RULE 102Habeas CorpusSection 1. To what habeas corpus extends. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ ofhabeas corpusshall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.Section 2. Who may grant the writ. The writ ofhabeas corpusmay be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for the hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district.Section 3. Requisites of application therefor. Application for the writ shall be by petition signed and verified either by the party for whose relief it is intended, or by some person on his behalf, and shall set forth:(a) That the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained on his liberty;(b) The officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained; or, if both are unknown or uncertain, such officer or person may be described by an assumed appellation, and the person who is served with the writ shall be deemed the person intended;(c) The place where he is so imprisoned or restrained, if known;(d) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person, if it can be procured without impairing the efficiency of the remedy; or, if the imprisonment or restraint is without any legal authority, such fact shall appear.Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Not shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.Section 5. When the writ must be granted and issued. A court or judge authorized to grant the writ must, when a petition therefor is presented and it appears that the writ ought to issue, grant the same forthwith, and immediately thereupon the clerk of the court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of emergency, the judge may issue the writ under his own hand, and may depute any officer or person to serve it.Section 6.To whom writ directed, and what to require. In case of imprisonment or restraint by an officer, the writ shall be directed to him, and shall command him to have the body of the person restrained of his liberty before the court or judge designated in the writ at the time and place therein specified. In case of imprisonment or restraint by a person not an officer, the writ shall be directed to an officer, and shall command him to take and have the body of the person restrained of his liberty before the court or judge designated in the writ at the time and place therein specified, and to summon the person by whom he is restrained then and there to appear before said court or judge to show the cause of the imprisonment or restraint.Section 7. How prisoner designated and writ served. The person to be produced should be designated in the writ by his name, if known, but if his name is not known he may be otherwise described or identified. The writ may be served in any province by the sheriff or other proper officer, or by a person deputed by the court or judge. Service of the writ shall be made by leaving the original with the person to whom it is directed and preserving a copy on which to make return or service. If that person cannot be found, or has not the prisoner in his custody, then the service shall be made on any other person having or exercising such custody.Section 8. How writ executed and returned. The officer to whom the writ is directed shall convey the person so imprisoned or restrained, and named in the writ, before the judge allowing the writ, or in case of his absence or disability, before some other judge of the same court, on the day specified in the writ, unless, from sickness or infirmity of the person directed to be produced, such person cannot, without danger, be bought before the court or judge; and the officer shall make due return of the writ, together with the day and the cause of the caption and restraint of such person according to the command thereof.Section 9. Defect of form. No writ ofhabeas corpuscan be disobeyed for defect of form, if it sufficiently appears therefrom in whose custody or under whose restraint the party imprisoned or restrained is held and the court or judge before whom he is to be bought.Section 10. Contents of return. When the person to be produced is imprisoned or restrained by an officer, the person who makes the return shall state therein, and in other cases the person in whose custody the prisoner is found shall state, in writing to the court or judge before whom the writ is returnable, plainly and unequivocably:(a) Whether he has or has not the party in his custody or power, or under restraint;(b) If he has the party in his custody or power, or under restraint, the authority and the true and whole cause thereof, set forth at large, with a copy of the writ, order execution, or other process, if any, upon which the party is held;(c) If the party is in his custody or power or is restrained by him, and is not produced, particularly the nature and gravity of the sickness or infirmity of such party by reason of which he cannot, without danger, be bought before the court or judge;(d) If he has had the party in his custody or power, or under restraint, and has transferred such custody or restraint to another, particularly to whom, at what time, for what cause, and by what authority such transfer was made.Section 11. Return to be signed and sworn to. The return or statement shall be signed by the person who makes it; and shall also be sworn by him if the prisoner is not produced, and in all other cases unless the return is made and signed by a sworn public officer in his official capacity.Section 12. Hearing on return.Adjournments. When the writ is returned before one judge, at a time when the court is in session, he may forthwith adjourn the case into the court, there to be heard and determined. The court or judge before whom the writ is returned or adjourned must immediately proceed to hear and examine the return, and such other matters as are properly submitted for consideration, unless for good cause shown the hearing is adjourned, in which event the court or judge shall make such order for the safekeeping of the person imprisoned or restrained as the nature of the case requires. If the person imprisoned or restrained is not produced because of his alleged sickness or infirmity, the court or judge must be satisfied that it is so grave that such person cannot be produced without danger, before proceeding to hear and dispose of the matter. On the hearing the court or judge shall disregard matters of form and technicalities in respect to any warrant or order of commitment of a court or officer authorized to commit by law.Section 13. When the return evidence, and when only a plea. If it appears that the prisoner is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be consideredprima facieevidence of the cause of restraint, but if he is restrained of his liberty by any alleged private authority, the return shall be considered only as a plea of the facts therein set forth, and the party claiming the custody must prove such facts.Section 14. When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted, and when let to bail. If it appears that the prisoner was lawfully committed, and is plainly and specifically charged in the warrant of commitment with an offense punishable by death, he shall not be released, discharged, or bailed. If he is lawfully imprisoned or restrained on a charge of having committed an offense not so punishable, he may be recommitted to imprisonment or admitted to bail in the discretion of the court or judge. If he be admitted to bail, he shall forthwith file a bond in such sum as the court or judge deems reasonable, considering the circumstances of the prisoner and the nature of the offense charged, conditioned for his appearance before the court where the offense is properly cognizable to abide its order of judgment; and the court or judge shall certify the proceedings, together with the bond, forthwith to the proper court. If such bond is not so filed, the prisoner shall be recommitted to confinement.Section 15. When prisoner discharged if no appeal. When the court or judge has examined into the cause of caption and restraint of the prisoner, and is satisfied that he is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained, he shall forthwith order his discharge from confinement, but such discharge shall not be effective until a copy of the order has been served on the officer or person detaining the prisoner. If the officer or person detaining the prisoner does not desire to appeal, the prisoner shall be forthwith released.Section 16. Penalty for refusing to issue writ, or for disobeying the same. A clerk of a court who refuses to issue the writ after allowance thereof and demand therefor, or a person to whom a writ is directed, who neglects or refuses to obey or make return of the same according to the command thereof, or makes false return thereof, or who, upon demand made by or on behalf of the prisoner, refuses to deliver to the person demanding, within six (6) hours after the demand therefor, a true copy of the warrant or order of commitment, shall forfeit to the party aggrieved the sum of one thousand pesos, to be recorded in a proper action, and may also be punished by the court or judge as for contempt.Section 17. Person discharged not to be again imprisoned. A person who is set at liberty upon a writ ofhabeas corpusshall not be again imprisoned for the same offense unless by the lawful order or process of a court having jurisdiction of the cause or offense; and a person who knowingly, contrary to the provisions of this rule, recommits or imprisons, or causes to be committed or imprisoned, for the same offense, or pretended offense, any person so set at liberty, or knowingly aids or assists therein, shall forfeit to the party aggrieved the sum of one thousand pesos, to be recovered in a proper action, notwithstanding any colorable pretense or variation in the warrant of commitment, and may also be punished by the court or judge granting the writ as for contempt.Section 18. When prisoner may be removed from one custody to another. A person committed to prison, or in custody of an officer, for any criminal matter, shall not be removed therefrom into the custody of another unless by legal process, or the prisoner be delivered to an inferior officer to carry to jail, or, by order of the proper court or judge, be removed from one place to another within the Philippines for trial, or in case of fire epidemic, insurrection, or other necessity or public calamity; and a person who, after such commitment, makes signs, or counter-signs any order for such removal contrary to this section, shall forfeit to the party aggrieved the sum of one thousand pesos, to be recovered in a proper action.Section 19. Record of writ, fees and costs. The proceedings upon a writ ofhabeas corpusshall be recorded by the clerk of the court, and upon the final disposition of such proceedings the court or judge shall make such order as to costs as the case requires. The fees of officers and witnesses shall be included in the costs taxed, but no officer or person shall have the right to demand payment in advance of any fees to which he is entitled by virtue of the proceedings. When a person confined under color of proceedings in a criminal case is discharged, the costs shall be taxed against the Republic of the Philippines, and paid out of its Treasury; when a person in custody by virtue or under color of proceedings in a civil case is discharged, the costs shall be taxed against him, or against the person who signed the application for the writ, or both, as the court shall direct.

SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 125901.March 8, 2001]EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R. TIJING,petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh Division) and ANGELITA DIAMANTE,respondents.D E C I S I O NQUISUMBING,J.:For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 6, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39056, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court in a petition forhabeas corpusof Edgardo Tijing, Jr., allegedly the child of petitioners.Petitioners are husband and wife.They have six children.The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila.Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila.According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job.Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned.She also left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while Bienvenida was doing laundry.When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone.Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelitas house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them there.Angelitas maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back later.She returned to Angelitas house after three days, only to discover that Angelita had moved to another place.Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance.Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could not imagine how her spouse would react to the disappearance of their youngest child and this made her problem even more serious.As fate would have it, Bienvenida and her husband reconciled and together, this time, they looked for their missing son in other places.Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts.Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan.Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four years.She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez.[1]She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to do so.Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition forhabeas corpuswith the trial court in order to recover their son.To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two witnesses, namely, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez.The first witness, Vasquez, testified that she assisted in the delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila.She supported her testimony with her clinical records.[2]The second witness, Benjamin Lopez, declared that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter was sterile.He recalled that Tomas met an accident and bumped his private part against the edge of a banca causing him excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing capacity.Benjamin further declared that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son and that he and Angelita were not blessed with children.[3]For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child.She asserts that at age 42, she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, Manila.She added, though, that she has two other children with her real husband, Angel Sanchez.[4]She said the birth of John Thomas was registered by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila on August 4, 1989.On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could not have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility.[5]The trial court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity.Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person who is the natural child of petitioners.The trial court decreed:WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition for Habeas Corpus, as such, respondent Angelita Diamante is ordered to immediately release from her personal custody minor John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him over and/or surrender his person to petitioners, Spouses Edgardo A. Tijing and Bienvenida R. Tijing, immediately upon receipt hereof.Branch Sheriff of this Court, Carlos Bajar, is hereby commanded to implement the decision of this Court by assisting herein petitioners in the recovery of the person of their minor son, Edgardo Tijing Jr., the same person as John Thomas D. Lopez.SO ORDERED.[6]Angelita seasonably filed her notice of appeal.[7]Nonetheless, on August 3, 1994, the sheriff implemented the order of the trial court by taking custody of the minor.In his report, the sheriff stated that Angelita peacefully surrendered the minor and he turned over the custody of said child to petitioner Edgardo Tijing.[8]On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court.The appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of thehabeas corpus.In its view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she was the mother of the minor.It ruled that the lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person,[9]and disposed of the case, thus:IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower court dated March 10, 1995 is hereby REVERSED, and a new one entered dismissing the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 94-71606, and directing the custody of the minor John Thomas Lopez to be returned to respondent Angelita Diamante, said minor having been under the care of said respondent at the time of the filing of the petition herein.SO ORDERED.[10]Petitioners sought reconsideration of the abovequoted decision which was denied.Hence, the instant petition alleging:ITHAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE PETITIONERS ACTION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS MERELY SECONDARY TO THE QUESTION OF FILIATION THAT THE PETITIONERS HAD LIKEWISE PROVEN.IITHAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS AND DIRECTING THAT THE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR JOHN THOMAS LOPEZ WHO WAS PROVEN TO THE SAME MINOR AS EDGARDO R. TIJING, JR., BE RETURNED TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.[11]In our view, the crucial issues for resolution are the following:(1) Whether or nothabeas corpusis the proper remedy?(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is the son of petitioners?We shall discuss the two issues together since they are closely related.The writ ofhabeas corpusextends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.[12]Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will.It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy.Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.[13]It must be stressed too that inhabeas corpusproceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual presumptions including those as to identity of the person.In this case, the minors identity is crucial in determining the propriety of the writ sought.Thus, it must be resolved first whether the Edgardo Tijing, Jr., claimed by Bienvenida to be her son, is the same minor named John Thomas Lopez, whom Angelita insists to be her offspring.We must first determine who between Bienvenida and Angelita is the minors biological mother.Evidence must necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially thought of to be distinct and separate from each other, are indeed one and the same.[14]Petitioners must convincingly establish that the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made is the person upon whom they have rightful custody.If there is doubt on the identity of the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made, petitioners cannot invoke with certainty their right of custody over the said minor.True, it is not the function of this Court to examine and evaluate the probative value of all evidence presented to the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned decision, resolution or order.[15]But since the conclusions of the Court of Appeals contradict those of the trial court, this Court may scrutinize the evidence on the record to determine which findings should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts.A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children.From her very lips, she admitted that after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974.Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered no evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten years. The midwife who allegedly delivered the child was not presented in court.No clinical records, log book or discharge order from the clinic were ever submitted.Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son.Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen years together.Though Tomas Lopez had lived with private respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no offspring.Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged birth of the child.Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the registration of such birth.Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child.The certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar within thirty days after the birth.[16]Significantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because even private respondent had admitted she is a common-law wife.[17]This false entry puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate.Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage.[18]Needless to stress, the trial courts conclusion should be given high respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned.Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenidas giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic.Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a log book, discharge order and the signatures of petitioners.All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of petitioners.The writ ofhabeas corpusis proper to regain custody of said child.A final note.Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available.Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test[19]for identification and parentage testing.The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis.The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father.The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage.[20]Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge.[21]Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence.For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.[22]Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.The assailed DECISION of the Court of Appeals is REVERSEDand decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED.Costs against the private respondent.SO ORDERED.Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena,andDe Leon, Jr., JJ.,concur.

[1]TSN, September 26, 1994, p. 6 and October 4, 1994, p. 19.[2]TSN, September 28, 1994, p. 3 and October 4, 1994, p. 3.[3]TSN, October 4, 1994, pp. 19-20.[4]TSN, November 22, 1994, p. 15.[5]Rollo, p. 44.[6]Id. at 46.[7]RTC Records, p. 118.[8]Id. at 119-120.[9]Rollo, pp. 27-28.[10]Id. at 31.[11]Id. at 10.[12]Section 1, Rule 102, Rules of Court.[13]Sombongvs. CA, 322 Phil 737, 750 (1996).[14]Id. at 752.[15]Acebedo Optical Inc.vs. CA, 320 Phil 506, 511-512 (1995).[16]Section 4, Act No. 3753 or Civil Register Law.[17]RTC Records, p. 40[18]R. J. Francisco.Basic Evidence (1991) pp. 95-96 citing Chua Yengvs. Collector of Customs, 28 Phil 591, 595 (1914).[19]DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) refers to the chain of molecules found in every cell of the body, except in red blood cells, which transmit hereditary characteristics among individuals.DNA testing is synonymous to DNA typing, DNA fingerprinting, DNA profiling, genetic testing or genetic fingerprinting.[20]A Primer On DNA-Based Paternity Testing, and Guidelines For DNA Analysis, UP-NSRI-DNA Analysis Laboratory, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City.[21]See S.C. Halos,Current Trends in DNA Typing and Applications in the Judicial System, a paper presented at the Third Convention and Seminar of Philippine Judges Association held on June 11, 1999, 4 Court Systems Journal 47, 55 (1999).[22]Jaovs. CA, 152 SCRA 359, 366 (1987).

SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 122954. February 15, 2000]NORBERTO FERIA Y PACQUING,petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA, METRO MANILA (IN PLACE OF THE JAIL WARDEN OF THE MANILA CITY JAIL), THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH II, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, and THE CITY PROSECUTOR, CITY OF MANILA,respondents.D E C I S I O NQUISUMBING,J.:The mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case subsequent to conviction of the accused will not render the judgment of conviction void, nor will it warrant the release of the convict by virtue of a writ ofhabeas corpus. The proper remedy is the reconstitution of judicial records which is as much a duty of the prosecution as of the defense.Subject of this petition for review oncertiorariare (1) the Decision dated April 28, 1995, of the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal of the petition forhabeas corpusfiled by petitioner, and (2) the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 1, 1995, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration. As hereafter elucidated, we sustain the judgment of respondent appellate court.Based on the available records and the admissions of the parties, the antecedents of the present petition are as follows:Petitioner Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention since May 21, 1981, up to present[1]by reason of his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, in Criminal Case No. 60677, by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, for the jeepney hold-up and killing of United States Peace Corps Volunteer Margaret Viviene Carmona.Some twelve (12) years later, or on June 9, 1993, petitioner sought to be transferred from the Manila City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City,[2]but the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the Presiding Judge of the RTC-Manila, Branch 2, that the transfer cannot be effected without the submission of the requirements, namely, the Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and Information.[3]It was then discovered that the entire records of the case, including the copy of the judgment, were missing. In response to the inquiries made by counsel of petitioner, both the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2 attested to the fact that the records of Criminal Case No. 60677 could not be found in their respective offices. Upon further inquiries, the entire records appear to have been lost or destroyed in the fire which occurred at the second and third floor of the Manila City Hall on November 3, 1986.[4]On October 3, 1994, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ ofHabeasCorpus[5]with the Supreme Court against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due process.In its Resolution dated October 10, 1994,[6]the Second Division of this Court resolved -" x x x (a) to ISSUE the Writ of Habeas Corpus; (b) to ORDER the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to conduct an immediate RAFFLE of this case among the incumbent judges thereof; and (c) to REQUIRE [1] the Judge to whom this case is raffled to SET the case for HEARING on Thursday, October 13, 1994 at 8:30 A.M., try and decide the same on the merits and thereafter FURNISH this Court with a copy of his decision thereon; [2] the respondents to make a RETURN of the Writ on or before the close of office hours on Wednesday, October 12, 1994 and APPEAR PERSONALLY and PRODUCE the person of Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing on the aforesaid date and time of hearing to the Judge to whom this case is raffled, and [3] the Director General, Philippine National Police, through his duly authorized representative(s) to SERVE the Writ and Petition, and make a RETURN thereof as provided by law and, specifically, his duly authorized representative(s) to APPEAR PERSONALLY and ESCORT the person of Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing at the aforesaid date and time of hearing."The case was then raffled to Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which on November 15, 1994, after hearing, issued an Order[7]dismissing the case on the ground that the mere loss of the records of the case does not invalidate the judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the proper remedy would be reconstitution of the records of the case which should be filed with the court which rendered the decision.Petitioner duly appealed said Order to the Court of Appeals, which on April 28, 1995, rendered the assailed Decision[8]affirming the decision of the trial court with the modification that "in the interest of orderly administration of justice" and "under the peculiar facts of the case" petitioner may be transferred to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City without submission of the requirements (Mittimus, Decision and Information) but without prejudice to the reconstitution of the original records.The Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order having been denied for lack of merit,[9]petitioner is now before us oncertiorari, assigning the following errors of law:[10]I. WHETHER OR NOT, UNDER THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, WHERE THE RECORDS OF CONVICTION WERE LOST, THE PETITIONERS CONTINUED INCARCERATION IS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE LAW.COROLLARY TO THIS, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS RESOLUTION, AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF HEREIN APPELLANTS PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS, IN CONTEMPLATION OF LAW, A JUDGMENT OR A SUBSTITUTE JUDGMENT, WHICH CAN BE UTILIZED AS A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR HIS INCARCERATION.II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RECONSTITUTION OF OFFICIAL RECORDS LOST/DESTROYED SHOULD BE INITIATED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS ORGANS, WHO ARE IN CUSTODY OF SUCH, OR BY THE PRISONER, WHOSE LIBERTY IS RESTRAINED.Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of avalidjudgment as required by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court,[11]and that the evidence considered by the trial court and Court of Appeals in thehabeas corpusproceedings did not establish thecontentsof such judgment. Petitioner further contends that our ruling inGunabe v. Director of Prisons, 77Phil.993, 995 (1947), that "reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the defense" has been modified or abandoned in the subsequent case ofOrdonez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152, 155 (1994), wherein we held that "[i]t is not the fault of the prisoners that the records cannot now be found. If anyone is to be blamed, it surely cannot be the prisoners, who were not the custodians of those records."In its Comment,[12]the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the sole inquiry in thishabeas corpusproceeding is whether or not there is legal basis to detain petitioner. The OSG maintains that public respondents have more than sufficiently shown the existence of a legal ground for petitioners continued incarceration,viz., his conviction by final judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the discharge of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment is not authorized. Petitioners remedy, therefore, is not a petition forhabeas corpusbut a proceeding for the reconstitution of judicial records.The high prerogative writ ofhabeas corpus, whose origin is traced to antiquity, was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.[13]It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority.[14]Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.[15]Petitioners claim is anchored on the first ground considering, as he claims, that his continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a copy of avalidjudgment of conviction, is violative of his constitutional right to due process.Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of petitioner which serves as the legal basis for his detention. Petitioner made judicial admissions, both verbal and written, that he was charged with and convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, and sentenced to suffer imprisonment "habang buhay".In its Order dated October 17, 1994, the RTC-Manila, Branch 9, made the finding that -[16]"During the trial and on manifestation and arguments made by the accused, his learned counsel and Solicitor Alexander G. Gesmundo who appeared for the respondents, it appears clear and indubitable that:(A) Petitioner had been charged with Robbery with Homicide in Criminal Case No. 60677, Illegal Possession of Firearm in Criminal Case No. 60678 and Robbery in Band in Criminal Case No. 60867. ... In Criminal Case No. 60677 (Robbery with Homicide)the accused admitted in open Court that a decision was read to him in open Court by a personnel of the respondent Court (RTC Branch II) sentencing him to Life Imprisonment (Habang buhay)..." (emphasis supplied)Further, in the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Commitment Order of the Above Entitled Criminal Case dated June 8, 1993,[17]petitioner himself stated that -"COMES NOW, the undersigned accused in the above entitled criminal case and unto this Honorable Court most respectfully move:1. That in 1981 the accused was charge of (sic) Robbery with Homicide;2. That after four years of trial, the court found the accused guilty and given a Life Sentence in a promulgation handed down in 1985;(emphasis supplied)3. That after the sentence was promulgated, the Presiding Judge told the councel (sic) that accused has the right to appeal the decision;4. That whether the de oficio