EIU Nigeria Report

Country Report

Nigeria

November 2011

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Nigeria 1

Country Report November 2011 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2011

Nigeria

Executive summary 3 Highlights

Outlook for 2012-16 4 Political outlook 5 Economic policy outlook 7 Economic forecast

Monthly review: November 2011 11 The political scene 12 Economic policy 15 Economic performance

Data and charts 17 Annual data and forecast 18 Quarterly data 19 Monthly data 20 Annual trends charts 21 Monthly trends charts 22 Comparative economic indicators

Country snapshot 23 Basic data 24 Political structure

Editors: Philip Walker (editor); Joseph Lake (consulting editor)

Editorial closing date: November 7th 2011

All queries: Tel: (44.20) 7576 8000 E-mail: [email protected] Next report: To request the latest schedule, e-mail [email protected]

2 Nigeria


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Nigeria 3


Executive summary

Highlights

November 2011

• Despite the sometimes tense political scene, the president, Goodluck Jonathan, and his party, the People's Democratic Party, will remain in power at least until the next elections in 2015, and probably beyond.

• The main threats to political stability are the various social tensions that frequently provoke violent unrest in parts of the country. A particular concern is the rise of Islamist fundamentalism.

• Economic expansion will be buoyed by robust performance in the non-oil sector. Real GDP growth is expected to average almost 7% in 2012-16.

• The relatively high GDP growth rate is still below the double-digit levels required if the country is to meet the goal of becoming one of the world's top-20 economies by 2020.

• Tighter monetary and fiscal policy should allow inflation to come down gradually in the first half of the forecast period, before stronger growth and higher commodity prices see it increase in the second half.

• Current-account surpluses are expected throughout the forecast period as oil exports remain robust. An upward trend in the oil price forecast means these surpluses are set to increase in size gradually in 2013-16.

• Islamist fanatics unleashed bloody mayhem in November, killing around 150 people in co-ordinated bomb and gun attacks in north-east Nigeria. Pressure is growing on the president to restore security.

• It appears that government crackdowns against Islamist extremists may be a factor precipitating violent reactions from the group.

• On November 1st an electoral tribunal upheld Mr Jonathanís victory in Aprilís presidential election, rejecting a challenge brought by a main opposition party that alleged the ballot was marred by fraud.

• Federal and state governments are once again at loggerheads, this time over the distribution of oil revenue. Finding a mutually acceptable solution is proving difficult.

• The quality of government financial management has come under scrutiny in recent weeks following disputes over the handling of public funds that raise questions about the credibility of the accounting system.

• The Nigerian Ministry of Power and the Export-Import Bank of the United States have signed an agreement that will allow independent power producers in Nigeria to secure up to US$1.5bn of loans.

Outlook for 2012-16

Monthly review

4 Nigeria


Outlook for 2012-16 Political outlook

The president, Goodluck Jonathan, and his party, the People's Democratic Party (PDP), returned to power in the elections of April 2011, and are expected to remain in power at least until the end of their current term in 2015. Nonetheless, Mr Jonathan faces a variety of political challenges that threaten to distract him from the reform agenda required to propel Nigeria's development. On the political front, not all the PDP is united behind Mr Jonathan, a southern Christian, particularly among the ruling party's mainly Muslim northern caucus, who felt it was the turn of one of their own to have the PDP's presidential ticket in April. This resentment in the north at being kept away from poweróboth inside and outside the PDPówill require some deft manoeuvring by the president to assuage regional concerns that they will be ignored by another southern president. Nevertheless, the unhappiness in the north provoked by the elections is not expected to affect overall political stability in Nigeria. Northern political parties outside the PDP lack the nationwide presence to challenge the ruling party effectively. Furthermore, those within the PDP who are unhappy with Mr Jonathan are likely to calculate that they are better off within the party, with access to power, than outside, and so will temper their criticism of the president.

A greater threat to political stability comes from the various social tensions that frequently provoke violent unrest in parts of the country. Hotspots include: Borno state, from where Boko Haram, a group of Islamist fundamentalists, has waged increasingly daring and widespread violent attacks against the authorities; Plateau state, at the meeting point of Nigeria's Muslim north and Christian south; and the oil-producing Niger Delta region, where armed militants demand a greater share of the country's oil wealth for the area. The government will struggle to find lasting solutions to these issues, primarily because a common theme stoking the tensions are the underlying problems of poverty and underdevelopmentóchallenges that will take decades to solve at the current rate of progress. Sporadic upsurges in unrest are therefore expected, albeit not of a sufficient magnitude to threaten overall stability in the country.

The fallout from the presidential, legislative and state-level elections in April 2011 will take some time to dissipate completely. A court case brought by an opposition party against some of the election results was rejected in early November. However, the opposition party has indicated that it is considering an appeal. It seems likely that some irregularities did take place and elections in some areas may have to be re-run. However, any hopes that the overall presidential election might be annulled seem forlorn at best. Given that the courts rejected legal proceedings against the dire 2007 presidential election, the chances of them overturning the 2011 election are extremely remote. Even accounting for some voting manipulation, Mr Jonathan won by a sufficiently convincing majority for the overall result of his victory to be in little doubt.

Political stability

Election watch

Nigeria 5


The next national and state-level elections are due in 2015. The issue likely to dominate those elections is whether Mr Jonathan seeks another term in office. This would be highly unpalatable to many in the north, and the president has already indicated that he will stand down in 2015. Mr Jonathan has also suggested adopting a one-term limit for all presidents, in order to shift the focus of Nigeria's leaders from re-election to improving governance. While it does seem that Mr Jonathan is determined to serve for only one term, this may change further down the line. If his current term in office proceeds well and he is able to build some momentum behind the reform process, it is not imposs-ible that he would attempt to win another term to try to finish the job. It is too early to say how such a decision would go down in the north, but it is likely that political tensions would once again surge. Even assuming that Mr Jonathan stands down as expected, the race to succeed him within the PDP will be fierce in the run-up to the elections. Meanwhile, the opposition will attempt to build on their gains at the 2011 elections. While strong powers of incumbency mean that the PDP and its presidential candidate will be the favourites at the 2015 elections, the party's domination of Nigerian politics is expected to be again eroded by opposition gains, as the latter capitalise on growing popular disillusion with the rate of Nigeria's development under the PDP.

