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THE GESTALT THEORY OF EXPRESSION BY RUDOLF ARNHEIM Sarah Lawrence College What is the exact location and range of the territory covered by the term 'ex- pression'? Thus far, no generally ac- cepted definition exists. In order to make clear what is meant by expression in the present paper, it is therefore nec- essary to indicate (1) the kind of per- ceptual stimulus which involves the phenomenon in question, and (2) the kind of mental process to which its ex- istence is due. This delimitation of our subject will show that the range of per- ceptual objects which carry expression according to gestalt theory is unusually large and that expression is defined as the product of perceptual properties which various other schools of thought consider non-existent or unimportant. (1) In present-day usage, the term 'expression' refers primarily to behav- ioral manifestations of the human per- sonality. The appearance and activities of the human body may be said to be expressive. The shape and proportions of the face or the hands, the tensions and the rhythm of muscular action, gait, ges- tures, and other movements serve as ob- jects of observation. In.addition, ex- pression is now commonly understood to reach beyond the observed person's body. The 'projective techniques' ex- ploit characteristic effects upon, and re- actions to, the environment. The way a person dresses, keeps his room, handles the language, the pen, the brush; the colors, flowers, occupations he prefers; the meaning he attributes to pictures, tunes, or inkblots; the story he imposes on puppets; his interpretation of a dra- matic part—these and innumerable other manifestations can be called 'ex- pressive' in that they permit conclusions about the personality or the temporary state of mind of the individual. Gestalt psychologists extend the range of expres- sive phenomena beyond this limit. For reasons which will be discussed, they consider it indispensable to speak also of the expression conveyed by inanimate objects, such as mountains, clouds, sirens, machines. (2) Once the carrier of expression is determined, the kind of mental process must be indicated which is charged with producing the phenomenon. It is the contention of Gestalt psychology that the various experiences commonly clas- sified under 'perception of expression' are caused by a number of psychological processes, which ought to be distin- guished from each other for the purpose of theoretical analysis. Some of these experiences are partly or wholly based upon empirically acquired knowledge. The mere inspection of many half- smoked cigarettes in an ashtray would suggest no connection with nervous ten- sion to a visitor from a planet inhabited by non-smokers. The letters EVVIVA GUERRA and EVVIVA DON PIO scribbled all over the walls of an Italian village will reveal the mentality of the natives only to someone who happens to know that these words pay homage to a champion cyclist and the village priest. For the purpose of the present paper, the use of past experience for the interpreta- tion of perceptual observations will be excluded from the field of expression and referred to the psychology of learning. We shall be concerned only with in- stances in which, according to Gestalt psychology, sensory data contain a core of expression that is perceptually self evident. The way a person keeps his lips tightly closed or raises his voice or 156

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  • THE GESTALT THEORY OF EXPRESSIONBY RUDOLF ARNHEIMSarah Lawrence College

    What is the exact location and rangeof the territory covered by the term 'ex-pression'? Thus far, no generally ac-cepted definition exists. In order tomake clear what is meant by expressionin the present paper, it is therefore nec-essary to indicate (1) the kind of per-ceptual stimulus which involves thephenomenon in question, and (2) thekind of mental process to which its ex-istence is due. This delimitation of oursubject will show that the range of per-ceptual objects which carry expressionaccording to gestalt theory is unusuallylarge and that expression is defined asthe product of perceptual propertieswhich various other schools of thoughtconsider non-existent or unimportant.

    (1) In present-day usage, the term'expression' refers primarily to behav-ioral manifestations of the human per-sonality. The appearance and activitiesof the human body may be said to beexpressive. The shape and proportionsof the face or the hands, the tensions andthe rhythm of muscular action, gait, ges-tures, and other movements serve as ob-jects of observation. In.addition, ex-pression is now commonly understood toreach beyond the observed person'sbody. The 'projective techniques' ex-ploit characteristic effects upon, and re-actions to, the environment. The waya person dresses, keeps his room, handlesthe language, the pen, the brush; thecolors, flowers, occupations he prefers;the meaning he attributes to pictures,tunes, or inkblots; the story he imposeson puppets; his interpretation of a dra-matic partthese and innumerableother manifestations can be called 'ex-pressive' in that they permit conclusionsabout the personality or the temporary

    state of mind of the individual. Gestaltpsychologists extend the range of expres-sive phenomena beyond this limit. Forreasons which will be discussed, theyconsider it indispensable to speak alsoof the expression conveyed by inanimateobjects, such as mountains, clouds,sirens, machines.

    (2) Once the carrier of expression isdetermined, the kind of mental processmust be indicated which is charged withproducing the phenomenon. It is thecontention of Gestalt psychology thatthe various experiences commonly clas-sified under 'perception of expression'are caused by a number of psychologicalprocesses, which ought to be distin-guished from each other for the purposeof theoretical analysis. Some of theseexperiences are partly or wholly basedupon empirically acquired knowledge.The mere inspection of many half-smoked cigarettes in an ashtray wouldsuggest no connection with nervous ten-sion to a visitor from a planet inhabitedby non-smokers. The letters EVVIVAGUERRA and EVVIVA DON PIOscribbled all over the walls of an Italianvillage will reveal the mentality of thenatives only to someone who happens toknow that these words pay homage to achampion cyclist and the village priest.For the purpose of the present paper, theuse of past experience for the interpreta-tion of perceptual observations will beexcluded from the field of expression andreferred to the psychology of learning.We shall be concerned only with in-stances in which, according to Gestaltpsychology, sensory data contain a coreof expression that is perceptually selfevident. The way a person keeps hislips tightly closed or raises his voice or

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  • THE GESTALT THEORY OF EXPRESSION 157

    strokes a child's head or walks hesitat-ingly is said to contain factors whosemeaning can be understood directlythrough mere inspection. Instances ofsuch direct expression are not limited tothe appearance and behavior of the sub-ject's own body. They are also found insuch 'projective' material as the stirringred of a woman's favorite dress or the'emotional' character of the music sheprefers. In addition, inanimate objectsare said to convey direct expression.The aggressive stroke of lightning or thesoothing rhythm of rain impress the ob-server by perceptual qualities which ac-cording to Gestalt psychology must bedistinguished theoretically from the ef-fect of what he knows about the natureof these happenings. It is assumed,however, that practically every concreteexperience combines factors of bothkinds.

