 27 THEMAXIMSOFEQUITY 65 (9) Thereare Equalthe Law will Prevail Therefore, if two or more persons to acontroversy in chancery haveequitablerightsinthesubject-matterofequalmeritand oneofthemhasthelegalrightthereto,thechancellorwillre-fuseto grantreliefagainstthe holderof suchlegalrightinfa-voroftheothers.Theresult,then,isthesameasif thepro-ceedinghadbeenbrought at law inwhicheventthelegalright wouldprevail. (10)WhereThereareEqual theFirstinTimeWill Prevail Thus, if two or more persons to acontroversy in chancery have equitablerIghtsinthesubject-matter whichareofequalmerit, except as to time of origin,and none of the parties hasthelegal right thereto, equity will not give relief against the holder of the oldest claim in favor of the others.The result isthat the oldest right prevails. (11)Equity Follows the Law Thismaximresultsfromthehistoricalfactthatequityde-velopedbecauseofinadequaciesofthecommon-lawstructure andasasupplementthereto;it was ,notintendedtosupersede theoldersystem.Therefore,aschancerywouldgivecomplete reliefupontakingjurisdictionpfacontroversy,itnecessarily appliedcommon-lawruleswhereitcouldconsistentlydoso, hence the maxim.However,"the maxim that equity followsthe law isdisregarded much more frequentlythan it isapplied;nec-essarily so,since equity isasystem for the correction of thede-fects in the law.When equity is giving specific relief for the pro-tectionof legalrights,it generallywill followthelawindeter-mining what those rights are.In determining the rightsof par-tiesclaimingequitableinterestsinproperty,equitywilloften resultinhisunjustenrichmentifhe is permitted to obtain the t elief while retainingthebenefit.Thusonewho seekstocancelanoutstandingtax deedwillbecompelledtorepaythe amountofthetaxlienwhichwas dischargedbythetaxsale;inasuit toquiettitleagainstonewhohas beeninposseSSioningoodfaithun-dercoloroftitle,orbecauseofmis-take,plaintiffmaybecompelledto reimbursethelatterforthevalue SMITH EL.LAW 2d- 5 ofpermanentimprovementsplaced uponthepremisesortaxespaid thereon;onewhoseekstoca,ncel aninstrumentforfraudorillegality maybecompelledtorepaythecon-siderationhe hasreceived,with legal interest.But plaintiff cannot be com-pelledtoreimbursethedefendant forexpenditureshehasmadeunless theyhaveresultedinabenefitto plaintiff."McClintock,pp.31,32. 66EQUITYCh.G followthe analogyof common-law estates,but,if it considersit to be equitable to depart from that analogy,it willdoSO."17 Summary As the maximsare contradictory and not absoluteor peremp-tory,they maybeconfusingunlessitisrememberedthatthey arethe productsoftheequitysysteminoperation,usedbyits judgeslargelyasguides,andthattheyarenotthecausesof that system.The maxims are the proverbs of equity, generaliza-tionsformulatedbychancerydecisions,andbecausetheyare such,like~ o s t if notallgeneralities,theyarenotcompletely true.However,they may beusefulif properly understood,and "it may be true that he whohasfullycomprehendedtliemean-ingattachedtothesemaximsbycourtsofequityhasanin-sight into the essentials of equity jurisprudence."18 EQUITY IN THECOLONIES AND THE UNITED STATES 28.TheequitysystemofEnglandwasgenerallyadoptedinthe originalEnglishcoloniesin Americaand int h ~ later States asapartoftheirlaw,buttheadministrationthereofby acourtseparatefromthecommon-lawcourtswasnotso generally adopted. IncludedinthelawwhichtheEnglishcolonistscarriedto AmericawastheequitysystemdevelopedinEnglandbythe chancellors, but in many of the colonies opposition to the king re-sultedinoppositiontothechancellorasaroyalappointee,and inmostofthemtherewasaconflictforcontroloftheadmin-istration of equity between the popular legislatures and the royal or proprietary governors."Where the governorsprevailed,they exercisedthepowerthemselves,orappointedchancellorstodo so. 'Wherethelegislatureprevailed,theadministrationofthe system wasvested in localcourts,often the same courtsaswere alreadyexercisingjurisdictionincommon-lawcases."19When the Government of the United States wasestablishedtheConsti-tution20 providedthat,"ThejudicialPowershallextendtoall Cases,inLawandEquity,arisingunderthisConstitution,the Laws of the UnitedStates,and Treaties made,or whichshallbe made, under their AuthoFity."Therefore,the jurisdiction of the 17McClintock,p.30. 18McClintock,p.31,citing1Pom-eroy,Eq.JUr.363. 19 McClintock,pp.6,7. 20 Art.3,2,U.S.C.A.Const.. SMITH EL.LAW 2d 29THEFUSIONOFLAWANDEQUITY 67 federalcourts wasmade toincludesuitsinequityas wellas ac-tionsat law,but the two systems havealways been administered by the same courts and judges, rather than by separate tribunals as was the case in England.However,"the provisionof the first judiciary act[1Stat. 73]and of its successors,that procedure in the federalcourts should conform,as nearly as might be,to that of the courts of the state in which they sat,never applied to pro-cedureinequity;"2landuntilSeptember16,1938,whenthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure went into effect, equity wasad-ministeredby thefederalcourtsinthevariousstatesasauni-formsystemgovernedonlybythe precedentsoftheEnglish chancery court,exceptasmodifiedbyequityrulespromulgated