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Factors to be Considered in

the Exercise of Discretion By Joseph P. Whalen (Saturday, July 25, 2015)

I. INTRODUCTION

While perusing various immigration-related cases, I came upon

Ifeyhewen Badidi v. Loretta Lynch, No. 14-60155 June 25, 2015 (5th Circuit

Summary Calendar) and was drawn to this passage:

"...We reach the merits of Badidi’s claim that the BIA erred in

denying his request for a continuance pending the appeal of the

denial of his I-130 petition. The BIA determined that the IJ had

properly denied Badidi’s continuance request, given that the United

States Citizenship and Immigration Service had denied the I-130

petition. This determination is in accord with the record, which

indicates that the I-130 petition was denied due to numerous

discrepancies in the couple’s answers to questions designed to

establish the authenticity of their marriage. Badidi’s conclusory

assertions regarding this issue do not establish a likelihood of

success in challenging USCIS’s determination, or that the denial of

a continuance was an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Ahmed v.

Gonzales, 447 F.3d 433, 438-39 n.3 (5th Cir. 2006); Matter of

Hashmi, 24 I & N. Dec. 785, 790 (BIA 2009) (listing factors to be

considered in assessing whether to grant a continuance due to a

pending petition)...."

Given the fact that the granting or denial of a request for a

continuance is vested solely in the sound discretion of an Immigration

Judge (IJ), the denial of a continuance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

Such a review is not without a proper framework in that the BIA and courts

have addressed the factors to be considered in deciding upon such a request.

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II. PERTINENT PRECEDENTS

In Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785 (BIA 2009), the BIA held:

(1) An alien's unopposed motion to continue ongoing

removal proceedings to await the adjudication of a pending

family-based visa petition should generally be granted if

approval of the visa petition would render him prima facie

eligible for adjustment of status. Matter of Garcia, 16 I&N

Dec. 653 (BIA 1978), followed.

(2) In determining whether good cause exists to continue

such proceedings, a variety of factors may be considered,

including, but not limited to:

(1) the Department of Homeland Security's response

to the motion to continue;

(2) whether the underlying visa petition is prima facie

approvable;

(3) the respondent's statutory eligibility for

adjustment of status;

(4) whether the respondent's application for

adjustment merits a favorable exercise of discretion;

and

(5) the reason for the continuance and any other

relevant procedural factors.

Ahmed v. Gonzales, 447 F. 3d 433 (5th Cir. 2006), stated in note 3 [Slip

Op. P. 12]:

3 In other words, had Ahmed received his labor certification

and completed the very first step in this process, he would

still have needed an employer, presumably American Rags,

to file an employment-based visa petition on his behalf with

DHS, and he would have needed that visa petition to have

been approved. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(2)(A), discussed supra.

Only then would he have been eligible for the discretionary

removal relief contemplated by § 1255(i). [INA § 245(i)]

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Matter of Garcia, 16 I&N Dec. 653 (BIA 1978), held:

(1) Rule that reopening of proceedings will be denied absent

a prima facie showing that the statutory requirements for

relief have been met must be reexamined as to adjustment of

status in view of the amendment of 8 C.F.R. 245.2(a)(2)

permitting an adjustment application, filed with a visa

petition, to be retained if later approval of the petition would

make a visa available at time of filing.

(2) 8 C.F.R. 245.2(a)(2), permitting simultaneous filing of an

application for adjustment of status and a visa petition,

applies both before and after the issuance of an Order to

Show Cause.

(3) Service1 policy permits a prima facie qualified beneficiary

of a visa petition to remain in the United States pending final

adjudication of the petition and an adjustment application.

(4) Unless clear ineligibility is apparent in the record, the

Board shall generally grant motions to reopen in cases

involving an application for adjustment of status filed

simultaneously with a visa petition pursuant to 8 C.F.R.

245.2(a)(2), notwithstanding the fact that the petition has not

yet been adjudicated.

(5) An immigration judge may, in his discretion, grant a

motion to reopen or a request for a continuance of a

deportation hearing pending final adjudication of a visa

petition filed simultaneously with an adjustment application

under 8 C.F.R. 245.2(a)(2) where a prima facie approvable

visa petition and adjustment application have been submitted

to him. Matter of Kotte, Interim Decision 2634 (BIA 1978)

clarified.

