Fairness Conceptualizations and Comparable Worth

Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 45, N o . 4. 1989, p p . 81-97

Fairness Conceptualizations and Comparable Worth

Karen A. Hegtvedt Emory University

What degree of equality or inequality between work and wages is fair? This paper examines wage-setting policies as different conceptualizations of fairness. Focusing particularly on comparable worth as an alternative to existing wage- setting policies, it demonstrates how social psychological approaches to justice contribute to the understanding of these policies. More specifically, it analyzes the contributions of research on distributive justice and procedural justice to understanding the determination of job worth and the dynamics of implementing comparable worth policy. The discltssion i l l umirhs theoretical issues regarding the nature of the relationship between individual deservingness, social fairness, and social power. Finally, suggestions are offered for future research that links policy with basic theoretical problems.

Undoubtedly, the wage issue of the 1980s is comparable worth (Kelly & Bayes, 1988). The debate over comparable worth pay equity policies originates in the unexplained variation in wages associated with jobs held primarily by either men or women, i.e., the “wage gap.” To narrow the gap, comparable worth policy proposes that individuals ought to be paid according to the intrinsic worth of their jobs, as measured by factors such as skill, effort, and responsibility (Hartmann, Roos, & Treiman, 1985). By raising questions about the nature of work and compensation, comparable worth provides a catalyst to evaluate the fairness of wage-setting policies as well as the structure of reward inequalities in American society.

The concept of comparable worth as well as the dynamics surrounding its promotion are practical examples of issues raised by research in the social psy-

I would like to thank Mary Brinton, Teny Boswell, the editors of this journal issue, and the

Correspondence regarding this article should be addressed to Karen A. Hegtvedt, Department of anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

Sociology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322.

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0022-453718911200-~81$06 W i I 0 19RY The Society for the Psychological Study of Social lasuer

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chology of distributive and procedural justice. The intent of this paper is to demonstrate that social psychological approaches contribute significantly to the understanding of this major policy issue, and in turn, to show how that policy issue stimulates theoretical developments regarding the relationship between individual deservingness, social fairness, and even social power.

The first part of the paper reviews general approaches to fairness in wage setting, and it locates comparable worth as one among a number of distribution or justice rules. The second section examines social psychological research relevant to application of a comparable worth rule, focusing particularly on the determination of job worth. The third part casts implementation issues in terms of the justice conceptualizations employed by parties to the comparable worth debate, and it illustrates the intermeshing of power processes with justice concerns. The paper concludes with research questions, both basic and applied, which are raised by the analysis.

Distribution Rules, Wage Setting, and Justice

It is quite common for individuals to apply the idea of fairness to the relationship between work and wages, and to the pay of one individual or group compared to that of another (Hyman & Brough, 1975). Cohen and Greenberg (1982) specify that fairness or, more formally, distributive justice, involves “the application of a normative rule to the allocation of resources to recipients” (p. 1). A distribution of resources or rewards is just if it corresponds with that specified by the agreed-upon rule (Homans, 1974); the rule, furthermore, should be impartial and consensual (Rawls, 197 1). Although these definitional criteria represent the normative conception of justice discussed by philosophers (Jasso, 1978), the conception begs the fundamental “positive” question at the crux of the comparable worth issue: What distribution rule do people believe is just in the workplace?

Distribution rules dictate the way in which rewards are allotted to a circle of recipients. One or a combination of these rules may define justice in a given situation. Theorists (e.g., Deutsch, 1975; Eckhoff, 1974; Leventhal, 1976) have suggested a number of distribution rules. Basically, there are two major types of rules: (1) individual deserving rules, which specify that rewards should be commensurate with one or a combination of relevant individual characteristics (e.g., contributions, ability, effort, status, needs); and (2) outcome distribution rules, which specify parameters to define the expected shape of the distribution of rewards prior to the actual allocation. Brickman, Folger, Goode, and Schul (1981) refer to the former as micro and the latter as macro principles of justice, while Jasso (1983) uses the terms “just reward function” and “just reward distribution,” respectively, to signify the same ideas and likewise to imply that a rule is normative in a situation.

