GLOBALISATION AND INDENTITY

BUILDING

A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH

TO SINO-TAINWANESE RELATIONS

By

Uwe Wunderlich

Draft only! No Quotation without author’s prior consent!

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Globalisation and Identity Building: A Social Constructivist Approach to Sino-

Taiwanese Relations

Introduction

During the last decade Taiwan has slowly moved away from the mainland and from

the ‘One China’ principle as the cornerstone for Sino-Taiwanese relations. This has

resulted in a period of enhanced tensions (periodically reaching crisis level) with

China. The 2004 presidential election in Taiwan and the campaign preceding it have

done nothing to improve cross-Strait relations. In some ways the re-elected president,

Chen Shui-bian, has taken the island closer to a formal separation from China than

ever before, resulting in an angry response from Beijing. Three issues stand out in this

context: Chen Shui-bian’s call for a new constitution, his visit to the United States

(US) in October 2003 and his call for a referendum on national security matters. Yet

Beijing has remained remarkably calm so far.1 As one commentator states: ‘Beijing

had clearly learned its lessons from Taiwan’s previous two presidential elections

when its sabre-rattling backfired.’2

Curiously enough, Chen’s timing could not have been worse – as far as international

relations are concerned. Taipei’s main security guarantor, the United States (US), is

everything but enthusiastic about a possible confrontation with the People’s Republic

of China (PRC). Washington needs Beijing’s co-operation in its ‘war on terrorism’

and regarding the situation on the Korean Peninsular. Following a visit of the Chinese

Premier. Wen Jiabao, President Bush asserted ‘We oppose any unilateral decision, by

either China or Taiwan, to change the status quo [of Taiwan’s relationship with the

mainland] … And the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate

that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally that change the status quo,

which we oppose.’3 Chen Shui-bian’s confrontational style had indeed become a

sensitive issue for Washington. Despite his promise to defend Taiwan against an

unprovoked attack, President Bush rebuked Chen-Shui-bian for his referendum plans

1 See A. Kuhn, ‘China bites its Tongue’, Far Eastern Economic Review (1April 2004).2 A. Kuhn, ‘The View from Beijing: A Sliver of Hope Would be Welcome’, Far Eastern EconomicReview (4 March 2004).3 S. V. Lawrence, J. Dean, ‘Taiwan – A New Threat’, Far Eastern Economic Review (18 December2003).

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to win support for additional military countermeasures to China’s missile build-up

and for a political dialogue with the mainland on an equal footing.4

The question arises as to why Taipei appears to be pursuing a policy that will

ultimately bring it into direct confrontation with an increasingly assertive China,

while at the same time forcing its most important supporter, the US, into a position

which may make it necessary to rethink its pledge to defend the island. The fragility

of cross-Strait relations were dramatically pointed out by the renewed threat from

Beijing that ‘the use of force may become unavoidable.’5 This paper argues that

behind Taipei’s recent independence noises are more than just election politics.

Although Chen Shui-bian’s push for Taiwanese voters to hold a referendum on threats

from the PRC and to rewrite the constitution of the Republic of China (ROC) have

been heavily influenced by campaign politics, it is also indicative of something more

substantial – a drive to reshape Taiwan’s understanding of itself and of its

relationship with the mainland. Taiwan is steadily developing a new identity as a

cultural, political and economic entity, separate from the mainland. This is a very

broad and long-term process. Even the main challenger of the Democratic Peoples’

Party (DPP), the Kuomintang (KMT), which originally propagated eventual re-

unification with the mainland, no longer regards Taiwan and China as an undividable

unit.6

Identity issues are at the heart of international security in the Taiwan Strait and, by

extension, of relevance for the wider Asia-Pacific region. Yet, despite their obvious

influence on the risk of war, mainstream International Relations theory has failed to

pay sufficient attention to the linkages between identity dynamics and matters of

international security.7 Drawing on the conceptual framework offered by social

constructivism, this paper examines Taiwan’s recent drive to build a national identity

in relation to the globalisation process, international forces and domestic reform in

Taiwan. A first section will briefly review social constructivism as a framework of

4 See D. Lague, ‘The Result is Final: A Divided Taiwan’, Far Eastern Economic Review (1 April2004).5 R. Cheung, ‘Beijing threatens War on Taiwan’, South China Morning Post (18 November 2003).6 As Shiu Sho-zu, a KMT official put it, ‘Everyone, regardless their affiliation, feels Taiwanese’[Quoted in: J. Watts, ‘Taiwan Provokes China with Missile Referendum’, The Guardian (19 March2004)].7 Mainstream IR theory refers predominantly to neorealist and neoliberal paradigms.

