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Governance in Sri Lanka: Lessons fromPost-Tsunami RebuildingRamanie Samaratunge a , Ken Coghill a & H. M.A. Herath ba Monash Universityb Carleton University , OttawaPublished online: 04 May 2012.

To cite this article: Ramanie Samaratunge , Ken Coghill & H. M.A. Herath (2012) Governance inSri Lanka: Lessons from Post-Tsunami Rebuilding, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 35:2,381-407, DOI: 10.1080/00856401.2012.662713

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Governance in Sri Lanka: Lessons from

Post-Tsunami Rebuilding

Ramanie Samaratunge and Ken Coghill, Monash University

and

H.M.A. Herath, Carleton University, Ottawa

AbstractThis article applies complex evolving systems theory (CES) to investigating thegovernance factors affecting rebuilding in the wake of the 2004 tsunami in SriLanka. It also examines the crucial processes of co-operation between thevarious governance actors (public, market and civil society) in the aftermath ofthe disaster. The main focus is on the horizontal integration in the process ofservice delivery at the district level during the rebuilding stage, and onexplaining the nature and extent of collaboration in the delivery of servicesneeded for the survivors to build their new lives. Our observations suggest thatinfluence, incentives and the power of dominant groups remain highly relevantto the outcomes and that the socio-political system within which they operate isdynamic. Governance as a whole has become a playing field for dominantstakeholder groups both within and outside the government. The studydemonstrates the value of CES in improving the understanding of complexgovernance in the context of a crisis.

Keywords: Collaboration, governance, rebuilding, Sri Lanka, complex evolvingsystems theory, tsunami, disaster, South Asia

IntroductionThe outcomes of reconstruction following major disasters vary considerablybetween social groups within affected communities and between affectedgeographical areas. In Sri Lanka, in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunamiof 2004, some local economies have experienced accelerated development andcertain social groups have even gained from the rebuilding process. Others, who

South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies,n.s., Vol.XXXV, no.2, June 2012

ISSN 0085-6401 print; 1479-0270 online/12/020381-27 � 2012 South Asian Studies Association of Australia

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were less powerful, have suffered further disadvantage through a skewed andproblematic reconstruction process.1

Governance factors play a considerable role in these differential effects, whichcan be seen in disaster management globally.2 Steinberg found that in the reliefefforts following a disaster in the US, the priority given to the securing ofproperty threw the weight of the reconstruction efforts behind relativelyprivileged groups, to the detriment of weaker sections of the community.3 Paisand Elliott suggest that additionally, there are donor and political incentives toreconstruct visible assets, which again is less likely to directly benefit lowersocio-economic groups, which did not own assets prior to the disaster.4 Thus,the socio-political context of the society determines disaster recuperationoutcomes; influence, incentives and power remain relevant even in the contextof catastrophe. This system is dynamic and extends beyond institutional rulesand hierarchical bureaucratic relationships, with a wide range of formal andinformal relationships and power relativities brought to bear on its functioning.As Bourgon suggests, ‘[G]overnments achieve results by working through vastnetworks of organizations—some inside government, many outside—towardscommon policy outcomes’.5

Several scholars have already begun to describe the complex network oforganisations involved in Sri Lanka’s response to the 2004 tsunami.Samaratunge et al. described major changes in the socio-political system’sfunctioning in the immediate aftermath.6 Weerakoon et al. outlined thebreakdown in co-ordination between non-government agencies, which under-mined rebuilding.7 However, only limited attention has been paid to the

1 J.F. Pais and J.R. Elliott, ‘Places as Recovery Machines: Vulnerability and Neighborhood Change after

Major Hurricanes’, in Social Forces, Vol.86, no.4 (2008), pp.1415–53.2 World Bank, Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (Washington, DC: International Development

Association, 2010); World Bank, Aid Effectiveness Beyond Accra: Good Governance and Anticorruption

(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008); and United Nations, The Challenges of Restoring Governance in Crisis

and Post Conflict Countries (New York: UNDESA and UNDP, 2007).3 T. Steinberg, Acts of God: The Unnatural History of Natural Disaster (New York: Oxford University Press,

2nd ed., 2006).4 Pais and Elliott, ‘Places as Recovery Machines’, p.1421.5 J. Bourgon, ‘New Governance and Public Administration: Towards a Dynamic Synthesis’, paper presented

at a public lecture hosted by the Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Canberra, 24

Feb. 2009, p.4.6 R. Samaratunge, K. Coghill and H.M.A. Herath, ‘Tsunami Engulfs Sri Lankan Governance’, in

International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol.74, no.4 (2008), pp.677–702.7 D. Weerakoon, S. Jayasuriya, N. Arunatilake and P. Steele, ‘Economic Challenges of Post-Tsunami

Rebuilding in Sri Lanka’, ADB Institute Discussion Paper No.75 (2007) [http://www.adbi.org/files/

dp75.sri.lanka.post.tsunami.rebuilding.pdf, accessed 16 Feb. 2012].

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distinctive features of governance vis-a-vis the actors. How, when and why didthe actors interact to provide services to the tsunami survivors? And what wasthe influence of contextual factors during reconstruction? To address thecountry’s ‘Crisis of State’, a focus ‘more on governance at the provincial andlocal levels in order to improve delivery and accountability at the communitylevel’ and ‘revitalisation of civil society’ become important according to a‘strategic conflict assessment (SCA)’.8

This article investigates the context-specific, perception-based views of differentstakeholders in Galle District, one of the most severely tsunami-affected areasof Sri Lanka. Our main focus is the horizontal integration of district-levelservice delivery, to explain how collaboration between actors to deliver servicesis fundamental to helping survivors to rebuild their lives. We argue that thetsunami placed severe strains on already-problematic governance arrange-ments, weakening them further. Thus, the dominance of particular actorswithin governance has only further exacerbated the disaster wrought by theocean on 26 December 2004.

These findings have the potential to enhance the capacities of policy-makers todesign and deliver better programmes in the wake of catastrophes in the future.The article has three sections. First, we sketch the literature, outliningtheoretical frameworks, identifying stakeholders and highlighting the impactof integrated governance on outcomes from a complex systems perspective. Thesecond section explains our case study, based on face-to-face interviewsrepresenting the relevant stakeholder groups, followed by our findings anddiscussion. The third section reviews the key lessons.

The Theoretical FrameworkThere is an increasing agreement in understanding the concept of governance.Recently, Reed and Bruyneel cited Bakker9 as referring to ‘governance as thedecision-making process we follow, the models, principles and informationused to make decisions and determine who gets to decide’.10 In a more idealisticvein, UNESCAP states: governance ‘comprises the complex mechanisms,processes, relationships and institutions through which citizens and groups

8 J. Goodhand and B. Klem, Aid Conflict and Peace Building in Sri Lanka 2000–05 (Colombo: Asia

Foundation, 2005), p.14.9 K. Bakker, ‘Introduction’, in K. Bakker (ed.), Eau Canada: The Future of Canada’s Water (Vancouver:

UBC Press, 2006), pp.1–22.10 M.G. Reed and S. Bruyneel, ‘Rescaling Environmental Governance, Rethinking the State: A Three-

Dimensional Review’, in Progress in Human Geography, Vol.34, no.5 (2010), pp.646–53.

