Fashionable Yet Useless

Still Fashionable Yet Useless? AddressingProblems with Research on theEuropeanization of Foreign Policy*jcms_2146 607..630

KYRIAKOS MOUMOUTZIS

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to address problems with research on the ‘European-ization’ of foreign policy. The first section shows that Europeanization defined as aprocess of incorporation of European Union norms, practices and procedures into thedomestic level is more useful than any of the other ‘faces’ of the concept discussed inthe literature. The second section shows that while Europeanization is applicable tothe study of foreign policy, the adaptational pressure model is not; that Europeaniza-tion should not be identified exclusively with socialization; and that it should bedistinguished from ‘uploading’. The final section shows how process tracing theobservable implications of alternative explanations of foreign policy change for threedimensions of the policy-making process – the definition of the policy problem, thealternatives considered and the manner in which the latter were assessed – makes itpossible to establish the causal significance of the EU.

Introduction

Since 1999 the field of European Studies has witnessed a remarkable growthof the literature on ‘Europeanization’ (Featherstone, 2003, p. 5). This empha-sis on Europeanization reflects the ‘deepening’ of integration since the late1980s’ (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004, pp. 1–3; Dyson and Goetz, 2003, pp. 12,21–6) and the resultant research interest in the possible causal significance

* The better part of this research was funded by the Bodossaki Foundation.

JCMS 2011 Volume 49. Number 3. pp. 607–629DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02146.x

© 2011 The Author(s)JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 MainStreet, Malden, MA 02148, USA

of the European Union (EU) for domestic change.1 Academic consensus,however, regarding the precise meaning of the concept has not yet beenreached. As the number of studies on Europeanization grew, so did the varietyof usages of the term and more often than not definitions have been usedexclusively by the study that introduced them (Börzel and Risse, 2003, p. 59;Olsen, 2002, p. 921). Consequently, the usefulness of the concept has comeinto question. What is the value of a concept without a precise or even stablemeaning for empirical research? Furthermore, while it has been shown thatthe EU effect has been greater on public policies than national polities ordomestic politics (Radaelli, 2004, p. 14), it has also been argued that themagnitude of change varies across policy areas depending on the relevantinstitutional arrangements at the EU level. With regard to foreign policy inparticular, it has been argued that the ‘unique nature’ of the policy area andintergovernmental decision-making at the EU level render Europeanizationless likely, or its effects weaker and, in any case, harder to trace (Major, 2005,p. 182; Miskimmon and Paterson, 2003, pp. 329–30; Smith, 2008, p. 17).

The purpose of this article is to show how the concept of Europeanizationcan be useful for empirical research on foreign policy. The first section willpresent a revised definition. It will be shown that Europeanization defined asa process of incorporation of EU norms, practices and procedures into thedomestic level is more useful than any of the other ‘faces’ of the conceptdiscussed in the literature.

The second section will establish that Europeanization is applicable to thestudy of foreign policy and it will construct two alternative explanations ofthe Europeanization of national foreign policy. It will be shown that EU-levelinstitutional arrangements affect the causal mechanisms through which policychange is produced, and not the magnitude of change. While the adaptationalpressure model is not applicable, Europeanization should not be identifiedexclusively with socialization. National foreign policy-makers choose toincorporate EU foreign policy norms, practices and procedures into theirpolicies either because they have become convinced that it is appropriate orbecause they have calculated that it is utility-maximizing to do so. Theinstrumental explanation of Europeanization should be distinguished from‘uploading’, which is neither a type nor an explanation of Europeanization,but may be one of its outcomes.

The final section will demonstrate how research on the Europeanization offoreign policy can be designed effectively. It will be shown that both theexplanatory (EU foreign policy) and the dependent (national foreign policy)

1 Stricto sensu, this literature is interested in ‘EU-ization’ rather than ‘Europeanization’ (for thisdistinction, see Flockhart, 2010).

608 KYRIAKOS MOUMOUTZIS

© 2011 The Author(s)JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

variable should be disaggregated in order to define the range of possibleoutcomes of Europeanization and identify potential cases of the phenomenon.Finally, it will be shown that process tracing the observable implicationsof alternative explanations of foreign policy change for three dimensions ofthe foreign policy-making process – the definition of the policy problem, thealternative courses of actions considered and the manner in which the latterwere assessed – makes it possible to establish the causal significance ofthe EU.

I. Defining Europeanization

While initially the growing number of meanings attributed to Europeaniza-tion was considered problematic, it is now understood that the concept’susefulness lies in its ability to raise interesting questions, and the challengefor researchers is to develop explanatory models that provide answers tothese questions (Olsen, 2002, pp. 922–3, 943–4; Radaelli, 2004, pp. 1–2,15–16). This line of reasoning may at first sight lead one to conclude that anyconceptualization of Europeanization can be useful provided it poses certainquestions. The argument, however, implicitly indicates two specific criteriathat definitions of Europeanization should meet. First, each conceptualizationshould help researchers ask new questions; the concept of Europeanizationwould indeed be redundant if it only directed our attention to and raisedquestions about phenomena captured by other concepts. Second, each con-ceptualization should help researchers ask questions that are researchable;the concept of Europeanization might remain interesting if it only raisedquestions the answers to which cannot be tested empirically, but it would notbe useful.

At this point it would be instructive to consider the definitions ofEuropeanization that feature most prominently in the literature in the light ofthese two criteria. In a comprehensive review, Olsen identified five differentuses of Europeanization: changes in external boundaries; developing institu-tions at the European level; central penetration of national systems of gover-nance; exporting forms of political organization; and a political unificationproject. He explained that he suspected that Europeanization as a politicalunification project would turn out to be the most interesting because itincludes the other four meanings (Olsen, 2002, pp. 923–4, 943). This assess-ment, however, contradicts his understanding of Europeanization as an‘attention-directing device’. Olsen’s preferred conceptualization encom-passes European politics virtually in its entirety and thus fails to direct ourattention to a specific set of phenomena. Furthermore, Olsen (2002, p. 941)

ADDRESSING PROBLEMS WITH RESEARCH ON THE EUROPEANIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY 609


argued that this political unification project proceeds through ‘the mutualadaptation of co-evolving institutions’. It is certainly important to point outthat neither the EU nor the domestic level is static; processes of change canbe observed at both levels. Olsen (2002, pp. 921, 943), however, explicitlydiscusses ‘simultaneous processes of change’ both at the national and EUlevels. If the two levels interact and change simultaneously, it is not possibleto determine the direction of causality.2 In other words, reality is by definitionmore complex than theory. The purpose of theoretical frameworks is to isolatecertain of the infinite elements that constitute the real world, create orderamong them and, thus, simplify reality (Clarke, 1996, pp. 19–21; Waltz,1979, pp. 6–9). This conceptualization does not isolate certain elements ofEuropean politics, but rather includes it in its entirety, effectively renderingempirical research impossible. If the usefulness of Europeanization lies in itsability to help us ask researchable questions, this conceptualization severelylimits the usefulness of the concept because it only raises questions theanswers to which cannot be tested empirically.

