Effects of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey

8/10/2019 Effects of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/effects-of-the-syrian-refugees-on-turkey 1/44

Report No: 195, January 2015

ORTADOĞU STRATEJİK ARAŞTIRMALAR MERKEZİCENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

EFFECTS OF THE SYRIANREFUGEES ON TURKEY

Türk ye Ekonom k veSosyal Etüdler Vakfı





ISBN: 978-605-4615-95-7

ORSAM Report No: 195

January 2015

Prepared in Cooperation between ORSAM and TESEV


Ankara - TURKEY ORSAM © TESEV © 2015

Content of this report is copyrighted to ORSAM and TESEV. Except reasonable and partial quotation anduse under the Act No. 5846, Law on Intellectual and Artistic Works, via proper citation, the content may notbe used or re-published without prior permission by ORSAM and TESEV. The views expressed in this reportre ect only the opinions of its authors and do not represent the institutional opinion of ORSAM and TESEV.



ORSAM


Prepared by:Oytun Orhan,ORSAM Researcher Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar,TESEV Director for the Foreign Policy Program



ORSAM

Report No: 195, January 2015 3

Contents

Preface..................................................................................................................................................................5

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..............................................................................................................................7

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................... 10

I. GENERAL SITUATION OF THE SYRIAN REFUGEES IN TURKEY ......................................... 12 II. EFFECTS OF THE SYRIAN REFUGEES ON TURKEY ................................................................ 16 a. Social Effects ....................................................................................................................................... 16 b. Economical Effects ............................................................................................................................. 17 c. Political and Security Effects ............................................................................................................ 19 d. Effects on Public Services ................................................................................................................ 20

III. ANALYSES OF CITIES ....................................................................................................................... 21 a. Gaziantep ............................................................................................................................................. 21 b. Şanlıurfa ............................................................................................................................................... 22 c. Kilis ...................................................................................................................................................... 24 d. Hatay .................................................................................................................................................... 25 e. Adana .................................................................................................................................................... 27 f. Osmaniye ............................................................................................................................................. 29 g. Kahramanmaraş ................................................................................................................................... 30 h. Mersin ................................................................................................................................................... 32

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................................... 34

APPENDIX I- Institutions Interviewed .................................................................................................... 40



ORSAM


Charts

Chart 1. Basic Data About The Refugee Camps Hosting Syrian Refugees ..........................................14

Chart 2. Syrian Refugees Living Outside the Refugee Camps.................................................................15



ORSAM


PREFACE

We believe that NGOs are responsible for attracting attention to the refugee issue and

should take the lead in contributing to solutions. ORSAM (The Center for Middle EasternStrategic Studies) released a report in 2014 that examined the refugee situation in a com-parative manner, drawing on extensive field research. TESEV (The Turkish Economic andSocial Studies Foundation) has also contributed to the process of public awareness about theSyrian refugee crisis by organizing meetings and hosting workshops related to the issue. Aspart of our ongoing research to understand this problem, we have jointly conducted a three-month-long study based on visits to the cities bordering Syria. Interviews were held withlocal authorities, NGOs, businessmen, academics, local communities and Syrians living inTurkey. This joint research prepared by ORSAM and TESEV investigates the effects ofSyrian refugees on the country’s social structure, economy, politics and security. Findingson these topics can be found in the study. Besides general classifications, each city hostingSyrian refugees have a unique condition according to its demography, economy and politi-cal atmosphere. Thus, there are individual city analyses investigating the unique situationin every city. The study is based on three main observations. First, a considerable numberof Syrian refugees in Turkey will either stay in the country for an extended period of timeor will live the remainder of their lives in Turkey. Second, based on the first observation, itis crucial that Turkey prepare a comprehensive policy that includes preventative measuresto deal with possible negative reaction from the local communities. This issue is predomi-nantly about social integration, and recommendations for decision makers are provided inthe conclusion. The third evaluation is related to diversity. If the integration process workseffectively, the Syrian refugee situation might contribute to an enhancement of the multi-cultural makeup of Turkey.

