Empathy's romantic dialectic

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    Psychoanalytic Psychology

    Copyright

    2001by the

    Educational

    Publishing

    Foundation

    2001, Vol. 18, No. 4,684-704 0736-9735/01/S5.00 DOI: 10.1037//0736-9735.18.4.684

    Empathy's Romantic Dialectic

    Self Psychology, Inter

    subjectivity,

    and Imagination

    David

    Klugman, CSW

    Upper

    Nyack,

    N ew York

    The author viewsKoh ut 'sconceptualization of psychoanalytic

    empathy

    and its

    subsequent development

    by

    intersubjectivity

    theorists

    as an

    extension

    of a

    larger Romantic epistemological

    traditioninwhichtherole ofim aginationinmental life isboth

    central and precise. To illuminate

    this

    argument, the author

    reconsiders Kohut's distinction between the presence of em-

    pathy

    and

    empathy

    as a

    mode

    of

    observation. Ne xt

    is

    described the way in which the ambivalence represented by

    this distinction

    is

    resolved through intersubjectivity theory.

    Finally, the author explores severalkeyaspects of theRoman-

    tic

    imagination

    as a

    response

    to Cartesianism in

    order

    to

    evolve

    an

    understanding

    of

    empathy

    as a

    bilateral procedure mediat-

    ing self-experience and experience of the other.

    Inevery

    act of

    consciousperception,

    we at

    once identify

    our

    being with that

    o f

    theworld withoutus, and yetplace ourselves in

    centra-distinction

    to that world.

    Samuel

    Taylor

    Coleridge

    David Klugman, CSW,independent practice,Nyack,

    New

    York.

    I express my appreciation to Dr.

    George

    Atwood and Dr. Robert Stolorow,

    whose

    close

    and

    careful readings

    of

    this

    articlehelped

    me to

    clarify both

    my

    feelings

    and my

    thoughts.

    Correspondence concerningthisarticleshouldbeaddressedto David Klugman,

    CSW,

    104

    Lewis D rive, Upper N yack,

    New

    York

    10960.

    Electronic mail

    may be

    sent

    to

    [email protected].

    684

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    SELF PSYCHOLOGY,

    INTERSUBJECTIVITY,

    AND IMAGINATION 685

    I was the world in which I walked, and what I saw

    Or

    heard

    or

    felt came

    not but from

    myself;

    And

    there

    I

    found myself more truly

    an d

    more

    strange.

    Wallace

    Stevens,

    from 'Teaat thePalazofHoon

    Viewing psychoanalysiscontextually can have value for psychoanalytic

    theorizing.

    F or

    instance, acknowledging Freud's fealty

    to the fundamental

    principles

    of

    Helm holtzian biology

    has

    shed light

    on the

    unders tanding

    of

    his

    adherenceto a strictly dualistic determinism (Yalom, 1980,p.

    69)

    evident, say, in his explanation of hysterical conversion (Gedo, 1996, p.

    36). Similarly,

    identifying

    characteristics of the larger, dialogic currents

    within

    whichthe psycho analytic conversationis taking place can help to

    elucidate the stakes beh ind certain theoretical positions. I am m ost inter-

    ested in the historical current of Romanticism and its theory of

    imagination.

    Briefly, as

    Engell(1981)

    has

    noted,

    the

    idea

    of

    imagination

    did not

    begin

    with th e Romantics but was largely a product of early Enlighten-

    mentthinking.

    Its

    primaryfunction

    was to

    replace

    th e

    m edieval concept

    o f

    th e

    Great Chain

    of

    Beinga concept that

    w as

    losing groun d

    fast

    with

    th e

    advance of rationalism and the new sciences. As the medieval unities

    between the mental and the natural ,the

    human

    and the divine, began to

    cleave,

    th e creative imagination becamea way to unify

    man's

    psyche

    to returnby

    the pathways

    of

    self-consciousness

    to a

    state

    of ... the

    sublime where senses,

    mind, and sp irit elevate the world arou nd them even as they elevate themselves.

    (Engell,

    1981,

    p. 6)

    Ironically, certain aspects of Enlightenment thinking grew into the very

    edifice

    against w hich Romanticism was,

    at

    least

    in

    part,

    a

    reaction

    (Tarnas,

    1991). The primary objects of this reaction were an ever-increasing

    determinism

    and a

    mechanistic model

    of the

    universe handed down from

    Newton

    and

    Descartes

    and later elaborated within the models of empirical

    science.

    Opposing these models asfairly representing the hum an situation,

    Romanticism seized on the idea of imagination as a way to both combat

    andbridge the

    fundamental

    rifts that the new rationalism w as creating. The

    pervasive dialog that emerged between these forces

    is, of

    course, still

    taking

    place; sometimes overtly, though more often covertly in a variety

    of forms.

    M y

    thesis

    in

    this

    article

    is

    that psycho analysis

    is no t

    exempt

    a nd

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    SELF PSYCHOLOGY, INTERSUBJECTIVITY, AND IMAGINATION 687

    Kohut's Ambivalent Empathy

    Kohut (1971, 1977, 1978, 1984) introduced empathy into

    the

    center

    of the

    psychoanalytic enterprise and thus transformed the action of the analytic

    scene. Even those

    who

    consider self psychology

    to be a

    one-person model

    recognize theparadigm

    shift

    that

    Kohut 's

    contribution represents (Orange,

    Atwood, & Stolorow, 1997; A.