It follows from the above that Europeanization will be a useful concept ifit only has one face – that is to say if it directs our attention to a single set ofphenomena. Of the four meanings of Europeanization that Olsen’s preferredconceptualization includes, only one refers to a set of phenomena that is notcaptured by other concepts. According to a prominent use of the concept,Europeanization refers to ‘the emergence and development at the Europeanlevel of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal and socialinstitutions associated with political problem-solving that formalize interac-tions among the actors and of policy networks specializing in the creation ofauthoritative rules’ (Risse et al., 2001, p. 3).3 These institutions, however, donot simply ‘emerge’. National governments establish these institutions as anintegral part of the integration process. Consequently, this particular concep-tualization of Europeanization renders it indistinguishable from integration(Dyson and Goetz, 2003, pp. 13–15, 20; Featherstone, 2003, p. 10; Radaelli,2003, p. 34). Indeed, one of the key debates within the context of integrationtheory discusses the extent to which national executives are capable of

2 The problem here is similar to that which Wendt faced when he attempted to address issues of researchdesign that stem from Giddens’ structuration theory. The research strategy Wendt proposed for the studyof the interplay between agency and structure was incompatible with Giddens’ theory because, accordingto the latter, agency and structure presuppose each other (Carlsnaes, 1992, p. 258). While Olsen does notexplicitly subscribe to such an extreme understanding of the mutual constitution of agency (EU MemberStates) and structure (the EU), his conceptualization of Europeanization poses the same problem forempirical research because it refers to simultaneous changes of both agency and structure.3 It should be noted that Caporaso (2008, pp. 27, 33) has conceded that this definition ‘poses someproblems’ and opted for a definition that is consistent with the third meaning on Olsen’s list, which doesnot render the concept ‘redundant’.



exercising control over the institutional evolution of the EU (Hix, 2002;Moravcsik, 1999; Pierson, 1996). Similarly, Europeanization as changes inexternal boundaries and exporting forms of political organization refers todifferent aspects of the EU’s external relations – the process of enlargement,relations between the EU and other international actors and the EU’s attemptsto define its international role – which the literature on EU foreign policyhas discussed extensively (Ginsberg, 1999; Hill, 1993; Moravcsik andVachudova, 2003; Sjursen, 2002; K.E. Smith, 2004; White, 2004). It remainsat best unclear what the added value of the reconceptualization of thesephenomena as Europeanization is. If the usefulness of Europeanization lies inits ability to help us ask new questions, these conceptualizations limit theusefulness of the concept because they only raise questions that have beenasked before.

The final meaning – central penetration of national systems of governance– seems more promising. In this vein, Radaelli (2004, p. 3) has argued thatEuropeanization ‘consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c)institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy para-digms, styles, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms which arefirst defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporatedin the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, political struc-tures and public policies’. The word ‘construction’ in this definition wasintended to signify that Europeanization might derive from the stage of policyformulation (Radaelli, 2004, p. 12; Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004, pp. 3–5).4

It was made explicit, however, that the stage of policy formulation isnot synonymous with Europeanization (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004, p. 5).Consequently, Europeanization does not consist of processes of constructionof EU rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’,beliefs and norms, but may originate from such processes. Similarly, theseEU ways of doing things need not be ‘consolidated’ at the EU level prior totheir incorporation into the domestic level.

Furthermore, it remains unclear with which modes of governance theterms ‘institutionalisation’ and ‘diffusion’ correspond. Given that the latteris understood as incorporation in a fashion less structured than institutiona-lization (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004, p. 3), it would be reasonable to assumethat it corresponds with ‘facilitated co-ordination’ – a mode of governancethat relates to policy areas not subject to EU law (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004,p. 7). In theory, however, there is no reason to assume a priori that

4 Bulmer and Radaelli (2004, p. 7) contradict themselves at this point: even though they have made itexplicit that Europeanization might emanate from the stage of policy formulation – that is, prior to themaking of a decision at the EU level – they have also argued that in the case of foreign policy there canbe no Europeanization unless a decision is made at the EU level.



EU ways of doing things generated by facilitated co-ordination will not beinstitutionalized, but simply diffused into the domestic level. Such anassumption would appear to imply that the process of Europeanization insuch policy areas is more easily reversible. The reversibility of the process,however, remains a matter of empirical investigation. It is, therefore, best tospeak simply of a process of incorporation and let each research projectidentify the particular form that the process assumed.

It follows from the above that Europeanization should be defined as ‘aprocess of incorporation in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national)discourse, political structures and public policies of formal and informalrules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things” andshared beliefs and norms that are first defined in the EU policy processes’.This revised definition retains all the advantages of Radaelli’s (2003,pp. 30–1) initial formulation and meets the two criteria set out above. First, itemphasizes the importance of change. Second, it refers to ‘EU policy pro-cesses’ as opposed to EU laws. It is, therefore, clear that a truly common EUpolicy with legally binding instruments is not a prerequisite of Europeaniza-tion. Third, it is broad enough to cover both Member States and non-MemberStates, both national and sub-national levels, and political structures, politicalprocesses, public policies and the cognitive and normative frames that cutacross the former. Finally, it secures the usefulness of the concept because itallows researchers to demarcate a set of empirically manageable phenomena(the incorporation of EU norms, practices and procedures in the domesticlevel), which are not captured by other concepts.

It should be noted here that possible interactions between the processof institution building at EU level and the process through which theseinstitutions have an impact on the domestic level (Börzel, 2001, pp. 1–2)cannot be ruled out at the analytical level. At this stage of research in the fieldof EU studies, however, Europeanization is not useful as a conceptualization ofthe interaction between or the mutual constitution of these processes (Major,2005, pp. 176–7) simply because there is something missing. Before oneattempts to study the interaction between these two processes, one needs toisolate each one of them and study them separately. Such a conceptualizationattempts to take both steps at once. If agency (EU Member States) and structure(the EU) are mutually constitutive and integration theory informs us of howagency is structuring, then Europeanization is best suited to direct our attentionto how agency is being structured. That particular process whereby the EUcauses change in national polities, public policies and domestic politics is whatthe concept of Europeanization can help us identify, isolate and ask questionsabout. Research on such questions logically precedes research on howprocesses of Europeanization feed back into the integration process.



