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8/9/2019 Empathy's romantic dialectic
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Psychoanalytic Psychology
Copyright
2001by the
Educational
Publishing
Foundation
2001, Vol. 18, No. 4,684-704 0736-9735/01/S5.00 DOI: 10.1037//0736-9735.18.4.684
Empathy's Romantic Dialectic
Self Psychology, Inter
subjectivity,
and Imagination
David
Klugman, CSW
Upper
Nyack,
N ew York
The author viewsKoh ut 'sconceptualization of psychoanalytic
empathy
and its
subsequent development
by
intersubjectivity
theorists
as an
extension
of a
larger Romantic epistemological
traditioninwhichtherole ofim aginationinmental life isboth
central and precise. To illuminate
this
argument, the author
reconsiders Kohut's distinction between the presence of em-
pathy
and
empathy
as a
mode
of
observation. Ne xt
is
described the way in which the ambivalence represented by
this distinction
is
resolved through intersubjectivity theory.
Finally, the author explores severalkeyaspects of theRoman-
tic
imagination
as a
response
to Cartesianism in
order
to
evolve
an
understanding
of
empathy
as a
bilateral procedure mediat-
ing self-experience and experience of the other.
Inevery
act of
consciousperception,
we at
once identify
our
being with that
o f
theworld withoutus, and yetplace ourselves in
centra-distinction
to that world.
Samuel
Taylor
Coleridge
David Klugman, CSW,independent practice,Nyack,
New
York.
I express my appreciation to Dr.
George
Atwood and Dr. Robert Stolorow,
whose
close
and
careful readings
of
this
articlehelped
me to
clarify both
my
feelings
and my
thoughts.
Correspondence concerningthisarticleshouldbeaddressedto David Klugman,
CSW,
104
Lewis D rive, Upper N yack,
New
York
10960.
Electronic mail
may be
sent
to
684
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SELF PSYCHOLOGY,
INTERSUBJECTIVITY,
AND IMAGINATION 685
I was the world in which I walked, and what I saw
Or
heard
or
felt came
not but from
myself;
And
there
I
found myself more truly
an d
more
strange.
Wallace
Stevens,
from 'Teaat thePalazofHoon
Viewing psychoanalysiscontextually can have value for psychoanalytic
theorizing.
F or
instance, acknowledging Freud's fealty
to the fundamental
principles
of
Helm holtzian biology
has
shed light
on the
unders tanding
of
his
adherenceto a strictly dualistic determinism (Yalom, 1980,p.
69)
evident, say, in his explanation of hysterical conversion (Gedo, 1996, p.
36). Similarly,
identifying
characteristics of the larger, dialogic currents
within
whichthe psycho analytic conversationis taking place can help to
elucidate the stakes beh ind certain theoretical positions. I am m ost inter-
ested in the historical current of Romanticism and its theory of
imagination.
Briefly, as
Engell(1981)
has
noted,
the
idea
of
imagination
did not
begin
with th e Romantics but was largely a product of early Enlighten-
mentthinking.
Its
primaryfunction
was to
replace
th e
m edieval concept
o f
th e
Great Chain
of
Beinga concept that
w as
losing groun d
fast
with
th e
advance of rationalism and the new sciences. As the medieval unities
between the mental and the natural ,the
human
and the divine, began to
cleave,
th e creative imagination becamea way to unify
man's
psyche
to returnby
the pathways
of
self-consciousness
to a
state
of ... the
sublime where senses,
mind, and sp irit elevate the world arou nd them even as they elevate themselves.
(Engell,
1981,
p. 6)
Ironically, certain aspects of Enlightenment thinking grew into the very
edifice
against w hich Romanticism was,
at
least
in
part,
a
reaction
(Tarnas,
1991). The primary objects of this reaction were an ever-increasing
determinism
and a
mechanistic model
of the
universe handed down from
Newton
and
Descartes
and later elaborated within the models of empirical
science.
Opposing these models asfairly representing the hum an situation,
Romanticism seized on the idea of imagination as a way to both combat
andbridge the
fundamental
rifts that the new rationalism w as creating. The
pervasive dialog that emerged between these forces
is, of
course, still
taking
place; sometimes overtly, though more often covertly in a variety
of forms.
M y
thesis
in
this
article
is
that psycho analysis
is no t
exempt
a nd
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SELF PSYCHOLOGY, INTERSUBJECTIVITY, AND IMAGINATION 687
Kohut's Ambivalent Empathy
Kohut (1971, 1977, 1978, 1984) introduced empathy into
the
center
of the
psychoanalytic enterprise and thus transformed the action of the analytic
scene. Even those
who
consider self psychology
to be a
one-person model
recognize theparadigm
shift
that
Kohut 's
contribution represents (Orange,
Atwood, & Stolorow, 1997; A.