    Ornstein

    &

    Ornstein,

    1995; P. Ornstein,

    1978; Schwaber, 1981). A central

    feature

    of this shift is the subjective

    participation

    of the analyst (via empathy,or vicarious introspection ) in

    the therapeutic action. A direct route to the patient's inner life, Kohut 's

    empathic mode obviates theneed for strict adherence to metapsychologi-

    cal assumptions, emphasizing instead the patient's subjective, relational

    experience (Orange et

    al.,

    1997, p. 6). Likemanypost-classical emenda-

    tions, however, Kohut's ideas about therapeutic action retain allegiance

    to

    the notion that the height of psychoanalytic work resides in the interpre-

    tation. Thus,unfolding in two phases ( understanding and explaining ;

    Kohut,

    1984;

    A .Ornstein&Ornstein, 1985), empathy reaches itspinnacle

    in the explaining phase, where interpretation acts as a higher

    form

    empathy (K ohu t, 1981b, p. 532). Although he did

    famously

    contradict

    himself

    on

    several occasions, stating that

    the

    mere presence

    of

    empathy

    was

    therapeutic in and of itself (Kohut, 1981a, p. 544; Kohut, 1981b, p.

    530),

    it is

    generally agreed Ko hut held

    firmly to the

    position that although

    healing comes about through empathy ananalytic curecanonly occur

    through interpretation

    (Rachman,

    1997, p. 346). Along these logical lines

    numerous theorists, including Kohut, argue convincingly that

    the

    more

    or

    less predictable movementofempathyfrom understanding to explain-

    ing represents adevelopmental lineofem path y (see, e.g.,

    Bacal,

    1985, p.

    213),onethat parallels thedevelopment

    from

    archaic to mature selfobject

    needs (Kohut,

    1984).

    K ohut's distinction between understanding and

    explaining

    is

    thus

    spared

    the

    fate

    of

    becoming

    a

    dichotomy

    by faithfully

    mirroring

    a

    traditional, more

    or

    less linear progression toward interpreta-

    tion(i.e.,empathy as explaining ).

    Conversely,

    I

    believe

    it may be

    argued w ith equal validity that Kohut

    struggled

    to honor both sides of this sometimes troublesome dialectic in

    view

    of

    what

    he

    called

    the

    presence

    of

    em pathy,

    up to and

    including

    his

    last public addressin the middle of whichhedeclared the following:

    Empathy

    despite

    all I

    have said,

    empathyper se

    thepresence

    [italics

    added] of empathy is a therap eutic action

    [italics

    added] in the broadest

    sense.Thatseems to contradict everythingI

    have

    said sofar,and IwishIcould

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    688

    KL UG MAN

    just simplyby-passit. B ut

    since

    it istrue, and Iknowit istrue,an dI'veevidence

    for

    itsbeing

    true,

    I

    must mention

    it.

    (Kohut,

    1981b,p.

    530)

    Although

    one

    interpretation

    of

    this statement could

    be

    that

    by

    therapeutic

    action Kohut was referring to the healing

    effect

    of empathy during the

    understanding phase, I believe that

    such

    a reading would dismiss the

    struggle that this sentence signifies.

    In fact,

    once

    one

    empathizes with

    the

    manner

    of his rhetoric in this passage, I think one may fairly reconsider

    Kohut's larger, overarching distinction (between

    the

    presence

    of

    empa-

    thy, on one hand, and empathy as an observational mode with an

    understanding and explaining phaseon the other) as an embodiment

    of his

    ambivalence about

    his own

    discovery.

    This ambivalence is best reflected in

    K ohut 's

    concerns regarding the

    misuse and disuse of empathy. Although hints of these can be found in

    many forms throughout his work,Kohut's basic admonition was, like so

    many aspects of his theory, Janus-faced: On one side he warned of

    infantile animism (Kohut, 1971, p. 300), sentimentality, and mysticism

    (Kohut,198la,

    p.

    544), whereas

    on the

    other

    he

    expressed concern about

    those who refuse or, however subtly, resist the use of empathy as an

    observational mode. The first and, for Kohut, more severe of these (i.e.,

    settling on the side of the presence of empathy as being sufficient in

    itself)

    he

    referred

    to as

    sentimentalism

    or

    subjectivism.

    The

    latter

    he

    attributed to a morality-based reaction formation against fear of

    faulty

    empathy, a fear whose roots lay foremost in an overly sober, objectivist

    perspective

    (i.e.,

    those

    who

    settle

    on the

    side

    of

    empathy

    as

    being

    at

    best

    a risky, thatis unscientific data gathering tool; Kohut, 1971, pp.300-

    307;

    1977,

    pp.

    302-306).

    Embedded inthese concerns, a philosophical issue restsat the heart

    of Kohut'stheory,

    an

    issue that

    was

    active

    in his

    descriptions

    of

    empathy

    from

    the

    start. Caught

    in the

    old

    and

    familiar conu ndru m

    of

    objectivism

    (i.e., how to account for subjectivity), Kohut's earliest definition of em-

    pathywas operational, encouraging us to speakof

    physical

    [italics added]

    phenomenon when the essential ingredient of our observational methods

    includes the senses, [and] of psychological [italics added] phenomena

    when

    the

    essential ingredient

    of our

    observation

    is

    introspection

    and

    empathy (Kohut, 1978,

    p.

    206). This operational strategy provided Kohut

    witha way torenegotiate the dichotomy between the subjective, psycho-

    logical inside, and the objective, physical outside of perception and

    experience without having

    to

    resolve

    the

    problem

    in the

    form

    of

    either

    a

    subjectivism that migh t leadtosentimentality andmysticism,or amaterial

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    690 KLUGMAN

    306).Likeagood astronomer, then,theanalyst's

    total

    attitude shouldbe

    characterized by a commitment to observe the planets thathe or she can

    see, while leaving room in his or hermind for unseen

    planets

    thatm ay

    be influencing their course (Kohut, 1978, p. 206).