Mr Jonathan has talked about his desire for Nigeriaís foreign policy to shift from being Africa-centred to placing greater emphasis on promoting domestic priorities. He spoke of a need to put the nationís international diplomacy at the service of domestic priorities, such as job creation, poverty eradication, economic progress and security. In reality this will likely mean using Nigeria's foreign missions to attract investment into Nigeria. Meanwhile, although Mr Jonathan may be less active on the international scene than some of his African peers, Nigeria will remain a leading power on the continent given its sheer size and resource base. The country is a key supplier of oil to the US, and the US administration is keen to improve relations in the face of growing Russian and Asian interest in the country's natural resources. Nigeria's relations with Western oil companies may undergo some changes as China increases its competitive bids for Nigerian hydrocarbons resources and as the government attempts to make changes to oil-sector legislation that could increase taxes and the requirement for local inputs and labour. However, the current oil majors will remain the primary producers in the medium term.

Economic policy outlook

The pace of reform has received a notable boost under Mr Jonathan. However, the implementation of crucial pieces of legislationósuch as the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), which is aimed at overhauling the hydrocarbons sectoróhas become bogged down in the cumbersome National Assembly. Mr Jonathan's relationship with the legislature will be key in driving policy development forward, as poor relations between the presidency and legislature have historically restricted progress. Matters are further complicated for Mr Jonathan by the increased opposition presence in the legislature, which will attempt to make itself heard in calling the government to account. Even if policy can be

Policy trends

International relations

6 Nigeria


got through the National Assembly, there is often further conflict to be found with the powerful state governors. In particular, any reform that involves less money going to the states, for example the saving of a portion of oil revenue for the future, will be fiercely resisted. Therefore, while Mr Jonathan is expected to try and speed up the pace of reform, especially given his self-imposed one-term limit, progress will be mixed.

It is arguable that the greatest policy challengeóand a major failing of previous administrationsówill be to find a solution to Nigeria's serious electricity supply problems. The government expects the private sector to play a key role, although private companies look set to take a cautious approach given the challenging operating environment and often conflicting signals from the government. Until these companies become fully involved, the government has committed itself to large subsidy payments to keep electricity prices low for end-users.

The Ministry of Finance is pushing for a tightening of fiscal policy over the forecast period, and reaffirmed this commitment in the recently published Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) for 2012-15. The aim is to reduce the fiscal deficit that built up in 2009-10 as the government attempted to mitigate the impact of the global slowdown with a loosening of fiscal policy. However, there is a divergence between the finance ministry and the wider legislature, which is pressing for even greater expenditure in an attempt to counter Nigeria's crippling infrastructure deficit. As has been repeatedly borne out though, Nigeria's infrastructure problems cannot be tackled simply by throwing money at them: all that results is an increase in corruption and economic imbalances such as higher inflation and a wider budget deficit. Therefore, the more prudent approach desired by Mr Jonathan and the finance ministry is considered the more sensible option, with its focus on bringing down recurrent expenditure while improving the quality of capital expenditure. However, compromise between the sides will be needed if budgets are to be passed in a timely manner.

The revenue picture will be dictated by the prospects for oil prices, which form the source of the majority of government financing. The trend for prices is downwards at the start of the forecast period, before a recovery in line with more favourable global economic prospects, which should allow the fiscal deficit to come down. Stronger domestic growth will also aid the domestic tax take as the forecast period progresses. The government will maintain its policy of setting a conservative benchmark oil price on which to base its revenue projections, with any money accruing at oil prices higher than that level being saved for the future. In recent years the government has found it hard to resist dipping into these savings, especially under pressure from the states for access to their shares. The recent establishment of a sovereign wealth fund, combined with an administration that is apparently determined to tighten fiscal policy, should mean that oil savings are built up, but at a much slower pace than envisioned given expenditure pressures.

Overall, owing to the need for compromise with the legislature on expenditure and declining oil prices on the revenue side, the budget deficit is not expected to meet the targets laid out in the MTEF, which sees the deficit drop to just over 1% of GDP by 2015. Instead, the deficit is expected to recede gradually to around

Fiscal policy

Nigeria 7


2% of GDP. Deficits of this level are considered sustainable provided that the efficiency of expenditure is steadily increased and starts to translate into higher longer-term economic growth. Although the deficits during the forecast period will continue to be financed largely by domestic borrowing, the government has also indicated that it intends to access external sources. A debut Eurobond was launched successfully in January 2011, and based on that success the government is expected to return to international capital markets in 2012-16.

The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is expected to find it difficult to maintain a balance between its objective of managing inflation and the government's aim of reducing the cost of borrowing by the private sector to encourage investment in productive activities. It is currently pursuing the former objective, with the CBN having increased its prime interest rate six times over the past year: the Central Bank is attempting to counter what it sees as high inflationary expectations embedded in the system. As the forecast period progresses and the inflation outlook improves, the focus of the CBN will return to easing monetary policy and boosting lending to the productive sectors. Nevertheless, this has been complicated by the banking crisis of 2009 and the subsequent reform programme put in place by the Central Bank, which is likely to mean that risk aversion in the banks continues into the first part of the forecast period at least. Even with the sector returning to normal towards the end of the forecast period, the CBN will then be faced with the expectation of higher inflation and so another round of monetary tightening may be required.

Economic forecast

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Economic growth (%) US GDP 1.6 1.3 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.3

OECD GDP 1.7 0.9 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.3

World GDP 2.5 2.1 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.1

World trade 6.8 5.2 6.1 6.4 6.6 6.6

Inflation indicators (% unless otherwise indicated) US CPI 3.1 2.1 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.2

OECD CPI 2.8 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2

Manufactures (measured in US$) 7.0 0.4 -0.7 0.3 2.0 2.1

Oil (Brent; US$/b) 110.0 90.0 95.0 100.0 104.0 110.0

Non-oil commodities (measured in US$) 27.9 -10.9 -4.0 -1.3 2.0 2.6

Financial variables US$ 3-month commercial paper

rate (av; %) 0.2 0.2 0.4 1.2 2.2 2.9

N:US$ (av) 153.4 160.0 165.0 170.0 175.0 175.0

Subdued global economic prospects, coupled with continued domestic capacity constraints, are expected to restrict the level of growth in 2012. The remainder of the forecast period will gradually see a more favourable global and domestic picture, which will allow real GDP growth to average more than 7% per year in 2013-16. However, this is below the double-digit levels required if the country is to see any real large-scale improvement in the population's living standards, let alone meet the government's goal of becoming one of the world's top-20

International assumptions

Monetary policy

Economic growth

8 Nigeria


economies by 2020. This is primarily the result of the dire state of Nigeria's infrastructure, notably the electricity supply. Furthermore, continuing flare-ups of political unrest in the Niger Deltaódespite growing efforts by the government to find a solution to some of the issues involvedówill constrain growth in the vital oil and gas sector. There will, however, be some increases in oil and gas production as new deepwater oilfields open or expand. These are less susceptible to action by militias than the onshore fields, but they will not be immune.