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An individual deserving rule, or micro justice principle, takes the form of “to each according to hidher [individual characteristic].” Equity (Adams, 1965; Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1978) obtains when individuals’ ratios of outcomes (rewards) to their inputs are equal. Inputs pertain to the combination of individual characteristics deemed reward-relevant in the situation. Comparisons of outcome/input ratios may be ‘‘local’’ or “referential” (Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972; see also Major, this issue). Local comparisons involve two individuals, for example two workers, who assess the equivalency of their wages in terms of their respective skills, job responsibilities, and other relevant individual-level characteristics; if inputs are similar, the workers should receive the same pay, whereas if inputs are different, the one with higher inputs should receive more pay. Referential comparisons focus on standards defined by a relevant reference group; for example, a word processor compares his or her wages to those generally earned by word processors within the same organization (internal equity) or in other organizations (external equity).

Most people living in industrial, capitalistic societies accept the equity principle as the basis for wages (Schwinger, 1980). As a type of individual deserving rule, equity guarantees workers a wage commensurate with their “contributions” (however defined) to the enterprise. The notion of equity, furthermore, appears to mirror the human capital model of earnings promoted by economists (see Bergmann, this issue). In principle, existing wage policies and comparable worth share an emphasis on individual deserving and thus appear to represent the same normative conception of justice. But, for the former, “contributions” theoretically are levels of worker productivity (defined at the margins), whereas the latter categorizes individual contributions in terms of job characteristics. Furthermore, in practice, the divergence between existing and proposed policies is much greater than these differences in their definitions of “contributions’’ suggest, thus creating the widely different positive conceptions of justice that are the foci of the present analysis.

One source of the divergence lies in the emphasis placed on market factors. Traditional wage systems relying upon neoclassical economics take principles of supply and demand as the basis for determining the value of individuals’ work contributions, claiming that they set the “market price” for labor (Mahoney, 1983). In other words, such principles determine the relevance and weighting of inputs and outcomes in the equity formula. The larger the demand for some types of inputs, especially when the supply of those skills is low, the higher the wage; in contrast, low wages characterize jobs for which skills are in low demand and/or the labor supply is high.

But, in reality, many factors interfere with market-based wage policies: unionization, government regulations, internal labor markets, worker preferences, employer preferences, etc. (Remick, 198 1). The latter three factors raise concerns regarding the relevance and evaluation of contributions and thus the

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calculation of supply and demand. Evaluations of the relative importance of skills generally reflect the social values and biases of a given location and time period (Stinchcombe, 1966) as well as existing policies within organizations (Remick, 1984). In contrast, although comparable worth is sensitive to market factors and internal labor markets, its intent is to decrease the influence of biases and outmoded social values in determining the worth of jobs by focusing more objectively on relevant job contributions.

A second source of the divergence between concepts of equity defined by existing wage policies and by comparable worth concerns the relationship between the underlying individual deserving rule and institutionalized outcome distribution rules. An outcome distribution rule, or macro principle of justice, ignores individual-level characteristics, focusing instead on group or distribution-level issues. Types of outcome distribution rules include an equal distribution, a distribution that ensures a minimum standard of rewards for all recipients, and subgroup principles dictating that one group should have on the average greater (or lesser) rewards compared to another. The actual income distribution of a society, indicating how many people earn various amounts of money, also represents an outcome distribution rule to the extent that the shape of existing inequalities influences the actual allocation of wages. For example, the actual bimodal distribution of wages in which women, on the average, earn less than men represents a subgroup outcome distribution rule that may influence the wage-setting policies.