counsel appealed the decision is beyond the accused comprehension (sic) because the last time he saw the counsel was when the decision was promulgated.5. That everytime there is change of Warden at the Manila City Jail attempts were made to get the Commitment Order so that transfer of the accused to the Bureau of Corrections can be affected, but all in vain;"Petitioners declarations as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him under Section 23 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This rule is based upon the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, unless such declaration were true,[18]particularly with respect to such grave matter as his conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Further, under Section 4 of Rule 129, "[a]n admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made." Petitioner does not claim any mistake nor does he deny making such admissions.The records also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated January 1985[19]of then Judge Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the fact that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide on January 11, 1985. Such Monthly Report constitutes an entry in official records under Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which isprima facieevidence of facts therein stated.Public respondents likewise presented a certified true copy of Peoples Journal dated January 18, 1985, page 2,[20]issued by the National Library, containing a short news article that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and was sentenced to "life imprisonment." However, newspaper articles amount to "hearsay evidence, twice removed"[21]and are therefore not only inadmissible but without any probative value at all whether objected to or not,[22]unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. In this case, the news article is admissible only as evidence that such publication does exist with the tenor of the news therein stated.As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other words, where the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its face shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process.[23]If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the return is consideredprima facieevidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal. Thus, Section 13 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:"SEC. 13.When the return evidence, and when only a plea.If it appears that the prisoner is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint, but if he is restrained of his liberty by any alleged private authority, the return shall be considered only as a plea of the facts therein set forth, and the party claiming the custody must prove such facts."Public respondents having sufficiently shown good ground for the detention, petitioners release from confinement is not warranted under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court which provides that -"Sec. 4.When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. -If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment."In the case ofGomez v. Director of Prisons,77Phil.458 (1946), accused was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape, and was committed to the New Bilibid Prison. Pending appeal with the Court of Appeals, the records of the case were, for reasons undisclosed, completely destroyed or lost. Accused then filed a petition for the issuance of the writ ofhabeas corpuswith the Supreme Court. The Court denied the petition, ruling thus:"The petition does not make out a case. The Director of Prisons is holding the prisoner under process issued by a competent court in pursuance of a lawful, subsisting judgment. The prisoner himself admits the legality of his detention. The mere loss or destruction of the record of the case does not invalidate the judgment or the commitment, or authorize the prisoners release."Note further that, in the present case, there is also no showing that petitioner duly appealed his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, hence for all intents and purposes, such judgment has already become final and executory. When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack byhabeas corpus.[24]Put another way, in order that a judgment may be subject to collateral attack byhabeas corpus, it must be void for lack of jurisdiction.[25]Thus, petitioners invocation of our ruling inReyes v. Director of Prisons,supra, is misplaced. In theReyescase, we granted the writ and ordered the release of the prisoner on the ground that "[i]t does not appear that the prisoner has been sentenced by any tribunal duly established by a competent authority during the enemy occupation" and not because there were no copies of the decision and information. Here, a copy of themittimusis available. And, indeed, petitioner does not raise any jurisdictional issue.The proper remedy in this case is for either petitioner or public respondents to initiate the reconstitution of the judgment of the case under either Act No. 3110,[26]the general law governing reconstitution of judicial records, or under the inherent power of courts to reconstitute at any time the records of their finished cases in accordance with Section 5 (h) of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.[27]Judicial records are subject to reconstitution without exception, whether they refer to pending cases or finished cases.[28]There is no sense in limiting reconstitution to pending cases; finished cases are just as important as pending ones, as evidence of rights and obligations finally adjudicated.[29]Petitioner belabors the fact that no initiative was taken by the Government to reconstitute the missing records of the trial court. We reiterate, however, that "reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the defense."[30]Petitioners invocation ofOrdoez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152 (1994), is misplaced since the grant of the petition forhabeas corpustherein was premised on the loss of recordspriorto the filing of Informations against the prisoners, and therefore "[t]he government has failed to show that their continued detention is supported by a valid conviction or by the pendency of charges against them or by any legitimate cause whatsoever." In this case, the records were lostafterpetitioner, by his own admission, was already convicted by the trial court of the offense charged. Further, the same incident which gave rise to the filing of the Information for Robbery with Homicide also gave rise to another case for Illegal Possession of Firearm,[31]the records of which could be of assistance in the reconstitution of the present case.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena,andDe Leon, Jr., JJ.,concur.

[1]He was initially detained at the Manila City Jail, then transferred to the Youth Rehabilitation Center, Camp Sampaguita, Muntinlupa, and later, pursuant to the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 28, 1995, transferred to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City; Petition forHabeas Corpus, Records, p. 5.[2]Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Commitment Order of the Above Entitled Criminal Case, Annex "F", Records, p. 31-32.[3]Letter dated November 26, 1993 to Hon. Napoleon Flojo, Presiding Judge, RTC-Manila, Branch 2, from C/Insp. JMP Warden Reynaldo E. Erlano, Annex "L" to the Petition forHabeas Corpus, Records, p. 42.[4]Petition, Records, p. 9; Certification dated November 17, 1993, by Emilia V. Queri, Chief, Records Division, City Prosecutors Office, Records, p. 38; Certification dated April 8, 1987 by Zenaida A. Arabiran, OIC, Administrative Division, City Fiscals Office, Manila, Records, p. 39.[5]Records, pp. 1-14.[6]Id.at 61.[7]Id.at 121-122.[8]Rollo, pp. 43-46.[9]Rollo, p. 50.[10]Memorandum,Rollo, p. 156; Petition for Review,Rollo, pp. 14-15.[11]Section 1 of Rule 120 provides:"Section 1. Judgment defined. - The term judgment as used in this Rule means the adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or is not guilty of the offense charged, and the imposition of the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by law on the accused."Section 2 provides:"Section 2. Form and contents of judgment. - The judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there are any; (b) the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or waived.In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party."[12]Rollo, pp. 66-102; Public Respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Memorandum;Rollo, pp. 134-135.[13]Velascov.Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 677, 679 (1995); Navav.Gatmaitan, 90 Phil. 172, 176 (1951); Villavicenciov.Lukban, 39 Phil. 778, 788 (1919).[14]Navav.Gatmaitan, 90 Phil. 172, 176 (1951); Quintosv.Director of Prisons, 55 Phil. 304, 306 (1930).[15]Andalv.People of the Philippines. et. al., G.R. Nos. 138268-69, May 26, 1999, p. 3; Hardenv.Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741, 746 (1948); Cruzv.Director of Prisons, 17 Phil. 269, 272 (1910).[16]Records, pp. 69-70.[17]Annex "F" of the Petition forHabeas Corpus, Records, pp. 31-32.[18]Francisco, R., Basic Evidence, 1991 ed., p. 116.[19]Records, p. 52.[20]Id.at 90.[21]State Prosecutorsv.Muro, 251 SCRA 111, 113 (1995), citing 3 Jones, Commentaries on Evidence, 2d. ed., Sec. 1084.[22]State Prosecutorsv.Muro, 251 SCRA 111, 113 (1995); Salongav.Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438, 451 (1985).[23]39 Am Jur 2d 152.[24]Hardenv.Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741, 749-750 (1948).[25]39 C.J.S. 35; 39 Am Jur 2d 11, 28, 30, 64.