1 “Service” refers to “Legacy” INS and the functions now under the auspices of three DHS immigration agencies. ICE and CBP are law enforcement components (like immigration police) while USCIS adjudicates benefits requests. The adjudicators are similar to occupations from “case workers” to “administrative magistrate judges”, all of whom are seeking the likely truth of the applicant/petitioner/beneficiary’s qualifications and eligibility for the benefit sought in an inquisitorial adjudicative framework.

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Matter of Kotte, 16 I&N Dec. 449 (BIA 1978), held, as follows:

(1) Where a visa petition, filed prior to the commencement of

deportation proceedings, to accord the respondent third-

preference status, had not been approved at the time of the

deportation hearing, the Board of Immigration Appeals

concluded that the immigration judge was not required to

continue deportation proceedings pending adjudication of

respondent's visa petition by the District Director.

(2) In deciding that the respondent did not possess an

approved visa petition and that, therefore, he was statutorily

ineligible for adjustment of status under section 245 of the

Immigration and Nationality Act, the Board of Immigration

Appeals concluded that neither it nor the immigration judge

had authority to determine the respondent's qualifications

for third-preference status and that jurisdiction in this matter

rested solely with the District Director and Regional

Commissioner.2

(3) Notwithstanding the amendment of section 245(a) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act by Pub. L. 94-571,

Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976

(October 20, 1976), and the amendment of 8 C.F.R.

245.2(a)(2) making adjustment of status contingent upon the

availability of a visa on the date of, ting rather than on the

date of approval of an application, there is no absolute right

to a continuance of the deportation hearing, at which

adjustment is sought, to a date after the District Director has

adjudicated a pending third-preference visa petition.

In my routine perusal of immigration-related cases from the Circuit

Courts of Appeals, I happened upon one that included a few lines that I

thought would add to this article. The case is Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch,

2 Back in 1978, the initial visa petition decisions were rendered by INS, an agency within DOJ. DOJ also contained other components including, the Immigration Courts and BIA. Original jurisdiction to decide visa petitions shifted to USCIS, within DHS, when INS was abolished and its functions were folded into DHS on March 1, 2003.

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__F.3d__ (5th Cir. 2015) No. 14-60546 July 21, 2015, which contains the

following gem:

“… II. Ramirez-Mejia’s Parole Into the United States

Ramirez-Mejia also argues that [8 U.S.C.] Section 1231

(a) (5) is inapplicable to her because it only applies to aliens

who reentered the United States illegally. She last entered

the country under a grant of parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

1182 (d) (5). Thus, she argues that the government, by

paroling her into the United States to determine whether she

was eligible for “withholding of removal only,” displaced her

prior illegal reentry and rendered her eligible for asylum.

The argument is imaginative but errant.

The Immigration and Nationality Act gave the

Attorney General authority to exercise discretion in granting

parole and to place “such conditions as he may prescribe” on

the parolee. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (d) (5) (A). Even though that

statute remains unchanged, parole authority now resides

with the DHS.1

Additionally, parole does not create an entitlement to

remain in the United States: “when the purposes of such

parole . . . have been served the alien shall forthwith return

or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and

thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same

manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the

United States.” Id. Regulations provide further requirements

and procedures for parole. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.5.

Ramirez-Mejia was granted parole for the purpose of

pursuing withholding of removal and CAT protection.

Though her presence in the country was with the permission

of the DHS, we see no basis for concluding that her

authorized presence overrode the effect of her earlier illegal

entry. Nothing about the grant of temporary parole to

pursue relief cancels the relevance of her earlier illegal

reentry after having been removed. She thus remains subject

to the provisions of Section 1231(a)(5).”

____________________________________________________

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“1 It seems agreed that authority over granting parole was

transferred from the Attorney General to the DHS in 2002 as a result of

the Act that created the DHS; we need not trace the statutory route of the

transfer here. See Matter of Castillo-Padilla, 25 I. & N. Dec. 257, 261 & n.1

(BIA 2010). One reference to the authority of the DHS Secretary is in 6

U.S.C. § 202(4), which provides that the Secretary is to establish and

administer rules governing parole.”

