Facing strategic narratives: In which we argue interactive effectiveness

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  • Agriculture and Human Values 16: 295308, 1999. 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

    Facing strategic narratives: An argument for interactive effectiveness

    Niels Rling and Marleen MaarleveldDepartment of Communication and Innovation Studies, Wageningen University and Research Centre, Wageningen, The Netherlands

    Accepted in revised form January 1, 1999

    Abstract. The multiple commons is an important context in a world facing the eco-challenge. The platform forland use negotiation is a perspective concerning the good governance of the multiple commons. Platforms aredevices or procedures for social learning and negotiation about effective collective action. They create collectivedecision making capacity at eco-system levels at which critical ecological services need to be managed. Takingplatforms seriously as an option for designing a more sustainable society assumes a belief in the human capacityto engage in collective action. Unfortunately, human thinking about humans is dominated by perspectives thatemphasize either technical solutions to given human ends, or perspectives that emphasize the selfish nature ofhuman ends. This article focuses especially on the latter: the strategic narratives that have become dominant associety increasingly becomes designed on economic principles. The paper seeks to explain the dominance of stra-tegic narratives and provides social science evidence for alternative perspectives. It concludes with cornerstonesfor an alternative narrative.

    Key words: Strategic narratives, Collective action narratives, Communicative rationality, Adaptive management,Soft side of land

    Niels Rling is professor at the Department of Communication and Innovation Studies, Wageningen University.At this university he received a M.Sc. in Rural Sociology. He received a Ph.D. in Communication from MichiganState University. His current research interests are brought together in a research program on Knowledgesystems for Sustainable Agriculture that addresses facilitation of social learning, linkage between softplatforms for decision making and hard ecosystems, and on institutional and policy conditions for learningsustainable agriculture at the farm and higher agro-ecosystem levels.

    Marleen Maarleveld is a Ph.D. research assistant at the Department of Communication and InnovationStudies, Wageningen University. She has a M.Sc. in Social and Organizational Psychology from LeydenUniversity, The Netherlands. Her doctoral research addresses social learning processes in natural resourcemanagement dilemmas.

    1. Introduction

    The multiple commons is rapidly becoming an import-ant context for managing human affairs (Steins andEdwards, 1999). Another example of such a context isthe market. The eco-challenge increasingly manifestas society moves into the age of the environment(Lubchenco, 1998) has elevated the importance ofthe multiple commons as a context. We are increas-ingly playing roles as inter-dependent stakeholdersin multiple but limited natural resource arenas (DeGroot, 1992). Governing multiple commons calls forplatforms for land use negotiation, the theme ofthis special issue. Such platforms mobilize a capacityfor social learning, negotiation, and collective actionat eco-systems levels at which threats to ecologicalservices1 or the degradation of natural resources canbe managed (Rling, 1994, 1995; Rling and Jiggins,

    1998; Maarleveld, in prep.). An interest in platforms islikely to express itself in a belief in one or more of thefollowing statements: The collective impact of human activities on the

    biosphere leads to system feedback that threatensthe ecological services and natural resources uponwhich human life depends. We have left an erain which the evolution of human opportunity waslargely a question of gaining control over the bio-physical environment and have entered one inwhich this evolution depends on our ability tocontrol our own activities. It is unlikely that some divine force will mira-

    culously help humans escape from their ecolo-gical predicament. If they do not change coursethemselves, no one will. Science-based technologies do not suffice to get us

    out. There are no technical fixes. And, as Albert

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    Einstein said, one cannot solve problems with thesame thinking that created them. Liberalizing the struggle among self-interested

    actors in search of profit might lead to the greatestbenefit for the greatest number in the short run,but a global competitive society evolves in direc-tions that are inconsistent with ecological sustain-ability. Collective action, based on social learning and

    negotiated agreement among the multiple stake-holders in an eco-system, is an essential condi-tion for sustainable use and regeneration of thateco-system. There is no given truth. Reality is socially con-

    structed and, if people want to and have the means,they can re-construct it. But . . . if they get it wrong,they might well perish.

    This set of beliefs is at odds with one or more of thefollowing dominant, contemporaneous perspectives:

    Religions that emphasize faith in an externalbeing. They have so far largely failed to developenvironmental issues into moral ones. Science that emphasizes instrumental action based

    on objective knowledge of cause-effect relation-ships. Neo-liberal economics that emphasizes global

    competition as the optimal design for humansociety. When the market fails, it advocatesfiscal policies, cost internalization, regulatoryintervention, and advertising, but not collectiveaction. Actor-oriented sociology that emphasizes the use

    of power in the struggle among strategic actorsseeking to realize their own projects and considersreliance on collective action nave. Realist positivism that emphasizes that reality

    exists out there, independently from the humanobserver, and can be objectively known by usingscientific methods.

    So where does that leave the believer in the pos-sibilities of negotiated collective action? What, ifanything, can (s)he achieve, given such a formidableset of perspectives that are incompatible with his/herown, especially when these perspectives are embeddedin powerfully established interest coalitions (Biggs,1995)? How can (s)he effectively argue that sociallearning, negotiated agreement, and collective actionoffer survival strategies that are not only more effectivein coping with our ecological predicament than prayer,technology, market liberalization, and power struggle,but also feasible in the sense that they are realistic, andnot contrary to human nature? It is our experience timeand again that ones view of human nature plays a cru-

    cial role in conceiving collective action as a feasiblestrategy.

    Our society tends to view people as strategic actors,bent on realizing their own projects and on optimizingtheir own benefit and, therefore, engaged in struggle,power conflicts, or competition to gain advantage overothers in situations of scarcity. This concept of humannature fuels strategic narratives that underpin ourideas about the design of society and hence most of ourpolicies. They prevent the exploitation of the poten-tial of collective action to create a more sustainablesociety.