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analysis within the academic field of International Relations. The second part of the

paper analyses the development of a Taiwanese national identity and its implications

for international security in the Taiwan Strait.

Social Constructivism – A Brief Review

As indicated, neorealism and neoliberalism appear to be inappropriate in analysing the

situation in the Taiwan Strait. Both paradigms are too narrow and tend to ignore

major factors of influence in international relations. A neorealist interpretation of

Sino-Taiwanese relations, for instance, would deem a military confrontation between

Beijing and Taipei unavoidable. This argument is supported by China’s economic and

military modernisation in conjunction with rising nationalisms on both sides of the

Taiwan Strait. While the latter results in the further drifting apart of both countries,

the former provides an increasingly assertive China with the economic and military

capabilities to enforce its foreign policy objectives. Despite recognising that identity

factors play a role in security relations, the neorealist paradigm offers no satisfactory

explanation for these dynamics. Instead, it takes notions of identity and actor interests

as exogenously given, determined by changes in the international structure.

Neorealism, therefore, tends to focus on power and ignores largely the development

of a Taiwanese national identity. In addition a neorealist outlook on Sino-Taiwanese

relations has the potential to become a self-fulfilling prophecy if rigidly applied by

political decision-makers.

Neoliberalism, on the other hand, paints a more optimistic picture of the future of

cross-Strait relations. This paradigm points to the possibility that economic growth on

the mainland has the intrinsic potential to lead to democratisation and pacification of

Beijing. Commercial relations between countries have never been better and there is

plenty of evidence of economic integration on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Neoliberalism assumes that economic progress in the PRC will lay the groundwork

for eventual democratisation and political pluralism. After all, something similar

happened not too long ago in another Chinese state/ society – Taiwan. In fact, the

PRC today looks in many ways similar to Taiwan of the 1970s: a one-party

authoritarian regime presiding over a fast-growing economy. It is assumed that

closing the economic gap and pushing for political reform on the mainland will

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motivate Taipei to consider a new political settlement. However, enhanced economic

integration and democratisation in China may not necessarily have the effects

neoliberals predict. Ironically, although economic exchange between the PRC and the

ROK has increased dramatically in recent years, Taipei is further away from

unification than ever before.8 Furthermore, even a democratically elected Chinese

government would find it difficult to give up sovereignty claims over Taiwan.

The problem is that neither neorealism nor neoliberalism pay particular attention to

the dynamics of identity issues. Both approaches tend to focus on material factors

such as power and economics. It is in this respect that social constructivism becomes

a useful instrument for analysing Sino-Taiwanese relations. The approach emphasises

the importance of cognitive and ideational forces. Instead of taking international and

national structures and interests as given, social constructivists share a belief that

institutions and structures are social normative constructs. Preferences and interests of

agents in international relations are not pre-determined externally but are influenced

by the interaction of norms, culture and identities.9 It is through these processes of

interaction that meaning arises, which creates structures affecting behaviour and

identities. Key structures in international relations are, therefore, intersubjective. This

implies that conditions such as anarchy at the international level and security dilemma

situations are not inevitable but are socially constructed and, therefore, can be de-

constructed.10 Nicholas Onuf remarks that ‘people always construct, or constitute,

social reality, even as their being, which can only be social, is constructed for them.’11

Constructivists do not deny the influence of material factors:

8 A more detailed analysis of neorealist and neoliberal arguments on Sino-Taiwanese relations can befound in: U. Wunderlich, ‘Globalization and Security in the Taiwan Straits’, in: Global Change, Peace& Security, vol. 15, no. 2. (2003), pp. 132 – 136.9 R. Palan, ‘Evaluating the Constructivist Critique in International Relations’, in: Review ofInternational Studies, vol. 26 (2000), p. 576. See also J. M. Hobson, The State and InternationalRelations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 145.10 See A. Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, in:International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2 (1992).11 N. G. Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations,(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), p. 1.