fromtime to time by the United States Supr-emeCourt,whereas the procedure foractionsat law inthe-federalcourtsvariedac-cording to the prpcedure for suchactions obtaining in the courts ofthevariousstates.. THEFUSIONOF LAWANDEQUITY / 29.LegislationadoptedinEngland,theUnitedStates,andama-jorityoftheStates,hascombinedtheformerlyseparate common-lawandequityproceduralrulesandmethodsinto single systemsadministeredbythesamesystemsofcourts. In General Originally,actionsat lawandsuitsinequityweregoverned bydistinct systemsofproceduralrules,that is,therewasadis-tinct procedure for each, but during the nineteenth century move-mentsarosein Englandandthestatesagainstsuchcomplexity andlegislativesimplificationresulted.However,theextentto which the formerly separate, systems of procedure have been uni-fiedvaries in different jurisdictions. The English Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875, whichwent into effect in 1875, united all the principal tribunals i.ntoone Supreme Courtof Judicature,andprovidedthat,ineachdivisionofsuch court,law and equity should be administered concurrently under asingle,simplifiedcodeofprocedure,andthat,incaseof con-flictbetween rules of equity and common-lawrulesapplicableto the same matter, therulesof equity shouldprevail. In1934,Congresspassedanenactment22 whichauthorized theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtt.ounitether.ulesgoverning 21McClintock,p.7.1,2,48Stat.1064,28U.S.C.A. 22ActofJune19,1934,c.651,723b,723c. 68 .EQUITYCh.5 suits in equity and actions at law in the federalcourts;and pur-suant to this statute "the Court has united the general rules pre-scribed by it for cases in equity with those in actions at law so as tosecureoneformofcivilactionandprocedureforboth."23 Theseregulations,entitledthe"FederalRulesofCivilProced-ure,"24 becameeffectiveSeptember 16,1938,andsupersededall prior lawsin conflictwiththem."Theserulesgovernthepro-cedure in the district courts of the United States in allsuits ofa civilnaturewhethercognizableascasesatlaworinequity."25 Rule2providesthat,"Thereshallbeoneformofactiontobe known as 'civil action.'''However,"these rulesdonot applyto proceedings in admiralty,"26sothe formsand modesof proceed-ing in suitsof admiralty and maritimejurisdiction arestillgov-ernedby aseparate systemofrulespromulgatedunderanother statute.27 Procedural regulations differ in the several states, ,but most of them haveadoptedlegislationabolishingtheformaldistinctions between suits in equity and actions .at law,and"the tendencyof the present age is strongly toward the obliteration of the separa-tion between common-law and equity jurisdiction."28 23FromalettefbyMr.CharlesE. Hughes,ChiefJusticeoftheUnited States,withwhichtheFederalRules ofCivilProcedureadoptedbythe SupremeCourtweretransmittedto the AttorneyGeneral,who,underthe Act ofJune 19,1934,had theduty of reporting the rulesto theCongress. 24Rule85,28U.S.C.A.following section723c. 25Rule1,28U.S.C.A.following ' section723c. 26 Rule81(a)(1),28U.S.C.A.fol-lowingsection, 723c.' 27SeeR.S. 913,28U.S.C.A.723. 28 Bowman,p.281. "Codesorpracticeactspurporting toabolishtheformaldistinctionsbe-tweenactionsatlawandsuitsin equitywereadoptedinthefollowing statesintheyearsindicatea.:Ari-zona,1864;California,1850;Col-orado,1877;Connecticut,1879;II linois,1933;Indiana,1852;Idaho, 1864 ;Kansas,1859 ;Minnesota, 1851 ;Missouri,1849 ;Montana, 1865;Nebraska,1855;Nevada, 18eO;NewMexiCO,1897;NewYork, 1848;NorthCarolina,1888;North Dakota,1862;Ohio,1853;Okla-homa,1890;SouthCarolina,1870; SouthDakota,1862;Utah,1870 ; Washington,1854;Wisconsin,1856; . and Wyoming,1869;andinthe Ter-ritoriesofAlaska,1900,andPuerto Rico,1904.InAlabama,Arkansas, Delaware,Mississippi,NewJersey, Tennessee,andVermontseparate courtsofequityarestillmaintained. Intheotherstatestheformaldis-tinction between law andequity suits . ismaintainedtoagreater or lessex-tent,buttnetwosystemsareadmin-isteredbythesamecourts,asisthe case in thefederaljudiciarysystem." McClintock,pp.7.8,note. CHAPTER6 ENACTEDLAW 30.InGeneral. 31.Classificationof Statutes. INGENERAL 30.Theenactedlawofastateisthatpartofitspositivelaw whichhasbeenformulatedbylegislation,asdistinguished fromadjudication,exceptthatitincludessuchjudicialde-cisionsasconstituteauthoritativeinterpretationsoflegis-lation.l Nature Legislative power is "lawmaking" power and therefore a part of . the ultimate, sovereign power in astate.As such, it is manifest-ed in one of the United States whenever the people thereof amend their constitution or ordain anew one.However,the most num-erousillustrationsofenactedlawintheStatesandtheUnited States are the statutes enacted by the legislativedepartmentsof thegovernments.BecausethelegislativepowerintheStates andthe UnitedStates may beauthoritativelyexercisedinmore waysthan one,theenactedlawsthereofsubdivideintothefol-lowingclasses:(1)federaland state constitutions;(2)federal andstatestatutes,oracts;(3)federaltreaties;(4)executive ordersand proclamations of the President and of the StateGov-ernors,asauthorized by statutes;(5)administrativeregulations of headsof departments,boards,and