[26]AN ACT TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE PROCEDURE FOR THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE RECORDS OF PENDING JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AND BOOKS, DOCUMENTS, AND FILES OF THE OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, DESTROYED BY FIRE OR OTHER PUBLIC CALAMITIES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES; See also Almariov.Ibaez, 81 Phil. 592 (1948); Zafrav.De Aquino, 84 Phil. 507 (1949).[27]Yatcov.Cruz, 6 SCRA 1078, 1081 (1962); Wee Binv.Republic, 100 SCRA 139, 149 (1980).[28]Erlanger & Galingerv.Exconde, 93 Phil. 894, 900 (1953).[29]Ibid.[30]Gunabev.Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 993, 995 (1947); See also Peoplev.Catoltol, Sr., 265 SCRA 109, 112 (1996), where it was the Public Attorneys Office which initiated the request for the reconstitution of the burned records of a decided case for rape; Asiavest Limitedv.Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128803, September 25, 1998, p. 541, where it was plaintiff, through counsel, which moved for the reconstitution of a pending civil case.[31]People of the Philippinesv.Norberto Feria y Pacquing, Criminal Case No. 60678, decided by the RTC-Manila, Branch 4 on January 24, 1983, convicting accused (petitioner herein); Records, Annex "C" to the Petition, p. 23-25.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 115576 August 4, 1994IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FORHABEASCORPUSOF LEONARDO PAQUINTO AND JESUS CABANGUNAY.CHAIRMAN SEDFREY A. ORDOEZ, COMM. SAMUEL M. SORIANO, COMM. HESIQUIO R. MALLILLIN, COMM. NARCISO C. MONTEIRO, COMM. PAULYNN PAREDES-SICAM, THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,petitioners,vs.DIRECTOR OF PRISONS,respondent.CRUZ,J.:Why are Leonardo Paquinto and Jesus Cabangunay still in prison?These persons are among the civilians who were tried by the military commissions during the period of martial law. Both were originally condemned to die by musketry, but their sentence was commuted by the new Constitution toreclusion perpetua.Their convictions were subsequently nullified by this Court in the case ofOlaguer v.Military Commission No.34,1where we held that the military tribunals had no jurisdiction to try civilians when the courts of justice were functioning.Accordingly, in the case ofCruz v.Ponce Enrile,2this Court directed the Department of Justice to file the corresponding informations in the civil courts against the petitioners within 180 days from notice of the decision.No information has so far been filed against Paquinto and Cabangunay, but they have remained under detention.On May 27, 1992, Ernesto Abaloc, together with Cabangunay and Paquinto, wrote to the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) complaining that their continued detention violated their rights under Articles 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.3In its decision dated October 14, 1993, the UNHRC declared their communication as admissible and requested the Republic of the Philippines to submit a written explanation of their complaint within six months from the date of transmittal.4The Department of Foreign Affairs furnished the Commission on Human Rights with a copy of the decision. Thereupon, the Commission, through its Chairman Sedfrey A. Ordoez wrote the Secretary of Justice of its intention to sue for the release of the complaints unless criminal charges had already been filed against them.5On June 7, 1994, the Department of Justice informed the Commission that Abaloc had been released on September 29, 1992, and that Paquinto and Cabangunay were still detained at the National Penitentiary. There was the intimation that it would not object to a petition forhabeas corpusthat the Commission might choose to file for Paquinto and Cabangunay.6This assurance was later confirmed in a letter from the Department dated May 31, 1994.7The present petition forhabeas corpuswas filed with this Court on June 13, 1994. The writ was immediately issued, returnable on or before June 22, 1994, on which date a hearing was also scheduled.At the hearing, Chairman Ordoez argued for the prisoners and pleaded for their immediate release in view of the failure of the Department of Justice to file charges against them within the period specified in the Cruz case. He stressed that their continued detention despite the nullification of their convictions was a clear violation of their human rights.For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the respondent Director of Prisons, argued that under our ruling inTan v.Barrios,8the Olaguer decision could not be retroactively applied to decisions of the military tribunals that have already become final or to persons who were already serving their sentence. It suggested that, under the circumstances, the only recourse of the prisoners was to reiterate and pursue their applications for executive clemency.It has been seven years since the Olaguer decision nullifying the convictions of Paquinto and Cabangunay by the military commissions was promulgated. It has been six years since our decision in the Cruz case directed the Secretary of Justice to file the appropriate informations against the civilians still detained under convictions rendered by the military tribunals. The prisoners have been confined since 1974. We can only guess at the validity of their convictions as the records of their cases have allegedly been burned.The loss of these records is the main reason the Department gives for its failure to file the corresponding charges against the two detainees before the civil courts. It is unacceptable, of course. It is not the fault of the prisoners that the records cannot now be found. If anyone is to be blamed, it surely cannot be the prisoners, who were not the custodian of those records. It is illogical and even absurd to suggest that because the government cannot prosecute them, the prisoners' detention must continue.The other excuse of the government must also be rejected. During the hearing, the Office of the Solicitor General contended that the prisoners had themselves opted to serve their sentences rather than undergo another trial. Their ultimate objective, so it was maintained, was to secure their release by applying for executive clemency. To prove this, counsel submitted a letter from oneAtty. Anselmo B. Mabuti to the Secretary of Justice manifesting that Leonardo B. Paquinto "chooses to complete the service of his sentence so that the Board of Pardons and Parole has jurisdiction over his case."9No mention was made of Jesus Cabangunay.Upon direct questioning from the Court during the hearing, both Paquinto and Cabangunay disowned Atty. Mabuti as their counsel and said they had never seen nor talked to him before. Paquinto denied ever having authorized him to write the letter. Instead, the two prisoners reiterated their plea to be released on the strength of the Olaguer decision.The petitioners further contend in their memorandum that a re-examination of the ruling inCruz v.Enrile10in relation to the case ofTan v.Barrios,11is necessary in view of certain supervening events. These are the failure of the Department of Justice to file the informations against the prisoners; the decision of the UNHRC declaring admissible the communicationNo. 503/1992 of Abaloc, Paquinto and Cabangunay and thus suggesting the violation of their liberty as guaranteed under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and the assurance of the Department of Justice that it would have no objection to the filing of a petition forhabeas corpusby the Commission on behalf of Paquinto and Cabangunay.The Court stresses that in itsen bancresolution dated February 26, 1991, it declared, citing the Tan case, that "those civilians who were convicted by military courts and who have been serving (but not yet completed) their sentences of imprisonment for the past many years" . . . "may be given the option either to complete the service of their sentence, or be tried anew by the civil courts.Upon conviction, they should be credited in the service of their sentence for the full period of their previous imprisonment.Upon acquittal, they should be set free."Accordingly, it directed "the Department of Justice to forthwith comply with the directive in the "Cruz Cases" for the filing of the necessary informations against them in the courts having jurisdiction over the offenses involved, without prejudice to said petitioners' exercise of the option granted to them by this Court's ruling in G.R. Nos. 85481-82,William Tan, et al.v.Hernani T. Barrios, etc.,et al.,supra."The Office of the Solicitor General submitted its memorandum after its second motion for extension was denied, in view of the necessity to decide this petition without further delay.12The memorandum was admitted just the same, but we find it adds nothing to the respondent's original arguments.There is absolutely no question that the prisoners' plea should be heeded. The government has failed to show that their continued detention is supported by a valid conviction or by the pendency of charges against them or by any legitimate cause whatsoever. If no information can be filed against them because the records have been lost, it is not the prisoners who should be made to suffer. In the eyes of the law, Paquinto and Cabangunay are not guilty or appear to be guilty of any crime for which they may be validly held. Hence, they are entitled to be set free.Liberty is not a gift of the government but the right of the governed. Every person is free, save only for the fetters of the law that limit but do not bind him unless he affronts the rights of others or offends the public welfare. Liberty is not derived from the sufferance of the government or its magnanimity or even from the Constitution itself, which merely affirms but does not grant it. Liberty is a right that inheres in every one of us as a member of the human family. When a person is deprived of this right, all of us are diminished and debased for liberty is total and indivisible.