    Procedures and findings. What is ex-pression, and what enables the observerto experience it? By means of whichperceptual factors and in what way dostimulus configurations evoke such ex-periences in the onlooker? During thelast twenty-five years or so, numerousexperimental investigations have beendevoted to the phenomena of expression,but hardly any of them have tried to an-swer our questions. Limited as theywere to the connection between how aperson behaves and what happens in himpsychologically, they centered upon thecertainly important problem: To whatextent are observers, untrained ortrained, gifted or average, capable ofgetting valid information about a per-son's temporary state of mind or hismore permanent psychical constitutionfrom an inspection of his face, voice,gait, handwriting, etc.?

    This is true for the various matching-experiments, which are convenientlysummarized by Woodworth (24, pp.242-256) and by Allport and Vernon(1, pp. 3-20). Similarly, in the field of

    the projective techniques psychologistshave looked for correlations betweenpersonality traits and reactions to envi-ronmental stimuli, Almost invariably,these stimuli contain factors of the kindwhich concern the present paper. How-ever, thus far, little explicit discussionhas been devoted to the question whyand how the given percepts provoke theobserved reactions. There is evidencethat the whole structure of a face ratherthan the sum of its parts determines ex-pression (2). But which structuralfeatures make for what expression andwhy? In the Rorschach test, the typicalreactions to color are probably based onexpression. But why are emotional at-titudes related to color rather thanshape? Ernest G. Schachtel has donepioneer work in this fieldj pointing out,for instance, that responses to colorsand to affect-experiences are both char-acterized by passive receptivity (19).On the whole, however, questions of thiskind have been answered thus far bysummary and scantily supported theo-retical assertions.

    A few remarks are in order on the in-vestigations which have tested the ac-complishments of observers. A glanceat the results reveals a curious contrast.One group of experimenters reports es-sentially negative findings. Another,consisting mainly of Gestalt psycholo-gists, asserts that observers judge por-traits, handwritings, and similar materialwith a measure of success that clearlysurpasses chance. Pessimistic generaliza-tions have been drawn from the studiesof the first type. The subject of expres-sion is sometimes treated with the buoy-ant unkindness that distinguished theearly behavioristic statements on intro-spection. This attitude has not encour-aged research.

    The main reason for the conflictingresults can be found in differences ofapproach. The investigators of the firsttype asked: How validly can the bodily

  • 158 RUDOLF AENHEIM

    expression of the average person or of arandom member of a particular groupof people be interpreted? In otherwords, they focussed on the importantpractical question of the extent to whichexpression can be relied upon in every-day life. On the other hand, the Gestaltpsychologists preferred the common sci-entific procedure of purifying as care-fully as possible the phenomenon underinvestigation. They searched for themost favorable condition of observation.A major part of their efforts was spentin selecting and preparing sets of speci-mens which promised to demonstrate ex-pression clearly and strongly (2, p. 8).

    Some of the factors which may ac-count for the often disappointing resultsobtained in experiments with randommaterial are the following, (a) Every-day observation suggests that the struc-tural patterns of character, tempera-ment, mood, are not equally clear-cut inall people. While some individuals arepronouncedly depressed or lighthearted,strong pr weak, harmonious or dishar-monious, warm or cold, others strike usas indefinite, lukewarm, fluid. What-ever the exact nature of such indefinite-ness, one would expect the correspondingfaces, gestures, handwritings to beequally vague in- form and therefore inexpression. When one examines ma-terial of this kind, one notices in somecases that the decisive structural fea-tures are not sharply denned. In othercases, factors which are clear-cut inthemselves add up to something thatshows neither harmony nor conflict buta lack of unity or relatedness, whichrenders the whole meaningless, inexpres-sive. Many telling examples can befound among the composite faces madeup by the summation of unrelated partsfor experimental purposes. If observerscan cope with such material at all, theydo so presumably by guessing whatthese artifacts are meant to mean ratherthan by having the experience of live

    expression, (b) The presence of a por-trait photographer's camera tends toparalyze a person's expression, and hebecomes self-conscious, inhibited, andoften strikes an unnatural pose, (c)Candid shots are momentary phases iso-lated from a temporal process and a spa-tial context. Sometimes they are highlyexpressive and representative of thewhole from which they are taken. Fre-quently they are not. Furthermore theangle from which a shot is made, theeffect of lighting on shape, the renderingof brightness and color values, as wellas modifications through retouching, arefactors which make it impossible to ac-cept a random photograph as a validlikeness, (d) If for purposes of match-ing experiments a number of samples iscombined at random, accidental similar-ities of expression may occur, which will.make distinction difficult, even thoughevery specimen may be clear-cut in it-self. Further reasons for the lack ofconsistent results are discussed byWolff (23, p. 7).1

    The conclusion seems to be that therecognition of expression has beenproven to be reliable and valid underoptimal conditions. For the averageface, voice, gesture, handwriting, etc.,the results are likely to be less positive.However, in order to establish this facttrustworthily, the additional obstacles

    1 Since there is no reason to expect that

    every photograph will reproduce essential fea-tures of expression, it would be interesting toknow by which criterion the photographs forthe Szondy-test (18) have been selected. Ifan integral feature of the test consists in estab-lishing the reactions of people to the person-alities of homosexuals, sadistic murderers, etc.,two questions arise. (1) Is there a completecorrelation between these pathological mani-festations and certain clear-cut personalitystructures? (2) Are the latter suitably ex-pressed in the photographs? These problemsare avoided if the test is meant simply to in-vestigate people's responses to a given set ofportraits, whatever their origin.

  • THE GESTALT THEORY OF EXPRESSION 159

    created by unsuitable experimental con-ditions will have to be reduced.

    Associationist theories. What enablesobservers to judge expression? The tra-ditional theory, handed down to our gen-eration without much questioning, isbased on associationism. In his essayon vision Berkeley (4, 65) discussesthe way in which one sees shame oranger in the looks of a man."Those passions are themselves invisible:they are nevertheless let in by the eyealong with colours and alterations of coun-tenance, which are the immediate object ofvision, and which signify them for no otherreason than barely because they have beenobserved to accompany them: withoutwhich experience, we should no more havetaken blushing for a sign of shame, thanof gladness."