commissions,when author-ized by statutes;(6)ordinances of the subdivisions of the States, such as cities and villages;and,(7)rules of courts regulating the manner~ conducting proceedings before them. 1The term"statutory law" is some-timesusedinreferringtotheenact-edlawofastate,butinthestrict senseastatuteis"aparticularlaw enactedandestablishedbythewill ofthelegislativedepartmentofgov-ernment,"[Black'sLawDictionary, 3d.Ed.,p.1655],anddoesnot include suchenactmentsaswrittenconstitu-69 tionsortreaties.Theterm"writ-tenlaw"hasalsobeenusedassyn-onymousof enacted law,but israrely usedsoinmodernpractice,theterm "legislation"beingpreferred,orthe specificterm"constitution,""stat-ute,"or "ordinance,"as thecase may Le. 70 ENACTEDLAWCh.6 HistoryandDevelopment The formulation of laws by enactment through the agency of a representative, distinct,and relatively independent legislative de-partmentofgovernmentsuchasthelegislaturesofthesevera.:. States and theCongressoftheUnitedStates,hasbeen brought aboutastheresultofgradualdevelopmentsinEnglandwhich evolved the English Parliament.2 "The English Parliament is the 2Concerningthisdevelopment,Ra-din hassaid:"We are,most of us,at the presentday,soaccustomedto the theorythat governmentalpowerisof threetypes,executive,legislativeand judicial,that wefindit hard tothink ourselvesintoasituationwhenthis divisionwasnotcommonlyusedbe-cause'itwasunknown.Further,of thethreepowers,thelegislative,al- ' thoughitisofficiallycalledmerely co-ordinate,isinpopularcontempla-tion,sodefinitelythemostimportant that itsactivityisthoughtofaspre-eminentlycreatingourlaw.Inan-cientsocieties'legislationisnot thoughtofasaofgovern-ment. "Ournotionofthelegislativefunc-tions,again,cannotreadily detachit-selffromthekindofiegislativema-chinerywhichwepossessourselves andwhichmostcountriesinthe world,exceptafewrecentlycreated dictatorships,haveadopted.It isof origin.Itscharacteristic ,is tliatitconsistsoftwoseparatelyor-ganizedbodies,usuallyequalinpow-H,butnotindignity.Inaddition, thereisasingleexecutivewhohas usuallyonlyasuspensiveveto,but whofrequentlyhastherightofsub-mitting proposalsor advisingthecar-ryingoutofcertainspecifiCorgen-eralpolicies.Whatthetwolegisla-tivebodies,meetingseparatelyand actingsuccessively,agreeupon,isa statute,a'law,'bindingonthe entire citizenry.Andthe'laws'so'passed,' numberingmanyhundredsoreven thousands,are peremptorycommands tothecourts. "Allthiswouldbequiteunintelli-gibletothe men wholaid thefounda-tionsofourlegalsystem ' andwho developedit intomoderntimes.Our theoryofstatute didnotbegin totakeshapeuntiltheoverthrowof theStuartsandtheestablishmentof Parliamentarysupremacy.TheEng-lishConstitutionoftheeighteenth century,idealizedandwronglyana-lyzedinMontesquieu'sSpiritof Laws,becamethesymbolof, enlight-enedfreedomandgatheredwithinit-selfagreatdealoftheimpulsive forceofthedoctrineofNaturalLaw. Thebreachwithmedievalideaswas reallymadethenandnottillthen. AnActofParliamentwasthenfor thefirsttimefullyandunquestion-ablywhatitsnameimplies,ade-terminationmadebyabody'organiz-edspecificallytomakesuchdeter-minations,andending allcontroversy onwhateversubject-mattercO)1ldby reasonableintendmentbecoveredby thewordsoftheact.*** "Theeffectofstatutesonthede-velopmentofEngiishlawis onethat ishighlycharacteristic.Thefirst statutesbeingspecificallyr2yalcom-mands,oftenaslimitedintimeasin personsaffected,didnotseemto createlaw,asweunderstandit. Thatistosay,theacceptednotion wasnotthattherewasagreatbody ofestablishedlawtowhicheach statuteprotam,tobroughtsomemod-ification,whetherbyadditionorsub-traction.Itwasinthefirstplace doubtfulwhetherastatutebyitself did not expire with the kingwhohad issuedit.Thedocumentsinwhich 30INGENERAL 71 modelofparliamentarygovernmentthroughouttheworld. Whenthe Americanstateandfederalconstitutionswereestab-lished,theEnglishmodelwascontrollingtoaconsiderableex-tent.Thetheoryofseparationofpowersassetforthbythe famousEspritdesLoisofMontesquieuwasaccepted,butit de-partedsofarfrom , theEnglishmodelthattheexecutive--cor-respondingroughlytotheMinistry- hadnoseatsinCongress or the Legislature and took no part in the debates of these bodies. Otherwise,thegeneralexampleoftheEnglishsystemwasfol-lowed.Whetherapowerislegislativeoradministrativeorju-dicialis determined,not by logical categories,but by the historic factofwhether it wasapower possessedbythe EnglishParlia-ment.If it wassopossessed,it isalsopossessedbyAmerican legislatures,unlessithasbeenspecificallytakenawaybythe Constitution.In this way,the rights to summon personsto give infOrrilation, to punish for contempt, to grant divorces,have been declaredtobepowersofthelegislatures,eventhoughnotex-presslygranted.Andsomeoftheseimpliedpowershavebeen claimedeven for the federalCongress,despitetheconstitutional declarationthatCongresshasonlyspecificallygrantedpowers. Whilethe upper house of the federalCongress,the Senate,has a basis of representation quite different from that of the lowerthe .' dIfference between the upper and the lower housesof most states isusually adifferenceof rank.The Senate issmaller,and mem-bership in it confers aslightly greater prestige,although,in