    This article examines the feasibility and poten-tial social acceptance of alternative narratives. Thefirst section explains the existence and persistenceof strategic narratives using Giddens (1987) conceptof double hermeneutics. This concept also unlocksopportunities for (re)constructing narratives that cangenerate faith in collective action to regenerate asustainable future. Insights from empirically groun-ded social science provide valuable input into suchnarratives. Subsequently, Habermass (1984, 1987)communicative action, Hollings (1995) adaptive man-agement, and Rlings (1997) notion of the soft sideof land are proposed as design principles to weavean alternative narrative that endorses collective action.The last section examines how this collective actionnarrative can contribute to more effective research oncommon property resources (CPRs), and concludes byapplying the insights gained to the discussion state-ments formulated in the introduction to this specialissue (Steins and Edwards, 1999).

    2. Explaining the persistence of the strategicnarrative

    The term narrative is used to express how perspec-tives, Leitbilds, metaphors, stories, images, theor-ies, slogans, and axioms are woven together, becomewidely shared and dominate behavior. The construc-tivist notion of double hermeneutics, introduced byAnthony Giddens (1987), clarifies this process. Singlehermeneutics refers to the act of making sense ofobjects and events. For example, Copernicus, the16th Century Polish astronomer, established that theearth is not the center of the universe. Instead, theearth is a rather insignificant planet turning aroundthe sun. Double hermeneutics refers to the fact thatsense making by some can affect the sense mak-ing and behavior of others. In other words, whetherpeople believe the earth turns around the sun or viceversa does not affect the behavior of these celes-tial bodies. But the way people make sense of theworld can certainly affect the sense making of others.

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    The Copernican Revolution is a prime example. Itis the name for the impact of the ideas of Coperni-cus, Darwin, Freud, and others on Western thought,and especially on its anthropocentrism (Tarnas, 1991).Thus Copernicus showed we are not the center of theuniverse, Darwin showed that we evolved from otherorganisms and are not specially elected and created,and Freud caused an uproar by his idea that humansare not only driven by their manifest intellect, butoften by an unconscious rooted in a murky animalpast.

    In other words, new sense making by Copernicus,Darwin, and Freud had a tremendous impact on societyand on how people make sense of the world, includinghow they look at themselves and others. Widely sharednarratives are constructed that influence individualsense making by highlighting and legitimating someoptions and making invisible others. In our times, eco-nomics that assumes that people make selfish, if notstrategic choices (see below), has become an equallypowerful narrative. It affects the recursive process thatGiddens (1995) calls structuration and that links socialrelations and structure. That is, strategic narrativesshape social relations by determining our expecta-tions about other peoples behavior. Social relationsproduce structure and structure produces social rela-tions. For example, a belief that people are selfishactors favors a society based on markets in which theinteractions among multiple selfish actors at the microlevel leads to the wealth of nations at the macrolevel. Thus economic narratives reinforce stable if notrigid arrangements that affect societys resilience insituations of rapid ecological change. But the marketmight not be the best way to design a society facingthe eco-challenge.

    Social science can be as powerful as natural sciencebecause it can equally affect peoples sense making. Itis not the power of its predictions that give social orany science its influence, but the extent to which itsperspectives or narratives take hold of peoples ima-gination and enthusiasm, and especially the extent towhich that sense making begins to justify policies andshape enduring practices, institutional design, and theuse of natural resources and ecological services.

    Currently, the strategic narrative dominates. We seeourselves as selfish economic beings, we shape ourinstitutions to be market driven, and we work hardto design collective interactive space as global net-works of competing actors, which render more or lessirrelevant the nation state with its institutions for nego-tiation and deliberation (Castells, 1996). In a way,we are back to the 19th Century Benthamite agenda:the greatest good for the greatest number is assuredthrough the individual pursuit of well being. This timeit is an agenda for the design of global society.

    An important reason for the current predominanceof the strategic narrative is the success of economicsin dominating our sense making. Economics is power-ful because it makes assumptions about peoplesgoals. Given these assumptions, it can concentrateon peoples goal seeking behavior and make power-ful statements about rational behavior. A typicalexample is the work of the institutional economist Plat-teau (1996, 1998), who presents a persuasive theoryof the evolution of land rights under population pres-sure in Sub-Saharan Africa. The predictions are basednot only on what Platteau calls parametric rationality,which assumes that people will maximize their benefit,but explicitly on strategic rationality: people anticip-ate the behavior of others in furthering their privateinterest, i.e., they try to win from or gain advantageover others. Strategic rationality is often also calledcompetition. Platteau would like his theory to be dis-proved, but has so far not seen reason to doubt it. Infact, his studies of fishermen in Senegal have con-vinced him that institutions are incapable of overridingstrategic rationality, i.e., of creating conditions inwhich people are willing to collaborate in controllingthe destruction of fisheries resources (Platteau, pers.comm., 1998).

    Economics has presented the world with an appar-ently persuasive narrative. That narrative emphasizesthe selfish nature of human beings and makes it lesslikely that we accept the feasibility of collective action.Our argument is that the impact of economics on ourcollective perspective through the mechanism of thedouble hermeneutics leads to a self-fulfilling proph-ecy. A study by Frank Young reported upon in theEconomist some years ago (see also Ridley, 1996:260) found that economics students were more selfishthan other students. The question arose whether thiswas a question of nature or nurture, i.e., whether stu-dents who chose economics were self-selected to havea tendency to chose the selfish options in prisonersdilemma games, or whether normal people becameselfish as a result of economics teaching. Follow-upresearch revealed that students just entering economicstudies were no more inclined to choose the selfishanswers than other students. In other words, exposureto economics tends to strengthen selfish tendencies.However, we tend to forget that economics is not anobjective body of knowledge. It is an axiomatic sci-ence that only works to the extent the axioms hold(Janice Jiggins, pers. comm.). Economics appearsto profit from the process of double hermeneutics.And this insight presents a window of opportunity forconstructing alternative narratives.