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Jesus Cabangunay and Leonardo Paquinto should not be detained in prison a minute longer. They are ordered released IMMEDIATELY.Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.#Footnotes1 150 SCRA 144.2 160 SCRA 700.3 Rollo, p. 17.4 Rollo, p. 18.5 Annex "B" to the Petition;rollo, p. 11.6 Annex "C" to the Petition;rollo, p. 12.7 Annex "A" to the Memorandum of Petitioners;rollo, p. 86.8 190 SCRA 686.9 Rollo, p. 70.10 Supra.11 Supra.12 Supreme Court, First Division, Resolution, July 20, 1994.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 139789 July 19, 2001IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO,petitioner,vs.ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES,respondents.x---------------------------------------------------------xG.R. No. 139808 July 19, 2001POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO,petitioners,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO,respondents.R E S O L U T I O NPARDO,J.:Once again we see the sad tale of a prominent family shattered by conflicts on expectancy in fabled fortune.On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable from her husband some years ago, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals1forhabeas corpusto have custody of her husband in consortium.On April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject, Potenciano Ilusorio.Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appealviacertiorari pursuing her desire to have custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio.2This case was consolidated with another case3filed by Potenciano Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio appealing from the order giving visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he never refused to see her.On May 12, 2000, we dismissed the petition for habeas corpus4for lack of merit, and granted the petition5to nullify the Court of Appeals' ruling6giving visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio.7What is now before the Court is Erlinda's motion to reconsider the decision.8On September 20, 2000, we set the case for preliminary conference on October 11, 2000, at 10:00 a. m., without requiring the mandatory presence of the parties.In that conference, the Court laid down the issues to be resolved, to wit:(a) To determine the propriety of a physical and medical examination of petitioner Potenciano Ilusorio;(b) Whether the same is relevant; and(c) If relevant, how the Court will conduct the same.9The parties extensively discussed the issues. The Court, in its resolution, enjoined the parties and their lawyers to initiate steps towards an amicable settlement of the case through mediation and other means.On November 29, 2000, the Court noted the manifestation and compliance of the parties with the resolution of October 11, 2000.10On January 31, 2001, the Court denied Erlinda Ilusorio's manifestation and motion praying that Potenciano Ilusorio be produced before the Court and be medically examined by a team of medical experts appointed by the Court.11On March 27, 2001, we denied with finality Erlinda's motion to reconsider the Court's order of January 31 , 2001.12The issues raised by Erlinda K. Ilusorio in her motion for reconsideration are mere reiterations of her arguments that have been resolved in the decision.Nevertheless, for emphasis, we shall discuss the issues thus:First. Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her in consortium and that Potenciano's mental state was not an issue. However, the very root cause of the entire petition is her desire to have her husband'scustody.13Clearly, Erlinda cannot now deny that she wanted Potenciano Ilusorio to live with her.Second. One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of her husband was that respondents Lin and Sylvia were illegally restraining Potenciano Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of property rights out of pure greed.14She claimed that her two children were using their sick and frail father to sign away Potenciano and Erlinda's property to companies controlled by Lin and Sylvia. She also argued that since Potenciano retired as director and officer of Baguio Country Club and Philippine Oversees Telecommunications, she would logically assume his position and control. Yet, Lin and Sylvia were the ones controlling the corporations.15The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at the Court of Appeals on March 23, 1999.16Potenciano himself declared that he was not prevented by his children from seeing anybody and that he had no objection to seeing his wife and other children whom he loved.Erlinda highlighted that her husband suffered from various ailments. Thus, Potenciano Ilusorio did not have the mental capacity to decide for himself. Hence, Erlinda argued that Potenciano be brought before the Supreme Court so that we could determine his mental state.We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose whether to see his wife or not. Again, this is a question of fact that has been decided in the Court of Appeals.As to whether the children were in fact taking control of the corporation, these are matters that may be threshed out in a separate proceeding, irrelevant inhabeas corpus.Third. Petitioner failed to sufficiently convince the Court why we should not rely on the facts found by the Court of Appeals. Erlinda claimed that the facts mentioned in the decision were erroneous and incomplete. We see no reason why the High Court of the land need go to such length. The hornbook doctrine states that findings of fact of the lower courts are conclusive on the Supreme Court.17We emphasize, it is not for the Court to weigh evidence all over again.18Although there are exceptions to the rule,19Erlinda failed to show that this is an exceptional instance.Fourth. Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code support her position that as spouses, they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live together and care for each other. We agree.The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.20The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.21Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972. We definedempathyas a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.22On June 28, 2001, Potenciano Ilusorio gave his soul to the Almighty, his Creator and Supreme Judge. Let his soul rest in peace and his survivors continue the much prolonged fracasex aequo et bono.IN VIEW WHEREOF, we DENY Erlinda's motion for reconsideration. At any rate, the case has been rendered moot by the death of subject.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ .,concur.

Footnotes1Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51689.2Docketed as G.R. No. 139789.3G. R No. 139808.4G. R. No. 139789.5G. R. No. 139808.6In CA-G.R. SP No. 51689, promulgated on April 5, 1999.7Decision, Rollo of G.R. No. 139808, pp. 290-A 290-J.8Promulgated on May 12, 2000.9Rollo of G. R No. 139808, p. 409.10Rollo of G. R No. 139808, p. 438.11Rollo of G. R No. 139808, p. 453-A.12Rollo of G. R No. 139808, p. 596.13Rollo of G. R. No. 139789, p. 24.14Rollo of G.R. No. 139808, p. 311.15Rollo of G.R. No. 139789, p. 560.16Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G. R. SP No. 51689, Rollo of G.R. No. 139789, pp. 29-38.17Omandam vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128750, January 18, 2001.18Co vs. Court of Appeals, 317 Phil. 230, 238 [1995]; Gobonseng, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 316 Phil. 570 [1995].19Romago Electric Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G. R No. 125947, June 8, 2000; Halili vs. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 465 [1998]; Bautista vs. Mangaldan Rural Bank, Inc., 230 SCRA 16 [1994].20Art. 68, Family Code.21Tsoi vs. Lao-Tsoi, 334 Phil. 294 [1997], citing Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298 [1964].22Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals,supra, Note 21.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-49299 April 15, 1988NORA CONTADO, ADELINA RAZON and NERA TIZON,petitioners,vs.RUFILO L. TAN, LILIO BORJA, EDEN BOCO, FELIPE ALDE JR., DICKY CERNAL, PIO GOPOLE, JOSE ROMEO ESCOTO, JORGE SILLA, ABRAHAM CODOY, PRIVADO ALIDO, ISAIAS COPADA, GONZALO BORJA, EUFEMIO BORMATE, ROBERTO TAN, JR., BENITO PICCIO and several PC soldiers,respondents.Lutgardo B. Barbo for petitioners.TEEHANKEE,C.J.:This is another tragic story of missing personsdesaparecidos during the martial law regime that must be told and recorded in the annals of our jurisprudence for the lessons that should be learned from it and never be forgotten by a freedom loving people.This petition for habeas corpus was flied on November 20, 1978 by Nora Contado, Adelina Razon and Nena Tizon in behalf of their spouses Crispo Contado, Cesar Razon and Jimmy Tizon. The respondents are Rufilo L. Tan, the then Municipal Mayor of Llorente, Eastern Samar; Lilio Borja Eden Boco, Felipe Alde, Jr., Dicky Cernal, Pio Gopole, Jose Alde, Romeo Escoto, Jorge Silla, Abraham Codoy, Privado Alido then members of the Integrated National Police of Llorente, Samar; Isaias Copada and Gonzalo Borja residents of Llorente, Eastern Samar, then government employees holding office at the municipal building of Llorente, Eastern Samar, Eufemio Bormate then driver of the ambulance car employee of the Llorente Community Hospital and Health Center (medicare) of Llorente, Eastern Samar; Roberto Tan, Jr. brother