The relationship between individual deserving rules and outcome distribution rules is complex. Under two special conditions, individual deserving and outcome distribution rules produce the same distribution of outcomes and are thus said to be “mutually entailed” (Jasso, 1983). First, when selected reward- relevant individual-level and group-level characteristics are distributed similarly within the recipient circle, then the use of either an individual deserving rule or an outcome distribution rule is likely to produce the same result. For example, assuming the absence of sex-segregated occupations, if about half of the popula- tion of a group possesses superior problem-solving skills and the other half does not, compensation according to individual skill level or according to a subgroup principle based on the two general skill levels should produce the same distribution of wages.

Second, when the initial selection of an individual deserving rule creates a new form of outcome distribution rule based on the repeated aggregation of individual deserving levels of “just rewards,” mutual entailment exists. For example, to the extent that people receive wages commensurate with their education levels, the aggregation of the resulting wage levels produces an income distribution that represents a consistent outcome distribution rule. The process of institutionalizing such a macro justice principle evolves over time as individuals come to judge as fair the distributions resulting from the repeated use of specific


individual deserving rules (cf. Berger et al., 1972; Homans, 1974; Jasso, 1983). The resulting outcome distribution rule promotes the values expressed inherently in the original individual deserving rule and is relatively insensitive to the biases it may represent.

This reasoning provides the basis for an explanation of the wage gap remaining after controlling for human capital investments such as education and experience (Hartmann & Treiman, 1983; England & Farkas, 1986). If the individual deserving rule guiding existing wage-setting policies ever explicitly or implicitly included sex as a reward-relevant characteristic or as a factor by which to weight all other contributions, the contributions made by women would have been judged of lower worth because of the historical social devaluation of working women and of women’s work (Remick & Steinberg, 1984). As a result of such valuations, the aggregation of individual deserving levels produced a wage gap between the wage distributions for men and women that became institutionalized as an accepted bimodal subgroup principle of justice.

Further evidence of the mutual entailment represented in the gender-based wage gap is the existence of job evaluation schemes that justify existing wage hierarchies (Remick, 1984; Steinberg, 1984). For example, to justify a wage hierarchy that benefits males, a job evaluation system may include primarily the compensable factors found primarily in men’s jobs but omit some of those found, primarily in women’s jobs. Thus, administrative practices maintain the mutual entailment represented by the institutionalized subgroup principle of justice and support the status quo. Such mutual entailment may characterize organizations with internal labor markets that are less subject to external market forces, including forces that may actually erode biases.

The primary source of threats to mutual entailment is changes in the selection and distribution of reward-relevant characteristics (Jasso, 1983). For exam- pie, if policymakers dismissed education ievels as reward-relevant criteria, then existing income distributions based on education would be an insufficient criterion for establishing wage hierarchies. Or if everyone obtained high levels of education, then the existing education-based subgroup outcome distribution rule would no longer be relevant. In addition, when there are insufficient resources to give people the rewards they “deserve” under existing rules, these types of rules fail to produce correspondent distributions (Cohen, 1979). A situation in which funds are inadequate to compensate all college-trained employees at the existing rate of compensation for such highly educated workers exemplifies this condition. The emergence of either condition fuels conflict between individuals or groups preferring different distribution principles and may stimulate changes in existing wage-setting policies.

Such conflicts are now occurring between comparable worth advocates and proponents of existing wage policies. Consistent with the first condition for the disruption of mutual entailment, the policy of comparable worth redefines re-

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ward-relevant Characteristics by emphasizing compensable job factors and by explicitly disallowing consideration of immutable status characteristics of workers such as sex and race. A consequence of this disruption is to raise questions about people’s beliefs concerning the fairness of the means used to set wages as well as the fairness of the resulting distribution.

As a means to set wages, determination of the comparable worth of jobs by objectively defining reward-relevant characteristics remains a formidable issue; as with traditional wage-setting policies, many technical issues affect the relevance, weighting, and combination of characteristics underlying pay scales. And because distribution rule preferences may reflect the self-interests of evaluators based on their social positions in a group (see Cook & Hegtvedt, 19831, multiple conceptions of fair wage policies will exist. The comparable worth concept and the debate over its implementation draw attention to social psychological research on principles of justice that addresses each of these issues.

