FPP § 3708 Page 1 14AA Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3708 ......Federal Practice & Procedure Database updated April 2013 Jurisdiction And Related Matters The Late Charles Alan Wright[a232],

Federal Practice & ProcedureDatabase updated April 2013

Jurisdiction And Related MattersThe Late Charles Alan Wright[a232], Arthur R. Miller[a233], Edward H. Cooper[a234], Vikram David Amar[a235], Richard D. Freer[a236], Helen Hershkoff[a237], Joan E. Steinman [a238], Catherine T. Struve[a239]

Chapter6. Amount In Controversy

Arthur R. Miller[a457]

Link to Monthly Supplemental Service

§ 3708 Amount in Controversy in Particular Cases—Proceedings for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief

Forms

West's Federal Forms §§ 2453 to 2456

As pointed out elsewhere in this Chapter,[1] it is well-settled that the amount in controversy is to bemeasured for subject matter jurisdiction purposes by the value of the right that the plaintiff seeks to enforce or toprotect against the defendant's conduct or the value of the object that is the subject matter of the action.Accordingly, and as well illustrated by the cases from the four corners of the federal judiciary cited in the notebelow, when a person seeks an injunction or other form of specific relief, such as specific performance, it is thevalue to the plaintiff to enjoy the property business, or personal affairs that constitute the subject of the actionfree from the activity sought to be enjoined or the benefit of the conduct requested to be mandated that is theyardstick for measuring whether the amount in controversy requirement has been satisfied.[2] With regard toactions seeking declaratory relief, the amount in controversy is the value of the right or the viability of the legalclaim to be declared, such as a right to indemnification or a duty to defend.[3] There are cases, however, inwhich a federal court has concluded that the value of the requested injunction or declaratory relief is toouncertain or speculative to be considered in calculating the amount in controversy.[4]

As in other contexts, the plaintiff's jurisdictional amount allegation, which is discussed elsewhere,[5] will beaccepted unless it appears to a legal certainty that the amount cannot be recovered. There is some questionwhether the generally accepted good-faith test for determining the sufficiency of the jurisdictional amount isapplicable to injunction suits. For instance, City of Milwaukee v. Saxbe[6] was a case charging the United StatesAttorney General with an alleged discriminatory enforcement of the civil rights laws. The decision was renderedat a time when Section 1331 of Title 28 included an amount in controversy requirement for federal questioncases. In a passage that is an alternative holding at most, the Seventh Circuit expressed the view that the goodfaith test is not applicable in injunction suits because that type of relief may be assessed more accurately at thebeginning of a case than can damages. According to the court of appeals, that is because the value of what is atstake when an injunction is sought is likely to be objective and lead to a fairly well-defined appraisal, butdamages often are far less ascertainable at the outset of a case as is true of matters such as pain and suffering.

FPP § 3708 Page 114AA Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3708 (4th ed.)

© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

But that distinction seems questionable and, at best, a generalization with limited utility in a considerable rangeof cases. Because the amount alleged was challenged in Saxbe, the court concluded that the plaintiff would beobliged to prove that the value of the City's being free of the alleged discriminatory conduct satisfied thejurisdictional amount requirement on remand. Apparent good faith was not enough. Remand was not ordered,however, because the court concluded that the City was not entitled to relief as a substantive matter.

As of this writing, only one district court, one in the Seventh Circuit, has cited City of Milwaukee for theproposition that the good faith test does not apply to injunction suits because proof of the amount in controversyshould be established at the outset of a case.[7] It is difficult to know what the Saxbe court meant by sayinggood faith is not the test. It might be suggesting that a fact-based showing was necessary when the value of thequested relief is challenged in an injunctive suit. The lack of reliance on the case by other courts perhapsindicates that since the Saxbe passage is mere dictum its relevance should be limited to that case. Numerouscourts continue to speak of good faith.[8]

A somewhat more recent Seventh Circuit decision indicates that issues continue to be raised about thestandard in injunction suits, at least in that circuit. Writing for the court, Judge Easterbrook stated that “theprinciple that a case may be dismissed only if the court is certain that the plaintiff cannot recover thejurisdictional amount … is the rule for damages actions, not for the equitable actions; it does not eliminate theneed to place a realistic value on injunctive relief.”[9] The court was concerned that the plaintiff, a divorcedmother suing for the trust documents of her former husband's estate, was pleading an amount in controversy thatcould not be substantiated. Judge Easterbrook cautioned that, “[n]ot until it becomes evident that the informationin these trust instruments is worth more than $75,000 should anyone knock on the federal court's door.”[10] Healso stated that “the rule … supposes that the plaintiff has first made a good faith effort to estimate the stakes.”[11] His court's earlier Saxbe discussion was not cited. This type of judicial concern has been shared by theEleventh Circuit, which has written that “a plaintiff who bases diversity jurisdiction on the value of injunctiverelief must show that the benefit to be obtained from the injunction is ‘sufficiently measurable and certain tosatisfy the … amount in controversy requirement,’” although the court acknowledged that it must give credit togood faith claims.[12] These cases make it clear that the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction in aninjunction or declaratory action must provide some basis for concluding that the amount in controversyrequirement is satisfied to avoid the uncertainty and speculation mentioned earler.

In applying the basic value-of-the-right or value-of-the-object principle, however, problems often arise as tothe elements that should be included in the measurement of these values. Another difficulty occurs when thebenefit to the plaintiff from securing the injunction differs from the loss that will be sustained by the defendantin complying with the court's order. A perusal of the cases cited in the notes to this section reveals that a numberof courts are willing to evaluate the amount in controversy from the defendant's point of view—the cost ofcomplying with the requested injunction or declaratory relief. Courts appear to be more willing to depart fromthe plaintiff viewpoint rule in specific relief cases than in damage actions. For purposes of this section, however,which discusses the general problems of measurement in suits for injunctive relief, it will be assumed thedefendant will lose whatever the plaintiff will gain by a judgment awarding the requested relief. A discussion ofthe viewpoint from which the amount in controversy should be measured is to be found in another section.[13]

When a business is threatened—by a regulatory statute, by unfair competition, or by breach of a covenantnot to compete—the stated rule is that the amount in controversy in an action for injunctive or declaratory reliefis the difference between the value of the business if left unregulated, or not subjected to the impropercompetition,[14] or with the covenant, and its value if the regulation is enforced, or with the competition, or



subject to the breach of the covenant. Potential, as well as past, harm to the company may be considered by thecourt,[15] unless the particular regulation or other challenged conduct covers only a specified period.[16] Whenthe regulation takes the form of a licensing fee or tax, however, the amount of the fee or tax is the matter incontroversy, not the consequences to the taxpayer's business if it refuses to pay the required sum[17] or anypenalty that might be imposed for a failure to pay the tax or fee.[18]

In a leading case, McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation,[19] the plaintiff sought to enjoin theenforcement of allegedly unconstitutional statutes regulating the purchase of installment sales contracts. TheSupreme Court stated that the measure of damages was the loss, if any, that would result from the enforcementof the statutes, not the entire net worth of the plaintiff's business, because the statutes did not completely preventthe plaintiff from conducting its business. The plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proof on the jurisdictionalissue, because it did not set forth any facts in its bill showing what curtailment of the plaintiff's business andconsequent loss would be caused to it by enforcement of the challenged statutes.[20]

In cases in which the plaintiff seeks to protect a business, the amount in controversy is the loss in profits tothe plaintiff as a result of the regulation or alleged unfair competition or a breach of covenant; accordingly, amere allegation of the decline in gross income is not sufficient.[21] This is illustrated by another case that wasdismissed by the Supreme Court for lack of the jurisdictional amount, in which the plaintiff, a news-gatheringagency, sought to enjoin a radio station from pirating news from three of its member newspapers.[22] Theplaintiff's only affidavit in support of its allegation that the amount in controversy exceeded $3,000 was that itwas paid over $8,000 per month by its members for the news sold to them by the plaintiff in the territory servedby the radio station. The Court held that the plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proof as to the jurisdictionalamount, because the plaintiff could not lose $8,000 a month since it made no profit from furnishing news andsimply divided its news-gathering expenses equitably among its members. Accordingly, the $8,000 a monthrepresented reimbursement of expenses, not profit.

The difference between the profits of a business that is unregulated, or not subject to alleged unfaircompetition or vulnerable to a breach of covenant, and the profits of a company that is subject to any of theseactivities never can be valued with precision, of course. However, so long as there is a “present probability” thatthe damages will exceed the requisite amount, jurisdiction will be upheld.[23] Thus, in a suit brought by anemployer against a former employee to enforce a covenant not to compete, the court usually will look to theprofits earned by the employer on business generated by the employee during the period immediately precedinghis termination.[24] It is recognized, nevertheless, that this figure is “only an analogous basis for determiningthe value to plaintiff of an injunction prohibiting defendant's competition with plaintiff”[25] since it assumesthat the plaintiff will lose all of the business previously generated by the defendant. As indicated by the McNuttdecision, if the entire business will be prohibited or lost due to the challenged conduct, then the net worth of thebusiness is the appropriate measure of the amount in controversy.[26]

The judicial decisions reveal other measures of the amount in controversy used in injunction proceedings indifferent contexts. In some cases involving an injunction against the application of a regulatory statute, the costof the plaintiff's compliance with the statute is considered to be the amount in controversy.[27] And anotherapproach employed by a number of courts in actions for unfair competition, or breach of a covenant, or torestrain violation of “fair trade prices,” is to consider the value of the goodwill of the plaintiff's business,[28]which in turn is measured in part by the amount expended in advertising the affected portion of the business inorder to enable it to regain its competitive position.[29]



Indeed, some cases—particularly unfair competition cases relying upon the plaintiff's goodwill as themeasure of the amount in controversy[30]—suggest that when the plaintiff seeks to protect a property right fromthe defendant's alleged interference, the entire value, rather than the diminution in value, of the property right isthe amount in controversy.[31] These decisions cannot be reconciled with the stricter rule established by theSupreme Court in the McNutt decision,[32] however, nor do they accord with the cases involving trespasses toproperty.[33] The McNutt case seems to represent the more logical rule from a subject matter jurisdictionperspective, even though the value of goodwill as the measure of the jurisdictional amount in unfair tradecompetition cases is a simpler standard to apply.

Finally, there is some suggestion in the literature[34] that a stricter amount in controversy standard shouldbe used when a state regulation is challenged than when the suit is between private parties. This view ispremised on the belief that as a matter of comity federal courts should be reluctant to interfere with state affairs.Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has articulated no such distinction and its opinions cite public and private casesinterchangeably.