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The key here is recognizing that materiality is not the same thing as objectivity. Cultural

phenomena are just as objective, just as constraining, just as real as power and interests. ...

The point is that the real world consists of a lot more than material forces as such.12

Identities and interests are inherently relational. This implies that there is a close

connection between what actors do and who they are. The concept of identity

provides the crucial link between the structure of the international or regional

environment and the interests of the various actors in international relations. These

actors and their policies determine the form, shape and structure of international and

regional settings and, at the same time, the same settings influence the behaviour, the

capabilities, the definition of identities and interests as well as the very existence of

international agents.13 Constructivism allows us to analyse the impact of norms,

identity formation, international order and security. Identities establish expectations

about who the actors are in particular structures and how they might behave. They

therefore influence the dynamics of the international system and can even generate a

re-definition of actor interests.

Such deliberations provide an alternative and potentially fruitful approach to account

for the development of a Taiwanese national identity and are, therefore, of particular

interest for any analysis of the future of a potentially very volatile area in the Asia-

Pacific region.

Taiwan’s National Identity and Cross-Strait Relations

Having outlined the theoretical framework guiding our investigation, we will now

proceed to focus our attention on the identity construction process in Taiwan and its

implications for relations with the mainland. For the construction of any identity,

including a national identity, some form of binding element is needed. Examples are a

common culture, a common ethnic background, shared linguistic similarities,

common experiences, a common heritage, shared norms and values. It follows that

many cross-cutting identities have to be taken into consideration for the formation of

12 A. Wendt, A Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1999), p. 136. Emphasis in original.

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a common national identity. Thus, a national identity does not imply cultural

homogeneity. The diversity of cultures, languages and ethnic groups which are

characteristic of many political entities do not necessarily pose major obstacles to the

formation of national identities. This applies also to the socio-cultural make-up of

Taiwan, combining ‘old’ and ‘new’ Taiwanese and aboriginal minorities.14 As

identities are never absolute, individuals can belong to more than one group at the

same time. People can assume multiple identities. For example, individuals can regard

themselves to be members of a family/clan, inhabitants of a village/town/district,

employees of a company, members of a political organisation, while being at the same

time representatives of a certain cultural group/nation, devotees of a religion and

citizens of a state.15 With regard to identity the context is therefore of particular

importance. It is, therefore, possible to assume culturally a ‘Chinese’ identity while

simultaneously maintaining politically a ‘Taiwanese’ identity. As we will see,

however, frictions may arise if different groups impose conflicting demands on their

members.

National identities form and generate interests since many interests depend on the

construction of some kind of self-identity in relation to others. Consequently, actors

can develop interests in enacting or developing particular identities. The commitment

to a configuration of certain sets of identities, therefore, reinforces the acceptance of

certain norms and, in turn, affects the normative structure of regional relations. The

policies and actions of international actors such as, for instance, nation-states, are

influenced by perceptions of self-identity and national interest. They also re-produce

and re-construct constantly the political, economic and security cultural structure of

the international system.

Taiwanese society is in a state of flux. Several changes have occurred since the late

1980s, which have directly and indirectly contributed to the development of the

Taiwanese national identity. Although they have their roots predominantly in

13 R. L. Jepperson, A. Wendt, P. J. Katzenstein, ‘Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security’, inP. J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 41.14 ‘Old’ Taiwanese refers to the decedents of groups of immigrants from the mainland prior theJapanese occupation in 1895, whereas ‘new’ Taiwanese identifies people and their decedents comingfrom the mainland after 1945.

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domestic politics it is possible to make linkages between domestic affairs and forces

in the international arena. In this context, globalisation and geopolitical dynamics are

of particular interest. Although political liberalisation and democratisation have

fostered identity building it is impossible to de-link these dynamics from the

international political economy.

The term ‘globalisation’ is being used frequently in academia, political debates, in the

media and everyday language.16 There is, however, a considerable vagueness,

inconsistency and confusion attached to the notion of globalisation. This makes it

important to clarify how the concept is being understood. For the purpose of this

paper, we will adapt a definition suggested by the distinguished scholar David Held.