    Jacksons (1998) paper for the European Societyfor Ecological Economics is of interest because itpresents a historical exegesis of strategic narratives (or

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    metaphors as he prefers to call them). His conclusionis that our existing knowledge borrows heavily ona relatively limited set of metaphors, in which thenotion of the struggle for existence dominates:

    The metaphor on which Darwin built his theory ofevolution, which Boltzmann borrowed to develophis thermo-dynamics, which Lotka used to char-acterize ecological behavior, Ostwald borrowed tomodel cultural development, Dawkins assumed forgenetic succession, Friedman hijacked for corporateselectionism, and Ridley borrowed to characterizehuman nature, has its roots in or at least is heavilyinfluenced by the cultural milieu of industrial cap-italism in the mid-nineteenth century . . . . It is notthe law of the jungle that is read into human affairs,Darwin read the ethos of early capitalism into thejungle.Ridley (1996: 252) puts it like this. Hobbes

    (1651) (who argued that the state of nature was oneof war, not of peace) begat David Hume (1739), whobegat Adam Smith (1776), who begat Thomas RobertMalthus (1798), who begat Charles Darwin (1859).The Hobbesian diagnosis, though not the prescrip-tion, still lies at the heart of both economics andmodern evolutionary biology.

    Jackson ends his analysis by asking whether thecultural conditions of that time and place are still validtoday, noting that the enthusiasm for liberal economicspartly emerged as a reaction to the earlier dominanceof Judeo/Christian religion, and also that differentcultures have entertained world views substantiallydifferent from our own. He names several authorswho have offered what constitutes a storm of protest largely on environmental grounds against conven-tional economic models, procedures and institutions.In fact he states it would not be implausible to saythat the entire discipline of ecological economics wasborne, and continues to flourish, on the premise thatconventional economics has failed signally to deliversustainable development.

    In all, Jackson pleads for an active reconstructionof the strategic narratives on which we base our self-image and that guide the design of our society. In thenext sections we explore grounds for a credible narra-tive that can support the belief in collective action as afeasible route out of our ecological predicament.

    3. Grounds for an alternative narrative: Evidencefrom social science

    The search for, and examination of, convincing socialscience arguments to underpin the feasibility of effec-tive collective action and the design of a society that

    fosters the greater good instead of self-interested andanti-social behavior has been on for some time (e.g.,Ridley, 1996). Moreover, recent developments in evo-lutionary biology give a place to co-operation that isunthinkable in classical Darwinism. Indeed the evolu-tion of complex organisms, such as humans, can onlybe explained by the collaboration of micro-organismsand our bodies bear witness to the fact that they arelargely collaborative structures (Capra, 1996). In oursearch for evidence that supports the feasibility ofeffective collective action and for (re)construction ofan alternative narrative, we shall focus on social sci-ence. Empirically grounded social science has broughtto light limitations to its power to explain and predicthuman behavior. These limitations appear to point tocollective action and an alternative narrative.

    3.1. Humans: Egoists or altruist?

    The strategic narrative assumes humans to be selfish,rational, calculating beings who anticipate othersmoves in order to pursue their advantage in conditionsof scarcity. Evidence of this view of human nature canbe found in both theories and models of social sci-ence and our daily lives. For this reason, the key tocollective action has been assumed to lie in aligningindividual interest with collective interest. In business,this argument has led to the practice of managementby objectives, i.e., creating conditions in which selfishpersonal goals are in line with business goals. The skillis in constructing the link. However, based on powerfullogical arguments, the Prisoners Dilemma, Hardins(1968) Tragedy of the Commons, and Olsons (1971)Logic of Collective Action refute the idea that indi-vidual rationality can guarantee collective rationality.The fact that total gains can exceed total costs of col-lective action is not enough for rational and intelligentindividuals to undertake collective action. The reasonis that groups cannot exclude from the collective bene-fits those who have not contributed to the realizationof those benefits. Free riding is inevitable. Strategicindividual reasoning (e.g., if others contribute, I donot have to, or if I do not take it, others will)makes management by objectives unlikely outside acontrollable organizational context. In other words,Olson, Hardin, and social dilemma theory in its earliergame theoretical form all provide powerful argumentsagainst collective action based on selfish rationalbehavior. And, in line with the process of doublehermeneutics, these arguments have strongly influ-enced the sense making of policy and decision-makers,creating an environment in which strategic actors per-form best.

    But not all social scientists have been satisfied withthis conception of human nature and behavior. Careful

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    Figure 1. Different possible value orientations (Uphoff, 1992: 341).

    and lengthy empirically grounded research has broughtto light human behavior that does not seem to fit thestrategic narrative. Ostrom and her colleagues (1992;Ostrom et al., 1994; Ostrom and Slater, 1996; Ostrom,1998) have identified collective action in situationswhere according to the strategic narrative, no incen-tives for collective action exist. Apparently, the tragedyof the commons is not so inevitable after all. Spe-cifically, Ostrom and her colleagues have identifiedconditions in which fear of free riding can be over-come and in which people engage in agreements andcollective action that can overcome the social dilemmaand allow people to make co-operative choices in thetrust that these will be reciprocated.

    Social psychologists (Van Lange, 1991; McClin-tock and Liebrand, 1989; Van Vugt et al., 1995; VanLange and Liebrand, 1989) have explained this diver-gent behavior by differences in value orientations.In experimental studies, it has been shown that indi-vidual values regarding outcomes and interdependenceof relationships influence the choice (s)he makes to co-operate or not. Four such value orientations have beendistinguished: altruism, co-operation, individualism,and competition. A person who has altruistic values ismainly concerned with the others in the interdependentrelationship, and with their benefits. A co-operative

    value orientation is focused on the joint gains, while anindividualist orientation focuses on ones own gains.Those with a competitive value orientation are inter-ested in maximizing the difference between their owngains and those of others.

