Habeas Corpus and Amparo

7/28/2019 Habeas Corpus and Amparo

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CANLAS, LIM, NUESTRO, POON, ROXAS, SAN JUAN, YANG

GROUP 5 Writ of Habeas Corpus and Writ of Amparo

E2016

Part I - Writ of Habeas Corpus

1. Provisions of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Constitution 1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 15:The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be

suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.

1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 18.The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of allarmed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such

armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of

invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding

sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus or place the Philippines or any

part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial

law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall

submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a

vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke suchproclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon

the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such

proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or

rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such

proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the

sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of

the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must

promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant

the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment

of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to

function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus shall apply only to persons

judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with,

invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus, any person thus

arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be

released.


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2. What is the Writ of Habeas Corpus? Habeas corpus ("may you have the body") is a prerogative writ of liberty employed to test

the validity of a persons detention (Cruz, Constitutional Law).

The writ is directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the bodyof the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his caption and

detention, to do, to submit to, and receive whatever the court or judge awarding the writ

shall consider in his behalf (Cruz, Constitutional Law, citing Moran, Rules of Court, Vol. II,

499).

The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy torelieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of

personal freedom. (Veluz, citing Villavicencio v. Lukban)

Distinction between the Writ and the Privilege of the WritIt should be emphasized that what is suspended by the Executive is not the writ but the

privilege of the writ. The writ always issues as a matter of course and the officer to

whom it is directed is bound to honor it. If, however, a person is detained on reasonable

belief of participation in a crime covered by the suspension of the privilege, the officer

states such fact in his Answer and Return and asks the court to proceed no further.

(Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary).

3. History of the Writ and Suspension of the Privilege of the WritSource Provision on the Bill of Rights Notes

Section 5, Philippine Bill of

1902

That the privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus shall not be

suspended, unless when in cases of

rebellion, insurrection, or invasion

the public safety may require it, in

either of which events the same

may be suspended by the President,or by the Governor-General with the

approval of the Philippine

Commission, whenever during such

period the necessity for such

suspension shall exist.

1. The first constitutional guarantee of the

availability of the writ found in the Philippine Bil

both guaranteed the right to the writ and set the

limit to its availability.

2. Authority to suspend the privilege of the wri

of habeas corpus was with the GovernorGeneral, jointly with the Philippine Commission

In Barcelon, following strictly the doctrine o

separation of powers, the SC refused to

interfere with the action of the politica

departments.

Paragraph 14, Section 3,

1935 Constitution

The privilege of the writ of Habeas

Corpus shall not be suspended

except in cases of invasion,

insurrection or rebellion when the

public safety requires it, in any of

which events the same may besuspended whenever during such

period the necessity for such

suspension shall exist.

1. There were two provisions on the suspension

of the writ of habeas corpus in that Constitution

one on the Bill of Rights, and the other in the

article on the Executive Department. The Bill o

Rights provision guaranteed the availability o

the writ and set the grounds for suspension. Theprovision under the Executive Department

besides setting the grounds for suspension, also

specified the seat of power to suspend.

2. Thus it was under the 1935 Constitution the

question arose as to which enumeration o

grounds for suspension of the privilege should


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prevail the enumeration under the BOR or that

under the article on Executive Department.

3. In Lansang, the Court overruled Barcelon

saying that it was unanimous in the conviction

that it had the authority to inquire into the

existence of said factual bases in order to

determine the constitutional sufficiency

thereof.

Section 15, Article IV, 1973

Constitution.

The privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus shall not be suspended

except in cases of invasion,

insurrection, or rebellion, or

imminent danger thereof, when the

public safety requires it.

Under the 1973 Constitution, the question (refe

to 1935 notes above) became academic because

BOR was harmonized with Article IX, Section 12

(1973), which said in part: In case of invasion

insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent dange

thereof, when public safety requires it [Prime

Minister] may suspend the privilege of the wri

of habeas corpus. It is clear that the power to

suspend the privilege belongs to the Executive.Section 15, Article III, 1987

Constitution

The privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus shall not be suspended

except in cases of invasion or

rebellion when the public safety

requires it.

1. The power to suspend ceased to be an almost

exclusively executive affair. The President may

suspend for a period not exceeding 60 days, and

Congress is given the power to revoke

suspension.

2. Congress, upon initiative of President, may

also extend the suspension.

3. Supreme Court may also now review the

sufficiency of factual basis of the suspensionbecause of judicial review.

4. The word insurrection is dropped as a

ground for suspension.

