Everything You Always Wanted to Know about Attitudes

Everything You Always Wanted to Know about AttitudesThe Psychology of Attitudes by Alice H. Eagly; Shelly ChaikenReview by: James M. OlsonPsychological Inquiry, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1993), pp. 358-365Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1449653 .

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Psychological Inquiry Copyright 1993 by 1993, Vol. 4, No. 4, 358-378 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

BOOK REVIEW ESSAYS ON EAGLY & CHAIKEN'S THE PSYCHOLOGYOFATTITUDES

Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Attitudes

James M. Olson University of Western Ontario

At the University of Western Ontario, graduate students in the social psychology program must take a course on theories in social psychology. A take-home exam, consisting of several questions intended to stim- ulate integrative and creative thinking, is always part of the evaluation process in this course. I have a favorite question when I teach the course: I ask the students to identify three or four findings in social psychology that illustrate important, general principles of social behavior that would be "news" to laypersons (e.g., principles that the students' parents or grandparents would find surprising or interesting). I have posed this question many times to students over the years and have invari- ably enjoyed the answers. For one thing, the answers always renew my enthusiasm for social psychology, because they remind me that the field has, in fact, uncovered many important, nonobvious principles of social behavior. Also, the answers provide an interesting glimpse of how beginning social psychologists view the field-a perspective both optimistic and filled with a sense of challenge.

But there have also been disappointments associated with reading students' answers to this question. As an attitude researcher, my most salient disappointment over the years has been that findings and principles from the attitude literature have constituted only a very small proportion of students' answers-certainly a much smaller proportion than would be expected based on the central role of the attitude concept in social psychological research (and in my lectures in the course!). The notion (derived from dissonance and self-perception theories) that attitudes are inferred from behavior has been relatively common in students' answers, as has the distinction (derived from the elaboration-likelihood and heuristic-systematic models of persuasion) between message-based and cue-based persuasion. Otherwise, though, my students have ap-

parently found few nonobvious findings or principles in the attitude literature.I

I am confident, however, that I will see many more references to the attitude literature in students' answers to my take-home exam question now that ThePsychol- ogy of Attitudes, by Alice Eagly and Shelly Chaiken, has been published. In this outstanding book, the authors detail the many accomplishments of attitude researchers, as well as identifying remaining gaps in our understanding. As I read the book, I was struck not only by the extent of our knowledge about attitudes and persuasion, but also by the many nonobvious findings in the literature. For example, a continuing issue in the attitude literature has been the conditions that increase attitude-behavior consistency (e.g., researchers have shown that attitudes predict individuals' behaviors more strongly when measures of attitude and behavior "correspond" with respect to action and target; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). Recently, researchers have examined the effects of introspection (thinking about one's attitude) on attitude-behavior consistency. As it turns out, introspection can either increase or decrease attitude-behavior consistency, depending on whether the introspection makes salient the same or a different aspect of the attitude as that driving the behavior (see Millar & Tesser, 1989; Wilson, 1990). Another continuing issue in the attitude literature is the manner in which attitudes influence the processing of attitude-relevant information (e.g., researchers have shown that individuals tend to seek out information that supports their existing views; Frey, 1986). Researchers have also shown that messages including mixed information on an issue can actually polarize opposing attitude subgroups, presumably because each subgroup perceives any supportive information in the mixed message as being cogent but any nonsupportive information as

The Psychology of Attitudes, by Alice H. Eagly and Shelly Chaiken, 1993, Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Eagly and Chaiken declined to write a response to these three book review essays.

1Readers might be interested to know that there has been a hands-down winner (i.e., the correspondence bias) as most frequent answer to my question. Students uniformly consider the finding that perceivers underestimate the power of situational factors to be an important insight.



BOOK REVIEW ESSAYS

being specious (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). These are only two of the many examples of nonobvious findings I could have selected from ThePsychology ofAttitudes.