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articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations andmediate their differences’.11 As Harrington, Curtis and Black explain,governance involves the recognition that ‘power and authority are horizontallydecentralized and devolved to broader members of society’.12 Reed andBruyneel go further, arguing that governance involves horizontal and verticaldistributions of power—horizontally amongst actors operating at similar scalesand vertically between actors operating at different levels, from internationalsystems to local communities.

The state’s monopoly of the legitimate exercise of coercive power makes itpivotal in governance, but it is not the only actor exercising power andauthority in any given socio-political system.13 Decision-makers are liable tooperate within the framework of state legislation, but other actors may operatein the market or in civil society, or both, to pressurise the legislative process andto affect key decisions touching individuals, communities of interest andcommunities of place.14 These powers, roles and relationships within the socio-political system are dynamic, the various roles of the actors being defined bycontextual factors that evolve over time.15 For example, the influence of theworkforce through workers’ unions may vary depending on the relative sizeand prosperity of the industry and the roles of the investors.

Rather than assume a functionalistic separation of actors or roles, thesecharacteristics of governance rest on dynamic interrelationships withinintegrated governance systems.16 It is this recognition of the systemic natureof integrated governance that leads us to consider it as a particular type ofcomplex system—a complex evolving system (CES).17

11 UNDP, Management Development and Governance Division, ‘Reconceptualising Governance:

Discussion Paper 2’ (New York: Bureau for Policy and Programme Support, 1997), p.2.12 C. Harrington, A. Curtis and R. Black, ‘Locating Communities in Natural Resource Management’, in

Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning, Vol.10, no.2 (2008), pp.200–10.13 K. Coghill, O. Tam, M. Ariff and C. Neesham, ‘Rating Integrated Governance: Conceptual Issues’, paper

presented at the conference on Integrated Governance: Linking up Government, Business and Civil Society,

Prato, Italy on 24–26 Oct. 2005; and M. Edwards, ‘Public Sector Governance—Future Issues for Australia’,

in Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol.61, no.2 (2002), pp.51–61.14 For a discussion of communities of interest and communities of place, see Harrington et al., ‘Locating

Communities in Natural Resource Management’, pp.199–214.15 UNDP, ‘Good Governance and Its Relationship to Democracy and Economic Development’, paper

presented at the Global Forum on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity—Workshop IV on

Democracy, Economic Development and Culture, Seoul, Korea, 20–31 May 2003.16 For a discussion on integrated governance, see Samaratunge et al., ‘Tsunami Engulfs Sri Lankan

Governance’.17 For a full discussion of complex evolving systems, see E. Mitleton-Kelly, ‘Ten Principles of

Complexity and Enabling Infrastructures’, in E. Mitleton-Kelly (ed.), Complex Systems and Evolutionary

Perspectives of Organisations: The Application of Complexity Theory to Organisations (London: Elsevier,

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Here the functioning of governance is explained using a particular typeof complex systems theory, Mitleton-Kelly’s Complex Evolving SystemsTheory. It is useful in explaining dynamic, often unpredictable real-worldsituations in which governance actors work and interact; links between actorsare in a constant state of flux and evolution due to internal and externalfactors.18 The application of CES to governance reflects Bourgon’s observationthat governance theory is increasingly integrating ‘ideas from many knowledgedomains—from chaos and complexity to dynamic systems theories, fromsocial innovation to network theories and from evolutionary biology andecology’.19 Furthermore, Loorbach points out that modern societies areconfronted with many complex new problems, necessitating ‘a new balancebetween state, market and society and new ways to facilitate and make aseffective as possible the informal network processes through which alternativeideas and agendas are generated that are often seen as important in fuellingregular policy making processes with new problem definitions, ambitions,solutions and agendas’.20

For Al-Hawamdeh et al., CES helps to explain relationships, con-nectivity and inter-dependence between actors (both internal and external)and also the range of structural influences affecting the environment withinwhich those actors operate. They argue that through identifying andanalysing the various elements interacting with and influencing each other,a deeper understanding can be achieved, and new insights into the mannerin which governance frameworks evolve, and the extent to which they areeffective, revealed.21 Internal relationships change in response to the system’sinternal and external environments, thereby affecting outcomes. Mitleton-Kelly has described characteristics of CES that reflect characteristics foundin integrated governance. These are summarised in Table 1.22

2003) [http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/complexity/events/PDFiles/publication/Ten_principles_of_complexity_enabling_infra

structure.pdf, accessed 4 Dec. 2010].18 Ibid., pp.23–50.19 Bourgon, ‘New Governance and Public Administration’, p.17.20 D. Loorbach, ‘Transition Management for Sustainable Development: A Prescriptive, Complexity-Based

Governance Framework’, in Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions,

Vol.23, no.1 (2010), p.162.21 A. Al-Hawamdeh, I. Chiu, M. Goergen, C. Mallin and E. Mitleton-Kelly, ‘Learning from Complexity:

Enabling Governance Frameworks’ (2009) [http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/complexity/Research/ESRCFinal

DraftReportv2_161107.pdf, accessed 8 March 2012], p.4.22 Mitleton-Kelly, ‘Ten Principles of Complexity and Enabling Infrastructures’, p.3.

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State Governance and ComplexityThe processes involving the actors in all social sectors active during Sri Lanka’srelief, recovery and rebuilding phases following the tsunami were complex. Theactors included a comprehensive range of entities: individuals; businessenterprises; religious communities associated with local temples; local,divisional, district, provincial and central (national) government politiciansand agencies; local, national and international non-government organisations(NGOs); and foreign donors and intergovernmental agencies. Whilst theseactors are diverse, each had identifiable roles, powers and interrelationships.

Elsewhere, we have demonstrated the evolution of governance as a nationalsystem and co-evolution of sub-systems.23 We found that the nature and extentof co-operation, collaboration and co-ordination degenerated as interconnect-edness, interdependence and interactivity were undermined by actors whoattempted to maximise their political influence and power. In this process, othervalues were subordinated. We analysed this from the perspective of integratedgovernance, which largely depends on effective links between sectors andorganisations.24 Factors that hamper the effective working of these

Table 1Characteristics of Complex Evolving Systems

Self-organisation Far from equilibriumEmergence Space of possibilitiesConnectivity Co-evolutionInterdependence Historicity and timeFeedback Path-dependence

Creation of new orderSource: Adapted from E. Mitleton-Kelly, ‘Ten Principles of Complexity and Enabling Infrastructures’,

in E. Mitleton-Kelly (ed.), Complex Systems and Evolutionary Perspectives of Organisations: The

Application of Complexity Theory to Organisations (London: Elsevier, 2003) [http://www.psych.lse.ac.

uk/complexity/events/PDFiles/publication/Ten_principles_of_complexity_enabling_infrastructure.pdf

(2003), p.3.