Case Name Fast Facts Doctrine/Ratio Previous Doctrine Cited

Barcelon v. Baker Because of the open

insurrection of a group

of ladrones (thieves) in

Batangas and Cavite,

the Governor-General

pursuant to a resolution

and request of the

Philippine Commission,

suspended the privilege

of the writ of habeas

corpus in the two

provinces, in

accordance with

Section 5 of the Act of

Habeas Corpus;

Suspension

Only the President or

the Governor-General

can determine the

existence of the

grounds specified in the

Constitution for the

suspension of the

privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus. This

power is discretionary

and therefore not


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Congress (Philippine

Bill).

justiciable.

Lansang v. Garcia Two grenades were

thrown at the miting de

avance of the Liberal

Party killing 8 persons

and injuring many.

President Marcos

subsequently issued

proclamation 889,

suspending the privilege

the writ of habeas

corpus. Members of the

Philippine Constabulary

by virtue of said

proclamation

apprehended herein

petitioners.

Habeas Corpus;

Suspension

(The doctrine

established in Barcelon

and Montenegro was

abandoned in this case).

The grant of power to

suspend the privilege of

writ of habeas corpus is

neither absolute nor

unqualified. Like the

limitations and

restrictions imposed by

the Constitution upon

the legislativedepartment, adherence

thereto and compliance

therewith may, within

proper bounds, be

inquired into by courts

of justice.

Barcelon v Baker, Montenegro

doctrine abandoned.

4. Preliminary ConsiderationsA. Standing Sec. 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court

Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court allows: any person who has a legally justifiedinterest in the freedom of the person whose liberty is restrained or who shows someauthorization to make the application (Velasco).

B. Jurisdiction - Sec 2, Rule 102, ROC The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member

thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof

in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in

the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof,

or before the Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for the hearing and decision

on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on

any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his

judicial district.

5. Nature The writ ofhabeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by

which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of a person is

being withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is issued when one is either deprived of

liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from exercising legal custody over another

person. Thus, it contemplates two instances:

i. deprivation of a persons liberty either through illegal confinement orthrough detention and


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ii. withholding of the custody of any person from someone entitled to suchcustody (Veluz)

A. Illegal detention/ Involuntary Restraint of Liberty The essential purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of

involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom

if such restraint is illegal (Manalo).

A prime specification of an application for a writ of HC is an actual and effective and notmerely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty (Manalo).

o Restrictive CustodyRestrictive custody is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty; it is a

nominal restraint beyond the ambit of habeas corpus, a precautionary measure to

account for charged PNP officers (Manalo, Ampatuan).

Case Name Fast Facts Doctrine/Ratio

Manalo v. Calderon Several police officers, petitioners

in this case, were implicated in theburning of an elementary school in

Taysan, Batangas at the height of

the May 2007 national and local

elections for failing to timely

respond to the incident. Acting on

the report, PNP superiors placed

them under restrictive custody

which directed that: 1. All their

movements within camp should be

monitored; 2. When situation

warrants their movement outside

camp, they should be properlyescorted on one-on-one basis; and

3. A logbook should be maintained

to record the accounting of their

place of destination, name of

escort, estimated time of departure

and return to the station.

Petitioners contend that their

restrictive custody status

amounted to an illegal restraint of

their liberty.

A petition for habeas corpus will be given due course

only if it shows that petitioner is being detained orrestrained of his liberty unlawfully. A restrictive

custody and monitoring of movements or

whereabouts of police officers under investigation

by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention o

restraint of liberty.

Restrictive custody is at best nominal restraint which

is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is a

permissible precautionary measure to assure the

PNP authorities that the police officers concerned

are always accounted for.

RA 6975 (DILG Act of 1990), as amended by RA 8551

(PNP Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998) clearly

provdes that members of the police force are

subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery

of the PNP. Section 41 (b) of the law enumerates

disciplinary actions including restrictive custody that

may be imposed by duly designated supervisors and

officers.

Ampatuan v. Macaraig Wife of PO1 Ampatuan filed for apetition for a writ of habeas corpus

when the PO1 Ampatuan was held

under restrictive custody by the

PNP for allegedly killing two

COMELEC Legal Officers.

PNP did not heed the writ, invoking

Habeas Corpus; Restrictive Custody

A restrictive custody and monitoring of movements

or whereabouts of police officers under

investigation by their superiors is not a form of

illegal detention or restraint of liberty.

The restrictive custody is a permissible


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the doctrine of Manalo v Calderon,

which held that habeas corpus will

not lie for a PNP personnel under

restrictive custody. They asserted

that PO1 Ampatuan was facing an

administrative charge for grave

misconduct and under Section 52,

par. 4, of RA 8551, the PNP Chief

can place the PNP personnel under

restrictive custody pending the

administrative case.

precautionary measure to assure the PNP

authorities that police officers are always accounted

for.

