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Entrepreneurship as Institutional Change: Strategies of Bridging Institutional ContradictionsToke Bjerregaard and Jakob Lauring Aarhus School of Business and Social Sciences, University of Aarhus This paper responds to calls to make more explicit linkages between institutional theory and entrepreneurship research through studies on how entrepreneurs navigate and work with institutions. The research examines the micro-strategies and activities through which small-scale entrepreneurs maneuver between and exploit the mul- tiple, potentially contradictory institutional logics of the different spheres in which they operate. While much research has elucidated how institutional entrepreneurs effect change, this study illustrates how effective entre- preneurs managing and exploiting institutional contradictions engage simultaneously in practices of maintaining and changing institutions to establish a balance between the poles on which their ventures depend. We illustrate this by two cases of small-scale entrepreneurship bridging institutional contradictions from an ethnographic study conducted under the ongoing efforts to implement liberal democracy in Malawi. This transition comprises attempts to build stronger pillars for democratic governance such as the development of a market economy. Keywords: developing country; entrepreneurship; institutional contradictions; social entrepreneurship; institutional voids Introduction How reforms of institutions are accomplished by nations, organizations and individuals has become of increasing importance with the current financial and economic downturn (Battilana et al., 2009). This is not only the situation for modern economies, but also for developing countries where international and local actors face challenges in reforming institutions that hamper market activity and participation and thereby social development (Mair and Martí, 2009). While market functioning is based on certain institutions and rules, some developing countries and transition econo- mies are characterized by weak formal institutions that support market activity and ‘institutional voids’ (Puffer et al., 2009). Developing countries may lack some of the formal institutions supporting a modern market economy, yet be rich on informal institutions which may potentially, through various social sanctions, inhibit market participation (Mair and Martí, 2009). In such situations entrepreneurs are often faced with balancing different formal and informal institutions (Puffer et al., 2009). By elucidating how entrepreneurs in a developing country navigate and interact with institutional pluralism expressed in co-existing formal and informal institutions during a societal change process, this paper responds to recent calls for making more explicit linkages between institutional theory and entrepreneurship research (Garud et al., 2007; Phillips and Tracey, 2007). These two bodies of knowledge have, as observed by Tolbert et al. (2011: 1332), ‘generally remained distinct litera- tures, with the connections made more implicit than explicit’. Relatively little research has accounted for how entrepreneurs interact with the wider institutional environments and logics with which they are bound up. However, as noted by Marquis and Lounsbury (2007, p. 801), it is of high importance to recognize that ‘sensing of “entrepreneurial opportunities” is not a neutral, objective occurrence but one perhaps embedded in broader institutional dynamics involving competing logics’. There is a void in research on how individual entrepreneurs manage and exploit different, potentially contradictory institutional arrangements. Hence, the purpose of the present paper is to examine the following question: How do entrepreneurs employ different Correspondence: Toke Bjerregaard Aarhus School of Business and Social Sciences, University of Aarhus, Haslegaardsvej 10, 8210 Aarhus V, Denmark, Tel: +45 894 86687. E-mail: [email protected] European Management Review, Vol. ••, ••–•• (2012) DOI: 10.1111/j.1740-4762.2012.01026.x © 2012 EuropeanAcademy of Management Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

Entrepreneurship as Institutional Change: Strategies of Bridging Institutional Contradictions

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Entrepreneurship as Institutional Change:Strategies of Bridging

Institutional Contradictionsemre_1026 1..13

Toke Bjerregaard and Jakob LauringAarhus School of Business and Social Sciences, University of Aarhus

This paper responds to calls to make more explicit linkages between institutional theory and entrepreneurshipresearch through studies on how entrepreneurs navigate and work with institutions. The research examines themicro-strategies and activities through which small-scale entrepreneurs maneuver between and exploit the mul-tiple, potentially contradictory institutional logics of the different spheres in which they operate. While muchresearch has elucidated how institutional entrepreneurs effect change, this study illustrates how effective entre-preneurs managing and exploiting institutional contradictions engage simultaneously in practices of maintainingand changing institutions to establish a balance between the poles on which their ventures depend. We illustratethis by two cases of small-scale entrepreneurship bridging institutional contradictions from an ethnographic studyconducted under the ongoing efforts to implement liberal democracy in Malawi. This transition comprises attemptsto build stronger pillars for democratic governance such as the development of a market economy.

Keywords: developing country; entrepreneurship; institutional contradictions; social entrepreneurship;institutional voids

Introduction

How reforms of institutions are accomplished bynations, organizations and individuals has become ofincreasing importance with the current financial andeconomic downturn (Battilana et al., 2009). This is notonly the situation for modern economies, but also fordeveloping countries where international and localactors face challenges in reforming institutions thathamper market activity and participation and therebysocial development (Mair and Martí, 2009). Whilemarket functioning is based on certain institutions andrules, some developing countries and transition econo-mies are characterized by weak formal institutions thatsupport market activity and ‘institutional voids’ (Pufferet al., 2009). Developing countries may lack some ofthe formal institutions supporting a modern marketeconomy, yet be rich on informal institutions which maypotentially, through various social sanctions, inhibitmarket participation (Mair and Martí, 2009). In suchsituations entrepreneurs are often faced with balancing

different formal and informal institutions (Puffer et al.,2009).

By elucidating how entrepreneurs in a developingcountry navigate and interact with institutional pluralismexpressed in co-existing formal and informal institutionsduring a societal change process, this paper responds torecent calls for making more explicit linkages betweeninstitutional theory and entrepreneurship research(Garud et al., 2007; Phillips and Tracey, 2007). Thesetwo bodies of knowledge have, as observed by Tolbertet al. (2011: 1332), ‘generally remained distinct litera-tures, with the connections made more implicit thanexplicit’. Relatively little research has accounted forhow entrepreneurs interact with the wider institutionalenvironments and logics with which they are boundup. However, as noted by Marquis and Lounsbury (2007,p. 801), it is of high importance to recognize that‘sensing of “entrepreneurial opportunities” is not aneutral, objective occurrence but one perhaps embeddedin broader institutional dynamics involving competinglogics’. There is a void in research on how individualentrepreneurs manage and exploit different, potentiallycontradictory institutional arrangements. Hence, thepurpose of the present paper is to examine the followingquestion: How do entrepreneurs employ different

Correspondence: Toke Bjerregaard Aarhus School of Business andSocial Sciences, University of Aarhus, Haslegaardsvej 10, 8210 AarhusV, Denmark, Tel: +45 894 86687. E-mail: [email protected]

European Management Review, Vol. ••, ••–•• (2012)DOI: 10.1111/j.1740-4762.2012.01026.x

© 2012 European Academy of Management Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UKand 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

strategies to navigate and exploit multiple, potentiallycontradictory institutional logics of the different spheresin which they operate in order to facilitate entrepreneur-ial venturing? The intent is thus to give illustrativeexamples of the strategies of individual entrepreneurs inmaneuvering across contradictory institutional logics onwhich their ventures are based in a developing countryand thereby affect the institutional framework.

