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Envisaging a peacereferendum in Israel: Thelegitimisation of peace or alegitimation crisis? Lessonsfrom Northern IrelandJonathan Rynhold a b & Asher Cohen ca Lecturer in the Department of PoliticalStudies , Bar Ilan University , Israelb Research fellow at the Begin‐Sadat Centrefor Strategic Studies , Bar Ilan University ,c Senior Lecturer in the Department of PoliticalStudies , Bar Ilan University , IsraelPublished online: 20 Sep 2007.

To cite this article: Jonathan Rynhold & Asher Cohen (2003) Envisaging apeace referendum in Israel: The legitimisation of peace or a legitimationcrisis? Lessons from Northern Ireland, Civil Wars, 6:1, 85-104, DOI:10.1080/13698240308402527

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698240308402527

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Envisaging a Peace Referendum in Israel:The Legitimisation of Peace or a

Legitimation Crisis?Lessons from Northern Ireland

JONATHAN RYNHOLD AND ASHER COHEN

In order to garner the necessary legitimacy to enact a future finalstatus peace agreement with Syria or the Palestinians, Israelipoliticians from the Left and the Right have endorsed the concept of apeace referendum. This article examines the potential consequences ofa peace referendum in Israel by drawing on the referendum experiencein Northern Ireland regarding the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. In thecase of Northern Ireland, the legitimisation of the agreement requirednot only a clear majority of votes cast but also a clear majority amongProtestants: an 'ethnic majority'. Given the similarity of the discoursesurrounding a peace referendum in Northern Ireland and in Israel, itis clear that a referendum in Israel would similarly require an ethnicJewish majority to legitimise a peace agreement. Under thesecircumstances, rather than legitimising peace between Israel and itsneighbours, a referendum would be more likely to result in a broadlegitimation crisis for Israeli democracy by deepening the ethnictensions between Israel's Jewish majority and its Arab minority.Hence, in contradistinction to the conventional wisdom, Israel wouldbe well advised to avoid the use of a peace referendum.

At least since the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin inNovember 1995, Israeli governments have been concerned with thequestion of how to garner the necessary legitimacy among the Israeli publicfor the major compromises that would be entailed in any final peace dealwith the Palestinians or Syria. In an effort to resolve this problem, Israelipoliticians from both major parties have endorsed the idea of holding areferendum. With the renewal of the peace process in 2003, the question ofa peace referendum has again become of practical relevance. This articleexamines the potential consequences of a peace referendum in Israel. Toassist in answering this question, the article draws on the referendum

Civil Wars, Vol.6, No.l (Spring 2003), pp.85-104PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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experience of Northern Ireland regarding the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.Analysts and politicians, including the British Prime Minister Tony Blairand the former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak,1 consider that the peaceprocess in Northern Ireland contains lessons applicable to the Middle Eastpeace process. Both are long-standing 'compound conflicts' consisting ofboth ethnic and inter-state elements.2 While the inter-state dimension hasbeen more prominent in the Arab-Israeli conflict than in the NorthernIreland conflict, over the last 20 years the ethnic/Palestinian dimension hasincreasingly moved to the centre of the Arab-Israeli conflict.3

Indeed, at their core, both conflicts are between two ethno-nationalgroups (Israeli Jews vs. Palestinian Arabs and Protestant Unionists vs.Catholic Nationalists) fighting primarily over political objectives. In bothcases religious and socio-economic divisions reinforce the core ethnicdivide.4 More specifically, each peace process has been accompanied by theneed to legitimise controversial peace agreements within democraticpolities deeply divided along ethno-national lines. In both cases areferendum has been viewed as having a major role to play in this process.In the case of Northern Ireland, the peace referendum held in the Provincewas tied to a parallel peace referendum in the Republic of Ireland, whereasin the Israeli case, the proposed referendum would take place unilaterally,in Israel.

Finally, in both cases the discourse surrounding a peace referendumreferred to the need for a majority within ethnic groups in addition to thesimple majority defined in terms of all voters, in order to truly legitimise therelevant agreements. For all these reasons, the Northern Ireland PeaceReferendum is a case from which Israel might learn.5

The central question is whether a peace referendum can legitimise apeace agreement without destabilising the democratic system of governancein deeply divided polities such as Israel and Northern Ireland. Lijphart hasargued that Westminster-style majoritarianism is likely to be inimical tostable democracy in such societies.6 Since a referendum is a powerfulexpression of majoritarianism, the question for Israel is not simply whethera referendum would succeed in legitimising a peace agreement but alsowhether it might trigger a more intense legitimation crisis that wouldthreaten the stability of Israeli democracy generally.

THE USE OF A REFERENDUM IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACIES

A referendum would appear to be an excellent tool for enhancing thelegitimacy of policy, as it is a clear manifestation of the popular will,'unsullied' by the personal and factional interests of political elites. If a

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A PEACE REFERENDUM IN ISRAEL 87

particular policy is deemed especially controversial or has majorconstitutional ramifications, the government may choose to initiate areferendum as a means of garnering the extra legitimacy that such a changeis deemed to require. For this reason, referendums sometimes require morethan a simple majority. For example, changes to the constitution in Australiaand Switzerland necessitate a 'double majority': a majority of voters as wellas a majority of votes in four of the six states of Australia.7 While in the1979 referendums on devolution for Wales and Scotland, the rules of thevote dictated not only that majority among votes cast be obtained, but thatat least 40 per cent of all registered voters support it as well.8 Thegovernment would hope that a clear majority in the referendum wouldprovide a sense of closure and head off any opposition. Of course, holdinga referendum always involves the risk of failure, which could also challengethe credibility of the government itself, engendering further politicalinstability.