Supreme Court upheld the PNPs arguments and

reiterated the doctrine that restrictive custody

under the PNPs governing rule is anothe

circumstance to which a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus will not lie.

Extended detention- post conviction remedyo Once a deprivation of a constitutional right (right to liberty) is shown to exist, the

court that rendered judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and Habeas Corpus is

the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention. (Gumabon).

Case Name Fast Facts Doctrine Previous Doctrine Cited

Gumabon v.

Director of

Prisons

The Court ruled in People v.

Hernandez that there is no

complex crime of rebellion

with murder, arson or

robbery. Herein petitioners,

having been convicted of the

said complex crime, raised

their constitutional right to

equal protection and invokedthat the ruling in Hernandez

be applied to them. They

contend that they already

served more than the

maximum penalty that could

have been imposed upon

them.

Habeas Corpus; Retroactivity

Judicial decisions favorable to the

accused must be applied

retroactively. Once a deprivation

of a constitutional right is shown

to exist, the court that rendered

judgment is deemed ousted of

jurisdiction and Habeas Corpus isthe appropriate remedy to assail

the legality of the detention.

People v Hernandez,

No crime of rebelli

complexed with murd

arson, or robbery.

Cures - Supervening events - Section 4, Rule of the Writ of Amparoo If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody

of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or

order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the

process, render the judgment, or to make the order, the writ shall not be allowed;

or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be

discharged by reasons of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or

order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person

charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering

imprisonment under lawful judgment.

INFORMATION


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BAIL It is settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused istantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.

(Velasco).

BAIL TO JURISDICTION if it appears that the person arranged to berestrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer by virtue of a court

order and that court had jurisdiction to make the order, the writ shall not be

allowed. (Velasco).


Velasco v. Court of

Appeals

Petitioners, members of the NBI,

want to set aside the CAs order

granting Lawrence Larkins petition

for habeas corpus and immediate

release because he has already been

charged with the crime of rape and

his motion for bail was denied by

the lower court. In this case, a

warrant of arrest was issued by anRTC judge against Larkins for

violation of BP22. Meanwhile, a

certain Desiree Alinea filed a

complaint-affidavit with the NBI

accusing Larkins of the crime of

rape. The NBI apprehended Larkins

without a warrant and detained him

in the NBI headquarters because of

said complaint. The RTC judge set

aside the warrant issued against him

for violating BP22 and ordered hisrelease unless otherwise detained

for some other cause. However,

the NBI personnel refused to release

Larkins because of the complaint

filed against him for rape. Larkins,

through counsel Ulep, filed a motion

for bail, which was denied by the

court. Larkins new conselTe filed a

motion for dismissal on the ground

of the illegality of his warrantless

arrest, which the court also denied.

Larkins common-law wife filed for

petition of habeas corpus, which the

CA granted because of the illegality

of the warrantless arrest.

Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening

events may bar his release or discharge from custody.

What is to be inquired into is the legality of his

detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the

application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the

detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of

some supervening events, such as the instances

mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer

illegal at the time of the filing of the application.

By filing his motion for bail, Larkins admitted that he

was under the custody of the court and voluntarily

submitted his person to its jurisdiction.

The court order denying his motion for bail was an

unequivocal assertion of its authority to keep in

custody the person of Larkins.

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus will not

prosper because his detention has become legal by

virtue of the filing before the court the complain

against him for the crime of rape and by the issuance

of the January 5 order denying his motion for bail.

Transition from Illegal detention to custodyo In this case, the issue is not whether the custody of Eufemia is being rightfully

withheld from petitioner but whether Eufemia is being restrained of her liberty.


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Significantly, although petitioner admits that he did not have legal custody of

Eufemia, he nonetheless insists that respondents themselves have no right to her

custody. Thus, for him, the issue of legal custody is irrelevant. What is important is

Eufemias personal freedom. (Veluz).


Veluz v. Villanueva The petitioner had been the

guardian of 94-year old Eufemia

Rodriguez since 2000. In 2005, the

legally adopted children of said

Eufemia Rodriguez took the latter to

take care for her. The petitioner

prayed for the issuance of a writ of

habeas corpus to regain custody

over Eufemia.

Habeas Corpus

-In this case, the issue is not whether the custody of

Eufemia is being rightfully withheld from petitioner

but whether Eufemia is being restrained of her liberty.

Significantly, although petitioner admits that he did

not have legal custody of Eufemia, he nonetheless

insists that respondents themselves have no right to

her custody. Thus, for him, the issue of legal custody is

irrelevant. What is important is Eufemias personal

freedom.

iii. In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, acourt or judge must first inquire into whether the

petitioner is being restrained or deprived of his

liberty. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be

unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the

petitioner discharged. There was no proof that

Eufemia was being detained or restrained of her

liberty by respondents. Nothing on record revealed

that she was forcibly taken.