We suggest that one fertile line of inquiry in theemerging area of research at the interface of institutionaltheory and entrepreneurship research comprises themundane, everyday micro-activities and strategies ofentrepreneurs venturing amid multiple, potentially con-tradictory logics and how they are influenced by and, inturn, shape institutional processes. This line holdspromise to bridge two converging trends in the different,yet increasingly intersecting fields. Thus, such a line ofinquiry may enable cross-fertilization between studyingentrepreneurship as an everyday practice of recombiningresources enfolded in broader societal contexts in theentrepreneurship literature (Steyaert and Katz, 2004;Tillmar, 2006; Sarasvathy, 2007), and the movement ininstitutional theory from focusing on the institutionalentrepreneurship of powerful macro-actors to elucidat-ing individuals’ mundane, often ‘invisible’ day-to-daywork with institutions at the micro-level (Battilana andD’Aunno, 2009; Powell and Colyvas, 2008; Hallettet al., 2010; Bechky, 2011; Lawrence et al., 2011; Smetset al., forthcoming).

Moreover, since DiMaggio’s and Powell’s (1991)reintroduction of change agency to institutional theorypaved the way for a burgeoning stream of literature oninstitutional entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2009),much research has concentrated on the efforts of actorswith accomplishing changes that deviate from the estab-lished institutions in a field of action (Battilana et al.,2009). Yet, drawing inspirations from literature on strat-egies of navigating and exploiting institutional contra-dictions (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2009), we employ aconceptualization of institutional entrepreneurship thatcomplements the predominant one. Hence, we proposethat effective entrepreneurs venturing across potentiallycontradictory logics from multiple spheres are likely toundertake activities to simultaneously both stabilize andchange institutions to sustain a balance between thepoles on which their ventures depend, namely, through acreative embrace of contradictions (Hargrave and Van deVen, 2009).

This paper is based upon an ethnographic field studyconducted under the ongoing efforts to implementliberal democracy in Malawi and promote a marketeconomy as one pillar for democratic governance. Thisgave rise to a situation characterized by co-existing,potentially contradictory upcoming market institutionsand established informal cultural and social institutionsconstraining and enabling the creation and circulation of

value. Research has examined how larger organizationsin developing countries such as NGOs act as institu-tional and social entrepreneurs in promoting socialchange in the face of institutional voids and therebyenable market participation for poor people (Martí andMair, 2009). The perspective of the present studyfocuses attention on how the individual entrepreneursthemselves act as institutional entrepreneurs in dealingwith co-existing institutions in situations with extremeresource scarcity. This research illuminates how infor-mal customary practices that together with weak formalmarket institutions seemingly constitute institutionalvoids and inhibit alternative profit making practices mayas well serve as an opportunity for value generation andchange. The uses of customary practices, norms andtraditions are thus multiple, contradictory and may servenew purposes in change processes. The study illustrateshow institutional change and maintenance takes placethrough the micro-activities of numerous entrepreneurialactors (Czarniawska, 2009). We thus compare the strat-egies employed in two cases of individual entrepreneurswho cope and work with institutional contradictionsduring a societal transition phase.

The remainder of the paper first provides a literaturereview of the conceptual parts of this investigation; theo-ries on institutional entrepreneurship amid institutionalcontradictions and theories of the role of entrepreneur-ship in social change and stability. This theoreticalunderpinning is succeeded by a method section thatdelineates the research approach. Then, our theoreticalargument is illustrated by an ethnographic field study.Finally, we discuss our findings in terms of implicationsand limitations.

Conceptual background: strategies ofmanaging contradictions ofstructural overlaps

The theoretical underpinnings of this study draw inspi-ration from the theory of how actors navigate contra-dictions of multiple institutional logics and on the roleof entrepreneurship in institutional change and conti-nuity. A long tradition of research conceives of institu-tional structures as the foundation for economicsystems rather than the rational maximizing individual(Polanyi et al., 1957). Hence, to avoid rational eco-nomic explanations, change has in this tradition beenexplained on the basis of change in structural formsrather than as being founded in individual choice. Eco-nomic activities are in this perspective seen as embed-ded in broader institutional spheres and logics whichimpose various constraints and opportunities on entre-preneurial ventures and market activity (Malinowski,1922; Polanyi, 1944; Polanyi et al., 1957; Parry andBloch, 1989).

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Following Berger and Luckmann, an institution canbe understood as social practice justified by a corre-sponding norm, thus, ‘institutions posit that actions oftype X will be performed by actors of type X’ (Bergerand Luckmann, 1966: 72). Recent conceptions convey amore elaborate understanding of institutions as:

more-or-less taken-for-granted repetitive socialbehavior that is underpinned by normative systemsand cognitive understandings that give meaning tosocial exchange and thus enable self-reproducingsocial order. Institutions are characterized by lack ofovert enforcement, their survival resting upon rela-tively self-activating social processes. (Greenwoodet al., 2008)

Various formal and informal institutions enable andconstrain exchange within and across spheres of valuecirculation (Bohannan and Dalton, 1965; Barth, 1967).When formal institutions supporting market activity areweak they can be considered as ‘institutional voids’(Mair and Martí, 2009). The notion of ‘institutionalvoids’ does not denote an absence of institutions, but anabsence of formal institutions that enable market partici-pation and activity (Mair and Martí, 2009). Informalsocial or cultural institutions may fill such voids andpotentially hamper market activity by sanctioning norm-deviating behavior and are thus something that someactors may change (Mair and Martí, 2009). Early con-tributions on the institutional embeddedness of econo-mies by explaining economic change with change instructural form provided less insights into how an insti-tution’s taken-for-granted repetitive social behavior canbe changed by actors that is, how an agent, both beingpart of the system and outside the system, can affect it(Seo and Creed, 2002).