Against referendums, it has been argued that they give greaterprevalence to extremists, inflame public passions and intensify conflictswithin society, especially in relation to minority groups.9 But recent studiesexamining the use of referendums in Europe and Canada found that theywere not harmful to the political stability of representative democracies.10

According to Qvortrup the potentially negative effects of referendums insuch cases are mitigated in large polities where there exists a large numberof cross-cutting cleavages." However, in smaller polities with overlappingcleavages, referendums have been problematic. In this vein, evidence ofintolerance was found regarding American state referendums that dealtexplicitly with the question of minority rights, as well as, during times ofgreat political upheaval - such as the spate of referendums in EasternEurope following the collapse of the Soviet Union - when ethno-nationalistsentiment was reawakened.12

Indeed, according to Lusztig and Knox, societies deeply divided alongethnic lines, in which the major groups are not interested in assimilation, areparticularly vulnerable to the negative consequences of a referendum.13 Onereason such societies are not well-suited to the majoritarian type ofdemocracy, let alone a referendum, is because 'the winner takes all' natureof the system poses too great a threat to potential losers for them to retain astake in the system. This position represents the conventional wisdom inBelgium, a consociational democracy deeply divided along ethnic linesbetween Flemings and Walloons. Belgium has held only one referendum(regarding the status of the monarchy) the result of which had to be nullifiedfollowing communal riots by the Walloons who found the resultunacceptable.14

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On the other hand, Switzerland, also a democracy deeply divided alongethnic lines, holds referendums on a regular basis without theaccompaniment of ethnic violence. The Swiss success in this regard can beexplained by three factors.

First, the uncompetitive nature of the party system in Switzerlandcushions the divisive effects of referendums by limiting popularmobilization.15

Second, constitutional referendums in Switzerland are not completelymajoritarian in nature, rather they are integrated into the federal power-sharing political system of the state by virtue of the fact that referendumsrequire both a simple majority and majority in 12 out of the 22 cantons.

Third, a large proportion of the referendums in Switzerland are of anincremental or technical nature and thereby do not relate to issues that aresensitive to inter-ethnic relations.16

The flipside of this last point is that the use of a referendum is likely tobe especially problematic if its subject matter touches on a sensitive subjectfor ethnic relations. In this vein, Lusztig and Knox argue that the use ofreferendums in Quebec led to the whipping up of extremism that resulted inincreased political instability and lessened the prospects of settlement. Theirreading of the Quebec case suggests that deeply divided societies shouldavoid using a referendum as the long-term costs to stability outweigh anyshort-run gains of legitimacy.17

On the other hand, it has been argued that referendums can, undercertain conditions, help settle national and border questions. According toBoagang Hi, these conditions include the achievement of a large majority inthe actual vote, a consensus regarding the nature of what constitutes alegitimate majority and freedom from elite manipulation.18 On this latterpoint, Walker argues that referendums themselves did not cause violentconflict in the post-Soviet states, though they did provide an opportunity forelites who were looking for an excuse for violence.19 In other words, Walkersuggests that whether or not a referendum leads to violence dependsultimately on how the process is managed by elites.

Similarly, Brady and Kaplan point out that pragmatic elites in theUkraine were able to skilfully manoeuvre a national referendum in waysthat promoted stability and constrained ethnic conflict.20

Approaching the issue from the opposite starting point, Cunningham hasargued that the benefits of direct democracy in terms of genuine massinvolvement are especially valuable in relation to ethnic conflict.21 This isbecause ethnic conflict is fundamentally a mass- and not an elite-drivenphenomenon. The elite may act to steer public opinion, but the bottom lineis always what the masses will accept in their name. It may even be the case

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that the masses will be more open to compromise than elites, as according toHorowitz in the politics of ethnic conflict, for most politicians most of thetime it is more rewarding to pursue conflict than to pursue accommodation.22

What are the implications of the literature on referendums regarding theuse of peace referendums in Northern Ireland and Israel?

On the one hand, the literature indicates that such referendums are likelyto be problematic as Israel and Northern Ireland are small polities that aredeeply divided along ethnic lines in which overlapping cleavagespredominate, where party politics is competitive and where the question ofwhat constitutes a legitimate majority is controversial. These problems arecompounded by the fact that the subject of the referendum is extremelysensitive to ethnic relations.

On the other hand, other elements within the literature suggest that suchproblems could be overcome by responsible and skilful elite behaviour,mass support and the integration of the referendum into a more consensualpolitical process (as in Switzerland). Against this background, the 1998Referendum on the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland isexamined below. Subsequently, the implications of the Northern Irelandcase for an Israeli Peace Referendum are analysed.

THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT REFERENDUM IN NORTHERNIRELAND: IN SEARCH OF AN 'ETHNIC MAJORITY'

The 1998 Good Friday Agreement is an internal consociation combinedwith overarching confederal and federalising institutions, including anascent element of co-sovereignty agreed between the two patron states: theUK and the Republic of Ireland. It also contains a 'double protection' clausethat effectively guarantees each community a link with their preferrednation-state whatever the final constitutional disposition of the province.23

The Assembly established by the agreement institutionalised decision-making based on concurrent majoritarianism whereby key decisions requirethe support of a majority of Assembly members and a majority of bothregistered Nationalists and Unionists. More broadly the agreement assertedthat Northern Ireland should remain within the UK so long as that is thewish of the people living there, but that both governments would give effectto arrangements for a united Ireland if that should become the wish of thepeople of Northern Ireland. In the meantime, a role for Dublin has beenestablished in the Province's political life.

Given the controversial nature of the Good Friday Agreement and itsmajor constitutional implications for Northern Ireland, there appeared to begood reason for holding a referendum. In addition, mass support for the

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peace process was deemed vital. Cross-party elite agreement succeeded inincreasing public support for a more accommodationist stance24 and theelites sought to lever that support to obtain mass legitimacy for theagreement through a referendum. Although formally, the 'Yes' campaignneeded to gain only an overall majority from among the votes cast in theProvince to win technically, to truly legitimise the agreement in practiceconcurrent majorities among both Catholic and Protestant communities inNorthern Ireland were required. After all, one reason why the 1973 'borderpoll' failed, despite the large majority achieved, was that the Catholiccommunity boycotted it.

This time, given overwhelming Catholic support for the agreement, themain effort was devoted to obtaining a Protestant majority.25 Protestants hadmisgivings about the agreement and most felt that the Unionist cause hadgiven more than it received in the negotiations.26 They were deeply dividedover whether to back the agreement. While the largest Unionist party, theUlster Unionists (UUP), officially supported the agreement, six out of its tenMPs opposed it.27 These MPs worked with the 'No' campaign along withthe Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) led by the Reverend Ian Paisley, theUK Unionist Party and the Orange Order.