Id. Slip Op. at pp. 8-9

Matter of Castillo-Padilla, 25 I. & N. Dec. 257, 261 & n.1 (BIA 2010),

held:

(1) Conditional parole under section 236(a)(2)(B) of

the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(B)

(2006), is a distinct and different procedure from parole

under section 212(d)(5)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §

1182(d)(5)(A) (2006).

(2) An alien who was released from custody on

conditional parole pursuant to section 236(a)(2)(B) of the Act

has not been "paroled into the United States" for purposes of

establishing eligibility for adjustment of status under section

245(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2006).

III. ADDITIONAL CASE-LAW & RESOURCES

The above cases have precedential value and are binding, as applicable,

but there are also many non-precedential case decisions out there that,

while not binding, may be persuasive. Although both the BIA and AAO

issue the vast majority of their respective case decisions as unpublished,

non-precedents, it is AAO that routinely posts them, albeit, redacted,

sometimes to the point of total uselessness. Following, is an excerpt that is

anything but useless. On the contrary, this near ubiquitous blurb contains a

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useful listing of direct, on-topic precedent decisions containing, inter alia,

lists of factors to be considered in discretionary waiver cases.

“The Board has also held that the common or typical results

of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute

extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship

factors considered common rather than extreme. These

factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current

employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of

living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation

from family members, severing community ties, cultural

readjustment after living in the United States for many

years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have

never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and

educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior

medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally

Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I&N Dec. [560] at 568 [(BIA

1999)]; Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. [627] at 631-32 [BIA

1996)]; Matter of Ige, 20 I&N Dec. [880] at 883 [(BIA 1994)];

Matter of Ngai, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984);

Matter of Kim, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); Matter of

Shaughnessy, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when

considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it

clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in

themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in

determining whether extreme hardship exists." Matter of O-J-

O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting Matter of Ige,

20 I&N Dec. [880] at 882 [BIA 1994)]). The adjudicator "must

consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in

their totality and determine whether the combination of

hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily

associated with deportation." Id.

Aug202010_07H6212.pdf, at p. 4.

Another factor to be considered is the effect that one case or

proceeding has upon others. This next excerpt from a non-precedent

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AAO Appeal Dismissal describes one such situation where the outcome

of one case dictated the outcome of another. This particular example

comes from a non-precedential I-212 decision.

In a separate decision, we dismissed an appeal of the denial

of the applicant's Form I-601. In Matter of Martinez-Torres,

the Regional Commissioner held that an application for

permission to reapply for admission is denied in the exercise

of discretion to an alien who is mandatorily inadmissible to

the United States under another section of the Act, and no

purpose would be served in granting the application. 10 I&N

Dec. 776 (Reg. Comm. 1964). As the applicant is inadmissible

under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i)3 of the Act and his waiver

application was denied, no purpose would be served in

granting the applicant's Form 1-212.

JUL022015_02H4212.pdf, at p. 3.

IV. DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS

While waivers4 are an easy example of discretionary decisions for

purposes of this essay, there are other applications and petitions that have a

discretionary element. For now, I will leave the readers on their own to

follow the hyperlinks above for more in-depth research into the various lists

3 8 U.S.C. § 1182. Inadmissible aliens (a) Classes of aliens ineligible for visas or admission

Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States: (6) Illegal entrants and immigration violators (C) Misrepresentation (i) In general Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this chapter is inadmissible. 4 See a variety of categories of AAO non-precedent decisions on various waiver Appeals here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.

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of factors to be considered in discretionary waiver decisions. Aside from

waivers and requests for continuances, supra., the classic example of a

major discretionary decision is the I-485, Application to Register Permanent

Residence or Adjustment of Status (AOS).

No alien has any entitlement or; legally enforceable right; to be granted

adjustment of status. After demonstrating prima facie eligibility, (such as

visa availability, financial ability, sponsorship, employment, etc… and basic

admissibility), the final answer is, that it is ultimately a discretionary

decision. That decision is vested by statute in either the Attorney General

(through IJs and the BIA) or the Secretary of Homeland Security (through

USCIS). Congress gave that discretion to those Executive Branch Officials

and could take it away, but has not done so. As clarified in Matter of Patel,

17 I&N Dec. 597 (BIA 1980); Affirmed In Part; Reversed and Remanded In

Part; [Patel v. INS, 638 F. 2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1980)], “The grant of an

application for adjustment of status under section 245 is a matter of

administrative grace. An applicant has the burden of showing that

discretion should be exercised in his favor.” At p. 601.