Just how good is the Eagly and Chaiken book? I venture to say that it is the best book ever published on attitudes-certainly the most comprehensive summary of existing theoretical and empirical work. I suspect, too, that it will prove to be the most influential attitude book published to date, although such a criterion is obviously difficult to measure. The point is that attitude researchers will be using the Eagly and Chaiken book as the definitive statement of the attitude literature for many years.

In this commentary, I begin by describing some of the book's highlights. I then turn to some of the gaps in our knowledge about attitudes that are identified in the book. Last, I discuss some revisions that I would like to see in future editions of the book.

Highlights of the Book

In their preface, Eagly and Chaiken state that their goal was to write "a substantial volume that would provide review and analysis of virtually all domains of attitude theory and research that have been approached from a psychological perspective" (p. v). The book is not a thematic presentation of a particular theoretical model (in contrast, e.g., to the influential book, Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). In- stead, Eagly and Chaiken provide a review of social psychological research on the attitude concept, including all major theoretical models and empirical findings. Not surprisingly, the end result is best suited for graduate students and researchers, although senior under- graduates should also be able to use the book.

The most impressive quality of The Psychology of Attitudes is its comprehensiveness. Each chapter provides a thorough and thoughtful analysis of the relevant literature. Eagly and Chaiken discuss theoretical con- troversies and disagreements, articulate the major conclusions that can currently be drawn from the literature, and identify important directions for future research. The reader is left with a clear sense of what we know and do not know about each topic.

Although it is comprehensive, the book does not read like an encyclopedia or a long list of unconnec- ted findings. Eagly and Chaiken have managed to make the presentation interesting and enjoyable to read. This accessibility is undoubtedly attributable, in large part, to good writing style. But the authors have also organized most chapters so they tell a "story"-posing an interesting question about attitudes and reviewing extant evidence pertinent to

the question. Indeed, most chapters can stand on their own as useful summaries of specific areas of the attitude literature. One consequence of this stand-alone quality is that instructors could easily vary the order in which chapters are covered in a course, without unduly confusing the students.

The book is also refreshingly frank in its analysis of theories and research. Eagly and Chaiken note in their preface that "we have emphasized the contributions of the approaches more than their weaknesses and short- comings. However, our analysis of theories and research is critical as well, because we believe that carefully considered criticism facilitates progress in scientific fields" (p. vi). Yes, they focus on the strengths of various approaches, but they certainly do not shrink from the task of identifying difficulties and uncertainties. One important contribution of the book is its careful, critical assessment of existing theories; it provides a systematic statement of remaining questions about the processes underlying attitudinal phenomena.

The book consists of 14 chapters, organized broadly by topics. Chapter 1 introduces the attitude concept and distinguishes it from related terms. Chapter 2 reviews attitude measurement techniques. Chapter 3 examines both intra-attitudinal and inter-attitudinal structure. Chapter 4 reviews the attitude-behavior consistency literature. Chapters 5 through 11 cover theories and research on attitude change, describing the broad range of theoretical perspectives on persuasion. Chapter 12 addresses resistance to persuasion. Chapter 13 reviews the social influence literature. And Chapter 14 dis- cusses future directions in the study of attitudes.

The chapters are uniformly strong, making it difficult to select favorites. Nevertheless, 4 chapters impress me as especially interesting and informative.

Chapter 1 provides the most complete and intelligent analysis I have seen of the attitude concept. Eagly and Chaiken define an attitude as "a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor" (p. 1). This definition captures several key features of attitudes, including that they are evaluative and directed at targets or objects. By defining attitudes as "tendencies," Eagly and Chaiken mean that attitudes are internal states that last for at least a short time. Eagly and Chaiken point out that attitudes can generate three classes of responses: cognitive responses (e.g., attributions for a target's actions), affective responses (e.g., liking for the object), and behavioral responses (e.g., overt actions toward the target). The antecedents of attitudes can similarly be divided into three classes (see also Zanna & Rempel, 1988): cognitive processes (e.g., beliefs), affective processes (e.g., conditioning), and behavioral processes (e.g., inferences of attitudes from prior ac-

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tions). This analysis nicely integrates the traditional three-component view of attitudes with the more recent one-component perspective.