Accordingly, globalisation can be interpreted as a multidimensional and multifaceted

process that is changing the very nature of political, economic, social and cultural

relations.17 It is a term describing certain trends, factors and forces that share a

transnational nature and penetrate all levels of international relations. From this it

becomes possible to derive a variety of distinctive indicators of the globalisation

process:

• Globalisation extends social, cultural, political and economic activities across

territorial boundaries.

• It intensifies international interdependence as flows of trade, investment, finance,

migration, ideas and cultures increase.

• It ‘speeds up’ the world through new systems of transport, communication and

information technology which means that people, ideas, goods and capital can

travel much faster and the diffusion in different societies and cultures of new ideas

and information is much more rapid and far more difficult to control by state

authorities.

15 See W. Loth, ‘Identity and Statehood in the Process of European Integration’, Journal of EuropeanIntegration History, 6, 1 (2000), p. 20.16 For the following discussion see Wunderlich, Globalization and Security, pp. 122-125 & pp. 128-132.17 See: D. Held, ‘Democracy and Globalization’, MPIfG Working Paper 95/5 (1997), p. 2,(http//www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/workpap/wp97-5/wp97-5.html). Accessed 19 September 2001.See also J. Krause, ‘Overview’, in Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation, Strengthening InternationalOrder – The Role of Asia-Europe Co-operation (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange,2000), p. 10.

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• Local development in far away places can have enormous global consequences.18

The connections between globalisation and identity issues are not always clear-cut.

On the one hand there is evidence that forces associated with the globalisation process

have the potential to undermine established national identities. On the other hand,

contemporary globalisation has provided wider scope for the discovery and

expression of identity.19 The forces of integration and fragmentation are inherent in

the globalisation process. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the case of Taiwan

where the last decade has witnessed the gradual de-construction of a ‘Chinese’

identity and the building of a new, a ‘Taiwanese’ identity. Another important feature

of the globalisation process is that it dissolves the dividing lines between international

and national affairs and, thus, between, foreign and domestic affairs. Consequently,

issues of foreign and domestic policies are becoming increasingly intermixed and

domestic dynamics can have consequences for international security.

Taiwan’s economic modernisation meant that the country opened itself to external

forces, which subsequently penetrated Taiwanese society in cultural, social, economic

and political terms. This has been an important factor for the democratisation and

liberalisation process. Taiwan’s impressive economic performance and its integration

with the international economy became a special force of influence in the re-definition

of Taiwan’s self-understanding. Like any identity, the emerging Taiwanese national

identity is characterised by internal features and an external side. This corresponds to

the unifying elements, describing who belongs to a particular group, and the dividing

elements, which are necessary to distinguish a particular entity from others. On the

internal side it appears that the cornerstones of this formative identity are economic

progress, democracy and political freedom.20 With regard to the external side notions

of sovereignty and resentment towards the mainland have to be considered.

As mentioned before, globalising forces and geopolitics have heavily influenced

Taiwan’s identity building process. By the mid-1980s, after nearly two decades of

18 See D. Held, A McGrew, D. Goldblatt and J. Perraton, ‘Managing the Challenge of Globalizationand Institutionalizing Cooperation through Global Governance’, in C. W. Kegley, E. R. Wittkopf(eds.), The Global Agenda – Issues and Perspectives (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001), p. 135.19 J. A. Scholte, Globalization – A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000), p. 226.20 See J. Kuo, ‘Building a Taiwanese National Identity’, Taipei Times (21 June 2001).

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economic growth and external influences, demands from Taiwan’s business

community to enhance business opportunities with the PRC grew louder. Taiwan’s

economic development in the 1970s and 1980s had facilitated the establishment of a

well-educated middle class who increasingly demanded more civil liberties. Enhanced

links with the international political economy and the outside world had (and has) a

profound impact on Taiwanese society and politics. The advancements in

communication technologies as well as mass international travel facilitated the

enhanced diffusion of ideas and information in society. The increased flow of data

and information made censorship also increasingly difficult to maintain. Opposition

parties began to form. Within the Kuomintang a generational change took place. The

old leadership was being replaced by younger, highly trained (often overseas-

educated) bureaucratic technocrats. Civilians and native Taiwanese began to take over

leading positions in party, government, bureaucracy, security forces and the army.

