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Electoral typologies and democracySalvatore d'Albergo a & Pier Paolo Frassinelli ba Professor of Constitutional Law, Faculty of Economics andCommerce , University of Pisab Research student at the University of SouthamptonPublished online: 06 Jul 2007.

To cite this article: Salvatore d'Albergo & Pier Paolo Frassinelli (1999) Electoral typologies anddemocracy, Representation, 36:1, 73-77, DOI: 10.1080/00344899908523060

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A referendum was held in Italy on 18 April 1999 on a proposalto replace the semi proportional additional member system, usedtwice to elect the Chamber of Deputies, with a majoritarianvoting system. The referendum proposal was not successful. Thefollowing article discusses the basis for Italy's attachment to PR

Electoral Typologies and DemocracySalvatore d'Albergo and Pier Paolo Frassinelli

Salvatore d'Albergo isProfessor ofConstitutional Law atthe University of Pisa,Faculty of Economicsand Commerce; PierPaolo Frassinelli is agraduate of theUniversity of Pisa and isa research student at theUniversity ofSouthampton,specialising in economicand institutional issues.The authors wish tothank Maggie Ronaynefor her editorial work.

In order to go beyond the simple question of electoral engineering,theoretical discussion about alternative voting systems must be put inits social, political and historical context. Too often, comparisons aremade as if electoral formulae were simply a matter of institutionaltechnique. This should become clearer when comparing the politicaland institutional peculiarities of Britain with those of a 'continental'system such as the Italian one.

The Italian 'anomaly'At the moment, Italy presents a significant contradiction. The Italianconstitution introduced in 1948 guarantees the political pluralismsanctioned by proportional representation. Now, while theconstitution is still in force, in 1994 a partial change of the electoralsystem has been introduced which undermines the criterion ofproportionality: the new mechanism for the election of parliament is amixture of first-past-the-post (75% of the seats) and proportionalrepresentation (25% of seats). This situation is the result of a long-term crisis within Italian democracy and in particular of the politicalforces that ratified the constitutional pact in 1948. In order tounderstand the nature of its subsequent crisis, it is necessary tohighlight some of the original characteristics of this institutional modeland the historical circumstances of its formation.

In Italy, a liberal and democratic system, after the fall of the Fascistregime, had to deal with the political and ideological antagonismbetween, one the one hand, liberal and Catholic political forces and, onthe other, Socialist and Communist organised mass parties. Thisantagonism, characterised by the political mobilisation of largesections of society, was the background for the agreement betweenChristian Democrats (DC), the Socialist Party (PSI) and the CommunistParty (PCI). These three parties were the most relevant politicalorganisations that contributed to the writing of the 1948 constitution.

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The key aim of the constitutional prescriptions about institutionalorganisation was to emphasise the pre-eminence of parliamentaryrepresentation and its sovereignty over the power of the executive.Hence the choice of proportional representation.

This choice was the result of the existing multiplicity of organisedpolitical parties representing diversified social demands, rather than, asit is commonly assumed, the cause of the so-called political'fragmentation'. Within this context, the creation of multi-partyparliamentary majorities and coalition governments was inspired bystrategies of achieving political and institutional representation of thedivisions between and internal to the working class and 'bourgeois'blocs as they emerged from the world conflict.

After the failure to introduce a majoritarian formula in 1953, for along period the requirement of Italian constitutional law forproportional representation in elected bodies became so universallyaccepted that it was automatically extended to regional, local andEuropean elections.

As mentioned above, a change of the electoral system was eventuallyintroduced in 1994. This historical transformation has been defined asthe passage from the First to the Second Italian Republic. In popularliterature the main reason for the change has been identified as aconcern with the well-known cases of the corruption of Italian politics,in particular of the government parties (DC and PSI). It is true that theissue of corruption played a fundamental role in the transformation ofthe Italian institutional system. But it would be a more accurate insightto recognise that the crisis of the system runs deeper: it is far morecomplex than it would superficially appear. It is important to note, infact, that the Italian 'crisis' first emerged during the late 1970s and itwas not a crisis of the political and institutional system in itself.Rather, it was determined by a transformation of the identity of thosepolitical parties which had contributed to framing the constitutionalprinciples safeguarding political pluralism.

In this regard, their different and opposed positions along with theirpolitical labels can not be oversimplified. In the late 1970s, a campaignfor 'institutional reforms' was launched with the key support of theSocialist Party leader Bettino Craxi. The motive behind this campaignwas the 'anomaly' that Italy had become, within the process ofEuropean integration (in 1979 the European Monetary System wasintroduced), a mixed economy with a strong state presence in allservices and sectors of production. Furthermore, the proposed reformsrepresented an attempt to counteract the growth of the electoralsupport of the PCI - which had come to represent one third of theItalian electorate - and the strengthening of the power of three maintrade unions (CGIL, CISL, UIL). The stability of the Italian system was

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represented as under threat.Consequently, the attack focused in particular upon proportional

representation, which was identified as the instrument of politicalfragmentation, and the undermining by parliament of the executivepower. The purpose of reform was the creation of homogeneousparliamentary majorities and a two 'pole' (or 'party') system. Thepropaganda for change was centred on the need to simplify the politicalsystem, strength the stability of government and improve theeffectiveness of the state apparatus. The outcome was to be surprising.