Ornstein
&
Ornstein,
1995; P. Ornstein,
1978; Schwaber, 1981). A central
feature
of this shift is the subjective
participation
of the analyst (via empathy,or vicarious introspection ) in
the therapeutic action. A direct route to the patient's inner life, Kohut 's
empathic mode obviates theneed for strict adherence to metapsychologi-
cal assumptions, emphasizing instead the patient's subjective, relational
experience (Orange et
al.,
1997, p. 6). Likemanypost-classical emenda-
tions, however, Kohut's ideas about therapeutic action retain allegiance
to
the notion that the height of psychoanalytic work resides in the interpre-
tation. Thus,unfolding in two phases ( understanding and explaining ;
Kohut,
1984;
A .Ornstein&Ornstein, 1985), empathy reaches itspinnacle
in the explaining phase, where interpretation acts as a higher
form
empathy (K ohu t, 1981b, p. 532). Although he did
famously
contradict
himself
on
several occasions, stating that
the
mere presence
of
empathy
was
therapeutic in and of itself (Kohut, 1981a, p. 544; Kohut, 1981b, p.
530),
it is
generally agreed Ko hut held
firmly to the
position that although
healing comes about through empathy ananalytic curecanonly occur
through interpretation
(Rachman,
1997, p. 346). Along these logical lines
numerous theorists, including Kohut, argue convincingly that
the
more
or
less predictable movementofempathyfrom understanding to explain-
ing represents adevelopmental lineofem path y (see, e.g.,
Bacal,
1985, p.
213),onethat parallels thedevelopment
from
archaic to mature selfobject
needs (Kohut,
1984).
K ohut's distinction between understanding and
explaining
is
thus
spared
the
fate
of
becoming
a
dichotomy
by faithfully
mirroring
a
traditional, more
or
less linear progression toward interpreta-
tion(i.e.,empathy as explaining ).
Conversely,
I
believe
it may be
argued w ith equal validity that Kohut
struggled
to honor both sides of this sometimes troublesome dialectic in
view
of
what
he
called
the
presence
of
em pathy,
up to and
including
his
last public addressin the middle of whichhedeclared the following:
Empathy
despite
all I
have said,
empathyper se
thepresence
[italics
added] of empathy is a therap eutic action
[italics
added] in the broadest
sense.Thatseems to contradict everythingI
have
said sofar,and IwishIcould
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688
KL UG MAN
just simplyby-passit. B ut
since
it istrue, and Iknowit istrue,an dI'veevidence
for
itsbeing
true,
I
must mention
it.
(Kohut,
1981b,p.
530)
Although
one
interpretation
of
this statement could
be
that
by
therapeutic
action Kohut was referring to the healing
effect
of empathy during the
understanding phase, I believe that
such
a reading would dismiss the
struggle that this sentence signifies.
In fact,
once
one
empathizes with
the
manner
of his rhetoric in this passage, I think one may fairly reconsider
Kohut's larger, overarching distinction (between
the
presence
of
empa-
thy, on one hand, and empathy as an observational mode with an
understanding and explaining phaseon the other) as an embodiment
of his
ambivalence about
his own
discovery.
This ambivalence is best reflected in
K ohut 's
concerns regarding the
misuse and disuse of empathy. Although hints of these can be found in
many forms throughout his work,Kohut's basic admonition was, like so
many aspects of his theory, Janus-faced: On one side he warned of
infantile animism (Kohut, 1971, p. 300), sentimentality, and mysticism
(Kohut,198la,
p.
544), whereas
on the
other
he
expressed concern about
those who refuse or, however subtly, resist the use of empathy as an
observational mode. The first and, for Kohut, more severe of these (i.e.,
settling on the side of the presence of empathy as being sufficient in
itself)
he
referred
to as
sentimentalism
or
subjectivism.
The
latter
he
attributed to a morality-based reaction formation against fear of
faulty
empathy, a fear whose roots lay foremost in an overly sober, objectivist
perspective
(i.e.,
those
who
settle
on the
side
of
empathy
as
being
at
best
a risky, thatis unscientific data gathering tool; Kohut, 1971, pp.300-
307;
1977,
pp.
302-306).
Embedded inthese concerns, a philosophical issue restsat the heart
of Kohut'stheory,
an
issue that
was
active
in his
descriptions
of
empathy
from
the
start. Caught
in the
old
and
familiar conu ndru m
of
objectivism
(i.e., how to account for subjectivity), Kohut's earliest definition of em-
pathywas operational, encouraging us to speakof
physical
[italics added]
phenomenon when the essential ingredient of our observational methods
includes the senses, [and] of psychological [italics added] phenomena
when
the
essential ingredient
of our
observation
is
introspection
and
empathy (Kohut, 1978,
p.
206). This operational strategy provided Kohut
witha way torenegotiate the dichotomy between the subjective, psycho-
logical inside, and the objective, physical outside of perception and
experience without having
to
resolve
the
problem
in the
form
of
either
a
subjectivism that migh t leadtosentimentality andmysticism,or amaterial
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690 KLUGMAN
306).Likeagood astronomer, then,theanalyst's
total
attitude shouldbe
characterized by a commitment to observe the planets thathe or she can
see, while leaving room in his or hermind for unseen
planets
thatm ay
be influencing their course (Kohut, 1978, p. 206).