From the outset of the campaign, the attainment of an overall majorityfor the agreement in Northern Ireland seemed very likely. However, thecampaign remained very lively due to the battle to obtain an 'ethnicmajority' among Protestants. A sign of the centrality of this issue in thereferendum was the fact that Paisley declared that the 'No' campaign's aimwas to gain 40 per cent of the overall vote. Later on the 'No' campaignannounced that even if it gained only 26 per cent of the vote, it would be avictory, as such a result would imply that a majority of Protestants rejectedthe agreement.28

This ethnic discourse was prevalent throughout the campaign. EvenUnionist leaders of the 'Yes' campaign admitted to needing a majority of70 per cent in order to obtain a Protestant majority.29 While the British andIrish governments did not officially accept that the referendum wouldhave failed if it did not obtain a Protestant majority, in practice they toorecognised this was an extremely important issue. They feared that if theagreement failed to gain the backing of the majority of Protestants, anti-agreement Unionists would receive a significant boost which wouldenable them to win enough seats in the following month's elections toeffectively wreck the new Assembly, which was to form the basis of thesettlement.30

Consequently, the British prime minister, Tony Blair, visited theprovince in the days before the referendum in order to boost support among

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Protestants.31 In addition, the British government took the precaution ofbanning the publication of the referendum results for local districts. In theevent of a close vote among Protestants, this move seemed designed toprevent the 'No' campaign from presenting the figures in a way that wouldenable them to claim that a majority of Protestants within individualconstituencies voted against the agreement.

The result of the referendum gave the 'Yes' campaign a clear victorywith 71.12 per cent of the votes cast. The 81 per cent turnout meant that the'Yes' campaign also secured the support of the majority of registered votersin Northern Ireland. In the absence of official statistics, it was impossible tobe certain of the results in each community. Indeed, no sooner had theresults come in than the Unionists began to claim that the majority of theProtestant electorate had voted against it.32

However, such claims lost credibility in the wake of exit polls that gavethe agreement a majority in 17 out of the 18 Westminster constituencies inthe Province, as well as a slim majority of 51-54 per cent, among theProtestants." The figure of 54 per cent refers to all Protestants, while thefigure of 51 per cent refers only to Protestants who identify politically withUnionism, as opposed to the non-sectarian Alliance Party.34

How did the narrow Protestant majority in the referendum affect thepeace process? First, it succeeded in legitimising the agreement in the short-term. 'No' Unionists took part in the subsequent elections for the Assembly.In addition, the Loyalist Volunteer Force issued a statement that stated that,as far as it was concerned, the war was over. However, the 'No' campaignwas not neutralised. It continued to threaten the viability of the overallagreement by constantly challenging whether the implementation of theagreement retained the support of a majority of Protestants.35 Indeed, theoutcome of the Assembly election, held a month after the referendum, wassubject to considerable uncertainty given the continued Unionist doubtsabout the agreement.

In the end, the Assembly elections returned a narrow concurrentlegislative majority of 30 'Yes' Unionists to 28 'No' Unionists. According toEvans and O'Leary, the principal reason that the 'No' Unionists were unableto prevent a workable Assembly was the use of the single transferable vote(STV) 36 procedure in the election. STV prevented the narrow 'No' firstpreference majority within the Unionist bloc of voters from being convertedinto a narrow 'No' majority among the Unionist legislative bloc. About tenper cent of the voters made a transfer from Unionist to Nationalist, and viceversa. This strengthened the 'Yes' parties in the Assembly. Moresignificantly net transfers among Unionists explains much regarding thecreation of a 'Yes' majority among Unionists in the Assembly.

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Even after this success, the Protestant community continued to nurturedoubts about the agreement and its implementation remained problematic.37

Following David Trimble's resignation as First Minister in July 2001, theBritish government was forced to temporarily suspend the new Assemblyuntil the IRA began decommissioning its weapons in October 2001. InOctober 2002, the Assembly was suspended again and in May 2003 Britishprime minister, Tony Blair, suspended elections in the Province due to hisbelief that the IRA had not made a sufficiently clear commitment on theissue of decommissioning. Blair feared that without this, the DUP wouldbecome the largest party in Northern Ireland, which could lead to the totalcollapse of the agreement. In turn, this reflected the fact that since thereferendum the trend among the Protestant community had been away fromthe pro-agreement UUP and towards support for the Rejectionist DUP asreflected in the 1998 Assembly election and the 2001 general election.38

This, despite the fact that the UUP tried to draw off support from 'No'Unionists by prevaricating and seeking to renegotiate the agreement duringits implementation.39

Overall, the referendum can be said to have been a qualified success. Itenhanced the legitimacy of the Good Friday Agreement through theachievement of concurrent ethnic majorities. However, the closeness of thevote among Protestants meant that 'closure' was not achieved; opposition tothe agreement remained very much alive. Indeed, the opposition used theprinciple of a 'Protestant majority', popularised in the referendum, as ameans of hindering the implementation of the agreement when opinionpolls showed a subsequent drop in Protestant support for it.

Part of the reason for the relative success of the referendum was that itwas not an either/or proposition, as the 'No' campaign had the chance tofight another day in the subsequent Assembly elections. In addition, theagreement itself softened the either/or nature of the referendum through the'double protection' clause. The legitimacy for compromise generated by thereferendum was not alone sufficient to stabilise the peace process. Rather,the use of the STV system in the subsequent election saved the peaceprocess by preventing the 'No' Unionists from gaining an effective veto inthe Assembly. Clearly, STV embodies an approach which is diametricallyopposed to that embodied in a referendum. Thus, the referendum owed itsrelative success partly to the fact that it was part of a wider consensualpolitical process.

In this regard, there is a danger that the very success of the PeaceReferendum may lead to it being used in the future outside of a frameworkof consensual politics. Indeed, this is what Trimble intended, in March2002, when he called for a referendum in Northern Ireland on the future of

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the Union which he claimed would 'settle the issue for a generation'.40 Usedin such a manipulative majoritarian fashion, future referendums would helpto destabilise the peace process, rather than strengthen it.