In a case decided in 1977,[35] the Supreme Court rather generally recited a variety of types of demonstratedand potential costs to the Washington state apple growers who were challenging a North Carolina statute, thenconcluded rather summarily that with regard to the amount in controversy question:

Both the substantial volume of sales in North Carolina … and the continuing nature of the statute'sinterference with the business affairs of the Commission's constituents, precludes our saying “to a legalcertainty,” on this record, that such losses and expenses will not, over time if they have not done so already,amount to the requisite $10,000 for at least some of the individual growers and dealers.[36]

Principles similar to those used in actions to protect a business have been employed in several cases tomeasure the amount in controversy when suit is brought by an individual to protect earning capacity.[37] InFriedman v. International Association of Machinists,[38] the plaintiff sought to enjoin his expulsion from aunion because of his alleged affiliation with the Communist Party. In concluding that the requisite jurisdictionalamount was in controversy, the court stated that there was a present probability that the plaintiff's expulsionfrom the union would prevent him from retaining his job and would result in reducing his earning capacity. Dueto the likelihood of damage to the plaintiff in excess of the requisite amount in controversy, subject matterjurisdiction was upheld. In the Friedman case, the reduction in earning capacity was presumed to last during theentire working life of the employee even though that might be thought speculative or inconsistent with the casesinvolving attempts to enjoin the collection of a tax, which is discussed below. However, if it is certain that thereduction is for a specific period of time, the calculation of the amount in controversy is limited to that period.[39]

In a taxpayer action to restrain the collection of a tax, the rule that the collateral effects of a judgment arenot includible in assessing the matter in controversy[40] has particularly important application. According to thecases, the amount in controversy is the cost of paying the tax at the time of the litigation, not the capitalizedvalue of the tax[41] or the consequences of not paying the tax.[42] The reasons given for this rule ofmeasurement are that it cannot be assumed that the defendant will continue to enforce the tax, or that theplaintiff will continue to be subject to the tax, or that the taxing statute will remain in effect and not be modifiedby legislation.[43]

An exception to this measurement rule is made and the capitalized value of the tax will be used, however, in



cases in which the validity of a permanent exemption by contract from a particular tax is at issue.[44] Althoughthe particular tax that has been assessed and levied might be less than the jurisdictional amount, the matter incontroversy is considered to be the value of the contract right providing permanent immunity from taxation. Thisexception has been criticized by several writers,[45] but is in accord with the cases involving installmentcontracts.[46] Much the same principle leads to the conclusion that when a taxpayer sues to prevent the issuanceof municipal bonds, the tax that would be levied on the plaintiff's property were the bonds issued, rather than thevalue of the bond issue, is the amount in controversy.[47]

Since many declaratory judgment actions are counterparts for suits for injunctive relief, the precedents seemclear that the same amount in controversy tests should apply to cases seeking either type of relief—the value ofthe right the plaintiff seeks to assert or protect or legal claim he wishes to establish.[48] Indeed, when bothdeclaratory and injunctive relief are sought in the same action, the federal courts generally employ the standardfor the latter without any comment on the subject. A number of declaratory judgment cases involving varioustypes of installment contracts and benefit programs are noted in a later section in this Chapter.[49]

[FNa232] Charles Alan Wright Chair in Federal Courts, The University of Texas.

[FNa233] University Professor, New York University. Formerly Bruce Bromley Professor of Law,Harvard University.

[FNa234] Thomas M. Cooley Professor of Law, University of Michigan.

[FNa235] Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.

[FNa236] Robert Howell Hall Professor of Law, Emory University.

[FNa237] Herbert M. and Svetlana Wachtell Professor of Constitutional Law and Civil Liberties, NewYork University.

[FNa238] Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago–Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute ofTechnology.

[FNa239] Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.

[FNa457] University Professor, New York University. Formerly Bruce Bromley Professor of Law,Harvard University.

[FN1]

Elsewhere

See the text at note 1 in § 3702.5.

[FN2]

Illustrative cases



Supreme Court

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Com'n, 432 U.S. 333, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383(1977), citing Wright, Miller & Cooper (right of apple growers to conduct business affairs in anotherstate free from statute's enforcement).

Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mut. Light, Heat & Power Co., 239 U.S. 121, 36 S. Ct. 30, 60 L. Ed.174 (1915).

First Circuit

The value of a warrant to acquire shares, and thus the amount in controversy of a claim alleging afailure to deliver the warrant, is the difference between the market value and exercise price of thoseshares times the number of shares acquirable, rather than merely the exercise price times the number ofshares acquirable. Barrett v. Lombardi, 239 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2001).

Local Div. No. 714, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. Greater Portland Transit Dist. ofPortland, Me., 589 F.2d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1978), citing Wright, Miller & Cooper (disapproved of onother grounds by, Local Div. 589, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Com. of Mass., 666F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1981)) and (disapproved of on other grounds by, Jackson Transit Authority v. LocalDiv. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, 457 U.S. 15, 102 S. Ct. 2202, 72 L. Ed. 2d639 (1982)).

MB Auto Care Management, Inc. v. Plaza Carolina Mall, L.P., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.P.R. 2010).

Lyons v. Salve Regina College, 422 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1976), judgment rev'd on other grounds, 565F.2d 200 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971, 98 S. Ct. 1611, 56 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1978) (cost ofbeginning nursing studies anew considered, and judicial notice taken that earnings in health care fieldwould be less without nursing degree).

Second Circuit

DiTolla v. Doral Dental IPA of New York, 469 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 2006) (CAFA's jurisdictional amountnot satisfied because entire value of New York Pool is not actually in controversy since plaintiff has noclaim of ownership over it, but merely speculates as to size of portion owned).

Correspondent Services Corp. v. First Equities Corp. of Florida, 442 F.3d 767 (2d Cir. 2006).

Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1103, 119 S.Ct. 867, 142 L. Ed. 2d 769 (1999) (despite presence of liability cap set below jurisdictional amount,amount in controversy requirement is satisfied in petition to compel arbitration when amount in excessof jurisdictional amount is claimed and when liability cap is challenged).

Dimich v. Med-Pro, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 517 (S.D. N.Y. 2004).

Leyse v. Domino's Pizza LLC, 2004 WL 1900328 (S.D. N.Y. 2004).

In a plaintiff's action against an insurer for reinstatement of a canceled policy, the amount in



controversy was equal to the endowment value of the policy assuming payment of all premiums, ratherthan the face amount or the cash value of the policy. Cheung v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 269 F.Supp. 2d 321 (S.D. N.Y. 2003), quoting Wright, Miller & Cooper.

Kings Choice Neckwear, Inc. v. DHL Airways, Inc., 2003 WL 22283814 (S.D. N.Y. 2003) (when classseeks injunctive relief, amount in controversy is measured by value of object of litigation from eachplaintiff's perspective).

Paduano & Weintraub, LLP v. Wachovia Secs., 185 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D. N.Y. 2002).

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mallela, 175 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. N.Y. 2001).

In re Rezulin Products Liability Litigation, 168 F. Supp. 2d 136 (S.D. N.Y. 2001) (if claim seeksprimarily equitable relief, amount in controversy, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, is measured byvalue of object of litigation to plaintiff; one method of measuring that value is by reference to cost todefendant).

In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 166 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. N.Y. 2001).

Lastih v. Elk Corp. of Alabama, 140 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D. Conn. 2001).

Steinberg v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 91 F. Supp. 2d 540 (E.D. N.Y. 2000), citing Wright & Miller.

Katz v. Warner-Lambert Co., 9 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D. N.Y. 1998) (claim for medical monitoring andcreation of research fund, which was injunctive in nature, was measured by cost to defendant ofcreating fund).

Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Hollingsworth, 949 F. Supp. 77, 82 (D. Conn. 1996) (amount in controversyin motion to compel arbitration is amount of potential award in underlying arbitration proceeding).

Leslie v. BancTec Service Corp., 928 F. Supp. 341 (S.D. N.Y. 1996).

Myers v. Long Island Lighting Co., 623 F. Supp. 1076 (E.D. N.Y. 1985).

Lieb v. American Motors Corp., 538 F. Supp. 127 (S.D. N.Y. 1982).

Rockwell v. SCM Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D. N.Y. 1980).

Aldamuy v. Pirro, 436 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. N.Y. 1977).

Tron v. Condello, 427 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D. N.Y. 1976).

Third Circuit

Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Tarbuck, 62 F.3d 538 (3d Cir. 1995).

“[T]he amount in controversy in a petition to compel arbitration or appoint an arbitrator is determinedby the underlying cause of action that would be arbitrated.” Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d873, 877 (3d Cir. 1995).



In re Corestates Trust Fee Litigation, 39 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 1994), quoting Wright, Miller & Cooper.

Hahn v. U.S., 757 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1985), citing Wright, Miller & Cooper.

The court found that the value of the litigation should be measured by the rights plaintiff sought toprotect as viewed from plaintiff's point of view. The plaintiff in the suit sought unpaid rent and evictionof the defendant. Therefore the court had to consider the value to the plaintiff of eviction, whichincluded improvements the defendant made to the property as well as the value of leasing the propertywith the improvements. Byler Management Co, LLC v. Bulletproof Enterprises, Inc., 2010 WL2431823, *4 (M.D. Pa. 2010).

Chamberlin v. Brown-Forman Corp., 2010 WL 715849, *4 (D.N.J. 2010) (“the simple invocation ofinjunctive relief does not somehow transform a case-otherwise ineligible to be heard in diversity-to oneproperly brought in federal court”), quoting Hilley v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 32 F. Supp. 2d 195,196 (E.D. Pa. 2010).

Capital Mfg., Inc. v. Rayco Indus., Inc., 2005 WL 1084649 (E.D. Pa. 2005).

In re Mobile Tool Intern., 320 B.R. 552 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005).

Jeffrey Press, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 626 (E.D. Pa. 2004).

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Corry, 324 F. Supp. 2d 666 (E.D. Pa. 2004).

Louis Dolente & Sons v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Corp., 252 F. Supp. 2d 178 (E.D. Pa. 2003).

Echols v. Pelullo, 2003 WL 21382508 (E.D. Pa. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 377 F.3d 272 (3d Cir.2004).

Stewart v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 2003 WL 21340266 (E.D. Pa. 2003).

Alsbrooks v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 2003 WL 21321735 (E.D. Pa. 2003).

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ciccarella, 2002 WL 827138 (E.D. Pa. 2002).

Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 503 (E.D. Pa. 2001).

Nolan v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 2001 WL 253865 (E.D. Pa. 2001).

Hilley v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 32 F. Supp. 2d 195 (E.D. Pa. 1998).

Johnson v. Gerber Products Co., 949 F. Supp. 327, 330 (E.D. Pa. 1996), quoting In re Corestates TrustFee Litigation, cited above, quoting Wright, Miller & Cooper.

Weinberg v. Sprint Corp., 165 F.R.D. 431 (D.N.J. 1996), citing Wright, Miller & Cooper.

Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Tarbuck, 845 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Pa. 1994), judgment aff'd, 62F.3d 538 (3d Cir. 1995).

