G.R. No. 132223June 19, 2001BONIFACIA P. VANCIL,petitioner,vs.HELEN G. BELMES,respondent.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,J.:Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45650, "In the Matter of Guardianship of Minors Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Bonifacia P. Vancil, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. Helen G. Belmes, Oppositor-Appellant," promulgated on July 29, 1997, and its Resolution dated December 18, 1997 denying the motion for reconsideration of the said Decision.The facts of the case as summarized by the Court of Appeals in its Decision are:"Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United States of America who died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two (2) children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes."Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB. At the time, Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was a 2-year old child. It is claimed in the petition that the minors are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and have an estate consisting of proceeds from their fathers death pension benefits with a probable value of P100,000.00."Finding sufficiency in form and in substance, the case was set for hearing after a 3-consecutive-weekly publications with the Sunstar Daily."On July 15, 1987, petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr."On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship under Special Proceedings No. 2819 before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City."Thereafter, on June 27, 1988, Helen Belmes followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors at Maralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing; that the petition was filed under an improper venue; and that at the time the petition was filed Bonifacia Vancil was a resident of 140 Hurliman Court, Canon City, Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen."On October 12, 1988, after due proceedings, the trial court rejected and denied Belmes motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and instead ordered petitioner Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office and perform her duties as such guardian upon the posting of a bond of P50,000.00. The subsequent attempt for a reconsideration was likewise dismissed in an Order dated November 24, 1988."1On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision reversing the RTC order of October 12, 1988 and dismissing Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB.The Court of Appeals held:"Stress should likewise be made that our Civil Code considers parents, the father, or in the absence, the mother, as natural guardian of her minor children. The law on parental authority under the Civil Code or P.D. 603 and now the New Family Code, (Article 225 of the Family Code) ascribe to the same legal pronouncements. Section 7 of Rule 93 of the Revised Rules of Court confirms the designation of the parents as ipso facto guardian of their minor children without need of a court appointment and only for good reason may another person be named. Ironically, for the petitioner, there is nothing on record of any reason at all why Helen Belmes, the biological mother, should be deprived of her legal rights as natural guardian of her minor children. To give away such privilege from Helen would be an abdication and grave violation of the very basic fundamental tenets in civil law and the constitution on family solidarity."2On March 10, 1998, Bonifacia Vancil filed with this Court the present petition, raising the following "legal points":"1. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that the preferential right of a parent to be appointed guardian over the persons and estate of the minors is absolute, contrary to existing jurisprudence."2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that Oppositor Helen G. Belmes, the biological mother, should be appointed the guardian of the minors despite the undisputed proof that under her custody, her daughter minor Valerie Vancil was raped seven times by Oppositors live-in partner."3. The respondent (sic) Court of Appeals gravely erred when it disqualified petitioner Bonifacia P. Vancil to be appointed as judicial guardian over the persons and estate of subject minors despite the fact that she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications as judicial guardian, merely on the basis of her U.S. citizenship which is clearly not a statutory requirement to become guardian."At the outset, let it be stressed that in her "Manifestation/Motion," dated September 15, 1998, respondent Helen Belmes stated that her daughter Valerie turned eighteen on September 2, 1998 as shown by her Birth Certificate.3Respondent thus prayed that this case be dismissed with respect to Valerie, she being no longer a proper subject of guardianship proceedings. The said "Manifestation/Motion" was noted by this Court in its Resolution dated November 11, 1998.Considering that Valerie is already of major age, this petition has become moot with respect to her. Thus, only the first and third "legal points" raised by petitioner should be resolved.The basic issue for our resolution is who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code which provides:"Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. InSagala-Eslao vs. Court of Appeals,4this Court held:"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship."Petitioner contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent.Petitioners claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way ofsubstitute parental authoritypursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus:"Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx."InSantos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals,5this Court ruled:"The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent,the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent."Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minors guardian, respondents unsuitability. Petitioner, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her (respondents) live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian.Moreover, we observe that respondents allegation that petitioner has not set foot in the Philippines since 1987 has not been controverted by her. Besides, petitioners old age and her conviction of libel by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CBU-168846filed by one Danilo R. Deen, will give her a second thought of staying here. Indeed, her coming back to this country just to fulfill the duties of a guardian to Vincent for only two years is not certain.

Significantly, this Court has held that courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards. InGuerrero vs. Teran,7this Court held:"Doa Maria Muoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed upon the theory that her appointment was void because she did not reside in the Philippine Islands. There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here."WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification in the sense that Valerie, who has attained the age of majority, will no longer be under the guardianship of respondent Helen Belmes.Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 73831February 27, 1987REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS,petitioners,vs.HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and CITY OF ZAMBOANGA,respondents.