    Darwin, in his book on the expressionof emotions, devoted a few pages to thesame problem (7, pp. 3S6-3S9). Heconsidered the recognition of expressionto be either instinctive or learned."Children, no doubt, would soon learnthe movements of expression in theirelders in the same manner as animalslearn those of man," namely, "throughtheir associating harsh or kind treatmentwith our actions.""Moreover, when a child cries or laughs,he knows in a general manner what he isdoing and what he feels; so that a verysmall exertion of reason would tell himwhat crying or laughing meant in others.But the question is, do our children acquiretheir knowledge of expression solely by ex-perience through the power of associationand reason? As most of the movements ofexpression must have been gradually ac-quired, afterwards becoming instinctive,there seems to be some degree of a prioriprobability that their recognition wouldlikewise have become instinctive."

    In Darwin's view, the relationship be-tween expressive bodily behavior andthe corresponding psychical attitude wasmerely causal. Expressive gestures were

    either remnants of originally serviceablehabits or due to 'direct action of thenervous system.' He saw no inner kin-ship between a particular pattern ofmuscular behavior and the correlatedstate of mind.

    A variation of the associationist theorycontends that judgments of expressionare based on stereotypes. In this view,interpretation does not rely on what be-longs together according to our spon-taneous insight or repeated observationbut on conventions, which we haveadopted ready-made from our socialgroup. We have been told that acqui-line noses indicate courage and thatprotruding lips betray sensuality. Thepromoters of the theory generally implythat such judgments are wrong, asthough information not based on first-hand experience could never be trusted.Actually, the danger does not lie in thesocial origin of the information. Whatcounts is that people have a tendency toacquire simply structured concepts onthe basis of insufficient evidence, whichmay have been gathered first-hand orsecond-hand, and to preserve these con-cepts unchanged in the face of contraryfacts. While this may make for manyonesided or entirely wrong evaluationsof individuals and groups of people, theexistence of stereotypes does not explainthe origin of physiognomic judgments.If these judgments stem from tradition,what is the tradition's source? Are theyright or wrong? Even though often mis-applied, traditional interpretations ofphysique and behavior may still bebased on sound observation. In fact,perhaps they are so hardy because theyare so true.

    Empathy. The theory of empathyholds an intermediate position betweenthe traditional and a more modern ap-proach. This theory is often formulatedas a mere extension of the associationtheory, designed to take care of the ex-pression of inanimate objects. When I

  • 160 RUDOLF AENHEIM

    look at the columns of a temple, I knowfrom past experience the kind of me-chanical pressure and counterpressurethat occurs in the column. Equallyfrom past experience I know how Ishould feel myself if I were in the placeof the column and if those physicalforces acted upon and within my ownbody. I project my feelings into the col-umn and by such animation endow itwith expression. Lipps, who developedthe theory, stated that empathy is basedon association (16, p. 434). It is true,he also says, that the kind of associa-tion in question connects "two things be-longing together, or being combined bynecessity, the one being immediatelygiven in and with the other." But heseems to have conceived of this innernecessity as a merely causal connection,because immediately after the statementjust quoted he denies explicitly that therelationship between the bodily expres-sion of anger and the angry person'spsychical experience could be describedas an "association of similarity, identity,correspondence" (p. 435). Like Darwin,Lipps saw no intrinsic kinship betweenperceptual appearance and the physicaland psychological forces 'behind' it.However, he did see a structural simi-larity between physical and psycholog-ical forces in other respects. After dis-cussing the mechanical forces whose ex-istence in an inanimate object is inferredby the observer through past experience,Lipps writes the following remarkablepassage:

    "And to (the knowledge of these mechan-ical forces) is furthermore attached therepresentation of possible internal ways ofbehavior of my own, which do not lead tothe same result but are of the same charac-ter. In other words, there is attached therepresentation of possible kinds of my ownactivity, which in an analogous fashion, in-volves forces, impulses, or tendencies,

    freely at work or inhibited, a yielding toexternal effect, overcoming of resistance,the arising and resolving of tensions amongimpulses, etc. Those forces and effects offorces appear in the light of my own waysof behavior, my own kinds of activity, im-pulses, and tendencies and their ways ofrealization" (16, p. 439).

    Thus Lipps anticipated the Gestaltprinciple of isomorphism for the rela-tionship between the physical forces inthe observed object and the psychicaldynamics in the observer; and in a sub-sequent section of the same paper he ap-plies the 'association of similarity ofcharacter' even to the relationship be-tween the perceived rhythm of musicaltones and the rhythm of other psychicalprocesses that occur in the listener.Which means that in the case of at leastone structural characteristic, namelyrhythm, Lipps realized a possible innersimilarity of perceptual patterns and theexpressive meaning they convey to theobserver.

    The Gestalt approach. The Gestalttheory of expression admits that corre-spondences between physical and psy-chical behavior can be discovered on thebasis of mere statistical correlation butmaintains that repeated association isneither the only nor the common meansof arriving at an understanding of ex-pression. Gestalt psychologists hold thatexpressive behavior reveals its meaningdirectly in perception. The approach isbased on the principle of isomorphism;according to which processes which takeplace in different media may be never-theless similar in their structural organ-ization. Applied to body and mind, thismeans that if the forces which determinebodily behavior are structurally similarto those which characterize the corre-sponding mental states, it may becomeunderstandable why psychical meaningcan be read off directly from a person'sappearance and conduct.