Chapter 4 provides a comprehensive review of the attitude-behavior consistency literature, including an informative presentation of the various factors that influence attitude-behavior covariation. The analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the most influential theory in this domain-the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975)-is excellent, including the discussion of theories that have been offered as alter- natives to Fishbein and Ajzen's model. Eagly and Chaiken also propose a new, composite model of the attitude-behavior relation here; their model is designed to integrate theories that focus on attitudes toward targets and theories that focus on attitudes toward behaviors. Eagly and Chaiken propose that habits, attitudes toward targets, and three classes of expected outcomes (utilitarian, normative, and self-identity) combine to determine attitudes toward behaviors, which then influence intentions and behaviors. Al- though the model has not yet been tested empirically, I consider it to be a potentially important extension and integration of existing models.

It should come as no surprise that the presentation of the dual-process theories of persuasion in Chapter 7 is another highlight of the book, given that Chaiken is the originator of one of these theories. In this chapter, the elaboration-likelihood (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and heuristic-systematic (Chaiken, 1980) models of persuasion are reviewed comprehensively. The models are compared and contrasted, and each perspective is crit- ically assessed. Both theories propose that when perceivers are motivated and able to process a message carefully, message-related thoughts will determine whether attitude change occurs; in contrast, when perceivers lack either motivation or ability, simple cues and heuristics (e.g., source attractiveness) will determine whether attitude change occurs. One important difference between the theories is that the elaboration- likelihood model views the two "routes" to persuasion as being mutually exclusive (at least in most cases), whereas the heuristic-systematic model posits that both types of processing can occur simultaneously (e.g., heuristic cues can influence persuasion even when message processing is careful). Eagly and Chaiken conclude that the two perspectives should be regarded as complementary rather than as either competing or re- dundant and propose that an integration of the two models would provide a truly impressive framework for understanding persuasion. Exactly how such a com- bination of the theories could be achieved is not entirely clear in the book, but the call for integration is welcome.

My final choice as a highlight of the book is Chapter 12, on resistance and persistence processes in attitude

change. Eagly and Chaiken begin by reviewing theories that deal specifically with resistance to persuasion, including McGuire's (1964) inoculation theory and Brehm's (1966) reactance theory. Next, they summarize work on how attitudes affect information processing. This topic is fascinating; indeed, I wish they had devoted an entire chapter to it. Eagly and Chaiken provide an excellent review of research on selective exposure, selective perception, and selective memory, arguing convincingly that attitudes influence whether information will be approached or avoided, how information will be interpreted, and whether information will be recalled. In general, attitudes serve to make "consistent" or "supportive" information more likely to get through the information-processing system (i.e., to be noticed, accepted, and recalled). The chapter con- cludes with a review of an important, but rarely studied, issue-the persistence of attitude change. Although the available data on persistence are scant, Eagly and Chaiken tentatively conclude that certain kinds of attitude change can be relatively enduring (e.g., attitude change resulting from systematic processing or self- persuasion).

Gaps in Our Knowledge Identified by the Book

In many ways, the functions of a good textbook are similar to the functions of a good theory: Both text- books and theories should (a) summarize available information systematically, (b) go beyond the available information by identifying implications and relations that would not otherwise be evident, and (c) serve as a stimulus for future research by identifying remaining questions and gaps in knowledge (see Shaw & Cos- tanzo, 1982, chap. 1, for a discussion of the role of theory in science). I have already explained how The Psychology of Attitudes fulfills the first two of these functions-Eagly and Chaiken provide a comprehensive summary of existing research and address the implications of the work for our understanding of attitudinal phenomena. Let me now discuss a few examples of how the book fulfills the function of identifying gaps in our knowledge.