To account for how entrepreneurs manage and exploitinstitutional contradictions and thereby capitalize uponand influence institutional change and stability, thepresent research draws inspiration from the notions of(1) structural overlaps between spheres, (2) strategies ofinstitutional entrepreneurs and (3) bricolage as part of abroader historical process (Thornton et al., 2005). Asnoted by Thornton et al. (2005), more research is neededon the micro-processes through which these mecha-nisms of institutional change work.

Navigating institutional contradictions: structuraloverlaps, entrepreneurs and bricolage

To analyze how micro-processes of institutional changeand stability play out through the activities of entrepre-neurs venturing amid institutional contradictions, inspi-ration can be drawn from Barth’s (1967) theory ofentrepreneurship in social change and stability. Barthprovided an account of entrepreneurship that integratesboth institutional structures and individual actions in

change and continuity. Entrepreneurs maintain andchange social forms through their practice. Economicpractice is based on given institutional patterns and con-ceptions of value. Institutional entrepreneurs act throughalternative, innovative profit-generating practices inrelation to this social pattern and generate social andcultural change in economy and society by manipulatingand mobilizing actors and resources in the entrepreneur-ial process (Barth, 1967). Barth’s approach to entrepre-neurship may be seen as a precursor to practice theory,which conceives of everyday practice as a form ofimprovisation where people more or less strategicallywork with rules, norms and institutions using knowledgeand resources at hand to pursue their interests (Wilk andCliggett, 2007). Hence, Barth’s efforts to combine socialand material value, action and structure, continuity andchange in an account of the entrepreneurial processspeak to recent work with balancing the reciprocal rela-tionship between institution and individual agency andintegrate oppositional categories (Barley and Tolbert,1997; Jarzabkowski et al., 2009; Lawrence et al., 2011).

A shift in institutional logics is likely to take placewhen institutional entrepreneurs and structural overlapoccasion or reveal discontinuities in the meaning ofinstitutional logics of different societal sectors (Thorn-ton et al., 2005). Hence, structural overlaps betweenspheres expose actors to multiple institutional logics(Thornton et al., 2005). Such logics can be considered as‘toolkits’ (Swidler, 1986), available for actors to elabo-rate on (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton andOcasio, 2008). Institutional logics consist of organizingprinciples that spell out the vocabularies of motive andare based on different conceptions of value (Friedlandand Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2005). An institutionallogic refers to the cultural content of institutions (Thorn-ton and Ocasio, 2008). It denotes a means-end relation-ship (Boxenbaum and Battilana, 2005), namely, theappropriate means to achieve a given goal in an institu-tional sphere. When institutions promote logics that arecharacterized by a dynamic tension between polar oppo-sites that are interdependent they constitute institutionalcontradictions (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2009). Anexample of such a structural contradiction is a tensionbetween a logic emphasizing individual freedom and acollectivistic logic (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2009). Insuch situations actors may devise different strategies tomanage institutional contradictions (Hargrave and Vande Ven, 2009).

Yet, much extant research has examined how institu-tional entrepreneurs make use of institutional logics topromote change within a field by transposing institu-tional elements or logics between fields (Martí and Mair,2009). Comparatively less research has illuminated thestrategies of those actors that operate in different spheressimultaneously where they, according to Martí and Mair(2009), at the same time have to juggle and navigate

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multiple and often contradictory logics. However, thereis a need for more research on the challenges faced andskills needed by actors operating across societal spheresand contradictory logics (Martí and Mair, 2009). This isoften a characteristic of entrepreneurship, which in thewords of Barth:

frequently involves the relationship of persons andinstitutions in one society with those of an other [. . .]and the entrepreneur becomes an essential “broker” inthis situation of culture contact. But in the mostgeneral sense, one might argue that in the activities ofthe entrepreneur we may recognize processes whichare fundamental to questions of social stability andchange, and that their analysis is therefore crucial toanyone who wishes to pursue a dynamic study ofsociety (Barth 1967: 3).

Broader historical processes shape how actorsbecome exposed to structural overlaps (Sewell, 1992;Ortner, 2006). Such historical processes thus affecthow structural overlap provides access to differentinstitutional logics, which institutional entrepreneursthrough different strategies may transform into actionsthat maintain stability or initiate change. When actorsare exposed to the logics of multiple sectors they havethe opportunity to hybridize institutions (Thorntonet al., 2005). This notion of the potential generativecapacity of entrepreneurship in institutional changeconveys a notion of innovation that echoes JosephSchumpeter’s (1934) seminal conception of entrepre-neurship (Hwang and Powell, 2005; Sarasvathy, 2007;Mair and Martí, 2009). For Schumpeter (1934: 68),‘development consists primarily in employing existingresources in a different way, in doing new things withthem, irrespective of whether those resources increaseor not’.

In summary, in the practice-based perspective takenhere, social continuity and change is the product of anarticulation process occurring at the macro-level ofstructuring structures as well as at the level of entrepre-neurs’ transformative praxis (Comaroff, 1985; Sewell,1992). Social continuity and reorganization takes placethrough a dialectical articulation process of institutionalstructure and action which may create a syncretisticbricolage (Lévi-Strauss, 1966; Comaroff, 1985). Sucha bricolage includes both a reproduction of existinginstitutions and a change with the introduction of newelements, that is, a joining together of distinct systems -themselves dynamic orders of practice and meaning. Byusing and recombining the institutional logics andresources at hand (Baker and Nelson, 2005), brokerspositioned in structural overlaps in this articulationprocess may partake in the construction of new institu-tional forms of legitimate social and economic action.This dialectic of social systems and entrepreneurialpractice continuously reproduces or transforms spheres

of value circulation and channels of conversion andthereby shapes the strategic agency of the entrepreneur(Barth, 1967).

The approach outlined is grounded on a concernto decipher social patterns-in-the-making, portrayingsociety as a continuous accomplishment and connectingdifferent levels of analysis (Gluckman, 1955; Velsen,1967; Barth, 1981; Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999;Burawoy, 2009). In the following sections we illustratethe value of this perspective by use of an ethnographicfield study of the strategies through which small busi-ness entrepreneurs cope with and exploit the institu-tional contradictions forming the basis for social andeconomic changes in the wider societal context. Thestudy illuminates the micro processes of structuraloverlap, entrepreneurship and emergent new structures(bricolage) as part of broader historical processes. Thisis done by examining individual entrepreneurs’ strate-gies of balancing two co-existing, yet potentially incon-sistent logics on which their ventures are based during asocietal transition phase, namely, a social logic of redis-tribution and a market logic of accumulation and indi-vidual profit making.

