Fowler Phish

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  • 7/30/2019 Fowler Phish

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    System Maintenance: Please verify your details

    Or bloody scammers, theyre at it again

    IT Services, Loughborough University1

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    System Maintenance: Please verify your details

    From: [email protected]: [email protected]

    Date: Thu, 28 May 2009 09:00:00 +0100

    Subject: SOME-UNI.AC.UK WEBMAIL MAINTENANCE

    Dear E-mail User,

    To complete your Account Verification process, you are to reply this

    message and enter your Username and Password respectively in the space

    provided below this email.You are required to do this before the next

    48hrs of receipt of this e-mail, or your mail Account will be

    de-activated and erased from our Database. Your account can also be

    verified at:

    https://student.some-uni.ac.uk/webmail/

    Enter Username ( )

    Enter Password ( )

    Thank you for using SOME-UNI.AC.UK WEBMAIL

    IT Services, Loughborough University2

    mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]://student-webmail.lboro.ac.uk/webmail/https://student-webmail.lboro.ac.uk/webmail/https://student-webmail.lboro.ac.uk/webmail/https://student-webmail.lboro.ac.uk/webmail/mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]
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    Todays session

    Evolution of spam Defences

    Our new approach to spear phishing

    IT Services, Loughborough University3

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    Originally no more than an irritation

    Marketing, sales relatively innocuous

    Developed over the years

    advance fee fraud, lottery scams etc

    still money-related in the main

    Now much more sinister

    Evolution of spam

    Loughborough University4

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    Huge volume

    Huge numbers

    of machines

    Volume

    Loughborough University5

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    Defence in depth

    Filtering as messages arrive Network level

    Protocol level

    DNSBLs

    IP, Netblock, AS Reputation checks

    Signatures (DCC Servers for example)

    Anti Virus

    Content scanning

    Heuristics

    ...

    Whats next? (Not the FUSSP, thats for sure)

    How do we keep up?

    IT Services, Loughborough University6

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    A New Approach

    We cant control the input properly...

    ...but (fanfare): we can control the output.

    ...we can then protect our systems and users

    Our solution is called Kochi:

    http://oss.lboro.ac.uk/

    IT Services, Loughborough University7

    http://oss.lboro.ac.uk/http://oss.lboro.ac.uk/
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    Kochi How it works

    Content scanning of outbound messages

    Outbound == traversing our mail routing

    infrastructure Message passed during SMTP transaction by

    MTA to a filter daemon (written in Perl)

    Uses ClamAVs daemon API

    Already accessible to a large number of MTAapplications

    Simple pass/fail result, with details

    IT Services, Loughborough University8

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    How it works in more detail

    First search for key words (big, complex

    regex) such as

    user, username, pass, password

    If keywords found (or skipped), tokenise emailinto candidate user/pass strings

    Our defined password policy gives us a regex:

    ## Regular expression matching valid passwords

    my $regex = qr{

    (?: (?=\S*?[a-z])(?=\S*?[A-Z])(?=\S*?[0-9])

    | (?=\S*?[a-z])(?=\S*?[A-Z])(?=\S*?[^a-zA-Z0-9\s])

    | (?=\S*?[A-Z])(?=\S*?[0-9])(?=\S*?[^a-zA-Z0-9\s])

    )[-0-9a-zA-Z_=\+\!"\$\%^\&\*\(\)\[\]\{\}\\;:\'\@#~\/\?\.,\|\`]{6,}

    }x;

    Likewise for usernames (big regex!)

    IT Services, Loughborough University9

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    Token Pair Authentication

    Can hook into all manner of authentication

    schemes (did I say its written in Perl?)

    If PAM available

    combine auth schemes

    check multiple auth backends

    abstract methodology tailored to platform

    Pass/Fail is cached to limit impact on authbackend

    If authentication succeeds...

    IT Services, Loughborough University10

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    Acting on detection results

    ...your choice of action

    Dont bounce or reject the message!

    We discard the message and generate an

    autoreply in a standard format:Your message with subject "$h_Subject:", contained a valid Loughborough

    University username and password.

    The message has not been sent.

    Usernames and passwords must never be disclosed by e-mail.

    If you feel you have received this message in error, please forward this

    message to [email protected]

    --

    IT Services

    IT Services, Loughborough University11

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    Side effects - good

    Not only stops phishing

    Enforces local policy

    Acceptable Use

    Security

    Good IT practice

    ...some users try to brute-force around it!

    IT Services, Loughborough University12

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    Side effects - bad

    Difficult to utilise in systems with lockout after

    repeated failures

    Accounts will be locked!

    ...can use abstraction in certain systems

    Windows Server 2008 AD has fine grained

    password security policies but can still be a

    problem

    Makes it near impossible to send passwords

    for user registered services

    IT Services, Loughborough University13

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    Some statistics

    IT Services, Loughborough University14

    0.00

    2.00

    4.00

    6.00

    8.00

    10.00

    12.00

    14.00

    16.00

    18.00

    20.00

    16/02/2009

    26/02/2009

    08/03/2009

    18/03/2009

    28/03/2009

    07/04/2009

    17/04/2009

    27/04/2009

    07/05/2009

    17/05/2009

    7-day average

    Count

    3rd & 4th March -

    66 and 13

    detections

    respectively dueto registration on

    non-IT ServicesSystem

    30th Mar - phish

    to 1000 recipients,

    0 responses

    16th May - phish

    to 1600 recipients,

    3 responses

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    Summary

    Spam, phishing very difficult to stop

    Concentrate where possible on detection of

    responses Kochi can help!

    http://oss.lboro.ac.uk/kochi1.html

    Graeme Fowler, [email protected]

    IT Services, Loughborough University15

    http://oss.lboro.ac.uk/kochi1.htmlhttp://oss.lboro.ac.uk/kochi1.html