    In view of these considerations it might be suggested that in addition

    tothe

    leading

    and

    trailing edge

    of

    self psychology (Miller,1985),

    the

    sharp edge

    of Kohut 's

    contribution requires

    one to

    mediate

    and

    make

    links between

    tw o

    positions: between

    the

    seen physical

    and the

    un-

    seen psychical, between the experienced

    affect

    and the reflected inter-

    pretation, between empathy as a mode of observation and empathy as a

    mode of presence. W ithin this paradigm the analyst can no long er remain

    content to be a detached observer of the radiant,

    affective

    flux of thera-

    peutic action;

    yet

    must

    she or he

    also

    be

    careful

    no t to

    fall into

    theclutches

    of illusion whereby shadows displace substance and intuition defeats

    reason. Thus risking the inevitable caricatures of the merely sympathetic,

    and

    even mystical-minded self psychologist, Kohut

    qualified

    but never

    refuted the value of the presence of empathyaware that by classical

    standards

    his

    position would

    be

    judged

    as a

    cleverly disguised

    first

    step

    toward nonscientific formsofp sychotherapy which provide cure through

    loveandcure throu gh suggestion (Kohut, 1977,p.304). Indeed, one may

    view

    K ohut 's

    persistent qualification

    of

    empathy

    as an

    observational m ode

    as a

    defense against this very misunderstanding (that such defensive

    qualifications are still deemed necessaryby Kohu t 'smost ardent followers

    is recently evident,

    for

    example,

    in P.

    Ornstein, 1998,

    pp.

    3-4).

    The Intersubjective Solution

    Perhaps

    the

    many forms

    of

    Kohut's

    undying

    ambivalence represent

    a

    necessary residue of caution by virtue of which the phobia of animism

    defends

    against illusion, whereas concern about the unsc ientific nature of

    empathy guards against the arrogance of intuition. Accordingly this am-

    bivalence ever encourages

    us to

    move beyond

    the

    banks

    of

    understanding

    toward the reflective promontories of interpretation. As such, discretion

    may

    indeed

    be the

    better part

    of

    analysis.

    And

    yet, would

    not a

    theory that

    could curtail

    the

    ambivalence within which

    we

    mus t exercise discretion

    be

    preferred?

    Ibelieve

    that

    intersubjectivity is

    such

    a

    theory (Orange

    et

    al.,

    1997; Stolorow

    &

    Atwood, 1992; Stolorow, Atwood,

    &B randchaft,

    1994;

    Stolorow, Brandchaft,&Atwood, 1987), amain provision ofwhichis the

    acknowledgment

    of how

    w rongheaded

    it is to

    posit

    a

    dichotomy between

    insight through

    interpretation

    and affective

    bonding

    with the analyst

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    SELF PSYCHOLOGY, INTERSUBJECTIVITY, AND IMAGINATION 691

    (Stolorow,

    1994,

    p. 11) in the firstplace.Alternatively, by

    bringing

    into

    focusat all times

    both

    the ind ividu al's world of inner experience

    and

    its

    embeddedness with other such worlds (Stolorow

    &

    Atwood,

    1992,

    p. 18),

    intersubjectivity theory integrates

    the

    terms

    of

    Kohut's dichotomy

    and

    thussmoothes the edge of his ambivalence by introducing the concept of

    an intersubjective field to

    which both parties

    not

    only contribute

    but

    actually cocreate. In this model, understanding and explaining be-

    come not linear stages in a method toward cure, but

    dialectically

    insepa-

    rable events that punctuatethe ongoingflow ofmutuality.

    Conceptualizing mutuality this way tends to dissolve rigid demar-

    cations tha t separate, say, the presence of empathy

    from

    empathy as

    observation, or affective bonding from

    insight,

    thu s rendering the old

    dichotomy between empathy and interpretation

    less

    useful

    clinically.

    Consequently, empathic immersionor, more accuratelyfor theintersub-

    jectivist, empathic-introspection (Orange et al., 1997, pp. 43-44)

    always

    implicates

    tw o

    subjectivities, intersubjectively engaged,

    such

    that

    [e]very

    transference interpretation that successfully illuminates

    for the

    patient his uncon scious past simultaneou sly crystallizes an elusive

    present (Atw ood & Stolorow, 1984, p. 60). In other wo rds, any genu ine ly

    effective

    interpretation presupposes and embodies a corresponding mea-

    sure

    of attunement to thepatient's affective

    experience, which experience

    is inevitably (though not entirely)coconstructed in the session. Here the

    analyst's embeddedness does not make it incumbent on him or her to be

    empathic (sentimentalism), but rather to be ever at the ready to acknowl-

    edge, analyze, and understand the various impacts that occur within the

    intersubjective

    field.

    Likewise

    it is not the

    girdle

    of

    scientific objectivism,

    or metapsychology, that guards against the mine fields of mysticism, but

    the analyst's ongoing recognition of his or her subjective participation in

    the

    work.

    Ithas been suggested (Shane & Shane, 1994)that this movefrom the

    empathic

    field

    to the intersubjective (or inter-affective)

    field,

    accelerates

    the paradigm shift that Kohut had begun by attempting to overcome

    remnants of isolated mind thinking (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992) still

    evident in Kohut's original contributions. This overcoming is accom-

    plished by repeated emphasis on the fact that psychoanalysis always

    involves two subjectivities w ho mutually regulate (however un equ ally) the

    interaction, yet while regulating themselves at the same time. Accordingly

    this self-

    and

    mutual regulation

    is a way of monitoringwithout

    dichot-

    omizingthe very edge that Kohut suggested we must walk with our

    patients: between empathy as a mode of being present and empathy as a

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    692 KLUGMAN

    mode of observation. As such, intersubjectivity theory implies a systems

    view

    in

    which self-

    and

    interactive regulation

    are

    simultaneous, comple-

    mentary, and optimally in dynamic

    balance

    (Beebe & Lachman, 1998,

    p.

