George Kennan on Containment Reconsidered

George Kennan on Containment ReconsideredAuthor(s): George F. Kennan and Eduard MarkSource: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Apr., 1978), pp. 643-647Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20039923 .

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COMMENT AND

CORRESPONDENCE

GEORGE KENNAN ON CONTAINMENT RECONSIDERED

To the Editor:

Regarding the exchange of communications between Mr. Mark and Mr.

Gaddis concerning my views as of 1947,1 I have no desire to comment on this

argument. Your readers, so far as I am concerned, may judge it as they like.

But I do not like to have my views misrepresented, and it seems to me that Mr.

Mark has done just that at two points in his treatise.

The first, and less important, is the statement that "In December 1947 (if we

may trust a rapporteur's notes) he contemplated the use of American forces in

Greece." This assertion is not based on any words of my own. It is derived from

the minutes of a joint State-military discussion of the situation in Greece and of

possible courses of action in the event that the communist guerrillas should have

such successes as to threaten a complete takeover of that country. I was strongly averse at all times to any dispatch of American forces, and voiced at this meeting

my misgivings about the suggestion that we should send some. The rapporteur chose unfortunate and somewhat misleading language in summarizing my

views; but an examination of his entire sentence, and not just the first phrase of

it, makes it clear that my words were meant to convey that we should consider

very carefully before embarking on any such course. Here is what the rappor teur said I said: "Mr. Kennan suggested that we should give very careful

consideration to sending American combat troops to Greece, especially if they were to go as part of a mixed United Nations force; we might find ourselves in

a difficult position from which it would be hard to withdraw, and equally hard

to keep other nations from withdrawing the contingents they contributed." Mr.

Mark had no excuse for misinterpreting this passage, for I had explained all

this in a comment on an earlier attack of similar tenor that appeared in the

Slavic Review (March 1976) and with which Mr. Mark was evidently familiar. The other charge is more serious. It is to the effect that on March 15, 1948, I

warned Secretary Marshall that a Russian invasion of Western Europe might be imminent. I had, it is said, previously supposed that the Soviets would avoid a

"military contest" with the United States, but the recent coup in Czechoslovakia had led me to revise that estimate. It now appeared to me "that they might resort to outright conquest."

What Mr. Mark is here referring to was the following. While I was on an

official mission in the Far East, General Lucius Clay, then in Berlin, sent to

Washington a message to the effect that whereas he had previously felt and held

that war was unlikely for at least ten years, he had now, in the past few weeks, felt a subtle change in the Soviet attitude "which I cannot define but which now

gives me a feeling that it may come with dramatic suddenness." This message was relayed to me by the Department of State, with a request for my comment.

I was taken aback by this, for I had not thought there was any such danger. But in the light of the general situation then prevailing in Europe, I found

1 Eduard Mark, "The Question of Containment: A Reply to John Lewis Gaddis," Foreign Affairs,

January 1978, pp. 430-40; John Lewis Gaddis's rejoinder appears on pp. 440-41.



644 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

General Clay's words very disturbing, and was obliged to reckon with the

possibility that things had been happening there, during my absence in the Far

East, of which I was not aware. Here was my reply:

I have always felt that the Russians neither wanted nor expected a military contest

with U.S. and that no military complications were likely to occur in our relations with

them unless: (a) their political fortunes were to advance too rapidly in Europe and

they were to become dizzy with success; or (b) they were to become really alarmed for

security of their power in eastern Europe and to take foolish and precipitate action to

prevent its dissolution.

Strangely enough, in their recent actions in Europe I think there is something of

both these elements. I suspect that many of the European Communists, partially victims of their own propaganda, are excited by recent successes and by prospect of

seizing rich prizes in western Europe. On the other hand, the savage abruptness and

cynical unconcern for appearances of recent action in Czechoslovakia leads me to feel

that Kremlin leaders must be driven by sense of extreme urgency. They probably

realizing that they are basically over-extended in eastern Europe and that unless they can break unity of western Europe and disturb ERP pattern it will be difficult for them to hold on in eastern and central Europe, because resulting material contrast,

added to the incurable desire of all eastern and central European peoples to be

considered part of western civilization, would probably prove decisive in the end.

If this analysis is correct, then there is indeed a real and new element of danger in

present situation, and we must be prepared for all eventualities. Top priority is of

course due to effort to improve our basic military reserve position at home. As far as

Europe is concerned, Italy is obviously key point. If Communists were to win election

there our whole position in Mediterranean, and possibly in western Europe as well,

would probably be undermined. I am persuaded Communists could not win without

strong factor of intimidation on their side, and it would clearly be better that elections

not take place at all than that Communists win in these circumstances.