Eagly and Chaiken do not include a separate chapter on attitude formation in their book. Instead, the 7 chapters that describe theories and research typically considered to be attitude change are titled, "... Attitude Formation and Change" (e.g., "Motivational Processes in Attitude Formation and Change"). This approach may seem to imply that the distinction between attitude formation and change is arbitrary or unimportant. After all, the end result (e.g., after the presentation of a persuasive message) is always a "new attitude"; the

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only difference may be that, in attitude formation, the previous state was a nonattitude, but, in attitude change, the previous state was an attitude of a different extrem- ity or valence.

Yet, the basic question of where attitudes come from is both interesting and important (possible sources include information from others, personal experiences, the media, etc.; see Oskamp, 1991). Also, the distinction between attitude formation and change can be very important, with different cognitive and motivational processes involved. For example, when an attitude already exists, new information may be interpreted in a biased fashion, and persuasive arguments may be resisted altogether (see Johnson & Eagly, 1989; Kunda, 1990). Although Eagly and Chaiken discuss some processes that undoubtedly underlie the initial develop- ment of many attitudes (e.g., conditioning, mere exposure, self-perception), their failure to address attitude formation separately from attitude change re- flects the paucity of research specifically exploring the former topic. In fact, in the closing chapter, Eagly and Chaiken themselves mention "the lack of attention to the developmental isssue of how attitudes are formed and become strong" (p. 681) as a limitation of the literature. Social psychologists have focused their theoretical and empirical attention on factors involved in attitude change, especially persuasion resulting from verbal and written messages. Whether subjects' previous positions constituted attitudes or nonattitudes has not generally been of much concern to researchers.

The tendency to ignore attitude formation as a research topic may be coming to an end, however. For example, there is increasing interest in conditioning models of attitudes, based on both instrumental and classical conditioning (e.g., Cacioppo, Marshall- Goodell, Tassinary, & Petty, 1992; Krosnick, Betz, Jussim, Lynn, & Stephens, 1992). Also, there has been recent interest in the possible heritability of attitudes, as the field of behavioral genetics has begun to influence social psychologists. For example, researchers have estimated that as much as 50% of the observed variance in some social attitudes may be attributable to genetic factors (see Arvey, Bouchard, Segal, & Abra- ham, 1989; Eaves, Eysenck, & Martin, 1989). Of course, such "heritability coefficients" say nothing di- rectly about the operation of genes within individuals, being dependent on environmental and genetic vari- ability within the population under study (Cropanzano & James, 1990; Weizmann, Wiener, Wiesenthal, & Ziegler, 1990). Nevertheless, a genetic perspective on attitudes raises many interesting questions. Tesser (in press) found that attitudes identified by other researchers as high in heritability (e.g., attitudes toward harsh treatment of criminals) produce faster response laten- cies from subjects and less conformity to alleged nor-

mative information than do low heritability attitudes (e.g., attitudes toward socialism). Also, similarity to a stranger on highly heritable attitudes evokes greater liking than does similarity on low heritability attitudes. Tesser concluded that highly heritable attitudes are "stronger" (e.g., more accessible, more resistant to change), perhaps because they have a biological substrate that makes change uncomfort- able and motivates psychological protection mechanisms around them.

A second gap in our knowledge about attitudes that is identified in The Psychology ofAttitudes (see, e.g., pp. 309-311, 324-325) concerns a very basic issue in persuasion-namely, what makes arguments "strong." The strength of arguments is an important factor in various attitudinal phenomena, including attitude change (obviously), attitude formation, and the effects of attitudes on learning and memory. Although we know that cogent arguments are generally more persuasive than specious arguments, the precise features that underlie argument quality are not clear. To a large extent, procedures for developing strong arguments have involved a mix of intuitive and empirical methods. For example, Petty and Cacioppo (1986) suggested that researchers should generate intuitively strong and weak arguments, which can then be rated by pilot subjects, with "strong" messages being empirically defined as those that predominantly elicit favorable rather than unfavorable thoughts. Areni and Lutz (1988) argued that manipulations of argument strength have typically associated differentially valenced attributes with the attitude object (e.g., strong arguments attempt to link the attitude object with very positive attributes, whereas weak arguments attempt to link the object with less positive or even negative attributes). As Eagly and Chaiken point out, this possible confounding of argument quality and argument valence underscores the need for researchers to develop more valid manipulations of argument strength.