In view of these considerations it might be suggested that in addition
tothe
leading
and
trailing edge
of
self psychology (Miller,1985),
the
sharp edge
of Kohut 's
contribution requires
one to
mediate
and
make
links between
tw o
positions: between
the
seen physical
and the
un-
seen psychical, between the experienced
affect
and the reflected inter-
pretation, between empathy as a mode of observation and empathy as a
mode of presence. W ithin this paradigm the analyst can no long er remain
content to be a detached observer of the radiant,
affective
flux of thera-
peutic action;
yet
must
she or he
also
be
careful
no t to
fall into
theclutches
of illusion whereby shadows displace substance and intuition defeats
reason. Thus risking the inevitable caricatures of the merely sympathetic,
and
even mystical-minded self psychologist, Kohut
qualified
but never
refuted the value of the presence of empathyaware that by classical
standards
his
position would
be
judged
as a
cleverly disguised
first
step
toward nonscientific formsofp sychotherapy which provide cure through
loveandcure throu gh suggestion (Kohut, 1977,p.304). Indeed, one may
view
K ohut 's
persistent qualification
of
empathy
as an
observational m ode
as a
defense against this very misunderstanding (that such defensive
qualifications are still deemed necessaryby Kohu t 'smost ardent followers
is recently evident,
for
example,
in P.
Ornstein, 1998,
pp.
3-4).
The Intersubjective Solution
Perhaps
the
many forms
of
Kohut's
undying
ambivalence represent
a
necessary residue of caution by virtue of which the phobia of animism
defends
against illusion, whereas concern about the unsc ientific nature of
empathy guards against the arrogance of intuition. Accordingly this am-
bivalence ever encourages
us to
move beyond
the
banks
of
understanding
toward the reflective promontories of interpretation. As such, discretion
may
indeed
be the
better part
of
analysis.
And
yet, would
not a
theory that
could curtail
the
ambivalence within which
we
mus t exercise discretion
be
preferred?
Ibelieve
that
intersubjectivity is
such
a
theory (Orange
et
al.,
1997; Stolorow
&
Atwood, 1992; Stolorow, Atwood,
&B randchaft,
1994;
Stolorow, Brandchaft,&Atwood, 1987), amain provision ofwhichis the
acknowledgment
of how
w rongheaded
it is to
posit
a
dichotomy between
insight through
interpretation
and affective
bonding
with the analyst
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SELF PSYCHOLOGY, INTERSUBJECTIVITY, AND IMAGINATION 691
(Stolorow,
1994,
p. 11) in the firstplace.Alternatively, by
bringing
into
focusat all times
both
the ind ividu al's world of inner experience
and
its
embeddedness with other such worlds (Stolorow
&
Atwood,
1992,
p. 18),
intersubjectivity theory integrates
the
terms
of
Kohut's dichotomy
and
thussmoothes the edge of his ambivalence by introducing the concept of
an intersubjective field to
which both parties
not
only contribute
but
actually cocreate. In this model, understanding and explaining be-
come not linear stages in a method toward cure, but
dialectically
insepa-
rable events that punctuatethe ongoingflow ofmutuality.
Conceptualizing mutuality this way tends to dissolve rigid demar-
cations tha t separate, say, the presence of empathy
from
empathy as
observation, or affective bonding from
insight,
thu s rendering the old
dichotomy between empathy and interpretation
less
useful
clinically.
Consequently, empathic immersionor, more accuratelyfor theintersub-
jectivist, empathic-introspection (Orange et al., 1997, pp. 43-44)
always
implicates
tw o
subjectivities, intersubjectively engaged,
such
that
[e]very
transference interpretation that successfully illuminates
for the
patient his uncon scious past simultaneou sly crystallizes an elusive
present (Atw ood & Stolorow, 1984, p. 60). In other wo rds, any genu ine ly
effective
interpretation presupposes and embodies a corresponding mea-
sure
of attunement to thepatient's affective
experience, which experience
is inevitably (though not entirely)coconstructed in the session. Here the
analyst's embeddedness does not make it incumbent on him or her to be
empathic (sentimentalism), but rather to be ever at the ready to acknowl-
edge, analyze, and understand the various impacts that occur within the
intersubjective
field.
Likewise
it is not the
girdle
of
scientific objectivism,
or metapsychology, that guards against the mine fields of mysticism, but
the analyst's ongoing recognition of his or her subjective participation in
the
work.
Ithas been suggested (Shane & Shane, 1994)that this movefrom the
empathic
field
to the intersubjective (or inter-affective)
field,
accelerates
the paradigm shift that Kohut had begun by attempting to overcome
remnants of isolated mind thinking (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992) still
evident in Kohut's original contributions. This overcoming is accom-
plished by repeated emphasis on the fact that psychoanalysis always
involves two subjectivities w ho mutually regulate (however un equ ally) the
interaction, yet while regulating themselves at the same time. Accordingly
this self-
and
mutual regulation
is a way of monitoringwithout
dichot-
omizingthe very edge that Kohut suggested we must walk with our
patients: between empathy as a mode of being present and empathy as a
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692 KLUGMAN
mode of observation. As such, intersubjectivity theory implies a systems
view
in
which self-
and
interactive regulation
are
simultaneous, comple-
mentary, and optimally in dynamic
balance
(Beebe & Lachman, 1998,
p.