23 Samaratunge et al., ‘Tsunami Engulfs Sri Lankan Governance’, pp.677–702.24 M.S. Haque, ‘Governance and Bureaucracy in Singapore: Contemporary Reforms and Implications’, in

International Political Science Review, Vol.25, no.2 (2004), pp.227–37; K. Kernaghan, ‘Moving Towards the

Virtual State: Integrating Services and Service Channels for Citizen-Centred Delivery’, in International

Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol.71, no.1 (2005), pp.119–31; K. Kernaghan, ‘Putting Citizens First:

Service Delivery and Integrated Public Governance’, in T. Mau and B. Sheldrick (eds), Canadian Public

Administration in Transition (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2009), pp.249–69; E. Krahmann, ‘National,

Regional and Global Governance: One Phenomenon or Many?’, in Global Governance, Vol.9, no.3 (2003),

pp.323–46; and J. Corkery (ed.), Governance: Institutional Concepts and Mechanisms (Brussels: IIASA/IIAS,

1999).

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links undermine the effectiveness of the whole process. Complex systems are‘multi-dimensional and the various dimensions interact and influence eachother’;25 complex behaviour arises through the interrelationship, connectivityand interdependence of different stakeholders and their feedback processes.

The processes were affected by the various relationships between theactors and, in turn, these were conscribed by the behaviour of the actors,which in each case was a product of both intrinsic factors (such as theactor’s own capabilities, resources, formal powers, leadership style andinfluence) and extrinsic factors (such as constitutional arrangements, therelative powers, resources and influence of other partners in each relation-ship and of third parties). Although formal constitutional arrangements werestable during the period studied, their interpretation was not. The variabilityof the actors’ behaviour according to context affected processes and hencegovernance.

These relationships were not invariably linear. Relatively small changes inrelationships can create tipping points that trigger cascades of effects,producing fundamental changes. Characteristically, when the system can nolonger function, new orders emerge, adapting to new dynamics.26 In socio-political systems (such as nation-states), the functioning of relationships isstrongly influenced by the relative powers of the individual and institutionalactors and the ways in which those powers are exercised.

System outcomes are expressed as probabilities, and as degrees of confidenceas to whether those probabilities are accurate. Importantly, the capacity ofcomplex evolving systems to adapt to changes in their environment isdetermined by the degree of central regulation and the relative powers andinfluence of the social sectors (Figure 1). If any sector is unduly powerfuland unreceptive to influence or persuasion by one or both of the othersectors, the system moves further from equilibrium and, hence, is lessconducive to adaptive change. If the level of internal control is too rigid,creativity and innovation are less likely to emerge, reducing the potential forthe system to adapt.

However, if the system is anarchic, without centralised control, powerful sub-systems emerge, which compete with each other at the expense of the

25 Al-Hawamdeh, Chiu, Goergen, Mallin and Mitleton-Kelly, ‘Learning from Complexity: Enabling

Governance Frameworks’.26 Ibid.

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performance of the aggregate system, which becomes less resilient.27 Betteroutcomes are expected at intermediate transition points between rigidcentralised control and anarchic conditions (Figure 2).

The extent of central regulation is therefore crucial to analysing the effects ofactors’ behaviours concerning the tsunami. The devolution of resources,responsibilities and powers from the central government to local authorities canbe expected to enhance the capacity of communities to adapt to theircircumstances, due to better, more proximate matching of the level ofgovernance to the scale of the socio-political processes.28 Societies wherepower is more equally distributed generally deliver better outcomes for all.29

Figure 1Integrated Governance: Power Relations between the Three InterrelatedSectors of SocietySource: Adapted from R. Samaratunge, K. Coghill and H.M.A. Herath, ‘Tsunami Engulfs SriLankan Governance’, in International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol.74, no.4 (2008),

p.680.

27 B. Walker, S. Carpenter, J. Anderies, N. Abel, G.S. Cumming and M. Janssen, ‘Resilience Management in

Social-Ecological Systems: A Working Hypothesis for a Participatory Approach’, in Ecology and Society,

Vol.6, no.1 (2002), p.14 [http://www.consecol.org/vol6/iss1/art14, accessed 16 Feb. 2012].28 B.H. Walker, N. Abel, J.M. Anderies and P. Ryan, ‘Resilience, Adaptability, and Transformability in the

Goulburn-Broken Catchment, Australia’, in Ecology and Society, Vol.14, no.1 (2009), p.12 [http://

www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss1/art12/, accessed 16 Feb. 2012].29 R. Wilkinson and K. Pickett, The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better

(London: Allen Lane, 2009).

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However, as discussed above, better outcomes are found where thereare moderate levels of regulation of the socio-political system. These arisefrom their role in providing a framework within which the costs ofinteractions between individual and institutional actors are reduced. As Offeexplains, reduced transaction costs mean building up trust-based relation-ships:

I do not need to monitor those whom I can trust, nor do I have tobuy what I trust they will offer me voluntarily (such as theoccasional use of a car), nor do I have to force them to do what Iexpect them to do or to call in third parties (such as courts) toenforce my claims.30

These apply at both individual and institutional levels. Lower transaction costsresult from greater predictability and certainty through enhanced social capitaland the operation of formal and informal rules, such as observance of the rule

Figure 2Transition between Rigid Centralised Control and Anarchic ConditionsSource: R. Samaratunge and K. Coghill ‘Integrated Governance in Sri Lanka: A Conceptual

Myth or a Practical Reality?’, in J. Vartola, I. Lumijarvi and M. Asaduzzaman (eds), TowardsGood Governance in South-Asia (Tampere, Finland: Department of Management Studies,University of Tampere, 2010), p.75.

30 C. Offe, ‘How Can We Trust Our Fellow Citizens?’, in M.E. Warren (ed.), Democracy and Trust

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.52.

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of law and trust in the fairness of decision-making.31 In the past decade, therehave been several positive trends towards healthy discussions and debateamongst stakeholders, with the potential to eventually lead to effective co-ordination and collaboration amongst them,32 leading to a situation in whichinformed citizens can act with minimal guidance.33 This could be applicable torebuilding after the tsunami, in the face of waning public confidence.

As Loorbach observes:

[S]ocial actors (governments, business, scientists, nongovernmentalorganizations [NGOs], [and] intermediary organizations) createformal and informal networks because they have partially over-lapping interests, and they find benefits in temporarily sharingcertain resources and working together toward shared objectives—something they cannot do well without each other and that theycan better achieve jointly than individually. . . . The centralproblem is that policy making this way has become lesstransparent; the division of power, as well as the accountabilityissue is no longer clear. . . .34

Understanding these networks requires an examination of their internalfeatures. Networks comprising whole systems may themselves be componentsof larger systems and conversely may include sub-systems nested within them.Ostrom cites Koestler who, in 1973, described such nested systems/sub-systemsas holons.35

The functioning of holons is a product of the actions that occur within them.This leads to examination of ‘action arenas’36 within which specific interactionsoccur. These in turn are subject to influence by exogenous variables andgenerate outcomes which may themselves influence the behaviour of the actorsthrough feedback mechanisms. Changed behaviour by actors may change the

31 K.S. Cook, Trust in Society (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001); A. Karayiannis and A.N. Hatzis,

‘Morality, Social Norms and Rule of Law as Transaction Cost-Saving Devices: The Case of Ancient Athens’

(2007) [http://ssrn.com/abstract¼1000749, accessed 16 Feb. 2012]; and Offe, ‘How Can We Trust Our Fellow

Citizens?’, pp.42–87.32 A. Rosenbaum, ‘Cooperative Service Delivery: The Dynamics of Public Sector–Private Sector–Civil

Society Collaboration’, in International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol.72, no.1 (2006), pp.43–56.33 H. Sims and K. Vogelmann, ‘Popular Mobilization and Disaster Management in Cuba’, in Public

Administration and Development, Vol.22, no.2 (2002), pp.389–400.34 Loorbach, ‘Transition Management for Sustainable Development’, p.165.35 E. Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), p.11.36 Ibid., p.13.