A related literature that might clarify the underpin- nings of argument quality is research on how perceivers process and evaluate assertions (e.g., how perceivers decide whether proffered statements are true or false). Gilbert, Krull, and Malone (1990) proposed that all assertions are initially represented as true and that false information must then be "unaccepted." Consistent with this reasoning, subjects who were interrupted while processing a false statement were more likely to identify it incorrectly as true than were uninterrupted subjects, whereas interruption did not increase the er- roneous identification of true statements as false. Arkes, Boehm, and Xu (1991) showed that simply repeating a statement causes it to be judged more true, compared to nonrepeated control statements, presumably because familiarity is used as one basis for judging

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validity (see also Jacoby, Kelly, Brown, & Jasechko, 1989). Applying these findings to the issue of argument strength, perhaps argument quality has something to do with the ease with which information can be unaccepted or with the subjective familiarity of the information. At any rate, if the persuasion literature is to continue to rely on argument strength as an important variable, researchers must elaborate the psychological mechanisms underlying the dimension.

A third gap in our knowledge that is made apparent by the Eagly and Chaiken book has already been mentioned in this review-the persistence of attitudes and persuasion. There has been surprisingly little attention given to whether attitudes and attitude change produced by researchers endure for any length of time. Most persuasion studies have been single-session laboratory experiments. It is generally assumed that observed attitude change persists for at least some time beyond the testing session, decaying slowly over time (see T. D. Cook & Flay, 1978). Rarely, however, have experi- menters included the delayed measures necessary to examine this assumption. Some attitude topics have stimulated interest in temporal stability because such stability is part of the focal phenomenon (e.g., research on the "sleeper effect"; see chap. 12 in Eagly & Chaiken), but, in most domains of the attitude literature, researchers have rarely addressed or measured temporal persistence.

Of course, the persistence of change is an important issue in areas other than attitudes. For example, changes in behavior often do not persist: Individuals may not adhere to new life styles (e.g., dieting, exer- cising) or to physicians' recommendations (e.g., medications, self-examinations). Researchers in these literatures have identified numerous factors that facilitate behavioral adherence, including personality factors (e.g., Dishman, Ickes, & Morgan, 1980), social support (e.g., Andrew & Parker, 1979), and reward programs (e.g., Meichenbaum & Turk, 1987). These factors are presumed either to provide external motivation for maintaining behavior change or to maintain the salience/strength of internal processes that motivated change (e.g., to remind individuals of their reasons for undertaking change). Presumably, research on the persistence of attitudes could benefit from a consideration of some of these same factors (e.g., see Zanna, Fazio, & Ross, in press). That is, attitude change should persist to the extent that there is social support for the new attitude, to the extent that rewards in the environment support the new attitude, and so forth. An integration of the attitudinal and behavioral persistence literatures might provide the necessary stimulus for increased attention to issues of temporal stability by attitude researchers.

Suggested Revisions for Future Editions of the Book

ThePsychology ofAuttitudes is such a good book that, if Eagly and Chaiken are willing to take on the task, it seems guaranteed of continued life in the form of second and third editions. On the assumption that such editions will appear, I offer some suggestions for revisions that I would like to see in future versions of the book. My comments address two issues: organization of the book and topics omitted from the first edition.

Readers will inevitably find certain aspects of the organization of the book to be at odds with their own preferences. Quite simply, it is impossible to review a field as large as the attitude literature in a sequence that makes sense to everyone. For example, I would put the discussion of how attitudes can influence information processing (currently in chap. 12) before the chapters on attitude change (chaps. 5 to 11), because I concep- tualize attitudinal effects on information processing as potentially occurring before (and even mediating) persuasion.