    It is not the aim of this paper to prove

  • THE GESTALT THEORY OF EXPRESSION 161

    TABLE 1 iISOMORPHIC LEVELS

    A. Observed PersonI. State of mind psychologicalII. Neural correlate of I electro-chemicalIII. Muscular forces mechanicalIV. Kinesthetic correlate of III psychologicalV. Shape and movement of body geometrical

    B. ObserverVI. Retinal projection of V geometricalVII. Cortical projection of VI electro-chemicalVIII. Perceptual correlate of VII psychological

    the validity of the Gestalt hypothesis.2We shall limit ourselves to pointing outsome of its 'implications. Only briefpresentations of the theory are availableso far. However, Kohler's (12, pp.216-247) and Koffka's (10, pp. 654-661) remarks about the subject are ex-plicit enough to indicate that isomor-phism on only two levels, namely thepsychical processes which occur in theobserved person, and the correspondingbehavioral activity, would be insufficientto explain direct understanding of ex-pression through perception. In the fol-lowing an attempt will be made to lista number of psychological and physicallevels, in the observed person and in theobserver, at which isomorphic structuresmust exist in order to make the Gestaltexplanation possible.

    Let us suppose that a person A per-forms a 'gentle' gesture, which is experi-enced as such by an observer B. On thebasis of psycho-physical parallelism in

    2 For that purpose, observations of infants

    are relevant. Even in his day, Darwin waspuzzled by the fact that young children seemeddirectly to understand a smile or grief "atmuch too early an age to have learnt anythingby experience" (7, p. 3S8). According toBiihler (6, p. 377), "the baby of three or fourmonths reacts positively to the angry as wellas to the kind voice and look; the five-to-seven-months-old baby reflects the assumedexpression and also begins to cry at the scold-ing voice and threatening gesture" on the basisof 'direct sensory influence.' Further evi-dence will have to come from detailed demon-strations of structural similarities. (Cf. p. 169.)

    its Gestalt version it would be assumedthat the tenderness of A's feeling (Table1, level I) corresponds to a hypotheticalprocess in A's nervous system (level II),and that the two processes, the psychicaland the physiological, are isomorphic,that is to say, similar in structure.

    The neural process will direct themuscular forces which produce the ges-ture of A's arm and hand (level III).Again it must be assumed that the par-ticular dynamic pattern of mechanicalaction and inhibition in A's muscles cor-responds structurally to the configura-tion of physiological and psychical forcesat the levels II and I. The muscularaction will be accompanied with a kines-thetic experience (level IV), which againmust be isomorphic with the other levels.The kinesthetic experience need not al-ways take place and is not strictly in-dispensable. However, the structuralkinship of the experienced gentleness ofhis gesture and the equally experiencedgentleness of his mood will make A feelthat his gesture is a fitting manifestationof his state of mind.

    Finally, the muscular forces of levelIII will cause A's arm and hand to movein a, say, parabolic curve (level V); andagain the geometric formation of thiscurve Would have to be isomorphic withthe structure of the processes at the pre-vious levels. An elementary geometricalexample may illustrate the meaning ofthis statement. Geometrically, a circleis the result of just one structural condi-

  • 162 RUDOLF AENHEIM

    tion. It is the locus of , all points thatare equally distant from one center. Aparabola satisfies two such conditions.It is the locus of all points that haveequal distance from one point and onestraight line. The parabola may becalled a compromise between two struc-tural demands. Either structural condi-tion yields to the other.3 Is there anypossible connection between these geo-metrical characteristics of the parabolaand the particular configuration of phys-ical forces to which we attribute gentle-ness? One may point to the kind ofphysical process that produces parabolicpatterns. In ballistics, for instance, theparabolic curve of a trajectory is the re-sult of a 'compromise' between the direc-tion of the original impulse and thegravitational attraction. The two forces'yield' to each other.4

    At this point the description mustshift from the observed person A to theobserver B. B's eyes receive an image(level VI) of the gesture performed byA's arm and hand. Why should this

    3 One can express this also in terms of pro-

    jective geometry by saying that the parabolaas a conic section is intermediate between thehorizontal section, namely the circle, and thevertical section, the straight-edged triangle.

    4 One of the principles on which the analysis

    of handwritings is based indicates that thescript pattern reflects dynamic features of thewriter's motor behavior, which in turn is pro-duced by a characteristic configuration of mus-cular forces. The same isomorphism of mus-cular behavior and resulting visible trace hasfound applications in the technique of drawing.Langfeld (15, p. 129) quotes Bowie (5, pp.35 and 77-79) concerning the principle of 'liv-ing movement' (Set Do) in Japanese painting:"A distinguishing feature in Japanese paintingis the strength of the brush stroke, technicallycalled fude no chikara or fude no ikioi. Whenrepresenting an object suggesting strength,such, for instance, as rocky cliff, the beak ortalons of a bird, the tiger's claws, or the limbsarid branches of a tree, the moment the brush"is applied the sentiment of strength must beinvoked and felt throughout the artist's sys-tem and imparted through his arm and handto the brush, and so transmitted into the ob-ject painted."

    image produce in B the impression thathe is observing a gentle gesture? It maybe true that the geometrical pattern ofthe gesture as well as the configurationof muscular forces which has createdthis pattern can both be characterizedstructurally as containing compromise,flexibility, yielding. But.this fact in it-self is not sufficient to explain the directexperience which B is said to receive byhis perceptual observation. It becomesclear at this point that the Gestalt the-ory of expression is faced not only withthe problem of showing how psychicalprocesses can be inferred from bodilybehavior, but that the primary task con-sists in making plausible the fact thatthe perception of shape, movement, etc.may convey to the observer the directexperience of an expression which isstructurally similar to the organizationof the observed stimulus pattern.

    A's gesture is projected on the retinaeof B's eyes 5 and, by way of the retinalimages, on the visual cortex of B's cer-ebrum (level VII). Correspondingly, Bperceives A's gesture (level VIII). Isthere a possible similarity of the geomet-rical structure of the stimulus configura-tion and the structure of the expressionwhich it conveys to the observer? Wemay go back to our mathematical anal-ysis of the circle and the parabola. Sim-ple experiments confirm what artistsknow from experience, namely that acircular curve looks 'harder,' less flex-

    5 At this stage a number of factors may in-

    terfere with the adequate projection of de-cisive characteristics of body A on the recep-tor organ of B. In our specific example it willdepend, for instance, on the angle of projec-tion, whether or not the perspective retinalimage will preserve the essential structuralfeatures of the parabolic movement or trans-form it into a stimulus trace of unclear orclearly different structure. (In photographsand motion pictures such factors influence thekind of expression obtained from the repro-duction of physical objects.) Similar factorswill influence the veracity of other perceptualqualities which carry, expression.