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operation of the sub-system and thereby the system within which it is embedded(Figure 3). A system’s susceptibility to change is related to its resilience.37

Sri Lanka: The ContextThe system is the society within Sri Lanka’s national territorial borders andincludes sub-systems formally defined by central, provincial, district and localgovernment political boundaries and statutory powers. It also includes NGOsand market sector actors (such as business) and allows limited permeability byinternational actors. Sri Lanka, a developing nation with 20.5 million people,represents a unique case in many aspects as its boundaries are both clearlydefined and permeable. When the tsunami hit it in 2004, Sri Lanka was stillinvolved in a nearly three-decade-long civil war, which ended in May 2009 withthe defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Democratic valuessuch as accountability, trust, transparency and media freedom were seriouslyeroded during this period.38

Figure 3Framework for Analysis of Actions within a Complex Evolving SystemSource: Adapted from E. Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 2005), p.15.

37 B.H. Walker and B. Harrison (eds), Exploring Resilience in Social-Ecological Systems: Comparative

Studies and Theory Development (Collingwood, VIC.: CSIRO, 2006).38 Transparency International Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka Governance Report: Making a Nation of Integrity

(Colombo: TIS, 2009).

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Secondly, when compared to most developing countries, Sri Lanka is a classicwelfare state. It has extensive food subsidies, and universal free education andhealth services. These instruments support a literacy rate of above 91 percent,life expectancy of more than 74 years and the best gender equity indicators inSouth Asia.39 With a relatively high level of human development in the country,it has the potential to develop an efficient service delivery system, but the realityis far from expectations.40 Instead, there has been a clear mismatch betweenthese social indicators and the country’s per capita income of $US2,014,41 avalue well below that of developed countries. This inconsistency has its roots inthe colonial period.42

Finally, Sri Lanka was the first South Asian nation to embrace open economicpolicies in the late 1970s, and today it has the region’s most open economy.Governance and development of the country ‘have seen unprecedented levels ofinternational engagement over the last four years. Even by global standards,such internationalisation is remarkable’.43

However, this system has been unable to effectively integrate the differentgroups involved in the development process. The pattern of civil societyparticipation in Sri Lanka is somewhat complex. Despite the fact that massparticipation in decision-making has been restricted, Sri Lankan politics ischaracterised by high voter participation. Some scholars argue that a well-developed education system and a longstanding tradition of regular electionsare contributing factors towards these levels of participation.44 Others,however, question the credibility of the country’s regular elections and voterparticipation in an era when ‘all checks and balances are silenced and renderedineffective if transparency is reduced and extinguished’.45 Corruption has

39 J. Hyndman, ‘The Securitization of Fear in Post Tsunami Sri Lanka’, in Annals of the Association of

American Geographers, Vol.97, no.2 (2007), pp.361–72.40 For details, see P. Athukorala and S. Jayasuriya, Macro Economic Policies, Crises, and Growth in Sri

Lanka, 1969–90 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1994); and J. Manor, ‘The Failure of Political

Integration in Sri Lanka (Ceylon)’, in Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol.17, no.1

(1979), pp.21–46.41 Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report (Colombo: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2008).42 For details, see Athukorala and Jayasuriya, Macro Economic Policies, Crises, and Growth in Sri Lanka;

and Manor, ‘The Failure of Political Integration in Sri Lanka (Ceylon)’.43 C. Pirani and A. Kadirgamar, ‘Internationalisation of Sri Lanka’s Peace Process and Governance: A

Review of Strategic Conflict Assessment’, in Economic and Political Weekly, No.18 (May 2006), pp.1789–95.44 R.N. Kearney, ‘Politics and Modernization’, in T. Fernando and R.N. Kearney (eds), Modern Sri Lanka:

A Society in Transition (Syracuse: Syracuse University, 1979), pp.57–70.45 C. Fernando, ‘Sri Lanka’, in H. Ehlert and H. Cordier (eds), The Transition from Higher Education to the

Labour Market: International Perspectives and Challenges (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2002).

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become prevalent in the country’s political culture, transparency is minimal andmedia freedom is restricted.

Sri Lanka’s public administrative system has been unified and centralised sincethe colonial period.46 The existing administrative system has five levels:national, provincial, district, divisional and village. The country is equippedwith a large number of elected politicians at most administrative levels, exceptdistrict and village.

The central government maintains its own administrative structure, with linedepartments from the national administration at each level. Sub-national levelco-ordination is effected through various elected and non-elected localinstitutions. Overall, the administrative system has been strongly centralised.The government is the sole provider of, and chief delivery channel for, manypublic goods and services. Each ministry in the central government maintains ahierarchical structure, with different departments under the tight control andsupervision of their respective ministers. Each department is responsible for itsassigned government activities on a nation-wide scale with little focus onhorizontal integration at the sub-national level.

At the district level, each district secretariat is the co-ordinating centre forgovernment programmes. District co-ordinating committees, chaired by districtsecretaries, play significant roles in implementing government programmes andmonitoring their progress. This structure is often criticised for grave deficits inhorizontal co-ordination below the national level of administration. Centralgovernment attempts to establish various co-ordinating committees at thedistrict level have met with limited success due to competing interests andexpectations among those involved. Many employees are more concernedabout line department functions than co-ordination at the local level.Employees see these changes at the district level as a threat to their legitimatepowers and responsibilities, undermining the district secretary’s leadershiprole.47 The establishment of the divisional secretariat system in 1991 broughtthe government closer to the local community, albeit in a limited manner.

The politicisation of the bureaucracy has been a problem in Sri Lanka since theconstitutional changes of the 1970s, which eroded institutions and politicised

46 For almost five centuries, from 1505 to1948, Sri Lanka was under the dominance of three colonial powers,

Portugal, the Netherlands and Britain. For details see R.N. Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka)

(London: Cornell University Press, 1973).47 B.S. Wijeweera, A Colonial Administrative System in Transition: The Experience of Sri Lanka (Colombo:

Marga Publications, 1988).

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many departments and government corporations. Election laws have been brokenand corruption has been practised by all the main political parties in power sincethen. Political patronage has extended to include close relatives, friends andbusinessmen. Political influence in post-tsunami rebuilding activities, therefore,needs to be considered in the broader context of these weakened institutions.