Patel was following along in a series of at least four prior decisions and

also noted the following. “[W]here adverse factors are present, it may be

necessary for the applicant to offset those factors by a showing of unusual

or even outstanding equities.” Id. [Emphasis added.] Patel and its

antecedents list numerous factors to be considered in rendering the

judgment in discretionary adjustment of status cases. Patel relied, in part

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upon: Matter of Marques, 16 I&N Dec. 314 (BIA 1977); Matter of Leung, 16

I&N Dec. 12 (DD 1976)5; Matter of Arai, 13 I&N Dec. 494 (BIA 1970); Matter

of Ortiz-Prieto, 11 I&N Dec. 317 (BIA 1965). I wish you the best in your

further research. The various cases that are listed, linked, and discussed

herein are just the tip of the iceberg, there are thousands more. It may be

useful to consult the indices found in the DOJ-EOIR Virtual Law Library.

The United States Code [U.S.C.] is a consolidation and codification by

subject matter of the general and permanent laws of the United States. An

excellent resource has been prepared by the Office of the Law Revision

Counsel of the United States House of Representatives (OLRC) and easily

found online at http://uscode.house.gov/. I like the version of the Code of

Federal Regulation found online known as the e-CFR. Finally, the “one stop

shop” for many federal laws, regulations, cases, and various federal

publications is by the Government Printing Office (GPO) website at

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/.

V. ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION, & OBSERVATIONS

Ahmed v. Gonzales, Hashmi, Garcia, Kotte, Ramirez-Mejia, Castillo-

Padilla, and Patel, etc…, make clear a number of pertinent points. I will

begin with what is most poignant in my opinion and then list some other

items in no particular order, unless you can find one.

5 This case was decided by a District Director, probably New York City District Office, and is often incorrectly attributed to the BIA.

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There has long been a separation between benefits

adjudications (rewards) and law enforcement &

removal proceedings (punishments).

That division of powers and responsibilities was

more muddled in the past but has become much

clearer over the last several decades.

The roles of benefits and enforcement agencies

become clearer through even a casual perusal of

various actions taken across all three branches of

our government, including:

o Executive actions via notice-and-comment

rulemaking and administrative precedents,

both of which seek a practical application of

and for legislation and interpretations thereof;

then later reinforced through;

o Judicial interpretations, which may mean

finding the executive branch to be acting ultra

vires, or the legislative branch to have passed

a law that is unconstitutional; and

o Legislative changes, which sometimes codify

and other times overrule executive branch

actions and/or judicial branch interpretations.

o Change is the Most Stable Constant. The three

items above illustrate how each branch of our

government can and does exercise its

Constitutional powers and duties in our

system of checks and balances. It is that

system that nurtures an ever-expanding

refinement of the powers and duties of the

various actors within immigration law

matters.

o Note: I have observed that courts more often

tend to find the executive to be acting ultra

vires, which is when the action is beyond the

legal authority to act, while mandamus is rare.

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o The opposites from ultra vires are when:

(1.) A duty owed is unduly delayed or

withheld. A court may exercise the

extraordinary remedy of issuing a writ of

mandamus which is a court order to the

government agency instructing it to

perform its duty forthwith. OR

(2.) An agency may choose to exercise its

innate authority to delay or withhold

enforcement of the law to its full extent;

this is known as prosecutorial discretion.6

Bodies of case-law exist in order to guide

Adjudicators and other Immigration Officers, or

Immigration Judges in the performance of their

duties and promote uniformity in decision-making.

The numerous and highly variable situations

routinely encountered by DHS Officers or IJs often

require an exercise of sound judgment in fact-

finding and reconciling those facts with the

applicable law via an inquisitorial adjudication.

Mixed questions of fact and law rely heavily upon

sound judgment and an appropriate exercise of

discretionary authority.

Where there is no statutorily assigned discretionary

authority allowing the agency to grant a benefit or

relief, in their discretion, then no discretion may be

exercised. See Matter of Polidoro, 12 I&N Dec. 353

(BIA 1967), which concluded: “The argument of

counsel has been noted. The issue in visa petition

proceedings is not one of discretion but of eligibility.

The appeal will be dismissed.” At p. 354.