    509).

    That this dynamic balance

    is

    more explicit

    in

    K ohu t's praxis than

    in

    his theory is well illustrated by the follow ing example. T rying to observe

    the psychological experience of avery tall

    person,

    Kohut

    (1978)

    said

    that

    without introspection andempathy hissize remains simplyaphysical

    attribute (p. 207). Rather, it is only when we

    think

    ourselves into

    his

    place,

    only

    when,

    by

    vicarious

    introspection, we

    begin

    to

    feel

    his

    unusual

    size

    as if it

    were

    our own and

    thus revive

    inner

    experiences

    in which

    we had

    been unusual

    or

    conspicuous,

    only then do we

    begin

    to

    appreciatethe meaningthat th eunusual sizemayhavefor thisperson,andonly

    then

    havewe

    observed

    a

    psychological fact. (Kohut, 1978,

    pp.

    207-208)

    In this seminal passage Kohut

    affirmed

    the presence of the analyst's

    subjectivity in the act of

    empathy

    by way of a

    dialectic between self-

    experience and experience of the other. Focusing on his experience of the

    patient, Kohut

    felt

    theother 's size as if itwerehis own while concom-

    itantly admitting into the field of his empathic inquiry the need for

    self-experience, recalling memories in which he had been unu sual or

    conspicuous. Considered this way, em path y is a bilateral procedu re that

    necessarily includes the a na lyst's subjectivity in the act of imagining how

    a

    patient feels, thinks,

    and so

    forth. Accordingly,

    the

    dynamic balance

    on

    which

    empathy depends involves(a)grasping the patient's experience as

    ifit were on e's own and then (b) measuring that experience againsts on e's

    own subjective history. A central them e I now elucidate is that a vision of

    theempathic ana lyst mediating between self-experienceandexperienceof

    the other in this way extends a Romantic, post-Cartesian paradigm in

    which

    the role of imagination is both central and precise.

    First let me

    define

    Cartesianism as any working model in which the

    basic elements of human relatedness comprise an irreducible duality

    between subjective experience and an objective, external world. Next let

    me

    definepost-Cartesianism

    as any working model that resists a view of

    relatedness as the bumping together of isolated variables, privileging

    instead

    the

    position that subject

    and

    world

    are

    coextensive, interdepen-

    dent, and interpenetrating. Although these

    definitions

    may unfairly repre-

    sent Descartes (for wh omallsub stances were united un der God), atomism

    and

    duality nevertheless characterize significant aspects of the Cartesian

    legacy against which Romanticism struggled. In what follows, I focus on

    this struggle as it was articulated in the writing of Samuel Taylor

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    SELF PSYCHOLOGY, INTERSUBJECTTVITY, AND IMAGINATION 693

    Coleridge (1835,

    1848/1951,

    1961, 1912/1969, 1973, 1980, 1817/1983,

    1825/1993,

    1995).

    Aspects of Imagination in Coleridge

    For

    Coleridge

    the

    sting

    ofCartesianismwas

    soul-stealing,

    and so he

    made

    it

    his business either to oppose or revise those philosophic and scientific

    models

    that were rooted in the dua lism of Descartes. Importantly, this was

    no tanantiscientific

    program

    forColeridgewho

    remained throughou t

    his

    life deeply interested in and profoundlyinfluenced by the science of his

    time (see Holmes, 1989, 1999; W ylie, 1989). Rather this impu lse

    was

    motivated

    by

    Coleridge's desire

    to

    counteract

    the

    passive, mechanistic

    models of the mind thatreliedon Cartesian dualism. His intention was to

    wake the

    human spirit from what

    he

    sometimes called

    the

    lethargy

    of

    custom (Coleridge, 1817/1983,

    II, p. 7). One

    central

    hub

    around which

    this

    lifelong mission turned

    wasDescartes's

    fam ous formulation: cogito

    ergo sum (i.e., I thin k therefore I am ). The implication of this axiom in

    which Coleridge

    was

    most interested

    is the way in

    which

    a

    thinking

    subject is ultimately and inexorably pitted against an independentlyex -

    isting

    object w orld. Altho ughhispreoccupation withtheresulting dualism

    between

    the

    mental

    and the

    physical took

    on

    many forms throughout

    his

    life

    (e.g.,

    see Coleridge, 1961, n. 3159; 1817/1983, I, pp. 232-294;

    1825/1993, p. 139; 1995,1,p. 349), ajudgmenthe returnedto againand

    again was thatfrom withinDescartes's systemone cann ot appreciate the

    basic processes that are uncon sciously involved in putting together a world

    of

    distinct objects. Evidence

    of

    this failing

    was

    signaled,

    for

    example,

    by

    Descartes's inference of the independent existence of objects from the

    appearance of their externality (or what Coleridge called

    outness see

    Bar-field, 1971,pp.59-68). Indeed Descartes's cardinal error lay, accord-

    ing

    to Coleridge, in his attempt to demonstrate that the experience of

    outness (i.e., the appearance of the externality of thin gs) inev itably leads

    one to consider the idea of the existence of things w ithou t us as a

    conclusion

    of

    judgment (Barfield,

    1971, p. 65; see also, Coleridge,

    1817/

    1983, I, p. 259); that is as something once established, never questioned.

    In

    turn we are confronted with the classic dichotomy between mind and

    nature which is the hallmark of Cartesian epistemology.

    Coleridge's opposition to this dichotomy and to its establishment as

    dogma is what I am most interested in here; for it is the psychological

    dimension of this fundamental rift between mind and nature that

    Coleridge's theory

    of

    imagination sets

    out to

    refute.