Determining Comparable Worth

Whether comparable worth is a fair and viable alternative to existing wage systems is at once a technical question and one of values. The technical issues focus on determining the worth of jobs, and the value questions arise in the debate over implementation of the policy. Notions of procedural justice (e.g., Leventhal, 1980; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975) are of particular importance in addressing the technical issues underlying comparable worth. Procedural justice involves the evaluation of procedures leading up to a distribution in terms of the same normative criteria applied to distributive justice: impartiality, and the welfare of those affected by the procedure.

The first step in establishing the worth of jobs and commensurate salaries is the choice of a job evaluation system to produce an “acceptable” pay structure. Whereas in traditional wage systems the market presumably ensures the accept- ability of outcome/input ratios, an impartial administrative procedure underlies determination of comparable job values. To define comparability, Remick (1984) recommends “the application of a single, bias-free point-factor job evaluation system within a given establishment, across job families, both to rank- order jobs and to set salaries” (p. 99). Point-factor analysis involves the following: rating each job on a series of reward-relevant characteristics (called factors) such as skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions; assigning points to represent the relative amount of each factor a job requires; and summing points to represent job worth. Internal pay equity exists when wages for jobs with the same number of points are equal and higher wages accrue to jobs with higher point scores. Use of such a job evaluation system involves additional procedures, each subject to fairness evaluations.


To ensure procedural justice, the job evaluation system must carefully com- plete the following steps: select a representative group of participants; gather information of various types, by various means and from a variety of sources; establish a priori decision rules for attaching wages to jobs; and set up review standards (Beatty & Beatty, 1984; Pierson, Koziara, & Johannesson, 1984). These steps can underscore procedural justice in several ways. First, inclusion of workers in the process allows them to feel some control over the process of determining outcomes; i.e., the more “voice” they perceive themselves to have, the fairer they will perceive the outcomes to be (Folger, 1977; Thibaut & Walk- er, 1975). Second, outside evaluators may be seen as impartial and more objective, providing a check on the continuation of biased “traditions” within the organization. Because the success of such outsiders’ analysis depends upon the information gathered from others, a more in-depth analysis is likely to ensure a broader basis for understanding the relevance and combination of reward-relevant characteristics. Third, using multiple methods of information gathering increases the reliability of the evaluations (Beatty & Beatty, 1984). Fourth, establishment of a priori decision rules sets up normative procedures that can decrease the effects of self-interest on the setting of wages by prohibiting adjust- ments to the wage scheme once individuals’ positions in the wage scheme are revealed. Fifth, the inclusion of review standards provides a means to address violations of the a priori rules that create wage inequities.

Although these steps for designing a comparable worth pay scheme ensure some degree of procedural fairness at the management level, they hardly address the actual operationalization of comparable worth as a distribution principle. Two major issues of allocation research pertain to such operationalization: (1) the relevance and perception of inputs (e.g., compensable contributions) and outcomes (e.g., actual wages, benefits) and (2) the ways of combining inputs or outcomes.

The first issue focuses on what factors individuals or groups select in assessing the equity ratio. Defining the relevance of any input depends upon the context in which it is embedded (Kayser & Lamm, 1980; Lamm & Kayser, 1978) as well as the interests of those assessing inputs (Cook & Yamagishi, 1983). Even if an input is relevant, individuals may differentially perceive its existence or value (Cohen, 1983). Differential perceptions may be due to information processing errors or egocentric biases in the perceptual process.

Cognitive biases, generally derived from unequal attention to various ele- ments of information, include expectancy, availability, and halo biases (see Schneider, Hastorf, & Ellsworth, 1979). The expectancy bias suggests that judgments are overly influenced by information that confirms evaluators’ expectations and values; for instance, people tend to attribute successes of males to their talents and those of females to luck (Deaux, 1976). The availability bias refers to

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people’s tendencies to assess events by the ease with which instances are brought to mind, based on familiarity, perceptual salience, or recency. For example, individuals may overestimate their own contributions to jointly produced outcomes and underestimate the contributions of others (Ross, 1981). The halo bias describes the consistency in positive evaluations; people presume that a person superior on one type of input will be superior on other relevant inputs.