THE POLITICS OF LEGITIMACY: THE REFERENDUM IDEA IN ISRAEL

From the 1980s until the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 the threatof regime crisis accompanied attempts to move the peace process forward.41

The assassination itself was carried out during a period of vociferous anti-government demonstrations. By negotiating with Yasser Arafat and thePalestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Rabin had not only broken amajor taboo, but also reneged on a specific election pledge. The legitimationcrisis surrounding Rabin's peace policies was greatly fuelled by the fact thatthe Interim Agreement (Oslo II) succeeded only in gaining a parliamentarymajority (61-59) due to the government's reliance on the Arab parties. Thiswas especially controversial as it meant that there was no 'Jewish majority'for the agreement, a fact that greatly intensified the legitimation crisissurrounding the peace process in Israel.

The assassination of Rabin a month later brought home to the Israeli Leftthe importance of gaining widespread legitimacy for their peace policies.Subsequently, on their return to power in 1999, they promised that any finalstatus peace agreements would be subject to a referendum. Despite thecollapse of the Israeli-Syrian talks in 1999 and the outbreak of violence in thePalestinian Authority in September 2000, the future use of a referendum in theevent of a peace agreement, has retained widespread acceptance in Israel.

The public debate over a referendum took off in 1999 as Syrian-Israelinegotiations reached an advanced state.42 The debate focused on themajority required to determine the outcome. The Labour Party and the Leftproposed an absolute majority of votes cast in a referendum as theappropriate measure; the same system as used in the direct election of theprime minister in 1996 and 1999. In contrast, the Likud, backed by the FarRight, the religious parties and Russian immigrant parties, proposed a lawthat would require an absolute majority of all those eligible to voteaccording to the electoral register, irrespective of whether they actuallyvoted or not in practice. On average, the electoral turnout in Israel for ageneral election is about 80 per cent. Assuming a similar turnout in areferendum, the practical meaning of this proposal would be that a peaceagreement would need 62.5 per cent of all votes cast to pass. The additional12.5 per cent of the vote required by the Likud proposal coincides almostexactly with the electoral strength of the Arab minority in Israeli elections.43

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THE 'SPECIAL MAJORITY' REFERENDUM DEBATESome supporters of a 'special majority' in a peace referendum, such ashuman rights activist, Professor Irwin Cotler, and Yoram Hazony, the headof the conservative Shalem Centre, made their case in terms of democraticlegitimacy and political stability.44 The Likud, led by the law's initiator,Silvan Shalom, Member of the Knesset (MK), consistently denied that itsaim was to neutralise the Arab vote. He argued that a special majority wasnecessary due both to the importance of the decision and the fact that onceadopted the decision was virtually irreversible.45 However, these ideas weredrowned out in a public discourse which understood the term 'specialmajority' to mean 'Jewish majority'.

The nature of the issue becomes apparent when one attempts to translatethe word 'referendum' into Hebrew. In Hebrew, the word for referendum is'mishal-am', which literally translated means 'a poll of the people'. In Israelthe term 'am' - people - is synonymous with nationhood, which in turn isunderstood by both the Jews and Arabs alike, in terms of ethnicity ratherthan citizenship. This is symptomatic of the fact that there is no such thingas an Israeli national identity of an entirely civic nature, neither in practicenor at the level of consciousness. Nor is the development of such an identitylikely.46

Thus, this linguistic difficulty bears witness to the deep divide betweenJews and Arabs in Israel, which became central to the discourse regarding areferendum. Indeed, figures associated with the Far Right argued thatIsrael's Arab minority should not participate in a peace referendum becauseby definition the vote would be a 'mishal-am' (a poll of the people/nation)not a 'mishal ezrachim' (a poll of the citizens).47

On the Far Right, supporters of the proposal argued that while Arabs inIsrael could be allowed to vote in a referendum, they should not be allowedto determine the outcome of such a vote because they question thelegitimacy of Israel's existence as a Jewish state or because they openlyidentify themselves as of Palestinian Arab nationality and as such constitutea fifth column.48

Other Far Right figures, such as former Moledet leader RehavamZe'evi49 and settlement leader Uri Elitzur, called on the Arabs not to vote ina referendum, because as Elitzur put it, 'in principle, your ballot box is overthere, on the Arab side'.50 More recently, as the question of a peacereferendum has resurfaced, settlement leader Pinchas Wallerstein reiteratedthat only a Jewish majority in a referendum would be sufficient to legitimisewithdrawal from settlements.51

Just as those who supported a 'special majority' viewed it in ethno-national terms, so did opponents of the bill. Labour MK Yossi Beilin and

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others labelled the law as 'racist'. On this basis, three MKs challenged thelegality of the proposal in the Supreme Court.52 However, on the CentreLeft, the then Centre Party leader Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, as well asmembers of the Labour Party's Steering Committee, thought that it waspolitically necessary to obtain a Jewish majority." During his term as primeminister, Ehud Barak's internal polls also paid attention to both the Jewishand civic majority for/against various peace proposals.54

It would appear that they, like the Blair government with regard to thereferendum in Northern Ireland, sensed that without an ethnic majority,the legitimacy of any agreement would be challenged, leading to greatpolitical instability within Israel and the wider region. This assessmentwas based not on the ethno-nationalist discourse of the Israeli Right, buton the strength of ethno-nationalist sentiment among the broader Jewishpublic in Israel. Thus, according to two opinion polls conducted when theLikud first proposed the 'special majority' law, over 50 per cent of theJewish public opposed the participation of Israel's Arab citizens in a peacereferendum.55

Several months later, over 60 per cent of all Israelis believed that aJewish majority was required in a peace referendum. Even among Israeliswho had voted for Ehud Barak in 1999, 53 per cent supported the idea of aJewish majority, compared with 81 per cent of Netanyahu voters. Surveysconducted at the same time also suggested that a majority of Israelis wouldsupport an agreement with Syria. Hence, a significant proportion ofproponents of far-reaching compromise must also have felt that a Jewishmajority for any such deal was important.56

This confirms previous surveys which demonstrated that the value of aJewish state was the most pervasive value in Israeli political culture, beingprevalent among both hawks and doves and receiving far higher levels ofsupport than the values of territory, democracy or peace.57

LEGITIMISING PEACE BY REFERENDUM: FOUR SCENARIOS

The major role of ethno-nationalism in the referendum discourse in Israelruns parallel to the discourse surrounding the 1998 referendum conductedin Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland experience suggests that it wouldbe necessary to obtain both a majority of all the votes cast in an Israelireferendum and an ethnic majority from among votes cast by Israeli Jews inorder to successfully legitimise a peace agreement.