    In

    other words,

    for

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    694 KLUGMAN

    Coleridgeeven

    the

    deadest Nature

    we can

    conceive

    is

    already

    a

    Nature

    ofourmaking (Richards, 1934, p.164), whichis to say

    there

    is alifeand

    death of the world, dependent on whatwe make of it (Cavell, 1988, p.

    68). A ccording toColeridge, ju st what wemakeof it dependson therole

    one

    assigns

    to

    imagination

    inone's

    perception

    and

    creation

    of the

    world.

    Imagination and Fancy

    One way to understand the role imagination plays in

    one's

    creation of

    the

    worldis toconsider

    Coleridge's

    (1817/1983,1,pp.304-305) famous

    distinction between imagination and

    fancy.

    From the Greek phantasia

    (phantasie,

    fantasy), fancy for

    Coleridge denotes

    the

    m echanical free play

    ofthe mind in relation to objects, images, andrecollections;it is the m ode

    of wit, comedy,

    and

    chimera. Imagination,

    on the

    other hand, from

    the

    Latin imaginatio, attains privileged status in his system owing to its stress

    on sensuous activity and the mind in the act of organizing perception

    itself; it is the mode of subtlety and genius. Whereas fancy was called by

    Coleridge

    (1817/1983,

    I, p. 305) an aggregative power that must

    receive all its materials ready made

    from

    the law of association, imagi-

    nation actually creates new images (of self and world) by virtue of its

    power

    to

    organize sensuous experience

    and

    achieve formu lations that

    the

    senses alone(i.e.,withoutthe aid ofimagination) could never accomplish.

    Thus Coleridge viewed

    fancy

    as being inferior in kind to the power of

    imagination, which does not have to take its materials ready-made

    from

    the law of association but can actually create new images, new worlds, and

    new

    experience from the dep ths of elemental sensation to the heights of

    poetic symbolism. Whereas fancy must operate within the limits of an

    already represented (and thus divided) object world, imagination presents

    thephenomenal world without referencetosomethingelse,save sensuous

    experience

    (i.e.,

    in its most basic mode one might say that imagination

    functions

    to interpret or represent sensuous experience and

    thus

    present

    the phenomenal world).

    A

    further

    distinction made

    by

    Coleridge between primary

    and

    sec-

    ondary

    imagination

    is

    illuminating here.

    Not

    unlike what neurobiology

    callsa printing

    (Schore,

    1994, pp.

    75-76,

    466-468), primary imagina-

    tion generates an affective copy (or template) of nature derived

    from

    sense

    impressions (see

    Engell in

    Coleridge,

    1817/1983, I, p.

    xci). From this

    it

    follows

    that primary imagination precedes fancy

    for the

    obvious reason

    that the primary imag ination mu st

    perceive

    and create in itself the

    associable beforeanyassociation canoccur (Engell,1981, p.343). Hence

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    SELF PSYCHOLOGY, INTERSUBJECTIVITY, AND IMAGINATION 695

    Coleridge's

    primary imagination is not what most

    people

    refer to when

    theyuse the word imagination, but is closer to something more basic, like

    being

    or I

    am-ness

    (Coleridge's concept

    of the

    secondary imagination,

    as

    I

    discuss later,

    iscloserto the

    colloquial,

    and yet

    their interplay

    iswhat

    makes his system useful and persuasive). This is partly so because the

    primary imagination

    is

    usua lly taken

    fo r

    granted

    just

    as a

    sense

    of

    balance is taken for granted and not mentioned while we are walking

    (Engell, 1981, p. 344), which also explains why Coleridge referred to

    primary

    imagination as the necessary Imag ination distinct

    from

    both

    fancy (which

    it

    precedes)

    and

    secondary imagination (which

    is its

    creative

    complement).

    For

    instance, individuals

    all see a

    mou ntain

    in

    more

    or

    less

    the

    same

    wayaccording to certain a

    priori

    mental categories such as space,

    magnitude, contour, and so forth. Indeed, these common qualities render

    the

    declarative,

    Look

    at that mountain, comp rehensible. This is the

    primary

    imagination

    at

    work:

    It

    takes

    up the

    available material

    athandand

    re-presents

    or

    copies

    it.

    Importantly,

    the

    idea that primary imagination

    produces

    a

    copy

    is not

    intended

    tocall up a

    passive model

    in

    which

    the

    isolated

    mind receives an impression. Rather,

    psychoanalytically

    speak-

    ing, something like the elemental andinv oluntary actionof

    identification

    is intended, in the sense of it being the first way in which the ego picks

    out

    an

    object

    (Freud,

    1917/1957a,

    p. 241) and thereby produces a

    sense

    sameness,linking self-experience

    to

    world-experience

    (or

    experience

    of

    the other). Conversely, as I elaborate later, the secondary imagination

    starts

    to

    work

    on

    this identification

    or

    sense

    of

    samenessfrom

    the

    angle

    of

    differencewhat

    Coleridge called

    centra-distinction

    (Barfield, 1971, p.

    65),

    or

    what contemporary

    developmentalists

    might call

    differentiation.

    As

    such, primary imagination

    does

    not

    produce anything original

    in the

    artistic sense, but is rather aboriginal(i.e., primary, necessary, given ).

    Secondary imagina tion, on the other hand, is used by the artist to produce

    an

    imitation

    of

    nature, that

    is, a

    creative alternative

    to

    what

    is given (or

    copied or printed ) by virtueofprimary imagination. For instance, as I

    linger withm yperception of them ountain, whichissnow-capped,I see a

    hooded monk

    riding

    through

    the

    forest, whereas

    my

    friend, viewing

    the

    same

    scene,

    envisions

    a

    breast that will never yield

    a

    single drop

    of

    milk.