Such errors or biases may also affect the ways in which individuals combine information on inputs or outcomes. As one example, the type of inputs involved affect the cognitive process of combining. Farkas and Anderson (1979) showed that when input dimensions are similar, individuals cognitively sum them to yield a single value, which becomes part of the equity equation (input integration). In contrast, with dissimilar input dimensions, a separate equity ratio is estimated for each input, and the resulting ratios are averaged (equity integration).

In addition to this “cognitive algebra” underlying assessment of equity, combining information involves the weighting of various relevant inputs or outcomes. Cook and Yamagishi (1983) showed that small-group members differentially weighted relevant inputs in a self-interested manner. Research focusing on the perceived fairness of incomes as related to individual characteristics demonstrates that people consider educational attainment and occupation as the most important compensable factors (Alves & Rossi, 1978; Sheplak & Alwin, 1986), whereas “need” variables (marital status and children) are considered less important, and status factors (sex and ethnicity) are virtually ignored. Differen- tial relevance, perception, and weighting of inputs and outcomes produce different perceptions of what constitutes an equitable distribution and of whether equity obtains-two assessments relevant to the comparison between existing wage policies and comparable worth.

Information gathered by the job evaluators is the basis for determining the relevance and weighting of compensable factors. Yet both value-laden and cognitive biases plague the perception and evaluation of inputs. The subtle influence of sex role stereotypes on evaluations of job worth is pervasive (McArthur, 1985; Mount & Ellis, this issue). That evaluation systems include both similar and dissimilar inputs leads to questions about the appropriate type of cognitive algebra: input integration vs. equity integration. Furthermore, existing job descrip- tions and wages that in part reflect social stereotypes may color evaluators’ perceptions, much as the expectancy bias predicts (Grams & Schwab, 1985). Also, the halo bias suggests that inflation on ratings of job dimensions is likely if the first dimensions are positively evaluated. In addition to these potential biases, characteristics of the organizational context, such as the ability of the organization to pay wages, the extent of unionization, and government regulations, may affect the evaluation of inputs.


Despite these difficulties, there are examples of the usefulness of “objective” point-factor job evaluation systems in documenting wage discrepancies (e.g., Cook, 1983; Remick, 1981). It is possible to minimize the influence of values related to sex roles in administrative job evaluation schemes, such as those designed by Hay and by Willis (see Bureau of National Affairs, 1981). Such schemes lay the basis for comparable worth by redefining reward-relevant characteristics, and thereby disrupting the mutual entailment of the individual deserving and outcome distribution rules that exists in traditional wage systems.This disruption, in turn, raises questions about the implementation of distribution principles and the fairness of the inequalities they produce, which are discussed next.

Implementing Distribution Principles

Comparable worth and traditional wage-setting policies are variants of the individual deserving rule, equity. But in addition, the traditional policies are mutually entailed with the existing outcome distribution rule, a subgroup principle legitimating gender-based differences. Different conceptualizations of wage- setting fairness underlie the comparable worth debate. This draws attention to two important issues: the relationship between justice and self-interest, and between power dynamics and justice. Social psychological research concerning the effects of social position on the use of distribution rules and on the evaluation of fairness of the resulting outcome distributions illustrates these issues, and it also helps illuminate the comparable worth debate.

Self-Interest, Power, and Fairness Evaluations

Distribution rule preferences, especially in impersonal, task-oriented situations, often reflect self-interest (Cook & Hegtvedt, 1983). Research suggests that small-group members who rank high on the reward-relevant characteristic(s) tend to distribute rewards commensurate with the characteristic(s) while those who rank low prefer an outcome distribution rule that allows for an equal divi- sion. The same pattern of rule preferences emerges at the societal level; those in the upper classes tend to prefer distributions based on some form of equity while the lower classes (i.e., social “underdogs”) prefer equality (Tallman & Ihinger- Tallman, 1979).