II. Two Explanations of the Europeanization ofNational Foreign Policy

Even though the literature on Europeanization has been steadily growingand research has shown that it is mostly public policies that have beenpenetrated by the integration process, foreign policy has not been studiedextensively (Featherstone, 2003, p. 6). Apart from doubts regarding the use-fulness of the concept in general, its applicability in the case of foreign policyin particular has also come into question due to the ‘unique nature of foreignpolicy’ and the intergovernmental nature of foreign policy decision-makingat the EU level (Major, 2005, pp. 182–3; Miskimmon and Paterson, 2003,pp. 329–30; Smith, 2008, p. 17). Europeanization, it is argued, was initiallyapplied to policy areas where the Community method applies; applying theconcept to foreign policy is problematic because the latter lies at thecore of national sovereignty, thus hindering the development of internationalco-operation. Intergovernmental co-operation can at best have a weak impacton national policies.

This scepticism is not theoretically justified. As was mentioned above,increased interest in Europeanization reflects a research interest in theimplications of certain EU-level developments, including the introductionof guidelines on employment and social security policy that followed theestablishment of the economic and monetary union (EMU). While thesepolicy areas fall within the scope of the first pillar, the Community methoddoes not apply. Consequently, the concept of Europeanization neverreferred exclusively to Communitized policy areas to begin with. Further-more, it follows from the argument regarding the ‘unique nature’ of foreignpolicy that one should not expect variation of preferences on co-operationin the field of foreign policy across countries. If the nature of the policyarea determines Member States’ preferences, no Member State should beexpected to prefer co-operation in the field of this uniquely sensitive policyarea. Since national preferences do vary across countries, the nature offoreign policy does not constitute a convincing explanation of limited andweakly institutionalized co-operation. More importantly, regardless of thereason why co-operation in the field of foreign policy remains limited, ahigh level of integration in a particular policy area is not a prerequisite ofEuropeanization. Indeed, there is no theoretical association between thelevel of integration and the magnitude of policy change. The latter remainsa matter of empirical investigation (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004, pp. 12–13).In fact, it has been argued that the reason why national foreign policy-makers incorporate EU norms, practices and procedures into their policiesis their socialization during EU-level interactions. Socialization may result



in change in foreign policy objectives and even in identity reconstruction –that is to say, in change of the greatest magnitude possible.

Finally, it should be pointed out that this scepticism is based on a misin-terpretation of the implications of ‘intergovernmental’ decision-making. It isassumed that since the latter requires the agreement of all Member States, EUforeign policy norms, practices and procedures established intergovernmen-tally simply constitute what all Member States wanted. Consequently, even ifthese norms, practices and procedures are incorporated into national policy,the EU could not possibly have been causally significant. Both liberal inter-governmentalist and rational choice institutionalist analyses of the effects ofunanimity – which is the key feature of the institutional environment of EUforeign policy decision-making – make explicit that this is inaccurate. Allother things being equal, unanimity will empower the government with theleast desire to change the status quo and allow it to determine the contentof the agreement (Moravcsik, 1993, pp. 499–502; Garrett and Tsebelis,1996, pp. 281–3). Member States will not get what they want, but simplyan outcome that is preferable to the status quo. The agreement will noteven perfectly reflect the preferences of the most recalcitrant government(Moravcsik, 1993, p. 501). Consequently, even intergovernmental decision-making may create a discrepancy between national policy and EU policy.Furthermore, even if a Member State has successfully ‘uploaded’ its prefer-ences, a discrepancy may still emerge if national preferences change overtime.5 Finally, the fact that EU foreign policy is a common, but not a singlepolicy, the absence of legal impediments to refraining from using the EUforeign policy framework and the lack of mechanisms that could enforcecompliance with EU foreign policy positions (Nuttall, 2000, pp. 188–90, 267;Smith, 2008, p. 17) only render the Europeanization of national foreignpolicy more puzzling. Why do national foreign policy-makers incorporate EUforeign policy norms, practices and procedures into their policies even thoughthey cannot be forced to do so?

The intergovernmental nature of EU foreign policy-making is reflected inthe causal mechanisms through which Europeanization produces foreignpolicy change (Radaelli, 2003, pp. 40–50). The adaptational pressure mecha-nism is not applicable. According to this mechanism, the misfit between

5 Despite the fact that multilateralism has been the ‘defining characteristic’ (Miskimmon and Paterson,2006, p. 30) of German foreign policy since the end of World War II, Germany refrained from adheringto procedural EC foreign policy norms and the issue-specific decision that had been made when it decidedto recognize Croatia and Slovenia (Nuttall, 2000, pp. 195–224; Salmon, 1992). Similarly, despite the factthat France initially insisted that the Community should impose sanctions on China in response to theTiananmen massacre, it subsequently breached the sanctions (Wong, 2006, pp. 76–99). As Pierson (1996,pp. 139–40) has pointed out, change in national preferences over time is one of the reasons why gapsemerge between national preferences and EU institutions and policies.



national and EU policy produces pressure for adaptation because the EUconstitutes an ‘authoritative decision making structure’ and ‘Member Stateshave no exit option given that EU law constitutes the law of the land’ (Börzeland Risse, 2003, p. 61). Despite the fact that the literature has discussed theadaptational pressure national foreign policy-makers are supposedly under(Miskimmon and Paterson, 2003; Torreblanca, 2001), in policy areas wherelegally binding instruments are not available at the EU level, by definition themisfit between national and EU policy does not produce adaptational pressureand EU policy produces its effects through different mechanisms. Nationalexecutives are the key actors and the process is voluntary (Bulmer andRadaelli, 2004, p. 7).

Scholars have indeed identified such alternative causal mechanisms.As was mentioned above, it has been argued that reiterated interac-tions within the context of EU-level co-operation in the field of foreignpolicy entail processes of socialization (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004, p. 7;Economides, 2005, p. 472; Rieker, 2006a, 2006b; M.E. Smith, 2004; Tonra,2001; Torreblanca, 2001; Wong, 2005, pp. 136, 138–40, 149–50; 2006,p. 10). During these interactions, national foreign policy-makers becomeconvinced of the appropriateness of the EU way of doing things and inter-nalize EU behavioural rules. Consequently, when they re-enter the nationaldecision-making process, they begin to think of the foreign policy issues athand through the prism of internalized rules and their preferences are thustransformed. National foreign policy-makers identify policy problems anddefine policy goals in accordance with established substantive EU foreignpolicy norms and they select the instruments and procedures that are con-sidered appropriate for EU Member States in each situation. Foreign policychange is guided by a logic of appropriateness – that is to say by consider-ations of what constitutes standard, normal, right or good behaviour withinthe context of the EU (March and Olsen, 2004).