    This is the secondary imagination at work: It generates an imitation of

    what

    theprimary imaginationhasprovided.InColeridge's

    (1817/1983,1)

    own

    language : the primary IMAGINATION

    I

    hold

    to be the ...

    prime

    Agentof allh um an perception

    [whereas]the secondary [imagination]

    I consider as an echo of the former. It dissolves, diffuses, and

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    KL UG MAN

    dissipates,

    in

    order

    to

    re-create [what

    is

    'given'

    by

    virtue

    of the

    necessary

    action of primary imagination] (p. 304).

    My interest in these distinctions centers on the way in which

    Coleridge's conception of primary and secondary imagination mayillu-

    minate the field of therapeutic action in psychoanalysis. For example, it

    may be useful to conceptualize the analyst's task in terms of her or his

    ability to grasp the patient's affective copying of reality via primary

    imagination. Instead of space, magnitude, and contour presenting moun-

    tains, this activity may present a felt sense of the patient's early care to

    form arelational

    pattern

    or

    configuration.

    Like the

    mountain,

    this rela-

    tional configuration

    and the

    world that

    it

    attends

    may

    feel

    to the

    patient

    unalterable and givena

    faithful

    copy of the only real world. Yet like the

    mountain

    it too may be re-created, this time through an intersubjectively

    constrained analysis

    of its

    derivation,

    form, and

    functionin

    a

    manner

    that

    resembles the activity of the secondary imagination. That is, this sort

    of mu tually inform ed analysis dissolves, diffuses, and dissipates the

    magnitude

    and force of the affective copy in order to re-create the basic

    organization of the patient's primary perceptions. Reflecting the means of

    artistic creation, this process might aptly be called the

    poetry

    of

    psycho-

    analysis,

    whereby patient and analyst cocreate alternatives to what was

    formerly given (i.e.,

    felt to be unalterable).

    It is in this way that the Romantic imagination transforms the

    subjective

    universe: un iting sense and thing, thoug ht and feeling, precisely

    because its activity both penetrates and precedes the perception and

    experience

    of

    their division.

    So

    conceived, imagination

    may be

    especially

    suited for

    that process

    of

    elevation whereby

    the

    subtlest stirrings

    of

    impulse, feeling, and sensation are given sublime

    form

    through (psycho-

    analytic) dialog.

    Coleridge's

    conversation poems

    are

    supreme illustra-

    tions of this procedure, wherein states of dejection, loneliness, and feelings

    of

    abandonment aredialogicallyengaged. The kind of self-reflective m ode

    wefind in Shakespeare's characters, for instance who will themselves

    to change upon self-overhearing and thus prophesy the psychoanalytic

    situation

    in

    which patients

    are

    compelled

    to

    overhear themselves

    in the

    context oftheir transference to the analyst (Bloom,

    1994,

    p. 365)may

    be

    found

    inpoems suchas

    This

    Lime Tree BowerMyPrison (Coleridge,

    1912/1969,pp. 178-181). Indeed, Coleridge's activity in hisearly poetry

    can be

    viewed

    as an

    illustration

    of his

    later theory, according

    to

    which

    the

    secondary imagination is put toworkon his given statesmuchlikeI

    am

    suggesting analyst and patient go to work on the

    given

    states of the

    latterin

    order to bring about renewal throughforms of understanding.

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    SELF PSYCHOLOGY, INTERSUBJECTTV1TY, AND IMAGINATION 697

    Effacing the notion of a dichotomy between

    affect

    and cognition, this

    transfigurationof feeling into thought thro ugh dialog illuminates the cash

    value

    of Rom antic truth: that we may reimagine and not merely reenact;

    re-create

    rather than

    repeat thematic

    patterns

    ofperception and

    self-in-

    world organization.

    Revisiting the old subject-object dichotom y with all of this in min d,

    I

    think

    we are now in a

    position

    to

    appreciate

    why

    Coleridge considered

    the appearance of externality less

    substantively

    than Descartes, that is, as

    a

    recurring experience rather than

    as a final

    revelation

    of the way

    things

    really are. In fact, Coleridge went so far as to suggest that the experience

    of

    a world of independent objects unconsciously presupposes the subjec-

    tive, I-am position (see, Coleridge, 1817/1983,1,

    p.

    260).

    3

    C onsequently,

    we

    can say

    that Coleridge gleaned

    a

    covert

    Iam-ness

    lurking

    a

    priori

    to

    Descartes's

    famo us declaration, from whichaColeridgean revision m ight

    be

    rendered

    as I am,

    therefore

    I

    think, therefore

    I

    am,

    or

    more radically

    as I am,

    therefore

    the

    world. Coleridge's

    effort to

    make this covert

    I

    am-ness explicit characterizes generally

    his

    effort

    to

    subvert

    the funda-

    mentalatomism tha t dominated thephilosophical andscientific modelsof

    his era. One startling result of his subversion is that the appearance of the

    existence

    of

    things witho ut

    us

    reveals itself

    to be

    not only coherent

    but

    identical, and one and the

    same thing with

    our own

    immediate self-

    consciousness (Coleridge,

    1817/1983,

    I, p. 260). This realization, far

    from lulling us to sleep in simple narcissism, or patheticfallacy, rouses

    us from whatwas essentially asleeping relation with phenomena intoa

    waking

    one

    (Barfield,

    1971, p. 66). It was into this

    wakefulness

    that

    Coleridge ever sought to stir himself, as well as his contemporaries.

    Imagination

    and

    Empathy

    Although these considerations may seem remote from the action of em-

    pathy in

    psychoanalysis, they

    are in

    fact germane,

    for

    what this wakeful-

    ness brings to our attention is the experience of a particular and inexorable

    connectiveness between

    the

    perceiver

    and

    that which

    is

    perceived,

    a

    unity

    which

    is for the most part an unconscious one, thoug h it need not remain

    so

    (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 204). Indeed it is part of the task of depth

    psychology to make this connection conscious, such that we might view

    3

    In the

    same

    way that fancy presupposes primary imagination (as

    discussed

    earlier).