In an injunctive suit seeking removal of the trustee, the amount in controversy is the value of the part of



the trust affected, not the entire value of the trust itself. In re Fidelity Bank Trust Fee Litigation, 839F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1993), quoting Wright, Miller & Cooper, judgment aff'd, 43 F.3d 1461 (3dCir. 1994).

Becker v. Sherwin Williams, 717 F. Supp. 288 (D.N.J. 1989).

Hirsch v. Jewish War Veterans of U. S. of America, 537 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Pa. 1982).

In an action for specific performance of a contract to convey realty, the value of the property involveddetermined the jurisdictional amount. Porter v. Hollander, 494 F. Supp. 151 (D. Del. 1980).

Weeks v. American Dredging Co., 451 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1978).

McKnight v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority, 438 F. Supp. 813 (E.D. Pa. 1977), judgmentvacated on other grounds, 583 F.2d 1229 (3d Cir. 1978).

Dawes v. Philadelphia Gas Com'n, 421 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1976).

Halderman v. Pittenger, 391 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Pa. 1975).

Fourth Circuit

Lanham Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 101 Fed. Appx. 381 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 957,125 S. Ct. 410, 160 L. Ed. 2d 319 (2004) (for citation see Fourth Circuit Rule 36(c)).

Agency Ins. Co. of Maryland, Inc. v. Smith, 161 F.3d 1 (4th Cir. 1998).

Asbury-Castro v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 729, 734 (N.D. W. Va. 2005) (when plaintiffalleged that “[a]s a direct and proximate result of their false and deceptive marketing, [defendant's]Paxil sales exceeded $2 billion of ill-gotten gains and profits in the year before plaintiff filed thisaction,” court was satisfied that restitution and disgorgement remedies sought on behalf of all stateresidents would result in pecuniary loss to defendant of greater than $75,000).

Market America, Inc. v. Tong, 2004 WL 1618574 (M.D. N.C. 2004).

Cogburn v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 2002 WL 31165151 (M.D. N.C. 2002).

Richardson v. Grant, 2002 WL 741624 (M.D. N.C. 2002).

In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 127 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Md. 2001), opinion supplemented,2001 WL 137254 (D. Md. 2001), and aff'd, 444 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2006) (utilizing “either viewpoint”rule, value of injunction is viewed from perspective of defendant, party that must comply, because costof compliance for one plaintiff is essentially same as for all class members).

Candor Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Intern. Networking Group, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 476 (M.D. N.C. 1998).

George D. Newman & Sons, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Com'n, 696 F. Supp. 160 (D. Md.1988), judgment aff'd, 873 F.2d 1438 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 854, 110 S. Ct. 158, 107 L.Ed. 2d 116 (1989).



Fifth Circuit

Hartford Ins. Group v. Lou-Con Inc., 293 F.3d 908 (5th Cir. 2002).

St. Paul Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250 (5th Cir. 1998).

Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1980), judgment rev'd in part onother grounds, 455 U.S. 283, 102 S. Ct. 1070, 71 L. Ed. 2d 152 (1982).

Texas Acorn v. Texas Area 5 Health Systems Agency, Inc., 559 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1977), citingWright, Miller & Cooper.

In a diversity action, jurisdiction is tested by the value of the rights sought to be protected againstinterference, and in a suit to restrain infringement of a tradename in a state, the jurisdictional amount isthe value to the plaintiff of his claimed right to prevent the use of the name in that state. SeaboardFinance Co. v. Martin, 244 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1957).

Marlow, LLC v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., 2010 WL 2773356, *2–3 (S.D. Miss. 2010)(allowed cost to defendant of moving equipment at issue to be included in amount in controversycalculation).

Piacun v. Swift Energy Operating, LLC, 2010 WL 989183, *2 (E.D. La. 2010) (despite fact injunctionmay exceed $75,000, plaintiff's statement that his claims did not exceed $75,000 coupled with lack ofsufficient evidence from defendant led court to deny jurisdiction).

Miller v. McEachern, 2008 WL 413630 (N.D. Tex. 2008).

Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.) v. Fairley, 485 F. Supp. 2d 731 (S.D. Miss. 2007).

Preece v. Physicians Surgical Care, Inc., 2006 WL 1470268 (S.D. Tex. 2006).

McCoy v. Exhibitgroup/Giltspur, Inc., 2004 WL 1562858 (N.D. Tex. 2004).

Mannesmann Dematic Corp. v. Phillips Getschow Co., 2001 WL 282796 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (arbitrationaward sought to be vacated, not original arbitration award sought, composes amount in controversy).

Wald v. C.M. Life Ins. Co., 2001 WL 256179 (N.D. Tex. 2001).

Energy Catering Services, Inc. v. Burrow, 911 F. Supp. 221 (E.D. La. 1995).

Stanley v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Tex. 1993).

Harger v. Burger King Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1579 (M.D. La. 1990).

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hilbun, 692 F. Supp. 698 (S.D. Miss. 1988).

Dallas City Packing, Inc. v. Butz, 411 F. Supp. 1338 (N.D. Tex. 1976).

Flato Realty Invs. v. City of Big Spring, 388 F. Supp. 131 (N.D. Tex. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 519F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1975).



Sixth Circuit

Cleveland Housing Renewal Project v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co., 621 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2010).

“A claim for vacation of an arbitral award in the amount of $50,000 or less is not sufficient for diversityjurisdiction.” Ford v. Hamilton Invs., Inc., 29 F.3d 255, 260 (6th Cir. 1994) (Nelson, J.).

JSC Terminal, LLC v. Farris, 2010 WL 1904002, *2 (W.D. Ky. 2010), quoting Northup Properties, Inc.v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 567 F.3d 767, 769 (6th Cir. 2009) (measure value of injunction asobject of litigation).

Petrey v. K. Petroleum, Inc., 2007 WL 2068597 (E.D. Ky. 2007).

Alinsub v. T-Mobile, 414 F. Supp. 2d 825 (W.D. Tenn. 2006) (even if plaintiffs do seek injunctiverelief defendant describes, value of such relief sought must be measured from plaintiffs' viewpoint).

Absolute Mach. Tools, Inc. v. Clancy Mach. Tools, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 665 (N.D. Ohio 2005),quoting Wright, Miller & Cooper.

Planning and Development Dept. v. Daughters of Union Veterans of Civil War, 2005 WL 3163393(E.D. Mich. 2005).

Pro-Onsite Technologies, LLC v. Jefferson County, Ky. Clerk's Office, 2005 WL 2000841 (W.D. Ky.2005).

Lorimer ex rel. Estate of Lorimer v. Berrelez, 331 F. Supp. 2d 585 (E.D. Mich. 2004).

Davis v. DCB Financial Corp., 259 F. Supp. 2d 664 (S.D. Ohio 2003).

McIntire v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F. Supp. 2d 911 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (value of right depends solely onvalue to plaintiff).

Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 203 F.R.D. 254 (E.D. Mich. 2001), aff'd, 383 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 2004)(disapproved of on other grounds by, Burkhead v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 250 F.R.D. 287 (W.D.Ky. 2008)) (amount in controversy is monetary value of benefit that would flow to plaintiff if injunctionwere granted).

Dist. 2, Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n, Associated Maritime Officers, AFL-CIO v. Adams, 447 F.Supp. 72 (N.D. Ohio 1977).

Tenneco Inc. v. May, 377 F. Supp. 941 (E.D. Ky. 1974), judgment aff'd per curiam, 512 F.2d 1380 (6thCir. 1975).

Seventh Circuit

Hawkins v. Aid Ass'n for Lutherans, 338 F.3d 801 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1149, 124 S.Ct. 1146, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1042 (2004) (when validity of insurance policy is in dispute, face value ofpolicy is appropriate measurement for amount in controversy purposes).



Wellness Community-National v. Wellness House, 70 F.3d 46 (7th Cir. 1995) (in suit for breach ofcontract clause prohibiting use of similar name, amount in controversy should turn on goodwill plaintiffcharitable organization had established in disputed name).

Rexford Rand Corp. v. Ancel, 58 F.3d 1215 (7th Cir. 1995).

Gould v. Artisoft, Inc., 1 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 1993) (shares of stock at stake in action for specificperformance).

The plaintiff-union's essential object in a suit to require a municipal transit utility and the city to enterinto arbitration of a new collective bargaining agreement was the right to an arbitration award when anew contract could not be reached through bargaining. Translating this right into pecuniary terms, thecourt found that a new contract certainly would be valued at more than $10,000, since past collectivebargaining agreements entered into by the union involved sums far in excess of the jurisdictionalamount. Local Div. 519, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. LaCrosse Mun. Transit Utility, 585F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1978) (abrogated on other grounds by, Jackson Transit Authority v. Local Div.1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, 457 U.S. 15, 102 S. Ct. 2202, 72 L. Ed. 2d 639(1982)).

U.S. v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875, 98 S. Ct. 225, 54 L.Ed. 2d 155 (1977) (rejected on other grounds by, Phillips v. U.S., 792 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1986)).

City of Milwaukee v. Saxbe, 546 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1976).

Acuity v. Interlog USA, Inc., 2005 WL 3242274 (W.D. Wis. 2005) (because defendant has not beenfound liable in state court action, only insurer's costs of defense, and not costs of indemnification, counttowards amount in controversy).

Clemons v. Ferolito, Vultaggio & Sons, 2004 WL 442602 (N.D. Ill. 2004).

Mailwaukee Mailing, Shipment and Equipment, Inc. v. Neopost, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 769 (E.D. Wis.2003), citing Wright, Miller & Cooper.

Kohler v. Albright, 2003 WL 22697213 (N.D. Ind. 2003).

Miller v. General Motors Corp., 2002 WL 31375526 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (cost to defendant of complyingwith injunctive relief is appropriate measure of amount in controversy).

Dickal 770 L.L.C. v. PRN Corp., 2002 WL 1285813 (N.D. Ill. 2002).

Sirotzky v. New York Stock Exchange, 2002 WL 1052029 (N.D. Ill. 2002), aff'd, 347 F.3d 985 (7thCir. 2003) (abrogated on other grounds by, Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 126 S. Ct.704, 163 L. Ed. 2d 547 (2005)).

Trilithic, Inc. v. Wavetek U.S. Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 803 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (when plaintiff seeks injunctiverelief, amount in controversy is value of right to be protected or extent of injury to be prevented).

Intern. Gateway Communications, Inc. v. Communication Telesystems Intern., Inc., 922 F. Supp. 122



(N.D. Ill. 1996).

Pratt, Bradford & Tobin, P.C. v. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co., 885 F. Supp. 1126 (S.D. Ill. 1994).

Bailey v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Ottawa, 467 F. Supp. 1139 (C.D. Ill. 1979).

Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of Ed., 391 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Ill. 1974).

Eighth Circuit

Usery v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 606 F.3d 1017, 1019 (8th Cir. 2010) (must use objective measureof plaintiff's claim, not plaintiff's subjective measure).