Methodology

The ethnographic field study is a near insider approachthat allows researchers to gain a deep understanding ofa social setting. Only scant research in the entre-preneurship field uses ethnographic methods (Lindh deMontoya, 2000). However, the approach is highly usefulfor the purpose of this study as it allows us to portrayentrepreneurial actions not merely as illustrative of iden-tified institutional patterns but as constitutive of suchpatterns (Barth, 1967; Velsen, 1967; Evens and Handel-man, 2006).

Data collection

Ethnographic studies generally use a combination ofdifferent data sources such as participant observation,semi-structured interviews and text material. In this casea five-month full-scale field study was conducted by oneassociate researcher. Other members of the researchgroup have been involved in analyses and discussion ofquestions and results.

An ethnographic approach is generally open to find-ings that could not be anticipated in an out-of-contextsituation. Hence, the research started out with verygeneral questions on the strategies of entrepreneurs insituations where competing logics exist, such as westerncapitalism vs. local redistribution structures. During thecourse of the study, more specific questions concerninglocal production and trade as well as the role of witch-craft developed from conversations with villagers.

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The study relied heavily on participant observationgenerally understood as attentive involvement in thedaily life of the community. When using participantobservation the ideal for the researcher is to reach theability to recognize and understand the social organiza-tion of interaction. This provides an opportunity to reg-ister processes producing and reproducing socialcategories applied at the scene (Brubaker, 2002). Villag-ers were told that the researcher was interested in theentrepreneurial activities. However, the researcher triedgenerally to keep as low a profile as possible and notto ask questions or perform actions that would createsocial behavior in others that would not have occurredordinarily and thereby bias observations. Through obser-vation and participation, research questions were devel-oped, changed or focused upon, in relation to theinformants. For example, the particular role of occultforces in entrepreneurial activities was not anticipated.Participant observation also included informal conversa-tion and questions that arose spontaneously during dailyinteraction. Another purpose of participant observationwas to gain the trust of the villagers without which manyquestions, such as the ones regarding witchcraft, wouldnot be answered correctly. Hence, participant observa-tions helped us to map implicit and sensitive aspects ofvillage life.

To supplement observations, semi-structured inter-views were conducted with most families of the villageand with individual key informants (Bernard, 1995). Allin all, more than 100 individuals contributed to the datamaterial. The interviewer generally tried to guide theconversations based on a standard set of questions.However, informants were encouraged to raise anddiscuss a variety of additional, related topics as well.Physically, the interviews took place in open spaces or invillagers’ houses and lasted between one and two hours.To minimize the effects of the setting, in order to avoidelite bias, individuals from different levels of the smallsociety were interviewed.

Early results were continuously discussed and cross-checked with different key informants. Two interpreterswere used to assist during the interviews. Due to theirsocial contacts and local knowledge they had a substan-tial influence on the final results. The interpreters’ state-ments and explanations, however, were continuouslycross-checked. Hence, interviews were used to discussactivities observed in the village as well as to register thedifferent voices of various members of the local setting.Finally, text materials and national statistics were usedin order to gain a good understanding of the context.

Data analysis

Analysis of the data was guided by the notion that it isthe connection with empirical reality that permits thedevelopment of a relevant and valid theory (Van

Maanen, 1988). Thus, the aim was to tell a story basedon the analysis of central themes. The analysis followedthe steps described by Spradley (1980) and involveddetailed close reading and coding of field notes, inter-view transcripts and documents, which led to the devel-opment of relatively rich descriptions of the researchsite. These descriptions helped to identify key aspects ofentrepreneurial practices. By use of the qualitativeanalysis program Nvivo, the data was sorted. The codeddata provided examples of how entrepreneurs cope andwork with institutional contradictions. In the analysis theresearcher relied on triangulation of data wherever it waspossible to check the validity of statements obtainedfrom interviews and observations. The reporting onlyincludes data substantiated over multiple informationsources.

Research site and socioeconomic context

The research project was finalized in 2005 while most ofthe data collection was carried out in 2002 under theongoing efforts to implement liberal democracy inMalawi which were initiated in 1995, and hence duringa fragile institutional transition process. This transitioncomprises attempts to build stronger pillars for demo-cratic governance such as the development of a marketeconomy. From 1891 Malawi came under the BritishEmpire. In 1964 it had its first election after which itbecame independent. Hastings Kamuzu Banda wasabsolute president and dictator from 1964. However,during the famine in 1992, the church and many Malaw-ians increasingly criticized the system. In 1994 the firstfree election was held. In 1995 Malawi passed a newconstitution which ensured multi-party democracy(Larney, 2001). Ninety percent of Malawi’s populationlives in rural areas (Larney, 2001). Like many otherdevelopment countries Malawi is rich on informal insti-tutions, but less so on formal institutions that support amodern market economy (Mair and Martí, 2009).Malawi’s democratization project is characterized byinstitutional fragility. The country has practically comeunder the administration of international actors whoinfluence the formulation of national policies and pro-grams, and the international development industry isstrongly present in the country.

The village of Mitengo was chosen due to knowledgeabout the social and political situation and the locallanguage Chichewa. Previously, work for a nearbypoverty alleviation organization operating micro-creditprograms showed that the organization believed thatlocal, customary practices, norms and myths impededeconomic and social development by, for instance,restricting women from participation in value-generating activities outside the house and demotivatingpeople from undertaking innovative value-generatingactivities. Hence, from the perspective of the NGO,

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economic practice was impeded by institutional voidsexpressed in occult forces which functioned as a lever-aging sanction and maintained the established socialorder. Behavior associated with the accumulation ofwealth and power is deemed anti-social according to theestablished social logic of rights and obligations requir-ing redistribution and increases the risk of being exposedto witchcraft as a result of jealousy. Witchcraft is thus asanction that is activated by the observation of a practiceof exchange that breaks with the logic of the conven-tional distribution structure. Witchcraft has a levelingcharacter in relation to the power and resource distribu-tion. Coming back to the area a few years later to carryout the ethnographic study, it was deliberately chosennot to gain access to the field through this social entre-preneur in order to be able to break with its representa-tions of the local economic practices and institutionsgoverning them. This was decided in order to get closerto the actual perceptions and strategies of the poorinforming their economic practice. Moreover, beingassociated with an NGO could limit the access to certainkinds of information among the poor. According toseveral informants, access to start-up capital and hencemarket participation is hampered by a long history ofwestern intervention comprising 50 years of Britishcolonial administration, western support to the dictatorduring the cold war and the international developmentindustry which is currently numerously present inMalawi leading to a lack of belief in their own resourcesand abilities. The field worker partly stayed with afamily in Mitengo. However, due to a situation withextreme resource scarcity and a death per week it wasdecided to partly stay with a comparatively wealthierfamily in the outskirts of Mitengo as well.