6 More discussion of this topic will follow below.

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Alternative options or courses of action exist. The

law includes specific assignments and/or delegations

of discretionary authority.

One such course of action is judicious inaction via

the standardized use of Prosecutorial Discretion.

Prosecutorial Discretion merely means that, while

no unauthorized grant of a benefit or relief is made,

the harsher punitive measures available under the

law are not pursued, as a matter of policy.

A Cabinet-Level Official may delegate their

discretionary authority but dictate, direct, and limit

how it may be exercised by issuing regulations,

policy memos, interpretations, declarations, edicts,

or directives.

Administrative Precedent Decisions and formal

Policy Memoranda are very popular means to

express an agency’s viewpoints and put the intended

publics on notice of those viewpoints/interpretations.

The law includes statutory entitlements which do

not contain any discretionary elements. In such

cases, if eligibility is demonstrated, then the benefit

or relief is bestowed and may not be withheld.

The best example of an entitlement is a claim to

citizenship. Citizens may not be deported.

The law includes statutory preclusions which do not

contain any discretionary authority. In such cases, if

the condition precedent exists, then either the

reward is denied and/or the assigned penalty is

imposed or carried-out. This may include denial of

benefits and/or relief; detention; or denial of

voluntary departure, etc…

Additional penalties may include inadmissibility or

removal, and may entail temporary or permanent

bars to admissibility or eligibility for some benefit

or form of relief.

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Many penalties, such as inadmissibility might be

subject to a discretionary waiver or other form of

relief such as adjustment of status to that of an alien

admitted for permanent residence.

Certain individuals might be eligible for a waiver of

a ground of inadmissibility or deportation, and some

waivers may only be available in conjunction with

an application for a benefit.

The most common “discretionary decision” situation

encountered by IJs and USCIS Adjudicators are I-

212 and/or I-601 waiver application in combination

with I-485 adjustment applications.

The above situation has a counterpart is asylum and

refugee cases, or withholding of removal, the form

numbers and procedures are different and tailored

to similar but distinct sections of law.

VI. CONCLUSION

The factors to be considered in the exercise of discretion need only be

considered if there is actually any discretion available to exercise in the first

place. Our Constitution gives Congress with the power to set immigration

and nationality rules through legislation. Article I, Section 8, Clause 4, of

the Constitution informs us, in pertinent part, that “The Congress shall

have Power … To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization …

throughout the United States;” Congress set the first such “Rule” via the

Naturalization of 1790 and has kept tweaking the law ever since. Congress

tends to be very strict in setting its immigration related rules. When they

wish to “pass the buck”, they grant discretionary authority to the executive

branch or courts. Until the Department of Homeland Security was created,

the Attorney General was the main delegate of discretion. Now, there are

more cabinet level officials who have some discretion, the Secretary of DHS

has the most discretion now.

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There is legislation pending in both houses of Congress as I write.

Most of what is introduced in Congress dies in committee so don’t hold

your breath in anticipation. The last major change to immigration law was

in the mid-1990s and the last major nationality law change was in 2000. The

Homeland Security Act which was passed after the terrorist attacks of

September 11, 2001, was more involved with beefing-up security measures,

reorganizing and restructuring than in making real “substantive” changes

to criteria relating to benefits under the law. There were some “reactionary

changes” when we were in “panic mode”. For purposes of this essay, the

latter are of little relevance. Minor adjustments to the interpretation of this

body of law can come from administrative bodies (AAO and BIA) or the

federal Courts of Appeals or the Supreme Court. Currently, the case I find

most controversial is from the Second Circuit. In Morales-Santana v. Lynch,

___F. 3d___(2nd Cir. 2015) [No. 11-1252 (2nd Cir. July 8, 2015)]; the three-

judge panel sought fit to declare as unconstitutional, legislation that has

been repeatedly upheld since it was passed in 1952. I personally cannot see

USCIS or the Department of Justice accepting that decision without a fight.

In that it is so recent, it is too soon to tell. As of this writing, there is still

time for the government to file a request for rehearing en banc or certiorari

to the Supreme Court. We’ll see.

Dated this 25th day of July, 2015

X

/s/ Joseph P. Whalen

That’s my two-cents, for now!

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EXTRAS!