CRUZ,J.:The instant case presents an issue of first impression, the respondent court having decided a question of substance not heretofore determined by this Court. The matter is now before Us in this petition for review praying for the reversal of the decision below escheating a parcel of land in favor of the City of Zamboanga.The property in dispute was among the lands taken over by the United States Government under the Philippine Property Act of 1946 enacted by the American Congress. It was registered in 1930 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9509 of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga in the name of Kantiro Koyama, a Japanese national, who has not been heard from since the end of World War II.1Under the said Act, the land was supposed to be transferred to the Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to its Section 3 reading as follows:All property vested in or transferred to the President of the United States, the Alien Property Custodian, or any such officer or agency as the President of the United States may designate under the Trading with the Enemy act, as amended, which was located in the Philippines at the time of such vesting, or the proceeds thereof, and which shall remain after the satisfaction of any claim payable under the Trading with the Enemy Act, costs and expenses of administration as may by law be charged against such property or proceeds, shall be transferred by the president of the United States to the Republic of the Philippines.The transfer was never made, however, and the property remained registered in the name of Koyama. Nevertheless, the lot has since 1978 been covered by Tax Declaration No. 42644 in the name of the Republic of the Philippines with the Board of Liquidators as administrator.2Earlier, in 1976, the Republic of the Philippines had filed escheat proceedings against the said property, claiming that the registered owner of the land "had been absent for the past ten years or more and he, therefore, may be presumed dead for the purpose of appointing his successor." It also alleged that since he left no heirs or persons entitled to the aforementioned property, the State should inherit the same in accordance with Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.3After the required publications, hearing was held at which the City of Zamboanga did not appear and no claim or opposition was filed by any party. The Solicitor General allowed the appearance of the Board of Liquidators as administrator of the disputed land and the City Fiscal of Zamboanga City did not object.4Finally, the trial court declared the property ... escheated to the State in favor of the City of Zamboanga where the property is located for the benefit of public schools and public charitable institutions and centers in the City of Zamboanga.Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner elevated the same to the Intermediate Appellate Court, where it was affirmed. The respondent court held that the City of Zamboanga which had later intervened with leave of court was entitled to the property in question under the provision of Section 3, Rule 91 of the Rules of Court, providing that Sec. 3.Hearing and judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has been published as directed and that the person died intestate, seized of real or personal property in the Philippines, leaving no heir or person entitled to the same, and no sufficient cause being shown to the contrary, the court shall adjudge that the estate of the deceased in the Philippines, after the payment of just debts and charges, shall escheat; and shall, pursuant to law, assign the personal estate to the municipality or city where he last resided in the Philippines, and the real estate to the municipalities or cities, respectively, in which the same is situated. If the deceased never resided in the Philippines, the whole estate may be assigned to the respective municipalities or cities where the same is located. Such estate shall be for the benefit of public schools, and public charitable institutions and centers in said municipalities or cities.The court, at the instance of an interested party, or on its own motion, may order the establishment of a permanent trust, so that only the income from the property shall be used.In so ruling, the respondent court rejected the position taken by the petitioner which it asks us now to consider as its justification for the reversal of the appealed decision. That position, simply stated, is that there was a mere oversight on the part of the American government which prevented the formality of a transfer of the property to the Philippine government. That neglect should not divest the Republic of the property which under the spirit and intendment of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 should belong to it as successor-in-interest of the United States.5Oversight or not, says the respondent court, the fact is that the property was not transferred as required by the said law. Hence, it was properly escheated to the City of Zamboanga, on the unrebutted presumption that the registered owner was already dead, and there being no heirs or other claimants to the land in question. Moreover, the Board of Liquidators had no personality to claim the land because it had the authority to administer only those properties that had been transferred by the U.S. Alien Property Custodian to the Republic of the Philippines.6We reverse, We rule for the petitioner.It is clear, and the respondent City of Zamboanga does not deny it, that there was mere inadvertence on the part of the American government in omitting to transfer the disputed land to the Republic of the Philippines. The obvious purpose of the Act was to turn over to the Philippine government all enemy properties situated in its territory that had been seized and were being held for the time being by the United States, which was then exercising sovereignty over the Philippines. The transfer of such enemy properties to the Philippine Republic was one of the acts by which the United States acknowledged the elevation of this country to the status of a sovereign state on July 4, 1946.While it is true that there are no records of such transfer, we may presume that such transfer was made. The lack of such records does not mean that it was not made as this would run counter to the mandate of the Philippine Property Act of 1946, which, to repeat, intended to vest title in the Philippines enemy properties found in its territory. It would be more reasonable to suppose that the President of the United States, or the person acting under his authority, complied with, rather than neglected (and so violated) this requirement of Section 3 of the said Act, if only on the basis of the presumption of the regularity of official functions. In the extreme, we can even say that this section legally effected the transfer, to be evidenced later by the formality of the corresponding deed, and that the lack of such deed does not mean that no transfer was made. Otherwise, we would have to face the dubious conclusion that the said property is still owned and so still subject to disposition by the United States.In support of its position, the City of Zamboanga argues, without much spirit, that anyway the land in question has an area of only 4,533 square meters and that for all practical purposes it can be better administered and used by the city authorities.7Perhaps so; but surely that is not the point. We are dealing here not with the pragmatic question of who can benefit more from the disputed property but with the legal question of who is its legal owner. That is the point.We hold that where it comes to ordinary real properties the owners of which may be presumed dead and left no heirs, the same may be escheated, conformably to Rule 91 of the Rules of Court, in favor of the political subdivisions in which they are located. The said Rule, however, does not cover properties taken from enemy nationals as a result of World War II and required to be transferred to the Republic of the Philippines by the United States in accordance with its own enactment commonly known as the Philippine Property Act of 1946. Such properties, including the land in dispute, belong to the Philippine government not by virtue of the escheat proceedings but on the strength of the transfer authorized and required by the said Act.