  • THE GESTALT THEORY OF EXPRESSION 163

    ible, than a parabolic one. In compari-son with the circle the parabola looksmore gentle. One could try to explainthis finding by assuming that the ob-server knows, through past experience,the geometrical characteristics of suchpatterns or the nature of the physicalforces which frequently produce them.This would take us back to the associa-tionist theory. Along Gestalt lines an-other explanation suggests itself.

    The projection of the perceptual stim-ulus on the visual cortex can be assumedto create a configuration of electro-chemical forces in the cerebral field.The well-known Gestalt experiments inperception suggest that retinal stimula-tions are subjected to organizationalprocesses when they reach the corticallevel. As a result of these processes theelements of visual patterns are perceivedas being grouped according to Wer-theimer's rules. Furthermore, any visualpattern appears as an organized whole,in which some predominant elements de-termine the overall shape and the direc-tions of the main axes, while others havesubordinate functions. For the samereasons, modifications of objective shapeand size are perceived under certainconditions.

    It will be observed that all these ex-perimental findings focus upon the ef-fects of the strains and stresses whichorganize the cortical field. Is there anyreason to assume that only the effects ofthese dynamic processes, namely thegroupings, the hierarchies of structuralfunctions, and the modifications of shapeand size, are reflected in perceptual ex-perience? Why should not the strainsand stresses of the cortical forces them-selves also have their psychologicalcounterpart? It seems plausible thatthey represent the physiological equiva-lent of what is experienced as expression.

    Such a theory would make expressionan integral part of the elementary proc-esses of perception. Expression, then,

    could be defined as the psychologicalcounterpart of the dynamic processeswhich result in the organization of per-ceptual stimuli. While concrete verifi-cation is obviously far away, the basicassumption has gained in concretenesssince Kohler and Wallach (14) have ex-plained phenomena of perceptual size,shape and location through the action ofelectro-chemical forces. The future willshow whether the theory can be ex-tended to covering the phenomena ofexpression.

    It is possible now to return to thequestion of how the perception of shape,movement, etc. may convey to an obser-ver the direct experience of an expres-sion which is structurally similar to theorganization of the observed stimuluspattern. We referred previously to theconstellations of physical forces whichwill induce an object to pursue a para-bolic path. The physicist may be ableto tell whether the example from ballis-tics is invertible. Will a parabolic pat-tern, such as the one projected on thecortical field, under certain conditionsset off a configuration of forces whichcontains the structural factors of 'com-promise' or 'yielding'? If so, isomor-phism of the cortical forces and those de-scribed as levels IV could be estab-lished.

    This brings the description of iso-morphic levels to an end. If the presen-tation is correct, the Gestalt-theoreticalthesis would imply that an observer willadequately gauge another person's stateof mind by inspection of that person'sbodily appearance if the psychical sit-uation of the observed person and theperceptual experience of the observerare structurally similar by means of anumber of intermediate isomorphiclevels.

    Expression as a perceptual quality.The definition which was given abovesuggests that expression is an integralpart of the elementary perceptual proc-

  • 164 RUDOLF ARNHEIM

    ess. This should not come as a surprise.Perception is a mere instrument for theregistration of color, shape, sound, etc.only as long as it is considered in, isola-tion from the organism, of which it is apart. In its proper biological context,perception appears as the means bywhich the organism obtains informationabout the friendly, hostile, or otherwiserelevant environmental forces to whichit must react. These forces reveal them-selves most directly by what is describedhere as expression.

    There is psychological evidence tobear out this contention. In fact, theobservations on primitives and childrencited by Werner (21, pp. 67-82) andKohler (13) indicate that 'physiog-nomic qualities/ as Werner calls them,are even more directly perceived thanthe 'geometric-technical' qualities ofsize, shape or movement. Expressionseems to be the primary content of per-ception. To register a fire as merely aset of hues and shapes in motion ratherthan to experience primarily the excitingviolence of the flames presupposes a veryspecific, rare and artificial attitude.Even though the practical importance of,and hence the alertness to, expression hasdecreased in our culture, it cannot bemaintained that a basic change hastaken place in this respect. Darwin(7, pp. 359-360) noted that peoplesometimes observe and describe facialexpression without being able to indicatethe features of form, size, direction, etc.which carry it. In experimental work,one notices that even with the object di-rectly in front of their eyes, subjects findit a hard and uncomfortable task to takenote of the formal pattern. They con-stantly fall back upon the expressivecharacteristics, which they describefreely and naturally. Everyday experi-ence shows that people may clearly re-call the expression of persons or objectswithout being able to indicate color orshape. Asch observes: "Long before one

    has realized that the color of the scenehas changed, one may feel that the char-acter of the scene has undergone change"(3, p. 85). Finally, there is the factthat the artist's, writer's, musician's ap-proach to their subject is principallyguided by expression.6

    Generalized theory. Thus far, thephenomenon of expression has been dis-cussed essentially in its best known as-pect, namely, as a physical manifestationof psychical processes. However, someof the foregoing considerations impliedthat expression is a more universal phe-nomenon. Expression does not only ex-ist when there is a mind 'behind' it, apuppeteer that pulls the strings. Ex-pression is not limited to living organ-isms, which possess consciousness. Aflame, a tumbling leaf, the wailing of asiren, a willow tree, a steep rock, a LouisXV chair, the cracks in a wall, thewarmth of a glazed teapot, a hedgehog'sthorny back, the colors Of a sunset, aflowing fountain, lightning and thunder,the jerky movements of a bent piece ofwirethey all convey expression throughthe various senses. The importance ofthis fact has been concealed by the pop-ular hypothesis that in such cases humanexpression is merely transferred to ob-jects. If, however, expression is an in-herent characteristic of perceptual fac-tors, it becomes unlikely that non-humanexpression should be nothing but an an-thropomorphism, a 'pathetic fallacy.'Rather will human expression have tobe considered a special case of a moregeneral phenomenon. The comparison

    - of an object's expression with a humanstate of mind is a secondary process (cf.p. 165). A weeping willow does not looksad because it looks like a sad person.It is more adequate to state that sincethe shape, direction and flexibility ofwillow branches convey the expressionof passive hanging, a comparison with

    6 This has led to the erroneous notion that

    all perception of expression is aesthetic.