Out of the 500 inhabitants in the village of Mitengo,the majority belonged to the Chewa tribe. However,migrations from other parts of the country and fromZimbabwe or Mozambique lead to an increasingnumber of outsiders settling down in the area. Tradi-tionally, the distribution of land has been guided bysocietal structures of inherited status and followingsocial obligations as leveling mechanisms – wealthyinhabitants were obliged to assist relatives, friends andneighbors. Through his power to distribute land, thechief traditionally was the top administrator of theexchange of value. In recent years this position hasincreasingly been replaced by market forces. Moreland is now available on the financial market, and gov-ernment institutions are continuously taking over largerparts of authority previously held by the chief. In addi-tion, villagers are feeling less obliged to follow the tra-dition of financially supporting the less fortunatehouseholds and relatives in the immediate surround-ings. Hence, these developments occasion a structuraloverlap of the market logic of individual profit makingand accumulation and a social logic of redistribution

and loyalty to social reproductive needs (Friedland andAlford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2005).

The primary income of the villagers comes frommaize production, but due to the scarcity of land, addi-tional sources of income are necessary for most inhab-itants. First, this can be seasonal farm labor, often paid inprovisions such as maize. Second, it can be trade ofhandiwork or prostitution in the city, as an example.Third, it can be the production of goods such as bricks,beer, etc. There are, however, certain types of trade andproduction that are especially nurturing entrepreneurialventures in Mitengo - such as the trade of meat, wood,hardware, foreign medicine or credit, and the productionof tobacco, furniture and textiles. These types of busi-nesses generate a relatively larger surplus compared tothe conventional small-scale business, but also assume amore substantial start-up capital and a higher risk.

Results: strategies of navigatingcontradictory logics inentrepreneurial venturing

The market logic of accumulation has been gaining instrength and is increasingly replacing the establishedsocial logic of rights and obligations in redistribution.Hence, money is achieving a steadily more central posi-tion in Mitengo’s system of value circulation. This isboth conditioned by and results in changes in the localpower and distribution structure as the market is beingdistanced from local power institutions. As explained bya local villager:

Nowadays, I tell you, there is no one who doesn’t likemoney. Everybody is working to have money. Every-one is looking for money. I tell you. [. . .] And peoplekill each other for money, I tell you. Not only bymagic. Even killing, reality killing.

In order to create a space for exchange in the systemof value circulation, the entrepreneur must act as abroker between the opposing logics in the articulationprocess, which serves as a basis for the changing posi-tion of money and market in the system. Through theinteraction between macro-institutional structures andentrepreneurial practice, different spheres of value cir-culation are maintained and changed. Questions ofimportance to social stability and change are thus highlyreflected in the entrepreneurial process.

The tobacco entrepreneur: a strategy of legitimizationthrough social engagement

Mr. Mossa is the only farmer making a living fromgrowing tobacco. This is the reason for people in thevillage to call him ‘Tobacco Man’. He is Chewa, born in

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Mitengo, and in accordance with tradition, he has inher-ited his land from his mother’s brother. The TobaccoMan is retired from a job at a large commercial tobaccoplantation, which provided him with a knowledge ofgrowing tobacco which is uncommon in Mitengo.

Being a local farmer, the Tobacco Man attracts capitalto the village and distributes it through social obligationand a demand for labor. In addition, Mr. Mossa is veryactive in the local community. He is a member of theCatholic Church, the government party UDF, connectedto the chiefdom as a substitute for his brother andfounder and an important financial contributor to theMitengo school. The Tobacco Man is the only person inMitengo who is a member of all authoritative institu-tions, and he has achieved these positions mainly due tostrategic financial investments in important social rela-tions. In the afternoon, the Tobacco Man could beobserved walking through the villages in order to nursehis local contacts having conversations with otherimportant members of institutions in the area. A familymember describes the Tobacco Man thus:

He is very influential and he knows everybody. He isalmost the oldest member of our church. He is also amember of UDF (the government party). Earlier, UDFand the church were far apart but this is changing. Ithink this is also because of Mr. Mossa. The townchairman is his relative. So you see he is everywhere.

By growing tobacco, Mr. Mossa is bridging thepresent divide between commercial large-scale planta-tion farming and the common local subsistence farming.Consequently, he is able to save money in the bank,which is rather unusual in the local area. In Mitengoprivate land is usually only used for growing maize andother food crops, but after changes, due to the democra-tization and privatization process after 1994, he was ableto utilize the openings between the authority of thechiefdoms and the new, emerging market economy. Asthe Tobacco Man notes himself: ‘If you see possibilitiesfor business you should also use them because you havethe chance to do something that is good that may other-wise not be done’. Hence, the Tobacco Man is one of thefew villagers not complaining about the expanding roleof the money economy and the centrality taken by theinstitutional logic of the market in the system of valuecirculation.

Through his specialized production, which is basedon his education and experience from previous employ-ment as well as the changing economic conditions on anational level, the Tobacco Man is bridging differentinstitutional domains, since he utilizes the new opportu-nity of exchanging money for positions in the powerfulinstitutions. Thereby, the Tobacco Man is trying to inte-grate market forces into the traditional hierarchy – andbuilding a bridge between the traditional, social logic ofrights and obligations requiring redistribution and the

new logic of market exchange and accumulation. Basedon the new rules of privatization, he is now able to growtobacco; generating profit that can be invested to acquirepower in relation to the traditional hierarchy, the Churchand the government party.

The Tobacco Man, according to himself, is not beingan entrepreneur to generate wealth solely to make lifeeasy for himself. On the contrary, he is sharing his eco-nomic surplus with the family and the different socialinstitutions. Mr. Mossa has all his relatives living inMitengo and highly prioritizes his financial obligationsto them. During interviews none of his relativesexpressed any negative emotions toward him - whichwas rather uncommon, when speaking of wealthy familymembers. Thereby, he is still subordinating himself totraditional normative patterns of rights and obligationsto add legitimacy to economic action. Yet, in order tofollow the social logic of redistribution, he must requireprofits from tobacco production and embrace the logicof accumulation. His success as an entrepreneur thusdemands that he can embrace the interdependent, yetcontradictory logics on which his venture is based.