It may really be that, for practical reasons, the disputed property should be entrusted to the City of Zamboanga, for the purposes indicated in the Rules of Court. That may still be effected. But this will require a transfer of the land to the city by the Republic of the Philippines, to which it belongs and which has the power to dispose of it.WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and another one is hereby entered declaring the Republic of the Philippines to be the legal owner of the land subject of the instant petition. No costs.SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-16185-86May 31, 1962TRUSTEESHIP OF THE MINORS BENIGNO, ANGELA and ANTONIO, all surnamed PEREZ Y TUASON,PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Judicial Guardian, J. ANTONIO ARANETA,trustee-appellee,vs.ANTONIO M. PEREZ,judicial guardian-appellant.

CONCEPCION,J.:These are two (2) incidents of the trusteeship of the minors Benigno, Angela and Antonio, all surnamed Perez Y Tuason. The issue in G.R. No. L-16185 is whether or not the trustee, J. Antonio Araneta hereinafter referred to as the appellee may be allowed to pay a sum of money to the law firm, Araneta & Araneta, of which he is a member, for services rendered to him, in his aforementioned capacity as such trustee, in several judicial proceedings, whereas G.R. No. L-16186 concerns the question whether the purchase of certain shares of stock nude by the appellee for the benefit of the trusteeship merits judicial approval. Both questions were decided by the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) in the affirmative. Hence, this appeal by Antonio M. Perez hereinafter referred to as the appellant as guardian of the person of said minors.With respect to G.R. No. L-16185, it appears that the law firm Araneta & Araneta, through its assistant, Atty. Francisco T. Papa, had rendered services, as counsel for the appellee, in connection with the following:1. The approval of his accounts for January to March, 1956, which were objected to by the appellant. Said objection was, on October 19, 1956, overruled by the lower court, the action of which was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. L-11788, on May 16, 1958, on appeal taken by appellant.2. The appellee's accounts for April to June, 1957; which were approved by the lower court on July 13, 1957, despite appellant's objection thereto. Although appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, he, subsequently, withdrew the appeal.3. In 1958, appellant instituted CA-G.R. No. 22810-R of the Court of Appeals for a writ ofcertiorariandmandamusagainst the appellee and the lower court, the latter having sustained the action of the appellee in withholding certain sums from the shares of the minors aforementioned in the net income of the trust estate for July to September, 1957, in view of the appellant's refusal to reimburse to said estate identical sums received in the form of allowances for the period from April to June, 1957, in excess of the shares of said minors in the net income for that period. After appropriate proceedings, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision on June 25, 1958, dismissing said petition.The lower court authorized the payment of P5,500.00 for the services thus rendered by Araneta & Araneta, which appellant assails upon the ground that, pursuant to Section 7 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court:When the executor or administrator is an attorney he shall not charge against the estate any professional fees for legal services rendered by him.that the services above referred to inured to the benefit, not of the trust estate, but of the trustee; that the amount of the award is excessive; and that the lower court should have required the introduction of evidence on the extent of the services rendered by the aforementioned law firm before making said award.Appellant's pretense is untenable. Said Section 7 of Rule 86 refers only to "executors or administrators" of the estate of deceased persons, and does not necessarily apply to trustees. It is true that some functions of the former bear a close analogy with those of the latter. Moreover, a trustee, like, an executor or administrator, holds an office of trust, particularly when, as in the case of appellee herein, the trustee acts as such under judicial authority. Hence, generally, the policy set forth in said Section 7 of Rule 86 basically sound and wise as it is should be applicable to trustees. The duties of executors or administrators are, however, fixed and/or limited by law, whereas those of trustee of an express trust like that which we have under consideration are, usually, governed by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, if established by contract (Art. 1441, Civil Code of the Philippines). Besides, the duties of trustees may cover a much wider range than those of executors or administrators of the estate of deceased persons. Again the application of Section 7 of Rule 86 to all trusteeships without distinction may dissuade deserving persons from accepting the position of trustee and consequently have a deterrent effect upon the establishment of trusts, at a time when a sizeable part of the burden to undertake important and even essential activities in advanced and/or developing communities or states, particularly in the field of education, science and social welfare, is borne by foundations or other similar organizations based upon the principles of trust. We believe it, therefore, to be the better policy to acknowledge the authority of courts of justice to exercise a sound judgment in determining, in the light of the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case, whether or not a trustee shall be allowed to pay attorney's fees and charge the same against the trust estate, independently of his compensation as a trustee.In the case at bar, considering that the appellee was merely defending himself in the proceedings that required the services of counsel; that in each case the stand taken by the appellee was upheld by the court; that the will creating the trust and designating the appellee as trustee explicitly grants him the right to collect for his services such reasonable fees; that, in view of the nature of the relations between the trustor and the trustee, on the one hand, and the trustor and appellant on the other, there can be little doubt but that the trustor would have sanctioned the payment of the attorney's fees involved in this incident; and that it may have been more costly for the trust estate to engage the services of a law firm other than that of Araneta & Araneta, we are not prepared to hold that the lower court has erred in authorizing the payment of said attorney's fees by herein appellee.For the rest, it is well settled that "a trustee may be indemnified out of the trust estate for his expenses in rendering and proving his accounts and for costs andcounsel fees" in connection therewith (54 Am. Jur. 415-416), apart from the fact that the nature of the professional services in question appeared in the records before the lower court and that the amount of P5,500 fixed by the same as compensation for such services is not excessive.Referring now to G.R. No. L-16186, it appears that from July to September, 1958, the appellee had bought for the trust estate, through a broker (Pedro Nolasco da Silva & Co.), a total of 118 common shares of stock of the Philippine-American Drug Co. at P100 each, and that, upon submission of appellee's accounts for said period, appellant objected to the items of expenses relative to the acquisition of said common shares, upon the ground that the investment therein is "unwise in that (the operation of) said company has not, to our knowledge, proved profitable and unlawful in that it is actually an act of self-dealing between the trustee and the beneficiaries of the trust", because the former (appellee) is, also, a stockholder of said company. After the introduction of the evidence of both parties, the lower court overruled the objection and approved said accounts.It is not disputed that appellee holds, in his individual capacity, 199 out of 30,000 common shares of stock of the Philippine-American Drug Co., whereas his children own 270 out of 5,000 preferred shares of stock of the same enterprise. As a consequence, the interest of appellees and his children in said company is not such as to warrant the charge that the purchase of 118 common stocks for the trust estate amounts to self-dealing by the appellee with himself. What is more, said purchase by the trustee may be considered as an indication that he had displayed in the management of the trust estate the same interest he had in the protection of his own property.Upon the other hand, it has, also, been established that the book value of each of said 118 common shares of stock, purchased by the trustee at P100 each, is P202.80; that in 1954 the Philippine-American Drug Co. had paid a cash dividend of 6%, side from declaring a 33-1/3% stock dividend for its common shares; and that 6- % and 4% cash dividends were paid in 1955 and 1957, respectively. Furthermore, the statement of accounts of the company for the years 1954, 1955, 1956 and 1957, satisfied the lower court that the enterprise "is financially stable and sound". Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the investment in question is unwise.Appellant's allegation to the effect that shares of stock of the San Miguel Brewery pay higher returns, even if true, does not establish his pretense. Whether an investment is good or not does not depend upon the general, abstract possibility of better investments. Again, one factor that should be taken into account is the degree of influence that the investor may have upon the management of the enterprise concerned, which appellee admittedly has in the Philippine-American Drug Co., but which it is not claimed he wields in the San Miguel Brewery Co.WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. It is so ordered.