  • THE GESTALT THEORY OF EXPRESSION 165

    the structurally similar psycho-physicalpattern of sadness in humans may im-pose itself secondarily.

    Expression is sometimes described as'perceiving with imagination.' In doingso Gottshalk (9) explains that "some-thing is perceived as if it were actuallypresent in the object of perception, al-though literally it is only suggested andnot actually there. Music is not literallysad or gay or gentle; only sentient crea-tures or creatures with feeling, such ashuman beings, could be that." If ourlanguage possessed more words whichcould refer to kinds of expression assuch, instead of naming them after emo-tional states in which they find an im-portant application, it would becomeapparent that the phenomenon in ques-tion is "actually present in the object ofperception" and not merely associatedwith it by imagination.

    Even with regard to human behavior,the connection of expression with a cor-responding state of mind is not as com-pelling and indispensable as is sometimestaken for granted: Kohler (12, pp.260-264) has pointed out that peoplenormally deal with and react to the ex-pressive physical behavior in itself ratherthan being conscious of the psychicalexperiences reflected by such behavior.We perceive the slow, listless, 'droopy'movements of one person as against thebrisk, straight, vigorous movements ofanother, but do not necessarily go be-yond the meaning of such appearance bythinking explicitly of the psychical wear-iness or alertness behind it. Wearinessand alertness are already contained inthe physical behavior itself; they arenot distinguished in any essential wayfrom the weariness of slowly floating taror the energetic ringing of the telephonebell.

    This broader conception has practicalconsequences. It suggests, for instance,that the phenomenon of expression doesnot belong primarily under the heading

    of the emotions or personality, where itis commonly treated. It is true that thegreat contributions which the study ofexpression has in store for these fieldsof psychology are thus far almost un-tapped. However, the experience of thelast decades shows that little progress ismade unless the nature of expression it-self is clarified first.7

    Secondary effects. Strictly speaking,the phenomenon of expression is limitedto the levels V-VIII of Table 1. Thatis, the term 'expression,' as used in thispaper, refers to an experience whichtakes place when a sensory stimulus af-fects the visual cortex of an observer'sbrain. The processes which may havegiven rise to the stimulus as well asthose which the cortical stimulation pro-vokes in other brain centers are supple-mentary.

    Once perceptual stimulation has takenplace, a number of secondary happeningsmay follow. (1) The observer B maydeduce from the expression of B's bod-ily behavior that particular psychicalprocesses are going on in A's mind; thatis, through the perception of level V theobserver gains knowledge about level I.The observation of a gentle gesture leadsto the conclusion: B is in a gentle mood.This conclusion may be based on an iso-morphic similarity between the observedbehavior and a state of mind known orimaginable to the observer. In othercases, the conclusion may rely on pastexperience. Yawning, for instance, con-veys the direct expression of sudden ex-pansion; but the connection betweenyawning and fatigue or boredom is dis-covered by learning. The same seems tobe true for the spasmodic outbursts ofsound which we call laughter and which

    7 Once this is done, it will be possible and

    necessary to approach the further problem ofthe influences which the total personality ex-erts upon the observation of expression. ToVincent van Gogh, cypress trees conveyed anexpression which they do not have for manyother people. Cf. Koffka (10, p. 600).

  • 166 RUDOLF ARNHEIM

    in themselves are so far from suggestingmirth that they remain permanently in-comprehensible to the chimpanzee, whootherwise "at once correctly interpretsthe slightest change of human expres-sion, whether menacing or friendly" (11,p. 307). It is important to realize thatan expression may be correctly perceivedand described, yet the inferences derivedfrom it may be wrong. If, in an experi-ment, 80 per cent of the observers agreeon an 'erroneous' attribution, it is notsufficient to dismiss the result as an in-stance of failure. The high amount ofagreement represents a psychologicalfact in its own right. The reliability ofthe observers' responses to a perceptualstimulus is a problem quite differentfrom the validity of such responses, i.e.,the question whether the observers' diag-nosis is 'true.'

    (2) The observed expression maybring about the corresponding state ofmind in B. In perceiving A's gentle be-havior, the observer himself may experi-ence a feeling of tenderness. (Lippsspeaks of 'sympathetic empathy' as dis-tinguished from 'simple empathy' 16, p.417). (3) The observed expression mayprovoke the corresponding kinestheticexperience, e.g., a feeling of relaxed soft-ness. The effects described under (2)and (3) may be instances of a kind of'resonance' based on isomorphism. Justas a sound calls forth a vibration of sim-ilar frequency in a string, various levelsof psychological experience, such as thevisual, the kinesthetic, the emotionalseem to elicit in each other sensations ofsimilar structure. (4) The perceivedexpression may remind B of other obser-vations in which a similar expressionplayed a role. Thus past experience isconsidered here not as the basis for theapperception of expression; instead, thedirect observation of expression becomesthe basis for comparison with similar ob-servations in the past.

    The role of past experience. While

    there is no evidence to support the hy-pothesis that the central phenomenon ofexpression is based on learning, it isworth noting that in most cases the in-terpretation of the perceived expressionis influenced by what is known about theperson or object in question and aboutthe context in which it appears. Mereinspection will produce little more thanoverall impressions of the forces at work,strong and clear-cut as such an experi-ence may be. Increasing knowledge willlead to more differentiated interpreta-tions, which will take the particular con-text into account. (As an example, onemay think of the expression conveyedby the behavior of an animal whose hab-its one does not know and the changesthat occur with closer acquaintance.)Knowledge does not interfere with ex-pression itself, it merely modifies its in-terpretation, except for cases in whichknowledge changes the appearance ofthe carrier of expression, that is, the per-ceptual pattern itself. For instance, aline-figure may change its; perceptualstructure and therefore its expression ifit is suddenly seen as a human figure.A lifted eyebrow is seen as tense becauseit is perceived as a deviation from aknown normal position. The expressionof Mongolian eyes or Negro lips is influ-enced, for a white observer, by the factthat he conceives them as deviationsfrom the normal face of his own race.