The business credit and housing entrepreneur: astrategy of local social distancing

As a member of the Ngoni tribe in Zimbabwe, Gossawas an outsider to Mitengo. In the 1980s he left hishome country and most of his relatives in search for newopportunities in Malawi. In Mitengo he asked the chieffor a piece of land that he paid for from his own account.As described by an individual close to the chief:

You know, he got all his land from paying money. Alarge area. This land was supposed to be passed on tosomeone else, but the chief gave it to him.

This transaction was possible only because Gossa was anewcomer and because he hid the transaction with thechief. By using concealment along with money toacquire a resource traditionally only available throughthe local hierarchy of inherency and social obligations,Gossa was bridging different normative spheres.

Gossa is solely supporting his own children, hismother in law and his wife’s brother, and he does notengage in social obligations outside the immediatefamily. Accordingly, as an outsider, he is able to putpriority on new investments at the expense of financialobligations to his kinsmen. Gossa thus, has a differentapproach to this practice compared to the Tobacco Man.As a consequence of his entrepreneurial activities, he isthe wealthiest inhabitant of Mitengo. He has much land,a car, a motorcycle and a large house with a fence and aniron gate, and he owns several apartment houses in thevillage and in the nearby town.

The main part of his surplus Gossa generates fromcredit business and from rental housing. This is unique

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to the area, since it is highly unusual to generate profitfrom relations to people with less resources than oneself.Traditionally, the system of social obligations is direct-ing the flow of money the other way around.

Gossa, however, is not interpreting the norm of socialobligation the way it has usually been conceived inMitengo. When people ask him for money, he, instead,offers them a loan and thereby actively utilizes the tra-dition of social obligation to expand his business area.As he explains: ‘If you just give and give and give thenno one will work. Many people are very lazy in theirnature. If they do not see the reason to work they will notdo it’. Hence, Gossa tries not to discourage the hard-working individuals, thus promoting entrepreneurialactivities throughout the village. In this way Gossa isintegrating the existing logic of rights and obligationsinto the new market economy and thereby brokeringbetween two oppositional, institutional structures ofvalue distribution.

Gossa’s strategy is made possible due to the fact thathe actively distances himself from social relations in thearea. He does not give in to people’s ‘begging’ and heonly opens the large iron gate for very few of his fellowvillagers. As a villager argues: ‘He will not make anyfriends here because he loves money and he is afraidthey will ask him for something’. Accordingly, it couldbe observed that every day he would take his motorbikeand drive to the nearby town where he had his friends.

The two entrepreneurs are bridging social and eco-nomic spheres in the sense that they operate across theembedded contradiction of the social and economicchange processes. Experiences (from an earlier job and aforeign background) of the entrepreneurs are the basis ofa knowledge differentiation and an understanding ofnew logics of value and exchange. This knowledge isused in the exploration of the already initiated changesof the value circulation in Mitengo. Linked to opportu-nities and financial surplus, however, is also the risk ofenvy and social sanctions. In contrast to the entrepre-neurial activity of the Tobacco Man who holds estab-lished, powerful positions within different institutionsand is thus highly embedded within them, but is stillboth a curator and creator of institutional order, Gossa’sentrepreneurial practice has relatively limited changecapacity as it is not to the same degree integrated into thedifferent social fields.

The role of witchcraft in maintaining and transformingsocial structure

Witchcraft is an example of how established social struc-tures may affect the entrepreneurial process making it adialectical rather than a linear process including broadersocietal structures. Confronted with the notion of witch-craft, all informants to begin with deny its existence, butafter being assured that the researchers do not find it

ridiculous or unchristian to acknowledge the powers ofthe supernatural, all informants can describe situationswhere friends or relatives have used or been affected bywitchcraft. As one local inhabitant argues, witchcraft oroccult forces are real:

Magic is science. Because, if we talk of magic, wetalk of something that is there. But for one to under-stand it, he has to use all his wisdom and all hisintelligence to understand it or to discover it. [. . .]Africans have their own science, the azungus (whitepeople) have their own science, the azungus have theirown magic.

Behavior associated with the accumulation of wealthand power is deemed anti-social according to the estab-lished social logic of rights and obligations and increasesthe risk of being exposed to witchcraft as a result of envy.Witchcraft is thus a sanction that is activated by theobservation of a practice of exchange that breaks with theinstitutional logic of the conventional distribution struc-ture. Witchcraft has a leveling character in relation to thepower and resource distribution. In different terms, therisk of envy is particularly high when individuals accu-mulate power and material resources that are in opposi-tion to the established normative sphere of rights andobligations. As mentioned by an informant: ‘If you havesomething that other people would also like to have theycan easily be very jealous. Then they sometimes usewitchcraft to harm you’. Hence, if one owns a car in anarea where people are starving, it is seen as a proof thathe is not facing his social obligations. Instead, he shouldshare his property with relatives and others in need. Asnoted by a villager: ‘Jealousy comes from the way youhandle people. We share with people when they haveproblems, so we don’t have to be afraid of jealousy’.

Mankwala can be described as a witchcraft prophy-laxis that can protect against all risks. Access toMankwala-protection, however, is dependent on financeand relations to a trustworthy Singanga or witch doctor.Apart from protection through counter-witchcraft, altru-istic behavior and concern for social relationships is alsobelieved to provide protection. As one villager put it: ‘Ifyou do good things that help others, that will make it moredifficult for the evil witch doctors to use magic. Then theywill have to use very strong ways to get to you’.

Entrepreneurs obviously are highly exposed to witch-craft as a result of envy and need strong protection.Gossa’s norm-breaking venture is conditioned by andmaintains a need for social relations outside the localarea. He consciously excludes himself from interactionwith the other villagers by building iron walls around hishouse. He explains that because many villagers cannotpay back what they owe him, they might try to harm himthrough witchcraft. To Gossa, Mankwala is the mostimportant protection from witchcraft, even though it isexpensive because he has much property to protect and it

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heightens the need for individual profit making. Theprotective devices that Gossa is using against witchcraft(Mankwala, secrecy and social distance) all need accessto money. With money he can buy himself Mankwala andfree himself of social relations in Mitengo while nursinghis friendship with more wealthy friends and businesscontacts in town. Gossa himself is also frequently sus-pected of using witchcraft in his prospering venture.