G.R. Nos. 168992-93May 21, 2009IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,MONINA P. LIM,petitioner.IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,MONINA P. LIM,petitioner.

The CaseThis is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision1dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed without prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.The FactsThe following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they were the childrens parents. The children2were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977.3Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioners clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.4The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty5given under Republic Act No. 85526(RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.7Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent.8Petitioners husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent9for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown.10The DSWD issued a similar Certification for Michael.11The Ruling of the Trial CourtOn 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioners argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice was untenable because, under the law, there are additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party in this case, must comply.As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental authority because an emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.Hence, the present petition.IssuePetitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.The Courts RulingPetitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.We deny the petition.Joint Adoption by Husband and WifeIt is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial courts decision denying the petitions for adoption.Dura lex sed lex.The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:SEC. 7.Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptees parent;(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals:Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter:Provided, further,That the requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.Husband and wifeshalljointly adopt, except in the following cases:(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter:Provided, however,That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)

The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.12The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.Effects of AdoptionPetitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.13The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children.14Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.15It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age16 emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.17However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:ARTICLE VEFFECTS OF ADOPTIONSEC. 16.Parental Authority.- Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).SEC. 17.Legitimacy.- The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family.SEC. 18.Succession.- In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other.18Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights19of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled20such as support21and successional rights.22We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.23But, as we have ruled inRepublic v. Vergara:24We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial courts decision favoring adoption in the case at bar,for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation.Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses petition for adoption. (Emphasis supplied)Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit petitioner.Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.WHEREFORE, weDENYthe petition. WeAFFIRMthe Decision dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 182497June 29, 2010NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN,petitioner,vs.JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 37, DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO RAZON, JR., DIRECTOR GEARY BARIAS, PSSUPT. CO YEE M. CO, JR. and POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR AGAPITO QUIMSON,respondents.

PEREZ,J.:Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 651of the Rules of Court assailing the Order dated 25 April 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 37, in Special Proceeding No. 08-119132 which denied the petition for Habeas Corpus filed by herein Petitioner Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan in behalf of her husband Police Officer 1 Basser B. Ampatuan2(PO1 Ampatuan).Petitioner alleged in her petition that her husband PO1 Ampatuan was assigned at Sultan Kudarat Municipal Police Station. On 14 April 2008, he was asked by his Chief of Police to report to the Provincial Director of Shariff Kabunsuan, Superintendent Esmael Pua Ali (Supt. Ali). The latter brought PO1 Ampatuan to Superintendent Piang Adam, Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Maguindanao. PO1 Ampatuan was directed to stay at the Police Provincial Office of Maguindanao without being informed of the cause of his restraint. The next day, 15 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to the General Santos City Airport and was made to board a Philippine Airlines plane bound for Manila. Upon landing at the Manila Domestic Airport, PO1 Ampatuan was turned over to policemen of Manila and brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim by Police Director Geary Barias and General Roberto Rosales. A press briefing was then conducted

where it was announced that PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for the killing of two Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Officials. He was then detained at the Police Jail in United Nations Avenue, Manila. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to inquest Prosecutor Renato Gonzaga of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila due to the alleged murder of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, head of the Law Department of the COMELEC. On 20 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was turned-over to the Regional Headquarters Support Group in Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City.3Petitioner continues that on 21 April 2008, Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva ordered the release for further investigation of PO1 Ampatuan.4The Order was approved by the City Prosecutor of Manila. But Police Senior Superintendent Co Yee Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson refused to release PO1 Ampatuan.This prompted Petitioner to file the petition for writ ofhabeas corpusin the RTC of Manila, Branch 37.5Private respondents had another version of the antecedent facts. They narrated that at around 7:08 oclock in the evening of 10 November 2007, a sixty-four-year-old man, later identified as Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District (MPD) Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutors Office.On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Clarence V. Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder) and recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing.On even date, a charge sheet for Grave Misconduct was executed against PO1 Ampatuan, the accusatory portion of which reads:

CHARGE SHEETTHE UNDERSIGNED NOMINAL COMPLAINANT hereby charges above-named respondent of the administrative offense of Grave Misconduct (murder) pursuant to Section 52 of R.A. 85516in relation to NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular 93-024, committed as follows:That on or about 7:08 in the evening of November 10, 2007, in M.H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil St., Ermita, Manila, above-named respondent while being an active member of the PNP and within the jurisdiction of this office, armed with a cal .45 pistol, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, shot Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Jr., COMELEC official on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal gunshot wounds which directly cause (sic) his death.Acts contrary to the existing PNP Laws rules and Regulations.7Also, through a Memorandum dated 18 April 2008, Police Director General Avelino I. Razon, Jr. directed the Regional Director of the National Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO) to place PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody, thus:1. Reference: Memo from that Office dated April 15, 2008 re Arrest of PO1 Busser Ampatuan, suspect in the killing of Atty. Alioden Dalaig and Atty. Wynee Asdala, both COMELEC Legal Officers.2. This pertains to the power of the Chief, PNP embodied in Section 52 of RA 8551, to place police personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of a grave administrative case filed against him or even after the filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such police personnel.3. In this connection, you are hereby directed to place PO1 Busser Ampatuan, suspect in the killing of Atty. Alioden Dalaig and Atty. Wynee Asdala, both COMELEC Legal Officers, under your restrictive custody.4. For strict compliance.8On 19 April 2008, through a Memorandum Request dated 18 April 2008, respondent Police Director Geary L. Barias requested for the creation of the Summary Hearing Board to hear the case of PO1 Ampatuan.9On 20 April 2008, Special Order No. 921 was issued by Police Director Edgardo E. Acua, placing PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody of the Regional Director, NCRPO, effective 19 April 2008. Said Special Order No. 921, reads:Restrictive CustodyPO1 Basser B. Ampatuan 128677, is placed under restrictive custody of the Regional Director, NCRPO effective April 19, 2008. (Reference: Memorandum from CPNP dated 18 April 2008).BY COMMAND OF POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL RAZON:10Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is being held for other charges/legal grounds.11Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila Citys Prosecution Office, petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008. The petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 08-119132 and was raffled to Branch 37.On 24 April 2008, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, respondent Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding therein respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing said respondents to show cause why they are withholding or restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan.12On 25 April 2008, the RTC resolved the Petition in its Order which reads:Essentially, counsels for petitioner insists that PO1 Basser Ampatuan is being illegally detained by the respondents despite the order of release of Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva dated April 21, 2008. They further claim that as of April 23, 2008, no administrative case was filed against PO1 Ampatuan.Respondents, while admitting that to date no criminal case was filed against PO1 Ampatuan, assert that the latter is under restrictive custody since he is facing an administrative case for grave misconduct. They submitted to this Court the Pre-charge Evaluation Report and Charge Sheet. Further, in support of their position, respondents cited the case of SPO2 Manalo, et al. v. Hon. Calderon, G.R. No. 178920 claiming that habeas corpus will not lie for a PNP personnel under restrictive custody. They claim that this is authorized under Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551 authorizing the Chief of PNP to place the PNP personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of administrative case for grave misconduct.Petitioner countered that the administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan was ante-dated to make it appear that there was such a case filed before April 23, 2008.The function of habeas corpus is to determine the legality of ones detention, meaning, if there is sufficient cause for deprivation or confinement and if there is none to discharge him at once. For habeas corpus to issue, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom which must be actual and effective, not nominal or moral.Granting arguendo that the administrative case was ante-dated, the Court cannot simply ignore the filing of an administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan. It cannot be denied that the PNP has its own administrative disciplinary mechanism and as clearly pointed out by the respondents, the Chief PNP is authorized to place PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody pursuant to Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551.The filing of the administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this Court has no authority to order the release of the subject police officer.Lastly, anent the contention of the petitioner that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has rendered the administrative case moot and academic, the same could not be accepted by this Court.It must be stressed that the resignation has not been acted (sic) by the appropriate police officials of the PNP, and that the administrative case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED.13Distressed, petitioner is now before this Court via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question the validity of the RTC Order dated 25 April 2008. The issues are:

I. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF PO1 BASSER B. AMPATUAN WAS MADE WITHOUT ANY WARRANT AND THEREFORE, ILLEGAL;II. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT CONCEDED THE AUTHORITY OF RESPONDENT AVELINO RAZON, JR. UNDER SEC. 52, PAR. 4, R.A. 8551 TO PLACE AMPATUAN UNDER RESTRICTIVE CUSTODY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS;III. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT SHIRKED FROM ITS JUDICIAL DUTY TO ORDER THE RELEASE OF PO1 AMPATUAN FROM THE CUSTODY OF RESPONDENTS MAMANG PULIS.14Essentially, a writ ofhabeascorpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.15Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Court sets forth the procedure to be followed in the issuance of the writ. The Rule provides:RULE 102HABEAS CORPUSSECTION 1. To what habeas corpus extends. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.SEC 2. Who may grant the writ. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district.x x xSEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.16Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.17The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individuals liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.18Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.19In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.20In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused.21While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed.22Petitioner contends that when PO1 Ampatuan was placed under the custody of respondents on 20 April 2008, there was yet no administrative case filed against him. When the release order of Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva was served upon respondents on 21 April 2008, there was still no administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan. She also argues that the arrest on 14 April 2008 of PO1 Ampatuan in Shariff Kabunsuan was illegal because there was no warrant of arrest issued by any judicial authority against him.On the other hand, respondents, in their Comment23filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that the trial court correctly denied the subject petition. Respondents maintain that while the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila had recommended that PO1 Ampatuan be released from custody, said recommendation was made only insofar as the criminal action for murder that was filed with the prosecution office is concerned and is without prejudice to other legal grounds for which he may be held under custody. In the instant case, PO1 Ampatuan is also facing administrative charges for Grave Misconduct. They cited the case ofManalo v. Calderon,24where this Court held that a petition forhabeascorpus will be given due course only if it shows that petitioner is being detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully, but a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.25The Solicitor General is correct.In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975 (also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Section 41(b) of the said law enumerates the disciplinary actions, including restrictive custody that may be imposed by duly designated supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP as a matter of internal discipline. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 8551 reads:Sec. 52 x x x.x x x4. The Chief of the PNP shall have the power to impose the disciplinary punishment of dismissal from the service; suspension or forfeiture of salary; or any combination thereof for a period not exceeding one hundred eighty (180) days. Provided, further, That the Chief of the PNP shall have the authority to place police personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of a grave administrative case filed against him or even after the filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such police personnel. [Emphasis ours].Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.26Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit ofhabeascorpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted for.27Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuans restrictive custody is the administrative case filed against him, his remedy is within such administrative process.We likewise note that PO1 Ampatuan has been under restrictive custody since 19 April 2008. To date, the administrative case against him should have already been resolved and the issue of his restrictive custody should have been rendered moot and academic, in accordance with Section 55 of Republic Act No. 8551, which provides:SEC. 55.Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days from arraignment: Provided, however, That if it can be shown by evidence that the accused is harassing the complainant and/or witnesses, the court may order the preventive suspension of the accused PNP member even if the charge is punishable by a penalty lower than six (6) years and one (1) day: Provided, further, That the preventive suspension shall not be more than ninety (90) days except if the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petitions of the respondent: Provided, finally, That such preventive suspension may be sooner lifted by the court in the exigency of the service upon recommendation of the Chief, PNP.Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. (Emphasis supplied.)Having conceded that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, we have to dismiss the petition.In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face that the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184467June 19, 2012EDGARDO NAVIA,1RUBEN DIO,2and ANDREW BUISING,petitioners,vs.VIRGINIA PARDICO, for and in behalf and in representation of BENHUR V. PARDICOrespondent.