With oil production having contracted in 2005-09, prior to a gradual recovery in 2010-11, owing to the troubles in the Delta, it has been non-oil growth that has driven the economy forward. This will continue to be the case in 2012-16. The services sector will be a major contributoróparticularly the dynamic tele-communications sector, but also through the construction of both privately and publicly financed infrastructure. The contribution of the banking sectoróa major source of growth in recent yearsówill be more muted in the early part of the forecast period as the sector recovers from the troubles of 2009, coupled with wider global uncertainties in the sector. The agricultural sector has also performed well in recent years, with food production increasing steadily. Agriculture will remain an important sector throughout the forecast period, not only as a contributor to overall economic growth, but also as a major employer. The manufacturing sector will show some growthómainly in areas connected to growth sectors, such as construction driving cement productionóbut this growth is from a low base caused by the dire infrastructure and strong (mainly Asian) competition in areas like textiles.

On an expenditure basis, growth in public consumption will remain significant as robust oil prices allow the government to expand its infrastructure develop-ment programme, but will be down on the levels seen during the 2009-10 fiscal expansion aimed at stimulating the economy. Gross fixed investment will remain centred on the oil and gas sector, but will be below potential because of the fragile security situation and ongoing confusion over the PIB. Private consumption will rebound in line with the broadly favourable outlook for economic prospects. Export growth will remain strong, although it will slow slightly later in the forecast period as the current policy uncertainty over the PIB translates to slower development of oil and gas production. Exports will continue to be outpaced by import growth as capital imports for infrastructure and consumer imports both increase quickly.

Economic growth % 2011a 2012b 2013 b 2014 b 2015b 2016b

GDP at factor cost 7.2 6.6 6.8 7.0 6.9 7.4

Private consumption 9.0 8.5 10.3 11.9 9.9 11.6

Government consumption 11.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 11.0 10.0

Gross fixed investment 6.5 6.0 10.0 12.0 11.5 12.0

Exports of goods & services 12.9 11.5 12.5 11.9 10.5 8.9

Imports of goods & services 24.5 16.1 21.3 22.0 19.7 16.4

Domestic demand 9.6 7.4 9.1 10.5 10.7 10.9

Agriculture 5.8 5.8 5.9 6.0 6.2 6.4

Industry 2.5 2.1 2.3 1.9 1.3 1.3

Services 11.0 9.5 9.8 10.0 9.8 10.5

a Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. b Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.

Nigeria 9


The outlook for inflation in the early part of the forecast period remains uncertain despite the monetary tightening being carried out by the CBN. In particular, although government expenditure will slow, it will remain robustóespecially at state level, where fiscal laxity remains a problem. Coupled with the payment of the new minimum wage, the injection of funds into bailed-out banks by the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria and plans to phase out the fuel price subsidy, inflationary pressures will persist into 2012. Furthermore, much of inflation in Nigeria is the result of factors outside the control of the CBN and its rate adjustments, such as international commodity prices, although expected falls in these prices (especially for oil) will help the CBN's inflation management as the forecast period progresses. Overall, inflation is expected to remain around 10% in 2012 before moderating to around 9% by 2014, then increasing in 2015-16 as the pace of growth quickens and international commodity prices start to rise again.

The CBN is expected to continue to favour maintaining the value of the local currency, the naira, within a narrow bandóto limit imported inflationówith periodic adjustments to avoid a further significant running-down of foreign-exchange reserves. Relatively strong oil prices in the forecast period should allow the maintenance of this policy, although global jittersóespecially during 2012óare likely to put pressure on emerging-market exchange rates such as the naira. In addition, the government is also keen to avoid the further running-down of foreign-exchange reserves, which plummeted in 2009-10 and failed to gain much ground in 2011. As a result, periodic downward adjustments to the currency are expected, although the frequency of these adjustments will lessen as the forecast period progresses, in line with greater global stability and higher oil prices boosting the reserve situation. From an average of N160:US$1 in 2012, the naira is expected to slide to N175:US$1 in 2015-16.

Oil prices will remain the single largest determinant of the health of Nigeria's external position, as diversification during the forecast period is expected to be subdued at best. The increase in the average oil price from 2013 will improve the external position, although this will be somewhat mitigated by the slow rate of increase in oil production, as the uncertainty surrounding the PIB has caused investment levels in the sector to fall. Meanwhile, imports will continue to grow at a robust pace as infrastructure spending increases and strong economic growth attracts higher levels of consumer imports. The services and income accounts will remain firmly in deficit, related as they are to trade and oil-sector profit repatriation, respectively. Private transfers from the large Nigerian diaspora will remain sizeable, but growth will be slow, owing to the impact of global economic uncertainty on Nigerians working in the West. Overall, after a fall to 1.5% of GDP in 2012, owing to the lower oil price and subdued global trade, the current-account surplus is forecast to pick up gradu-ally during the remainder of the forecast period, reaching 3.6% of GDP by 2016.

Exchange rates

External sector

Inflation

10 Nigeria


Forecast summary (% unless otherwise indicated)

2011a 2012b 2013 b 2014 b 2015b 2016b

Real GDP at factor cost growth 7.2 6.6 6.8 7.0 6.9 7.4

Industrial production growth 2.5 2.1 2.3 1.9 1.3 1.3

Gross agricultural production growth 5.8 5.8 5.9 6.0 6.2 6.4

Consumer price inflation (av) 10.8 10.1 9.2 8.9 9.4 9.7

Consumer price inflation (end-period) 11.0 9.7 9.1 9.2 9.6 9.5

Commercial lending rate 16.5 16.0 14.0 13.0 13.5 13.8

Government balance (% of GDP) -3.3 -3.0 -2.1 -1.9 -2.0 -1.9

Exports of goods fob (US$ bn) 103.8 96.7 109.9 123.4 133.9 143.4

Imports of goods fob (US$ bn) 69.1 74.6 82.5 90.8 96.3 98.5

Current-account balance (US$ bn) 12.7 3.5 7.4 9.2 10.8 14.3

Current-account balance (% of GDP) 5.3 1.5 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.6

External debt (end-period; US$ bn) 12.3 13.4 15.3 17.5 20.3 23.1

Exchange rate N:US$ (av) 153.4 160.0 165.0 170.0 175.0 175.0

Exchange rate N:US$ (end-period) 156.7 162.5 167.5 172.5 175.0 175.0

Exchange rate N:•100 (av) 192.65 208.25 206.25 207.32 208.33 213.41

Exchange rate N:Ä (end-period) 210.8 213.7 206.0 214.8 225.1 221.9

a Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. b Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.