    In Gestalt terms, past experience,knowledge, learning, memory are con-sidered as factors of the temporal con-text in which a given phenomenon ap-pears. Like the spatial context, onwhich Gestaltists have concentratedtheir attention during the early develop-ment of the theory, the temporal contextinfluences the way a phenomenon is per-ceived. An object looks big or smalldepending on whether it is seen, spa-tially, in the company of smaller orlarger objects. The same is true for thetemporal context. The buildings of a

  • THE GESTALT THEORY OF EXPRESSION 167

    middle-sized town look tall to a farmer,small to a New Yorker, and correspond-ingly their expression differs for the twoobservers. Mozart's music may appearserene and cheerful to a modern listener,who perceives it in the temporal contextof twentieth-century music, whereas itconveyed the expression of violent pas-sion and desperate suffering to his con-temporaries against the background ofthe music they knew. Such examples donot demonstrate that there is no intrinsicconnection between perceptual patternsand the expression they convey but sim-ply that experiences must not be evalu-ated in isolation from their spatial andtemporal whole-context.

    Knowledge often merges with directlyperceived expression into a more com-plex experience. When we observe thegentle curve of a coachman's whip whilebeing aware at the same time of the ag-gressive use of the object, the resultingexperience clearly contains an element ofcontradiction. Such contradictions areexploited by artists; compare, in motionpictures, the uncanny effect of the mur-derer who moves softly and speaks witha velvety voice.

    Finally, the perceptual experience ofexpression can be influenced by the kindof training which in artistic and musicalinstruction is known as making students'see' and 'hear.' By opening people'seyes and ears to what is directly per-ceivable, they can be made to scan thegiven sensory pattern more adequatelyand thus to receive a fuller experience ofits expression. A neglected or misledcapacity for responding perceptually canbe revived or corrected.

    The role of kinesthesia. Frequentlypeople feel that another person, whomthey are observing, behaves physicallythe way they themselves have behavedbefore. They get this impression eventhough at that time they probably didnot watch themselves in the mirror. Itmay be that they compare their own

    state of mind as they remember it fromthe former occasion with the expressionconveyed by the bodily behavior of theother person and/or with the state ofmind reflected in that behavior. Prob-ably the kinesthetic perception of one'sown muscular behavior plays an impor-tant part in such situations. If muscu-lar behavior and kinesthetic experienceare isomorphic, it becomes explainablewhy at times one is so keenly aware ofone's own facial expression, posture, ges-tures. One may feel, for instance: Rightnow, I look just like my father! Themost convincing example is furnished byactors and dancers, whose bodily per-formance is created essentially throughkinesthetic control. And yet their ges-tures are understandable to the audiencevisually. This suggests that there is avalid correspondence between bodily be-havior and the related kinesthetic per-ception. The problem of what enablesan infant to imitate an observer whosmiles or shows the tip of his tongue be-longs in the same category. Of particu-lar interest is the fact that the blindexpress their feelingseven though im-perfectlyin spite of their inability toobserve expression in others visually.The blind also understand certain ges-tures on the basis of their own kines-thetic experiences.

    "The blind man, like the person who sees,is aware of the gestures he makes whenunder the influence of various emotions.He shrugs his shoulders and raises his armsto express his disdain and amazement. Thesame gestures recognized by him in astatue will evoke within him the samesentiments" (20, p. 320).

    Isomorphism would seem to accountalso for the fact that it often suffices toassume a particular posture (levels IIIarid IV) in order to enter into a corre-sponding state of mind (level I). Bend-ing the head and folding the hands ismore than an accidentally chosen pos-

  • 168 RUDOLF AKNHEIM

    ture of praying, which derives its mean-ing merely from tradition. The kines-thetic sensation which accompanies thisposture is structurally akin to the psy-chical attitude called devotion. 'Bow-ing' to a superior power's will is a men-tal condition so directly related to thecorresponding bodily gesture that itscommon linguistic description uses thephysical to describe the psychological.Rituals not only express what peoplefeel but also help them to feel the waythe situation requires. By straighteningour backbones we produce a muscularsensation which is akin to the attitude ofpride, and thus introduce into our stateof mind a noticeable element of boldself-sufficiency.8

    Even the 'practical' motor activitiesare accompanied more or less stronglyby structurally corresponding states ofmind. For instance, hitting or breakingthings normally seems to evoke the emo-tional overtone of attack. To assertmerely that this is so because people areaggressive would be an evasion of theproblem. But if the dynamic characterof the kinesthetic sensation which ac-companies hitting and breaking re-sembles the emotional dynamics of at-tack, then the one may be expected toevoke the otherby 'resonance' (cj. p.166). (This kinship makes it possiblefor aggressiveness, wherever it exists, toexpress itself through such motor acts.)Probably this parallelism holds true forall motor activity. Muscular behaviorsuch as grasping, yielding, lifting,straightening, smoothing, loosening,bending, running, stopping seems to pro-duce mental resonance effects constantly.(In consequence, language uses all ofthem metaphorically to describe states

    8 James's theory of emotion is based on

    a sound psychological observation. It failswhere it identifies the kinesthetic sensationwith the total emotional experience instead ofdescribing it as a component which reinforcesand sometimes provokes emotion because ofthe structural similarity of the two.

    of mind.) The psychosomatic phenom-ena of pathological 'organ-speech' ("Icannot stomach this!") may be consid-ered the most dramatic examples of auniversal interdependence. The rangeand the importance of the phenomenonare not acknowledged as long as onestudies expression only in motor activ-ties that are not, or not any more, serv-iceable. It seems safe to assert that allmotor acts are expressive, even thoughin different degrees, and that they allcarry the experience of correspondinghigher mental processes, if ever so faint-ly. Therefore, it is inadequate to de-scribe expressive movements as mereatavisms, the way Darwin did. Theyare physical acts which take place be-cause of their inner correspondence withthe state of mind of the person who per-forms them. To use one of Darwin'sexamples: a person who coughs in em-barrassment is not simply the victim ofa meaningless association between a stateof mind and a physical reaction, whichwas or can be serviceable under similarcircumstances. Rather does he producea reaction which he experiences to bemeaningfully related to his state ofmind. The bodily accompaniment com-pletes the mental reaction. Togetherthey form an act of total psycho-physicalbehavior. The human organism alwaysfunctions as a whole, physically andpsychically.

