European Military Capabilities, the Defense Industry and the Future Shape of Armaments Co-operation

  • Published on
    25-Feb-2017

  • View
    214

  • Download
    2

Transcript

  • This article was downloaded by: [University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign]On: 05 October 2014, At: 06:24Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office:Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

    Defense & Security AnalysisPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscriptioninformation:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cdan20

    European Military Capabilities, the DefenseIndustry and the Future Shape of ArmamentsCo-operationAndrew James aa PREST, Manchester Business School , University of Manchester , HaroldHankins Building, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL, UKPublished online: 01 Jul 2010.

    To cite this article: Andrew James (2005) European Military Capabilities, the Defense Industryand the Future Shape of Armaments Co-operation, Defense & Security Analysis, 21:1, 5-19, DOI:10.1080/1475179052000341470

    To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1475179052000341470

    PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

    Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the Content)contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and ourlicensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, orsuitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publicationare the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor &Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independentlyverified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for anylosses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilitieswhatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to orarising out of the use of the Content.

    This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantialor systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, ordistribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and usecan be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

    http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cdan20http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/1475179052000341470http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1475179052000341470http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

  • Defense & Security Analysis Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 520, March 2005

    Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and in the European Union(EU), the shortfall between European capabilities and European political and militaryaspirations is a source of considerable concern. In November 2002, the NATO PragueSummit adopted a Capabilities Commitment aimed at enhancing the military capabil-ities required for the full range of future NATO missions. The new NATO ReactionForce is to act as a catalyst for change and is an essential element of NATOs transfor-mation agenda, focusing on and promoting improvements in NATO capabilities. Thecreation of the new NATO post of Supreme Allied Commander for Transformationaims to give further impetus to the process. In parallel, the European Unions HelsinkiHeadline Goal and the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) process has sought tosecure the necessary capabilities to fulfill the Petersburg tasks within the EuropeanSecurity and Defense Policy (ESDP).

    Such developments raise questions about the future shape of the European defenseindustry and the role of armaments co-operation, both within Europe and acrossthe Atlantic, in helping European governments meet their capabilities shortfalls.2

    Competing views exist. There are those in European policy circles who raise the specterof US defense industrial dominance and argue that the ESDP will count for nothingwithout an independent European defense industrial base.3 There are others who arguethe case for a transatlantic defense industry as the most effective and efficient means ofdelivering the technological capabilities Europe needs and promoting interoperabilitywithin NATO.4

    This paper seeks a middle ground by arguing that Europe will only meet its capabil-ities shortfalls through a combination of strong European efforts complemented bytransatlantic armaments co-operation. Europe needs to build Towers of Excellencein those capability areas that are critical to its NATO commitments and the implemen-tation of the ESDP. A strengthened European technological and industrial base, thispaper proposes, is also the best way to ensure that future transatlantic armaments co-operation is balanced and in European interests. There should be no doubt that

    ISSN 1475-1798 print; 1475-1801 online/05/010005-15 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd 5DOI: 10.1080/1475179052000341470

    European Military Capabilities, theDefense Industry and the FutureShape of Armaments Co-operation1

    Andrew D. JamesPREST, Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, Harold Hankins Building,Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL, UK

    21-1 Master 2/3/05 5:02 PM Page 5D

    ownl

    oade

    d by

    [U

    nive

    rsity

    of

    Illin

    ois

    at U

    rban

    a-C

    ham

    paig

    n] a

    t 06:

    24 0

    5 O

    ctob

    er 2

    014

  • European governments will need to acquire US technologies selectively. Simply put,European defense Research and Development (R & D) and procurement budgets willmake it impossible to keep pace with US technological developments across the fullrange of capabilities. But co-operation works best when partners are of comparabletechnological competence. The question, therefore, is how Europe can enhance itsdefense industrial capabilities in selected critical capability areas to give it moreleverage in transatlantic negotiations with US policy-makers and industry.

    For the last 40 years, European governments have pursued co-operative armamentsprograms both within Europe and with the US. The case for closer co-operation isstronger than ever when faced by the cost and complexity of those systems that are thekey to military transformation. Europes relatively limited spending on defenseprocurement makes it imperative that its governments seek more cost-effective pro-curement processes. Defense procurement remains overwhelmingly a national activityand current arrangements are expensive and inefficient, duplicating effort and raisingcosts. Fragmented national markets deny Europe the economies of scale necessary toreduce costs, fund R & D and ensure the effective application of technology.

    On the supply side, the European defense industry has already undergone a dramaticconsolidation, although further mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures may benecessary if industry is to address the emerging capability needs of its customers.Equally, that capability agenda requires governments to address demand-side deficien-cies. Recent political developments suggest that, at last, European governments appearserious about developing closer co-operation between themselves in the field ofarmaments. The most tangible sign of this new determination is the establishment ofthe inter-governmental European Defence Agency (EDA) by the European Councilwith the aim of developing defense capabilities, promoting and enhancing Europeanarmaments co-operation, strengthening the European defense industrial base andcreating a competitive European defense equipment market as well as promotingresearch efforts.5 Such a reform of the demand side is important and long overduebecause it holds out the possibility of procurement of more cost-effective, technologic-ally advanced and timely defense equipment.

    Ultimately, however, the pace of technological developments in the US, combinedwith constraints on European defense R & D and procurement budgets, means thatEurope will only meet its capabilities needs through a combination of European devel-opments complemented by transatlantic armaments co-operation. If transatlanticco-operation is to be successful in this new environment, the US needs to recognize thatits European allies have significant technological capabilities in some fields.6 ForNATO transformation to be effective, the US must be willing to trust its Europeanpartners by sharing the advanced technologies that are critical to transformation.Moreover, the US government will likely need to reform technology transfer and exportcontrols if it wishes allies to have comparable capabilities. These are big challenges forpolicy-makers and politicians on both sides of the Atlantic.