With regard to the evaluation of outcomes, individuals whose benefits in a small group are higher than others are generally more satisfied and judge the outcomes as fairer (Brickman, 1975). Also, occupants of powerful bargaining positions who accrue higher benefits are more likely to judge the outcome distribution as fair than are the less powerful participants (Cook & Hegtvedt, 1986;

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Stolte, 1983). Similarly on the societal level, those who benefit from the system define objective inequality as just, whereas underdogs who benefit less define it as unjust (Robinson & Bell, 1978).

Together, these studies suggest that position in the social system defined in terms of individual or relational (i.e., power) characteristics influences distribution rule preferences and, ultimately, conceptions of justice. The power-advantaged individual or group, furthermore, is likely to maintain the current concep- tualization of justice or to promote a change favorable to those in similar positions (Austin & Hatfield, 1980; Cook & Hegtvedt, 1986). Such positional differences characterize participants in the comparable worth debate,

Conceptions of Justice Underlying the Debate

The debate over comparable worth involves groups differentially positioned in the social structure, who represent conflicting conceptions of justice in wage setting. Proponents of comparable worth include women, labor organizations, civil rights groups, and professional associations. These marketplace underdogs reject as unfair the existing distribution of wages in society and by implication reject the individual deserving rule that produced it. Their interest lies in the formulation of a new, more explicit individual deserving rule that would eventually alter the overall distribution of wages. Major opposition to comparable worth comes from the business sector, which defends the market-based deserving rule and by implication supports a subgroup justice principle allowing differential pay standards for the work that women do compared to that per- formed mainly by men.

Consistent with previous research findings, the distribution rules promoted by each party to the debate appear to further their self-interested goals. Propo- nents of comparable worth, the less powerful groups, are responding to the inequality of wages for men and women that remains after controlling for human capital investments and job characteristics. The remaining wage gap implies that gender continues to operate in some subtle way as a reward-relevant criterion. Thus, they propose an alternative individual deserving rule that would explicitly omit a characteristic on which they “rank low”: sex. The more powerful side, opponents of comparable worth, who are primarily male, “rank high” on the characteristic that comparable worth would eradicate as an implicit compensable factor. Thus, implementation of comparable worth runs counter to their interests in several ways. First, they would no longer be compensated for their high rank on the sex criterion. Second, erosion of the remaining wage gap might lead to greater valuation of the work women do, and thus might lower the relative prestige of male-dominated jobs. Third, for employers, implementation of com-


parable worth might result in immediate costs of increasing wages of workers in female-dominated jobs. By opposing comparable worth and promoting the individual deserving rule embedded in existing wage policies, the more powerful male-dominated business sector protects its vested interests in a system that ensures it higher rewards.

This interpretation of the rules each side promotes highlights what is per- haps the most profound paradox of justice: Definitions of fairness often reflect self-interest. Although normative conceptions of justice emphasize impartiality (Rawls, 197 l ) , effective social cooperation to promote individual well-being (Deutsch, 1983), and collective welfare (e.g., Cohen, 1979; Ginsberg, 1965), nevertheless actual beliefs about fairness are intimately related to social positions and power (Cook & Hegtvedt, 1986). Currently, each side presents arguments consistent with its position in society as well as its conception of justice.

For example, to justify their adherence to existing wage-setting policies, opponents of comparable worth reject the possibility that sex bias is institutionalized in market rates and concomitant administrative practices, and they criticize comparable worth in terms of its implementation costs and the threat it poses to the economic sphere and the fabric of society (e.g., Livemash, 1980; Perrin, 1985). They argue that if wages were independent of productivity, con- sumers would face higher prices (or higher taxes) and employers who were forced to pay higher wages might hire fewer people. As an alternative to admin- istratively raising wages, they propose that the principles of supply and demand will erode wage discrimination and that increasing the upward mobility of women into male-dominated jobs will enhance their position in the compensation hierarchy.