    Variations in value orientation have also been foundin the field. Reporting on (action) research in one of thelargest irrigation systems in Sri Lanka, Uphoff (1992)identified four different value orientation as illustratedin Figure 1. In addition to identifying these alternativevalue orientations, the action research with irrigatorsin Gal Oya showed that it is possible to move from cell1 to cell 4 through structural innovations that introducechecks and balances, reduce conflict, make corruptionmore difficult, allow people to behave in a generousmanner, and otherwise introduce social energy.

    So humans are neither altruistic nor selfish buthave the capability to be both, in varying degrees.Which type of behavior emerges is dependent on theinteractions between individuals and their social envir-onment, and on the institutions and structures thatgovern them. Drawing together research in the naturalsciences, social sciences, and philosophical debates,Ridley (1996: 264) comes to the following conclusion:The roots of social order are in our heads, where wepossess the instinctive capacities for creating not a per-

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    Box 1. Communicating scientific knowledge is not enough.Al Gore, Vice President of the US at the time of writing, claimed that scientific research had shown that July1998 had been the hottest month since 1880 when recording began. Hence global warming was taking placeat an unprecedented rate. People had to take collective action to stop the production of greenhouse gases.This was a logical argument for collective action relying on scientific proof. But it did not work. In the firstplace, everyone knew that scientists do not agree among themselves. There are scientists who do not believein anthropogenic global warming and point to natural cyclic fluctuations instead. Thus Mr. Gore, whowanted to sign the Kyoto convention, referred to scientists who believe in anthropogenic global warming,while Republicans who wanted from trade, emphasized the work of scientist who believe global warmingis a cyclical even. In the second place, scientific arguments are not considered trustworthy, especially asa result of the widespread awareness of the ease with which scientists have been bought by the tobaccoindustry to provide proof for the harmlessness of smoking. Thus the Republicans accused Mr. Gore ofusing scinetists with democratic sympathies to produce answers that were politically concenient.

    fectly harmonious and virtuous society, but a better onethan we have at present. We must build our institutionsin such a way that they draw out those instincts.

    3.2. Structural innovation to promote collectiveaction

    This brings us to the second argument in support ofcollective action and an alternative narrative. Institu-tions and structures can be designed to protect peopleagainst shortsighted selfish behavior, and make spacefor value orientations that promote collective action.The question is which type of environments brings thisabout.

    CPR researchers have done much to develop cred-ible arguments underpinning the feasibility of agree-ments for governing the commons and maintainingpublic goods. Their focus on the conditions underwhich co-operative choice is likely has led to the iden-tification of the following conditions: an ability toexclude people from using the resource, a strong senseof interdependence among the stakeholders, regularinteraction, agreement about rules for access, a sys-tem for monitoring access, and sanctions for breakingthe agreement (Ostrom, 1992; Steins and Edwards,1999).

    Political science research on international conven-tions and other agreements replicates these findings.Studies of such regimes have shown that it is fartoo simple to assume that the most powerful are fixedon myopic self-interests. People and countries arelinked in multiple ways and are mutually dependent.Such linking issues diversify the ways in which theyhold power over one another. In similar vein, stud-ies of efforts to break impasses through consensualapproaches to distributive conflict resolution (Suss-kind and Cruickshank, 1987; Pruitt and Carnevale,1993) suggest that in environmental conflicts, groupswith relatively little formal power can achieve a greatdeal by making use of the many ways in which theycan exert power in complex situations.

    Studies of community forests in Nepal (Potters,1998), landcare activities in Australia (Campbell,1994), groundwater management in The Netherlands(Maarleveld, in prep.), and the solution of conflictsbetween herders and farmers in Benin (Dangbgnon,1998), just to name a few, have shown that stake-holders who have experienced their mutual depend-ence with respect to future survival, can, under certaincircumstances, reach effective agreements about thesustainable management of natural resources on whichthey depend, to the point of reducing their individualconsumption in line with the agreement. One of thekey points is creating conditions for trust that otherswill also honor the agreement. According to Ridley(1996), if we are to recover social harmony andvirtue, . . . it is vital that we reduce the power andscope of the state. . . . It means devolution . . . We mustencourage social and material exchange among equals,for that is the raw material of trust, and trust is thefoundation of virtue (264/265).

    3.3. Learning our way out

    For Jane Lubchenco (1998), the President of the Amer-ican Association for the Advancement of Science atthe time of writing, the anthropogenic eco-challengeshould lead society into a new social contract with sci-ence. Part of that contract must be to communicatewhat is out there, i.e., what scientists have dis-covered about the environment to society as a basis forits dealing with the eco-challenge. However, the com-munication of scientific knowledge, in itself, seemsnot sufficient to generate societal change. The doublehermeneutic cannot be harnessed as easily as that(Box 1).

    In all, Lubchencos expectation of the power of sci-entific knowledge is refuted by social science researchon the utilization of scientific knowledge (i.e., Cal-lon and Law, 1989). But that is not all. Even ifpeople accept the results of scientific studies andhence know, for example, that smoking reduces

  • FACING STRATEGIC NARRATIVES 301

    their life expectancy, they are not likely to act on thisknowledge. The link between knowledge and beha-vior is tenuous. Research of environmental behaviorhas shown time and again that knowledge in itself isinsufficient to change behavior for most people (e.g.,Van Meegeren, 1997). Such research does indicatethat integrating scientific knowledge and knowledgedevelopment into existing social-political processeshas more effect. In other words, the processes ofeveryday sense making in terms of single and doublehermeneutics become of central importance.

    In that sense, and seen in the light of Al Goresexperience, our effort in this paper to support an altern-ative narrative could also be naive, depending on ourassumptions about the working of the double hermen-eutic. The reconstruction of the prevailing strategicnarrative towards an alternative that supports collectiveaction entails management of the process of changeof conditions under which self-assertiveness prevailsto conditions in which people accept being part of alarger whole. In other words, disseminating scientificknowledge is not a sufficient condition for dealing withthe eco-challenge. It will be necessary to create struc-tures and institutions that allow the kind of collectiveaction that is required to reverse the negative impactof human activity on our biosphere. That process ofinstitutional change and learning increasingly takes onsurvival value. Understanding it better seems a keymandate for social science.