The 1980s saw a relaxation of military tensions between the PRC and Taiwan which

was supported by political and economic measures. Over the years, trade with and

investment in the mainland, mostly via Hong Kong, had constantly grown.21 In 1987

President Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law, allowed Taiwanese citizens to travel to

the mainland and legalised the formation of political parties.

Meanwhile, following a shift in US foreign policy objectives in the Asia-Pacific

region as highlighted by the Sino-US rapprochement, Taipei was no longer recognised

as the legitimate representative of ‘free’ China. Indeed, what followed the

normalisation of Sino-US relations was a switch of diplomatic recognition from

Taipei to Beijing by nearly all countries. This supported the formation of a Taiwanese

identity in two ways. First, Taiwan began to lose confidence in a Chinese identity

which had failed.22 It also triggered step-by-step liberalisation and democratisation

which became increasingly a self-interest of the Kuomintang and the ROC since they

provided an opportunity to gain international and domestic legitimacy and to ensure

long-term US support. In the changing international climate it was not enough to be

an anti-Communist regime.

21 See Ministry of Economic Affairs – Board of Foreign Trade,http://www.moeaboft.gov.tw/english/htm. Accessed 25 March 2002. By the beginning of the 1990sTaiwan had become one of the main sources of foreign direct investment in China.

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The democratisation process launched by the ruling KMT also meant a ‘nativisation’

of politics, responding to overwhelming demographics. It allowed ‘native’ parties to

form and challenge Kuomintang authority and ‘nativisation’ of the KMT, originally

seen as a ‘mainlander’ party, itself. Chen Shui-bian and Lee Teng-hui are perfect

examples. In fact, Lee Teng-hui, a native Taiwanese, managed to rise through the

Kuomintang party ranks to become the first elected president. The Taiwanisation of

politics, culture and society is clearly visible. In order to be successful in a democratic

system, political candidates must appeal to popular sentiment: To be seen as a

Taiwanese ‘patriot’ is a must – especially at the national level. This includes the

ability to speak Taiwanese in order to appeal to a broad base of voters. Other

indicators include a new interest in Taiwan’s history and Taiwan’s aboriginal cultures,

Taiwanese art and literature. The opening up of the society relaxed inter-ethnic

relationships and ended the suppression and censorship of the media and local culture.

In the 1990s, the mass media began to broadcast folksongs and popular music, movies

and TV programmes, magazines and books in native Taiwanese dialects such as

Hakka and Minnan. Indeed Taiwanese language seems to penetrate more and more

the education system which has so far been dominated by Mandarin.

The end of the Cold War provided another important factor supporting Taiwan’s

newly found national self-confidence. With the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact and

the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US was less dependent on Beijing. The strategic

triangle (US-PRC-USSR) determining Sino-US relations since the 1970s had

disappeared. The US administration, in particular under Clinton, expressed a strong

commitment to fostering and expanding the zone of democratic countries. In this

context Taiwan’s political development stands in stark contrast to China’s oppression

of political activists and constant human rights infringements.23 Over the years, the

Washington has become increasingly sympathetic towards Taipei. At the same time it

has become more critical of human rights and democratisation issues in China. This

was intensified by suspicions regarding China’s military build-up, non-proliferation

matters, its long-term strategic intentions and its contingency planning. This policy

has been continued under the present Bush administration, which has also begun to

22 W. H. Peng, ‘End Taiwan’s Diplomatic Isolation’, Asian Wall Street Journal (3 September 2002).23 The Tiananmen massacre of 1989 is a good example.

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restore its military relationship with Taiwan.24 Although certainly not in favour of any

drastic action by Taipei, enhanced US support has certainly played a role in Taiwan’s

new international assertiveness.

The importance of Taiwan’s political development for the relations with the mainland

cannot be contested. First, democratisation in Taiwan will inevitably widen the

political distance between Taipei and the mainland. Until the 1990s, both countries

adhered to the ‘One China’ principle. However, a democratically elected Taiwanese

government can only claim legitimacy over Taiwan. Second, political liberalisation

allowed pro-independence groups to organise themselves and become more active,

gaining access even to the highest political office as the example of Chen Shui-bian’s

DPP all too clearly pointed out. And third, democratisation and liberalisation directly

and indirectly facilitated the development of a new Taiwanese national identity. The

problem is that the Taiwanese identity is currently evolving in explicit opposition to

China. The term ‘Taiwanese’ is increasingly used to distinguish it from ‘Chinese’.