To refute these arguments, comparable worth proponents emphasize empirical findings that suggest the existence of subtle forms of discrimination in wages (England & Farkas, 1986), and they point to existing market impurities that undermine the productivity/wage relationship (Remick, 1981). Further- more, proponents argue that gender discrimination cannot be excused solely because it is costly to remedy (approximately 1-5% of a payroll-Cook, 1984; Gasaway, 1981). With regard to opponents’ proposed solution, comparable worth advocates note the social and physical limits of attaining high-status positions in society (Hirsch, 1976) and the one-sidedness of the proposal in that it does not envision integration of males into female-dominated occupations, owing to their undervaluation (Remick & Steinberg, 1984).

Careful analysis of the debated points might reveal serious deficiencies in the arguments of both proponents and opponents (Neuse, 1982). Nonetheless, the claims offered by each side remain consistent with their respective conceptualizations of justice. Ultimately, the struggle over what is truly just-not simply what is justified as fair-will be fought in the political arena.

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The Politics of Comparable Worth

While arguments regarding pay are replete with moral terminology, appeals to fairness do not always yield solutions-especially when multiple notions of fairness exist. Furthermore, questions of control over jobs, the value of jobs, and fair pay are not mutually exclusive (Willman, 1982). It comes as no surprise, then, that the comparable worth debate represents a struggle between those who wield power in the marketplace and those who do not.

Comparable worth is a conception of justice in wage setting promoted by representatives of relatively powerless employee groups. The proposal, however, is a profound challenge to the theoretical operating principles of the United States economy (Remick & Steinberg, 1984). Failure to dismiss the proposal summarily and eradicate the challenge implies that ( 1) the group promoting it is in some sense more powerful than it appears, based on its structural position; and/or (2) the fairness of existing wage-setting policies is at least somewhat questionable.

Twenty years ago, the notion of equal pay for equal work was radical; today, the issue involves equal pay for work of equal value. The comparable worth challenge stems from changes in the sociohistorical conditions that fos- tered the wage-setting policies that create the current wage gap. “In these twenty years, the economic contributions of women have become more important, not only because of the increased number of women working for pay, but also because of the decreased earning power of men, increased divorce rates, increased expectations about the standard of living, and women’s increased self- esteem” (Remick & Steinberg, 1984, p. 286). In addition, the labor force participation trends have translated into increased political power for women. Together, the structural changes in the labor market and increased political clout of a formerly relatively powerless group allow for the presentation of a new concept of justice in wage setting.

Introducing comparable worth as a form of fairness typifies the ongoing process of defining justice in terms of sociohistorical circumstances (Deutsch, 1983). But the fate of any definition of fairness ultimately depends upon the power relations of the involved parties. Power is a more primitive concept than justice (Homans, 1974). The political clout and strategies of proponents and opponents will shape the future of the pay equity policy (Johansen, 1984).

Questions for Further Research

Comparable worth raises interesting questions about justice in terms of issues regarding perceptions, self-interest, and power. Some of these questions are relevant to existing social psychological theory and research; others pertain


more specifically to comparable worth but imply avenues for more basic research (see Hartmann, et al., 1985). The myriad of questions signals the difficulty in judging what is really fair in the contemporary American workplace.

Assessing whether wages are equitable is a difficult task, largely due to variation in the perception, judged relevance, and weighting of inputs and outcomes. The comparable worth policy draws attention to the need to analyze cases more complex than previous experimental studies, which often involved only two task-related inputs, or than nonexperimental research which frequently includes extraneous need and status factors. One avenue of research is to examine how individuals perceive multiple task-related inputs, and to combine this with similar investigations focusing on outcomes. An empirical method to analyze such perceptions could adapt the factorial-survey design of Rossi and his col- leagues (Alves & Rossi, 1978; Jasso & Rossi, 1977) by creating vignettes that describe jobs rather than individuals; respondents yould assess the fairness of wages associated with various factorial combinations of job characteristics (e.g., education required, working conditions, experience necessary). Comparisons across types of respondents (e.g., workers, managers, professionals) would determine the extent of agreement on compensable factors and their weights, as well as assess the influence of self-interest on such evaluations.