fact, theSenatehas very little legislativepower that isnotP9ssessed by the lower house, generally called the Assembly.The ghost of thekingspeaksforhimselfandhis , uccessorsareusuallychartersof libertieswhichwereassumedtohave existedbeforetheking'sreignand mightthereforewellsurviveit. Kingswouldrepeatthe'goodstat-ures'oftheirpredecessors,andthat factmayhaverenderediteasyto thata 'royalenactmentlasted indefinitelyandwouldbeenfor:ced, or,better,thatitwastacitlyreaf-firmedbysubsequentkings. "ButtheCommonLawwasthe creationoftheking'scourts.They hadmenbroughtbeforethemby writs,andtheKing'sChancery, whichserved,supplementedandlater correctedtheking'scourts,wouldis-suewritstoalltheking'sliegemen forafee.Itwasbynomeansa matterofcoursethateverystatute wouldjustifyawrit[onaright claimedunderastatute].*** Butitsoonbecamethecasethat statuteshadthisforce.Inthe four -teenthcentury,itwastakenfor grantedthat,iftherewasastatute, oneneededneitheraprecedentin theChancerynoracloselyresembl-ingwrit.If thestatutewaspresent-ed,awrit citing itswordsandbasing itself on that alonewasquiteenough. Theclerksmustissueit,asthey must issueanywritdecursu.Other-wisetheydeniedjustice,andanac- ' countwouldbedemandedofthem. "Statutesthusbecomeasourceof lawintheEnglishsystem,because 72 ENACTEDLAWCh.6 theFeudal MagnaOuriaseems tobechieflyresponsibleforthe distinction."3 United States The enacted law of the United States embraces:(1)the Con-stitution of the United States;(2)actsof Congress;(3)treaties of the UnitedStates;(4)executiveordersandproclamationsof the President;(5)administrative regulationsof headsof depart-ments,boards,andcommissions;(6)actsofterritoriallegisla-tures,localtoeachparticularterritory;(7)judicialinterpreta-tions of the foregoing by federaland State courts subject tofinal determinationby the SupremeCourtofthe UnitedStates;and, (8)the rules of practice in the federalcourts. States The enacted law of astate embraces:(1)its constitution;(2) . theactsofitslegislature;(3)executiveordersandproclama-tionspromulgatedbyitsgovernor;(4)administrativeregula-tions of state boards and commissions;(Q)ordinancesofits sub-divisionssuch ascitiesand villages,local to eachparticular sub-division;(6)judicialinterpretationsoftheforegoingbystate andfederalcourts;and,(7)therulesofpracticeofthestate courts. Legislative Procedure Afederalor state statute, to be valid,must beenacted incon-formity with pertinent constitutional provisions;but it is not nec-essarythat parliamentaryrulesofprocedurenor theanalogous rules of the enacting house be strictly followed.4 During its for-mativestagesinthelegislativeprocessaproposedenactment is called a"bill,"and it doesnot becomea"statute" or law until ithassuccessfullyprogressedthroughthevariousstepsofthe theyareadmittedbythecourtsas ameansofinitiatingcourtaction." RadinonAnglo-AmericanLegalHis-tory,pp.327,328,333,334. 3RadinonAnglo-AmericanLegal History,pp.63,64. 4Inrespecttoproceduralmatters notregulatedbyconstitutionalpro-visions,legislaturesaresubjectonly tosuchrulesas ' theymayprescribe forthemselvesorchoosetorecog-nize.However,parliamentaryrules ofprocedureingeneraluseareor-dinarilyfollowed,exceptastomat-tersregardedbyaparticularlegis-latureasrequiringspecialrules.As alegislaturehastheauthorityto changeitsrulesofprocedurewhen-everitmaysodesire,astatuteen-actedbyitinconformitywithper-tinentconstitutionalprovisionswill besustainedbythecourtsalthough theproceduralrulesofthelegisla-tivebodymaynothavebeenobserv-edinthe passage of the ad;. 80INGENERAL 73 I legislative ,process.Thesestepsusuallyinclude:(1)introduc-tion;(2)referenceto acommittee;(3)readings;(4)vote;(5) signingbythepresidingofficer;(6)presentationtotheother housewherein the foregoingprocedureisrepeated;(7)submis-sionto,andapproval or disapprovalby,theexecutive;and,(8) reconsideration by the legislature in case of veto by the executive. Ordinarilyanymemberhasarighttointroduceabilltohis house,and the usualpracticeistoreferthebilltoacommittee afteritsintroduction.Thecommitteethenconsidersitandre-fersit back,withreportsfavorableor otherwise, . forconsidera-tionbythehouse.In severalofthestatesthiscourseismade obligatorybytheconstitution."Asageneralrule,billsofany kindmayoriginateineitherhouseofastatelegislature,and may be amended,accepted,or rejectedbythe other.Theprin-cipalexception to thisrule isin the caseof measures forraising revenue,which,bytheconstitutionsofmostofthestates,are requiredtobefirstintroducedintheloweror morenumerous branchofthelegislature.1iButsuchaconstitutionalprovision appliesonly to bills to levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, andnot to billsforother purposeswhichmayincidentallyraise revenue.Theconstitutionsofmanyofthestatesrequirethat abill,beforeit shall becomealaw,shall bereadacertain num-beroftimes(usuallytwoorthree)ineachhouse.In respect tothe manner of such reading,theprovisionisconsideredmere-ly directory; but not so with regard to the fact of its beingread. If the constitution isnot obeyed in thisparticular,the statute is void."6Thesovereign intendment behindsuchprovisionsisthe procurementofduedeliberationat thisstageoftheenactment proceeding. To become alaw abillmust .be approved by avote of the nec-essary majority of both hauses of the legislature."In some spe-cialcasesamajorityoftwo-thirdsor eventhree-fourthsispre-scribed.But ordinarily asimple majority isenough.If the con-IS (TheConstitutionoftheUnited States,art.1,7,cl.1,U.S.C.A.also requiresthat,"AllBillsforraising RevenueshalloriginateintheHouse ofRepresentatives.") 