And Chinese refers to the PRC and the Taiwanese ‘mainlanders’ who constitute about

14 per cent of the people of Taiwan.

In fact, the national identity of Taiwan can draw from many sources. History is often

used to point out the differences between China and Taiwan – by constructing the idea

of a colonialisation lasting for more than 400 years. First came the Dutch, followed by

the Ming general Koxinga and his successors who were finally defeated and replaced

by the Qing (or Manchu Dynasty). From 1895 to 1945, the island was under Japanese

colonial rule before being taken over by the mainland Chinese KMT. To be

‘Taiwanese’ implies to have emigrated to the island before 1895. Such interpretations

of history have the potential to undermine assertions of a multiple cultural Chinese

and national Taiwanese identity. Unlike in their other colonial dominions, the

Japanese regime was seen as relatively orderly, less cruel, less oppressive and less

corrupt compared to the KMT who managed to alienate the Taiwanese through their

repressive Sinification policies and the brutality used in the suppression of the

Taiwanese following the rebellion of 28 February 1947.25 The identification as

24 An example is the US pledge to supply Taiwan with a US $ 4 billion fleet of eight conventionalsubmarines. See D. Lague, ‘Coming About’, Far Eastern Economic Review (13 December 2001).25 W. Ming-jen, ‘Leaving the Darkness of 2-28 Behind’, Taipei Times (29 February 2000).

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‘Taiwanese’ is, therefore, directed against any identification with China. It implies a

certain political meaning and supports notions of Taiwanese sovereignty and

independence. This is only re-enforced by its vagueness and large potential for

political manipulation. In addition, mass travel from Taiwan to the mainland only

seems to have contributed to a feeling of separateness. The differences in economic

and political development between both countries became obvious to large sectors of

the Taiwanese population, effectively undermining whatever China nostalgia there

might have been.

This identity building process can be followed through the 1990s. Although the issue

appears to have been monopolised by Chen during his election campaign, it is worth

remembering that his presidential predecessor Lee Teng-hui took up the topic before

him. Lee gave voice to a growing sense of identity on the island. It was also Lee who

alarmed Beijing and Washington alike with his declaration that the PRC and the ROC

should interact as political equals.26 What is even more worrying for Beijing is the

fact that not to be regarded as a mainland supporter has almost become a matter of

political survival. The recent presidential election was heavily influenced by identity

politics. Chen Shui-bian rallied his supporters by insisting that Taiwan should reject

China’s sovereignty claims over the island. Chen Shui-bian won the 2004 presidential

election by a very narrow margin. However, compared to the 2000 election his

support has increased from 30.9 percent to 50.1 percent. This is indicative of the

burgeoning Taiwanese identity. Both parties, the KMT and the DPP have repeatedly

attempted to tap into the national identity issue. Even the KMT is now considering

taking a more ‘Taiwanese’ direction in politics.27 This reflects the ‘nativisation’ of the

party and its eagerness to enhance support among native Taiwanese. Such

deliberations will ultimately distance the KMT even further from the mainland. In the

light of the current campaign, senior KMT officials openly contemplate whether

eventual Taiwanese independence should be considered.28

These elaborations cast doubt on the theory that enhanced economic interaction

between Taipei and Beijing will pull Taiwan closer to China – eventually facilitating

26 See S. Luman, ‘Taiwan’s Developing Identity – Old Divisions Meld into New Nationalism’, in: SanJose Mercury News (9 August 1999).27 J. Dean, ‘Can’t Let Go’, Far Eastern Economic Review (8 April 2004).