Also, the chapters on attitude change are presented in a different order than I would choose. In general, I prefer a chronological presentation within a substantive topic domain, so that the cumulative nature of the growth of knowledge is communicated clearly. Al- though information within chapters of The Psychology of Attitudes is often organized chronologically, Eagly and Chaiken did not arrange their attitude change chapters that way. For example, many of the studies con- ducted during the 1950s in the Yale communication research program, which laid the foundation for subse- quent experimental work on persuasion, are described in chapter 10, whereas many more recent theories (including the currently dominant dual-process models) are presented in earlier chapters.

Of course, these organizational complaints reflect personal preferences and would not necessarily be en- dorsed by most attitude researchers. As a contrasting example, some readers (but not I) might consider the inclusion of social influence (e.g., conformity, obedi- ence, power) in a book on attitudes to be inappropriate, although the conceptual links between persuasion and conformity (e.g., both involve yielding or resistance to attempted interpersonal influence) have been observed before (see Chaiken & Stangor, 1987; Zanna, Olson, & Herman, 1987).

More substantive and important suggestions for revisions concern topics that are omitted from the current version of The Psychology ofA ttitudes. To be sure, the topics reviewed in the book are covered exhaustively. Unfortunately, some areas of research that I consider to be important are excluded. I suspect that Eagly and Chaiken consciously decided they could not cover

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these issues because of space limitations; the book is long and detailed even as it is. I think, however, that the book would be improved by the addition of some further topics.

I especially hope that the topic of stereotypes and prejudice will be added to the book (in the current edition, these concepts receive only brief mention at a few points). One of the major reasons the attitude concept originally captured the interest of social psychologists was its perceived relevance for understanding ethnic and racial enmity. Moreover, there is a long history of research on stereotypes and prejudice in social psychology (see, e.g., Allport, 1954). Students who begin their study of the attitude literature by reading The Psychology of Attitudes will learn little about this history.

I recognize that stereotypes and prejudice constitute, in a sense, the "application" of the attitude concept to a particular domain. One might argue that, if stereotypes and prejudice should be included in a book on attitudes, then so should the application of attitudes to such domains as consumer behavior (e.g., advertising) and health psychology (e.g., behavioral medicine). Yet, I see stereotypes and prejudice as different, somehow, from other applications of the attitude concept. Part of my reaction is based on historical precedent (prejudice has a longer history of research in social psychology than does advertising). But my reaction is also based on the reasoning that stereotypes and prejudice are themselves attitudes (or, at least, components of attitudes), whereas other domains of application seem less isomorphic with the attitude concept (e.g., advertising involves many factors besides attitudes). Also, the concepts of stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination map nicely onto the well-known distinctions between cognitive, affective, and behavioral classes of responses in the attitude literature.

My belief that stereotypes and prejudice should be added to future editions of The Psychology ofAttitudes is also based on the fact that there has been a recent resurgence of interest in this topic among social psychologists (see Mackie & Hamilton, in press; Olson & Zanna, 1993; Zanna & Olson, in press). For example, the issue of when perceivers rely on stereotypes to make judgments about individuals has received a lot of recent attention (this issue is mentioned briefly in The Psy- chology of Attitudes). Fiske and Neuberg (1990) proposed a continuum of impression formation ranging from category-based to individuated processing (see also Brewer, 1988; Dovidio & Gaertner, in press). Perceivers are assumed initially to make stereotypic, category-based judgments about targets; piecemeal processing (based on specific attributes of the target) will occur only if personal relevance is high and available information about the target is inconsistent with

category-based expectations. Several researchers have also documented that perceivers rely more on stereotypes when their processing capacities are reduced. For example, Pratto and Bargh (1991) manipulated the speed at which information was presented to subjects; impressions were more stereotypic when subjects did not have time to integrate individuating information. Bodenhausen (1990) found that subjects exhibited more pronounced stereotypic biases in their judgments when tested at a nonoptimal, as opposed to optimal, time of day, as determined by individual differences (e.g., in the morning for "night people"). Presumably, circadian variations in arousal levels influence perceivers' motivation and/or ability to process individuating information.