    Coleman (1988) sees two broad intellectual streamsin the description and explanation of social action.One stream, characteristic of the work of most eco-nomists, sees the human actor as having goals inde-pendently arrived at, as acting independently, andas wholly self-interested. Its principal value lies inhaving a principle of action, that of maximizing util-ity. The other intellectual stream, characteristic ofthe work of most sociologists, sees the actor as social-ized and action as governed by social norms, rules, andobligations. The principal virtues of this intellectualstream lie in the ability to describe action in socialcontext and to explain the way action is shaped, con-strained, and redirected by the social context. Ourpoint is that the latter intellectual stream seems toprovide more hope for effective action in a contextdetermined by the eco-challenge than the former.

    The arguments with respect to the management ofsocial change are still being developed. Examples canbe seen in the mechanisms by which people becomeinvolved in working out a mutually acceptable solu-tion to a project or problem that affects the communityand their personal lives, and mature into responsibledemocratic citizens and reaffirm democracy. One wayof describing this phenomenon at a societal level is theterm social learning (Lee, 1993; Webler et al., 1995).

    Social learning with respect to the eco-challenge is justbeginning to be explored (e.g., Parson and Clark, 1995;Maarleveld, in prep.; Maarleveld and Dangbgnon,1999). Conflict appears to be an important mechan-ism for social learning about ones interdependencewith others, about the nature of those others, andabout the feasibility of resolving conflicts (e.g., Upreti,1998). In fact, some speak of social capital to indic-ate the extent to which a community has learned totrust in collective action (e.g., Coleman, 1988; Dang-bgnon, 1998), or to which it has developed checksand balances for accountability (Vodouh, 1996) andto which it has access to commonly accepted reper-toires for conflict resolution. It seems, for example,that Nepalese villages have a considerable indigenousrepertoire of procedures that can be called upon intimes of trouble (Upreti, 1998). Social learning is acrucial ingredient in platforms for managing multiplecommons (Steins and Edwards, 1999). Social learningis the mechanism through which the double hermen-eutic operates, and hence a key issue in the age of theenvironment.

    A number of participatory methodologies havebeen developed in order to guide the facilitation ofsocial learning. Soft Systems Methodology (Check-land and Scholes, 1990), for example, is a con-sultancy method, tested especially in corporate envir-onments, to take a group of people, who share aproblem, through a systemic learning process as abasis for agreement to take collective action. SSMhas inspired work on Rapid Appraisal of AgriculturalKnowledge Systems (RAAKS) (Engel and Salomon,1997), and Platforms for Resource Use Negotia-tion (Rling, 1994, 1995; Maarleveld et al., 1997;Rling and Jiggins, 1998). RAAKS is a methodo-logy to take a set of actors in a theater of innova-tion through a learning process that can enhancetheir synergy and collective innovative performance.It uses windows on the actors collaboration asparticipatory tools for learning about collaboration.Platforms for resource use negotiation allow the mul-tiple stakeholders in a natural resource, such as awater catchment, to engage in collective action atthe eco-system level at which sustainable managementseems feasible. Such platforms are the very theme ofthis special issue (Steins and Edwards, 1999). Plat-forms, mesas de concertacin (in Latin America,see Dourojeanni, 1998), or co-operative discourses(Webler et al., 1995) are invented all over the placebecause they provide a way out of the ecologicalpredicament.

    Examples of concrete methods that are currentlydeveloped are back casting, i.e., formulating objec-tives for future society on which everybody can agreeand then working back to the implications for present

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    individual behavior (Weber, 1995), and the FutureSearch Conference (Weisbord, 1998), which uses asimilar approach. Such communicative methodologiesare paralleled by multi-agent modeling, cellular auto-mata, distributive artificial intelligence, and other com-puter simulation techniques that focus on generatingcomplex emergent environmental macro phenomenaand processes on the basis of fairly simple propertiesand rules of engagement of agents at the micro level(Jennings et al., 1998).

    Summarizing section 3, we conclude that there isa considerable body of social science knowledge andpractice that holds promise of providing an alternativewidely shared narrative that can help us face the eco-challenge. Of course, we can still lose by running outof time.

    4. Cornerstones for (re)constructing a collectiveaction narrative

    In addition to the arguments for the feasibility ofcollective action presented above in section 3, wepresent below a number of theoretical perspectives thatunderpin collective action for dealing with ecologicalimperatives.

    4.1. Communicative rationality

    Habermas (1984, 1987, also White, 1988; Brand,1990) has made a useful distinction between instru-mental, strategic, and communicative rationality asthree ways of being effective. Instrumental rational-ity deals with cause and effect relationships and theirinstrumental manipulation through techniques in ser-vice of reaching given goals. It aims at control overthe biophysical environment. Instrumental rationalityand belief in the possibility to develop the best tech-nical means to reach given goals is dominant in oursociety, largely as a result of past success. We happilyconsume our fossil energy in the certainty that somenew technological option will be available by the timeit runs out. We accept the present destructive impact ofmass car mobility in the expectation that the car willbe technically improved to a point where its environ-mentally destructive aspects can be controlled. Socialengineering assumes that instrumental rationality canbe used to control decision making and behavior ofpeople. Efforts based on that idea are usually doomedto failure.

    Strategic rationality assumes that one is faced withother strategic intentional actors. The purpose is toanticipate their moves and win. People are expectedto be selfish, bent on realizing their own projects orprofits, and struggle for survival or hegemony in the

    social arena. As we have seen, strategic rationalitypowerfully influences the way we design our (global)society. World trade agreements underpin global com-petition, market liberalization is seen as the fastestroute to global food security, and only the entre-preneurial university is seen to have a chance in theprivatized future.