Burns v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 820 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1987).

“In an injunction suit the amount in controversy may be tested by the value of the right sought to begained by the plaintiff.” Hedberg v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.2d 924, 928 (8th Cir. 1965)(Blackmun, J.).

Noel v. Liberty Bank of Ark., 2010 WL 2804331, *1 (E.D. Ark. 2010) (“In a suit for injunctive relief,the Eighth Circuit generally follows the ‘plaintiff viewpoint’ rule and measures the value of the objectof the litigation by the value to the plaintiff of the right sought to be enforced.”).

Wood v. Teris, LLC, 2006 WL 2091865 (W.D. Ark. 2006).

Hartford Ins. Co. of Midwest v. Wyllie, 2005 WL 902776 (E.D. Mo. 2005).

APA Optics, Inc. v. Khan, 2002 WL 737486 (D. Minn. 2002).

Modern Equipment Co. v. Continental Western Ins. Co., Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 987 (S.D. Iowa 2001)(value of litigation measured by coverage of insurance policies).

Crosby v. Aid Ass'n for Lutherans, 199 F.R.D. 636 (D. Minn. 2001).

Commercial Coverage, Inc. v. Paradigm Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Mo. 1998).

Blair v. Source One Mortg. Services Corp., 925 F. Supp. 617 (D. Minn. 1996) (defendants cannotaggregate cost of complying with injunctive relief in order to meet amount in controversy).

Williams Pipe Line Co. v. City of Mounds View, Minn., 651 F. Supp. 544 (D. Minn. 1986).

In an action to compel arbitration, the amount of the underlying claim determines the amount incontroversy. J. E. Sieben Const. Co., Inc. v. City of Davenport, Iowa, 494 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D. Iowa1980).

Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 478 F. Supp. 434 (D.N.D. 1979), opinion vacated on other grounds, 623 F.2d517 (8th Cir. 1980), citing Wright, Miller & Cooper (right of United States citizen to remain in thiscountry).

First Nat. Bank of Aberdeen v. Aberdeen Nat. Bank, 471 F. Supp. 460 (D.S.D. 1979), judgment vacated



on other grounds, 627 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1980).

Ninth Circuit

Combined Communications Corp. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 641 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1981).

Jackson v. American Bar Ass'n, 538 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1976).

Cabriales v. Aurora Loan Services, 2010 WL 761081, *3–4 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (used value of object oflitigation and rejected standard of equity).

Berry v. American Exp. Pub., Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (plaintiff seeking remandof class action removed pursuant to Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 met burden of proving thatamount in controversy was less than $5,000,000 in aggregate when plaintiff sought only injunctiverelief and specifically stated that class did not seek to recover more than $5,000,000 in aggregate, andvalue of injunctive relief was speculative from perspective of both plaintiff and defendant).

Sackos v. Great-West Life Assur. Co., 2004 WL 1562874 (D. Or. 2004).

The amount in controversy for the plaintiff's petition to vacate an arbitration award equals the amountawarded rather than the amount originally sought through arbitration. Goodman v. CIBC Oppenheimer& Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2001).

Brown v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (S.D. Cal. 1998).

Ministry of Health, Province of Ontario, Canada v. Shiley Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1426 (C.D. Cal. 1994).

Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158 (C.D. Cal. 1977), judgment vacated on other grounds, 436U.S. 901, 98 S. Ct. 2228, 56 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1978).

Mirin v. Justices of Supreme Court of Nevada, 415 F. Supp. 1178 (D. Nev. 1976).

Tenth Circuit

Lovell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 466 F.3d 893, 898 (10th Cir. 2006).

Mid-America AG Network, Inc. v. Monkey Island Development Authority, 109 Fed. Appx. 187 (10thCir. 2004) (citation disfavored except in specific situations per Tenth Circuit Rule 36.3).

City of Moore, Okl. v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 699 F.2d 507 (10th Cir. 1983).

BTU Empire Corp. v. Barker, 2005 WL 1924573 (D. Colo. 2005).

Fitzgerlad Railcar Services of Omaha, Inc. v. Chief Transp Products, Inc., 2003 WL 21344535 (D. Neb.2003) (in action seeking to enforce lease, amount in controversy is lost profits in event that lease isdeclared unenforceable).

City of Atchison v. Maczuk Industries, Inc., 2002 WL 1900493 (D. Kan. 2002) (when plaintiff seeksequitable relief related to possession of property, amount in controversy is value of realty affected).



Molina v. Christensen, 2001 WL 789191 (D. Kan. 2001) (injunction sought to prevent defendants fromutilizing state courts in any manner that would seek to punish plaintiff for pursuing his cause of actionin federal court or seek any form of dismissal or other order that would deprive plaintiff of his cause ofaction in federal court, and declaratory relief sought requesting court to declare that it has jurisdiction isvalued by underlying claims for purposes of amount in controversy determination).

“When injunctive relief is sought, ‘the amount in controversy may be established by looking at thedefendant's cost of complying with the injunction.’” Copeland v. MBNA America, N.A., 820 F. Supp.537, 541 (D. Colo. 1993), quoting Justice v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 927 F.2d 503,505 (10th Cir. 1991).

Perrin v. Tenneco Oil Co., 505 F. Supp. 23 (W.D. Okla. 1980).

Taylor v. Sandoval, 442 F. Supp. 491 (D. Colo. 1977), citing Wright, Miller & Cooper.

Eleventh Circuit

Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinnon Motors, LLC, 329 F.3d 805 (11th Cir. 2003), citing Wright,Miller & Cooper.

Leonard v. Enterprise Rent a Car, 279 F.3d 967 (11th Cir. 2002).

Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2000).

Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 957, 121 S. Ct. 381,148 L. Ed. 2d 294 (2000).

Ericsson GE Mobile Communications, Inc. v. Motorola Communications & Electronics, Inc., 120 F.3d216 (11th Cir. 1997).

White-Spunner Const., Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 2010 WL 3489956, *2 (S.D. Ala. 2010) (valuemeasured as “value of the benefit that would flow to the plaintiff if the injunction … were granted”).

McGettigan v. Ford Motor Co., 265 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (S.D. Ala. 2003).

Owners Ins. Co. v. McClung, 2003 WL 23190907 (N.D. Ga. 2003).

Household Bank v. JFS Group, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (M.D. Ala. 2002), judgment vacated on othergrounds, 320 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2003) (court should look to value of defendants' claims in arbitration,when plaintiff seeks declaration of enforceability of arbitration agreements allegedly executed bydefendants).

Chapman Funeral Home, Inc. v. Nat. Linen Service, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (M.D. Ala. 2002).

Novastar Mortg., Inc. v. Bennett, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2001), aff'd, 35 Fed. Appx. 858 (11thCir. 2002) (although value of land to which creditors sought possession may have exceeded amount incontroversy requirement, debtors had no legal right to land and debtors failed to establish that value ofremaining in possession fulfilled amount in controversy requirement).



Kline v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1237 (S.D. Ala. 1999).

Edge v. Blockbuster Video, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (object of litigation is value ofrevenue that would be lost by Blockbuster in event that injunction were granted that would prohibitcharging of late fees in excess of initial rental fee).

Crawford v. American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida, 987 F. Supp. 1408 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (value toplaintiffs, of potential outcome that defendant insurance company no longer would be able to writeforce-placed insurance in Alabama, was zero).

Earnest v. General Motors Corp., 923 F. Supp. 1469 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (value of object of litigationmeasured by pecuniary consequence to those involved in litigation).

Shell Oil Co. v. Altina Associates, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 536 (M.D. Fla. 1994).

Stegman v. Horton Homes, Inc., 845 F. Supp. 1571 (M.D. Ga. 1994).

Hall County Historical Soc., Inc. v. Georgia Dept. of Transp., 447 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ga. 1978).

D.C. Circuit

Smith v. Washington, 593 F.2d 1097, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

Brand v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 2005 WL 3201322 (D.D.C. 2005) (value of litigation ispecuniary result to either party which the judgment would directly produce).

See also

Chamberlin v. Brown-Forman Corp., 2010 WL 715849, *4 (D.N.J. 2010) (“the simple invocation ofinjunctive relief does not somehow transform a case-otherwise ineligible to be heard in diversity-to oneproperly brought in federal court”), quoting Hilley v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 32 F. Supp. 2d 195,196 (E.D. Pa. 2010).

Williams v. Brown Family Communities, 2005 WL 1651049 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (in determining whetheramount in controversy requirement is met, courts may consider not only damages but also cost todefendant of specific performance).

Clemons v. Ferolito, Vultaggio & Sons, 2004 WL 442602 (N.D. Ill. 2004), quoting Macken ex rel.Macken v. Jensen, 333 F.3d 797, 799 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[A]t least in this circuit, the object may bevalued from either perspective—what the plaintiff stands to gain, or what it would cost the defendant tomeet the plaintiff's demand.”).

A defendant seeking removal must show that the cost of an injunction would exceed $75,000 even if theinjunction were granted in favor of only one plaintiff, i.e., the injunction's fixed costs must exceed$75,000. Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.S.C. 2003).

When the plaintiff seeks money damages as primary relief, the defendant cannot add the value ofincidental injunctive relief for the purpose of reaching the federal amount in controversy requirement.In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litigation, 918 F. Supp. 1181 (N.D. Ill. 1996), order supplemented,



(Mar. 6, 1996).

[FN3]

Declaratory judgment action

Michaels v. Vickers, 477 Fed. Appx. 871 (3d Cir. 2012) (Amount in controversy requirement not metwhen plaintiff "sought declaratory relief, specific performance of a trust, a general injunction torestrain, and the return of trust res. He emphasized that his is a 'suit in equity.' His claims relate to adelinquent Florida child support order.").

Enbridge Pipelines (Illinois) L.L.C. v. Moore, 633 F.3d 602, 605-606 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.).

Dow Agrosciences LLC v. Bates, 332 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded on othergrounds, 544 U.S. 431, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 161 L. Ed. 2d 687 (2005) (when plaintiff seeks declaratoryrelief, amount in controversy is determined by value of right to be protected or extent of injury to beprevented).

Webb v. Investacorp, Inc., 89 F.3d 252 (5th Cir. 1996) (amount in controversy in declaratory judgmentaction is determined by amount disputed in underlying arbitration proceeding).

In an action to declare a subcontractor's notice of lien void, the amount in controversy was held to bethe plaintiff's potential liability under the lien not the premium on the plaintiff's bond. Beacon Const.Co., Inc. v. Matco Elec. Co., Inc., 521 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1975).

Institute of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1227 (W.D.Wash. 2012), injunction pending appeal granted, 702 F.3d 573 (9th Cir. 2012) and rev'd on othergrounds, 2013 WL 673712 (9th Cir. 2013) (when diversity suit seeks declaratory or injunctive relief,amount in controversy is measured by value of object of litigation).