Prejudice has also received recent attention from researchers. For example, the respective roles of affective and cognitive determinants of prejudice have been explored. Stangor, Sullivan, and Ford (1991) compared the importance of stereotypic beliefs about groups (e.g., traits associated with groups) and affect toward groups (e.g., how the groups make you feel) as predictors of global evaluations and social distance measures. Emo- tional responses consistently predicted attitudes and social distance more strongly than did cognitive stereotypes. Esses, Haddock, and Zanna (in press) examined stereotypic beliefs, feelings, and symbolic beliefs (beliefs that social groups violate or uphold cherished values; see also Sears, 1988) as predictors of overall attitudes. Again, stereotypic beliefs did not predict intergroup attitudes strongly. Both emotions and symbolic beliefs had better predictive power but were par- ticularly relevant within specific personality subgroups. Symbolic beliefs were the strongest predictors of intergroup attitudes for highly authoritarian individuals, whereas emotions predicted attitudes best for individuals low in authoritarianism.

Thus, social psychologists have developed a substantial body of knowledge about prejudice and have much to contribute to the understanding of this important social problem (including the reduction of prejudice: see Aronson, 1990; S. W. Cook, 1990; Gaertner, Mann, Dovidio, Murrell, & Pomare, 1990). Thus, for reasons of both practical and theoretical significance, I hope that Eagly and Chaiken will add a chapter on stereotypes and prejudice to the next edition of The Psychology of Attitudes. In the meantime, instructors may want to supplement the book with readings on prejudice when using the text in graduate courses on attitudes.

Another, less important possible addition to the book is the concept of values. Eagly and Chaiken define values in chapter 1 as a type of attitude-namely, attitudes toward "abstract goals or end states of human existence" (p. 5). This definition is defensible but does

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not capture certain qualities of values that have interested researchers (e.g., they serve as important, positive guides or standards for behavior). Although Eagly and Chaiken mention values at a few points subsequently in the book, there is no detailed, explicit consideration of research on this concept.

As with prejudice, there is a history of social psychological research on values (e.g., Rokeach, 1973) that could be described in future editions of the book. Also, recent advancements in our understanding of this concept could be presented. For example, Feather (1990) provided data suggesting that values affect behavior by influencing individuals' evaluations of the consequences of actions (an expectancy- value perspective). On the basis of research in 20 countries, Schwartz (1992) developed a comprehensive value survey that distinguishes 10 broad content domains (e.g., achievement, security, conformity). Analyses indicate that two fundamental dimensions underlie the content domains-openness to change versus conservation (whether the values motivate behavior along predictable versus unpredictable paths) and self-enhancement versus self-transcen- dence (whether the values motivate self-interested actions or promote the welfare of others). Given the potential importance of values for understanding individual differences in behavior and preferences (including attitudes), I hope that this concept will receive more detailed coverage in the next edition of The Psychology of Attitudes (perhaps most logically in the chapter on attitude structure).

Conclusions

The Psychology of Attitudes is an extraordinary book. The coverage of relevant theories and research is comprehensive, the writing style is excellent, and the critical analysis is intelligent and informative. Simply put, reading The Psychology ofAttitudes is both necessary and sufficient for being well-informed about the current state of attitude research.

Notes

I prepared this book review essay while supported by a research grant from the Social Sciences and Human- ities Research Council of Canada.

I thank Victoria Esses, Clive Seligman, and Mark Zanna for their comments on a previous version of this essay.

James M. Olson, Department of Psychology, Uni- versity of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, N6A SC2, Canada.

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Chaiken, S. (1980). Heuristic versus systematic information processing and the use of source versus message cues in persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 752-766.

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