The 2004 TsunamiThe tsunami was devastating. It killed nearly 36,000 people in Sri Lanka anddisplaced a million more, affecting at least one-tenth of the population.48

Overall damage was estimated at around $US1 billion, which is approximately4.5 percent of Sri Lanka’s gross domestic product (GDP).49 Of the 25administrative districts of Sri Lanka, fourteen were deeply affected. GalleDistrict, in the Southern Province, was the second-hardest hit, with the worst-affected administrative divisions in the district being Hikkaduwa, FourGravates, Habaraduwa, Ambalangoda, Balapitiya and Bentota.50 Most ofthe affected people were already vulnerable.51 Fisheries, tourism and coastalagricultural industries were heavily affected, leaving the survivors in absolutepoverty, lacking food, shelter, livelihood and income.52

Since the tsunami, many stakeholders, including the Sri Lankan government,international agencies and the business community at local and internationallevels, have addressed different aspects of the damage. However, theconstraints, complexities and challenges faced by these groups wereenormous.53 Despite the unique solidarity witnessed in the immediate responseto the disaster, the initial expectations for rebuilding turned out to be

48 R. Oloruntoba, ‘Humanitarian Aid: An Agile Supply Chain?’, in Journal of Disaster Prevention and

Management, Vol.14, no.4 (2006), pp.506–21.49 Asian Development Bank (ADB), Sri Lanka: 2005 Post-Tsunami Recovery Program, Preliminary Damage

and Needs Assessment (Colombo: ADB, 2005); P. Athukorala and B.P. Resosudarmo, ‘The Indian Tsunami:

Economic Impact, Disaster Management, and Lessons’, in Asian Economic Papers, Vol.4, no.1 (2005), pp.1–

39; and G. Frerks and B. Klem, ‘Tsunami Response in Sri Lanka: Report on a Field Visit from 6–20 Feb.

2005, Disaster Studies’ (The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2005) [http://www.povertyenvironment.net/node/

637, accessed 16 Feb. 2012].50 District Secretariat, Galle, Tsunami Devastation: District Experiences and the Challenges Ahead (Galle:

District Secretariat, 2005).51 ADB, Sri Lanka: 2005 Post-Tsunami Recovery Program, Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment, p.8.52 District Secretariat, Galle, Tsunami Devastation, p.2.53 J. Telford, J. Cosgrave and R. Houghton, Joint Evaluation of the International Response to the Indian

Ocean Tsunami: Synthesis Report (London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), 2006); J. Telford and J.

Cosgrave, ‘The International Humanitarian System and the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunamis’,

in Disasters, Vol.31, no.1 (2007), pp.1–28; and Frerks and Klem, ‘Tsunami Response in Sri Lanka’.

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optimistic.54 Generous private donations exceeded government aid commit-ments,55 but there were significant gaps between the initial commitments andthe actual flows of funds to the needy.56 After relatively successful emergencyrelief operations in the devastated areas, serious governance issues arose. Withthe arrival of foreign aid, political motives intruded and political assertions ofcontrol over these new resources inhibited effective relationships andjeopardised outcomes.57 At the expense of the needs of the survivors, partypolitics and administrative red tape blocked the smooth functioning of thegovernance processes, creating tensions and dysfunctional relationshipsamongst the actors involved in the rebuilding efforts. We agree with Uyangodathat ‘unless the affected communities are active participants in the exercise ofrebuilding their lives, livelihoods and communities, the rebuilding process isthoroughly undemocratic. To ensure popular participation of all actors in thepolitical process in post-tsunami rebuilding, involvement and strengthening ofthe institutions of local governance is a better and workable option’.58

Co-ordination problems between the stakeholder groups, constraints in aidabsorption capacity, inequities in aid distribution among regions and the lack ofinstitutional capabilities at the local level hindered large-scale reconstruction sothat infrastructure rebuilding targets were not fully met.59 Initial expectations thatthe tsunami would provide the context for the resolution of the civil war were notfulfilled; instead, the inequitable distribution of aid exacerbated mistrust andlarge-scale conflict resumed. Construction costs escalated rapidly, producingunanticipated funding gaps and undermining the quality of new constructions.

Our study aimed to investigate the causal factors and mechanisms affecting therebuilding efforts following the tsunami, as institutional rules do not provideadequate explanations of the operation of governance in crisis.60 Accordingly,this study sought to identify the actors that had significant roles; to identify theactual roles of these actors, including those outside the public sector; and to

54 Weerakoon et al., ‘Economic Challenges of Post-Tsunami Rebuilding in Sri Lanka’.55 Athukorala and Resosudarmo, ‘The Indian Tsunami’.56 J. Uyangoda, ‘Ethnic Conflict, the State and the Tsunami Disaster in Sri Lanka’, in InterAsia Cultural

Studies, Vol.6, no.3 (2005), pp.341–52.57 Samaratunge et al., ‘Tsunami Engulfs Sri Lankan Governance’, pp.677–702.58 Uyangoda, ‘Ethnic Conflict, the State and the Tsunami Disaster in Sri Lanka’, p.351.59 S. Jayasuriya, P. Steele, D. Weerakoon, M. Knight-John and N. Arunatilake, ‘Post-Tsunami Recovery:

Issues and Challenges in Sri Lanka’ [http://www.adbi.org/files/2005.10.dp39.tsunami.recovery.srilanka.pdf,

2005, accessed 16 Feb. 2012].60 T.H. Hammond and C.K. Butler, ‘Some Complex Answers to the Simple Question ‘‘Do Institutions

Matter?’’: Policy Choice and Policy Change in Presidential and Parliamentary Systems’, in Journal of

Theoretical Politics, Vol.15, no.2 (2003), p.183.

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understand the differentials in the power available to the various actors,including the influence of leadership styles and personality and any spatial ortemporal variations that may have occurred during the period.

The existing theories of governance are inadequate to explain what we observedin the aftermath of the tsunami. Joined up government theory does not factorin non-state actors and, similarly, partnership theory does not accommodatethe wide range of relationships involved. Participatory governance was unlikelyto be broad enough to cover all the key elements of relief, recovery andrebuilding. Network governance suffers from the limitation identified byProvan and Kenis that ‘the tradition has been for networks to be treated asundifferentiated forms, as if they all could be characterized in the same generalway’.61 Instead, we wished to investigate ‘networks’ and complex ‘networks ofnetworks’, the forms of which may be differentiated internally and incomparison to other networks. Our approach therefore has similarities toOstrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. In herconception, a framework is ‘a nested set of theoretical concepts which rangefrom the most general to the most detailed types of assumptions made by theanalyst’. The IAD framework is described as ‘composed of nested sets ofcomponents within components’; these are equivalent to networks of networks.Like Ostrom, we aim to draw on the work of other scholars to contribute to thedevelopment of a shared understanding that ‘has a higher chance ofaccumulation than many of the separate paths currently in vogue incontemporary social sciences’.62 We propose that a theoretical frameworkbased on CES63 has the capacity to explain the interactions between differentactors, while understanding the contextual factors at play. The approach takenis similar to that described by Al-Hawamdeh et al. in their application ofcomplex systems theory to the investigation of corporate governance.64

Research MethodThe research method was based on in-depth face-to-face interviews with the keystakeholders using open-ended questionnaires.65 This qualitative method works

61 K.G. Provan and P. Kenis, ‘Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness’,

in Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol.18, no.2 (2008), pp.232–3.62 E. Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp.7,

11, 27.63 Ibid., p.12.64 Al-Hawamdeh et al., ‘Learning from Complexity’.65 W.G. Zikmund, Business Research Methods (Mason, OH: South-Western College Publishing, 8th ed.,

2010).