DEL CASTILLO,J.:For the protective writ of amparo to issue in enforced disappearance cases, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown by the required quantum of proof that their disappearance was carried out by, "or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, [the government] or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge [the same or] give information on the fate or whereabouts of [said missing] persons."3This petition for review on certiorari4filed in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC5challenges the July 24, 2008 Decision6of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Malolos City which granted the Petition for Writ of Amparo7filed by herein respondent against the petitioners.Factual AntecedentsOn March 31, 2008, at around 8:30 p.m., a vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation8(Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore (Lolita) located at 7A Lot 9, Block 54, Grand Royale Subdivision, Barangay Lugam, Malolos City. The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolitas son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita where they could find her son Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with them to the security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision.9Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision.10The supervisor of the security guards, petitioner Edgardo Navia (Navia), also arrived thereat.As to what transpired next, the parties respective versions diverge.Version of the PetitionersPetitioners alleged that they invited Bong and Ben to their office because they received a report from a certain Mrs. Emphasis, a resident of Grand Royale Subdivision, that she saw Bong and Ben removing a lamp from a post in said subdivision.11The reported unauthorized taking of the lamp was relayed thru radio to petitioners Ruben Dio (Dio) and Andrew Buising (Buising), who both work as security guards at the Asian Land security department. Following their departments standard operating procedure, Dio and Buising entered the report in their logbook and proceeded to the house of Mrs. Emphasis. It was there where Dio and Buising were able to confirm who the suspects were. They thus repaired to the house of Lolita where Bong and Ben were staying to invite the two suspects to their office. Bong and Ben voluntarily went with them.At the security office, Dio and Buising interviewed Bong and Ben. The suspects admitted that they took the lamp but clarified that they were only transferring it to a post nearer to the house of Lolita.12Soon, Navia arrived and Buising informed him that the complainant was not keen in participating in the investigation. Since there was no complainant, Navia ordered the release of Bong and Ben. Bong then signed a statement to the effect that the guards released him without inflicting any harm or injury to him.13His mother Lolita also signed the logbook below an entry which states that she will never again harbor or entertain Ben in her house. Thereafter, Lolita and Bong left the security office.Ben was left behind as Navia was still talking to him about those who might be involved in the reported loss of electric wires and lamps within the subdivision. After a brief discussion though, Navia allowed Ben to leave. Ben also affixed his signature on the logbook to affirm the statements entered by the guards that he was released unharmed and without any injury.14Upon Navias instructions, Dio and Buising went back to the house of Lolita to make her sign the logbook as witness that they indeed released Ben from their custody. Lolita asked Buising to read aloud that entry in the logbook where she was being asked to sign, to which Buising obliged. Not contented, Lolita put on her reading glasses and read the entry in the logbook herself before affixing her signature therein. After which, the guards left.Subsequently, petitioners received an invitation15from the Malolos City Police Station requesting them to appear thereat on April 17, 2008 relative to the complaint of Virginia Pardico (Virginia) about her missing husband Ben. In compliance with the invitation, all three petitioners appeared at the Malolos City Police Station. However, since Virginia was not present despite having received the same invitation, the meeting was reset to April 22, 2008.16On April 22, 2008, Virginia attended the investigation. Petitioners informed her that they released Ben and that they have no information as to his present whereabouts.17They assured Virginia though that they will cooperate and help in the investigation of her missing husband.18Version of the RespondentAccording to respondent, Bong and Ben were not merely invited. They were unlawfully arrested, shoved into the Asian Land vehicle and brought to the security office for investigation. Upon seeing Ben at the security office, Navia lividly grumbled "Ikaw na naman?"19and slapped him while he was still seated. Ben begged for mercy, but his pleas were met with a flurry of punches coming from Navia hitting him on different parts of his body.20Navia then took hold of his gun, looked at Bong, and said, "Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben."21Bong admitted that he and Ben attempted to take the lamp. He explained that the area where their house is located is very dark and his father had long been asking the administrator of Grand Royale Subdivision to install a lamp to illumine their area. But since nothing happened, he took it upon himself to take a lamp from one of the posts in the subdivision and transfer it to a post near their house. However, the lamp Bong got was no longer working. Thus, he reinstalled it on the post from which he took it and no longer pursued his plan.22Later on, Lolita was instructed to sign an entry in the guards logbook where she undertook not to allow Ben to stay in her house anymore.23Thereafter, Navia again asked Lolita to sign the logbook. Upon Lolitas inquiry as to why she had to sign again, Navia explained that they needed proof that they released her son Bong unharmed but that Ben had to stay as the latters case will be forwarded to the barangay. Since she has poor eyesight, Lolita obligingly signed the logbook without reading it and then left with Bong.24At that juncture, Ben grabbed Bong and pleaded not to be left alone. However, since they were afraid of Navia, Lolita and Bong left the security office at once leaving Ben behind.25Moments after Lolita and Bong reached their house, Buising arrived and asked Lolita to sign the logbook again. Lolita asked Buising why she had to sign again when she already twice signed the logbook at the headquarters. Buising assured her that what she was about to sign only pertains to Bongs release. Since it was dark and she has poor eyesight, Lolita took Buisings word and signed the logbook without, again, reading what was written in it.26

The following morning, Virginia went to the Asian Land security office to visit her husband Ben, but only to be told that petitioners had already released him together with Bong the night before. She then looked for Ben, asked around, and went to the barangay. Since she could not still find her husband, Virginia reported the matter to the police.In the course of the investigation on Bens disappearance, it dawned upon Lolita that petitioners took advantage of her poor eyesight and naivete. They made her sign the logbook as a witness that they already released Ben when in truth and in fact she never witnessed his actual release. The last time she saw Ben was when she left him in petitioners custody at the security office.27Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo28before the RTC of Malolos City. Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the amparo court issued an Order29dated June 26, 2008 directing, among others, the issuance of a writ of amparo and the production of the body of Ben before it on June 30, 2008. Thus:WHEREFORE, conformably with Section 6 of the Supreme Court Resolution [in] A.M. No. 07-[9]-12-SC, also known as "The Rule On The Writ Of Amparo", let a writ of amparo be issued, as follows:(1) ORDERING [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising of the Asian Land Security Agency to produce before the Court the body of aggrieved party Benhur Pardico, on Monday, June 30, 2008, at 10:30 a.m.;(2) ORDERING the holding of a summary hearing of the petition on the aforementioned date and time, and DIRECTING the [petitioners] to personally appear thereat;