Nigeria 11


Monthly review: November 2011

The political scene

Pressure is growing on the president, Goodluck Jonathan, to restore security in north-eastern Nigeria after it was estimated that more than 150 people were killed on November 4th in a series of gun and bomb attacks that point to an escalation in the uprising of Boko Haram a fervently anti-modernisation group that seeks wider application of sharia Islamic law in Nigeria. The worst carnage occurred in Damaturu in Yobe state, where militants bombed several targets, including churches and police stations. The Red Cross said at least 63 people were killed in Damaturu. On the same day, Maiduguri, capital of neighbouring Borno state, was hit by a triple suicide bomb attacks on a military headquarters and three roadside explosions in different parts of the city. According to human rights organisations, over 150 people died in the attacks in the two states.

The atrocities shocked Nigerians across the country and left many frightened local residents frustrated at the apparent inability of the government to contain Boko Haramówho are thought to have links with al-Qaidaís north Africa wingówhich has killed hundreds of people over the past two years in numerous gun attacks and bombings in northern Nigeria, especially in Maiduguri. President Jonathan condemned the latest terror attacks and ordered security agents to hunt down the perpetrators. This offered limited reassurance, however, coming after the failure of past attempts by the security forces to root out the extremists, who seem to have grown in their contempt for the authorities.

It appears that government crackdowns against the sect may also be a factor precipitating violent reactions from the group. On November 1st security forces began door-to-door searches for weapons in Maiduguri. The operation by the Joint Military Task for Borno state started after the expiration of an October 31st deadline for residents to surrender all illegal firearms at designated centres. Boko Haram criticised the weapons-gathering exercise, accusing the authorities of trying to disarm residents before a government crackdown.

President Jonathanís administration clearly faces a dilemma in trying to contain Boko Haram, which has grown in sophistication in recent years and seems set on creating havoc for the authorities. It is unclear that an amnesty programme would have much chance of success (August 2011, The political scene), while a scaling up of military operations is only likely to fan the instability. Meanwhile, on November 6th the US embassy issued a warning that it had received information that Boko Haram may be planning to bomb hotels in the capital, Abuja, where in August it carried out a suicide bombing on UN building that killed 26 people (September 2011, The political scene).

On November 1st an electoral tribunal upheld Mr Jonathanís victory in Aprilís presidential election, rejecting a challenge brought by a main opposition party that alleged the ballot was marred by fraud, particularly in the southern states of the federation. The five judges in the Presidential Election Petition Tribunal

Islamist fanatics unleash bloody mayhem

The government may be making things worse

A court upholds President Jonathan's election victory

12 Nigeria


unanimously dismissed the petition of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC). They said the CPC failed to prove its allegations of irregularities in the election, which Mr Jonathan, a southern Christian, won with 59% of the votes cast, while his nearest rival, former military ruler Muhammadu Buhari, a northern Muslim, polled 32%. Mr Buhariís CPC said it will appeal against the judgment. Although the run-up to Aprilís general elections, which also included parliamentary and state elections, was marred by violence, electoral observers reckoned that the actual ballots were more credible than previous elections in Nigeria (May 2011, The political scene). Mr Buhari, in his third bid to become a civilian president, gained wide support in the predominately Muslim north, while Mr Jonathan swept most of the mainly Christian south and the ethnically mixed central states. Post-election violence unleashed by CPC supporters in the north left an estimated 500 people dead. However, the carnage probably had as much to do with poverty and a sense of economic marginalisation in the north as with underlying political instability in Nigeria, which has now undergone three sets of civilian organised general elections since the end of military rule in 1999. Any appeals against the ruling elite are highly unlikely to be successfulóevidence of wrong-doing is not strong enoughóand Mr Jonathan is expected to complete his term in office.

Economic policy

On October 24th Nigeriaís 36 state governors applied to the Supreme Court to stop the federal governmentís plan to deduct money from the countryís crude oil savings to establish a sovereign wealth fund (SWF; June 2011, Economic policy). The disagreement is part of growing tension in Nigeriaís federal structure over the management and sharing of scarce national resources among the different tiers and branches of government. The minister of finance, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, had announced on national television a plan to withdraw US$1bn from the Excess Crude Account (ECA) to use as seed money for launching the SWF. However, the governors asked the court to stop President Jonathanís administration from making any withdrawals from the ECA pending the determination of their 2008 suit, which challenged the right of the federal government to withhold any part of Nigeriaís revenue from submission into the federation's account.

The ECA was established in 2003 to save oil revenue above the benchmark price set in the budget, as part of reforms to enable Nigeria better to cope with oil-related boom-bust cycles. However, following criticisms that the operation of the account lacked a firm legal basis the government earlier this year enacted the Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority Act to create a SWF to replace the ECA. Nonetheless, critics argue that the new legislation does not alter the fact that Nigeriaís constitution requires all oil revenue to be paid into the federation account and all money in the account to be shared among the three tiers of government according to an allocation formula prescribed by the National Assembly. This confusion and acrimony is expected to drag on, delaying the implementation of the SWF, which in itself is a sound idea. It is this sort of policy-making paralysis that has repeatedly restricted the government's reform efforts.

Federal and state governments are at loggerheads again

Nigeria 13


For their part, Nigeriaís cash-strapped state governors, under growing pressure to deliver services to their citizens, want to take a bigger slice of the national cake. In October their umbrella association, the Nigeria Governorsí Forum said that the leaders are working on a proposal to amend the current revenue allocation formula, which gives the federal government 52.7%, the states 26.7% and local governments 20.6%. It is not clear precisely how much the states will demand, but there has long been a clamour by some groups for greater decentralisation in the federation. However, while some Nigerians would like to see the importance of the central government downgraded, others believe the problem with Nigeriaís fiscal federalism stems from the creation of too many unviable states over the past four decades. The governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Lamido Sanusi, touched a raw nerve when at a book presentation in Kaduna at the end of October he asked whether Nigeria needs 36 states, questioning the development value of states that spend about 96% of their revenue paying civil servants. He suggested that Nigeria needs to overhaul its political structure to address the issue of supporting unviable states and local governments as well as federal ministries, with the result that there are insufficient funds for infrastructure.