    6 ANDREW D. JAMES

    21-1 Master 2/3/05 5:02 PM Page 6D

    ownl

    oade

    d by

    [U

    nive

    rsity

    of

    Illin

    ois

    at U

    rban

    a-C

    ham

    paig

    n] a

    t 06:

    24 0

    5 O

    ctob

    er 2

    014

  • TRANSFORMATION AND THE US DEFENSE INDUSTRY

    The imbalance in European and US military capabilities has been an issue for NATOthroughout its history, but the last decade has seen mounting concerns that this gapcould grow to such an extent that US and European armed forces will find it increas-ingly difficult to operate effectively together.7 The US focus on military transformationhas only heightened these concerns. The CSIS Commission on Transatlantic Securityand Industrial Co-operation in the Twenty-First Century bluntly states the problem:

    The Bush administration has made military transformation a central defense andnational security objective and has embarked on a radical reorganization andtransformation of its military resources and capabilities at a speed and of a scopethat current European defense budgets are in no position to match any timesoon.8

    The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) focused on dominant military capabili-ties that would be reinforced by a transformation in doctrine and technology and ableto operate on a global basis. As Dombrowski and Ross observe:

    Information superiority is to be the underpinning of dominant maneuver,precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection.US forces are expected to prevail over any and all military challengers by movingmore quickly, hitting harder and more precisely, and when necessary, sustainingoperations longer than potential adversaries.9

    Such concepts are being supported by a slow but perceptible redirection of R & D andprocurement spending. Within the huge hike in US defense R & D spending is a newTransformational Technology Initiative focusing attention on hypersonics and spaceaccess, advanced reconnaissance and knowledge architecture, and power and energytechnologies.10 Patterns of procurement spending are also changing, albeit slowly.The cancellation of the US Armys $1.1 billion Crusader artillery program is seen asevidence of the direct impact that transformation may have on the future shape of USdefense equipment requirements.

    Within the US Department of Defense (DOD) there are those who argue that thesedevelopments require a transformation of the defense industrial base.11 They argue thatthe transformational shift to effects-based operations requires that the defense indus-trial base should be viewed as being composed of operational effects-based sectorsrather than simply platforms or weapons systems. At the same time, they argue, invest-ment and sourcing of transformational technologies may require the DOD to lookbeyond its traditional suppliers to commercial companies and start-ups in sectors asdiverse as robotics, information technology and biotechnology.

    Indeed, since the early 1990s, the US defense industry has been shifting the focus ofits activities from platforms towards defense electronics and systems integration activi-ties. The Bush Administrations focus on transformation has given added impetus tothat process. Defense contractors such as Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed

    EUROPEAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES 7

    21-1 Master 2/3/05 5:02 PM Page 7D

    ownl

    oade

    d by

    [U

    nive

    rsity

    of

    Illin

    ois

    at U

    rban

    a-C

    ham

    paig

    n] a

    t 06:

    24 0

    5 O

    ctob

    er 2

    014

  • Martin and General Dynamics have greatly expanded their information technologycapabilities in large part through acquisitions of small defense IT firms or the ITdivisions of larger defense firms. 12

    DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE

    While the Pentagon has pushed ahead with its transformation efforts, European gov-ernments have been more cautious. Few Europeans use the term transformation,preferring instead to talk about modernization, network centric warfare or networkenabled capability.13 This is more than mere semantics. Skeptical Europeans questionwhether the American way of warfare associated with transformation is necessarilyappropriate to European strategic requirements.14 The caution also reflects the realityof European defense procurement budgets. Most European countries are still trying toreorientate their militaries from their Cold War posture. European governments arestruggling to find funds for strategic air lift, C4ISR and the other equipment necessaryto support their new expeditionary war-fighting and peacekeeping missions.15 At thesame time, a few large programs like the Eurofighter are consuming a large share ofexisting modernization spending. Difficult decisions still need to be taken acrossEurope regarding force structures, the mix of platforms and enabling capabilities andthe like.16

    Against this background, the UK government, for one, has made it clear that there isno realistic way that it can or would wish to follow the US vision of wholesale trans-formation of its forces. Instead, the UK is pursuing what it calls Network EnabledCapability. This is an incremental and selective development of the transformationalcapabilities it believes are most likely to improve the effectiveness of British armedforces in a context of coalition warfare. The situation in France is similar. Germany hasonly just begun begun to address such questions.17

    STRENGTHENING THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY

    Industry reflects the demands of its customers. The main challenge for the Europeandefense industry has been the relatively slow pace at which its principal customers namely European governments have been willing and able to adopt the new transfor-mational technologies and allocate the budgets for procurement and R & D necessaryfor modernization.

    Where customer requirements have emerged, European industry has already gonesome way to establishing European solutions to European capability shortfalls. In thearea of precision strike weapons, the European missile company MBDA has developedthe Storm Shadow/Scalp EG cruise missile. In C4ISR, France is deploying the Heliosseries of optical observation satellites. A European industry team offered the Stand-offSurveillance and Target Acquisition Radar (SOSTAR) as an alternative to theNorthrop Grumman J-Stars for the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS)requirement. Similarly, Europe has programs that span the entire spectrum ofunmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and the French companies Sagem and DassaultAviation are collaborating to develop an unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV).18

    8 ANDREW D. JAMES

    21-1 Master 2/3/05 5:...

Recommended

View more >