The case below examines four possible scenarios in a referendum overpeace with Syria in exchange for a full Israeli withdrawal from the GolanHeights, as it was in this context that the referendum idea was debated. The

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outcome of such a referendum would not be a foregone conclusion.Between 1968 and 1986, 74-96 per cent of Israelis opposed returning anypart of the Golan. Even in 1995, at the height of negotiations between Israeland Syria, over 50 per cent of Israelis opposed any withdrawal whatsoeverfrom the Golan. Indeed, in 2000 the percentage of Israelis supporting a fullwithdrawal from the Golan Heights in exchange for peace reached a newhigh: 15 per cent!

On the other hand, when the public was asked (also in 2000) how itwould actually vote in a referendum regarding return of the Golan Heightsin exchange for full peace and security, 60 per cent of the Israeli public saidthey would vote 'Yes'.58 This poll result provides the foundation for the firsttwo scenarios explored below.59 It should be noted however that when 'fullwithdrawal from the Golan Heights' was defined as including Syriancontrol over part of the Sea of Galilee and part of its shoreline, support forfull withdrawal dropped by 11 per cent.60

The first scenario envisages a referendum being carried out on the basisof the Likud proposal for a 'special majority' based on the requirement foran absolute majority from among all registered voters. The chances of areferendum occurring on this basis are relatively small as any referendum islikely to occur under a Labour-led government. Nonetheless, given the widesupport for the proposal both among the public and in the Knesset, as wellas former Likud prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu's, apparentwillingness to withdraw from the vast majority of the Golan in secretnegotiations with the Syrians,61 this proposal might well become real.

The remaining three scenarios are based on three assumptions.First, that the referendum will occur on the basis proposed by the Labour

Party, that is, it would require an absolute majority from among the votescast.

Second, that 95 per cent of Israel's Arab citizens will vote in favour ofan agreement with Syria.62

Third, that the electoral weight of the Arab minority in a referendum willbe ten per cent. Each scenario contains within it two sets of results, the sizeof the 'civic' majority from 100 per cent of votes cast and, second, the sizeof the Jewish majority from among votes cast from within the Jewishpopulation alone, that is, from 90 per cent of votes cast.

Scenario A: Likud Proposal, Majority of Registered Voters Required

All Citizens: YES 60: NO 40Jewish Citizens: YES 50: NO 40Referendum Result: NO vote wins

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A PEACE REFERENDUM IN ISRAEL 97

This scenario is likely to lead to a serious legitimation crisis. Assuming aturnout similar to an election (80 per cent), to win the referendum it wouldbe necessary to achieve a majority of 62.5 per cent from among the votescast. Although both a civic and a Jewish majority from among the totalvotes cast would be obtained, the agreement would still not be approved, asit would not have attained the support of the majority of registered voters!Under these circumstances supporters of the agreement will certainly notsee the issue as closed and will most likely devote a massive political effortto organise another referendum according to different rules.

Apart from the destabilising and even paralysing effect of such a processon Israeli politics, this outcome will raise the temperature of Jewish-Arabrelations. Since the assassination of Rabin, Jewish-Arab relations in Israelhave deteriorated.63 Three days of riots in October 2000 constituted theworst disturbances in Israel's Arab sector since 1949. These disturbancescoincided with the outbreak of violence in the Palestinian Authority andwere followed by Israeli Arab involvement in terrorism for the firsttime.This situation reinforced many Israelis' perceptions of the Arabminority as a fifth column.65 In turn, this has led to a rise in support for the'transfer' of Israeli Arabs out of Israel, from 24 per cent in 1991 to 31 percent in 2002.66

Meanwhile, during the October 2000 riots 13 Arabs were shot dead byIsraeli police. This fuelled Israeli Arabs' sense of alienation, which in turnwas reflected both by their boycott of the 2001 prime ministerial electionsand the increasingly radical and (Palestinian) nationalist turn in theirpolitics.67 Against this background, Israel's Arab minority would most likelyinterpret a 'special majority' referendum as a serious deterioration of theiroverall status in Israel. In fact, it would probably be seen as a watershed. Asthe chairman of the predominantly Arab Chadash Party (Democratic Frontfor Peace and Equality) exclaimed, 'The neutralisation of the Arab vote isan invitation to civil war.'68

Even if this claim is exaggerated, it is certainly possible that the Arabminority would boycott such a referendum. As opposed to Northern Ireland,a peace referendum in Israel would not require concurrent ethnic majorities(among Jews and Arab respectively) to be perceived as legitimate.However, a boycott would raise wider questions as to the legitimacy ofIsrael within the Arab minority.

The consequences of this for the overall stability of Israeli politics arelikely to be fateful and cannot be dismissed lightly, especially when setagainst the circumstances under which 'the troubles' broke out in NorthernIreland. In the 1960s a well-educated, more independently organised,Catholic middle class had developed with some sense of 'Britishness', and

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98 CIVIL WARS

was mainly concerned with civic reforms. Disappointment at the failure ofPrime Minister Terence O'Neill to follow through on his liberal reformistrhetoric, coupled with the repressive measures taken by Unionists and laterthe British against Catholic protests, and international support generated bymedia attention, galvanised and radicalised the Catholic population.69

Similarly, Israeli Arabs have become increasingly modernised andorganisationally independent; they also developed a greater sense of Israeliidentity in the period 1976-95.™

However, they have become increasingly alienated, in part, due to thedissonance between hopes raised by the reformist policies of the Rabingovernment of 1992-95 and their disappointment with subsequentgovernments' policies. Under such circumstances, a referendum could leadto increased support for and further mobilisation of radical forces within theIsraeli Arab community, which in turn could push Israeli democracytowards a systemic crisis and 'Belfastisation'.

Scenario B: Labour Proposal, Majority of Votes Cast Required

All Citizens: YES 70-60: NO 30-40Jewish Citizens: YES 60-50: NO 30-40Referendum Result: YES vote wins

According to this scenario there are decisive civic and ethnic majorities infavour of the agreement. Such a result would almost certainly lower tensionleaving extremist groups opposed to accepting the referendum resultmarginalised and illegitimate in the eyes of the overwhelming majority ofIsraelis.