6Black,p.357."In aconsiderable numberofthestates,theconstitu-tionprovidesthatthethreereadings ofabillmaybe ' dispendedwithin caseof'urgency'byavoteoftwo-thirdsorthree-fourthsofthemem-bersofthe,housewhere' themeasure ispending.Whensuchanoccasion arises,it isfor the house alonetode-terminewhetherthereissuch'ur-gency'astojustifythepassageof thebillwithoutreadingorwithless thantheusualnumberofreadings. Thisisaquestionwhichwillnotbe inquiredintobythecourts."Black, p.358.. 74 ENACTEDLAWCh.6 stitutionprovidesforavotebyamajority'ofthemembers'or 'of the wholerepresentation,'thisisimperative.But if there-quirementissimplythat thereshallbeamajority,itisunder-stood that amajority of those present and voting(provided they constituteaquorum)will .besufficient.Butwhateverthecon-stitutionalrequirementmaybe,itisabsolutelynecessary,that thebillshouldreceivethe concurrent votesofasufficientnum-ber of the members of each house to enact it into alaw.If this is notthecase,itneverbecomesastatuteofthestate,andthe courtsare not bound t9regardor obeyit.Moreover,thesame actmustbepassedbybothhousesinthesameidenticalform, and inthat formit mustbesubmittedtothegovernorinorder tobecomealaw."7Havingbeendulypassedbytherequisite majorities of the legislature,engrossed,andattested by thepre-siding officersof the legislativehouses,abillissubmitted tothe executive for his approval or veto.If approved by the executive, the bill becomes alaw; if vetoed, abill doesnot become alaw un-lessitisenaGtedoverthedisapprovaloftheexecutivebythe legislativemajorityrequiredinsuchcases,but"suchpassage makes it ipso facto alaw."8" OF STATUTES 31.Statutesdivideintodifferentclasses,accordingtotheirform, thetimeoftheactsonwhichtheyoperate,thepersons whomtheyaffect,theterritorywithintheirforce,their ob-ject,their effectastoactsincomplianceornotincompli-ancewiththem,theirrelationtopriorstatutes,andtheir re,lation to the decisional or common law.. Form Astotheir form,statutesareeitheraffirmativeornegative. , Astatuteisaffirmativeinformwhenexpressedinaffirmative terms;negative,whenexpressedinnegativeterms. 07 Black,pp.358,359. 8 Black,p.314. Astatuteofcompleteformusually containsthefollowingparts:(1)A title,brieflyindicating its nat ure;(2) Apreamble,beginningwith"Where-as,"andindicatingthereasonsfor thestatute,'andpossiblyitsgeneral effect;(3)The ' pur view,orbodyof t hestatute,generallybeginningwith "Beitenacted."Tovariousother partsorclausesofastatutedescrip-tivetermsarealsocommonlyattach-edbylawyers.Thus,theclausebe-ginningwith"Beitenacted,"and endingwith"that,"istermedtheen-actingclause;apassageexplaining themeaningofwordsortermsused i::;calledaninterpretationclause; and,passagesbeginning"Except,"or "Provided,"Or"Nothinginthisact shall,"aretermed,respectively,ex-ceptions,provisos,and saving clauses. 31 Time CLASSIFICATIONOFSTATUTES75 Asto the time of the acts on whichthey operate,statutesare either prospectiveor retrospective.Aprospective statute isone whichappliesonlytoactswhichareperformedafteritsenact-ment.Aretrospectivestatuteisonewhichappliestoactsper--formed' priorto its enactment."If aretrospectivestatuteisin thenature ofan ex post factolawor abillofattainder,or ifit impairstheobligation ofcontrC;lctsor divestsvestedrights,or if allretrospectivelawsarespecificallyforbiddenbytheconstitu-tionoftheparticular state,suchanact willbeunconstitutional and void,but not otherwise." PersonsAffected As to the persons whomthey affect,statutes are either public or private.Apublicstatuteisonewhichappliestopersonsin general. 'Aprivate statute isone whichappliesonlytopartieu-lar persons.For example,alaw providingpensionsforallper-sonsconformingto .certainconditionsispublic;whereasanact granting apensiontoaparticularpersonisprivate.Generally, publicstatutesareincludedin codificationsbutprivatestatutes arenot,andtheformermaybejudiciallynoticed,ornoticed withoutproofofthembycourts;whereasprivateenactments must be proved incourt unlessjudicial noticeofthemisrequir-ed by statute.10 Territory Asto the territory within their force,statutesare either gen-eral or local.Ageneralstatute isonethat appliestothe entire territory over which the legislature which enacts it has authority. A localstatute isoneapplicableonlytoalimitedportionofthe territory over which the legislature that enacts it has authority. The classification of general and localstatutes issometimescon-fusedwiththeclassificationofpublicandprivatestatutes,but theirbasesaredifferent,theformerinvolvingadistinctionof persons;the latter,adistinctionofplace. Object Astotheirobject,statutesareeitherremedialorpenal. "Remedial statutes are those which are enacted to afford arem-9 BlackonInterpretationofLaws, 2d.Ed"115,p.382. TheConstitutionoft):leUnited Statesprovides,(Art.1,9,c1.3), "NoBill of Attainder or ex post facto Lawshallbepassed;"and,1, 10,c1.1),"NoStateshall..,.,. passanyBillofAttainder ,expost factoLaw,orLawimpairingtheOb-ligationofContracts." 