In the early 1990s, Bettino Craxi and the Socialist Party leadershipbecame involved with the scandals relating to political corruption.Surprisingly, the catchword 'institutional reforms' was embraced,among others, by the main opposition party - the former CommunistParty - by now the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS). The wave ofdiscontent caused by corruption expressed itself in the form of popularsupport for a referendum that, in the event, only partially changed theelectoral system. Three other attempts to bring about more radicaltransformations (in 1983,1988 and 1997) also failed as they have had toconfront the heritage of the 1948 constitution, which is still in force andwhich is actively defended by the Constitutional Court.

In Italy, as in Britain, the debate over the electoral system is still a keypolitical issue. The various political forces continue to be divided bydifferent positions alternatively supporting majoritarian formulae orproportional representation. Hence the compromise introduced in 1994and the ongoing discussion about further change.

The British debateWhat the Italian experience should make clear, is that electoral systemsare not neutral means of representation, on the contrary they play a vitalpart in connecting institutional politics with society at large. Now, thereference to Italy and the acknowledgement that the problem ofelectoral reform is not only a feature of British politics should help todemystify some of the misunderstandings characterising the currentdebate. A typical one is the argument used to maintain support for theexisting electoral system, that Britain, differently from other continentaldemocracies, is not solely a party system at all. Hence the advantages itenjoys in terms of direct links of MPs with constituencies.

On the contrary, as various studies have pointed out, Britain is a'party democracy par excellence', where 'the notion of an autonomousform of individual MP accountability... constitutes little more than achimera'.1 Aside from exceptional cases of independent candidates, inthe British system the selection of parliamentary candidates for eachconstituency is up to the political parties that include them on theirslate, rather than to the preference of the electorate. So, the premise

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1. Peter Mair, 'TheQuestion of ElectoralReform', New Left Review,4 (1992), p. 91.

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that this system is not based on party discipline is at the very leastinaccurate.

The British electoral system hinges on the creation of government,even by a single seat majority, translating minority electoral supportinto a parliamentary majority. Periodic electoral endorsement is strictlyfunctional to the achievement of executive power by one or other of thecompeting parties. So that, notwithstanding the alternativesrepresented by the Labour, Liberal Democrat and Conservativeprogrammes, the unquestioned supremacy of the criterion of'stabilityof government' works as a safeguard for political and institutionalconservatism. Hence the difficulty in going beyond a debate in whichthe electoral system is restrictively conceived as an instrument for thealternation of competing political forces in public administration. Theachievement of parliamentary majority and government ends up beingconsidered as an end and a means in itself. Consequent to thisconception is the critique of proportional representation as a cause ofpolitical 'fragmentation'.

The case for proportional representationIn providing a contribution to the debate that moves from thecomplexity of the Italian experience, we wish to emphasise theimportance of recognising diversified criteria of evaluation. The casefor proportional representation, in fact, needs to be addressed in thelight of the intricate series of relationships between institutions,politics and society. As it is not within the scope of this article toprovide a comprehensive analysis of this issue, we will limit ourselvesto some general and brief considerations in support of PR.

Sets of relations between institutions, politics and society must notbe seen as constant but, rather, as historically constituted. As we haveargued, they are constantly shifting and changing when politicalalliances are made and unmade, when social blocs come into conflictor when economic relations change the social map. But preciselybecause these events are historically derived, we need to pay attentionto their relations with electoral processes and, alternately, to the broadhistorical context which give rise and continue to be relevant to theseprocesses themselves. One of the most important of these historicalconditions is the emergence of the modern, constitutional nation-state.In this regard, the historical period through which we have just passedstill offers useful elements of analysis in order to interpret the latemodern world we live in, characterised by so-called 'globalisation' andthe emergence of such supranational institutions as the EuropeanUnion. Within this context, it is necessary to recognise the need torelate the ideas of freedom and democracy (historically emergent withand linked to the formation of the modern state) to the new

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developments occurring at a national and supranational level. Thechoice of proportional representation is then an acknowledgement thatthe social and political questions that have marked the emergence ofmodern constitutional states are inevitably destined to affect the newlevel of internationalisation of politics and economics.

There is no doubt that such questions will not be reproduced in thesame terms as in 1948 or any other such historic turning point. Thespecific relationships between the state and socio-political identity havechanged considerably in recent years. However, the question of the co-habitation between conflicting positions and diversified socialidentities has been, and remains, the key issue of institutional andpolitical organisation. As the essence of popular sovereignty still lies inthe recognition of the plurality of social-political interests anddemands, a coherent 'democratic' and 'progressive policy' must opt forelectoral and institutional models that reflect this. It must be groundedelectorally on proportional representation, rather than in the denial ofthis antagonistic plurality. It must be noted, however, that a system ofproportional representation is not in itself the end result, but a pre-condition for further transformative changes to social relations.

ConclusionAs the question of democracy should not be restricted to the periodicendorsement of the political apparatus, institutional issues are to berelated to processes of decision making in which all sectors of societyshould be involved. In stressing the importance of broadening thediscussion over different electoral typologies, the key point to be madeis that proportional representation is antithetical to the first-past-the-post system in a general sense. It aims at representing, rather thanconstraining, the plurality of interests, needs and demands deep rootedin modern society. Proportional representation subordinates thequestion of political alliances and government coalitions to theunification of a 'social bloc'. That is, it connects the dynamics of socialand political transformation, making politics the site of the dialecticalrepresentation of the plurality of social interests, rather than simply ameans to register passive consensus. Conceived as an instrument of'social', rather than merely 'party political' representation, the criterionof proportionality allows the pursuing of the broadest form ofparticipatory democracy within the existing socio-historical formation.

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