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peaceful re-unification. Taiwanese companies have invested over US $ 100 billion in

China over the last fifteen years and more than a third of the islands exports is

heading now for the mainland.29 Despite this ongoing economic integration,

politically Taiwan is drifting further away from China. The growing sense of identity

has been confirmed in a poll carried out by the Election Study Centre at Taipei’s

National Chengchi University. In 1992, 26 percent of the respondents identified

themselves as Chinese, 17.3 percent as Taiwanese and 45.4 percent said they were

both. In June 2003 another poll was carried out. This time the proportion of those

identifying themselves as Taiwanese had increased to 41.5 percent. Those identifying

themselves as Chinese dropped to 9.9 percent while 43.8 percent see themselves as

both.30

Such developments in Taiwan are worrying for Beijing’s prospect of achieving a

peaceful re-unification with the island in the foreseeable future. It also puts a big

question mark over the future security relations in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan

consistently and explicitly maintains that it is not only a defacto state but also a dejure

sovereign nation. As it becomes apparent from the discussion above, this trend is

more than just a personal agenda of some ‘maverick’ Taiwanese politicians. While it

is certainly true that the identity building process is fostered and encouraged by the

current government and even elements in the opposition, we can conclude that it is

more than just a top-down process. It reflects a wider and deeper process of re-

defining collective self-perception among substantial proportions of the Taiwanese

population. In terms of international security this conclusion throws open many

problems. It is unlikely that the issue will disappear even if Chen or his DPP are

eventually replaced. Although less vocal on Taiwanese sovereignty there is only little

hope that the KMT or any other major party will move closer in Beijing’s direction.

The mainstream debate in Taiwan is not whether or not to work toward unification

with the mainland but how to deal with China. The ongoing penetration of Taiwanese

society by international political, social, cultural and economic forces supports the

ongoing democratisation and identity formation process. This in turn, leads to a clash

between Chinese and Taiwanese views of the future of Sino-Taiwanese relations. On

28 J. Dean, ‘The Taiwan Strait Grows Wider’, Far Eastern Economic Review (4 March 2004).29 Dean, Taiwan Strait Grows Wider.30 Source: Dean, Taiwan Street Grows Wider.

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the one hand we have an increasingly impatient China acquiring the means to enforce

its foreign policy objectives if necessary. On the other hand we have Taiwan on a path

of developing a new identity as a distinct cultural, social, political, economic and

sovereign entity. The ‘One China’ principle which has played so far a key role in

stabilising Sino-Taiwanese relations is everything but formally ‘dead’. Recent events

in Hong Kong where the PRC appeared to end all pretence of its promise of autonomy

for the territory seems to support this conclusion.31

Although this casts a very bleak outlook on the future security in the Taiwan Strait it

has to be remembered that Taiwan’s identity is in constant flux. Like all identities it is

not fixed but subject to constant transformation and readjustment. That leaves

sufficient room for more optimistic speculations. Taiwanese identity formation is very

complex and multifaceted. There is no reason to assume that the current separation

trend is predetermined. There is certainly room for the development of a common

Chinese identity. Common denominators, which also facilitate economic integration,

include language, ancestry, customs and culture. By putting too much emphasis on the

differences dividing both countries, we run into the danger of obscuring the fact that

the basis of Taiwan’s society is still Chinese.32 In many ways, Taiwan regards itself as

the preserver of traditional Chinese culture. The results of the poll are far from

adequate to make future predictions about the development of Taiwan’s national

identity.

Conclusions

The paper has demonstrated that international security in the Taiwan Strait and,

therefore, in the Asia-Pacific region is influenced by the dynamics of identity

formation in Taiwan. This process is driven by domestic factors, geopolitics and the

forces of globalisation which have facilitated the development of a democratic state in

search of its place in the international arena.

31 See Editorial, ‘Goodbye to ‘Two Systems’, Far Eastern Economic Review, (8 April 2004).32 R. P. Weller, Alternate Civilities: Democracy and Culture in China and Taiwan (Boulder: WestviewPress, 1999), p. 11.

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The paper has also argued that it is potentially useful to analyse Sino-Taiwanese

relations from a constructivist perspective. Social constructivism provides an

interesting framework in this context as it allows us to make a connection between

globalisation and international security by looking at the penetration of previously

sovereign space by outside forces and the resulting effects on domestic circumstances

and national identities. In fact, constructivism places much emphasis on ideational

factors than its rival paradigms (neoliberalism, neorealism). However, it is worth

remembering that no theoretical approach can capture the full complexity of

international politics accurately.