10 SeeMcKelvey ' onEvidence,4th. Ed.,p.30. 76 ENACTEDLAW C46 edy,or facilitatean existing remedy,or tocorrectdefects,mis-takes,andomissions.Penalstatutesarethosebywhichpun-ishmentsare imposed for transgressions of the law,civilaswell as criminal."11 Effect Astotheir effect onactsof persons whichareincompliance or not in compliancewith them,and as to their effect whenper-sonsomit to dosuch actsasarewithintheir scope,statutesare eitherpreceptive,prohibitive,permissive,or directory.Astat-uteispreceptiveormandatory"whenitcommandsandre-quiresthatcertainactionshallbetakenbythosetowhomthe statute isaddressed,without leavingthem anychoiceor discre-tion in the matter, or when,in respect to action taken under the statute, there must be exact and literal compliance with its terms, or else the act done willbe 'absolutelyvoid."l2Failure to doan actrequiredbyapreceptiveormandatorystatute,whichact isoneofaseries,may renderineffectualaresultsoughttobe obtained.For example,failureof personsorganizing acorpora-tiontodoanactrequiredbyamandatoryprovisionoftheap-plicablelaw maypreventtheirassociation 'frombecomingade jure, as distinguished from ade facto,corporation, although they may have complied with variousother mandatoryrequirements. Aprohibitive statute is one which forbidscertain acts,rendering suchactsunlawfulwhencommittedandsubjectingthepersons guiltythereof totheprescribedpenalties.Astatute"which authorizesor'peJ;'1l1itscertainactiontobetakenbythoseto whomit is addressedor whomit concerns,at their optionor in their discretion, but does not imperatively require it,issaid to be enabling or permissive."13Astatute "which directsthemanner inwhichcertainactionshall. betakenorcertainofficialduties performed issaidto bedirectory when itsnature and terms are such. thatdisregardofit,or wantofliteralcompliancewithh, thoughconstitutinganirregularity,willnotabsolutelyvitiate theproceedingstakenunder it."14 RelationtoPrior Statutes In its relation to existing acts amay be either amenda-tory,declaratory,ororiginal.Astatuteisamendatorywhen 11 How toFind the Law, 2d.Ed.,p.13 Blackon Interpretation of Laws, 181.2d.Ed.,148,p.525. 12 Black onInterpretation of Laws,14 BlackonInterpretation of Laws, 2d.Ed.,147,p.525.2d.Ed.,149,p.525, 31CLASSIFICATIONOFSTATUTES 77 it alters,amends,or supplementsanexisting. Astatuteis declaratoryor expository in its relationt? an eXlstmgactwhen its purpose is to interpret or construe, clarify or define,the mean-ingofanexistingact.A which. neith_eramendatory nor declaratory of an existing act ISan orIgmal stawte. Relation to CommonLaw Commonlawmaybeaffirmedordeclared,or superseded by statutes.Astatute ismItsto the common law when it merely affirmsprmclples alreadyeXist-ingtherein.Onthe other hand anact whichissupplementary to the common law "does not displacethat law anythan isclearlynecessary.Thestatuteisingen.eralas Iumulativeunless the rights or remedies WhIChIt creates mere y c,"hIw areexpresslymadeexclusive."15However". t commona givesway to astatute whichis WIthIt;a.nda statute is designedas arevision, or cOdi.ficatI.onof thewholebodyofthelawapplicabletoagivenItsu-persedes the c'ommon law so far as it applies tosubJect,and 1 Partofit inforce."16Court-made develop eavesno.It'ld I darealtered graduallyandslowly,but by legiS aIOn0aw :ay bechangedornewlaw instantaneously; thus"legislation tends, with advancmg CIvilIZation,to become the ,.fI"17 nearly exclUSIve source 0newaw. 15 Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2d.Ed., 111,p. 363. 16 Black onInterpretation of Laws, 2d.Ed.,112,p.365. 17 Holland,Jurisprudence,p.65. CHAPTER7 THERANKANDINTERPRETATIONOFLAWS 32.LawasSupreme. 33.LawsandTheir Rank. 34.RulesforConstructionof Statutes. 35.TheAuthorityandInterpretationofJudicialDecisions., LAWASSUPREME 32.Theprincipleof"equalitybeforethelaw"isa ' characteristic ofAnglo-Americanjurisprudence,andgovernmentalof-. ficialsaswellasprivatepersonsareusually subjecttothe samegenerallegalpreceptsadministeredbytheordinary courtsofjustice;butthelegalpreceptssoadministered are of differentrank. Law in medievalEngland was thought ofas"something ante-cedentandparamount tothestate.Hencedespite 'thedespotic characterofthekinglypowerthenandlater,abstracttheories of an absolute and limitless sovereignty have never had the place inEnglishconstitutionaltheorywhichtheyearlyobtainedand long held in other countries."1.AsBracton wrote,(about 1250), "ThekingrulesunderGodandtheLaw."2. Suchphilosophy constitutedat leastapart ofthebackgroundoftheconflictbe-tweentheStuart kingsandthecourtsin ,theearlyseventeenth century,comingtorealizationintheRevolutionof1688;and, "whilethepoliticaltenetstillremainstruethat'thekingcan do no wrong,'his'responsible'ministers,whoconduct the actual operations of government in his name, are for the most part sub-ject,like unofficialpersons,to the ordinary law oftheland.In most countries the conduct of publicofficersisjudged in accord-ancewithaspecialadministrativelawadministeredbyspecial administrative courts.In England, and consequently in the Unit-edStates,suchofficersareforthemostpart answerabletothe ordinary law administered by the ordinary courts;[and the con-ceptionof lawashasmadeEnglishpoliticaldevelop-ment and English politicaltheory,and in consequencethe politi-caldevelopmentand theoryoftheUnitedStates,differentfrom those of most of the world.It has also exalted the judicial office and the power of the courts-the law issupreme,and the judges 1 Bowman,pp.203,204. 