    This view permits an application tothe theory of art. It highlights the in-timate connection of artistic and 'prac-tical' behavior. The dancer, for in-stance, does not have to endow move-ments with a symbolic meaning forartistic purposes, but uses in an artis-tically organized way the unity of psy-chical and physical reaction which ischaracteristic for human functioning ingeneral.

    In a broader sense, it is the directexpressiveness of all perceptual quali-ties which allows the artist to convey

  • THE GESTALT THEORY OF EXPRESSION 169

    the effects of the most universal and ab-stract psycho-physical forces throughthe presentation of individual, concreteobjects and happenings. While paintinga pine tree, he can rely on the expressionof towering and spreading which thistree conveys whenever it is seen by ahuman eye, and thus can span in hiswork the whole range of existence, fromits most general principles to the tangi-ble manifestations of these principles inindividual objects.

    An illustration. It has been pointedout in the beginning that experimentershave been concerned mostly with thequestion whether and to what extent ob-servers can judge a person's state ofmind from his physical appearance. Inconsequence, the psychological literaturecontains few analyses of perceptual pat-terns with regard to the expression theyconvey. As an example of the kind ofmaterial which is badly needed in thisfield, Efron's study on the gestures oftwo ethnical groups (8) may be cited.He describes the behavior of EasternJews and Southern Italians in NewYork City by analyzing the range,

    speed, plane, coordination, and shapeOf their movements. A comparison of-these findings with the mentalities of thetwo groups would probably produce ex-cellent illustrations of what is meant bythe structural similarity of psychical andphysical behavior. Among the experi-mental investigations, Lundholm's earlystudy (17) may be mentioned. Heasked eight laymen in art to draw lines,each of which was to express the affec-tive tone of an adjective given verbally.It was found, for instance, that onlystraight lines, broken by angles, wereused to represent such adjectives as ex-citing, furious, hard, powerful, whileonly curves were used for sad, quiet,lazy, merry. Upward direction of linesexpressed strength, energy, force; down-ward direction, weakness, lack of energy,relaxation, depression, etc. RecentlyWillmann (22) had thirty-two musi-cians compose short themes, meant toillustrate four abstract designs. Someagreement among the composers wasfound concerning the tempo, meter, me-lodic line, and amount of consonance,chosen to render the characteristics of

    Speed:

    Range:

    Shape:

    Tension:

    Direction:

    Center:

    TABLE 2ANALYSIS OF DANCE MOVEMENTS IMPROVISED BY FIVE

    Sadness: Strength:5: slow 2: slow

    1: very fast1: medium1: decrescendo

    5: small, enclosed

    3: round2: angular

    4: little tension1: inconsistent

    5: indefinite,changing, wavering

    S: passive,pulled downward

    S: large, sweeping

    5: very straight

    5: much tension

    5: precise, sharp,mostly forward

    S: active, centeredin body

    SUBJECTSNight:

    5: slow

    3: small2: large

    5: round

    4: little tension1: decrescendo

    3: indefinite, changing2: mostly downward

    3: passive2: from active to

    passive

  • 170 RUDOLF AENHEIM

    the drawings. Subsequently the de-signs and compositions were used formatching experiments.

    Because of the scarcity of pertinentmaterial, it may be permissible to men-tion here an experiment which is toolimited in the number of cases and toosubjective in its method of recordingand evaluating the data to afford a proofof the thesis we are discussing. It ispresented merely as an example of thekind of research which promises fruit-ful results.9 Five members of the stu-dent dance group of Sarah LawrenceCollege were asked individually to giveimprovisations of the following threesubjects: sadness, strength, night.Rough descriptions of the dance patternswhich resulted were jotted down by theexperimenter and later classified accord-ing to a number of categories. Table 2presents the findings in an abbreviated1form. The numerical agreement is highbut obviously carries little weight. Asa point of method, it may only be men-tioned that instances of disagreementcannot be taken simply to indicate thatthere was no reliable correspondence be-tween task and performance. Some-times, the task allows more than onevalid interpretation. For instance,'strength' expresses itself equally wellin fast and in slow movement. 'Night'is less directly related to one particu-lar dynamic pattern than sadness orstrength.

    Most tempting is the comparison be-tween the movement patterns and thecorresponding psychical processes. Suchcomparison cannot be carried throughwith exactness at this time mainly be-cause psychology has not yet provideda method of describing the dynamics ofstates of mind in a way which wouldbe more exact scientifically than the de-scriptions offered by novelists or every-

    9 The data were collected and tabulated by

    Miss Jane Binney, a student at Sarah Law-rence College.

    day language. Nevertheless, it can beseen from our example that the dynamicpatterns of expressive behavior permitrelatively concrete and exact descrip-tions in terms of speed, range, shape,etc. Even the crudely simplified charac-terizations given in the table seem tosuggest that the motor traits throughwhich the dancers interpreted sadness re-flect the slow, languishing pace of thepsychological processes, the indefinite-ness of aim, the withdrawal from theenvironment, the passivityall of whichdistinguish sadness psychologically. Thefact that expressive behavior is so muchmore readily accessible to concrete sci-entific description than the correspond-ing psychical processes deserves atten-tion. It suggests that in the future thestudy of behavior may well become themethod of choice, when psychologistsundertake the task of reducing emotionsand other psychical processes to config-urations of basic forces. Already theanalysis of handwriting has led to anumber of categories (pressure, size,direction, proportion, etc.) which invitea search for the corresponding psycho-logical concepts.

    Our example will also show why it isfruitless to dismiss the phenomena of ex-pression as 'mere stereotypes.' If it canbe demonstrated that the dynamics ofpsychical and physical processes arestructurally interrelated and that thisinterrelation is perceptually evident, thequestion of whether and to what ex-tent the performance and its interpre-tations are based on social conventionsloses importance.

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    [MS. received October 20, 1948]