Petition DENIED.

B. Custody Different rationale

o In custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint ofliberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy;

rather, the writ is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody

over a child (Sombong).

o In passing on the writ in a child custody case, the court deals with a matter of anequitable nature and not on personal freedom because a minor is presumed to be in

the custody of someone until he reaches majority age (Sombong).

3 requisites for custodyi. That the petitioner has the right of custody over the minor;ii. That the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from the petitioner by

the respondent; and

iii. That it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in the custody ofpetitioner and not that of the respondent (Sombong)


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Sombong v. Court of

Appeals

Petitioner prays for the reversal of

the CA decision denying the petition

for habeas corpus filed by her.

Petitioner is the mother of

ArabellaSombong who she brought

to the Sir John Clinic owned by

private respondents Dr. and Dra. Ty.

Because petitioner didnt have

enough money to pay for the bills,

the spouses refused to discharge

Arabella. 2 years after, petitioner

claimedArabella but was

unsuccessful. Dra. Ty stated that

there is a possibility that Arabella

was given to a certain Marietta

NeriAlviar since they thought thatshe had abandoned her daughter.

NBI conducted an investigation and

found a female child with the name

of Cristina Neri who was adopted by

the Neris from the clinic. There is no

evidence; however to prove that

Cristina is Arabella.

The Court cannot grant her the writ of habeas corpus

because the evidence does not support a finding that

the child, Cristina, is in truth and in fact her child,

Arabella. Neither is there sufficient evidence tosupport the finding that private respondents custody

of Cristina is illegal to warrant the grant of the writ.

Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where the

rightful custody of any person is withheld from the

person entitled thereto. Thus, although the writ of

habeas corpus ought not to be issued if the restraint is

voluntary, we have held time and again that the said

writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to

regain the custody of a minor child even if the latterbe in the custody of a third person of her own free

will.

The grant of the writ in the instant case will depend on

the concurrence of the following requisites:

1. That the petitioner has the right of custody over the

minor;

2. That the rightful custody of the minor is being

withheld from the petitioner by the respondent; and

3. That it is to the best interest of the minor concerned

to be in the custody of petitioner and not that of

respondent.

PART II - Difference of HC and Amparo

The act or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of should be illegal or unlawful

i. habeas corpus; confinement and custody forii. amparo; violations of, or threat to violate, a person's life, liberty, and security. It also covers

extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats. (So v. Tacla).


So v. Tacla

So filed writs of habeas corpus andamparo on behalf of his daughter

accused of qualified theft before Judge

Tacla. Prior to the criminal

proceedings, Sos daughter Elena

Guisande was committed in the Makati

Medical Center. Judge Tacla transferred

Guisande to the NCMH, a government

Amparo

iii. The writ of amparo should be grantedjudiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo

Rule be diluted and undermined by

indiscriminate filing.

Habeas Corpus; Illegal and Involuntary


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hospital, to determine if she could

stand trial. Guisande claimed to

experience life-threatening

circumstances in her confinement.

Hence, her father filed for the writs.

The NCMH reported eventually that

Guisande could indeed stand trial.

Justice Pizarro, pursuant to the

directive of the SC, ordered the transfer

of Guisande to St. Clares Medical

Center, her hospital of Choice, under

strict watch.

The criminal charges against Guisande

were dismissed, hence the writs of

amparo and habeas became moot and

academic.

So filed a comment opposing the

dismissal of the criminal and

administrative cases against Judge

Tacla and Dr. Vicente of the NCMH.

Deprivation

iv. Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan v. JudgeMacaraig: the most basic criterion for the

issuance of the writ is that the individual seeking

such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of

movement or place under some form of illegal

restraint. The nature of the restraint must be

illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of

action.

v. If a person is not being restrained ofliberty, the writ will be refused.

When Guisandes case was dismissed, she was no

confined in a jail facility, the NCMH, or under any

involuntary deprivation.

PART III - Writ of Amparo

1. Source Rules of Court

2. History (Secretary of National Defense)

Originated in Mexico during the time when Mexican jurists became interested in Americasconcept of Judicial Review

o 1847 Yucatan Constitution (in Mexico) embodied a constitutional provisiongranting the judges the power to protect all persons in the enjoyment of their

constitutional and legal rights, which reads:

The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the

Republic in the exercise and preservation of those rights granted

to him by this Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant

thereto, against attacks by the Legislative and Executive powers

of the federal or state governments, limiting themselves to

granting protection in the specific case in litigation, making no

general declaration concerning the statute or regulation thatmotivated the violation.