For these reasons I question whether it would not be preferable for Italian

Government to outlaw Communist Party and take strong action against it before

elections. Communists would presumably reply with civil war, which would give us

grounds for reoccupation Foggia fields or any other facilities we might wish. This

would admittedly result in much violence and probably a military division of Italy; but

we are getting close to the deadline and I think it might well be preferable to a

bloodless election victory, unopposed by ourselves, which would give the Communists

the entire peninsula at one coup and send waves of panic to all surrounding areas.2

In the light of retrospect, I find nothing to be ashamed of in this message. This was a moment of great uncertainty for the Soviet leadership. Unbeknownst to the Western world, they were already in a state of dangerous conflict with

Tito; and my observation that they were basically overextended in Eastern

Europe could not have been more right. They were at that moment preparing to mount the Berlin blockade, as an almost desperate defensive action. On the other hand, that faction, headed by Zhdanov, which saw chances for a peaceful conquest of Western Europe by infiltration and subversion was much excited by the possibility that the Italian Communists might succeed, by various tactics, in

achieving a sufficient success in the Italian elections to capture certain of the key positions in that country.

It was, therefore, indeed a delicate and dangerous moment. But you will

note that not only did the initiative for this message not come from me but there

2 This reply was published in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, III, Washington: GPO, 1974, pp. 848-49.



COMMENT AND CORRESPONDENCE 645

is in it not the slightest reference to any "Russian invasion" of Western Europe; nor did I say that the coup in Czechoslovakia had led me "to revise my estimate" that the Russians neither wanted nor expected a military contest with the United States. I said merely that this coup led me to feel that the Kremlin leaders must

be driven by a sense of extreme urgency, which indeed they were. Finally, the

message made it abundantly clear that I viewed the prospects for a communist

political success in Italy as the principal danger of the moment. I consistently opposed, throughout that period (and ever since), the view that

the Soviet leaders wished to invade, or were planning to invade, Western

Europe. Mr. Mark would have had no difficulty finding, even in the same

volume to which he here refers, clear expressions of this view ?

expressions so

obviously at odds with the impression he has labored to convey that I think he

ought, in all fairness, to have quoted some of them, too. As an example, let me

just cite this passage from a formal Policy Planning Staff paper, drafted by myself, submitted later that same year (November 24, 1948), at a moment of

particular tension in view of the rapid intensification of the Berlin blockade.

A military danger, arising from possible incidents or from prestige engagement of

the Russians and the western powers in the Berlin situation, does exist, and is

probably increasing rather than otherwise. But basic Russian intent still runs to the

conquest of western Europe by political means. In this program, military force plays a major role only as a means of intimidation.

The danger of political conquest is still greater than the military danger. If a war

comes in the foreseeable future, it will probably be one which Moscow did not desire

but did not know how to avoid.3

George F. Kennan The Institute for Advanced Study Princeton, New Jersey

Mr. Mark replies: To consider the documents at issue in Ambassador Kennan's order: 1. I did indeed read his reply to an "earlier attack" in the March 1976 issue of

the Slavic Review. My "excuse" for nonetheless stating that he "contemplated the use of American forces in Greece" is that I was not persuaded by it.

I invite the interested reader's attention to the document in question and bid him observe the following: in the discussion of aid to Greece, Ambassador Kennan asked a general "whether the introduction of a United Nations force to

occupy strategic points in Greece would be effective in enabling the Greek forces to clean up the guerrillas." When the officer replied that it might be good for Greek morale but would prove ultimately ineffective if pressure on Greece

were increased from the north, Kennan then inquired "if it would not be feasible to throw a cordon of foreign troops right across northern Greece." The

general replied that it might in certain circumstances, whereupon another officer and Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett, stated that an American corps of two divisions in Thrace would have a useful effect. At this point in the record there occurs the sentence Ambassador Kennan quotes above ? that "very careful consideration" be given to the sending of American forces, especially if they were to be accompanied by allies. Then we find another the Ambassador chose

3 This, too, was published in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, III, p. 285 ?the same

volume to which Mr. Mark refers.



646 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

not to quote: "He [Kennan] also thought an area in southern Greece, such as the Peloponnesus, might be easier to defend and therefore a better place for

our troops from a strategic point of view.4

Since it was Ambassador Kennan who raised the question of sending troops to Greece, and who evidently thought enough of the idea to restate it when a

difficulty was raised, and even to suggest two locations where American forces

might be deployed, it seems quite reasonable to state that he "contemplated" military intervention in Greece, even though he also discussed some of the

possible political complications that might attend such a course. His denial calls attention only to this latter circumstance and ignores utterly the entire structure of the conversation.