Constructivist explanations of the Europeanization of national foreignpolicy have been widespread in the literature. In fact, in a most prominentcontribution, Tonra (2001) offered no explicit definition of Europeanizationand he implicitly identified the concept with norm internalization.6 In the

6 As Karen Smith (2003a, p. 250) has pointed out, ‘a rather colossal omission in the book is that Tonranever directly gets to grips with the concept of “Europeanisation” – there is no discussion of the meaningof this term (although it appears in the title), so his book can only make a disappointingly indirectcontribution to the burgeoning literature on it’. Tonra (2000, p. 229) made his understanding of the conceptexplicit in his contribution to the volume edited by Manners and Whitman, when he defined European-ization as ‘a transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways inwhich professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalisation of norms andexpectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy making’.



absence of legally binding instruments and adaptational pressure emanatingfrom the EU level, such an explanation is certainly plausible. Empiricalevidence, however, suggests that it may not be the most convincing andcertainly not the only plausible explanation. First of all, Hooghe’s (2005)research has shown that even in a most-likely critical case – the EuropeanCommission – there is little evidence to support the idea that adherence to EUnorms is the outcome of international socialization. Since the argumenthas failed the rather undemanding empirical test of a most-likely case, thephenomenon of international socialization might not be as common as theliterature on EU foreign policy suggests. In fact, Nuttall (2000, pp. 271–4)has argued that the transition from European political co-operation (EPC) tothe common foreign and security policy (CFSP) reinforced the decline ofsocialization during EU-level interactions, and the empirical record appearsto confirm this view (Gordon, 1998, p. 88). Furthermore, with regard to theEuropeanization of foreign policy in particular, even though Tonra identifiedEuropeanization with norm internalization, his research produced empiricalevidence that suggests that when national foreign policy-makers do adhere toEU foreign policy norms they do so for instrumental reasons. The instrumen-tal logic is clear when Danish, Dutch and Irish diplomats refer to the value ofprivileged access to information, the increased international weight and thegreater impact their foreign policies have had through the EPC/CFSP (Tonra,2000, p. 229). Consequently, it is at least equally plausible to argue thatnorm conformance may be driven by self-interest (Finnemore and Sikkink,1998, p. 912).

It has indeed been suggested that an instrumental logic may be underlyingEuropeanization in what has been referred to as ‘export’, ‘projection’,‘uploading’ or ‘problem transfer’ (Economides, 2005, p. 472; Torreblanca,2001; Wong, 2005, pp. 137, 150; 2006, pp. 8–9).7 According to these analy-ses, Member States ‘export’, ‘project’ or ‘upload’ their foreign policy goals orproblems onto the EU’s agenda. It remains unclear whether these terms referto a constituent element of Europeanization or to a specific causal mechanismthat explains the Europeanization of national foreign policy. What is clear isthat the discussion of ‘uploading’/‘downloading’ has created more problemsthan it has resolved. This dichotomy has created confusion regarding thedirection of causality that Europeanization refers to, thus bringing the

7 See also the sections that discuss the EU as a constriction/opportunity in the contributions to thevolume edited by Manners and Whitman. The literature has occasionally discussed the Europeanizationof national preferences on co-operation in the field of foreign and security policy (see Oliver and Allen,2006; Miskimmon and Paterson, 2003). What is implicitly being argued is that national preferences areendogenous to the integration process.



usefulness of the concept into question (Dyson and Goetz, 2003, pp. 13–15,20; Featherstone, 2003, p. 10; Radaelli, 2003, p. 34). When Member Statesupload their policy goals onto the EU, these goals are not transformed. It isthe policy-making process that changes as decisions on the issue are madecollectively at the EU level.

Jacquot and Woll’s (2003, p. 8) concept of ‘strategic usage’ is of relevancehere. According to them, ‘public officials may find it useful to employ aformerly unused mechanism of institutional co-operation with other MemberStates’. When national foreign policy-makers find that uploading will allowthem to achieve their goals more effectively, they decide to incorporate thenorm of collective decision-making into their policies. While Europeaniza-tion refers to the process of incorporation of this procedural EU foreign policynorm into national policy, uploading refers to the outcome of the process.8

Consequently, co-ordination per se cannot be considered an observableimplication of Europeanization.

It follows from the above that the alternative to the model based onsocialization is the incorporation of EU foreign policy practices and pro-cedures into national foreign policy as a result of strategic calculation.9 Thedifferences between the two explanations are considerable. According to thisexplanation, the definition of the policy problem and foreign policy goals arenot transformed as a result of Europeanization. National foreign policy-makers engage in strategic calculation in an attempt to maximize the attain-ment of fixed policy preferences and secure specific foreign policy goals.They consider the consequences of alternative courses of action (the costs andbenefits of each alternative in terms of the goals set) and choose the relevantEU foreign policy practices and procedures amongst them because they allowfor such maximization and offer the means to achieve national foreign policygoals more effectively.

8 The concept of ‘downloading’ is also problematic. While the explanation based on socialization isreferred to as ‘top-down’ Europeanization or ‘downloading’, it is clear that the process is not hierarchical,but horizontal and voluntary.9 Rieker’s (2006a, b) analysis constitutes a notable exception in the sense that it makes explicit that theEuropeanization of national foreign and security policy may be the outcome of instrumental calculationswithout identifying the latter with uploading. This is considered as an early stage of a socialization model.There is no reason, however, to assume that socialization is invariably preceded by the incorporation of EUnorms, practices and procedures for instrumental reasons. For rational choice models in foreign policyanalysis, see Allison (1969) and Allison and Zelikow (1999, pp. 16–26). It should be pointed out that, incontrast to what Allison’s discussion of rational choice models in foreign policy analysis suggests, it ispossible to construct such models without introducing the state-as-a-unitary-actor assumption andtreat the preferences of different actors as a matter of empirical investigation (see Hollis and Smith, 1986,pp. 273, 278).



III. Designing Research on the Europeanization ofNational Foreign Policy

As Europeanization is often understood as a concept that refers to thedomestic impact of the EU, empirical research is often organized as a searchfor such an impact. Consequently, the outcomes of the process of European-ization are rarely defined with a sufficient degree of precision. As has beenpointed out, due to the early stage of research on Europeanization, researchershave shown preference for an analytical grid ‘broad enough as to accom-modate a wide range of empirical observations that may have something todo with Europeanisation’ (Radaelli, 2003, p. 32). Our inability to specify thisrange, however, hinders our efforts to identify the empirical puzzles that arerelevant to Europeanization. In other words, we are uncertain about what theempirical observations that would make us suspect that Europeanization hasoccurred are. Indeed, it is not unusual for researchers to choose a state’saccession to the EU or the establishment of co-operation in the field of foreignpolicy as a starting point and then try and find some sort of EU impact. It isoften the case that either no change can be observed, or that every observablechange is ex post facto conceptualized as a form that Europeanizationassumed. If Europeanization is a process that leads to change, but we are notexactly sure what the outcomes of the process are, we are facing the exactsame problem that Haas (1971, p. 18) identified almost four decades ago: adependent variable problem. Back then it was unawareness of the possibleoutcomes of the integration process that hindered theorizing; nowadays it is asimilar unawareness of the possible outcomes of Europeanization that posesa challenge for researchers.