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    KL UG MAN

    thelatteras amethod for exploringandilluminating the

    unconsciousness

    of

    self-consciousness. Whereas

    the

    Romantic's awareness

    of

    this inexo-

    rable connectiveness was directed primarily toward the experience of

    nature,

    the psychoanalyst's focus is appropriately aimed toward the ex-

    perience of the patient, an experience that is

    united

    by the phenomenon

    of

    emp athy, through which im agination acts

    to

    reveal

    the

    interdependence

    and

    interpenetration

    of

    interacting subjective worlds.

    In

    other words,

    the

    seeing into nature that characterizes the Romantic orientation becomes a

    seeing into

    the

    experience

    of the

    other within

    a

    psychoanalytic

    frame.

    4

    In sum , then, what

    Coleridge's

    subversion helps toclarify is how the

    experience of Cartesian duality is intermediate rather than final or con-

    clusive; areification of a particular state of being in which the sense of self

    is insulated from the

    always already

    interpenetrating surround ofone's

    own and

    other worlds.

    In a

    word,

    the

    reification

    of the

    experience

    of

    self-consciousness as alienation. The fact that up

    until

    recently Cartesi-

    anism

    as

    such

    was so

    pervasively reflected

    in

    analytic theories

    of

    devel-

    opmentwherein a merged self must separate from its surroundin order

    to

    establish

    its autonomyindicates theprofound and

    lastinginfluence

    of

    this model and mayalsobe asignof the unconscious presence oftrauma

    in

    our theories. Conversely, recent developmental schemas (Lyons-Ruth,

    1991) that stress attachment-individuation rather than separation-indi-

    viduation

    support the primacy of the inexorable connectiveness between

    self and other, as do those developmental theories in which the sense of

    agency or

    being

    is not

    endogenous,

    but

    rather depends

    on the

    recognition

    of the (m)other (Rustin, 1997; Sander, 1995).

    The Rationalist Critique

    It would be, perhaps, remiss of me not to mention the long history of

    criticism that characterizes the Romantic position described herein as a

    strategic denial of duality, separateness, and

    thus

    as a denial of vicissitude

    en masse. Indeed,

    it has

    often been

    the

    case

    that critics have accused

    Rom antics of wan ting to have their cake and eat it too, o f wanting to enjoy

    the

    interactive productivity of subject and object (self and other, serf and

    world) w ithout

    suffering

    their vicissitudes. Although this indictment has a

    4

    In

    this

    context, one may be

    tempted

    to interpret

    Wordsworth's

    famous

    lines

    with thedeeppowerofjoy Iwe seeintothe lifeof

    things

    (Brett &Jones, 1991,

    p. 114)as an important gloss on the

    effect

    of

    affect

    on perception in relational

    experiencethat is, with thedeeppower

    of

    joy I we see

    into

    the life of[others].

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    PSYCHOLOGY,

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    AND

    IMAGINATION

    699

    complex history at least as long as Positivism itself, its gist is that

    Romanticism, in any form, is a regressive effort to reestablish lost unity.

    Philosophically the Romantic is accused of attempting to mend the

    ob-

    jectivist rift between mind and nature (Wilber, 1995), whereas from a

    psychoanalytic perspective this criticism is mirrored by developmental

    theories rooted

    in the

    paradigm

    of

    primary narcissism (Freud, 19147

    1957b), which posit that

    the ego

    takes form only reluctantly (Freud,

    1911/1958)

    by

    differentiating

    from the

    primal narcissistic matrix.

    In

    both

    instances, the Romantic (or read, respectively, the neurotic) individual

    clings to an infantile,

    prerational omnipotence

    that is developmentally

    aberrant, scientifically u nso und , philosophically confused,andsometimes

    morally depraved.Inother words Romanticismineither case isviewedas

    a regressive reaction against the bad new s of Enlightenment, wh ich bad

    news

    is, developmentally speaking, separateness. This regressive reaction,

    so the

    Rationalist argument

    goes,

    threatens

    to

    forfeit

    all of the

    most

    important gains attributed to the ego's hard won differentiation from

    nature

    (or again, developmentally speaking, read mother nature ).

    From this critical vantage point thep rioritizing of subjectivityto

    the extent that it represents an organic unity intended to displace the

    Cartesian priority of the phenomenal world

    (i.e.,

    things as they exist

    without

    us)is

    viewed as a naive, or worse, a cowardly retreat from the

    hard existential facts ofhuman life. For example, literary critics suchas

    Paulde Man

    (1962,

    1969; Lentricchia, 1980, pp.282-317) maintain that

    the

    Rom antic priority of the su b je c t. . . is 'i llusionary,' and

    canonly

    arise when the subject 'in fact' borrows from the outside a temporal

    stability which it lacks withinitself (p.292). Ruskin's (1902) pathetic

    fallacy makes a similar claim. Andonceagain parallels to psychoanalytic

    modelsofdevelopment can bemade (Freud,

    1914/1957b;

    Mahler, Pine,&

    Bergman, 1975;Pine, 1979), according to which motherfunctions as the

    original source of this

    borrowed

    and therefore illusionary sense of

    stability, which illusion mustbe shedinorderfordevelopmenttoproceed

    along

    its normal, healthy course. In the event, the Romantic is charged

    with acting

    in

    bad faith (Sartre, 1956/1994)

    by

    pretending

    to

    possess

    a

    determinate nature that he can hold responsible for who he is (Atwood,

    1994, p. 171).