509).
That this dynamic balance
is
more explicit
in
K ohu t's praxis than
in
his theory is well illustrated by the follow ing example. T rying to observe
the psychological experience of avery tall
person,
Kohut
(1978)
said
that
without introspection andempathy hissize remains simplyaphysical
attribute (p. 207). Rather, it is only when we
think
ourselves into
his
place,
only
when,
by
vicarious
introspection, we
begin
to
feel
his
unusual
size
as if it
were
our own and
thus revive
inner
experiences
in which
we had
been unusual
or
conspicuous,
only then do we
begin
to
appreciatethe meaningthat th eunusual sizemayhavefor thisperson,andonly
then
havewe
observed
a
psychological fact. (Kohut, 1978,
pp.
207-208)
In this seminal passage Kohut
affirmed
the presence of the analyst's
subjectivity in the act of
empathy
by way of a
dialectic between self-
experience and experience of the other. Focusing on his experience of the
patient, Kohut
felt
theother 's size as if itwerehis own while concom-
itantly admitting into the field of his empathic inquiry the need for
self-experience, recalling memories in which he had been unu sual or
conspicuous. Considered this way, em path y is a bilateral procedu re that
necessarily includes the a na lyst's subjectivity in the act of imagining how
a
patient feels, thinks,
and so
forth. Accordingly,
the
dynamic balance
on
which
empathy depends involves(a)grasping the patient's experience as
ifit were on e's own and then (b) measuring that experience againsts on e's
own subjective history. A central them e I now elucidate is that a vision of
theempathic ana lyst mediating between self-experienceandexperienceof
the other in this way extends a Romantic, post-Cartesian paradigm in
which
the role of imagination is both central and precise.
First let me
define
Cartesianism as any working model in which the
basic elements of human relatedness comprise an irreducible duality
between subjective experience and an objective, external world. Next let
me
definepost-Cartesianism
as any working model that resists a view of
relatedness as the bumping together of isolated variables, privileging
instead
the
position that subject
and
world
are
coextensive, interdepen-
dent, and interpenetrating. Although these
definitions
may unfairly repre-
sent Descartes (for wh omallsub stances were united un der God), atomism
and
duality nevertheless characterize significant aspects of the Cartesian
legacy against which Romanticism struggled. In what follows, I focus on
this struggle as it was articulated in the writing of Samuel Taylor
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SELF PSYCHOLOGY, INTERSUBJECTTVITY, AND IMAGINATION 693
Coleridge (1835,
1848/1951,
1961, 1912/1969, 1973, 1980, 1817/1983,
1825/1993,
1995).
Aspects of Imagination in Coleridge
For
Coleridge
the
sting
ofCartesianismwas
soul-stealing,
and so he
made
it
his business either to oppose or revise those philosophic and scientific
models
that were rooted in the dua lism of Descartes. Importantly, this was
no tanantiscientific
program
forColeridgewho
remained throughou t
his
life deeply interested in and profoundlyinfluenced by the science of his
time (see Holmes, 1989, 1999; W ylie, 1989). Rather this impu lse
was
motivated
by
Coleridge's desire
to
counteract
the
passive, mechanistic
models of the mind thatreliedon Cartesian dualism. His intention was to
wake the
human spirit from what
he
sometimes called
the
lethargy
of
custom (Coleridge, 1817/1983,
II, p. 7). One
central
hub
around which
this
lifelong mission turned
wasDescartes's
fam ous formulation: cogito
ergo sum (i.e., I thin k therefore I am ). The implication of this axiom in
which Coleridge
was
most interested
is the way in
which
a
thinking
subject is ultimately and inexorably pitted against an independentlyex -
isting
object w orld. Altho ughhispreoccupation withtheresulting dualism
between
the
mental
and the
physical took
on
many forms throughout
his
life
(e.g.,
see Coleridge, 1961, n. 3159; 1817/1983, I, pp. 232-294;
1825/1993, p. 139; 1995,1,p. 349), ajudgmenthe returnedto againand
again was thatfrom withinDescartes's systemone cann ot appreciate the
basic processes that are uncon sciously involved in putting together a world
of
distinct objects. Evidence
of
this failing
was
signaled,
for
example,
by
Descartes's inference of the independent existence of objects from the
appearance of their externality (or what Coleridge called
outness see
Bar-field, 1971,pp.59-68). Indeed Descartes's cardinal error lay, accord-
ing
to Coleridge, in his attempt to demonstrate that the experience of
outness (i.e., the appearance of the externality of thin gs) inev itably leads
one to consider the idea of the existence of things w ithou t us as a
conclusion
of
judgment (Barfield,
1971, p. 65; see also, Coleridge,
1817/
1983, I, p. 259); that is as something once established, never questioned.