It follows from the above that it is necessary to specify when it is worthinvestigating whether Europeanization has occurred. One should begin byobserving change in national foreign policy that follows the establishment offoreign policy norms, practices and procedures at the EU level and is consis-tent with them (Radaelli, 2004, pp. 8–10). In order to be able to discernwhether change in national foreign policy is consistent with the logic of EUforeign policy, it is necessary to disaggregate both the explanatory and thedependent variable. One needs to identify the relevant EU foreign policynorms, practices and procedures and the elements of national foreign policyeach one of them may affect. While the list of norms, practices and proce-dures discussed below is not exhaustive (additional issue-specific objectivesand instruments may be found in the acquis politique that co-operation in thefield of foreign policy has produced), it serves as a useful starting pointbecause the norms, practices and procedures on this list cut across mostforeign policy issues (Manners, 2002; Smith, 2003b; M.E. Smith, 2004).



First, substantive EU foreign policy norms, when incorporated intonational foreign policy, change national foreign policy goals. Nationalforeign policy-makers begin to consider peace, international co-operation,democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental free-doms, respect for the rights of minorities and good governance as foreignpolicy issues that merit attention. When third countries fail to take thecourse of action that EU foreign policy norms prescribe – when peace,democracy and the rule of law are threatened; when human rights, funda-mental freedoms and the rights of minorities are being violated; wheninternational co-operation and good governance falter – national foreignpolicy-makers identify foreign policy problems that need to be addressed.The objective is to ensure that third countries comply with EU foreignpolicy norms.

Second, EU foreign policy practices – once incorporated into nationalforeign policy – change policy instruments, their configuration and the way inwhich they are used. While the use of military instruments has increased tosuch an extent that it is no longer possible to classify the EU as a ‘civilianpower’ (Smith, 2005), the mixture still consists predominantly of diplomaticand economic instruments (Smith, 2003b, p. 52). Furthermore, the offer ofEU membership constitutes a unique instrument at the Union’s disposal,which has turned out to be the most effective (Smith, 2003b, p. 67). The useof this instrument is governed by a specific type of conditionality, whichhas been referred to as ‘reinforcement by reward’ (Schimmelfenning et al.,2003). National foreign policy-makers reconfigure the national mixture ofinstruments so that it matches that of the EU. Military instruments are usedonly in those cases that fall within the EU-defined scope for acceptablemilitary action. They also use the offer of EU membership to achieve theirown national goals and the use of the instrument is guided by the logic ofenlargement conditionality.

Finally, procedural EU foreign policy norms – once incorporated intonational foreign policy – affect the national foreign-policy-making processand the actors involved. As has been pointed out, EU-level co-operation ‘hasmoved the conduct of national foreign policy [. . .] towards a collectiveendeavour’ (Hill and Wallace, 1996, p. 6). EU foreign policy is primarilyabout making collective decisions, co-ordinating, consulting or, at the veryleast, informing one’s partners. National foreign policy-makers begin toco-operate with their partners on issues they previously had sought to keepseparate from the EU context. When they allow an issue to be discussed at theEU level and a decision to be made, the decision-making process itself iselevated onto the EU level and national foreign policy-makers’ EU partnersbecome co-equal decision-makers.



It should be noted here that any mention of a ‘European Union foreignpolicy’ almost inevitably raises certain issues that are the subject of heateddebates in the literature. First of all, certain scholars would go so far asto debate the very existence of an EU foreign policy (Carlsnaes, 2004,pp. 497–503). Second, the literature discusses whether and to what extentdifferent aspects of EU foreign policy are ‘unique’ (Manners, 2002; Smith,2003b; Hyde-Price, 2006). It should be made explicit that these debates areonly marginally related to Europeanization. Whether or not the substantiveand procedural norms and practices discussed here amount to a ‘foreignpolicy’ is a matter of conceptualization that has implications for the theore-tical approaches selected to answer the question of why these norms andpractices have been established at the EU level. As was mentioned above, thisis not one of the questions that the concept of Europeanization raises. Euro-peanization helps us ask why these norms and practices are incorporated intonational foreign policy, but not why they were established at the EU level tobegin with. Furthermore, it is clear that the EU is not the only internationalactor that emphasizes norms such as respect for human rights and democ-racy.10 This is not to suggest, however, that the possibility that Europeaniza-tion may occur can be ruled out at the analytical level. The fact remains thatthese are features of the way in which the EU manages its external relations.Consequently, it is plausible to argue that when national foreign policychanges so as to incorporate these norms it might have been the EU thatcaused this change.11 The fact that the EU is not the only actor that empha-sizes such norms simply means that the EU is not the only plausible sourceof this particular type of foreign policy change. This is partly why the set ofresearch questions relevant to Europeanization are puzzling and the multitudeof possible explanatory factors should come as no surprise to students offoreign policy. The difference in terms of the analysis is that these norms arenot incorporated into national policy because they are universally accepted,but because the course of action they prescribe is considered appropriatewithin the EU context. The concept of Europeanization does not imply thatEU foreign policy is sui generis, but only that it might be causally significantfor processes of national foreign policy change. By allowing researchers tospecify the range of possible outcomes of Europeanization, the disaggrega-tion of both national and EU foreign policy makes it possible to determinewhen it is worth investigating whether this might be the case.