2. Context is again crucial in the case of the second document. In this regard two considerations must be borne in mind. The first is that this message ?as

Ambassador Kennan states above ?was a solicited response to a recent cable

from General Clay, in which that officer stated that various developments had led him to fear that war might come with "dramatic suddenness." The second is that those who feared a war in February-March 1948 believed that it might come

from a rapid Soviet thrust to the west. Swollen Soviet forces in advanced

positions in Germany had generated the concern in Western Europe that led to the signing of the Brussels mutual defense pact on March 17, 1948; the very same day President Truman, moved by a similar fear, asked Congress to reinstitute conscription. The Russian radio, moreover, had been warning West Germans for some months not to cooperate with the United States because "the unavoidable withdrawal of the Allies which will come about very suddenly" would leave them open to reprisals. The Red Army, finally, was known to be

practicing ?and capable of executing ?the rapid occupation of Western Europe in the event of hostilities. There was, in short, a "real war scare" (as the

Ambassador recalled in his memoirs). It was in this superheated atmosphere that Ambassador Kennan was asked to

comment on Clay's warning ?and thereby, of course, on the general situation.

It will be observed that there is not the least effort to urge a calm reassessment nor even the hint of a suggestion that Clay had exaggerated the dangers of the

moment. He rather wrote that he himself, like Clay (see the pr?cis of the

general's telegram given by Ambassador Kennan above), had theretofore

thought a "military contest" or "military complications" with the Soviets unlikely unless either condition (a) or condition (b) developed. Unfortunately, he

continued, both had in some measure matured, and that the United States should be prepared for "all eventualities" and "foolish and precipitate actions"

by the Soviets, such that it should look to its "basic military reserve position at

home." To this last recommendation the Ambassador assigned "top priority." In context, I submit, this document is most plausibly read as a cautious

endorsement of General Clay's concern as well as a specific warning about Italy. The references to the Soviets seem to contemplate dangers beyond an attempt

by the Italian Communists to win an election in their own country, and the

proposed preparations something more than the possible occupation of a few airfields.

As for the charge that I should have cited documents in which the Ambassa dor minimized the likelihood of a Russian attack, I can only say that I was at

pains to show that it was his general opinion that the Soviets would be deterred

4 Memorandum of conversation by John D. Jernegan, December 26, 1947, Foreign Relations of the

United States, 1947, V, Washington: GPO, 1971, pp. 466-69.



COMMENT AND CORRESPONDENCE 647

from such a course by the superior power of the United States, and that as long as they were so deterred the immediate military danger lay in "nominally domestic" civil wars waged by "stooge forces" in such places as Greece and

Korea. (This is a distinction, I might add, that also escaped Professor Gaddis in

his rejoinder to my article.) I am quite prepared, accordingly, to believe that

Ambassador Kennan's fears of March 1948 (assuming the correctness of my

analysis) were atypical, as indeed were those of General Clay and President Truman. Indeed, Ambassador Kennan seems to say almost as much when he

writes, ". . .1 found General Clay's words very disturbing, and was obliged to

reckon with the possibility that things had been happening there [in Europe],

during my absence in the Far East, of which I was not aware."

THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA

To the Editor: Like good debaters, Ambassador Clyde Ferguson and Mr. William Cotter

commence the argument in their article ("South Africa ?What is to be Done") in

your January 1978 issue, by setting the stage in a fashion most favorable for themselves. The issue, as they pose it, is whether the policy of "communication,"

which they say has been dominant in our policy toward South Africa during the

past decade, has a chance of fostering "the major U.S. objective regarding South Africa ?a transition to a just power-sharing with a minimum of violence."

Mr. George Ball is singled out as the most distinguished advocate of "commu

nication," of maintaining and increasing the points of contact and interchange with South African leadership rather than intensifying their sense of isolation and hence their obdurate determination to maintain apartheid.

Mr. Ball's views on this issue are shared by a great number of observers,

including myself, and it appears to be the main purpose of Messrs. Ferguson and Cotter in this article to refute and discredit them. This is achieved by attributing to those in Mr. Ball's camp claims that few if any of them would

make for their preferred strategy of "communication." Furthermore, they point out that the repressions and tightened segregationist restrictions have continued

despite much communication with more democratic countries and during a

period when external pressure was relatively absent. Since "communication"

clearly has not overturned the Nationalists, we should step up the level and

intensity of external pressure through resort to some of the 41 steps that the authors list in their article.

It is important to recognize the assumptions which are made. 1. The authors appear to assume that social and political developments in

South Africa are entirely ?or at least chiefly ?determined by external influ

ences, particularly the actions and pronouncements of Americans. One is reminded of the warning of the British scholar, Denis Brogan, in "Illusion of

American Omnipotence" {Harper's, December 1952), addressed to those in the United States who, in the early 1950s, were debating the issue, "Who Lost China?"

2. They would have us believe that there has been an unmitigated deteriora tion in the status of the non-whites during the past decade, whereas in fact there

has been a very mixed and confusing picture, but with some important indicators showing an improvement. Thus, some of the more humiliating aspects of "petty apartheid" have been removed and blacks are now accepted in

many occupations previously reserved for whites. Afrikaner as well as English



Documents

George Kennan on Containment Reconsidered