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best as it allows the establishment of trust and rapport and facilitates theprovision of more in-depth understanding, which are not possible with a surveyquestionnaire.66 The average interview took between 30 and 90 minutes andwas conducted in either Sinhalese or English, according to the interviewee’sconvenience, as the interviewer was Sri Lankan born and fluent in bothlanguages. To ensure accurate translation, the Sinhalese version was thentranslated into English by a professional translator. These two versions werecompared in order to resolve any discrepancies. Only minor discrepancies dueto stylistic differences in wording were found.

The research, conducted three years after the tsunami, aimed to deepen andbroaden understanding of the distinctive interactions of government,business and NGOs in the rebuilding process. Four groups of stakeholderswere interviewed: senior bureaucrats from the different levels of the centralgovernment and the Provincial Councils (PCs) with significant responsi-bilities for the implementation of policies affecting relief, recovery andrebuilding; representative members of the business community and civilsociety organisations (including Buddhist temples, churches and other civilorganisations at the village level); local and international NGOs; andtsunami-affected people.

The 59 interviews conducted in November–December 2007 and July 2008 werewith 25 senior government officials from the central, district and localgovernments; four members of the business community in Galle; five membersof the local community; five personnel from local and international NGOs; andtwenty survivors of the tsunami fromGalleDistrict. The relatively large numberof government officials interviewed was due to the need to represent both thesizeable number of post-tsunami projects in the different DivisionalSecretariats in Galle District and the dominant position that the governmenthas taken in the rebuilding process. Each government official had more thanten years public sector experience and had held senior government positionsin various ministries.

The problems and issues related to each project seem to be unique. Eventhough the number of beneficiaries interviewed was relatively small, they wereselected very carefully from different villages in Galle District so as to gatherthe widest possible range of data on the governance of rebuilding. Most hadbeen active members in different rebuilding projects since 2005.

66 Ibid.

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Findings and DiscussionAccording to the Ministry of Finance and Planning, Sri Lanka has beenrelatively successful in its post-tsunami rebuilding effort;67 however our findingspaint an unclear picture of governance. In general, the feelings of all theparticipants we interviewed were those of frustration and disappointment at theoverall outcomes. Satisfaction was not commonly reported. The underlyingsentiment was that there have been many setbacks and mistakes made along theway and that there was considerable room for improvement.

State Governance and Complexity in Practice: The Nature of Relationshipsbetween Different ActorsThis study mainly examined the relationships between sectors at the‘horizontal’ level, but included the relationships at the ‘vertical’ level whereappropriate. As the UN Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery, Bill Clinton,points out, all-party involvement is necessary to enhance the prospects ofeffective recovery.68 Therefore, the nature of the relationships between thedifferent stakeholders greatly determines the effectiveness of governance.According to the majority of government officials, formal relationships werethe most prominent form of interaction between the government, NGOs and,to some extent, the business community during the rebuilding stage, whereascivil society and the business communities mostly interacted informally in theaftermath of the tsunami. They shared information and resources to a degree,but the dominance of government actors undermined the opportunity forestablishing effective co-ordination. Members of the business communityspecifically complained that the other sectors ignored their involvement duringthe rebuilding process. Co-ordination within the government sector was also amatter of concern. As one government official complained:

[T]here was no support at the policy level throughout the processof recovery/rebuilding. [There was] no vision that leads to anappropriate comprehensive plan [and] no authority to create a planat the district level. [It was a] fully centralised governmentauthority. The involvement of private sector people in the process[further worsened the situation]. Also there was lack of supportfrom different organisations within the government.

67 Ministry of Finance and Planning, Post Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction: Progress, Challenges and

Way Forward, Joint Report of the Government of Sri Lanka and Development Partners (Colombo: Ministry of

Finance and Planning, 2005).68 Tamil Information Centre, Sri Lanka Tsunami Situation Report, No.6 (Tsunami Information Project,

Tamil Information Centre, Kingston upon Thames, 2006) [http://www.unep.org/tsunami/reports/

Tsunami_Report_No_6.pdf, accessed 16 Feb. 2012].

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Decision-making was centralised in Colombo and devolved to the districtswhere the disaster occurred, so that the officials on site had little say inimproving the plight of the people in their localities. One official’srecommendation for building effective relationships with other sectors was:

(It is important to) delegate authority to the district level whileestablishing a co-ordinating committee at the central level [with]senior government officials coming from each district.

Lack of sound monitoring of all activities, poor communication channels,corruption and theft of government property were also reported during therecovery and rebuilding process. Circulars conveying government policy decisionsto other organisational units changed repeatedly and unpredictably, frustratingthe officials. One of them said: ‘Decisions/circulars changed very frequently; [assoon as] one circular is adhered to, another replaces it with a different policy rule’.

Who DominatesIn the aftermath of the tsunami, bilateral donors, multilateral lendinginstitutions and foreign non-governmental relief agencies all rushed to mobilisefunds and relief aid for the affected countries. Large amounts of foreign funds,physical goods and volunteer efforts flowed into the affected regions, bringinghope of reconstructing shattered lives and economies. International donorsgave most generously: more than $US11 billion was generated by donorcountries and aid agencies.69 However there was a broadly articulated fear thatgiven the history of corruption in many of the countries in the region, includingSri Lanka, the money could be diverted into the wrong pockets.70 Allparticipants in the rebuilding process we interviewed were doubtful that therehad been ‘fair’ utilisation and distribution of the aid monies. Concerns such asunfair methods in distributing funds, favouritism by politicians when selectingrecipients and instances of bribery and corruption were voiced repeatedly bythe majority of our respondents. One government official went so far as toaccuse a leading politician of ‘stealing’ aid monies meant for the rehabilitationof the tsunami survivors. Reported cases of misconduct, inequitable allocationof resources and wrongdoing have undermined the effective delivery of servicesto the needy. There is almost no evidence that any allegedly corrupt personnelhave been prosecuted or punished.

69 ‘South Asia: Tsunami Aid Hits Record $11b—UN’, Reuters (25 Sept. 2005) [http://www.reliefweb.int/

node/191583, accessed 16 Feb. 2012].70 M. Casey, ‘Concerns of Possible Corruption Emerging’, The Boston Globe (6 Jan. 2005).

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One government official stated that there was no systematic plan to handle thelarge number of donations received. Another reported that there were manyproblems and conflicts when distributing houses and other donations. Abusiness community respondent highlighted the unfair allocation of funds.Hambantota and Matara Districts, which adjoin Galle District, benefited morethan the other areas from the reconstruction efforts. The then prime minister ofSri Lanka, Mahinda Rajapaksa, was personally involved in the recovery andrebuilding process in Hambantota District, which was in his former electorate,accounting for Hambantota’s rapid recovery.

Many instances of multiple donations received by survivors signalled that therewere problems in co-ordinating the rebuilding process. Some families receivedthree or four houses, while others received nothing at all. In some instances,even non-victims were able to claim donations, much to the chagrin of thedestitute. A government official estimated that ‘eighty percent [of donations]were given to the needy; twenty percent went to non-victims’. A governmentofficial explained that the redistribution was not efficiently planned partlybecause donor funding was not pooled. Due to the lack of accurate financialreporting methods, transparency in handling funds and accountability on thepart of the aid distributors, it is difficult to get a precise picture of how muchmoney was actually received and for whose benefit it was used.