Having identified a potential case of Europeanization (a case of foreignpolicy change that falls within the scope of outcomes discussed above),

10 It is equally clear that not all international actors share these norms.11 The argument is plausible provided that causal mechanisms that explain the process of incorporation canbe identified.



empirical research aims at establishing the causal significance of the EU. Ashas been pointed out, the problem here is that the literature often attempts toanswer the question of what has been the domestic impact of the EU. Byposing this question, however, the literature has prejudged the significance ofthe EU as an explanatory variable (Radaelli, 2003, p. 50). Consequently,explanations that attribute causal significance to the EU should be testedagainst alternatives (Haverland, 2008, p. 66; Radaelli, 2004, p. 8). This isconsistent with foreign policy analysis as a strand of international relationstheory, which is based on the premise that foreign policy may be affected bya multitude of variables spread over different levels of analysis and thereforethe study of foreign policy at the micro-level of the policy-making process isnecessary in order to establish the relative causal significance of varioussources of foreign policy change (Hudson, 2005; Hudson and Vore, 1995;Most and Starr, 1984; Snyder et al., 1962). Consequently, ‘comparison’(Gerring, 2005, pp. 181–2), in the sense of establishing the superiority of aparticular cause in comparison with other possible causes, is a crucial prop-erty of powerful causal arguments in both literatures. Testing alternativeexplanations based on configurations of variables (sources of foreign policychange), which constitute causes that are individually necessary and jointlysufficient for the outcome under investigation (foreign policy change), istypical of the understanding of causality in qualitative research (Mahoney andGoertz, 2006, p. 232).12

Process tracing makes it possible to empirically distinguish between alter-native explanations and establish which sources of foreign policy changewere causally significant and whether Europeanization produced foreignpolicy change through socialization or strategic calculation by allowingresearchers to trace a series of ‘theoretically predicted intermediate steps’between the explanatory and the dependent variable (Checkel, 2005, p. 5).First, this method allows researchers to establish causality in cases of equi-finality – that is to say in cases where there are multiple causal paths to thesame outcome – by focusing on the causal mechanisms through which aparticular outcome may have been produced (Checkel, 2005, pp. 3–6, 14–15,19–20; Cortell and Davis Jr, 2000, pp. 84–6; Mahoney and Goertz, 2006, pp.236–7). As was indicated above, the empirical puzzles that Europeanization isrelated to constitute cases of equifinality. Second, the emphasis on ‘interme-diate steps’ allows for greater spatial and temporal continuity between theexplanatory and the dependent variable than analyses based merely on cor-relation (Bennett, 2003, pp. 13–19). Consequently, it is not only possible to

12 It should be noted that certain sources of foreign policy change will be more pertinent in some cases thanin others. As Hill (2003, p. 224) has pointed out, ‘every domestic environment is unique and is in acondition of perpetual movement [. . .] this means that generalisations are always contingent’.



empirically distinguish between explanations based on different theoreticalpremises, but also to compare causal arguments with regard to this dimensionand determine which is ‘richest’ (Gerring, 2005, pp. 173–4). Finally, theemphasis on ‘intermediate steps’ multiplies observable implications andmakes it possible to establish causality even within the context of a singlecase based on within-case observations (Bennett and Elman, 2006, p. 262).

The empirical evidence that studies of Europeanization have presented hasoften been either ambiguous or even irrelevant in the sense that it indicateslittle regarding the considerations of national foreign policy-makers thatpreceded foreign policy change.13 Process tracing the observable implicationsof alternative explanations of foreign policy change should focus on threedimensions of the policy-making process: the definition of the policyproblem, the alternative courses of action considered and the manner in whichthey were assessed. In this sense, research should start by establishing hownational foreign policy-makers defined the policy problem they intended toaddress. Has the definition of the policy problem changed? By definition,what constitutes appropriate behaviour for EU Member States depends onwhat the situation is. According to the explanation based on socialization,national foreign policy-makers begin to identify violations of substantive EUforeign policy norms by third countries as a foreign policy problem. Ensuringthat these countries take the course of action that substantive EU foreignpolicy norms prescribe becomes the objective. In contrast, the explanationbased on strategic calculation predicts no change in the definition of thepolicy problem and policy objectives. If empirical evidence shows that suchchanges have taken place, the explanation based on strategic calculation canbe refuted. The above changes in the definition of the policy problem shouldbe distinguished from cases where foreign policy does not change in responseto the establishment or internalization of substantive EU foreign policynorms, but rather as a response to the identification of shifts in a MemberState’s relative power position or the identification of foreign policy failure orpolitical turnover when a new policy-maker sees something he or she wantsto change and moves (Allison, 1969, p. 50).

The next step is to identify the various courses of action that wereconsidered as alternative options. Was an EU foreign policy practice orprocedural norm one of them? Did national foreign policy-makers consider

13 Rieker (2006b, p. 525) has conceded that the evidence she has presented ‘might’ be interpreted as beingconsistent with Europeanization, Wong (2006, p. 92, and footnote 40) has argued that French policytowards China has been Europeanized, yet he has attributed the calculation of the benefits of collectivedecision-making to the British Embassy in Paris, and Oliver and Allen (2006, p. 200) have argued that aspeech by Henry Kissinger constitutes the most accurate measurement of the extent of the Europeanizationof British foreign policy!



the use of diplomatic and/or economic instruments as opposed to the use offorce? Did they consider using the offer of EU membership as an instrument?Did they consider conditionality as the logic underlying the use of theseinstruments? Did they consider involving their EU counterparts as opposed toa unilateral approach? Both explanations of Europeanization presented herepredict that national foreign policy-makers distinguish between the nationalpolicy previously pursued and an EU foreign policy practice or proceduralnorm. If empirical evidence shows that substantive EU foreign policy normshave not affected the definition of the policy problem and EU foreign policypractices and procedural norms have not affected the alternative courses ofaction national foreign policy-makers considered, it is no longer meaningfulto speak of Europeanization and both explanations can be refuted.14

The final step is to establish whether national foreign policy-makers con-sidered the consequences (costs and benefits) of each alternative and, if so,what type of costs and benefits they calculated. According to the explanationbased on socialization, national foreign policy-makers incorporate EU foreignpolicy norms, practices and procedures into their policies because they becomeconvinced that it is the right thing to do for an EU Member State given thesituation. By definition, behaviour based on the logic of appropriateness isbehaviour that is not driven by considerations of consequences (March andOlsen, 2004, p. 3). If empirical evidence shows that national foreign policy-makers calculated the costs and benefits of the alternatives they considered, theexplanation based on socialization can be refuted. Furthermore, it is importantto check for consistency (Cortell and Davis Jr, 2000, pp. 71–2). Given thatchange, according to this explanation, is caused by the internalization ofbehavioural rules, national foreign policy-makers are expected to take thecourse of action internalized rules prescribe consistently across issues and overtime. If national foreign policy-makers take the course of action prescribed byEU norms in the case of certain policy issues but not in others, if they take thecourse of action prescribed by EU norms once or if they alternate betweencourses of action that are prescribed by EU norms and courses of action thatare not, the explanation based on socialization can be refuted.

Apart from the differences discussed above, the two explanations ofEuropeanization presented here have different implications for the possibleinteractions between EU norms, procedures and practices and other sourcesof foreign policy change. According to the explanation based on socialization,

14 The two explanations of Europeanization presented here make similar predictions regarding the alter-native courses of action national foreign policy-makers consider. While this particular dimension of thepolicy-making process does not allow researchers to distinguish between these two explanations, it doesmake it possible to distinguish between the latter and explanations that do not conceptualize foreign policychange as the outcome of Europeanization.



national foreign policy-makers do not calculate the costs and benefits of theEU foreign policy practices and procedures that they feel obliged to followand they do not take into consideration other relevant developments and theirimplications. What constitutes appropriate behaviour is determined indepen-dently of such developments and policy choices are made regardless of suchconsiderations. Consequently, variation in other sources of foreign policychange can only be part of explanations that constitute alternatives to theexplanation based on socialization. In contrast, the explanation based onstrategic calculation predicts that national foreign policy-makers will alsotake into consideration developments other than the establishment of EUnorms, procedures and practices and their implications.