Scenario C: Labour Proposal, Majority of Votes Cast Required

All Citizens: YES 56: NO 44Jewish Citizens: YES 46: NO 44Referendum Result: YES vote wins.

This is the result most similar to the referendum result in Northern Ireland.Given the similarities between the cases, at first glance it would appear thatthe legitimacy of a peace agreement between Israel and Syria would likelybe strengthened. However, as in Northern Ireland, despite the large civicmajority, the narrow ethnic majority would probably mean that staunchopponents of the agreement would not totally concede defeat. In particular,there are likely to be problems in legitimising the implementation ofcontroversial elements of the agreement. In the Northern Ireland case theissue has been IRA decommissioning of arms; in the Israeli case, the issue

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A PEACE REFERENDUM IN ISRAEL 99

would be the evacuation of settlements. In this vein, opponents ofwithdrawal, such as National Religious Party MK Shaul Yahalom, haveargued that a narrow ethnic majority would be a problematic basis fordismantling settlements.71

This would be particularly true if public support for the agreementdropped between the date of the referendum and the set date forimplementation, for example, in the wake of terror attacks.72 Given thestrong motivation of Arab Rejectionists to prevent the institutionalisation ofan Arab-Israeli peace, this scenario is not far-fetched.

On the other hand, if public support is sustained then, based on theprecedent of the evacuation of the Sinai settlements following the 1979peace with Egypt, Israel could probably implement the agreement withoutdamaging the overall stability of its democratic system of government.

Scenario D: Labour Proposal, Majority of Votes Cast Required

All Citizens: YES 54: NO 46Jewish Citizens: YES 44: NO 46Referendum Result: YES vote wins.

This scenario, which involves a clash between a decisive civic majority infavour of the agreement and a narrow Jewish majority against an agreementis likely to provoke a major legitimation crisis, at least as potent as the crisisenvisaged in scenario A. Such a result would lead to a direct confrontationbetween the concept of liberal democracy and the ethno-nationalisticconception of the state's Jewishness adhered to by most of the population.Under these circumstances, the Arab vote will be perceived by most of theJewish population to have been the decisive factor in the victory of the 'Yes'campaign, which they would most likely view as a major threat to Israel'sJewish character. Subsequently, when the government attempts toimplement the agreement, they would probably face violent opposition byextremists, which would succeed in garnering legitimacy among broaderswathes of the Jewish public.

More generally, this scenario could erode the long-term stability ofIsraeli democracy.73 The Centre Right is, in any case, increasinglyconcerned by the rise of Post-Zionism (which seeks to denude Israel of itsJewish-Zionist character) on the Jewish Left, and the rise of extremistrhetoric by the political leaders of Israel's Arab minority. In the wake ofsuch a referendum result, they are likely to become increasingly extreme inthe defence of perceived threats to the Jewish-Zionist character of the state.In this atmosphere the extreme Right are bound to benefit as well. Thisscenario could also lead to an erosion of support for democratic norms

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TABLE 1FOUR SCENARIOS FOR A PEACE REFERENDUM IN ISRAEL.

PEACE MAJORITYREFERENDUM REQUIREDSCENARIOS

RATIO OF YES-NO VOTES

a) Total civic vote:100% of votes castby all citizensb) Total Jewishvote: 90% of votescast by all citizens

TYPE OFMAJORITYATTAINED

REFERENDUMRESULT REGARDINGPEACE AGREEMENT

CONSEQUENCES OFREFERENDUM INTERMS OF LEGITIMACY

Absolutemajority ofregistered voters(62.5% of votescast)

Civic YES 60: NO 40Jewish YES 50: NO 40

Decisive Civicmajority of votescast Decisive Jewishmajorityof votes castNarrow minority ofregistered voters

Does not pass Major legitimationcrisis

Absolute majority Civic YES 70-60: Decisive Civicof votes cast NO 40-30 majority

Jewish YES 60-50: DecisiveNO 40-30 Jewish majority

Passes Legitimacy enhanced

Absolute majority Civic YES 56: NO 44 Decisive Civicof votes cast Jewish YES 46: NO 44 majority

Narrow Jewishmajority

Passes Legitimacy achievedbut not decisively.Problems likely topersist withimplementation.

Absolute majority YES 54: NO 46 Decisive Civic Passesof voters cast Jewish YES 44: NO 46 majority Narrow

Jewish minority

Major legitimation crisis

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A PEACE REFERENDUM IN ISRAEL 101

among those sections of the population whose commitment to democraticvalues tends to be relatively weak, namely religious and traditional Jewsmany of who are from a Sephardi background.74

This would then, no doubt, trigger a reaction from both the Arab minorityand the Jewish Left. This scenario would thus lead to further polarisation byhardening the two stereotypical camps of Israeli politics with right-wing,religious, Sephardi, lower class hawks on the one side and left-wing, secular,Ashkenazi, middle-class doves on the other side. The subsequent decline ofcross-cutting cleavages would increase the difficulty of obtaining the necessarycompromises for democratic politics in Israel to function effectively. Theincentive for compromise would be reduced, as today's opposition would beincreasingly unlikely to become tomorrow's coalition partner.

CONCLUSION

In order to legitimise the Good Friday Agreement, the referendum inNorthern Ireland required not only a clear majority of votes cast but also aclear majority among both ethnic groups. The lesson for Israel is that for areferendum to legitimise a peace agreement it must obtain not only a clearmajority of votes cast but also a Jewish majority, without neutralising theinfluence of the Arab minority's vote. On this basis, only one of the fourreferendum scenarios discussed above would clearly enhance the legitimacyof a peace agreement. One scenario would partially legitimise a peaceagreement but problems would remain regarding the implementation ofcontroversial elements of the agreement, as has occurred in NorthernIreland. Two other scenarios would lead to a more general legitimationcrisis. Consequently, in contradistinction to the conventional wisdom, thisarticle argues that the threat of a legitimation crisis is too great and thatconsequently Israel should not hold a peace referendum.

Horowitz and Lissak define Israel as an 'overburdened polity'.75 Israel hasto deal with conflict with its neighbours as well as deep social divisionsbetween hawks and doves, religious and secular, Ashkenazim and Sephardim,veteran Israelis and new immigrants, and between Arabs and Jews. The twomost problematic scenarios discussed above would exacerbate these tensionsby eroding the strongest element of consensus within Israeli political culture,namely that Israel should be both a Jewish and a democratic state. The erosionof this consensus could place an intolerable strain on the democratic politicalsystem or at the very least lead to serious erosion in its ability to mediatebetween the myriad of group conflicts in Israel.