(3) COMMANDING [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising to file, within a non-extendible period of seventy-two (72) hours from service of the writ, a verified written return with supporting affidavits which shall, among other things, contain the following:a) The lawful defenses to show that the [petitioners] did not violate or threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or omission;b) The steps or actions taken by the [petitioners] to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission; andc) All relevant information in the possession of the [petitioners] pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party.(4) GRANTING, motu proprio, a Temporary Protection Order prohibiting the [petitioners], or any persons acting for and in their behalf, under pain of contempt, from threatening, harassing or inflicting any harm to [respondent], his immediate family and any [member] of his household.The Branch Sheriff is directed to immediately serve personally on the [petitioners], at their address indicated in the petition, copies of the writ as well as this order, together with copies of the petition and its annexes.30A Writ of Amparo31was accordingly issued and served on the petitioners on June 27, 2008.32On June 30, 2008, petitioners filed their Compliance33praying for the denial of the petition for lack of merit.A summary hearing was thereafter conducted. Petitioners presented the testimony of Buising, while Virginia submitted the sworn statements34of Lolita and Enrique which the two affirmed on the witness stand.Ruling of the Regional Trial CourtOn July 24, 2008, the trial court issued the challenged Decision35granting the petition. It disposed as follows:WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants the privilege of the writ of amparo, and deems it proper and appropriate, as follows:(a) To hereby direct the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to immediately conduct a deep and thorough investigation of the [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising in connection with the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of [Benhur] Pardico, utilizing in the process, as part of the investigation, the documents forming part of the records of this case;(b) To hereby direct the NBI to extend to the family of [Benhur] Pardico and the witnesses who testified in this case protection as it may deem necessary to secure their safety and security; and(c) To hereby direct the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to investigate the circumstances concerning the legality of the arrest of [Benhur] Pardico by the [petitioners] in this case, utilizing in the process, as part of said investigation, the pertinent documents and admissions forming part of the record of this case, and take whatever course/s of action as may be warranted.Furnish immediately copies of this decision to the NBI, through the Office of Director Nestor Mantaring, and to the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan.SO ORDERED.36Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration37which was denied by the trial court in an Order38dated August 29, 2008.Hence, this petition raising the following issues for our consideration:4.1. WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO.4.1.1. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT PETITIONERS HAVE COMMITTED OR ARE COMMITTING ACTS IN VIOLATION OF HER HUSBANDS RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY, OR SECURITY.4.1.2. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THE FACT OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF BENHUR PARDICO.4.1.3. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE ALLEGED DISAPPEARANCE OF BENHUR PARDICO WAS AT THE INSTANCE OF HEREIN PETITIONERS.39Petitioners ArgumentsPetitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They contend that the writ of amparo is available only in cases where the factual and legal bases of the violation or threatened violation of the aggrieved partys right to life, liberty and security are clear. Petitioners assert that in the case at bench, Virginia miserably failed to establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on its face as it failed to state with some degree of specificity the alleged unlawful act or omission of the petitioners constituting a violation of or a threat to Bens right to life, liberty and security. And second, it cannot be deduced from the evidence Virginia adduced that Ben is missing; or that petitioners had a hand in his alleged disappearance. On the other hand, the entries in the logbook which bear the signatures of Ben and Lolita are eloquent proof that petitioners released Ben on March 31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus posit that the trial court erred in issuing the writ and in holding them responsible for Bens disappearance.Our RulingVirginias Petition for Writ of Amparo is fatally defective and must perforce be dismissed, but not for the reasons adverted to by the petitioners.A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief "to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity."40Here, Bens right to life, liberty and security is firmly settled as the parties do not dispute his identity as the same person summoned and questioned at petitioners security office on the night of March 31, 2008. Such uncontroverted fact ipso facto established Bens inherent and constitutionally enshrined right to life, liberty and security. Article 641of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights42recognizes every human beings inherent right to life, while Article 943thereof ordains that everyone has the right to liberty and security. The right to life must be protected by law while the right to liberty and security cannot be impaired except on grounds provided by and in accordance with law. This overarching command against deprivation of life, liberty and security without due process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law.44The pivotal question now that confronts us is whether Bens disappearance as alleged in Virginias petition and proved during the summary proceedings conducted before the court a quo, falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and relevant laws.

It does not. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis ours.)While Section 1 provides A.M. No. 07-9-12-SCs coverage, said Rules does not, however, define extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. This omission was intentional as the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court which drafted A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC chose to allow it to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through substantive laws as may be promulgated by Congress.45Then, the budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis46when this Court defined enforced disappearances. The Court in that case applied the generally accepted principles of international law and adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances definition of enforced disappearances, as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law."47Not long thereafter, another significant development affecting A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC came about after Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 985148on December 11, 2009. Section 3(g) thereof defines enforced or involuntary disappearances as follows:(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

Then came Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo49where Justice Arturo D. Brion wrote in his Separate Opinion that with the enactment of RA No. 9851, "the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is now a procedural law anchored, not only on the constitutional rights to the rights to life, liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory definition as well of what an enforced or involuntary disappearance is."50Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SCs reference to enforced disappearances should be construed to mean the enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons contemplated in Section 3(g) of RA No. 9851. Meaning, in probing enforced disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851.From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following elements that constitute it:(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,

(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation.In the present case, we do not doubt Bongs testimony that Navia had a menacing attitude towards Ben and that he slapped and inflicted fistic blows upon him. Given the circumstances and the pugnacious character of Navia at that time, his threatening statement, "Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben," cannot be taken lightly. It unambiguously showed his predisposition at that time. In addition, there is nothing on record which would support petitioners assertion that they released Ben on the night of March 31, 2008 unscathed from their wrath. Lolita sufficiently explained how she was prodded into affixing her signatures in the logbook without reading the entries therein. And so far, the information petitioners volunteered are sketchy at best, like the alleged complaint of Mrs. Emphasis who was never identified or presented in court and whose complaint was never reduced in writing.But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of State participation is not present in this case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginias amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable persons.51Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a hand in Bens disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his case, the Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as responsible or accountable persons.We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. As discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person.WHEREFORE, the July 24, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Malolos City, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Writ of Amparo filed by Virginia Pardico is hereby DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 189155September 7, 2010

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OFAMPAROAND THE WRIT OFHABEAS DATAIN F