of then Mayor Rufilo Tan-head of the Llorente Community Hospital; Lt. Col. Benito Piccio, then Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police at Camp Asidillo, Borongan, Eastern Samar and the soldiers were under his command.Petitioners alleged that on September 13,1978, their spouses were arrested by members of the Integrated National Police of Llorente, Eastern Samar, restrained of their liberty and were in grave danger of being liquidated, if they had not already been liquidated; that respondents conspired, helped one another and operated in arresting and detaining said Crispo Contado, Cesar Razon and Jimmy Tizon who were maltreated, tortured and subjected to cruel and inhuman punishment in the municipal building of Llorente, Eastern Samar; that the imprisonment of the above detainees or the restraint of their liberty, or their possible liquidation was without any legal authority or lawful basis. Petitioners further alleged that detainees were abused, maltreated, beaten and tortured by respondents led by then Mayor Rufilo Tan and his brother Roberto Tan, Jr. They had bloodied noses and mouths, broken teeth, black eyes, swollen ears, and blackish parts of their bodies. They were brought down from the second floor of the municipal building to the ground floor where the jail is located, totally naked with nothing to cover their bodies, with the exception of Crispo Contado who had only a brief. They were ordered to drink urine. Their backs, hands and mouths showed cigarette burns. They were handcuffed at the back even as handkerchiefs were tied into their mouths. Respondents Eden Boco, Privado Alido and Felipe Alde, Jr. entered the detention cell to beat and maltreat the three by boxing and using karate chops on their mouths and bodies while the three were handcuffed and helpless. The three were not allowed to eat for several days. Their fellow detainees were ordered not to give food to them. Even the relatives and friends of Crispo Contado, a native of Llorente, Eastern Samar, were prohibited to see him and bring him food. The petitioners further stated that per their information, their husbands were transferred from the Llorente Municipal Jail to the Philippine Constabulary Stockade at Borongan, Eastern Samar and back. They were also informed that on September 18, 1978 at 2:00 a.m. or 3:00 a.m., a very unholy hour, their husbands were taken out of the Llorente Municipal Jail aboard an ambulance car and brought to an undisclosed, unknown and secret place somewhere in Can-avid or Oras, Eastern Samar. Such ambulance car of the Llorente Community Hospital and Health Center (medicare) was driven by respondent Eufemio Bormate upon instructions of Roberto Tan, Jr., the mayor's brother and was escorted by two jeeploads of PC soldiers. Petitioners expressed their fear that in such unknown, undisclosed and secret place, their husband might have already been liquidated without mercy and justice.On the same date that the petition was filed on November 20, 1978, we issued the writ requiring respondents to make a Return and to hear the petition on November 29, 1978. The respondents filed their separate returns1which alleged in substance that they could not comply with the writ and present the persons of the detainees as they had been released on the very same day of their arrest, September 13, 1978 at 8:00 p.m.After hearing the parties on November 29, 1978 the court required counsel for respondents to file, if they wished, a proper return of the writ to counter the allegations in the petition and counsel for petitioners to file a reply or traverse to respondents' separate returns as well as to submit any document or affidavits specifically dealing with the factual issue of whether or not the three persons arrested on September 13, 1978 and whose whereabouts and release were sought in the petition at bar were indeed released on the same day at 8:00 p.m. as alleged in the returns.In their separate amended returns,2respondents denied the material allegations of the petition stating that they (respondents) merely invited the three missing persons for questioning and reiterated that they had been released on the same day on September 13, 1978 at 8:00 p.m. Respondents prayed that the petition be dismissed for being moot and academic.Petitioners, in their reply to the separate amended returns,3stated that the subject persons were never released on September 13,1978 or on any day thereafter as shown by the affidavits of one Diosdado Camora and one Diomedes Bono (Annexes "A" and "B", Reply) who stated that they saw Crispo Contado, one of the detainees at the municipal jail of Llorente, Eastern Samar on September 14 and 15, 1978. Petitioners' counter had interviewed and talked with respondent Lt. Col. Piccio who told him that he (Piccio) had recommended the release of the detainees two nights after or on September 15, 1978 contrary to respondents' claim that they released the subject persons on September 13, 1978. Petitioners averred that if their spouses had been truly released, they would have certainly gone home to them and their children. Petitioners further stated that respondents had not produced the bodies of the detainees, neither had they offered a valid excuse not to produce them and prayed that the respondents be adjudged guilty of contempt and be imprisoned and fined.At the resumpttion of the hearing on December 1, 1978, the Court continued to interpellate respondents Piccio and Lilio Borja as well as Messrs. Diosdado Camora and Diomedes Bano who affirmed their statements in their affidavits (Annexes "A" and "B" reply) and resolved, among others, to direct the Chief, Philippine Constabulary thru Major Benito Y. Custodio to hold respondents Lt. Col. Piccio, Cpl. Lilio Borja and Beneficto (Dicky) Cernal in Metro Manila until further orders from the Court and to direct NBI Director Jolly Bugarin to take the alleged driver of the ambulance respondent Eufemio Bormate under protective custody and to conduct an investigation as to his alleged participation in spiriting away the three detainees to an undisclosed place. The three (3) respondents who were under PC custody were nevertheless allowed upon motion to be with their respective families during the holidays by then Chairman of the First Division, now the Chief Justice, in an order dated December 28, 1978 provided that they returned and were held back in Metro Manila from January 8,1979 and thereafter .4On December 11, 1978, respondent Eufemio Bormate filed a manifestation of waiver with motion to lift order of protective custody;5On December 13, 1978, the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation wrote the Court a letter stating that efforts exerted by agents of his office to locate and place under protective custody the person of Eufemio Bormate yielded negative results, as persons knowledgeable of his whereabouts were either hostile or uncooperative and transmitted a copy of the Agents' Report for the Court's information and proper action.6On January 3, 1979, the Court Resolved among others to deny the prayer in the manifestation of waiver with motion to lift order of protective custody personally filed by respondent Eufemio Bormate with the assistance of his counsel and to require said counsel to explain why he should not be held in contempt of court or disciplinarily dealt with for obstructing the implementation of the Court's resolution of December 1, 1978 and the investigation therein ordered to be conducted as to Bormate's alleged participation in the alleged transporting and killing of the detainees subject of the petition at bar and to produce the person of Bormate before the NBI Director or agents-in-charge of the case, both within 5 days from notice hereof.7Said lawyer complied when he filed his explanation and compliance8and produced on January 12, 1979 at around 3:30 p.m. the person of Eufemio Bormate before NBI Director Jolly Bugarin and Agent Antonio A. Reyes.Meanwhile, Administrative Case No. 78-33 for grave misconduct was filed against respondent Lilio Borja and Benedicto Cernal with the National Police Commission of the Ministry of National Defense,9the investigation of which was conducted by the Hearing Officer of the NAPOLCOM at its headquarters here in Metro Manila instead of in Camp Asedillo, Borongan, Eastern Samar.10On January 19, 1979, Assistant Commissioner Alfredo G. Pagulayan of the Inspection, Investigation and Intelligence Branch of the National Police Commission filed a letter stating that their office was directed by then Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to conduct a thorough investigation on the alleged involvement of Mayor Rufilo Tan of Llorente, Eastern Samar and some members of the Police station thereafter in the mysterious disappearance of Crespo Contado, Jaime Tizon and Cesar Razon and requesting that an order be issued directing that Eufemio Bormate who was then under NBI custody be escorted and accompanied to their office for interrogation/interview.11This was granted in the resolution of January 19, 1979.12Respondent Cpl. Lilio Borja and Benedicto (Dicky) Cemal who were then under PC custody were also escorted/accompanied as requested to the Commissioner for interrogation/investigation at the scheduled dates and time .13In the comment14filed by respondent Piccio on the declarations of Diomedes Bano and Diosdado Camora in open court of December 1, 1978, he stated that these two are not telling the truth. Said comment was adopted by respondents Lilio Borja and Benedicto Cernal.On March 24,1979, respondent Eufemio Bormate, thru counsel, filed a motion to lift order of protective custody.15The Court, acting on said motion, required the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation to comment on said motion and to submit a status report on its investigation.16In the same resolution, the Court also directed Major General Fidel V. Ramos, then Chief of the Philippine Constabulary and Director General, Integrated National Police and Brig. Gen. Antonio P. Uy, Commanding General, CIS to submit their report of the thorough investigation conducted by them as per their Return of November 29, 1978. In a letter dated April 10, 1979, the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation offered objection to Eufemio Bormate's motion on grounds of investigative necessity.17Attached to said letter are copies of their Agents' self- explanatory status reports dated 5 and 10 April, 1979 on the investigation conducted pursuant to the resolution of 1 December 1978, General Ramos and Brig. Gen. Antonio Uy, through Col. Santiago 0.Tomelden, complied with said resolution when it submitted its initial report dated April 27, 1979.18In the meantime, in the January 7, 1979 issue of the TimesJournal, page 119under the heading "Marcos sacks Eastern Samar town mayor" it was stated that then President Marcos has ordered the ouster of the mayor of Llorente, Eastern Samar, for his alleged participation in the unlawful arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment and disappearance of three Manila fish merchants three months ago.On May 28, 1979, the Court Resolved among others to require Commissioner Alfredo Pagulayan of the NAPOLCOM to submit within ten (10) days from notice, a copy of the report to the NAPOLCOM as reported in the Philippine Daily Express issue of February 22, 1979, page 1 under the heading "Murdered Trader"s Body Dug Up" carrying the by-line of Ros Manlangit stating that "the remains, said to be those of Manila businessman Jaime Tizon, were discovered in a remote area in barangay Calbang in Can-avid town, about 100 kilometers from Llorente, in the town where the three were held earlier by the police and further reporting that "Commissioner Alfredo Pagulayan of the NAPOLCOM said the grave digger (name withheld) admitted having buried Tizon"s body "on orders of certain persons."20In compliance with the above resolution, Commissioner Pagulayan stated that after digging the spot pointed to as the alleged grave, the team, unearthed what Dr. Marcial B. Adal, Municipal Health Officer of Can-avid certified as: part of the scalp hair; whitish substance with bad peculiar odor probably melted fatty tissues and cartiliges; blackish substances with a foul odor probably melted muscles substances and blood and pubic hair. The health officer was very certain that the remains found and mentioned above were parts and accessory of a human organism.21Commissioner Pagulayan further stated that on January 12 and 13, 1979, the statements of the two grave diggers, Salvador Rebay and Peperion Hubayan, were taken down and they alleged in substance that sometime in the month of September or October, 1978, at Sitio Calbang, Barangay Carolina, Can-avid, Eastern Samar, after hearing a burst of gunfire, they were called by a group of unidentified soldiers and required to Identifya person who had gunshot wounds in his body and lying dead. Having failed to ascertain the Identity of the dead man, the two and some other persons who were around at the time were ordered by the said group of unidentified soldiers to dig up a hole and bury him: they obeyed. One Salvador Rebay further alleged that the male dead person had a mestizo feature.He further stated that one Leo Rebay, one of the alleged grave diggers, gave his statement on January 24, 1979 and he substantially corroborated the statements of Salvador Rebay and qqqPeperion Hubayan. When shown a line-up of photographs, Leo Rebay readily picked up the picture of one Jaime Tizon and pointed to it as that of the very person whom they buried in Sitio Calbang, Barangay Carolina, Can-avid, Eastern Samar sometime in the month of October 1978.This report was noted in the resolution of June 22, 1979. On June 4, 1979, respondent Lt. Col. Benito D. Piccio filed an urgent ex-parte motion for permission to leave Metro Manila and go home to Cebu City to attend to his daughter who was then in the hospital.22This motion was granted in the resolution of June 6, 1979 provided he returned after ten days and reported back to the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary in accordance with the court's resolution of December 1, 1978.23On December 19, 1979, Brig. Gen. Prospers A- Olivas then Acting Chief of Constabulary and Acting Director General of the Integrated National Police filed a letter24addressed to this Court on behalf of respondents Lt. Col. Piccio, Cpl. Lilio Borja and Pat. Benedicto (Dicky) Cernal who requested that their custody be transferred from the Chief of Philippine Constabulary through Major Benito Y. Custodio to the Regional Commander, PC Regional Command No. 8 and the restriction of their movement to Metro Manila be enlarged to include Camp September 21st, Leyte, where the Headquarters of PC Regional Command No. 8 is stationed. This request was granted in the Resolution of January 14, 1980 and the Court also Resolved to Require the Chief of the P.C. and Director General, INP; National Police Commisision, Ministry of National Defense; and the Director, NBI to submit their final reports of their respective" investigations conducted on the disappearance of Crispo Contado, Cesar Razon and Jimmy Tizon.25On January 11, 1980, respondent Lt. Col. Benito D. Piccio filed an urgent ex-parte motion for the Lifting of the order holding him in Metro Manila in order that he could seek preferential assignment in Region 7 with station in Cebu City, to enable him to resettle his family in Minglanilla before his retirement on May 30, 1980.26This was granted in the resolution of February 1, 1980.27In the report of Santiago O.Tomelden, Colonel, JAGS (PC) GSC Constabulary Judge Advocate, for the Chief of Constabulary/Director General, Integrated National Police and the Commanding General, Criminal Investigation Service, Philippine Constabulary, he stated that the result of his investigation showed that there is no evidence which would warrant prosecution of any persons or at least pinpoint responsibility for the alleged disappearance of Crispo Contado, Jimmy Tizon and Cesar Razon.28In the contrary investigation Report of the Inspection, Investigation and Intelligence Branch of the National Police Commission, Ministry of National Defense, thru Assistant Commissioner Alfredo G. Pagulayan, it was stated, however, that on the basis of its findings, it would appear that Mayor Rufilo Tan, Dr. Roberto Tan, Jr., Castolo Ocampo, Isaias Copada, Pat. Benedicto Cernal, Pat. Jose Alde, Pat. Privado Alido Pat. Jorge Silla, Pat. Eden Boco and Pat. Romeo Escoto and PC Capt. Berting Casillana were probably liable for murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code; that the killing of Jimmy Tizon and his two other companions almost resulted in a perfect crime that the precision in carrying out the plot was almost perfect; that the arrest, detention, maltreatment, the use of government personnel and equipment and the attempt to mislead government agents were only some of the circumstances that strengthened the suspicion that influential persons, military and/or civilians, were involved in the killing; and it recomendedthat all the suspects, namely Mayor Rufilo Tan, Dr. Roberto Tan, Castolo Ocampo; Isaias Copada, Pat. Benedicto Cernal, Pat. Jose Alde, Pat. Privado Alido, Pat. Jorge Silla,Pat. Eden Boco, and Pat. Romeo Escoto, who were positively Identified by witnesses as responsible in connection with the illegal arrest, detention, maltreatment and killing of Jaime Tizon be arrested and detained; thatPC Captain Betting Casillanoof the PC Command in Can-avid, Eastern Samar who was Identified by witnesses to be the Officer ordering the burial of Jaime Tizon in Sitio Carolina, Can-avid, Eastern Samar, be likewise arrested and detained; and that steps should be taken to assure the safety of witnesses.29In the finall report of the National Bureau of Investigation, it stated that the involvement of respondent Bormate in the instant case was established by evidence.30On February 20, 1980, the Court resolved to furnish the Minister of Justice a copy of the aforesaid reports for the criminal prosecution of the officials and persons involved on the basis of the evidence collated by the National Police Commission and National Bureau of Investigation.31On May 29, 1981, an amended information for murder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against the herein respondents, more specifically Criminal Case No. 2679 entitled"People of the Philippines vs. Rufilo L. Tan, et al."On January 29, 1982, the First Division of the Sandiganbayan32rendered its decision in the aforesaid case wherein it found respondents Rufilo L. Tan, Dr. Roberto L. Tan, Jr., Lilio G. Borja, Benedicto Cernal, Isaias A. Copada and Castulo A. Campo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Less Serious Physical Injuries. The remaining respondents were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The pertinent portion of the 72-page decision is hereunder reproduced:For any of the accused to be held liable for the death of Tizon in Can-Avid, it is, therefore, imperative and essential that conspiracy between them and those who filled Tizon be proven, which proof of conspiracy is quite separate and different from that which the prosecution has shown to have existed between and among those who participated in the maltreatment of Tizon and his companions. Unfortunately, the prosecution's evidence is bereft of such proof of conspiracy between those who liquidated Tizon in Can-Av