o Implications of the provision: enables the courts to enforce the constitution byprotecting individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using this

power to make law for the entire nation

The concept ofamparo evolved to address violation of particular Constitutional rights (i.e.amparo libertad, amparo contra leyes, amparo administrative, amparo agrario)


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In the Philippines, there are already existing provisions that afford protection to theConstitutional rights (i.e. Grave Abuse Clause in Art VIII, Sec 1, and Writ of Habeas Corpus)

However, these existing protection are not enough to address cases of extrajudicial killingsand enforced disappearances, both of which require immediate granting of reliefs

Hence, the Writ of Amparo was born:o

promulgated on 24 October 2007o exercise for the first time of the Courts expanded power to promulgate the rules to

protect the peoples constitutional rights; response to the prevalence of extralegal

killings and enforced disappearances

3. Definition

The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid judicialrelief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make

the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. It is not an action to

determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages

requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial

evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. (Secretary of National Defense,

Rodriguez).

It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses,and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably

leading to subsequent investigation and action (Secretary of National Defense, Rodriguez).

4. Preliminary ConsiderationsA. Standing Section 2, Rule on the Writ of Amparo

1. Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents of

the aggrieved party;

2. Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the

fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the

preceding paragraph; or3. Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known

member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.

The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends the right of all other authorized

parties to file similar petitions. Likewise, the filing of the petition by an authorized party

on behalf of the aggrieved party suspends the right of all others, observing the order

established herein.

o The parents of Sherlyn and Karen who filed for the Writ of Amparo did NOThave standing to file a writ of amparo on behalf of Manuel Merino. This is

according to Section 2 of the rule on the Writ of Amparo which provides

who may file the writ. In this case, the parents failed to allege that there

were no known members of the immediate family or relatives of Merino.

However, they could file the writ for habeas corpus. (Boac).

B. Jurisdiction - Sec 3, Rule of the Writ of Amparo The petition may be filed on any day and at any time with the Regional Trial Court of

the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements

occurred, or with the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, or any

justice of such courts. The writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.


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5. Requisites for court to grant Writ of Amparo Sec. 5, Rule on the Writ of AmparoA. Personal circumstances by the petitionerB. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or

omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an

assumed appellation;

C. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened withviolation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation

is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;

Substantial proofo Sec. 17 & 18 of Rule on WOA requires that substantial evidence prove the

allegations in the petition.

o Substantial evidence such relevant evidence as a reasonable man mightaccept as adequate to support a conclusion

o The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summaryproceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate

reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal

guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages

requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibilityrequiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive

proceedings. (Secretary of National Defense).

Totality of Evidenceo Quoted ruling in Razon: The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to

consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider

any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible

if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we

reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason i.e., to the relevance of

the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of

adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it

satisfies this basic minimum test. (Rodriguez).D. The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and

addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of

the investigation, together with any report;

E. The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts ofthe aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or

omission; and

F. The relief prayed for.6. Liability/ who can be impleaded

A. Doctrine of Command Responsibility "Responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the

armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic

conflict." (Roxas, citing Rubrico).

As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individualcriminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his

subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he

ordered). (Roxas, citing Rubrico).

The inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceedingdoes not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the


13/21

ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or

indirect acquiescence. Commanders may therefore be impleadednot actually on the

basis of command responsibilitybut rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at

least (Balao, citing Roxas).

B. Responsibility Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial

evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced

disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the

directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in

the proper courts. (Rubrico, Razon, cited in Rodriguez).

C. Accountability Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be

addressed to those

i. who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance withoutbringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility

defined above

ii. or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforceddisappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure

iii. or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden ofextraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced

disappearance. (Rubrico, Razon, cited in Rodriguez).

We conclude that the PNP and the AFP have so far failed toconduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into

the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the

extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties)

that the Rule on the Writ ofAmparo requires. (Burgos)

The standard of diligence required the duty of publicofficials and employees to observe extraordinary diligence

called for extraordinary measures expected in theprotection of constitutitional rights and in the consequent

rights and in the consequent handling and investigation of

extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearance. From the

evidence gathered, respondents clearly failed to discharge

their burden of extraordinary diligence required in the

investigation of Balaos abduction. (Balao).


Roxas v.

Macapagal-

Arroyo

Petitioner Roxas is assailing the

decision of the court of appeals

which extended to her the

privilege of the writs of Amparo

and Habeas Data but dined her

prayers for an inspection order

(of Fort Magsaysay),

production order and the

return of her belongings. Roxas

claims that police and military

focibly abducted her and held

GMA Immune, presidential

immunity.

Amparo; Command Responsibility:iv. Since the application of

command responsibility

presupposes an imputation of

individual liability, it is more aptly

invoked in a fullblown criminal or

administrative case rather than in

a summary amparo proceeding.