Meanwhile, in late October the chairman of the Revenue Mobilisation, Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC), Elias Mbam, told reporters that his agency aims to complete its review of the current revenue-allocation scheme and submit a new allocation formula to Mr Jonathan in the first quarter of 2012. However, getting an agreement between the federal and sub-national governments on how to slice national revenue will not be easy.

The quality of public financial management has come under scrutiny in recent weeks following disputes between state agencies over the handling of public funds that raise questions about the credibility of the accounting system. The House of Representatives committee on finance, petroleum products and resources has been investigating a claim that the National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) failed to remit to the federation account a total of N450bn (US$2.9bn) between 2005 and 2008. The RMAFC chairman, Mr Mbam, told the committee that the state oil corporation began withholding some portion of revenue due to the federation account from its domestic crude sales from November 2004. He said that the NNPC has admitted to owing N450bn to the federation account, while noting that the operation of the corporationís domestic crude oil and gas account hinders transparency and accountability. This account relates to crude oil allocated to the corporation for its refineries, much of which is then sold abroad as the refineries run below capacity.

The minister for petroleum, Diezani Alison-Madueke, later told the House of Representatives committee that the NNPC has been told to start repaying the federation account the N450bn, but denied the allegations that money had been illegally withheld by the corporation. The minister defended the NNPC and dismissed calls by lawmakers for the corporationís finances to be subjected to legislative appropriation. She said the nationís oil business is sensitive and needs to continue to be handled with this in mind. This is a fairly poor excuse given that the NNPC has long faced criticisms for its poor management and the

Finding a mutually acceptable solution will be hard

Lawmakers investigate state oil company finances

14 Nigeria


opaqueness of its finances. The restructuring of the NNPC to make it more transparent is contained within the government's ambitious Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), implying that the government is at least aware of some of its major faults. However, the PIB remains stuck in the legislature and seems unlikely to be passed any time soon.

In a separate development, the House of Representatives on November 2nd mandated its committee on banking and currency to investigate the sources of the funds used by the CBN and the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) to bailout or recapitalise troubled banks. The committee will determine whether these financial authorities have operated in conformity with the nationís constitution. Some lawmakers believe the CBN overstepped its authority when in 2009 it rescued nine banks with a N620bn (US$4.1bn) bailout. Legislators also question the injection of billions of dollars by AMCON to recapitalise some rescued banks.

When faced with similar questions at the time of the bailouts, the CBN responded by saying the interventions were loans it gave in its role as lender of last resort. It maintained that the money used was not from the Treasury or federation account, and therefore did not require appropriation by parliament. Nonetheless, this explanation left lawmakers unhappy and many remain unconvinced about the legitimacy of colossal sums of money being injected into private institutions without democratic oversight. The house has urged the president to include the budget estimates of the CBN and all other independent revenue earnings of the government in his 2012 budget so they may be subject to appropriation.

On October 11th the president launched a job-creation programme aimed at tackling the growing problem of youth unemployment in the country by supporting young budding entrepreneurs to develop. Mr Jonathan said the Youth Enterprise with Innovation in Nigeria initiative, also known as YouWin!, will largely target owners of existing formal and informal businesses who will be invited to submit their business plans for a competition to determine which enterprises will get financial backing to create jobs. The programme, aimed at people between the ages of 18 and 35, is to be funded from N50bn (US$331m) set aside in the 2011 budget for job creation, explained Mr Jonathan. The government hopes the scheme will help more than 3,600 young people to actualise their entrepreneurial ideas and plans and expects these will create between 80,000 to 110,000 sustainable jobs over the next four years. The president noted that youth unemployment is one of Nigeriaís biggest challenges, a situation that is liable to become even more pressing in the future given Mr Jonathanís observation that close to 70% of Africaís population will be under 20 by 2020. On paper the scheme has much potential. Nigeria's informal sector has many thousandsóif not millionsóof promising, albeit small-scale, entrepreneurs, and helping them grow into the formal sector would be a boon for both the economy and employment levels. However, Nigerian policymakers have a real problem turning good ideas into concrete results. All too often the age-old problems of bureaucracy and corruption halt any sort of progress and it is difficult to see things being different this time.

A probe into Central Bank intervention is ordered

President launches job-creation programme

Nigeria 15


Unemployment in Nigeria(% of labour force)

Source: Nigeria National Bureau of Statistics.

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

100908070605040302012000

Unemployment is getting worse

In a recent labour force statistics report, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) put the unemployment rate in Nigeria in 2010 at 21.1%, up from 19.7% in 2009. The report, National manpower stock and employment generation survey, 2010, shows that unemployment among 15 to 24 year olds was 35.9% in 2010, while it was 23% in the 25-34 age group. The report provides some interesting insights into the pattern of employment and economic growth in Nigeria over the past decade. For example, despite robust GDP growth during this period, the trend of unemployment has generally been upwards, from 13.1% in 2000. Also disturbing are the geopolitical breakdowns of Nigeriaís joblessness situation. There are wide regional variations in unemployment rates, with some of the countryís most politically volatile areas suffering the highest unemployment. For example, Borno state, the north-eastern home base of Boko Haram, the fanatical Islamist sect that has killed hundreds in the province, had an unemployment rate of 26.5% in 2010, compared with 7.6% in Lagos state, Nigeriaís southern coastal commercial capital. Yobe state, neighbouring Borno in the remote underdeveloped far-north of Nigeria had the worst unemployment rate in the country at 39%. Also noteworthy is that unemployment rates are high in the oil-producing Niger Delta states where armed militants have been demanding a bigger local share of oil wealth; 27.2% in Delta state and 20.7% in Bayelsa state. Yet another disturbing indicator in the NBS report is that distribution of unemployment by education level shows that joblessness was highest among first-degree graduates and Higher National Diploma holders, at 24.6% in 2010. This suggests either that Nigeriaís many higher-education institutions are not producing suitable graduates for the economy or that the economy is insufficiently diverse and knowledge-orientated to absorb the growing output of the countryís universities. It is most likely a bit of both.