2De Legibu8,f.5b. 78 83LAWSANDTHEIRRANK 79 areitscustodiansandinterpreters.WhereverEnglishlawhas gone throughout the world,the courts of last resort have always apeculiarlypowerfulandpredominantauthorityinitsenuncia-tion."3 Consistentwiththistradition,thejurallawoftheUnited StatesandthemunicipallawoftheseveralStatesaresupreme withintheir spheres,andallpersonsareordinarilyamenableto th,em;but,byreasonoftheconstitutionaltheoriesandthefed-eraland,stategovernmentsobtainingintheUnitedStates,the variouslawsofthedifferentgovernmentsareofunequalrank and where two rules conflict the higher in rank prevails. LAWSAND THEIR RANK 33.LawsintheUnitedStatesrankinauthorityasfollows: (a)The Constitution of the United States, (b)TheStatutesandTreaties oftheUnited States, (c)The Constitution of the State, (d)The Statutes of the State, (e)The Local Ordinances, and (f)TheCommonLaw. TheConstitutionoftheUnited, States,aspreviouslyshown, provides:"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall bethe supremeLaw of the Land;andtheJudgesin every Stateshallbeboundthereby,anyThingintheConstitutionor LawsofanyStatetotheContrarynotwithstanding."4Conse-quently,if aprovision of the federalconstitution isapplicableto acontroversypendingbeforeacourt,nootherlawneedbe lookedto as the constitutionissupreme ana governswhere ,per-tinent;but as the precepts recited in the federalconstitution are relativelyfewinnumberandgeneraliri character,therulede-terminativeoflitigationismoreoftenofdifferentauthority.. Nexttothe federalconstitutionindegreeof forcearethestat-utesand treaties of the UnitedStates.Theseare of co-ordinate rank,alatertreatysupersedingaprior,inconsistentstatute; a later statute superseding aprior, inconsistent treaty. 3 Bowman,p.204.4Art.6,U.S.C.A.Const. 80 THERANKANDINTERPRETATIONOFLAWSCh.7 Theconstitutions,statutes,andordinancesoftheseveral statesandtheir subdivisionsareinferiorinranktothefederal constitutionandthevalidstatutesandtreatiesoftheUnited States,and nolawofaparticular state hasany forceif it isin--consistentwiththe, constitutionorvalidstatutesandtreades oftheUnitedStates.However,mostofthecasespresentedto the courts of astate involveonlythe law o f theparticular state and within its sphere the constitution ofthe state isthe supreme law.Nextinauthorityaretheconstitutionalstatutesofthe state,andbelowthestatutesaretheregulationsofthestate's subdivisionssuchastheordinancesofcitiesandvillages.No such ordinance is valid if it conflicts with either astatute or the constitutionofthestate. In casesofconflict between common-law principlesand enact-ed precepts, the latter prevail. , Executive Regulations By reason of the functionaldivisionof governmentalpower in the UnitedStatesandtheconstitutionalgrantsthereoftosepa-ratedepartments,thegeneralprincipleisthatCongressorthe legislature of astate cannot transfer the legislativepowers vest-ed in themto thejudicial or the executivedepartments;butal-though alegislative body cannot delegate its power to make laws, "yet, having enacted statutes,it may invest executiveofficersor boards or commissionscreated for the purpose with authority to makerulesandregulationsforthepracticaladIDinistrationof such statutes in matters of detail and to enforce the same, and al-so to determine the existence of the facts or conditionson which the application of the law depends."5 15 Black,76,p.108. "The Congressmay not delegate its purelylegislativepowertoacOp1mis-sion,but,havinglaiddownthegen-eralrulesofactionunderwhicha commissionshallproceed,it mayre-quireofthatcommissiontheappli-cationofsuchrulesto particularsit-uationsandtheinvestigationof facts,witllaviewtomakingorders inaparticularmatterwithfnthe ruleslaiddownbytheCongress." InterstateCommerceCommissionv. GoodrichTransitCo.,224U.S.194, 214,32S.Ot.436,441,56L.Ed.729, 1912. Thus,"astoallofthefollowing, the constitutionalityoftheircreation andofthegrantsofpowerstothem hasbeensustained:TheInterstate CommerceCommission,withcontrol overallthe' railroadsofthecountry doinganinterstatebusiness;the FederalTradeCommission,designed to stop unfair method;;of competition inbusiness;theFederalReserve Board,unifyingthebankingsystem (\fthe country and with ameasureof controloverthenationalbanks; variousformsofindustrial commissions in theseveralstates,ad-ministeringworkmen'scompensation 33LAWSANDTHEIRRANK81 However,the President oftheUnitedStateshasauthorityto promulgate proclamations "either on hisowninitiativeor asa u ~thorizedor directedbytheConstitutionoranactofCongress. While they have not the force of