Command responsibility;

Rubrico v Arroyo

- "Responsibility of

commanders for crimes

committed by

subordinate members of

the armed forces or

other persons subject to

their control in


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her in Fort Magsaysay for 5

days, allegedly being part of

the CPP-NPA. Being blindfloded

the whole time however, she

was unable to posetively

identify her abductors as being

part of the police, military or to

convince the court/ prove that

she was actually taken to Fort

Magsaysay.

The obvious reason lies in the

nature of the writ itself:

v. While the principalobjective of its proceedings is the

initial determination of whether

an enforced disappearance,extralegal killing or threats

thereof had transpiredthe writ

does not, by so doing, fix liability

for such.

- Instead, commanders may be

impleaded NOT ON THE BASIS OF

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY, but

rather on the ground of their

responsibility.

Same; Same; Responsibility-vi. The totality of the evidence

does not inspire reasonable

conclusion that her abductors

were military or police personnel

and that she was detained at fort

Magsaysay.

Petition DENIED.

international wars or

domestic conflict.

Same; Razon v Tagitis;

Responsibility-

vii. Refers to theextent the actors have

been established by

substantial evidence to

have participated in

whatever way, by

action or omission, in

an enforced

disappearance, as a

measure of the

remedies this Court

shall craft, among them,

the directive to file theappropriate criminal

and civil cases against

the responsible parties

in the proper courts

Same; Same;

Accountability-

viii. Refers to themeasure of remedies

that should be

addressed to those who

exhibited involvement

in the enforced

disappearance without

bringing the level of

their complicity to the

level of responsibility

defined above; or who

are imputed with

knowledge relating to

the enforced

disappearance and who

carry the burden ofdisclosure; or those

who carry, but have

failed to discharge, the

burden of extraordinary

diligence in the

investigation of the

enforced disappearance


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Burgos v.

Macapagal-

Arroyo

Edita Burgos filed a petition for

Habeas Corpus and Amparo on

behalf of her son Joseph

Burgos who was allegedly

abducted by a group of four

men in Ever Gotesco mall. The

CA denied the writ of Habeas

Corpus, and partially granted

the writ of Amaparo. The facts

show that Burgos was forcibly

taken while in Ever Gotesco,

the plate number of the vehicle

used to abduct him was traced

back to the AFP, 56th Infantry

batallion Impound lot. Upon

inspection of the impound lot itwas found that the plate

number was missing and the

vehicle was scrapped.

Defendants on the other hand

contend that Burgos was

abducted by member of the

CPP-NPA.

Evidence presented fails to

establish connection between

military and the abductors of

Burgos.

Amparo; Standard of dilligence

ix. Writ of Amparo require theAFP and PNP to conduct an

exhaustive and meaningful

investigation into disappearancesand to exercise extraordinary

diligence in the performance of

their duties.

x. Because of theinvestigative shorcomings, WE

CAN NOT RULE on the case until a

more meaningful investigation

using extraordinary dilligence is

undertaken.

There were significant lapses in

handling of the investigation.

Further investigation and

monitoring should be undertaken.

Directs CHR to conduct

examination with aid of PNP, AFP.

Boac v.

Cadapan

Armed men abducted Sherlyn

Cadapan, Karen Empeno, and

Manuel Merino. Their family

members filed a petition for

habeas corpus against the

members of the military. After

the trial, the petition was

dismissed because it was not

the appropriate remedy.

During pendency of the

reconsideration, their family

members filed a petition forWrit of Amparo against the

same military soldiers. The two

petitions were consolidated.

The trial called upon Raymond

Manalo whose testimony

revealed that he indeed met

the tree abducted individuals in

Presidential immunity from suit

The President cannot be sued in

any civil or criminal case during his

tenure of office or actual

incumbency.

Amparo; Standing; Who may file

xi. The parents of Sherlyn andKaren who filed for the writ of

Amparo did NOT have standing to

file a writ of amparo on behalf of

Manuel Merino. This is according

to Section 2 of the rule on the

Writ of Amparo which provides

who may file the writ. In this case,

the parents failed to allege that

there were no known members of

the immediate family or relatives

Rubrico v. Macapagal

Arroyo on command

responsibility

Razon Jr. v. Tagitis:

defining what constitutes

responsibility and

accountability


16/21

the Camp Tecson. The court

ruled that Raymond Manalos

testimony was truthful, taking

judicial notice of its decision in

Secretary of National Defense

v. Manalo.

of Merino. However, they could

file the writ for habeas corpus.