Conclusions

The conceptual analysis of Europeanization presented here shows that theconcerns of those who have questioned the usefulness of the concept have notbeen entirely unjustified. The various meanings that have been attributed tothe concept are not invariably useful for empirical research. Nevertheless,considerable progress has been made. It is now understood that European-ization is a concept that can help us ask interesting questions. Definitions ofthe concept should demarcate a set of empirically manageable phenomena,which are not captured by other concepts.

In contrast, the critique of the applicability of Europeanization to the studyof foreign policy is not theoretically justified. The two explanations of foreignpolicy change as the outcome of Europeanization presented here reflect theintergovernmental nature of EU foreign policy-making. Since legally bindinginstruments are not available at the EU level, these explanations are not basedon the adaptational pressure model. At the same time, both explanationsdistinguish the process of Europeanization from uploading and refrain fromequating Europeanization with socialization. National foreign policy-makerswill choose to incorporate EU foreign policy norms, practices and proceduresinto their policies either because they have become convinced it is appropriateor because they have calculated it is utility-maximizing to do so. In order toestablish that foreign policy change was driven by a logic of appropriatenessit is necessary to show that national foreign policy-makers redefined theirsituation in a manner consistent with substantive EU foreign policy norms,distinguished between the national policy previously pursued and therelevant EU foreign policy practices and procedures and selected the latterconsistently across issues and over time without calculating their costs andbenefits. Consequently, co-ordination per se is not an observable implication



of Europeanization. Similarly, if co-ordination is not pursued consistentlyacross issues and over time, it is not a reflex. The lack of consistency inselecting co-ordination as the appropriate course of action is not compatiblewith behaviour based on the logic of appropriateness.

The acknowledgement of the voluntary nature of the Europeanization offoreign policy, the construction of two alternative explanations of foreignpolicy change as the outcome of Europeanization and the consequent empha-sis on process tracing allows research on Europeanization to fit traditionalanalyses of foreign policy well. The theoretical framework presented hererefrains from assuming that foreign policy change produced by Europeaniza-tion constitutes a sui generis phenomenon that requires ad hoc explanations.The emphasis is placed on the actors who make and change foreign policy andthe process through which change is produced. The emphasis on this ‘point ofintersection’ (Hudson, 2005, p. 3) of the determinants of foreign policy allowsresearchers to take into consideration a multitude of factors from differentlevels of analysis. The concept of Europeanization suggests one further factor(EU foreign policy norms, practices and procedures) that may (or may not) beof significance, thus preserving the multifactorial and multi-level character ofthe study of foreign policy (Hudson, 2005, pp. 2–4).

Correspondence:Kyriakos Moumoutzisemail [email protected]

References

Allison, G.T. (1969) ‘Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis’. AmericanPolitical Science Review, Vol. 63, No. 3, pp. 689–718.

Allison, G. and Zelikow, P. (1999) Essence of Decision: Explaining the CubanMissile Crisis (New York: Longman).

Bennett, A. (2003) ‘Beyond Hempel and Back to Hume: Causal Mechanismsand Causal Explanation’. Paper presented at the American Political ScienceAssociation annual conference, Philadelphia, PA, 28 August.

Bennett, A. and Elman, C. (2006) ‘Complex Causal Relations and Case StudyMethods: The Example of Path Dependence’. Political Analysis, Vol. 14, No. 3,pp. 250–67.

Börzel, T.A. (2001) ‘Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging and Fence-Sitting: MemberState Responses to Europeanisation’. Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation 4(Belfast: Queen’s University).

Börzel, T.A. and Risse, T. (2003) ‘Conceptualising the Domestic Impact of Europe’.In Featherstone, K. and Radaelli, C.M. (eds) The Politics of Europeanisation(Oxford: Oxford University Press).



Bulmer, S.J. and Radaelli, C.M. (2004) ‘The Europeanisation of National Policy?’Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation 1 (Belfast: Queen’s University).

Caporaso, J. (2008) ‘The Three Worlds of Regional Integration Theory’. In Graziano,P. and Vink, M.P. (eds) Europeanisation: New Research Agendas (Basingstoke:Palgrave Macmillan).

Carlsnaes, W. (1992) ‘The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis’.International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 245–70.

Carlsnaes, W. (2004) ‘Forum Section: Where is the Analysis of European ForeignPolicy Going?’ European Union Politics, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 495–508.

Checkel, J.T. (2005) ‘It’s the Process Stupid: Process Tracing in the Study ofEuropean and International Politics’. Working Paper 26 (Oslo: ARENA).

Clarke, M. (1996) ‘Foreign Policy Analysis: A Theoretical Guide’. In Stavridis, S.and Hill, C. (eds) Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Western EuropeanReactions to the Falklands Conflict (Oxford: Berg).

Cortell, A.P. and Davis Jr., J.W. (2000) ‘Understanding the Domestic Impact ofInternational Norms: A Research Agenda’. International Studies Review, Vol. 2,No. 1, pp. 65–87.

Dyson, K. and Goetz, K.H. (2003) ‘Living with Europe: Power, Constraint andContestation’. In Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford:Oxford University Press).

Economides, S. (2005) ‘The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy’. WestEuropean Politics, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 471–91.

Featherstone, K. (2003) ‘Introduction: In the Name of Europe’. In Featherstone, K.and Radaelli, C.M. (eds) The Politics of Europeanisation (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press).

Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) ‘International Norm Dynamics and PoliticalChange’. International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 887–917.

Flockhart, T. (2010) ‘Europeanisation or EU-isation? The Transfer of EuropeanNorms across Time and Space’. JCMS, Vol. 48, No. 4, pp. 787–810.

Garrett, G. and Tsebelis, G. (1996) ‘An Institutionalist Critique of Intergovern-mentalism’. International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 269–99.

Gerring, J. (2005) ‘Causation: A Unified Framework for the Social Sciences’. Journalof Theoretical Politics, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 163–98.

Ginsberg, R.H. (1999) ‘Conceptualising the European Union as an InternationalActor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability–Expectations Gap’. JCMS, Vol. 37,No. 3, pp. 229–454.

Gordon, P.H. (1998) ‘Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy’. International Security,Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 74–100.

