Embed Size (px)
DESCRIPTION
Government S-1740. INTERNATIONAL LAW Summer 2006. Lecture 2: Explaining the “Legalization” of International Relations. OUTLINE. I. Legalization: a growing trend? II. The Debate over “Law” A. J. Austin: Rules backed by force B. H.L.A.Hart: Primary & secondary rules - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Citation preview
Government S-1740Government S-1740
Lecture 2: Explaining the “Legalization” of International Relations
INTERNATIONAL LAWINTERNATIONAL LAW Summer 2006
OUTLINEOUTLINEI. Legalization: a growing trend?
II. The Debate over “Law”
A. J. Austin: Rules backed by force
B. H.L.A.Hart: Primary & secondary rules
C. H. Bull: subjective acceptance
III. An alternative conception - “Legalization”: Obligation, Precision, Delegation
IV. What explains the legalization trend?
V. What explains the form agreements take?
I. Legalization: A Growing I. Legalization: A Growing Trend?Trend?
Coverage
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
1900-25 1926-50 1951-75 1976-95
Years
Number of New Multilateral Treaties Concluded
Other
Environment
Cultural
HumanWelfare
Economic
Military
Political/Diplomatic
Source: Charlotte Ku, 2001
Growth of international Growth of international trade lawtrade law
19461946 19919955
World trade:
Of which, % covered by multilateral agreements
$10 billion$10 billion
20%20%
$150 Billion$150 Billion
90%90%
I. Legalization: A Growing I. Legalization: A Growing Trend?Trend?
Coverage
Institutionalization
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
1909 1951 1972 1984 1992
Number of International Organizations
I. Legalization: A Growing I. Legalization: A Growing Trend?Trend?
Coverage
Institutionalization
Judicialization
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Nu
mb
er o
f b
od
ies
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Growth in International Judicial, Quasi-judicial, and Dispute Settlement Bodies
Quasi-judicial and other dispute settlement bodies Judicial bodies
Number of ICJ Decisions
0
5
10
15
20
25
Years
decisions
International Criminal International Criminal Tribunals since World Tribunals since World
War IIWar II 1993: Yugoslavia
1994: Rwanda
2000: East Timor
2001: Sierra Leone
2003: Cambodia
1998-2003: International Criminal Court
III. The Debate over III. The Debate over “Law”“Law”
J. Austin: Rules backed by force
H.L.A. Hart: Primary & secondary rules
H. Bull: subjective acceptance
IV. An alternative IV. An alternative conception - conception -
“Legalization”“Legalization”
IV. An alternative IV. An alternative conception - conception -
“Legalization”:“Legalization”: Obligation: States are legally bound to a particular rule or commitment; bound to do something or refrain from so doing.
IV. An alternative IV. An alternative conception - conception -
“Legalization”:“Legalization”: Obligation: States are legally bound to a particular rule or commitment; bound to do something or refrain from so doing.
Precision: the exactness, definiteness of a rule.
IV. An alternative IV. An alternative conception - conception -
“Legalization”:“Legalization”:Obligation: States are legally bound to a particular rule or commitment; bound to do something or refrain from so doing.
Precision: the exactness, definiteness of a rule.
Delegation: Acceptance of 3rd party authority in dispute settlement, rule making, and rule interpretation.
V. What explains the V. What explains the legalization trend?legalization trend?
More transactions, more to regulate?
Trade and International Organizations in the Twentieth Century
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
1909 1951 1972 1984 1992
Year
# of
IOs
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Exp
orts
% o
f wor
ld G
DP
Number of IGOs Exports as % of World GDP
V. What explains the V. What explains the legalization trend?legalization trend?
More transactions, more to regulate?Complexity of interactions?Demands of smaller states, newer states?Increased perceptions of interdependence?New norms that require codification?End of the Cold War?Democratization?
Democracy and International Organizations in the Twentieth Century
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
1909 1951 1972 1984 1992
Year
# of
IOs
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
% o
f cou
ntri
es d
emoc
rati
c
Number of IGOs share of Dems
V. What explains the V. What explains the legalization trend?legalization trend?
More transactions, more to regulate?Complexity of interactions?Demands of smaller states, newer states?Increased perceptions of interdependence?New norms that require codification?End of the Cold War?Democratization?US leadership/hegemony?Too many lawyers?
VI. What explains the VI. What explains the form that international form that international
agreements take?agreements take?Hard versus soft law
Duration and renegotiation provisions
Hard versus Soft LawHard versus Soft Law
HARD:– clear, legally binding obligations– precise language– high delegation– Parties “shall”, “are obligated”, “must…”
SOFT: States should “strive to…” “Efforts will be made to…” “to the best of their abilities…” “as conditions permit…”
Legalization: Hard v Legalization: Hard v Soft LawSoft Law
Sovereignty costsContracting costsUncertainty
Non-self enforcing,Transactions costs
Hard law
Soft law
Transition from Soft to Transition from Soft to Hard LawHard Law
Trade: broad liberalization principles specific barrier reductions
Arms control: from confidence building measures to weapons reductions
Environmental agreements: adjustments to small non-binding agreements.
Summary:Summary: Increasingly, states are making more highly “legalized”
agreements to regulate their mutual relations By legalization we mean agreements with greater
precision, obligation, and delegation This is probably due to the density of interactions and
growing interdependence Rational perspective: governments make strategic,
purposive decisions about what form these agreements take.
The form these “contracts” take depends on sovereignty costs, transactions costs, contracting costs, and the structure of the information environment.
Next: what about compliance?