McCoy v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 858 F. Supp. 2d 639, 650 (S.D. W. Va. 2012) ("'[I]n a suit forinjunctive relief, 'the amount in controversy, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, is measured by thevalue of the object of the litigation.''"), quoting Macken ex rel. Macken v. Jensen, 333 F.3d 797, 799(7th Cir. 2003).

The court declined to exercise diversity jurisdiction over an action that was inherently one fordeclaratory judgment, coupled with a claim for injunctive relief to assist and implement any declaratoryjudgment that might issue. The matter was dismissed as one more appropriate for state courtadjudication since it involved fundamental state law questions concerning insurance, arbitration, andstacking. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Southeast v. John J., 848 F. Supp. 2d 506, 513 (M.D. Pa. 2012).

Mireles v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1052 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (during determinationof whether object in litigation satisfies amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction,even if property at issue already has been sold in foreclosure by defendant, property still may be objectof litigation when plaintiff sues for injunctive or declaratory relief).

"In a declaratory-relief action where the applicability of liability coverage to particular incidents is atissue, the amount in controversy is the value of the insurance claim, and not the face value of the



policy." Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London Subscribing to Policy No. FINFR 1001771 v.Commonwealth Intern., Inc., 2012 WL 2328215, *1 (C.D. Cal. 2012), citing Budget Rent-A-Car, Inc. v.Higashiguchi, 109 F.3d 1471, 1473 (9th Cir. 1997).

Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Herrera, 2012 WL 948412, *2 (E.D. Cal. 2012) ("In an unlawfuldetainer action, 'the right to possession alone [is] involved-not title to the property.'").

When a party seeks a declaratory judgment, the amount in controversy required for diversityjurisdiction is not necessarily the money judgment sought or recovered, but rather the value of theconsequences that may result from the litigation. Mt. Clemens Auto Center, Inc. v. Hyundai MotorAmerica, 844 F. Supp. 2d 804, 808 (E.D. Mich. 2011).

Westfield Ins. Co. v. Kuhns, 2011 WL 6003124 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (amount in controversy in actionbrought by insurer seeking declaratory judgment that there was no obligation to defend was potentialoutlay for indemnity).

Barrus v. Recontrust Co., N.A., 2011 WL 2360206 (W.D. Wash. 2011).

“In actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, it is well established that the amount in controversyis measured by the value of the object of the litigation.” Gisele Grocery & Deli v. Hanover Ins. Group,2010 WL 1688578, *1 (D.N.J. 2010), quoting Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Com'n,432 U.S. 333, 347, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1977).

Preece v. Physicians Surgical Care, Inc., 2006 WL 1470268 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (in action for declaratoryrelief amount in controversy is value of right to be protected).

Shamrock Holdings of California, Inc. v. Arenson, 2005 WL 400198 (D. Del. 2005) (in declaratoryjudgment action, plaintiff's claim that defendants had threatened to sue plaintiff for “millions of dollars”is sufficient evidence of amount in controversy exceeding $75,000 to support removal).

Walker v. Waller, 267 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D.D.C. 2003) (when plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, amount incontroversy is value of object of litigation).

Total Environmental Solutions, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2003 WL 715755 (E.D. La.2003) (in lawsuit seeking declaration to determine scope of insurance policy, amount in controversy isvalue of plaintiff's potential right to indemnity).

Barbuto v. Medicine Shoppe Intern., Inc., 166 F. Supp. 2d 341 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (amount in controversyrequirement for diversity jurisdiction of removed case was satisfied because complaint in state courtaction sought declaration that licensing agreement was terminated for cause, allowing two pharmaciststo cease paying licensor's fees in excess of $75,000 for eight years).

Coregis Ins. Co. v. Schuster, 127 F. Supp. 2d 683 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (in declaratory action on insurancecontract, amount in controversy is determined by value of underlying legal claims for which insurancecoverage is sought, and is not restricted by policy limits).

Southeast Neuroscience Center of Excellence v. Datamed Forms & Software, Inc., 2001 WL 839012(E.D. La. 2001) (value of declaratory relief).



[FN4]

Uncertain or speculative

Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2000) (value of injunctive relief to individualclass members is “too speculative and immeasurable” to be included in amount in controversycalculation).

Mathews v. PHH Corp., 2010 WL 3766538, *6 (W.D. Va. 2010) (object of litigation was face-to-facemeeting before foreclosure began, which court found “too speculative and immeasurable to satisfy theamount in controversy requirement”), quoting Vargo v. Delaware Title Loans, Inc., 2010 WL2998788, *2 (D. Md. 2010).

The plaintiff's value of Olympic participation was not the measure of the amount in controversybecause allegations of misfeasance during trials is insufficient evidence to find the plaintiff otherwisewould have been chosen to participate. U.S. Olympic Committee v. Ruckman, 2010 WL 2170527, *9(D.N.J. 2010).

AT & T Corp., v. Austal, USA, L.L.C., 2006 WL 295393, *3 (S.D. Ala. 2006) (plaintiff who basesdiversity jurisdiction on value of injunctive relief must show that benefit to be obtained from injunctionis sufficiently measurable and certain to satisfy requirement).

Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Meadow Preserve York, LLC, 2006 WL 1376912 (N.D. Ohio2006) (claim for injunctive relief not sufficiently measurable and certain to satisfy amount incontroversy requirement).

Berry v. American Exp. Pub., Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (monetary value ofrequested injunction against credit card complany to prevent it from charging cards for failure to rejectunsolicited magazine subscriptions too uncertain to ascertain amount in controversy) (alternativeholding in CAFA action on motion to remand).

Dimich v. Med-Pro, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 517 (S.D. N.Y. 2004) (benefits from injunction for medicalmonitoring program is too speculative).

Cowan v. Outpatient Partners, Inc., 17 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 502, 2004 WL 1084160 (M.D. Fla. 2004)(“Further, subject matter jurisdiction does not exist where any benefit plaintiff could receive frominjunctive relief is ‘too speculative and immeasurable to satisfy the amount in controversyrequirement.’”).

Davis v. DCB Financial Corp., 259 F. Supp. 2d 664 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (benefits resulting frominjunction are not included as amount in controversy when they are so uncertain that court cannotdetermine whether amount of money placed in controversy exceeds $75,000).

Gonzalez v. Fairgale Properties Co., N.V., 241 F. Supp. 2d 512 (D. Md. 2002) (value of declaratoryrelief is too speculative to be included in calculation).

“While the fact that equitable relief may not be capable of exact valuation will not negate federaljurisdiction, if the matter is incapable of being reduced to a pecuniary standard of value, jurisdiction



cannot be predicated upon 28 U.S.C. § 1332.” Stoller v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 934 F. Supp.423 (S.D. Fla. 1996), citing Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp. v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 589 F. Supp.275 (D. Minn. 1984) (equitable bill of discovery lacks subject matter jurisdiction under diversity ofcitizenship statute).

When the rights involved in a declaratory judgment action as to the marital status of the parties werenot subject to pecuniary evaluation and any monetary damage that the plaintiff might suffer by loss of$12,000 annual support from the defendant was speculative and collateral to the proceeding, the amountin controversy was insufficient to bring the action within the jurisdiction of the district court. Walpertv. Walpert, 329 F. Supp. 25 (D.N.J. 1971).

[FN5]

Discussed elsewhere

See § 3702.

[FN6]

City of Milwaukee case

546 F.2d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 1976). The court relied on D. Currie, Federal Courts, 2d ed., pp. 515–516(1975).

[FN7]

Citing Milwaukee case

U.S. v. Leiby, 1985 WL 3239, *4 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (“the amount at stake is an objective fact, often asascertainable before as after the trial, and the good-faith test does not apply”), quoting City ofMilwaukee v. Saxbe, 546 F.2d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 1976).

[FN8]

Good faith

Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinnon Motors, LLC, 329 F.3d 805, 807 (11th Cir. 2003).

A.F.A. Tours, Inc. v. Whitchurch, 937 F.2d 82, 87–88 (2d Cir. 1991).

Burns v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 820 F.2d 246, 248 (8th Cir. 1987) (“While a plaintiff's goodfaith allegation is to be taken as true unless challenged, a plaintiff who has been challenged as to theamount in controversy has the burden of showing that the diversity jurisdiction requirements have beenmet.”).

Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

Fein v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 7, Yonkers, N. Y., 430 F.2d 376, 384 (2d Cir. 1970),judgment aff'd on other grounds, 405 U.S. 365, 92 S. Ct. 1062, 31 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1972).



Skudnov v. Nat. City Bank, 2010 WL 3069103, *1–2 (W.D. Ky. 2010).

Garcia v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co. of America, 2010 WL 2691692, *3 (D. Colo. 2010).

See also

“Thus even if no plaintiff will concede that the stakes exceed $75,000 or refuse to accept a cap onrecovery-neither option is helpful when removal is based on the cost to the defendant of an injunctionor other equitable relief-a defendant can satisfy the rule by supplying “a statement by each of thedefendants … that it is his, her or its good faith belief that the amount in controversy exceeds thejurisdictional amount.” Rubel v. Pfizer Inc., 361 F.3d 1016, 1018–1019 (7th Cir. 2004).

[FN9]

Damages actions

Macken ex rel. Macken v. Jensen, 333 F.3d 797, 800 (7th Cir. 2003).

[FN10]

Federal court's door

333 F.3d at 800–801.

[FN11]

Estimate the stakes

333 F.3d at 800–801.

[FN12]

Eleventh Circuit

Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1269 (11th Cir. 2000), quoting Ericsson GE MobileCommunications, Inc. v. Motorola Communications & Electronics, Inc., 120 F.3d 216, 221 (11th Cir.1997).

[FN13]

Another section

See § 3703.

[FN14]

Stated rule

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Com'n, 432 U.S. 333, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383(1977).



“In determining whether the requisite jurisdictional amount is in controversy, where it does not appearthat the complainant is deprived of its license or is prevented by the regulation from prosecuting itsbusiness, the question is not the value or net worth of the business, but the value of the right to be freefrom the regulation, and this may be measured by the loss, if any, that would follow the enforcement ofthe rule prescribed.” Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Lutz, 299 U.S. 300, 57 S. Ct. 215, 81 L. Ed. 251(1936) (per curiam).

McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. of Indiana, 298 U.S. 178, 56 S. Ct. 780, 80 L. Ed. 1135(1936) (loss following enforcement of prescribed rules).

Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 44 S. Ct. 257, 68 L. Ed. 596 (1924) (object of suit to enjoinenforcement of statute).

In an action to enjoin a bank from charging allegedly excessive fees, the court determined the amount incontroversy to be the difference in cost to the plaintiff between doing business with the fees in placeand doing business without them. In re Corestates Trust Fee Litigation, 39 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 1994).

Fred Harvey, Inc. v. Mooney, 526 F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1975).

Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1019, 95 S. Ct. 491, 42 L. Ed.2d 292 (1974).

Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841, 91 S. Ct. 82, 27 L. Ed. 2d 75(1970) (value of buildings free from rent control). Jurisdiction would be present in this case under 28U.S.C.A. § 1343(3), without regard to the amount in controversy. See § 3709.

Yoder v. Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck Indian Reservation, Mont., 339 F.2d 360 (9th Cir.1964).

“The applicable rule of the measure of damage is, then, … the amount of pecuniary loss that wouldresult to appellee if he is forced to do business in Lawton hampered by the expenses incident tocompliance with the city ordinance.” City of Lawton, Okl. v. Chapman, 257 F.2d 601, 605 (10th Cir.1958).

Jackson-Shaw Co. v. Jacksonville Aviation Authority, 510 F. Supp. 2d 691 (M.D. Fla. 2007), aff'd, 562F.3d 1166 (11th Cir. 2009).

Uni-Worth Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, Mississippi, 412 F. Supp. 349 (N.D. Miss. 1976).

Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York, 340 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D. N.Y. 1972), order aff'd, 468 F.2d 624(2d Cir. 1972).

The district court had jurisdiction over an action by the plaintiff oil corporation to enjoin theenforcement of a town zoning ordinance that prevented the plaintiff from constructing a gasoline stationon its property, since the requisite amount was provided by the difference in the value of the property ifa service station could be built on it. Saar v. Town of Davie, 308 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1969).

In a diversity suit for an injunction, the amount in controversy is determined by the value of the object



to be gained by the plaintiff. Hence, in an action to restrain the alleged violation of a covenant not tocompete, the measure of the amount in controversy is the profit that will be lost by the employer as aresult of the employee's breach of the covenant. Zep Mfg. Corp. v. Haber, 202 F. Supp. 847 (S.D. Tex.1962).

“In an injunction action, the amount in controversy is to be tested by the value of the right to beprotected and, in this case, the right to be protected against is the right of [the employer] … to be freefrom [the employee's] … competition to the extent of the terms of the contract.” Burndy Corp. v.Cahill, 196 F. Supp. 619, 622 (D. Minn. 1961), order vacated on other grounds, 301 F.2d 448 (8th Cir.1962).

See also

Suther v. City of Midfield, Inc., 358 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1966).

Compare

In a diversity suit for enforcement of a covenant not to compete, the value of the covenant is theplaintiff's anticipated future earnings for the duration of the covenant, which are based on prior earningsfor the same time period. Mailwaukee Mailing, Shipment and Equipment, Inc. v. Neopost, Inc., 259 F.Supp. 2d 769 (E.D. Wis. 2003), citing Wright, Miller & Cooper.

[FN15]

Potential harm

Siegerist v. Blaw-Knox Co., 414 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1969).

“It is also settled that, in an action to enjoin the enforcement of a regulation alleged to be invalidbecause of its continuing harmful effect upon the plaintiff, the jurisdictional amount is not determinedsolely by damages incurred prior to the suit, but also by loss likely to flow from continuedinterference.” Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp. v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 350 F.2d 1006, 1008 (8thCir. 1965) (Matthes, J.).

“In an equitable action for an injunction against irreparable injury, the amount in controversy isdetermined by the value of the property right sought to be protected against the alleged interference. …Translated into the facts of the instant case, that right is definable as plaintiff's alleged entitlementunder the employment contract to be free from the defendant's disclosure of its specified proprietarytrade secrets to a competitor in the United States for two years following severance of the employmentrelationship. While such a right is not susceptible of exact evaluation, the weight of authority intrademark-tradename and unfair competition suits generally permits evidence of potential, as well aspast, damages in arriving at the dollar value of the subject matter of the lawsuit.” Hulsenbusch v.Davidson Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 730, 733 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 977, 86 S. Ct. 545, 15L. Ed. 2d 468 (1966) (Mehaffy, J.).

Planning and Development Dept. v. Daughters of Union Veterans of Civil War, 2005 WL 3163393(E.D. Mich. 2005).



The value of the choice of management agent to the plaintiff limited liability company does not includeany portion of the value of the fees paid to the management company, even when the sole member ofthe plaintiff company and the president and sole shareholder of the management company are husbandand wife, respectively. The defendant's attempt to invoke state marital statutes to add one-half of thefees paid to the management company to the plaintiff's potential losses in calculating the amount incontroversy fails because it ignores the distinct legal status of the companies. Warren Loveland, LLCv. Keycorp Inv. L.P. IV, 2005 WL 1427707 (W.D. Wis. 2005).

Steinberg v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 91 F. Supp. 2d 540 (E.D. N.Y. 2000), citing Wright & Miller.

[FN16]

Specified period

Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Lutz, 299 U.S. 300, 57 S. Ct. 215, 81 L. Ed. 251 (1936).

[FN17]

Fee or tax

In May v. Supreme Court of Colorado, 508 F.2d 136 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008, 95S. Ct. 2631, 45 L. Ed. 2d 671 (1975), a class of attorneys sought to enjoin the enforcement of aColorado Rule of Procedure requiring lawyers to pay a $20 annual fee and imposing the sanction ofsuspension for noncompliance. The court held that the amount of the fee was in controversy not thevalue of their legal businesses.

[FN18]

Not penalty

Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 54 S. Ct. 700, 78 L. Ed. 1248 (1934).

See also

Washington & G.R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 146 U.S. 227, 13 S. Ct. 64, 36 L. Ed. 951 (1892).

[FN19]

McNutt case

298 U.S. 178, 56 S. Ct. 780, 80 L. Ed. 1135 (1936).

[FN20]

Statutes

Ever since the Supreme Court's decision in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 92 S. Ct.1113, 31 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1972), noted in 11 Duq.L.Rev. 686 (1973), 17 How.L.J. 17, 6 Ind.L.Rev. 566,22 DePaul L.Rev. 413 (1972), 41 Fordham L.Rev. 431, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 201, 24 Stan.L.Rev. 1134,



jurisdiction would exist in the McNutt case under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(3) without regard to the amountin controversy.

[FN21]

Lost profits

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Com'n, 432 U.S. 333, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383(1977), citing Wright, Miller & Cooper (losses to Washington apple growers caused by NorthCarolina statute prohibiting showing of Washington apple grades).

Gibson v. Jeffers, 478 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1973).

Hedberg v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.2d 924 (8th Cir. 1965).

Buckeye Recyclers v. CHEP USA, 228 F. Supp. 2d 818 (S.D. Ohio 2002).

Barrette v. City of Marinette, 440 F. Supp. 1277 (E.D. Wis. 1977).

“Plaintiff's gross income of approximately $115,000 from defendant's 1961 sales is also a neutral factinsofar as it does not reflect true benefit to the plaintiff from defendant's services.” Zep Mfg. Corp. v.Haber, 202 F. Supp. 847, 848 (S.D. Tex. 1962) (Ingraham, J.).

Often the cases are neither clear nor precise as to this point. See, e.g., Puente de Reynosa, S. A. v. Cityof McAllen, 357 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1966), in which the court appears merely to refer to annual profitsrather than net income and Scalise v. Nat. Utility Service, 120 F.2d 938 (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1941), inwhich the court appears to refer to the value of the plaintiff's business rather than the change in valuedue to the alleged infringement of its trade name. Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Masonic Hosp. Ass'n ofPayne County, Okl., 191 F. Supp. 51 (W.D. Okla. 1961), is to the same effect. See also Clark v. Cityof Fremont, Nebraska, 377 F. Supp. 327 (D. Neb. 1974).

[FN22]

Another case

KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269, 57 S. Ct. 197, 81 L. Ed. 183 (1936).


[FN23]

Upheld

The value to the plaintiff of the rights that he seeks to protect is the measure of jurisdiction in equitycases, even though the value of that right may not be capable of exact valuation in money. PremierIndus. Corp. v. Texas Indus. Fastener Co., 450 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1971).

Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp. v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 350 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1965).



“This court has recognized that, although injury in an injunction suit may not be capable of exactvaluation in money, this fact of itself does not negative federal jurisdiction.” Hedberg v. State FarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.2d 924, 929 (8th Cir. 1965) (Blackmun, J.).

City of Memphis, Tenn. v. Ingram, 195 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1952).

Miller v. McEachern, 2008 WL 413630 (N.D. Tex. 2008).

Great Lakes Spice Co. v. GB Seasonings, Inc., 2005 WL 1028177 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (value of covenantnot to compete used to calculate amount in controversy).

Mailwaukee Mailing, Shipment and Equipment, Inc. v. Neopost, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 769 (E.D. Wis.2003), citing Wright, Miller & Cooper.

“It has been recognized by the courts that in an injunction action, the injury, if any, is not susceptible ofexact valuation in monetary terms. … [But] it appears, at least at this stage of the proceeding, that thereis a present probability that [plaintiff] … could suffer damages in excess of $10,000.” Burndy Corp. v.Cahill, 196 F. Supp. 619, 623 (D. Minn. 1961), order vacated on other grounds, 301 F.2d 448 (8th Cir.1962) (Devitt, C.J.).

See also

Administrative and clerical costs of complying with an injunction that are conceivable but not probableare not considered in the measurement of the amount in controversy. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.,Tires Products Liability Litigation, 256 F. Supp. 2d 884 (S.D. Ind. 2003).

[FN24]

Termination

Premier Indus. Corp. v. Texas Indus. Fastener Co., 450 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1971).

Hedberg v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.2d 924 (8th Cir. 1965).


Zimmer-Hatfield, Inc. v. Wolf, 843 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. W. Va. 1994).

Zep Mfg. Corp. v. Haber, 202 F. Supp. 847 (S.D. Tex. 1962).

[FN25]

Analogous

Zep Mfg. Corp. v. Haber, 202 F. Supp. 847, 848 (S.D. Tex. 1962).

[FN26]

Net worth



Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 59 S. Ct. 725, 83 L. Ed. 1111 (1939).

McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. of Indiana, 298 U.S. 178, 56 S. Ct. 780, 80 L. Ed. 1135(1936).

Seven-Up Co. v. Blue Note, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ill. 1958), judgment aff'd, 260 F.2d 584 (7thCir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 966, 79 S. Ct. 878, 3 L. Ed. 2d 835 (1959).

But see

In an action by an automobile dealer challenging the manufacturer's termination of a franchiseagreement, the value of the automobile dealership exceeded the amount in controversy requirementeven though the dealership had reported negative net worth because the dealership had nearly $56million in annual sales, made over $7 million in gross profit on those sales, and had total assets of$16,482,315. Lanham Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d 691 (D. Md. 2003), judgmentaff'd, 101 Fed. Appx. 381 (4th Cir. 2004).

[FN27]

Cost of compliance


Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 59 S. Ct. 725, 83 L. Ed. 1111 (1939).

Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 44 S. Ct. 257, 68 L. Ed. 596 (1924).

Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 605 F.2d 1155 (10th Cir. 1979).

Harris v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Utah 1999).

Asten v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 914 F. Supp. 430 (D. Kan. 1996).

Paradise Distributors, Inc. v. Evansville Brewing Co., Inc., 906 F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Okla. 1995).

In an action by owners and operators of licensed taxicabs, a preliminary injunction was sought againstthe enforcement of a city ordinance requiring exhaust emission control for licensed taxicabs. Therequisite amount existed since the plaintiffs could be forced to purchase more expensive gasoline or toinstall costly emission control devices, and these expenses over a period of time, could amount to$10,000 even for a small fleet owner. Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York, 340 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), order aff'd, 468 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1972).

But see

Diversified Mortg., Inc. v. Merscorp, Inc., 2010 WL 1793632, *2 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (underlying value ofproperty was proper measure of amount in controversy, not plaintiff's future collection strategies tocomply with possible order).



[FN28]

Another approach

Schering Corp. v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 320 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1963).

Ambassador East, Inc. v. Orsatti, Inc., 257 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1958).

Seaboard Finance Co. v. Martin, 244 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1957).

Barrette v. City of Marinette, 440 F. Supp. 1277 (E.D. Wis. 1977).

“The test of the jurisdictional amount when only an injunction is sought in a trade name case is not thedamage to plaintiff but the value of the name or business good will which plaintiff seeks to protect.”American Plan Corp. v. State Loan & Finance Corp., 278 F. Supp. 846, 848 (D. Del. 1968) (Steel, J.).

Tiffany & Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836 (D. Mass. 1964).

Coca-Cola Co. v. Foods, Inc., 220 F. Supp. 101 (D.S.D. 1963).

Murphey v. G. C. Murphy Co., 216 F. Supp. 124 (W.D. La. 1963).

Parke, Davis & Co. v. Jarvis Drug Co., 208 F. Supp. 350 (S.D. N.Y. 1962).

The value of the good will of the plaintiff, seeking a halt to the defendant's sale of the plaintiff'strademarked products is the measure of the amount in controversy for purposes of federal jurisdiction.Upjohn Co. v. Barbarand Merchandise Corp., 207 F. Supp. 585 (S.D. N.Y. 1960).

Johnson & Johnson v. Wagonfeld, 206 F. Supp. 30 (S.D. N.Y. 1960).

Youngs Rubber Corp. v. Dart Drug Corp. of Md., 175 F. Supp. 832 (D. Md. 1959).

See also

In Premier Indus. Corp. v. Texas Indus. Fastener Co., 450 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1971), the court suggeststhat the value of an earlier damage suit involving a similar covenant not to compete dismissed withprejudice by the plaintiff in consideration for a settlement agreement with the defendant could be usedas a basis for determining the amount in controversy.

Zep Mfg. Corp. v. Haber, 202 F. Supp. 847 (S.D. Tex. 1962).

But compare

Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. New Cut Rate Liquors, Inc., 245 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355U.S. 837, 78 S. Ct. 61, 2 L. Ed. 2d 48 (1957).

Seven-Up Co. v. Blue Note, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ill. 1958), judgment aff'd, 260 F.2d 584 (7thCir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 966, 79 S. Ct. 878, 3 L. Ed. 2d 835 (1959) (pecuniary loss toplaintiff's good will, not value of good will, is measure of amount in controversy).



Pure Oil Co. v. Puritan Oil Co., 39 F. Supp. 68 (D. Conn. 1941), judgment rev'd on other grounds, 127F.2d 6 (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1942).

[FN29]

Advertising

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Com'n, 432 U.S. 333, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383(1977) (cost of new advertising to restore competitive advantage considered).

Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith Kline & French Laboratories, 207 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1953).

Hanson v. Triangle Publications, 163 F.2d 74 (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 855, 68 S.Ct. 387, 92 L. Ed. 424 (1948).

American Plan Corp. v. State Loan & Finance Corp., 278 F. Supp. 846 (D. Del. 1968).


[FN30]

Unfair competition cases

See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Barbarand Merchandise Corp., 207 F. Supp. 585 (S.D. N.Y. 1960).

[FN31]

Entire value

John B. Kelly, Inc. v. Lehigh Nav. Coal Co., 151 F.2d 743 (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S.779, 66 S. Ct. 530, 90 L. Ed. 1007 (1946) (this case seems to misconstrue several Supreme Courtdecisions on this point).

Diversified Mortg., Inc. v. Merscorp, Inc., 2010 WL 1793632, *2 (M.D. Fla. 2010).

In a suit by a shareholder to obtain production of a list of shareholders to be used in a proxy fight toelect his slate of directors, the court held that since the value of the injunction ordering production wasdifficult to calculate, the reasoned approach to measuring value is by reference to the entire value of theplaintiff's shares. Rockwell v. SCM Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D. N.Y. 1980).

Mid-America Pipe Line Co. v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 298 F. Supp. 1112 (D. Kan. 1969).

Tiffany & Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836 (D. Mass. 1964).

Coca-Cola Co. v. Foods, Inc., 220 F. Supp. 101 (D.S.D. 1963).

Burndy Corp. v. Cahill, 196 F. Supp. 619 (D. Minn. 1961), order vacated on other grounds, 301 F.2d448 (8th Cir. 1962).

Upjohn Co. v. Barbarand Merchandise Corp., 207 F. Supp. 585 (S.D. N.Y. 1960).




Youngs Rubber Corp. v. Dart Drug Corp. of Md., 175 F. Supp. 832 (D. Md. 1959) (recognizing twoapproaches to valuation of amount in controversy—past and potential harm to right sought to beprotected and value of good will).

When the question presented in an action by a stockholder against a corporation was whether four of itsdirectors were to be re-elected for a period of three years, in view of the alleged defects in the proxiesof a certain group, the matter in controversy was the value of the property to be protected. This valuewas at least the value of the plaintiff stockholder's share in the company, control or partial control ofwhich might depend upon the outcome of the election, and when the value of that share far exceeded$3,000, jurisdiction was present. Textron, Inc. v. American Woolen Co., 122 F. Supp. 305 (D. Mass.1954).

See also

Myers v. Long Island Lighting Co., 623 F. Supp. 1076 (E.D. N.Y. 1985).

Weeks v. American Dredging Co., 451 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1978).

But see

Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. New Cut Rate Liquors, Inc., 245 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355U.S. 837, 78 S. Ct. 61, 2 L. Ed. 2d 48 (1957).

In an action by a trademark owner for damages and injunctive relief against the defendant allegedlypassing off its beverage as the plaintiff's product, the defendant's conduct, although it may have resultedin a loss of the plaintiff's customers, constituted only an injury to the plaintiff's good will rather than athreat of complete destruction of the good will. Thus, the plaintiff could not rely on the value of thegood will to establish the amount in controversy, but only on the damage sustained or threatened by thedefendant's conduct. Seven-Up Co. v. Blue Note, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ill. 1958), judgmentaff'd, 260 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 966, 79 S. Ct. 878, 3 L. Ed. 2d 835 (1959).

Pure Oil Co. v. Puritan Oil Co., 39 F. Supp. 68 (D. Conn. 1941), judgment rev'd on other grounds, 127F.2d 6 (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1942).

[FN32]

Cannot be reconciled

“The ‘amount in controversy’ issue poses a more troublesome problem. A conflict of authorities exists,compare Seagram Distillers Corp. v. New Cut Rate Liquors … with Youngs Rubber Corp. v. Dart DrugCo. …. In view of the many fair-trade cases decided by this court in the past and entertained on appealwithout discussion of the question of jurisdiction, I am unwilling to enter a determination which wouldeffectively bar this type of litigation from a federal forum. I therefore hold that the value of theplaintiff's good will is the appropriate yardstick ….” Upjohn Co. v. Barbarand Merchandise Corp., 207F. Supp. 585, 586 (S.D. N.Y. 1960) (Palmieri, J.).



[FN33]

Trespass cases

See the text at notes 13 to 16 in § 3702.5

[FN34]

Some suggestion

Ilsen & Sardell, The Monetary Minimum in Federal Court Jurisdiction, 29 St. John's L.Rev. 1, 24-25(1954).

Note, Federal Courts: Jurisdictional Amount in Injunction Suits in Federal District Courts, 25Calif.L.Rev. 336 (1937).

See also

City of Lawton, Okl. v. Chapman, 257 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1958).

John B. Kelly, Inc. v. Lehigh Nav. Coal Co., 151 F.2d 743 (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S.779, 66 S. Ct. 530, 90 L. Ed. 1007 (1946).

Note, Federal Jurisdictional Amount: Determination of the Matter in Controversy, 73 Harv.L.Rev.1369, 1375 (1960).

[FN35]

1977 decision


[FN36]

Requisite $10,000

432 U.S. at 348, 97 S.Ct. at 2444 (Burger, C.J.).

[FN37]

Earning capacity

Restricting the jurisdictional amount in a diversity action for wrongful discharge to the actual wagesthat an employee might have earned to the next termination date of the collective bargaining agreementwas error, since the employee may have been deprived of other compensable benefits and there was nosubstantial reason to assume that the collective bargaining agreement would not have continued beyondthe next termination date. Martin v. Ethyl Corp., 341 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1965).

Friedman v. Intern. Ass'n of Machinists, 220 F.2d 808, 95 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 824,



76 S. Ct. 51, 100 L. Ed. 736 (1955).

Odell v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 201 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 941, 73 S.Ct. 833, 97 L. Ed. 1367 (1953).

An employee discharged after working four months under a contract, terminable at will by either party,which called for a $15,000 yearly salary, was not lacking the requisite jurisdictional amount in a breachof contract action. Uriarte v. Perez-Molina, 434 F. Supp. 76, 78 n. 5 (D.D.C. 1977).

When a case involves a denial of employment or dismissal from employment, the amount incontroversy may be met by considering the value of the job in question over the indefinite future or forthe rest of the employee's work expectancy. Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158 (C.D. Cal.1977), judgment vacated on other grounds, 436 U.S. 901, 98 S. Ct. 2228, 56 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1978).

The district court had jurisdiction of a suit for an injunction by a draft registrant who, if he reported forcivilian work as a conscientious objector would earn approximately $7,500 during the 24 month period,but if he remained at his current employment would earn approximately $19,000 to $21,000, since thedifference between the two salaries exceeded $10,000. Rheingans v. Clark, 314 F. Supp. 1398 (N.D.Cal. 1968).

See also

In Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970), a similar principle was relied upon to find the requisiteamount in a suit by a private challenging the authority of his superiors to order him to Vietnam.

Gainey v. Broth. of Ry. and S. S. Clerks, Freight Handlers, Exp. and Station Emp., 177 F. Supp. 421(E.D. Pa. 1959), judgment aff'd, 275 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 811, 80 S. Ct.1248, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1153 (1960).