In
turn we are confronted with the classic dichotomy between mind and
nature which is the hallmark of Cartesian epistemology.
Coleridge's opposition to this dichotomy and to its establishment as
dogma is what I am most interested in here; for it is the psychological
dimension of this fundamental rift between mind and nature that
Coleridge's theory
of
imagination sets
out to
refute.
In
other words,
for
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694 KLUGMAN
Coleridgeeven
the
deadest Nature
we can
conceive
is
already
a
Nature
ofourmaking (Richards, 1934, p.164), whichis to say
there
is alifeand
death of the world, dependent on whatwe make of it (Cavell, 1988, p.
68). A ccording toColeridge, ju st what wemakeof it dependson therole
one
assigns
to
imagination
inone's
perception
and
creation
of the
world.
Imagination and Fancy
One way to understand the role imagination plays in
one's
creation of
the
worldis toconsider
Coleridge's
(1817/1983,1,pp.304-305) famous
distinction between imagination and
fancy.
From the Greek phantasia
(phantasie,
fantasy), fancy for
Coleridge denotes
the
m echanical free play
ofthe mind in relation to objects, images, andrecollections;it is the m ode
of wit, comedy,
and
chimera. Imagination,
on the
other hand, from
the
Latin imaginatio, attains privileged status in his system owing to its stress
on sensuous activity and the mind in the act of organizing perception
itself; it is the mode of subtlety and genius. Whereas fancy was called by
Coleridge
(1817/1983,
I, p. 305) an aggregative power that must
receive all its materials ready made
from
the law of association, imagi-
nation actually creates new images (of self and world) by virtue of its
power
to
organize sensuous experience
and
achieve formu lations that
the
senses alone(i.e.,withoutthe aid ofimagination) could never accomplish.
Thus Coleridge viewed
fancy
as being inferior in kind to the power of
imagination, which does not have to take its materials ready-made
from
the law of association but can actually create new images, new worlds, and
new
experience from the dep ths of elemental sensation to the heights of
poetic symbolism. Whereas fancy must operate within the limits of an
already represented (and thus divided) object world, imagination presents
thephenomenal world without referencetosomethingelse,save sensuous
experience
(i.e.,
in its most basic mode one might say that imagination
functions
to interpret or represent sensuous experience and
thus
present
the phenomenal world).
A
further
distinction made
by
Coleridge between primary
and
sec-
ondary
imagination
is
illuminating here.
Not
unlike what neurobiology
callsa printing
(Schore,
1994, pp.
75-76,
466-468), primary imagina-
tion generates an affective copy (or template) of nature derived
from
sense
impressions (see
Engell in
Coleridge,
1817/1983, I, p.
xci). From this
it
follows
that primary imagination precedes fancy
for the
obvious reason
that the primary imag ination mu st
perceive
and create in itself the
associable beforeanyassociation canoccur (Engell,1981, p.343). Hence
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SELF PSYCHOLOGY, INTERSUBJECTIVITY, AND IMAGINATION 695
Coleridge's
primary imagination is not what most
people
refer to when
theyuse the word imagination, but is closer to something more basic, like
being
or I
am-ness
(Coleridge's concept
of the
secondary imagination,
as
I
discuss later,
iscloserto the
colloquial,
and yet
their interplay
iswhat
makes his system useful and persuasive). This is partly so because the
primary imagination
is
usua lly taken
fo r
granted
just
as a
sense
of
balance is taken for granted and not mentioned while we are walking
(Engell, 1981, p. 344), which also explains why Coleridge referred to
primary
imagination as the necessary Imag ination distinct
from
both
fancy (which
it
precedes)
and
secondary imagination (which
is its
creative
complement).
For
instance, individuals
all see a
mou ntain
in
more
or
less
the
same
wayaccording to certain a
priori
mental categories such as space,
magnitude, contour, and so forth. Indeed, these common qualities render
the
declarative,
Look
at that mountain, comp rehensible. This is the
primary
imagination
at
work:
It
takes
up the
available material
athandand
re-presents
or
copies
it.
Importantly,
the
idea that primary imagination
produces
a
copy
is not
intended
tocall up a
passive model
in
which
the
isolated
mind receives an impression. Rather,
psychoanalytically
speak-
ing, something like the elemental andinv oluntary actionof
identification
is intended, in the sense of it being the first way in which the ego picks
out
an
object
(Freud,
1917/1957a,
p. 241) and thereby produces a
sense
sameness,linking self-experience
to
world-experience
(or
experience
of
the other). Conversely, as I elaborate later, the secondary imagination
starts
to
work
on
this identification
or
sense
of
samenessfrom
the
angle
of
differencewhat
Coleridge called
centra-distinction
(Barfield, 1971, p.
65),
or
what contemporary
developmentalists
might call
differentiation.