Economic performance

The Nigerian Ministry of Power and the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank) have signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) that will allow independent power producers in Nigeria to secure up to US$1.5bn of loans to acquire goods and services from US firms. The chairman of Ex-Im Bank, Fred Hochberg, who signed the agreement in Abuja on October 19th, said the amount agreed was just a start and that his bank would consider additional financing, if needed, to help Nigeria achieve its objective to boost power

Nigeria and US EX-IM Bank sign US$1.5bn loan agreement

16 Nigeria


supplies from the current 4 gw to 15-20 gw by 2015 and 40 gw by 2020. Under the MoU, loans will be agreed by the US bank on a case-by-case basis. Mr Hochberg was quoted in an Ex-Im Bank press release saying that the bank is also interested in financing US exports targeted at developing Nigeriaís other infrastructure requirements. Nigeria is one of nine countries in the world that Ex-Im Bank has identified as offering US companies the greatest opportunities for sales, said the statement. International interest in Nigeria is high, and American companies are likely to face stiff competition, especially from the Chinese who are seeking to build ties with Nigeria. The key test will be to use the funds offered on productive opportunities, rather than lose them to inefficiency and corruption.

The House of Representatives on November 1st ordered an inquiry into the growing instances of oil theft in the Niger Delta which is costing Nigeria hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Daniel Rayenieju, who presented the motion in the house, spoke of an unprecedented upsurge of illegal bunkering activities within the Nigerian coastal region that is causing harm to oil installations and losses in revenue as well as engendering insecurity in the region. Pipelines are often ruptured by criminal gangs to siphon off crude oil for sale on the black market at home and abroad. Shell said in a news release on November 1st that there has been an upsurge of crude oil theft and sabotage in the Niger Delta region, noting that 16 oil theft points were discovered in Imo River field in September alone. The company, Nigeriaís biggest private-sector oil producer, called for concerted efforts to stop oil thieves, whose activities not only adversely affect oil operations but also cause severe environmental damage. It maintained that more than 75% of all oil spill incidents and more than 70% of all oil spilled by Shell in the delta between 2006 and 2010 were caused by sabotage, theft and illegal refining.

The parliamentary committee on petroleum resources will try to identify the individuals behind the illicit oil trade that has gone on for decades, and determine why it has proved so difficult to stop. Many observers, including the Economist Intelligence Unit, believe the answer is related to the growth of criminal syndicates who have connections to well-placed members of the political elite and security forces. Whether or not the committee will be prepared to risk the possible political fallout from investigating these suspicions remains to be seen.

Lawmakers order probe into oil theft

Nigeria 17


Data and charts Annual data and forecast

Pl ea se se e g ra p hi c b el ow

2007a 2008a 2009a 2010a 2011 b 2012c 2013c

GDP

Nominal GDP (US$ bn) 166.5 208.1 169.4 196.3 242.4 241.4 270.9

Nominal GDP (N bn) 20,941 24,665 25,225 29,498 37,185 38,618 44,704

Real GDP at factor cost growth (%) 6.4 6.0 7.0 7.8 7.2 6.6 6.8

Expenditure on GDP (% real change)

Private consumption 6.6 -34.3 6.4 -26.7 9.0 8.5 10.3

Government consumption 90.8 4.4 -8.1 17.8 11.0 7.0 8.0

Gross fixed investment 24.5 -6.8 9.1 -3.6 6.5 6.0 10.0

Exports of goods & services -11.7 43.4 -30.0 11.4 12.9 11.5 12.5

Imports of goods & services 54.4 -18.8 -15.8 -15.3 24.5 16.1 21.3

Origin of GDP (% real change)

Agriculture 7.2 6.3 5.9 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.9

Industry -2.2 -3.4 2.0 5.3 2.5 2.1 2.3

Services 12.5 12.2 11.2 11.6 11.0 9.5 9.8

Population and income

Population (m) 143.3b 146.3 b 149.3b 152.2b 155.2 158.1 161.1

GDP per head (US$ at PPP) 2,049b 2,100 b 1,908b 1,944b 2,081 2,231 2,395

Fiscal indicators (% of GDP)

Public-sector revenue 11.0 12.2 6.4 10.5b 9.5 9.8 10.0

Public-sector expenditure 11.2 10.6 11.7 14.2b 12.9 12.8 12.1

Public-sector balance -0.2 1.5 -5.3 -3.7b -3.3 -3.0 -2.1

Net public debt 12.3 11.5 15.3 17.8 17.4 17.2 14.7

Prices and financial indicators

Exchange rate N:US$ (av) 125.81 118.55 148.90 150.30 153.42 160.00 165.00

Exchange rate N:US$ (end-period) 117.97 132.56 149.58 150.66 156.71 162.50 167.50

Consumer prices (av, %) 5.4 11.6 11.5 13.7 10.8 10.1 9.2

Stock of money M1 (% change) 61.0 50.1 7.0 4.3 14.6 12.2 15.8

Stock of money M2 (% change) 58.1 53.6 20.6 3.7 13.6 8.7 14.5

Lending interest rate (av; %) 16.9 15.5 18.4 17.6 16.0 14.0 14.0

Current account (US$ m)

Trade balance 37,748 45,885 25,342 20,237 34,682 22,163 27,384

Goods: exports fob 66,040 85,729 56,121 73,698 103,814 96,740 109,929

Goods: imports fob -28,291 -39,844 -30,779 -53,461 -69,131 -74,578 -82,546

Services balance -16,902 -22,113 -16,479 -19,231 -24,051 -23,110 -24,328

Income balance -11,747 -15,059 -14,404 -18,623 -22,697 -20,712 -24,445

Current transfers balance 18,545 19,366 18,694 20,092 24,812 25,192 28,820

Current-account balance 27,643 28,079 13,153 2,476 12,746 3,533 7,431

External debt (US$ m)

Debt stock 8,628 11,509 7,846 9,160b 12,288 13,442 15,260

Debt service paid 1,251 591 510 439b 521 661 688

Principal repayments 914 338 339 364b 431 540 556

Interest 336 253 171 76b 89 121 133

International reserves (US$ m)

Total international reserves 51,334 53,002 44,763 34,919 38,359 39,364 43,959

a Actual. b Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. c Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