    Communicative rationality is the new perspectivesuggested by Habermas. People can solve problems,i.e., reach individual goals, through negotiation, delib-eration, co-operation, and agreement about a shareddefinition of the situation, leading to consensus. Peoplecan, in fact, roll back the invasion of the life worldby the system through communicative action, e.g.,social movements or platform processes. In fact, socialtheory based on instrumental or strategic action can-not explain the reproduction of society. Social theoryhas to be based on the rationality of communicativeaction. This is a hopeful thought that has inspiredmany people, including the present authors. But, addsHabermas, conditional for communicative rational-ity is an ideal speech situation. This means thatpeople choose for communicative action on the basisof reasoned agreement (and not coercion), that there iscomplete mutual agreement and that each stakeholderin the agreement has the right to participate in thedeliberation. In ideal speech situations, solutions tointractable problems emerge from interaction amongreasonable people.

    In distinguishing communicative rationality,Habermas has done much to place social learning andcollective action on the agenda as an alternative totechnology and competition. But the ideal speechproviso leads many to reject communicative rationalityas unrealistic and nave. However, the social researchfindings presented in section 3 make clear thatcollective reflection and action are feasible. It ispossible to develop devolved institutions that supportthe human ability to make co-operative choices andcollaborate in regenerating the biosphere. The roadto realizing such outcomes is ridden with problemsand pitfalls. Moreover, it is uncertain whether weshall be able to do it and do it in time. But that isnot a reason not to try. Democracy and civil societyare generally accepted as worth fighting for, evenif they remain elusive. Similarly, we need to fightto realize the potential of communicative rationalityand collective action. After all, they offer our onlyhope for working back from the threatening systemfeedback that emerges from our selfish actions.

    The struggle between strategic and communicativerationality seems a new version of Mac Gregors the-ory X versus theory Y. The manager who holdstheory X believes that the average human being hasan inherent dislike of work and will avoid it. Hence

  • FACING STRATEGIC NARRATIVES 303

    most people must be coerced and threatened with pun-ishment to achieve organizational objectives. Whatsmore, the average human being prefers to be direc-ted, wishes to avoid responsibility, has relatively littleambition and wants security above all. Theory Y, onthe other hand, emphasizes motivation, inquisitive-ness, and the need for self-realization and achieve-ment. People can be relied upon to loyally servethe organizations goals if they are trusted and givenresponsibility. In our times, we face an adapted ver-sion: theory X expects people to be selfish and engagedin competitive struggle, while theory Y expects themto make co-operative choices.

    Students of CPRs will recognize the social dilem-ma: X defects and Y co-operates. But X and Y arenot alternatives, they are two conditions of Koestlers(1967) holon. People are two-faced. They can empha-size their own identity and be self-assertive and selfish,but they can also see themselves as part of a largerwhole and be integrative and co-operative. The interestof CPR researchers is, of course, not in either state, butin the conditions that determine the switch from selfishbehavior to co-operation. That is their unique perspec-tive and the reason for the potential significance oftheir contribution, given that the entire biosphere israpidly becoming a CPR, or more accurately: that wecan only survive as a species if we learn to constructthe biosphere as a CPR.

    Perhaps we can say that instrumental, strategic,and communicative rationality resemble three Russiandolls. The first one is science-based technology. Ithas brought us untold benefits and helped us escapefrom the miseries that were our lot after the fall fromparadise (and, some add, the invention of agriculture).But technology needs to be economically feasible. Itrequires competitive markets to ensure the greatestgood for the greatest number. Hence strategic think-ing and its embodiment in economics is the secondRussian doll that encompasses the first. But the dom-inance of strategic thinking in the design of our globalsociety has raised awareness of the failure of the mar-ket when it comes to sustaining the ecological serviceson which we depend. Hence, technology and marketmust be conditioned by collective action, the third,most encompassing Russian doll.

    Of course, we shall soon find out that we need afourth one. But it is too early to guess its contours.Spiritualism perhaps? Or virtual life?

    4.2. Adaptive management

    The Canadian ecologist C. S. Holling and his col-leagues (Gunderson et al., 1995) have given prom-inence to the phrase adaptive management. This

    term has attracted a great deal of attention from thoseconcerned with the eco-challenge.

    A careful analysis of case studies of human deal-ings with large eco-systems, such as the Baltic Sea,the New Brunswick forests, the Everglades, and theColumbia River, has revealed a basic incongruitybetween peoples goals in managing eco-systems andthe dynamic nature of those eco-systems themselves.Ecosystems pass through cycles (the lazy eight) ofexploitation, conservation, release, and reorganization.During exploitation, the system builds up capital andbecomes more connected. During conservation, thesegains are consolidated. Release by fire, storm, or pestsis marked by decrease in stored capital and connec-tedness, while in the reorganization phase, the systemis weakly connected but begins to again store capital.However, it might not be able to recover and mightflip into a state of more or less organization and largeror smaller productivity (Holling, 1995: 22).

    Given these inherent dynamics, success in man-aging a target variable for sustained production offood or fiber apparently leads to an ultimate patho-logy of less resilient and more vulnerable eco-systems,more rigid and unresponsive management agenciesand more dependent societies (Holling, 1995: 29).Capra (1996: 291) puts it like this. A major clashbetween economics and ecology derives from the factthat nature is cyclical, whereas our industrial systemsare linear . . . the market gives the wrong information.

    The essential point is that evolving systemsrequire policies and actions that not only satisfysocial objectives but also achieve continually mod-ified understanding of the evolving conditionsand provide flexibility for adapting to surprises.(Holling, 1995: 14)Hence, their ecological analysis leads Holling and

    his colleagues to identify important implications forhuman behavior that they call adaptive management.This term was coined for the first time in 1978 byan inter-disciplinary team of biologists and systemsanalysts under the leadership of Holling at the Inter-national Institute for Applied Systems Analysis loc-ated at Laxenburg, Austria (Lee, 1993: 54). Adaptivemanagement is a guiding principle for the design ofthe interface between society and biosphere, betweencommunity and eco-system, and between householdand environment.