Amparo; Command Responsibility

xii. The court maintains itsadherence to Rubrico as far asamparo cases are concerned. This

means that command

responsibility in amparo cases

should not be used to determine

criminal liability. However,

Rubrico recognizes the application

of command responsibility to

determine those who are

responsible and accountable to

protect the rights of the aggrieved

party.xiii. Such identification may be

a preliminary determination of

criminal liability, subject to

further investigation by the

appropriate government agency.

xiv. RA 9851 includes commandresponsibility as a form of criminal

complicity in crimes against

international humanitarian law.

There is no need to file a motion

for execution for an amparo orhabeas corpus decision.

Rodriguez v.

Macapagal-

Arroyo

Rodriguez was abducted and

tortured by the military, forcing

him to name the location of the

NPA camp. He was later freed

and at the camp, he was made

to sign an affidavit that he was

a surrenderee and was never

beaten up. A few months after

his release, he noticed that

several suspicious-looking men

are following him. He filed for a

Petition for the Writ of Amparo

and Writ of Habeas Data with

Prayers for Protection Orders,

Inspection of Place, and

Production of Documents and

Personal Properties

impleading GMA and several

Presidential immunity from suit

The presidential immunity from

suit is concurrent only with his

tenure and not his term. Former

President Arroyo cannot use the

presidential immunity from suit to

shield herself from judicial scrutiny

that would assess whether, within

the context of amparo proceedings,she was responsible or accountable

for the abduction of Rodriguez.

Amparo; Command responsibility

- Nothing precludes this Court from

applying the doctrine of command

Amparo; Command

Responsibility; Boac v

Cadapan; Opinion of

Carpio- Morales

xviii. Rubricocategorically denies the

application of command

responsibility in amparo

cases to determinecriminal liability. The

Court maintains its

adherence to this

pronouncement as far

as amparo proceedings

are concerned. xxx

Command responsibility


17/21

officers of the 17th Infantry

Batallion of the Philippine

Army.

responsibility in amparo

proceedings to ascertain

responsibility and accountability in

extrajudicial killings and enforced

disappearances. GMA can be

impleaded as a respondent under

the doctrine of command

responsibility.

Same; Same; Liability; 3 Elements

of Doctrine of Command of

Responsibility

xv. The existence of a superior-subordinate relationship

between the accused as superior

and the perpetrator of the crime

as his subordinate

xvi. The superior knew or hadreason to know that the crime

was about to be or had been

committed; and

xvii. The superior failed to takethe necessary and reasonable

measure to prevent the criminal

acts or punish the perpetrators

thereof.

No substantial evidence proving

GMA's neither responsibility nor

accountability.

may be loosely applied

in amparo cases in

order to identify those

accountable individuals

that have the power to

effectively implement

whatever processes an

amparo court would

issue.

Same; Totality of

evidence; Razon

xix. The fair andproper rule, to our

mind, is to consider all

the pieces of evidence

adduced in theirtotality, and to consider

any evidence otherwise

inadmissible under our

usual rules to be

admissible if it is

consistent with the

admissible evidence

adduced. In other

words, we reduce our

rules to the most basic

test of reason i.e., to

the relevance of the

evidence to the issue at

hand and its consistency

with all other pieces of

adduced evidence.

Thus, even hearsay

evidence can be

admitted if it satisfies

this basic minimum

test.

xx. Substantialevidence provided toprove responsibility and

accountability of some

military respondents.

Balao v.

Macapagal-

James Balao, who founded the

left-leaning group Cordilera Amparo; Substantial Evidence forCited Rubrico, which was

also cited in Roxas v


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Arroyo Peoples Allicance (CPA) was

abducted in La Trinidad,

Benguet by armed men. One of

the armed men was heard

telling the driver of the van

that they are going to proceed

to Camp Dangwa (PNP

Provincial Headquarters in La

Trinidad Benguet). Siblings of

James Balao filed a Petition for

the Writ of Amparo, ordering

the respondents (GMA, several

Department Secretaries and

several AFP and PNP

commanders) to disclose

where James is detained or

confined, to release James, and

to cease and desist fromfurther inflicting harm upon his

person.

Responsibility and Accountability

xxi. Such documented practiceof targeting activists in the

militarys counter-insurgency

program by itself does not fulfil

the evidentiary standard in the

Amparo rule to establish an

enforced disappearance.

Accordingly, the trial court cannot

simply infer government

involvement in the abduction of

James Balao from past similar

incidents in which victims also

worked or affiliated with the CPA

and other left-leaning groups.

Such pronouncement of

responsibility on the part of thepublic respondents cannot be

made given the insufficiency of

evidence.

Same; Standard of diligence

required

xxii. Duty of public officials andemployees to observe

extraordinary diligence called

for extraordinary measures

expected in the protection of

constitutitional rights and in the

consequent rights and in the

consequent handling and

investigation of extra-judicial

killings and enforced

disappearance. From the evidence

gathered, respondents clearly

failed to discharge their burden of

extraordinary diligence required

in the investigation of Balaos

abduction.