To a much higher extent the Tobacco Man follows astrategy of attending to his social obligations in accor-dance with the established institutional logic of valuecirculation in order to legitimize his alternative profit-generating practice and reduce the risks of jealousy andwitchcraft accusations. He is socially active in the localcommunity. He shares his wealth with relatives, supportsthe school and has no walls around his house. To face hissocial obligations he needs money, which is why he,according to himself, produces tobacco. But that alonedoes not totally free him from envy. He is making a finesurplus on his tobacco production and people have startedto wonder why he cannot afford a car. A number ofinformants even mention that they suspect he is spendinghis money on witchcraft by employing zombies to workfor him, which explains why he can generate suchunusual wealth. As a neighbor expresses it: ‘He had a joband he could easily have bought a vehicle, but instead hebought ndondoches [zombies to work for him]’. Anothervillager states that ‘everyone knows it. Even the childrenknow that he is keeping four or five ndondoches in hishouse’. Hence, a nephew notes that ‘he is working there inthe tobacco by himself, but there are many.You just can’tsee them’. The Tobacco Man is thus dependent on con-tinuously legitimizing his entrepreneurial practice inrelation to the social logic of redistribution to gain accessto labor and local resources. Likewise, people believeGossa only thinks about profit and employs numerousndondoches that work at night in his fields. The conse-quence of such jealousy is that people may move awayfrom him or not undertake work for him.

The Tobacco Man and Gossa legitimize their interestin individual profit by a concern for social relationshipsand by basing their ventures on the established logic ofsocial rights and obligations. They thus use the estab-lished logic and value conception on which the tradi-tional system of value circulation is based to legitimizetheir alternative profit-making practice. Gossa justifieshis lack of assistance to the villagers by arguing that theyneed to learn how to take care of themselves. TheTobacco Man, on the contrary, legitimizes his motive forgenerating profit through alternative practices by a socialinterest and an urge to support his relatives, the schooland other institutions in Mitengo. The entrepreneurs,however, do not achieve full social acceptance of theirventures in the local area. Due to legitimacy concerns,they face suspicion or envy in their social surroundings.In consequence, they are accused of being concerned

with individual material needs at the expense of theresponsibility for social relations in accordance with theestablished logic of the system of rights and obligations.Furthermore, they are accused of using witchcraft toreach their needs.

The two local entrepreneurs mention jealousy as anexplanation for the resistance they face in the local com-munity. To them, jealousy indicates traditionalism, igno-rance and inactivity. Yet, there is a substantial differencein the way the entrepreneurs and villagers interpret anduse the witchcraft terminology to handle the conflictualstructural contradictions in the change process. Hence, itis used both as a measure to resist change and as ameasure to integrate new forms of exchange and valueconceptions depending on the positions of actors in rela-tion to the structural overlap between the systems. To theentrepreneurs, witchcraft is a way to explain the resis-tance they meet in the village. According to the entre-preneurs, jealousy is the foundation for social exclusionand is a reason for non-entrepreneurs to direct evil forcesagainst those who know how to integrate changes intheir economic and social practices. They use theirsocial interest as well as possible exposure to evil forcesto explain and legitimize their need for alternative profitmaking. The risk of witchcraft and the measures toreduce that risk increase the demand for individual eco-nomic profit and integrating market forces. The villag-ers, on the contrary, use the term witchcraft to explainthe entrepreneurs’ unusual ability to create profit by useof ndondoches. Hence, witchcraft operates on both sidesof the contradictory relationships of the change processin Mitengo through the different ways people experienceand use the new structural conditions.

The relation between entrepreneurship, the estab-lished logic of social obligations and the upcoming logicof market exchange and witchcraft is interrelated. Thetwo cases show how the entrepreneurs through theiralternative profit-oriented practice contribute to integrat-ing new institutional structures of exchange with regardto social rights and obligations into the existing systemof value circulation. Thereby, the traditional informalsystem of social leveling and sanctions is slowlychanged. Hence, entrepreneurship in Mitengo is condi-tioned by the entrepreneurs being able to base theirventures on existing institutional structures and logicsand at the same time building bridges to upcoming insti-tutions. The entrepreneur, in other words, has to bridgethe paradoxes that form the basis for changes in thecontext – also in relation to the perception of witchcraftthat is integrated into such a process.

Discussion

This paper sets out to examine how individual entrepre-neurs cope with and exploit institutional contradictions

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to facilitate entrepreneurial venturing that draws uponand generates institutional change and maintenance. Thestudy answers calls for more research on how entrepre-neurs interact with the broader institutional environ-ments and logics with which they are bound up with andthus research at the intersections of the institutional andentrepreneurship literatures (Hwang and Powell, 2005;Tillmar, 2006; Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007; Phillipsand Tracey, 2007; Sarasvathy, 2007). The cases serve toshed light on entrepreneurial processes that are notpurely restricted to business but pertain to societal issues(Steyaert and Katz, 2004; Steyaert and Hjorth, 2006;Klein et al., 2010). Moreover, the research illuminatesthe relatively under-researched role of individuals ininstitutional change and continuity (Battilana, 2006;Reay et al., 2006; Battilana et al., 2009). The studyarticulates calls for more research on how actors copeand work with institutional multiplicity in micro-practice (Zilber, 2011). More particularly, the studyillustrates how institutional change and maintenancetakes place through the micro-activities of numerousentrepreneurial actors on which institutions depend(Czarniawska, 2009).

This study responds to calls for research on the micro-processes and strategies through which institutionalentrepreneurs exploit structural overlaps betweenspheres and logics and generate bricolage (Thorntonet al., 2005). Hence, the findings illustrate how institu-tional and stability change occur in the nexus of struc-tural overlaps and entrepreneurs’ strategies of managingcontradictions between logics. Situated in the structuraloverlap between spheres, the entrepreneurs presented inthis paper are brokers between the logic of accumulationcharacterizing market capitalism and the social logic ofredistribution which sanctions deviating accumulativepractices (Thornton et al., 2005). These processes ofbrokering between different logics and conceptions ofvalue are part of a broader historical articulation thatreaches beyond the local community (Comaroff, 1985;Thornton et al., 2005). The Tobacco Man, in contrast toGossa, used his central positions and embeddednesswithin different institutions to facilitate social changeand entrepreneurship. The findings thus contribute withinsight into how embeddedness of actors (Seo andCreed, 2002), in established positions in institutions notmerely works as a possible constraint to be overcome butmay potentially serve as a resource to be drawn upon infacilitating entrepreneurship and effecting change (Reayet al., 2006). Hence, they elucidate the significance ofsocial dimensions to entrepreneurs such as embedded-ness in local communities and broader spheres (Dahland Sorensen, 2009; Marquis and Battilana, 2009).