    The release of human opportunity requires flexible,diverse and redundant regulation, monitoring thatleads to corrective action, and experimental probingof the continually changing reality of the externalworld. (Holling, 1995: 30)

  • 304 NIELS RLING AND MARLEEN MAARLEVELD

    This is fundamentally new in the sense that ourpresent global, national, and household manage-ment strategies largely focus on the linear growth ofconsumption and exploitation. Adaptive managementemphasizes social learning about the complex adap-tive systems (Holland, 1995) of which we are part.It looks at economic uses of nature and at policies asexperiments from which we must learn (Lee, 1993: 8).

    Adaptive management is a general principle thatneeds to be translated into concrete forms of experi-mentation, monitoring, probing, and other forms oflearning, conflict resolution, and concerted action(e.g., Lee, 1993). The ecologists cannot escapefrom seeing human institutions and learning as cru-cial factors for achieving adaptive management (e.g.,Berkes and Folke, 1998). This provides an opportunityfor multi-disciplinary science that is currently taken upby ecological economics, students of common prop-erty, human ecology, and others. Social scientists canadd value to their work by embracing adaptive man-agement as a key design principle for a society thatrisks destroying its habitat as it climbs out of the valeof tears. But that design principle needs to be trans-lated into a workable praxeology a theory to informeffective practice with respect to social learning andcollective action.

    4.3. The soft side of landUnderstanding the soft side of land is an importantcornerstone for perceiving the importance of collectiveaction. Land and land use are usually thought of inhard terms, that is, in terms of soils, crops, livestock,pests, water, yields, erosion, etc. But land use canalso be seen as emergent from human goals, organ-ization, technology, etc. A good example is the aweinspiring rice terraces that cover entire mountainsidesin Ifugao in the Northern Philippines. These terraceshave been in use continuously for 3000 years. Onecan look at these terraces from the hard side, andmarvel at the complexity of their construction, theirrigation methods, and other technologies that havesupported a dense population in an otherwise inhos-pitable landscape for such a long time. Sustainableagriculture indeed. But one can also look at the softside of these terraces: the complex organization, lead-ership, economics, religious beliefs, cultural practices,labor allocation, and so forth that have allowed thissustainable form of land use (Gonzalez, in prep.).

    The soft side of the rice terraces becomes evenmore evident if one analyses the reasons for the presentcollapse of this land use system. It started towards theend of the last century, when missionaries introducedChristianity and undermined the religious beliefs andcosmovisions (Millar, 1996) that underpinned the

    Figure 2. Land-use as interface between eco-system andsociety.

    system, including rites for first planting, priests withcertain powers to maintain the system, etc. The systemwas further affected by changes in political adminis-tration that undermined the traditional leadership andauthority that are required to maintain the disciplineand social organization for the upkeep of the terracesand the hard work, and that are required for the accept-ance of taboos with respect to cutting trees in theforests in the upper catchments that stored the waterrequired for the system. The most recent threat comesfrom cheap rice produced in the low lands of thePhilippines from high yielding varieties that haverendered unprofitable the arduous labor to produce riceon the terraces.

    The example makes clear that land use, be it at thelevel of the field, farm, village territory, landscape, orwatershed, can be seen as the emergent property of thesociety that lives off it. In that perspective, sustainab-ility is not only a hard attribute in terms of carryingcapacity or ecological footprint, but also a soft one,in the sense that sustainable land use emerges fromcollective decisions with respect to taking less fromcommon property resources, giving more to publicgoods, the design of the economy, etc. (Bawden andPackam, 1991). The unsustainable land use in a coun-try such as The Netherlands, with its manure surplusof one metric ton of slurry per head of the population,can only be understood through the soft side, and alsoremedying it can only come about through the softside: making collective decisions about how the landwill be used. Such decisions must involve consumers,mitigate the impact of the agricultural treadmill and thesubsequent price squeeze (e.g., Rling et al., 1998),and overcome the powerful coalition of interest offarmers, agribusiness, exporters, ministry officials,chemical industries, etc. Sustainable land use sug-gests collective action at a level of social aggregationat which critical ecological factors seem to be man-ageable. Indeed, such collective action must includeagreed-upon rules of access and use, and systems of

  • FACING STRATEGIC NARRATIVES 305

    monitoring and sanction, as indicated by the researchof sustainable common property resource management(e.g., Ostrom, 1992).

    Our current predicament suggests that the termland use needs to be stretched up. It is easy tovisualize the set of fields or irrigated terraces that avillage community has constructed to produce crops.But among CPR enthusiasts, it is hardly necessary topoint out that land use would also include the use ofcommon forests, pastures and fishing grounds, andmining, as well as dumping garbage, skiing, and soforth. In a modern setting, it is perhaps better to speakof ecological services than of land use (De Groot,1992). These go beyond food, fodder, fuel, and fiber,and include desirable, if not essential, conditions forhuman existence that could once be taken for grantedbut are increasingly in need of management. The termservice suggests the interface between the biosphereand society. Ecological services include soils, the pol-lination of crops, clean air, drinking water, a stableclimate, regeneration of waste, biological control of(micro-) organisms, health, reproductive or geneticintegrity, protection from cosmic rays, bio-diversity,undamaged brains, pleasure, silence, beauty, etc. Thelist of ecological services of which we are aware andthat turn out to be in need of management regularlyis expanded by the discovery of yet another essentialcondition for human life which is threatened by ourown activities. Most agricultural universities would dowell to expand their attention from food, fodder, fuel,and fiber to include all ecological services.

    Figure 2 shows land use as the interface of theeco-system and society, at whatever level of systemhierarchy. The figure further suggests a link betweeneco-system level and the level of social aggregation,in that critical eco-system functions require humanmanagement at a commensurate level of social aggre-gation, usually involving scaling up collective agencyto the eco-system level at which critical ecologicalfactors seem to be manageable.