Even the under best-case scenario, a referendum is not withoutsignificant costs. A successful referendum would encourage further

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referendums. These would continuously raise the profile of the ethnic divideaffording numerous opportunities for political entrepreneurs with radicalagendas to mobilise the masses and thereby intensify the ethnic conflictbetween Jews and Arabs inside Israel. In turn, this could push Israelidemocracy towards systemic crisis.

One might argue that this problem is inherent to Israeli politics and notsignificantly affected by a referendum. In this regard, parliamentary politicsallows for a variety of political outcomes and often produces moderate orrelatively neutral groups with an interest in compromise. In contrast, areferendum presents an either/or choice with absolute consequences and nopossibility of compromise. Here again the Northern Ireland case is instructive.Part of the reason for the relative success of the Province's peace referendumwas that it mitigated the 'either/or' effect of most referendums both by beinga part of a consensual political process and by virtue of the fact that theagreement itself did not absolutely determine the core sovereignty issue. Incontrast, an Israeli peace referendum would force a far starker choice on thepublic and a decision in favour of an agreement would be virtuallyirreversible. This irreversible majoritarianism would increase the potential toturn a peace referendum in Israel into a major legitimation crisis.

NOTES

1. Author interview with Ehud Barak, 9 Feb. 2003; A. Cawthorne, 'Britain Sees NorthernIreland as Possible Blueprint for Middle East', Reuters, 6 April 2003.

2. S. Sandier and H. Ben-Yehuda, The Arab-Israeli Conflict Transformed (Albany: SUNY2002).

3. Ibid. pp. 168-76.4. B. O'Leary and J. McGarry, Explaining Northern Ireland (Cambridge: Blackwell 1995); J.

Ruane and J. Todd, The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland (Cambridge: CUP 1996).For a discussion of the nature of ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland, see B. Hayes and I.McAllister, 'Ethnonationalism, Public Opinion and the Good Friday Agreement', in J. Ruaneand J. Todd (eds.), After the Good Friday Agreement (Dublin: Univ. College Press 1999)pp.30-36. For an alternative perspective that views the essence of each conflict in terms ofcolonialism, see F. Wright, Northern Ireland: A Comparative Analysis (Dublin: Macmillan1987); Y. Peled and G. Shafir, Being Israeli (Cambridge: CUP 2002) respectively.

5. For a comparison of the two conflicts, see S. Smooha, 'The Viability of Ethnic Democracyas a Mode of Conflict Management: Comparing Israel and Northern Ireland', in T. Endelman(ed.), Comparing Jewish Societies (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press 1997) pp.267-312.

6. A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1977).7. D. Butler and A. Ranney (eds.), Referendums Around the World (Basingstoke: Macmillan

1994) pp.2-3.8. P. Goodhart, 'Referendums and Separatism', in A. Ranney (ed.), The Referendum Device

(Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute 1981) p.140.9. Ibid.

10. M. Gallagher, 'Conclusion', in M. Gallagher and P. Vincenzo-Uleri (eds.), The ReferendumExperience in Europe (NY: St Martin's Press 1996); M. Mendelsohn and F. Cutler, 'TheEffect of Referendums on Democratic Citizens', British Journal of Political Science 30/4(2000) pp.685-98.

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11. M. Qvodrup, A Comparative Study of Referendums (Manchester UP 2000) p.158.12. H. Brady and C. Kaplan, 'Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union', in I. Budge (ed.),

The New Challenge of Direct Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press 1995); B. Gamble,'Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote', American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997)pp.245-69.

13. M. Lusztig and C. Knox, 'Good Things and Small Packages: Lessons from Canada for theNorthern Irish Constitutional Settlement', Nations and Nationalism 5/4 (1999) pp.543-63.

14. L. Morel, 'Le Referendum: Etat des Recherches', Revue Française de Science Politique 42/6(1992) p.858.

15. A. Ware, Citizens, Parties and the State (Princeton UP 1987) p.114.16. K. Kobach, Switzerland', in Butler and Ranney (note 7) p.109; A. Treschel and H. Kriesi,

'Switzerland', in Gallagher and Vincenzo-Uleri (note 10) pp.185-208.17. Lusztig and Knox (note 13).18. Boagang Hi, 'Referenda as a Solution to the National-Identity Boundary Question',

Alternatives 27 (2002) p.79.19. M. Walker, The Strategic Use of Referendums (NY: Palgrave 2003).20. Brady and Kaplan (note 12) pp.199-201.21. W. Cunningham, 'Conflict Theory and Conflict in Northern Ireland', Masters thesis,

Auckland Univ. 1998. Retrieved 1 March 2000 <www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/conflict/cunningham.htm>.

22. D. Horowitz, Community Conflict: Policy and Possibilities (Coleraine: N. Ireland Centre forthe Study of Conflict 1990).

23. B. O'Leary, 'The Belfast Agreement and the British-Irish Agreement', in A. Reynolds (ed.),The Architecture of Democracy (Oxford: OUP 2002) pp.344-9.

24. G. Evans and B. O'Leary, 'Northern Irish Voters and the British Irish Agreement', PoliticalQuarterly 71/1 (2000) pp.78-101.

25. The Economist, 16 May 1998, p.60; 23 May 1998, p.19.26. Evans and O'Leary (note 24).27. Daily Telegraph, 25 April 1998.28. Draft Chronology of Events 1998 (n.d.). Retrieved 1 Dec. 2001 <www.cain.ulst.ac.uk>.29. The Scotsman, 23 May 1998.30. Ibid.31. The Economist, 30 May 1998, p. 56.32. Daily Telegraph, 24 May 1998.33. R. Wilford, 'Epilogue', in idem (ed.), Aspects of the Belfast Agreement (Oxford: OUP 2001)

p.300; M. Melaugh and F. McKenna, 'The Referendum on the 1998 Agreement'. Retrieved1 March 2000 at: <cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/refl998.htm>.