Another significant issue is that people’s participation in the rebuilding activitieshas been minimal. Since the common goal of all parties in this process was torebuild survivors’ lives, it was imperative for the success of the whole process thatthe survivors themselves take a more active role in this endeavour by voicing theirconcerns and needs openly to the authorities, taking on community leadershiproles, participating in the production process and taking an active role in re-establishing devastated communities. However, the respondents identified the lackof people’s participation as a hindrance, blaming social and religious barriers,such as caste, as well as other factors, such as resistance to change, pessimism,plus an inability to organise themselves and make effective demands. Theseobservations are consistent with the findings of Mulligan and Nadarajah that ‘acommunity development approach to disaster recovery has more chance than‘‘asset replacement’’ for delivering on the promise of ‘‘build back better’’’.71

71 M. Mulligan and Y. Nadarajah, ‘Rebuilding Community in the Wake of Disaster: Lessons from the

Recovery from the 2004 Tsunami in Sri Lanka and India’, in Community Development Journal [http://

cdj.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2011/04/15/ cdj.bsr025.full.pdfþhtml, accessed 16 Feb. 2012].

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The inability to access basic information was also a major problem.Information regarding government policies and decisions, goods and servicesavailable to survivors during the rebuilding stage, the distribution of donations,the names of the various aid agencies and their aid programmes was not readilyaccessible to the public. This kept the intended recipients of the rehabilitationefforts largely uninformed throughout the rebuilding stage. In some instances,survivors simply accepted goods for which they had no use because theydoubted they would receive anything else. Without accurate and timelyinformation, people cannot make informed decisions about where to settledown, how to resume their occupations and how to plan their own recoveryeffort with confidence, let alone highlight weaknesses and corrupt practices andbribery in the service delivery process or demand transparency and account-ability. As a result, they were largely alienated from the rebuilding process. Thesituation has been exacerbated by a lack of community leadership, which mighthave played an important role in representing people’s interests and promotingpeople’s participation. It might have also improved the general attitude of thesurvivors towards rebuilding their lives after the catastrophe.

Although a careful mapping of survivors’ needs was required, the survivorswere not approached or consulted by the authorities. Assessments of individualneeds for housing, damaged property, and livelihood, and anxieties andconcerns in the wake of mass bereavements, were not conducted. Donationswere made on a general basis, regardless of what each recipient specificallyneeded. This might have been due to the difficulties posed in tracking people’sneeds because of the constant mobility of people within communities andextended families coming together in the aftermath of the crisis. The aidagencies depended heavily on the beneficiary lists drawn up by localgovernment authorities.

Another major concern for those helping survivors restore their lives is a‘welfare dependency mentality’, which has increased over the years. Even afterthree years of the tsunami rebuilding effort, most survivors interviewed stillidentified themselves as victims. The survivors’ expectations of welfareallocations and subsidies had not diminished with time. This is possibly dueto the fact that maintaining a ‘victim status’ ensured a continuous supply of freegoods and donations for which they would have had to work in ordinarycircumstances. Some survivors have also been accused of trying to sell thehouses that were allocated to them by the government.

The tsunami survivors interviewed spoke of their present conditions with pityand frustration and appraised the tsunami recovery process as being

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inadequate. Some stated openly that they are still to overcome the losses theyincurred and are still awaiting help from the government and other benevolentorganisations. Most respondents were frustrated with the inequitable nature ofthe distribution of donations and were quick to state that undeserving peoplereceived donations, while deserving ones were mostly overlooked. The majorityof the survivors identified government and volunteer organisations as the mainservice providers during the rebuilding stage. For example, the governmenthanded out cash for building houses, while building materials were provided byinternational NGOs. When questioned about the problems that could haveexisted in the delivery of services, the survivors were aware of many of thedeficiencies in administration, co-ordination and co-operation.

In some instances, aid and donated resources have been misappropriated andused to expand, rather than replace, lost properties. One official stated:

Buildings have been constructed in excess of the required amount,for example, a three-storey building has been built for just fortystudents, it is a burden on the PC [Provincial Council] to maintainsuch a huge building, the principals of schools have complainedregarding this matter.

In many instances, contractors have profited by entering into lucrativecontracts with NGOs. One government official used the term, ‘GoldenTsunami’, to emphasise the fact that for some parties, the disaster had broughtunanticipated financial benefits.

In the area of asset replacement, allowances were not made for women’sdomestic businesses. Most of the assets lost in the disaster had been held bymen and, therefore, they were given back to men. But a lot of women in thedevastated areas had conducted home-based businesses such as manufacturingrope, making sweets and food and so on. After the disaster, women were unableto claim any compensation for their lost ventures because government policiesdid not directly target providing relief to women entrepreneurs, and alsobecause their businesses were mostly unregistered. Thus, these women wereboth homeless and bereft of their businesses. They also needed information onfinding new sources of income and financial assistance, especially if the disasterhad now rendered them the sole providers for their families.

Psychological counselling had not been provided to the survivors on asystematic basis. There were no specific support programmes targeting thevulnerable, such as children, women and the elderly. One possible explanation

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might lie in the weak culture of professional counselling in Sri Lanka, wherepersonal problems are usually shared with close-knit informal networks,including extended family members and close friends. This practice isembedded in Sri Lankan culture and is confirmed by many social serviceproviders in Melbourne, Australia, who work with the Sri Lankan immigrantcommunity.72 When a crisis hits an entire community, however, its resourcesfor coping with stress are depleted and empowerment programmes andleadership programmes might be of use to build people’s confidence levels andcapacity for recuperation.

Why It MattersThe above discussion shows that power relationships in Sri Lanka haveundermined connectivity and interdependence between internal and externalactors at the district level. The government has not moved away from acommand and control mode, nor has it provided leadership or guidance to theother stakeholders. In particular, the influence of cabinet ministers has been acritical factor at the local level, leaving locally-elected politicians with little butthe unpalatable, powerless and wasteful option of simply passively following aminister’s orders. As a result, co-ordination amongst the different players in thepost-tsunami recovery effort was quite unsatisfactory. In addition to theduplication of rebuilding efforts, this has led to several interrelated problems:many sectors working according to their own vested interests; an inability tomonitor the activities of the other sectors; breakdowns in communicationamongst the sectors; and low levels of co-operation between the sectors. Manyrespondents, including the survivors, agreed that there was no evidence ofteamwork or constructive relationships between those working for recovery.

The dominance of the central government effectively denied roles to the civilsociety sector and to community-based organisations, which argued forinvestment in soft infrastructure. Consequently, they were rarely able to playactive roles, undermining the implementation of a range of programmes.Decisions to replace key assets only partially addressed the more diverse andcomplex needs of the community. The involvement of communities, includingbusinesses, in the rebuilding process might have strengthened the adminis-trative framework, but this was overlooked.

72 R. Samaratunge, ‘Cross-Cultural Training on Sri Lanka’, seminar presented to service providers, Monash

City Council, Mount Waverley Community Centre, Melbourne, 20 Dec. 2006.