Haas, E.B. (1971) ‘The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joyand Anguish of Pretheorizing’. In Lindberg, L.N. and Scheingold, S.A. (eds)Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress).

Haverland, M. (2008) ‘Methodology’. In Graziano, P. and Vink, M.P. (eds) Europe-anisation: New Research Agendas (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).



Hill, C. (1993) ‘The Capability–Expectations Gap or Conceptualising Europe’sInternational Role’. JCMS, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 305–28.

Hill, C. (2003) The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: PalgraveMacmillan).

Hill, C. and Wallace, W. (1996) ‘Introduction: Actors and Actions’. In Hill, C. (ed.)The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy (London: Routledge).

Hix, S. (2002) ‘Constitutional Agenda-Setting through Discretion in Rule Interpre-tation: Why the European Parliament Won at Amsterdam’. British Journal ofPolitical Science, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 259–80.

Hollis, M. and Smith, S. (1986) ‘Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy DecisionMaking’. British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 269–86.

Hooghe, L. (2005) ‘Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few via Inter-national Socialisation: A Case Study of the European Commission’. InternationalOrganization, Vol. 59, No. 4, pp. 861–98.

Hudson, V.M. (2005) ‘Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and theGround of International Relations’. Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 1, No. 1,pp. 1–30.

Hudson, V.M. and Vore, C.S. (1995) ‘Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today andTomorrow’. Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 209–38.

Hyde-Price, A. (2006) ‘Normative Power Europe: A Realist Critique’. Journal ofEuropean Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 217–34.

Jacquot, S. and Woll, C. (2003) ‘Usage of European Integration: Europeanisationfrom a Sociological Perspective’. European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 7,No. 12.

Mahoney, J. and Goertz, G. (2006) ‘A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitativeand Qualitative Research’. Political Analysis, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 227–49.

Major, C. (2005) ‘Europeanisation and Foreign and Security Policy: Undermining orRescuing the Nation-State?’ Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 175–90.

Manners, I. (2002) ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ JCMS,Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 235–58.

March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (2004) ‘The Logic of Appropriateness’. Working Paper04/09 (Oslo: ARENA).

Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W.E. (2003) ‘Foreign and Security Policy: On theCusp between Transformation and Accommodation’. In Dyson, K. and Goetz,K.H. (eds) Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press).

Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W.E. (2006) ‘Adapting to Europe? German ForeignPolicy, Domestic Constraints and the Limitations of Europeanisation sinceUnification’. In Maull, H.W. (ed.) Germany’s Uncertain Power (Basingstoke:Palgrave Macmillan).

Moravcsik, A. (1993) ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A LiberalIntergovernmentalist Approach’. JCMS, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 473–524.

Moravcsik, A. (1999) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power fromMessina to Maastricht (London: UCL Press).



Moravcsik, A. and Vachudova, M.A. (2003) ‘National Interests, State Power and EUEnlargement’. East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 42–57.

Most, B.A. and Starr, H. (1984) ‘International Relations Theory, Foreign PolicySubstitutability and “Nice” Laws’. World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 383–406.

Nuttall, S.J. (2000) European Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Oliver, T. and Allen, D. (2006) ‘Foreign Policy’. In Bache, I. and Jordan, A. (eds)

The Europeanisation of British Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).Olsen, J.P. (2002) ‘The Many Faces of Europeanisation’. JCMS, Vol. 40, No. 5,

pp. 921–52.Pierson, P. (1996) ‘The Path to European Integration’. Comparative Political Studies,

Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 123–63.Radaelli, C.M. (2003) ‘The Europeanisation of Public Policy’. In Featherstone, K.

and Radaelli, C.M. (eds) The Politics of Europeanisation (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press).

Radaelli, C.M. (2004) ‘Europeanisation: Solution or Problem?’ European IntegrationOnline Papers, Vol. 8, No. 16.

Rieker, P. (2006a) Europeanisation of National Security Identity: The EU and theChanging Security Identities of the Nordic States (London: Routledge).

Rieker, P. (2006b) ‘From Common Defence to Comprehensive Security: Towards theEuropeanisation of French Foreign and Security Policy? Security Dialogue, Vol.37, No. 4, pp. 509–28.

Risse, T., Cowles, M.G. and Caporaso, J. (2001) ‘Europeanisation and DomesticChange: Introduction’. In Cowles, M.G., Caporaso, J. and Risse, T. (eds) Trans-forming Europe: Europeanisation and Domestic Change (Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press).

Salmon, T.C. (1992) ‘Testing Times for European Political Co-operation: The Gulfand Yugoslavia, 1990–1992’. International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 2, pp. 233–53.

Schimmelfenning, F., Engert, S. and Knobel, H. (2003) ‘Costs, Commitment andCompliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakiaand Turkey’. JCMS, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 495–518.

Sjursen, H. (2002) ‘Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification inthe EU’s Enlargement Policy’. JCMS, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 491–513.

Smith, K.E. (2003a) ‘Understanding the European Foreign Policy System’. Contem-porary European History, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 239–54.

Smith, K.E. (2003b) European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World(Cambridge: Polity).

Smith, K.E. (2004) The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

Smith, K.E. (2005) ‘Still “Civilian Power EU”?’ Working Paper 1 (London: EuropeanForeign Policy Unit).

Smith, K.E. (2008) ‘The EU in the World: Future Research Agendas’. Working Paper1 (London: European Foreign Policy Unit).

Smith, M.E. (2004) ‘Toward a Theory of EU Policy-Making: Multi-level Gover-nance, Domestic Politics and National Adaptation to Europe’s Common Foreign



and Security Policy’. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 11, No. 4,pp. 740–58.

Snyder, R.C., Bruck, H.W. and Sapin, B.M. (eds) (1962) Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics (Glencoe, NY:Free Press).

Tonra, B. (2000) ‘Denmark and Ireland’. In Manners, I. and Whitman, R.G. (eds) TheForeign Policies of European Union Member States (Manchester: ManchesterUniversity Press).

Tonra, B. (2001) The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danishand Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union (Ashgate: Aldershot).

Torreblanca, J.I. (2001) ‘Ideas, Preferences and Institutions: Explaining the Europe-anisation of Spanish Foreign Policy’. Working Paper 01/26 (Oslo: ARENA).

Waltz, K.N. (1979) Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House).White, B. (2004) ‘Foreign Policy Analysis and European Foreign Policy’. In Tonra,

B. and Christiansen, T. (eds) Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy(Manchester: Manchester University Press).

Wong, R. (2005) ‘The Europeanisation of Foreign Policy’. In Hill, C. and Smith,M. (eds) International Relations and the European Union (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press).

Wong, R. (2006) The Europeanisation of French Foreign Policy: France and the EUin East Asia (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).



Documents

Fashionable Yet Useless