As
such, primary imagination
does
not
produce anything original
in the
artistic sense, but is rather aboriginal(i.e., primary, necessary, given ).
Secondary imagina tion, on the other hand, is used by the artist to produce
an
imitation
of
nature, that
is, a
creative alternative
to
what
is given (or
copied or printed ) by virtueofprimary imagination. For instance, as I
linger withm yperception of them ountain, whichissnow-capped,I see a
hooded monk
riding
through
the
forest, whereas
my
friend, viewing
the
same
scene,
envisions
a
breast that will never yield
a
single drop
of
milk.
This is the secondary imagination at work: It generates an imitation of
what
theprimary imaginationhasprovided.InColeridge's
(1817/1983,1)
own
language : the primary IMAGINATION
I
hold
to be the ...
prime
Agentof allh um an perception
[whereas]the secondary [imagination]
I consider as an echo of the former. It dissolves, diffuses, and
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KL UG MAN
dissipates,
in
order
to
re-create [what
is
'given'
by
virtue
of the
necessary
action of primary imagination] (p. 304).
My interest in these distinctions centers on the way in which
Coleridge's conception of primary and secondary imagination mayillu-
minate the field of therapeutic action in psychoanalysis. For example, it
may be useful to conceptualize the analyst's task in terms of her or his
ability to grasp the patient's affective copying of reality via primary
imagination. Instead of space, magnitude, and contour presenting moun-
tains, this activity may present a felt sense of the patient's early care to
form arelational
pattern
or
configuration.
Like the
mountain,
this rela-
tional configuration
and the
world that
it
attends
may
feel
to the
patient
unalterable and givena
faithful
copy of the only real world. Yet like the
mountain
it too may be re-created, this time through an intersubjectively
constrained analysis
of its
derivation,
form, and
functionin
a
manner
that
resembles the activity of the secondary imagination. That is, this sort
of mu tually inform ed analysis dissolves, diffuses, and dissipates the
magnitude
and force of the affective copy in order to re-create the basic
organization of the patient's primary perceptions. Reflecting the means of
artistic creation, this process might aptly be called the
poetry
of
psycho-
analysis,
whereby patient and analyst cocreate alternatives to what was
formerly given (i.e.,
felt to be unalterable).
It is in this way that the Romantic imagination transforms the
subjective
universe: un iting sense and thing, thoug ht and feeling, precisely
because its activity both penetrates and precedes the perception and
experience
of
their division.
So
conceived, imagination
may be
especially
suited for
that process
of
elevation whereby
the
subtlest stirrings
of
impulse, feeling, and sensation are given sublime
form
through (psycho-
analytic) dialog.
Coleridge's
conversation poems
are
supreme illustra-
tions of this procedure, wherein states of dejection, loneliness, and feelings
of
abandonment aredialogicallyengaged. The kind of self-reflective m ode
wefind in Shakespeare's characters, for instance who will themselves
to change upon self-overhearing and thus prophesy the psychoanalytic
situation
in
which patients
are
compelled
to
overhear themselves
in the
context oftheir transference to the analyst (Bloom,
1994,
p. 365)may
be
found
inpoems suchas
This
Lime Tree BowerMyPrison (Coleridge,
1912/1969,pp. 178-181). Indeed, Coleridge's activity in hisearly poetry
can be
viewed
as an
illustration
of his
later theory, according
to
which
the
secondary imagination is put toworkon his given statesmuchlikeI
am
suggesting analyst and patient go to work on the
given
states of the
latterin
order to bring about renewal throughforms of understanding.
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Effacing the notion of a dichotomy between
affect
and cognition, this
transfigurationof feeling into thought thro ugh dialog illuminates the cash
value
of Rom antic truth: that we may reimagine and not merely reenact;
re-create
rather than
repeat thematic
patterns
ofperception and
self-in-
world organization.
Revisiting the old subject-object dichotom y with all of this in min d,
I
think
we are now in a
position
to
appreciate
why
Coleridge considered
the appearance of externality less
substantively
than Descartes, that is, as
a
recurring experience rather than
as a final
revelation
of the way
things
really are. In fact, Coleridge went so far as to suggest that the experience
of
a world of independent objects unconsciously presupposes the subjec-
tive, I-am position (see, Coleridge, 1817/1983,1,
p.
260).
3
C onsequently,
we
can say
that Coleridge gleaned
a
covert
Iam-ness
lurking
a
priori
to
Descartes's
famo us declaration, from whichaColeridgean revision m ight
be
rendered
as I am,
therefore
I
think, therefore
I
am,
or
more radically
as I am,
therefore
the
world. Coleridge's
effort to
make this covert
I
am-ness explicit characterizes generally
his
effort
to
subvert
the funda-
mentalatomism tha t dominated thephilosophical andscientific modelsof
his era. One startling result of his subversion is that the appearance of the
existence
of
things witho ut
us
reveals itself
to be
not only coherent
but
identical, and one and the
same thing with
our own
immediate self-
consciousness (Coleridge,
1817/1983,
I, p. 260). This realization, far
from lulling us to sleep in simple narcissism, or patheticfallacy, rouses
us from whatwas essentially asleeping relation with phenomena intoa
waking
one
(Barfield,
1971, p. 66). It was into this
wakefulness
that
Coleridge ever sought to stir himself, as well as his contemporaries.