Much previous research has suggested that much pre-vious research has suggested that institutional entrepre-neurs create institutions and incumbents maintain them(Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; Hargrave and Van de

Ven, 2009). Yet, the present research supports the obser-vation by Hargrave and Van de Ven (2009) that success-fully navigating institutional contradictions, actors mustlikely engage simultaneously in practices of institutionalstabilization and change. Hargrave and Van de Ven(2009: 129) note that ‘the simultaneous embrace of con-tradictory poles can stimulate creativity and innovation’.Thus, negating one pole of a contradiction, they argue,can lead to adverse consequences by generating pressureto satisfy the contradictory pole. The entrepreneursdeveloped strategies to keep a contradictory positioningin mind between poles by a ‘both/and approach’ to man-aging contradictions (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2009).The contradictions constitute the foundation for theirentrepreneurial ventures. The entrepreneurs thus striveto maintain a balance between poles as both are neces-sary for sustaining their ventures. Their entrepreneurialpractice serves to maintain institutional forms throughsocial redistribution and change institutions by integrat-ing new value conceptions and practices. Yet, while theTobacco Man, as both a curator and creator of institu-tions, attempts to embrace and exploit the tensionbetween the two contradictory logics by, for instance,reinvesting some of the economic profit in social rela-tions, Gossa to a higher extent tends to negate the sociallogic of redistribution and seals himself off from localsocial relations. Both of them, however, continuouslyneed to legitimize and balance their entrepreneurialpractice in relation to both logics of individual profit andcollective responsibility and convert resources betweenthem. Entrepreneurial venturing amid contradictorylogics may thus be said to involve the creative embraceand exploitation of dynamic tensions between contradic-tory institutions (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2009).Moreover, the study illustrates how effective institu-tional agency involves mutually reinforcing efforts atvarious levels as proposed by Hargrave and Van de Ven(2009). The Tobacco Man, for instance, is brokeringbetween the two logics not only through the day-to-dayinteractions in his entrepreneurial venturing of generat-ing profit from tobacco production but also in relation tofriends and family, the church, the traditional hierarchyand the political party.

The entrepreneurs are institutional brokers in thearticulation of the oppositions forming the basis for thechanges in the context. As shown in the case, the relationbetween entrepreneurship, social obligations and cul-tural institutions – in this case witchcraft - is dialectical.The two entrepreneurs, through their alternative profit-oriented practices, contribute to the integration of newstructures of exchange with regard to social rights andobligations into the existing system of value circulation.Thereby, the traditional system of social leveling andsanctions is changing. The entrepreneur, in other words,has to bridge the contradictions that form the basis forchanges in the context - also in relation to the percep-

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tions of witchcraft that are integrated into such a process.The entrepreneurial ventures are conditioned by operat-ing in the current institutional structures of exchange(logics of redistribution through social relations and net-works) as well as in upcoming spheres (logics of inde-pendent market forces). Thereby, the entrepreneur isactively reproducing and transforming the social struc-tures in the surroundings.

Thus, on the one hand, the field study shows that thetwo entrepreneurs are faced with inertia and frictions inthe institutional setting in which they operate. On theother hand, the two entrepreneurs do not take inertiaand barriers in the institutional setting for granted. Theyactively use contradictory logics, separating differentsocial and economic spheres, to create new channelsof exchange. They convert barriers of exchange tochannels of exchange through their bridging of con-tradictions. Sánchez and Ricart (2010) report thatentrepreneurs in emerging markets such as larger cor-porations either rely on a strategy of developing simpleproducts that require no ecosystem or create the eco-systems themselves by integrating and linking parts ofthe missing ecosystem. As illustrated by the presentstudy, the strategy of integrating and linking missingparts of the ecosystem may be common to both largercorporations in emerging economies as well as indi-vidual, small-scale entrepreneurs.

From Barth (1967, 1981) we learn that entrepreneur-ship is a process of bridging existing institutional struc-tures and upcoming structures. His focus on thedialectical movement between societal structure andmicro agency provides an account of the entrepreneurialprocess including both individual entrepreneurial actorsand social structures in a dynamic and dialectic fashion.Rather than merely impeding economic action as insti-tutional voids, established informal institutions and cus-tomary practices were also used to legitimize alternativevalue generation. A local micro-credit organization heldbeliefs that customary practices and myths impede eco-nomic development and practice, as occult forces, suchas witchcraft, through social control maintain an egali-tarian social structure. Yet, the study illustrates how cus-tomary practices and beliefs not merely served asconstraints but held a capacity for individual value gen-eration. Hence, the study illustrates that norms andbeliefs associated with witchcraft are not merely tradi-tionalistic and retrospective resistance to change butmultiple, dynamic and part of modern and global devel-opments (Geschiere, 1997).

This study is not without limitations. It is an explor-ative investigation of institutional entrepreneurship inone country, in one location. Moreover, the study isundertaken in a developing country and in a situation ofextreme resource scarcity and poverty that may differfrom industrialized nations in many respects. Hence, thefindings of this study may be less generalizable to such

industrialized forms of institutional entrepreneurship.Yet, comparative studies of how entrepreneurs navigateinstitutional contradictions constitute a fertile venue forfurther research that may yield new insight into theunderexplored intersection of entrepreneurship researchand theories of institutions.

Practical implications for (institutional) entrepreneursmay be somewhat premature due to the exploratory char-acter of the study. Nevertheless, increasing the awarenessof challenges connected to entrepreneurship in develop-ing countries may be a first step toward addressing them.The findings suggest that entrepreneurship cannot betaken as a neutral and value-free process but may becomesubject to institutional sanctions. Participating in entre-preneurial processes may therefore require multipleinstitutional or social skills in order to mobilize or gainlegitimacy from other actors to initiate norm-challengingentrepreneurship as well as, for instance, establishingnew forms of legitimate practice in society. Moreover, tohandle the contradiction between stability and change,entrepreneurs navigating institutional contradictionsmust also be able to ‘embrace the contradictions‘between principle and spontaneity, planning and emer-gence, acceptance and control’ (Hargrave and Van deVen, 2009: 121).

Implications for further research are obvious sinceboth replicating and extending this exploratory investi-gation may be a fruitful approach. While there is ageneral lack of research on institutional entrepreneur-ship in the developing world (Mair and Martí, 2009;Martí and Mair, 2009), comparison of different types ofsettings could be investigated to assess possible differ-ences and similarities between modern market econo-mies and developing countries in relation to the ways inwhich institutions interact with the entrepreneurialprocess (Tillmar, 2006).

Acknowledgement

We are grateful to Inge Pasgaard without whom thispaper would not have been possible.

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