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Governance as a Complex Evolving SystemDuring the rebuilding process, governance and its sub-systems were self-organising within the parameters determined at the system level. An exceptionto this may be the extent to which all sections of local communities co-operatedin the relief effort immediately after the tsunami, before the central governmenthad a chance to act. However, this was short-lived and quickly supplanted bythe intervention of higher levels of authority. In effect, system level controlswere absent in that initial period.

As the central government intervened, key features were observable. Interac-tions between actors led to changed behaviour and outcomes; there wasconnectivity between actors, including systems, although it was often skewed infavour of the more powerful actors; interdependence was present, but its extentvaried between sub-systems (holons); feedback appeared to be weak or wasliable to be ignored. That the tsunami forced holons ‘far from equilibrium’ isclearly exhibited by the tsunami’s effects, which forced almost all the actors to‘create new structures and order’;73 the latter created a ‘space of possibilities’,but as we demonstrate, these were often used by actors within holons to theadvantage of their personal or institutional interests over those of the intendedbeneficiaries.

Mitleton-Kelly raises questions over how co-evolution occurs in socialsystems.74 Our study found limited evidence that some holons changed inresponse to changes in other holons, with feedback and connectivity being thekey mediating factors. Historicity and time are obvious factors in rebuildingafter a disaster and these clearly affected outcomes in these action arenas. Path-dependence is also readily observed from the effects of constitutional design,which both enabled and limited the actions of national actors, to the effects ofcaste on individual and group behaviour.

Spatial factors are not explicitly recognised in Mitleton-Kelly’s ten principles,but were in fact crucial in explaining rebuilding differences between certainlocalities, such as the superior outcomes in the former president’s Hambantotaelectorate. Our findings suggest that spatial factors should be recognised as afurther distinguishing characteristic of subordinate-level holons.

73 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, p.11.74 Mitleton-Kelly, ‘Ten Principles of Complexity and Enabling Infrastructures’, pp.23–50.

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ConclusionThis study raises important questions about the extent and nature of theintegrated governance of post-disaster rebuilding. The sheer magnitude andforce of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was far greater than anything SriLanka had witnessed before. Officials and the public alike were totallyunprepared for the disaster and lacked the experience necessary for the hugerelief, recovery and rebuilding activities that needed to be carried out in itsaftermath. As a result, it could be expected that some mistakes andinefficiencies would occur during the road to recovery and rehabilitation.

However three years later, the country was still dealing with the effects of thetsunami. There were major flaws in the integration of key aspects ofgovernance, which account for much of the failure to rebuild infrastructureand devastated areas or to fully utilise the foreign funds received for thebetterment of the survivors of the disaster. CES suggests that the observance ofdue process in political decision-making and the practice of the rule of law, inconcert with decentralisation within overall central co-ordination, and trustand co-operation between individual and institutional actors, combine toreduce inefficiencies. In this case, they could have been expected to reduceadministrative transaction costs and facilitate the rebuilding processes.

But in the aftermath of the tsunami, effective governance was undermined bymultiple flaws. Central government politicians intervened in matters thatshould have devolved to local authorities who had the legal authority,knowledge of local conditions and trust of the affected communities. Theintervention by the central government authorities was compounded bycompetition for partisan advantage between the central government coalitionpartners such as the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), an influentialconstituent party in the coalition, and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP).The effect was to exacerbate the inequalities of power and influence, toexaggerate bureaucratic rigidity and, in so doing, to inhibit the execution ofthe rebuilding activities. Furthermore, whereas after major hurricanes in theUS rebuilding focussed on tangible capital goods,75 in Sri Lanka the focus wason housing and the capital equipment required for livelihoods, such as fishingboats. While these were oriented to the lower socio-economic groups, many ofthe poorest of the poor—those formerly without land or other assets—weredenied the opportunity of assistance with the replacement of capital.

75 Pais and Elliott, ‘Places as Recovery Machines’, pp.1415–53.

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Another parallel with the findings reported by Pais and Elliott was the failure toprovide services and ‘soft’ infrastructure such as counselling and training,which might have assisted individuals and communities in taking full advantageof the funding for housing and capital equipment.76 Whilst local decision-making might have led to greater recognition of the importance of softinfrastructure, it is not at all clear that this would have led to the allocation offunds to such intangible investments. Instead, local political decision-makerspreferred to fund highly-visible, tangible projects that would demonstrate earlyevidence of output, rather than invest in ‘soft’ infrastructure which deliversmore subtle, longer-term outcomes. The decisions did not reflect anyunderstanding of the fact that rebuilding communities and livelihoods is along-term process that extends beyond the mere provision of housing andmaterial goods.

The key features of effective complex evolving systems were compromised bythe actions of powerful actors and compounded by weaknesses in the system’sdesign and operation. Self-organisation at the sub-national level was effectivelyblocked by the actions of the dominant central government actors and theabsence of constraints on their behaviour. Emergence was likewise severelyinhibited by centralised control, in which creativity was not encouraged andinnovative solutions were not welcomed. Connectivity was strictly limited bythe command and control approach of the central government. Interdepen-dence was not acknowledged by the central government, which was reflected inlittle opportunity for feedback. Rather than accept the potential benefits ofenabling the system to operate ‘far from equilibrium’, centralised controlattempted to restore and maintain stability. As well, the continuing civil warwas undoubtedly a factor which led to the government wanting to keep controlover events. However, the effect was to reduce the space for possibilities andhence suppress the generation of creativity and innovation. The rigidity ofcentral control also restricted opportunities for co-evolution, as no alternativestrategies were readily able to emerge.

This demonstrates the effects of historicity and time on governance. Theconduct of the actors, especially the more powerful actors, reflected theirhistory as individuals and institutions. Whilst time might have facilitatedtransformations in the behaviour of the relevant actors, it had the reverse effectof enabling a certain path-dependence to prevail, in which earlier patterns ofinfluence inhibited behavioural reform.

76 Ibid.

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Taking Sri Lanka as an example, this study of rebuilding after the 2004 tsunamihas examined the roles and processes of integrated governance, seeking toidentify features in common with complex evolving systems. It illustrates theutility of integrated governance as a theoretical approach to facilitate anunderstanding of the operation of governance in a complex socio-politicalenvironment. As expected, political power and influence had a dominating andunequal effect on the system, overriding the effective functioning of the othersectors and making the overall rebuilding effort insufficient, inefficient andunstable. This sends a strong message to those sectors involved in large-scaledisaster management and humanitarian efforts, stressing the importance ofrelative power balances in each sector to achieve healthy and effectiveoutcomes.

We are not persuaded that more traditional public administration conceptualapproaches could have revealed the complexity, subtlety and nuances or thespatial and temporal factors that operated in this case. CES relates to processesinvolving actors in all social sectors and, in so doing, takes into account thecharacteristics of both the actors and the relationships between them, includingthe temporal and spatial variability of both. CES attempts to explain thecomplexity of the real world, recognising that ‘soft’ factors such as power,influence and leadership style may be elements of causal mechanisms affectinggovernance systems. Combining CES with Ostrom’s IAD framework imbues itwith analytical power. This model delivers a new perspective on a complexevolving system which has the capacity to improve our understanding of theoperation of governance.

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