    These allegations are,

    of

    course, improperly alleged. There

    is no

    denialofvicissitudein theRomantic assertionof aprior

    unity

    sustainedby

    the imagination;on the contrary, imagination is theembodimentof vicis-

    situde.

    Indeed,Coleridge'sexistential form ulation:

    Being

    .. .isposterior

    to

    Existence

    (Coleridge, 1973, n. 3593), m ay itself be viewed as a

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    KL UG MAN

    precursor

    of

    Sartre's(1956/1994)

    existence

    precedesessence

    (p.

    630)

    which axiom forms the basis for the latter's theory of bad faith (pp.

    47-70).

    Once

    awakened to

    self-consciousness, h owever, Coleridge held

    it

    to be the

    task

    of the

    imagination

    to

    assert (indeed,

    to

    discover)

    the

    priority of the subject, not as a denial of the existence of things withou t

    usasifimagination could co nquer chaosandcontrolothernessbut on

    the

    more humble, phenomenological basis that

    being is coextensive with

    perception.

    Conclusion

    Indictments against Romanticism such

    as the

    pathetic fallacy will

    un-

    doubtedlycontinue as its various dialogs with Rationalism evolve. Indeed

    the differences between these schools ofthoughtmay be more profitably

    struggled

    with than finally settled.

    My

    argument

    in

    this article

    is

    that

    Kohut 's

    insistence on thecentrality ofempathycan be viewed within the

    context ofthat struggle. How

    better

    tounderstandhis

    ambivalence

    and his

    persistent need

    to

    anticipate

    the

    argum ent that self psychology

    is a

    cow-

    ardlyattempt

    to ...

    deny m an 's drive-nature (Ko hut, 1977,

    p.

    xviii)

    an d

    that its

    emphasis

    on

    empathy

    is

    likewise

    a

    replacement

    of the

    scientific

    mode of thoug ht by a quasi-religious or my stical approach (Ko hut,

    1977,

    p. 304)? Within this broader historical context I believe Kohut's voice is

    one in a

    long line

    of

    thinkers

    to

    oppose reductionism, while

    rigorously

    defending his opposition against charges of recreancy and regression.

    SimilarlyCo leridge'santi-Cartesian fo rmu lations do notreflect a denial of

    theexperienceofalienation,butratherresistanceto its enshrinement as the

    core truthofhu man life. Insteadhis

    efforts

    reflectadeeply held conviction

    that once we have awakened to the alienating aspects of self-conscious-

    ness (traumatic or otherwise), it is the task of imagination to

    assertor,

    again, to

    discoverthe

    priority of our subjectivity.

    My

    central theme is that this discovery of personal subjectivity

    through

    imaginatio n is akin to the action of empathy in the analytic setting,

    through whichtheanalystm ay discover the subjectivityof the patient.In

    this respect, Kohut's recognition

    of therole of

    empathy

    in the

    analytic

    process parallels

    the

    Romantic recognition

    of therole of

    imagination

    in

    perception and

    experienceneither

    of which is meant as a denial of the

    vicissitudes

    ofseparateness,

    uncertainty,

    or

    existential despair,

    but

    rather

    constitute responses to these, responses intended to wash away the numb-

    ing film offamiliarity

    in consequence [of

    which]...

    w ehave eyesyet

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    SELF PSYCHOLOGY, INTERSUBJECTTVITY,

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    701

    see not, ears that hear not, and hearts that neither feel nor understand

    (Coleridge, 1817/1983,

    II, p. 7).

    Summary

    In this article I have attempted to illustrate three things: (a) the way in

    which an

    intersubjective theory

    of

    empathy

    is

    presaged

    in Kohut 's

    theory

    by

    virtue

    of his

    recognition

    of the

    ambivalence between

    the

    presence

    of

    empathy and empathy as a mode of observation ; (b) the notion that this

    ambivalence finds resolution in thetheoryofintersubjectivity, which asks

    us

    to

    consider that affective bon ding

    and

    interpretation

    are not two

    faces

    of

    a dichotomy, nor are they linear stages in a method toward

    cure,

    but

    rather represent dialectically inseparable even ts that pu nc tuate

    th e

    ongoing

    flow

    of

    mutuality;and (c) thenotion that imag ination providesuswithan

    epistemological modality through which

    we may

    render

    the alterity of the

    patient as

    Other, while grasping

    concomitantly the

    inescapable involve-

    ments and inevitable impacts of our own subjectivity.One advantageof

    viewing

    em pathy this

    wayas a

    bilateral procedure enabled

    by

    imagina-

    tionis that

    it

    further

    obviates

    the

    need

    fo r

    isolated variables (e.g.,

    the

    analyst's mind perceives

    th e

    patient's state), privileging instead

    th e

    pro-

    cess through wh ich self-experience

    an d

    experience

    of the

    other

    are

    assim-

    ilated,and

    thus

    also

    through which minds

    and

    states

    are

    ever

    linked to

    worlds.

    References

    Atwood,

    G.(1994).T he

    pursuit

    of

    being

    in the

    life

    an d

    thought

    of

    Jean-Paul Sartre.

    In

    R. Stolorow, G. Atwood, & B.

    Brandchaft (Eds.),

    Th e

    intersubjective perspective

    (pp.

    157-176).

    Northvale,NJ:

    Jason

    Aronson.

    Atwood,

    G.,&Stolorow, R.(1984).Structures of subjectivity. Hillsdale,NJ: Analytic

    Press.

    Bacal,

    H.

    (1985).

    Optimal

    responsiveness and the

    therapeutic process.

    In A.

    Goldberg

    (Ed.),Progress in

    self

    psychology

    (Vol.

    1,

    pp. 202-227).Hillsdale,NJ: Analytic

    Press.

    Barfield, O.(1971). What Coleridge thought.Middletown,CT: Wesleyan University

    Press.

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