[FN38]

Friedman case

220 F.2d 808, 95 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 824, 76 S. Ct. 51, 100 L. Ed. 736 (1955).

[FN39]

Limited

A federal district court had jurisdiction under the section governing federal question jurisdiction of asuit for an injunction by a draft registrant who, if he reported for civilian work for the required periodwould earn approximately $7,500 during twenty-four months, but who, if he remained at his currentemployment would earn $19,000 to $21,000, since the difference between the two salaries exceeded therequisite jurisdictional amount. Rheingans v. Clark, 314 F. Supp. 1398 (N.D. Cal. 1968).

[FN40]

Collateral effect



This rule is discussed in § 3702.5.

[FN41]

Measurement

Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 59 S. Ct. 744, 83 L. Ed. 1001 (1939).

The leading case on this point clearly is the Supreme Court's decision in Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263,54 S. Ct. 700, 78 L. Ed. 1248 (1934).

In an action by a labor organizer and a union to enjoin a municipality from instituting or prosecutingcriminal proceedings under an ordinance requiring labor organizers to pay a license tax of $1,000 plus$100 a day thereafter, the initial fee and probable liability for the daily fee for 21 days made the actioninvolve the $3,000 minimum jurisdictional amount under the statute giving federal courts jurisdiction ofactions arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States. Denton v. City of Carrollton, Ga.,235 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1956).

The commuted value of future taxes may not be considered when it is merely “possible” that thetaxpayer will suffer future harm in an amount sufficient to satisfy the statutory test. M & M Transp.Co. v. City of New York, 186 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1950).

Flato Realty Invs. v. City of Big Spring, 388 F. Supp. 131 (N.D. Tex. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 519F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1975).

Allanson v. Camp, 324 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ga. 1971).

When the regulations complained of by motor carriers, challenging the validity of a Tennessee advalorem tax statute, clearly were incidental to the taxing aspect of the statute, the amount in controversyfor the purpose of determining whether the federal court had jurisdiction was the amount of the tax andnot the cost of complying with the statute. Alterman Transport Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Com'n ofTenn., 259 F. Supp. 486 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), judgment aff'd, 386 U.S. 262, 87 S. Ct. 1023, 18 L. Ed. 2d39 (1967).

Detroit Edison Co. v. East China Tp. School Dist. No. 3, 247 F. Supp. 296, 304 (E.D. Mich. 1965),judgment aff'd, 378 F.2d 225 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 932, 88 S. Ct. 296, 19 L. Ed. 2d284 (1967).

In an action by a bridge user and taxpayer and by an alleged unincorporated association of bridge usersto enjoin the collection of tolls on a bridge, that was formerly a free bridge, the amount of tollsexpected to be paid by each plaintiff during the period of litigation was the measure of the amount incontroversy for the purpose of determining jurisdiction. Greater Hartford Free Bridge Ass'n v. GreaterHartford Bridge Authority, 172 F. Supp. 244 (D. Conn. 1958), judgment aff'd, 265 F.2d 656 (2d Cir.1959).

[FN42]

Consequences of not paying



May v. Supreme Court of Colorado, 508 F.2d 136 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008, 95 S.Ct. 2631, 45 L. Ed. 2d 671 (1975) (described in note 18).

Moreover, a penalty for nonpayment of the tax is not includible in the matter in controversy, unless asuit is brought to restrain the imposition of a penalty already accrued. Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263,268, 54 S. Ct. 700, 702, 78 L. Ed. 1248 (1934). See also M & M Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 186F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1950) (amount of tax levied, including penalties, was less than jurisdictional amount).When penalties for failing to comply with reporting procedures of an ad valorem tax statute were notautomatic, but enforceable only on request of the Public Service Commission, the possibility thatpenalties would be invoked was too speculative to be taken into account for the purpose of determiningthe jurisdictional amount. Alterman Transport Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Com'n of Tenn., 259 F.Supp. 486 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), judgment aff'd, 386 U.S. 262, 87 S. Ct. 1023, 18 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1967).

[FN43]

Reasons

Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270, 54 S. Ct. 700, 78 L. Ed. 1248 (1934).

[FN44]

Exception

Berryman v. Bd. of Trustees of Whitman College, 222 U.S. 334, 32 S. Ct. 147, 56 L. Ed. 225 (1912).

Deposit Bank of Frankfort v. Bd. of Councilmen of City of Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499, 24 S. Ct. 154, 48L. Ed. 276 (1903).

City of New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank of Louisiana, 167 U.S. 371, 17 S. Ct. 905, 42 L. Ed. 202 (1897).

[FN45]

Criticized

Ilsen & Sardell, The Monetary Minimum in Federal Court Jurisdiction, 29 St. John's L.Rev. 1, 27(1954).

Note, Federal Courts: Jurisdictional Amount in Injunction Suits in Federal District Courts, 25Calif.L.Rev. 336, 344 (1937).

Note, The Jurisdictional Amount in Federal Court Proceedings to Enjoin Action of State Officers, 48Harv.L.Rev. 95, 99 (1934).

[FN46]

Installment contracts

These cases are discussed in § 3710.



[FN47]

Similar principle

Scott v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 243, 40 S. Ct. 503, 64 L. Ed. 883 (1920).

Colvin v. City of Jacksonville, 158 U.S. 456, 15 S. Ct. 866, 39 L. Ed. 1053 (1895).

El Paso Water Co. v. City of El Paso, 152 U.S. 157, 14 S. Ct. 494, 38 L. Ed. 396 (1894).

Vraney v. County of Pinellas, 250 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1958).

Preece v. Physicians Surgical Care, Inc., 2006 WL 1470268 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (in action for declaratoryrelief amount in controversy is value of right to be protected).

Coregis Ins. Co. v. Schuster, 127 F. Supp. 2d 683 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (in declaratory action on insurancecontract, amount in controversy is determined by value of underlying legal claims for which insurancecoverage is sought, and is not restricted by policy limits).

In Wallace v. City of Rock Island, 198 F. Supp. 73 (S.D. Ill. 1961), judgment aff'd, 303 F.2d 637 (7thCir. 1962), the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant city, which had erected an interstate tollbridge, to compel the city to use the toll revenues only as authorized by federal authority. The plaintiffwas a holder of bonds issued to finance construction of the bridge. The court held that the plaintifffailed to show that the requisite amount was in controversy since there was no allegation that the bondsor the interest coupons thereon had not been paid when they became due.

But compare

Brown v. Trousdale, 138 U.S. 389, 11 S. Ct. 308, 34 L. Ed. 987 (1891).

[FN48]

Declaratory judgment actions

See § 3710.

Hartford Ins. Group v. Lou-Con Inc., 293 F.3d 908 (5th Cir. 2002).

Dixon v. Edwards, 290 F.3d 699 (4th Cir. 2002) (value of contract that is declared null and void).

Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1976) (declaration of unconstitutionality of ban against nudebathing).

Fred Harvey, Inc. v. Mooney, 526 F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1975) (declaration relating to petition to prohibitsale of alcoholic beverages).

Beacon Const. Co., Inc. v. Matco Elec. Co., Inc., 521 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1975) (value of consequencesthat may result from litigation).

Siewak v. AmSouth Bank, 2006 WL 3391222 (M.D. Fla. 2006).



As to a declaratory judgment involving a duty to defend under an insurance policy, the value of theclaim is limited to the potential costs of defense; potential damages in the underlying lawsuit should notbe considered. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Commercial Property Associates, Inc., 2005 WL 1126883(N.D. Ill. 2005).

Concorde Financial Corp. v. Value Line, Inc., 2004 WL 287658 (S.D. N.Y. 2004) (noting value ofrelief sought by original plaintiff was proper focus).

Buckeye Recyclers v. CHEP USA, 228 F. Supp. 2d 818 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (economic value of legalrights put into issue by assertion of claims).

Broth. Mut. Ins. Co. v. United Apostolic Lighthouse, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 689 (E.D. Ky. 2002).

Household Bank v. JFS Group, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (M.D. Ala. 2002), judgment vacated on othergrounds, 320 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2003).

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ciccarella, 2002 WL 827138 (E.D. Pa. 2002).

Wolfe v. Lincoln General Ins. Co., 2002 WL 484638 (S.D. Ohio 2002).

Foundation for Interior Design Educ. Research v. Savannah College of Art and Design, 39 F. Supp. 2d889 (W.D. Mich. 1998), aff'd, 244 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2001).

Bailey v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Ottawa, 467 F. Supp. 1139 (C.D. Ill. 1979) (rejected onother grounds by, Smart v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Detroit, 500 F. Supp. 1147 (E.D. Mich.1980)).

The value of the consequences of the decision in an action for a declaratory judgment interpreting alicensing agreement exceeded the jurisdictional amount inasmuch as it would provide a partial orcomplete defense to the defendant's claim that the plaintiff owed it about $1,000,000 in back royalties.Forbo-Giubiasco, S. A. v. Congoleum Corp., 463 F. Supp. 1243 (S.D. N.Y. 1979).

In an action by an injured party against an insurer for a judgment declaring that a release agreementexecuted by the parties was invalid because it was procured through fraud, the amount in controversywas not the $1000 paid to the injured party by the insurer in exchange for the release, but the value ofthe plaintiff's personal injury claim against the insured in the event that the release was declared void.Hill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 453 F. Supp. 1342 (E.D. Va. 1978) (jurisdiction denied on other grounds).

When a journal editor sought, in an action against the publisher, a determination that the right tocopyright future issues of the journal belonged to the editor and alleged that that right was worthbetween $14,000 and $43,000, the federal court did have subject matter jurisdiction over the action.Freeman v. Gordon & Breach, Science Publishers, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 519 (S.D. N.Y. 1975).

The amount in controversy, in an action for a judgment declaring an agreement not to compete invalidand to recover the amount paid under protest by the plaintiff as the defendant's franchisee, exceeded$10,000 when the liquidated damages provision of the agreement could require payment of more than$80,000 for breach of an agreement not to compete. Fine v. Property Damage Appraisers, Inc., 393 F.Supp. 1304 (E.D. La. 1975).



See also the cases cited in note 3.

Compare

DiTolla v. Doral Dental IPA of New York, 469 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 2006) (in dentist's state-court classaction against administrator of Medicare-and Medicaid-funded reimbursement pool, seeking accountingof amounts by which pool had been funded and reduced throughout specified period, in order todetermine possibility of bilking by administrator, amount in controversy was not entire amount bywhich pool had been funded and reduced, and in fact amount in controversy was indeterminable,precluding removal; complaint did not specify amount in controversy and did not lay claim to pool, butrather sought only accounting).

[FN49]

Installment contracts

See the discussion in § 3710.

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FPP § 3708

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FPP § 3708 Page 1 14AA Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3708 ......Federal Practice & Procedure Database updated April 2013 Jurisdiction And Related Matters The Late Charles Alan Wright[a232],