Research might also explore how the process of gathering the information regarding inputs affects evaluations of the resulting outcome distribution. Com- parable worth brings together concerns with distributive justice and procedural justice, both of which are growing areas of basic research (Lind & Tyler, 1988). For example, Greenberg (1987) found that people perceive outcomes derived from fair procedures as fair (although they assess lower outcomes as slightly less fair); however, people respond negatively to unfair procedures only if outcomes are low, whereas if outcomes are relatively high, they tend to tolerate unfair procedures. Again, self-interest appears to color justice evaluations. Exploration of the conditions under which procedural fairness guarantees the perceived fairness of outcomes may facilitate the development of job evaluation schemes. In addition, because wage distributions often are taken as givens prior to actual job assessments, future studies should reverse the question and examine how various outcome distributions affect perceptions of procedural fairness. Schwab ( 1 985) has suggested that determination of a system of compensable factors and weights might begin with assessing what people evaluate as a fair outcome distribution and then deriving a mutually entailed individual deserving rule.

Schwab’s proposal draws attention to two relatively ignored areas of research: perceptions of distributions per se, and mutual entailment. Experimental research on the perceived fairness of outcome distributions rarely includes variation in distribution shapes. And studies on the fairness of income distributions typically focus on equality vs. inequality comparisons or on the extent of differences among occupations. Variations in the perceived fairness of different

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subgroup outcome distribution principles remains to be examined. Such research should reveal what types of wage gaps people perceive as fair and factors affect- ing their evaluations, including social positions and attitudes. For example, with regard to the gender-based wage gap, males, especially those holding traditional values, might be more likely to judge the gap as fair than would women or nontraditional males. The comparable worth debate epitomizes conflict arising from different perceptions of justice-research terrain that social psychologists have hardly explored because of their focus on distribution preferences in situations involving little interaction among decision makers. Yet as the debate illustrates, conflict is often inevitable when the opposing vested interests of occupants of different social positions are at stake.

Research on the causes of outcome distributions and the “defenses” of particular concepts of justice may raise questions of individual deservingness and its mutual entailment with outcome distributions. Assuming that changes in sociohistorical circumstances are likely to disrupt mutual entailment, research questions should focus on the structural conditions enhancing or challenging mutual entailment. In such research, knowledge regarding the relationship between individual and societal justice concerns should emerge.

Research on comparable worth per se should delineate who objects to the policy and should ask, Are objections based on technical, economic, or political grounds? This question is the most critical one for determining wage policy in the 1990s as well as for sorting out theoretical relationships. If comparable worth is solely a technical issue, then creation of some sort of bias-free job evaluation should quiet the debate and produce some consensus on perceptions of justice. If it is a combination of technical, economic, and political issues, the debate will probably rage on, with each side invoking justice rhetoric as a powerful tool to gain support. Because no definitive tests or absolute standards exist, the ultimate definition of fairness in wage setting depends upon consensus between power- advantaged and disadvantaged parties (Steinberg, 1984). Possible changes in relationships between work and wages, employers and employees, and men and women await such consensus.

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KAREN A. HEGTVEDT is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Emory Univer- sity. Her current research on justice issues explores two topics: the effects of social identities and wage-setting attitudes on workers’ evaluations of the fairness of gender- and education-based wage gaps, and negotiated resolution of conflict between individuals promoting different conceptions of justice. Her other research interests concern the social antecedents and consequences of attributions in exchange situations.

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Fairness Conceptualizations and Comparable Worth