law,they are,in the latter case, of binding effect.In English law, aproclamation is 'a notice pub-liclygivenofanythingwhereof thekingthinksfittoadvertise hissubjects.'In American law,it isaformalandofficialpublic notice,issuedbythechiefexecutiveinhisownname,intended forthe noticeofallpersonswhomay beconcerned,announcing somestatuteor treaty,or somepublicactordetermination,or intendedaction,oftheexecutivedepartment,whichotherwise might not be sowidely or soquicklypromulgated.Themaking ofproclamationsisnotanassumptionoflegislativepowers. ......TheauthorityofthePresidenttoissueproclamations issometimesderivedfromactsofCongressspecificallyempow-ering him to do soin relation to aparticular matter,and in other casesappearstobederivedfromhisduty totakecarethatthe lawsbe faithfullyexecuted."s The President alsohas authority to issue executive orders and his subordinates have authority to promulgate rulesforthe reg-ulation of the internal affairs and procedure ofthe executivede-partment andits subdivisions;but therulesandorderspromul-gatedbythePresidentor by theheadsofthedepartmentsun-der his authority relating to the conduct of publicbusinessor to thecivilserviceorotheradministrativematters"havenotthe force of law and are not statutes in any sense;and although they areeffectiveforthe internalcontrolandgovernmentoftheex-ecutive departments, courts of equity have no jurisdiction or au-thority to enforce them."7 laws;boardsandcommissionsau-thorizedtofixminimumwagesand maximumhoursoflaborforwomen andchildreninindustry;stateand nationalcivilservicecommissions, prescribingrulesfortheapPOintment andremovalofpublicofficers;rail-roadboards,publicservicecommis-sionsorpublicutilitiescommissions, withcontroloverthevariousforms ofpubliGservicecorporations,the servicetheyrender,andtp.erates theymaycharge;stateandlocal boardsofhealth;commissionsto regulatethesaletothepublicof SMITH EL.LA w 2d-6 stocksandbondsandenforcethe 'bluesky'laws;boardsofcensors formovingpictures;"andboardsof . examinersorcommissionershaving C0ntl'01overthelicenSingofp2rsons desiringtopracticeasphysicians, dentists,pharmacists,engineers,ar-chitects,ortoengageinanyoneof ~ largenumberofoccupations." Black,pp.110,111. 6Black,pp.140,141. 7 Black,p.141. 82 THERANKANDINTERPRETATIONOFLAWSCh.7 Principlesanalogoustothosepertinenttofederalexecutive promulgationsapplyingeneral to thesimilarregulations' issued by state executive officers,boards,and commissions.Hencethe power tomake,amend,andrepeallawsallowedthelegislatures of the states by their constitutionscannot bedelegatedbythem tootherbodiesor persons;butwhenthelegislatureofastate enactsageneral law completeinitself"it mayconferonpublic officers9radministrativeboardsorcommissionstheauthority tomakerulesandregulationsforcarryingthelawintoeffect, andthereisnounlawfuldelegationoflegislativepowerthough the administrators of the law must deal in aquasi legislative way with matters which are in acertain aspect legislative, though pre-dominantlyadministrativeintheirnature.Butnoperson's rights or property can be subjected to the arbitrary control of any officer or board, and a statute which delegates unlimited power to apublic official, to be exercised by him in his discretion and with-out restraint fromany rulesor laws,isinvalid."8 CourtRules Courts have inherent power to make proper regulations for the administrationof their businessandrulestogovern theproced-ureoftrials,but the legislativepower,subjecttoconstitutional restrictions,,includesauthoritytoestablishtheprocedureby whichcourtsshallexercisetheirjurisdictionandwhereaposi-tive rule of practice is declared by statute the courts have no dis-cretion in the matter.Generally,however,courts are authorized by statute to make such regulations asare necessary. Theinherentpowerofthejudiciarytoregulateitsadminis-trativeandproceduralaffairsisnotabsolutebutissubjectto constitutionalandstatutorylimitations.Inotherwords,court rulesareinferiorin , ranktostatutesandconstitutionalprovi-sions,thus,where acourt ruleconflictswithastatuteor consti-tutional provision the court rule must yield and the superior con-stitutionalorstatutory provisionprevails.9 8Black,p.354. 9"Onlysuchmattersasarenot regulatedbygeneralorspeciallaws inreferencetopracticeandproce-duremayberegulatedbyaruleof court.Amongmatterswhich,sub-jecttothisprincipleandtotherules 28toreasonablenessandconformity toconstitutionalandstatutorypro-visions,areproperforregulationby r-uleofcourtmaybementionedproc-ess;theissuanceofattachments; noticesofappearance;calendars; callingofthedockets;thepublica-tionoflegalnotices;thenecessity ofpleadings;theformofpleading, orbriefs,orofstipulationsoragree-ments;presentingorfilingcom-plaints,pleadingsandotherpapers; SMITH EL.LAW2d 84 RULESFORCONSTRUCTIONOFSTATUTES83 RULESFOR CONSTRUCTIONOF STATUTES .-34.Rulesfortheconstructionofstatutesconsistofregulatory anddirectoryprincipleswhichhavebeendevelopedbythe judiciaryandwhichareusedbythecourtsasstandards forinterpretingenactmentsanddeterminingthelegislative intention in statutes." InGeneral The functionof the is that ofresolvingconflictsbe-tweenlegalinterestsbyth