    The eco-system is the realm of study of life andearth sciences, such as respectively entomology andsoil science, which look at land use from a hardscience perspective. In that case, sustainability is typi-cally defined in terms of attributes of the eco-system,e.g., its carrying capacity, or its bio-diversity.

    Land-use itself is the area of focus of agronomy,farming systems research, animal husbandry, agricul-tural economics, rural sociology, and other typicalapplied sciences focusing on the design of technologyand management. A set of applied sciences dealingwith ecological services in the broader sense is begin-ning to emerge, especially where it comes to energy,water, toxic waste, etc. In this sphere, sustainabilitytypically refers to the resource base and production

    systems on which continued provision of ecologicalservices depends.

    Of particular interest is the second circle, society.In our society, which is still dominated by science andtechnology (based on instrumental reasoning and themanipulation of causal factors) as dominant ways ofdealing with the eco-system, the second circle is notimmediately obvious. There are still major Europeanagricultural universities, for example, which do nothave a social science department, apart perhaps fromclassical economics. Yet one can say that the useof land and of ecological services is determined bysociety, i.e., by institutions such as land tenure andmarkets for inputs, gender, and by negotiated agree-ments among stakeholders, or by reasons (as opposedto causes), such as food preferences and existingknowledge. The land is socially constructed.

    The second circle is, of course, the realm of socialsciences such as economics, but especially sociology,anthropology, and psychology that look at land usefrom the soft social science perspective. In thatperspective, sustainability is considered an emergentproperty of a soft system (Bawden and Packam,1991), that is, sustainability or the lack of it is seenas determined by human activity. Sustainable land useemerges from negotiated agreement about concertedaction with respect to rules of access, monitoring, andsanctions, the key tenet of CPR researchers.

    The emphasis on the soft side of land in the abovedoes not mean that the hard side is unimportant. Wewould rather advocate a hybrid approach (Richardsand Ruivenkamp, 1994) that combines the causal logicof the sciences with the hermeneutic logic of thesocial sciences. For example, one could use indicatorsderived from life and earth sciences to make visiblethe impact of our activities on the biosphere, whilefocusing on human activity as the explanation and areaof likely effective intervention.

    5. Conclusion

    We have created a society that is sophisticated inits handling of instrumental and strategic rationality.Mainstream theories of economic and social develop-ment point towards selfish individualism as the mostpromising area for fulfilling human potential and meet-ing human need (Uphoff, 1992: 351). However,with such a value orientation it is impossible to dealwith the ecological predicament, a macroscopic threatthat emerges from the collective impact of our selfishmicroscopic actions. Sustainable development requirescollective action to redress that collective impact. Thatwill require effective mechanisms, methodologies, andpolicy strategies, such as building platforms for land

  • 306 NIELS RLING AND MARLEEN MAARLEVELD

    use negotiation and the facilitation of social learning.But first of all, it will require broad acceptance that col-lective action is feasible. Such broad acceptance is faraway. Public opinion and major political programs arestill based on narratives that reflect nineteenth centuryrealities. Therefore, scientists, who feel responsiblefor helping society learn its way out of the ecologicalpredicament it has created for itself, need to presentcredible arguments to enhance the necessity and feas-ibility of collective action based on communicativerationality.

    CPR researchers, who emphasize the conditionsunder which people are willing to make co-operativechoices in social dilemmas and who, therefore, addressthe strategic tendencies of humans head on, havea crucial role to play, not only in doing empiricalresearch and in developing working strategies, but alsoin developing effective arguments to deal with dismalnarratives. They have a task in double, as much as insingle hermeneutics. This has important implicationsfor CPR researchers. They are not just working ona body of knowledge based on research. They areat the forefront of a battle with powerful interest tochange the narratives for the design of society. It isironic that the conditions for collective action mustbe strategically constructed. We believe that lookingat the mandate of CPR research in this manner hasimportant implications for its agenda. This agendacould do worse than to include the conditions for idealspeech situations, the institutions and collective learn-ing involved in adaptive management, and the socialconstruction of ecological services. What is more,the agenda should not be limited to the analysis ofwhat occurs, but include analysis of interventions tofacilitate collective action.

    This special issue of Agriculture and Human Val-ues focuses on platforms for resource use negotiation,and the discussion statements suggest criteria for inter-ventions to design and establish them (Steins andEdwards, 1999). At present, CPR enthusiasts areestablishing such criteria in their efforts to make senseof the world (single hermeneutics). But CPR researchwill really have done its job when social learning andplatforms for resource use negotiation, as well as theirfacilitation, have become a repertoire in the publicdomain that can be called upon whenever multiplestakeholders with divergent interests in multiple com-mons seek to engage in collective action to regeneratethe ecological services on which they depend. Andthat is not only a question of the wide impact of theknowledge that CPR researchers develop (double her-meneutics). The mechanism of double hermeneuticsitself needs to become subject of wide spread reflec-tion. People need to socially learn how they sociallylearn and how they can improve their performance in

    that respect, for example through creating platformsfor land use negotiation. That seems to be the conditionfor continued human participation in the unfinishedsymphony (Jackson, 1998) of evolution, now that wedominate the Earth.

    Acknowledgments

    The authors would like to thank Natalie Steins, oneof the guest editors of this special issue, for her con-structive comments. The authors do, of course, remainresponsible for the contents of the article.

    Note

    1. The term ecological services refers to essential ecologicalconditions for human life (De Groot, 1992). They includefood, drinking water, genetic integrity, a stable climate, bio-diversity, resilience in face of external disturbance (such ascosmic rays), the pollination of crops, etc. The term servicesuggests that the biosphere is a type of agency set up tocreate the conditions in which humans can go about theirbusiness. Of course, this is a quite erroneous view. Butin our world dominated by economic and anthropocentricthought, the term has caught on.

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    [email protected]