34. The Economist, 30 May 1998, p.55; Hayes and. McAllister (note 4) p.31.35. DUP Press Release, 4 March 1999.36. Evans and O'Leary (note 24). On the workings of STV, see D. Farrell, Comparing Electoral

Systems (Hemel Hempstead: Prentice-Hall 1997).37. On trends in public opinion regarding the agreement analysed from the perspective of

divisions within and between ethno-national communities, see Hayes and McAllister (note4).

38. The Guardian, 7 Jan. 2003, p.10; 2 May 2003, p.1; 2 May 2003, p.6.39. O'Leary (note 23) pp.344-9.40. H. McDonald, 'Anger Over Trimble's Irish Insult', The Observer, 10 March 2002.41. I. Lustick, Unsettled States, Disputed Lands (Ithaca, NY: Cornel UP 1993) pp.406-21.42. The analysis of the public discourse is based on articles from the following Hebrew language

newspapers: Ha 'aretz, Yediot Achronot, Maariv, Hatzofeh and Makor Rishon.43. Although the Arab population makes up 19 per cent of the total population of Israel, it

constitutes a smaller proportion of the electorate. This is due primarily to the large proportionof Arab citizens under 18.

44. D. Blander and G. Rahat, Referendum: Myth and Reality (Jerusalem: Van Leer Institute1999); Y. Hazony 'A Referendum on the Future of the Golan', Emdat Mafteach 5 (Jerusalem:Shalem Centre 1995) [Hebrew]; Ha'aretz, 2 March 2000, p.B2.

45. Maariv, 29 Feb. 2000, p.3.

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46. E. Kaufman, 'The Option of an Israeli State', in S. Olszaki-Lazar, A. Ghenem and I. Pappe(eds.), Seven Ways: Theoretical Options Regarding the Status of the Arabs in Israel (GivatHaviva: Institute for Peace Research 1999) pp.201-49 [Hebrew].

47. Yediot Achronot, Sabbath Supplement, p.11; Makor Rishon, 7 Jan. 2000, pp.14-17.48. Ha'aretz, 14 Dec. 1999, p.B2; Hatzofeh, 23 March 2000, p.9; Maari-Today section, 15 Dec.

1999, p.6; Maariv - Today section, 6 Jan. 2000, p.6; Yediot Achronot - 24 Hours section, 1March 2000, p.5; Maariv, 14 Dec. 1999, p.5; Ha'aretz, 26 Jan. 2000, p.B2; Hatzofeh, 6March 2000, p.91].

49. 'Mishal Cham', Israel Television - Channel 2, 13 Dec. 1999.50. Yediot Achronot - Shabbat Supplement, 17 Dec. 1999, p.11.51. Channel 33 (Israeli Television) 16 June 2003.52. See Maariv - Shabbat Supplement, 17 Dec. 1999, p.19; Yediot Achronot - 24 Hours section,

26 Dec. 1999, p.5; Yediot Achronot, 2 March 2000, p.1. Ha'aretz, 1 March 2000, p.B11].53. Maariv, 29 Dec. 1999; Yediot Achronot, 4 Jan. 2000, p.4; Yediot Achronot, 10 Jan. 2000, p.5.54. R. Drucker, Harakiri (Tel Aviv: Yediot Achronot 2002) [Hebrew] pp. 378-9.55. 'Gallup Poll' conducted for 'Mishal Cham' Channel 2 Television, Israel, 13 Dec. 1999;

Ha'aretz, 6 Feb. 2000, p.B4.56. Maariv - Shabbat Supplement, 3 March 2000, pp.2-3.57. A. Arian, Security Threatened (Cambridge: CUP 1995) p.23.58. A. Arian, Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2000 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for

Strategic Studies 2000).59. Regarding negotiations with the Palestinians, Barak's internal polls after the Camp David

summit in July 2000 and the presentation of the Clinton Framework in December 2000showed that a majority of 1-8 per cent of all Israelis and 9-15 per cent of Israeli Jewsopposed the two plans, Drucker (note 54) pp.378-9.

60. A. Arian, Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2001 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center forStrategic Studies 2001), p.27. The international border between Israel and Syria gives Israelsole control over the Sea of Galilee and its shoreline; however between 1948 and 1967 Syriaoccupied some Israeli territory adjacent to the Sea of Galilee, which it continues to claimsand which would give it rights over part of the Sea.

61. Ha'aretz, 28 May 1999.62. A Gallup poll put the figure at 93 per cent, Maariv - Shabbat Supplement, 3 March 2000,

pp.2-3.63. A. Ghanem and S. Smooha, The Al-Aksa Intifada among the Palestinian Citizens of Israel

(Givat Haviva: Institute for Peace Research 2001).64. A. O'Sullivan and N. Gilbert, 'Shin Bet calls for Buffer Zone', Jerusalem Post, 13 Feb.

2001; O. Nir, 'The First, But Perhaps Not the Last', Ha'aretz, 10 Sept. 2001; R. Singer,'Israeli Arabs Busted for Allegedly Building Bombs for Islamic Jihad', Ha'aretz, 1 April2003.

65. Arian, 2001 (note 61) pp.18-19.66. Ibid. pp.29-31.67. Ghanem and Smooha (note 63).68. Maariv, 13 Dec. 1999, p.7.69. J. McGarry and B. O'Leary, The Politics of Antagonism (London: Athlone 1996) pp.153-80.70. Ghanem and Smooha (note 64).71. Hatzofeh, 5 March 2000, p.7; Maariv - Shabbat Supplement, p.6.72. In the past terror attacks have consistently led to a drop in short-term support for the peace

process, Arian 1995, 2001 (notes 58, 61).73. For general assessments as to the impact of Arab-Jewish relations on the stability of Israeli

democracy, see O. Yiftachel, 'The Concept of Ethnic Democracy and its application toIsrael', Ethnic and Racial Studies 15/1 (1992) pp. 125-34; S. Smooha, 'Approaches to Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel and the Riots of October 2000', in National Security Issues 1 (June2001) pp.17-32 [Hebrew]; A. Dowty, The Jewish State (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press1998) Ch.9.

74. T. Herman and E. Yaar, Between Consent and Dissent (Jerusalem: Tami Steinmetz Centre forPeace and Israel Democracy Institute 1998)[Hebrew].

75. D. Horowitz and M. Lissak, Trouble in Utopia (Albany: SUNY 1987).

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