18 Nigeria


Quarterly data Pl ea se se e g ra p hi c b el ow

2009 2010 2011

3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr

Prices

Consumer prices (May 2003=100) 145.5 149.0 154.6 158.2 165.1 167.8 173.2 176.0

Consumer prices (% change, year on year) 9.9 11.7 14.9 14.0 13.4 12.6 12.0 11.3

Financial indicators

Exchange rate N:US$ (av) 150.9 150.1 149.9 150.1 150.5 150.7 152.0 154.4

Exchange rate N:US$ (end-period) 148.8 149.6 149.8 150.0 151.3 150.7 153.0 151.3

Lending rate (av; %) 18.4 19.0 18.9 18.5 17.0 16.0 15.8 n/a

Deposit rate (av; %) 13.5 12.8 10.6 6.2 4.6 4.7 5.0 n/a

Money market rate (av; %) 4.5 4.5 2.3 1.7 4.0 7.3 7.6 n/a

M1 (end-period; N bn) 4,334 5,004 4,658 4,680 5,006 5,220 5,427 n/a

M1 (% change, year on year) -4.2 7.0 4.3 4.4 15.5 4.3 16.5 n/a

M2 (end-period; N bn) 9,458 10,767 10,654 10,595 10,941 11,161 11,615 n/a

M2 (% change, year on year) 5.6 20.6 21.5 16.7 15.7 3.7 9.0 n/a

Stockmarket index (NSE all share; end-period; Jan 3rd 1984=100) 22,065 20,827 25,966 25,384 23,051 24,771 24,621 24,980

Stockmarket index (% change, year on year) -52.3 -33.8 31.0 -5.5 4.5 18.9 -5.2 -1.6

Sectoral trends

Crude oil production (m barrels/day)a 1.8 2.0 2.0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

Crude oil production (% change, year on year) -11.9 2.4 10.1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

Foreign trade (US$ m)

Exports fob 14,699 19,883 15,386 23,999 19,626 27,525 21,164 23,145

Oil 13,877 15,743 11,094 15,631 15,323 18,834 15,935 19,390

Imports cif 8,684 11,896 9,953 8,127 14,379 11,765 20,439 21,536

Trade balance 6,015 7,987 5,433 15,872 5,247 15,760 725 1,609

Foreign reserves (US$ m)

Reserves excl gold (end-period) 45,749 44,763 42,972 39,946 37,196 34,919 35,878 n/a

a Excluding condensates.

Sources: Central Bank of Nigeria; Nigeria National Bureau of Statistics; IMF, International Financial Statistics; Direction of Trade Statistics; International Energy Agency, Monthly Oil Market

Report; Energy Intelligence Group, Oil Market Intelligence; Bloomberg.

Nigeria 19


Monthly data Pl ea se se e g ra p hi c b el ow

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Exchange rate N:US$ (av) 2009 145.78 147.14 147.72 147.23 147.84 148.20 148.59 151.86 152.30 149.36 150.85 149.95

2010 149.78 150.22 149.83 149.89 150.31 150.19 150.10 150.27 151.03 151.25 150.22 150.48

2011 151.62 151.96 152.54 153.97 154.79 154.46 151.82 150.70 153.25 n/a n/a n/a

Exchange rate N:US$ (end-period) 2009 145.96 147.31 147.16 147.36 148.17 148.22 151.25 151.42 148.79 150.63 149.79 149.58

2010 150.32 150.10 149.78 150.10 150.27 149.99 150.09 150.78 151.35 149.99 150.24 150.66

2011 151.85 152.07 153.04 154.45 155.13 151.29 149.96 151.90 154.10 n/a n/a n/a

Real effective exchange rate (2000=100; CPI-based) 2009 78.85 79.43 78.77 77.63 76.27 74.96 75.31 73.06 72.59 74.55 74.21 76.71

2010 78.00 80.86 80.83 81.20 83.28 85.36 83.53 83.56 82.77 81.04 82.66 84.18

2011 83.26 82.86 82.10 80.60 80.96 81.68 83.76 84.80 n/a n/a n/a n/a

M1 (% change, year on year) 2009 36.1 23.1 2.7 12.7 8.2 3.6 5.0 5.9 -4.2 3.7 10.6 3.0

2010 -2.1 2.8 6.1 10.1 15.8 9.7 15.2 20.1 21.3 21.5 11.7 10.6

2011 20.3 12.6 9.5 11.7 10.9 14.7 18.4 8.3 14.3 n/a n/a n/a

M2 (% change, year on year) 2009 42.4 29.5 12.5 15.3 15.6 14.2 10.2 13.7 5.6 18.9 22.1 17.5

2010 12.3 18.6 22.4 21.8 23.2 19.5 23.1 21.6 18.7 13.2 8.8 6.7

2011 10.8 7.6 5.8 8.6 11.5 12.3 13.3 8.6 12.4 n/a n/a n/a

Deposit rate (%) 2009 13.2 14.3 14.1 12.8 13.1 13.1 13.4 13.7 13.4 12.4 13.5 12.6

2010 12.4 10.9 8.6 7.3 6.2 5.0 4.5 4.1 5.2 4.3 5.1 4.6

2011 5.0 4.6 5.4 5.5 5.4 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

Lending rate (%) 2009 16.1 17.9 18.2 18.4 19.5 18.2 18.5 18.3 18.3 19.0 18.9 19.0

2010 18.8 18.7 19.0 19.1 18.8 17.7 17.4 16.9 16.7 16.2 16.1 15.7

2011 15.7 15.8 15.8 15.8 15.8 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

Monetary policy rate (%) 2009 9.8 9.8 9.8 8.0 8.0 8.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0

2010 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3

2011 6.5 6.5 7.5 7.5 8.0 8.0 8.8 8.8 9.3 12.0 n/a n/a

Stockmarket index (NSE all share; end-period; Jan 3rd 1984=100) 2009 21,814 23,377 19,825 21,491 29,717 26,862 25,287 23,009 22,065 21,805 21,010 20,827

2010 22,595 22,985 25,966 26,453 26,183 25,384 25,844 24,268 23,051 25,042 24,765 24,771

2011 26,827 26,017 24,621 25,042 25,867 24,980 23,827 21,498 20,373 20,935 n/a n/a

Consumer prices (% change, year on year; av) 2009 13.1 13.5 13.4 12.2 12.2 10.2 10.1 10.1 9.4 10.7 11.4 12.9

2010 14.3 15.6 14.8 15.0 12.9 14.2 12.9 13.7 13.7 13.4 12.8 11.7

2011 12.1 11.1 12.8 11.4 12.3 10.2 9.5 9.3 10.3 n/a n/a n/a

Foreign-exchange reserves excl gold (LCU/US$ m) 2009 50,110 48,114 47,083 45,915 44,837 43,463 43,352 43,790 45,749 45,469 45,469 44,763

2010 44,435 43,737 42,972 42,616 41,054 39,946 39,699 39,298 37,196 36,230 35,616 34,919

2011 35,749 35,882 35,878 35,551 35,783 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Haver Analytics.

20 Nigeria


Annual trends charts Pl ea se se e g ra p hi c b el ow

Annual trends charts

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.