Imagination
and
Empathy
Although these considerations may seem remote from the action of em-
pathy in
psychoanalysis, they
are in
fact germane,
for
what this wakeful-
ness brings to our attention is the experience of a particular and inexorable
connectiveness between
the
perceiver
and
that which
is
perceived,
a
unity
which
is for the most part an unconscious one, thoug h it need not remain
so
(Ellenberger, 1970, p. 204). Indeed it is part of the task of depth
psychology to make this connection conscious, such that we might view
3
In the
same
way that fancy presupposes primary imagination (as
discussed
earlier).
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KL UG MAN
thelatteras amethod for exploringandilluminating the
unconsciousness
of
self-consciousness. Whereas
the
Romantic's awareness
of
this inexo-
rable connectiveness was directed primarily toward the experience of
nature,
the psychoanalyst's focus is appropriately aimed toward the ex-
perience of the patient, an experience that is
united
by the phenomenon
of
emp athy, through which im agination acts
to
reveal
the
interdependence
and
interpenetration
of
interacting subjective worlds.
In
other words,
the
seeing into nature that characterizes the Romantic orientation becomes a
seeing into
the
experience
of the
other within
a
psychoanalytic
frame.
4
In sum , then, what
Coleridge's
subversion helps toclarify is how the
experience of Cartesian duality is intermediate rather than final or con-
clusive; areification of a particular state of being in which the sense of self
is insulated from the
always already
interpenetrating surround ofone's
own and
other worlds.
In a
word,
the
reification
of the
experience
of
self-consciousness as alienation. The fact that up
until
recently Cartesi-
anism
as
such
was so
pervasively reflected
in
analytic theories
of
devel-
opmentwherein a merged self must separate from its surroundin order
to
establish
its autonomyindicates theprofound and
lastinginfluence
of
this model and mayalsobe asignof the unconscious presence oftrauma
in
our theories. Conversely, recent developmental schemas (Lyons-Ruth,
1991) that stress attachment-individuation rather than separation-indi-
viduation
support the primacy of the inexorable connectiveness between
self and other, as do those developmental theories in which the sense of
agency or
being
is not
endogenous,
but
rather depends
on the
recognition
of the (m)other (Rustin, 1997; Sander, 1995).
The Rationalist Critique
It would be, perhaps, remiss of me not to mention the long history of
criticism that characterizes the Romantic position described herein as a
strategic denial of duality, separateness, and
thus
as a denial of vicissitude
en masse. Indeed,
it has
often been
the
case
that critics have accused
Rom antics of wan ting to have their cake and eat it too, o f wanting to enjoy
the
interactive productivity of subject and object (self and other, serf and
world) w ithout
suffering
their vicissitudes. Although this indictment has a
4
In
this
context, one may be
tempted
to interpret
Wordsworth's
famous
lines
with thedeeppowerofjoy Iwe seeintothe lifeof
things
(Brett &Jones, 1991,
p. 114)as an important gloss on the
effect
of
affect
on perception in relational
experiencethat is, with thedeeppower
of
joy I we see
into
the life of[others].
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699
complex history at least as long as Positivism itself, its gist is that
Romanticism, in any form, is a regressive effort to reestablish lost unity.
Philosophically the Romantic is accused of attempting to mend the
ob-
jectivist rift between mind and nature (Wilber, 1995), whereas from a
psychoanalytic perspective this criticism is mirrored by developmental
theories rooted
in the
paradigm
of
primary narcissism (Freud, 19147
1957b), which posit that
the ego
takes form only reluctantly (Freud,
1911/1958)
by
differentiating
from the
primal narcissistic matrix.
In
both
instances, the Romantic (or read, respectively, the neurotic) individual
clings to an infantile,
prerational omnipotence
that is developmentally
aberrant, scientifically u nso und , philosophically confused,andsometimes
morally depraved.Inother words Romanticismineither case isviewedas
a regressive reaction against the bad new s of Enlightenment, wh ich bad
news
is, developmentally speaking, separateness. This regressive reaction,
so the
Rationalist argument
goes,
threatens
to
forfeit
all of the
most
important gains attributed to the ego's hard won differentiation from
nature
(or again, developmentally speaking, read mother nature ).