Same; Command responsibility

xxiii. The doctrine of commandresponsibility has little bearing, if

at all, in amparo proceedings. The

inapplicability of the doctrine of

Macapagal-Arroyo


19/21

command responsibility in an

amparo proceeding does not, by

any measure, preclude impleading

military or police commanders on

the ground that the complained

acts in the petition were

committed with their direct or

indirect acquiescence.

Commanders may therefore be

impleaded not actually on the

basis of command of

responsibility but rather on the

ground of their responsibility, or

at least accountability.

7. Application - Applies only to unlawful acts or omissions which result in violations, or threats to:

a. Lifeb. Liberty

c. Security

immunity of ones person, including extensions of his/ her personhouses, papers, andeffectsagainst government intrusion

can exist independent of the right to liberty has 3 ASPECTS:

i. Freedom from fear/ threat (threat to the life, liberty, and security ofthe person)

ii. Guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security (freedomfrom torture/ force/ violence that vitiates the exercise of freewill;

proscribed in Sec 12, Art III, 1987 Const.)iii. Guarantee of protection of ones rights by the government

Case Name Fast Facts Doctrine/Ratio Previous Doctrine Cited

Manalo v. Calderon Manalo brothers were illegally

detained for 18 months by alleged

CAFGU members, during which

they were repeatedly tortured and

beaten up. They were able to

escape from their guards. After

which, they filed a petition for

injunction, prohibition and

temporary restraining order

against petitioners Secretary of

National Defense and AFP Chief of

Staff, the said petition was treated

by the Court as an Amparo

petition. Court of Appeals granted

the petition and ordered herein

petitioners to furnish the reports

Amparo: Proof necessary

Substantial evidence - such

relevant evidence as a

reasonable man might accept

as adequate to support a

conclusion

necessary to prove the

allegations embodied in the

petition for the WOA

Amparo: Right to security

defined

Right to security of a person

embodied in Sec 2, Art III, 1987

Cited Rubrico, which

was also cited in Roxas v

Macapagal-Arroyo


20/21

of the investigation and the

information regarding the

incident. Supreme Court upheld

CA, holding that respondents

right to security of a person had

been violated, which warrants

the issuance of the writ in their

favor.

Const. (The right of the people

to be secure in their persons,

xxx shall be inviolable xxx)

immunity of ones person,

including extensions of his/ her

personhouses, papers, and

effectsagainst government

intrusion can exist independent

of the right to liberty (not

intended to be narrowed to

situations of formal deprivation

of liberty only)

It has 3 different permutations:

1.freedom from fear/ freedom

from threat the right embodied

in Section 1 of the Amparo ruleany threat to the rights of life,

liberty or security is a violation

of this right

2. guarantee of bodily and

psychological integrity or

security proscribed by Sec 12,

Article III, 1987 Const.

-Torture, force, and violence,

when employed to vitiate the

free will of the victim,constitutes an invasion of both

bodily and psychological

integrity as the dignity of the

human person includes the

exercise of free will.

3. guarantee of protection of

ones rights by the government

embodied in the right to life

and liberty in Sec. 1, Art III,

1987 Const.; corollary of State

policy that guarantees full

respect for human rights under

Sec. 11, Art II, 1987

*Does not apply to Property

What is clear from the statements of the petitioners is the overridinginvolvement of property issues. Issues relating to the right to life or to liberty

can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past


21/21

violence has been alleged. None of the supporting affidavits show that the

threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or

continuing. (Tapuz)

It applies only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances,not in cases concerning property or commercial rights. (Salcedo)


Tapuz v. del Rosario A case for forcible entry was filed by

the Sanson spouses against

petitioners Tapuz et. al wherein they

were forced to vacate a disputed

land. One of the reliefs sought by

Tapuz was the writ of amparo,

alleging in their application that 12

men intruded into the property and

two of these men burned two houses

of the petitioners and that these acts

constitute TERRORISM and thethreats against the life and security of

the petitioners continue because the

Sanson spouses have under their

employ armed men and they are

influential with the police authorities

owing to their financial and political

clout.

Amparo.

The writ of amparo is intended to address violations

of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security. It

is not a writ to protect concerns that are purely

property or commercial.

Amparo; Property-related cases.

The alleged violent incidents appear to be purely

property-related and focused on the disputed land.

Issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can

hardly be discerned except to the extent that the

occurrence of past violence has been alleged. None of

the supporting affidavits show that the threat to the

rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is

imminent or continuing. If the petitioners wish to seek

redress, the remedy may lie more within the realm of

ordinary criminal prosecution rather than the

extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.

Petition DENIED.