GDP per head (US$; PPP)

Trade balance (% of GDP)



Real GDP growth(% change)

Consumer price inflation(av; %)

Main destinations of exports, 2010 Main origins of imports, 2010(share of total) (share of total)

Brazil 7.5%

Others40.2%

Spain 6.6%

US36.1%

India 9.6%

France 4.9%

Others59.8%

China15.8%

Netherlands 10.0%

US 9.5%

-4.0

-2.0

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0 World Sub-Saharan Africa Nigeria

13121110090820070.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

14.0

16.0 World Sub-Saharan Africa Nigeria

1312111009082007

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000 World Sub-Saharan Africa Nigeria

13121110090820070.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0 Sub-Saharan Africa Nigeria

1312111009082007

Nigeria 21


Monthly trends charts Pl ea se se e g ra p hi c b el ow

Monthly trends charts

Exchange rate (N:US$; av)

Consumer price inflation (% change, year on year)

Foreign-exchange reserves(US$ m)

Oil: Brent crude price (US$/b; av)

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.

7.0

8.0

9.0

10.0

11.0

12.0

13.0

14.0

15.0

16.0

JulAprJan11

OctJulAprJan10

OctJulAprJan09

OctJulAprJan2008

115

120

125

130

135

140

145

150

155

160

JulAprJan11

OctJulAprJan10

OctJulAprJan09

OctJulAprJan2008

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

JulAprJan11

OctJulAprJan10

OctJulAprJan09

OctJulAprJan2008

30,000

35,000

40,000

45,000

50,000

55,000

60,000

65,000

AprJan11

OctJulAprJan10

OctJulAprJan09

OctJulAprJan2008

22 Nigeria


Comparative economic indicators Pl ea se se e g ra p hi c b el ow

Comparative economic indicators, 2010

Gross domestic product(US$ bn; market exchange rates)

Gross domestic product(% change, year on year)

Consumer prices(% change, year on year)

Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit estimates; national sources.

Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit estimates; national sources.Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit estimates; national sources.

Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit estimates; national sources.

Gross domestic product per head(US$ '000; market exchange rates)

0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0

São Tomé & Príncipe

Liberia

The Gambia

Cape Verde

Central African Republic

Togo

Mauritania

Sierra Leone

Guinea

Niger

Benin

Chad

Burkina Faso

Mali

Senegal

Congo (Brazzaville)

Equatorial Guinea

Gabon

Côte d'Ivoire

Cameroon

Ghana

Nigeria

0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0

Liberia

Niger


Guinea

Togo

Burkina Faso

Mali

The Gambia

Chad

Benin

Senegal

Mauritania

Côte d'Ivoire


Cameroon

Nigeria

Ghana

Congo (Brazzaville)

Cape Verde

Sierra Leone

Gabon

Equatorial Guinea

-5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0

Chad

Burkina Faso

Niger

Mali

Côte d'Ivoire

Senegal

Cameroon

Gabon


Togo

Cape Verde

Benin

Congo (Brazzaville)

The Gambia

Mauritania

Sierra Leone

Liberia

Equatorial Guinea

Ghana


Nigeria

Guinea

0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0

Equatorial Guinea

Benin

Côte d'Ivoire

Guinea

Cameroon


Sierra Leone

Togo

Senegal


Mauritania

Cape Verde

Liberia

Mali

Gabon

The Gambia

Ghana

Nigeria

Burkina Faso

Niger

Congo (Brazzaville)

Chad

20.0196.3

Nigeria 23


Country snapshot

Basic data

923,773 sq km

158.3m (2010, IMF mid-year estimate)

Population in millions (2010, World Gazeteer estimates)

Lagos 10.0a

Ibadan 5.2 Benin 2.4 Abuja 1.4

Tropical; with a long wet season in the south, particularly the south-east, and a shorter wet season in the north

Hottest month, March, 26-32C; coolest month, August, 23-28C; driest month, December, 25 mm average rainfall; wettest month, June, 460 mm average rainfall

English (official), Hausa, Yoruba and Ibo; many other local languages are widely spoken

Metric system

Naira (N) = 100 kobo

One hour ahead of GMT

January 1st; February 15thb (Mawlid al-Nabi); April 22nd-25th (Easter); May 1st (Workers' Day); May 29th (Democracy Day); August 30thb (Eid al-Fitr); November 6thb (Eid al-Adha); October 1st (Independence Day); December 25th-26th (Christmas)

a There are large variations in estimates of the size of Lagos and other cities in Nigeria,

reflecting the weakness of population statistics in general and failure to agree over city

boundaries.

b The dates of official public holidays, to be confirmed by the government, may differ

from those of the Muslim festivals given here.

Population

Main towns

Climate

Weather in Lagos (altitude 3 metres)

Languages

Measures

Time

Public holidays

Land area

Currency

24 Nigeria


Political structure

Federal Republic of Nigeria

Federal republic, comprising 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT, Abuja)

Based on English common law

National Assembly, comprising the 109-seat Senate and the 360-seat House of Representatives; both are elected by universal suffrage for four-year terms

Most recent legislative and presidential elections, April 2011; Goodluck Jonathan was elected to the presidency, and his party, the People's Democratic Party, won a majority of seats in both houses of the National Assembly; next national elections are scheduled for 2015

President, elected by universal suffrage to serve a four-year term

State governors and state houses of assembly

The Federal Executive Council, which is chaired by the president; appointed July 26th 2007; extensive reshuffle carried out in April 2010

People's Democratic Party (PDP); Action Congress (AC); All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP); Progressive Peoples Alliance (PPA); All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA); Congress for Progressive Change (CPC); more than 30 political parties are currently registered

President Goodluck Jonathan Vice-president Namadi Sambo

Agriculture & water resources Ahmed Abdullah Defence Bello Mohammed Education Ruqayyatu Rufai Finance Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala Foreign affairs Olugbenga Ashiru Health Christian Otu Onyebuchi Information & communications Labaran Maku Interior Abba Moro Justice & attorney-general of the federation Mohammed Bello Adoke Labour Emeka Wogu Mines & steel Musa Mohammed Sada National planning Shamsudeen Usman Niger Delta affairs Godsday Orubebe Petroleum Diezani Alison-Madueke Power Bart Nnaji Trade & investment Olusegun Aganga Transport Idris Umar Works Mike Onolememen Youth development Mallam Bolaji Abdullahi

Lamido Sanusi

Key ministers

Form of state

Legal system

National legislature

National elections

Head of state

State government

National government

Official name

Central Bank governor

Main political parties

Documents

EIU Nigeria Report