From this critical vantage point thep rioritizing of subjectivityto
the extent that it represents an organic unity intended to displace the
Cartesian priority of the phenomenal world
(i.e.,
things as they exist
without
us)is
viewed as a naive, or worse, a cowardly retreat from the
hard existential facts ofhuman life. For example, literary critics suchas
Paulde Man
(1962,
1969; Lentricchia, 1980, pp.282-317) maintain that
the
Rom antic priority of the su b je c t. . . is 'i llusionary,' and
canonly
arise when the subject 'in fact' borrows from the outside a temporal
stability which it lacks withinitself (p.292). Ruskin's (1902) pathetic
fallacy makes a similar claim. Andonceagain parallels to psychoanalytic
modelsofdevelopment can bemade (Freud,
1914/1957b;
Mahler, Pine,&
Bergman, 1975;Pine, 1979), according to which motherfunctions as the
original source of this
borrowed
and therefore illusionary sense of
stability, which illusion mustbe shedinorderfordevelopmenttoproceed
along
its normal, healthy course. In the event, the Romantic is charged
with acting
in
bad faith (Sartre, 1956/1994)
by
pretending
to
possess
a
determinate nature that he can hold responsible for who he is (Atwood,
1994, p. 171).
These allegations are,
of
course, improperly alleged. There
is no
denialofvicissitudein theRomantic assertionof aprior
unity
sustainedby
the imagination;on the contrary, imagination is theembodimentof vicis-
situde.
Indeed,Coleridge'sexistential form ulation:
Being
.. .isposterior
to
Existence
(Coleridge, 1973, n. 3593), m ay itself be viewed as a
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KL UG MAN
precursor
of
Sartre's(1956/1994)
existence
precedesessence
(p.
630)
which axiom forms the basis for the latter's theory of bad faith (pp.
47-70).
Once
awakened to
self-consciousness, h owever, Coleridge held
it
to be the
task
of the
imagination
to
assert (indeed,
to
discover)
the
priority of the subject, not as a denial of the existence of things withou t
usasifimagination could co nquer chaosandcontrolothernessbut on
the
more humble, phenomenological basis that
being is coextensive with
perception.
Conclusion
Indictments against Romanticism such
as the
pathetic fallacy will
un-
doubtedlycontinue as its various dialogs with Rationalism evolve. Indeed
the differences between these schools ofthoughtmay be more profitably
struggled
with than finally settled.
My
argument
in
this article
is
that
Kohut 's
insistence on thecentrality ofempathycan be viewed within the
context ofthat struggle. How
better
tounderstandhis
ambivalence
and his
persistent need
to
anticipate
the
argum ent that self psychology
is a
cow-
ardlyattempt
to ...
deny m an 's drive-nature (Ko hut, 1977,
p.
xviii)
an d
that its
emphasis
on
empathy
is
likewise
a
replacement
of the
scientific
mode of thoug ht by a quasi-religious or my stical approach (Ko hut,
1977,
p. 304)? Within this broader historical context I believe Kohut's voice is
one in a
long line
of
thinkers
to
oppose reductionism, while
rigorously
defending his opposition against charges of recreancy and regression.
SimilarlyCo leridge'santi-Cartesian fo rmu lations do notreflect a denial of
theexperienceofalienation,butratherresistanceto its enshrinement as the
core truthofhu man life. Insteadhis
efforts
reflectadeeply held conviction
that once we have awakened to the alienating aspects of self-conscious-
ness (traumatic or otherwise), it is the task of imagination to
assertor,
again, to
discoverthe
priority of our subjectivity.
My
central theme is that this discovery of personal subjectivity
through
imaginatio n is akin to the action of empathy in the analytic setting,
through whichtheanalystm ay discover the subjectivityof the patient.In
this respect, Kohut's recognition
of therole of
empathy
in the
analytic
process parallels
the
Romantic recognition
of therole of
imagination
in
perception and
experienceneither
of which is meant as a denial of the
vicissitudes
ofseparateness,
uncertainty,
or
existential despair,
but
rather
constitute responses to these, responses intended to wash away the numb-
ing film offamiliarity
in consequence [of
which]...
w ehave eyesyet
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701
see not, ears that hear not, and hearts that neither feel nor understand
(Coleridge, 1817/1983,
II, p. 7).
Summary
In this article I have attempted to illustrate three things: (a) the way in
which an
intersubjective theory
of
empathy
is
presaged
in Kohut 's
theory
by
virtue
of his
recognition
of the
ambivalence between
the
presence
of
empathy and empathy as a mode of observation ; (b) the notion that this
ambivalence finds resolution in thetheoryofintersubjectivity, which asks
us
to
consider that affective bon ding
and
interpretation
are not two
faces
of
a dichotomy, nor are they linear stages in a method toward
cure,
but
rather represent dialectically inseparable even ts that pu nc tuate
th e
ongoing
flow
of
mutuality;and (c) thenotion that imag ination providesuswithan
epistemological modality through which
we may
render
the alterity of the
patient as
Other, while grasping
concomitantly the
inescapable involve-
ments and inevitable impacts of our own subjectivity.One advantageof
viewing
em pathy this
wayas a
bilateral procedure enabled
by
imagina-
tionis that
it
further
obviates
the
need
fo r
isolated variables (e.g.,
the
analyst's mind perceives
th e
patient's state), privileging instead
th e
pro-
cess through wh ich self-experience
an d
experience
of the
other
are
assim-
ilated,and
thus
also
through which minds
and
states
are
ever
linked to
worlds.
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