General Interest Articles:

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/position-paper-settled-v-unsettled-

collateral-estoppel-or-topple-signed

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/position-paper-on-inconsistencies-

incompetence-and-obfuscation

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/bifurcated-analysis-on-appellate-review

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/common-law-master-servant-relationship-

not-master-slave-or-indentured-servant

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/sometimes-the-only-thing-worth-reading-

is-the-footnotes

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/smoke-and-mirrors-and-premature-

whining-and-cases

General Interest Items:

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/fatima-mohamed-v-rosemary-melville-et-

al-no-072750-8th-cir-2008-tps-not-basis-to-reopen-for-i485pdf

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/jd-a-minorv-uscis-chicago-asylum-

mandamus-complaint-june-12-2015

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/what-is-the-motivation-for-an-ice-agent-to-

do-anything-about-eb5

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/basic-scheduling-and-procedures-order-dc-

district-july-13-2015

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http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/2015-cis-ombudsman-annual-report

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/rules-of-practice-and-procedure-for-

administrative-hearings-before-the-dol-office-of-administrative-law-judges-

5192015

Employment-Based:

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/balca-en-banc-decisions-as-of-feb-11-

2004pdf

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/matter-of-muhammad-imran-butt-26-in-

dec-108-bia-2013

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/aao-jun08201501b6203-7th-mtrr-for-eb3-

admin-asst-in-sole-proprietor-retail-business

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/aao-jun01201501b4203-eb1c-2-yrs-away-

from-employer-disqualifies-bene

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/aao-jun012015-01-d7101-l1b-remand-new-

decision-shall-be-certified-to-aao

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/jiangshan-xiao-et-al-v-jeh-johnson-et-al-no-

1441332-5th-cir-7915pdf

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/arvind-gupta-v-headstrong-inc-

2014lca00008-alj-january-21-2015

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/aao-may07201501b5203-niw-toner-

cartridges-cases

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/aao-may01201501b5203-debarred-entity-

must-be-denied

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EB-5:

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/considerations-for-the-eb5-entrepreneur-

as-opposed-to-an-eb5-investor

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/sec-v-vineet-kalucha-et-al-complaint-and-

dismissal

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/amicus-brief-to-uscis-on-eb5-reformpdf

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/talkingpointseb5interactiveseriesexpenses

6415

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/in-the-matter-of-ireeco-llc-and-ireeco-

limited-sec-june-23-2015

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/california-blue-sky-regional-center-

designation-and-approval

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/aao-may012015-08-d2101-eb5-paralegal-

as-h1b-dismissed

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/immigrant-investor-petitions-aao-non-

precedents-posted-as-of-may-28-2015

Citizenship, Naturalization, & Related:

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/a-case-on-point-in-derivative-citizenship

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/moralessantana-v-lynch-f-3d2nd-cir-2015-

no-111252-2nd-cir-july-8-2015-published-citizenship-law

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/aao-jun25201501e2309-n600-sustained-

long-overdue-dose-of-good-sense

e-mail: joseph.whalen774@gmail.com Page 19 of 19

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/aao-jul02201504e2309-stepchild-not-

eligible-to-derive-usc-unless-as-an-adopted-child

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/aao-jun09201501e1316-n470-mistates-the-

law-again

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/aao-jun03201501e2309-n600-sustained-

jamaican-legitimation-invokes-matter-of-cross-includes-jsca-of-1976

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/united-states-v-jammal-no-312cv07925-

sdwva-filed-feb-9-2015-entered-feb-10-2015-affd-4th-cir-june-9-2015

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/hamid-kamara-v-loretta-lynch-f3d5th-cir-

2015-no-1360807-may-18-2015-derv-citz-clarified

Misc.

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/ifeyhewen-badidi-v-loretta-lynch-no-

1460155-june-25-2015-summary-calendar

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/mazariegos-v-holderlynch-f3d-1st-cir-

2015-no-141431-june-24-2015

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/usa-v-arturo-gonzalezf3d5th-cir-2015-no-

1440344cr0-june-23-2015-ak47

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/in-the-matter-of-armin-shir-mohammadi-

docisb-export-prohibition-order-june-18-2015

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/aao-jan27201501l7202-remand-cuban-

adjustment-act-with-extras

http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/medinanunez-v-lynch-f3d9th-cir-2015-no-

1470657-june-8-2015