Although the report was written by Oytun Orhan and Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar, manypeople contributed to the study during fieldwork and preparation stages. We would like tothank Ferhat Pirinççi, a faculty member of Uludağ University and an ORSAM advisor, forhis help with the field research in Gaziantep and Şanlıurfa and for drafting the frameworkof the report in an academic perspective. Also, we would like to thank Mustafa Aldı, a doc -toral student at Bilkent University’s International Relations Department, who worked inthe team conducting field research in Adana, Osmaniye, and Hatay, for his preparation ofthe notes for the interviews and for translating the complete report into English. We alsothank Tunç Demirtaş, a research assistant at Uludağ University’s International Relations

Department, for conducting the field research and interviews in Mersin. We would also liketo extend our gratitude to two TESEV program assistants, Zerrin Cengiz Ceren Zeytinoğlu,and to the program’s intern, Esra Şimşek, for their help in setting up appointments for theresearch. We would like to especially send our gratitude to the NGOs, local authorities andcommunities for helping us bring this report together by accepting our interview requestsand by sharing their information. The list of the institutions interviewed can be found atthe end of the report. We hope that the study attracts attention to the living conditionsand problems of the Syrian refugees while also generating solutions for the problems in thearea. The burden of the refugee situation falls mostly on the shoulders of the border citiesin Turkey. We hope that this report can be an effective tool to convey the issues to decisionmakers. Thank you to all who contributed to the study and to those who attended theinterviews. In the end, we hope readers better understand the refugee situation and realizethe steps needed to ameliorate it.

Assoc. Prof. Şaban Kardaş Pres dent of ORSAM





ORSAM

ORSAM


Basic data about Syrian refugees in Tur-key:

• According to the official numbers, thereare 1,645,000 Syrian refugees in Turkeyas of November 2014. Unofficial num-bers are estimated at around 2 million.These numbers mean that Turkey hosts

a Syrian refugee population of 2.1% (of-ficially) and 2.5% (unofficially) of itspopulation.

• 1.2 million people have been included tothe 10 million already residing in citiesnear the Syrian border.

• With the Interior Ministry’s decision inOctober 2011, registered Syrian refu-gees are given “temporary protectionstatus.” Under the temporary protectionregime, protection and aid is provided toSyrians, covering regulations on indefi-nite residence, protection against goingback under coercion, and responding toemergency needs.

• 85% of the Syrians live outside of refugeecamps.

• 500,000 Syrian patients have been sentto the hospitals from the camps.

• Syrians working in Turkey have reached200,000 individuals.

• According to Ministry of Health data,35,000 Syrians have given birth in Tur-key.

• Turkey has spent 4.5 billion dollars onSyrian refugees between April 2011 andNovember 2014.

• According to official numbers, aid fromthe UN and European countries is ap-proximately 246 million dollars.

Social effects of Syrian refugees on Turkey:

• Differences in cultures, languages andlife styles make social integration morechallenging.

• Polygamy among local communities isspreading as a result of an increase indivorce rates.

• Child labor is spreading.• A suitable environment for ethnic and

sectarian polarization can be observedat present.

• Uncontrolled urban development is onthe rise.

• In some bordering cities, there hasbeen disturbance due to changing de-mographics.

• There has been a change in demography

(fertility rates, population increase, etc.).• The challenging living conditions and

lack of educational opportunities forSyrian refugees might worsen certainsocial issues in the long term. However,

ORSAM Report No: 195, January 2015

Prepared by: Oytun Orhan, ORSAM Researcher Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar, TESEV Director for the Foreign Policy Program


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ORSAM ORSAM CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES





EFFECTS OF THE SYRIAN REFUGEES ON TURKEY

ORSAM


ORSAM

refugees are directly involved are verylow and, in most cases, Syrians livingin Turkey are the victims.

•

The most serious security threat is arisk of violent mass reaction, caused bythe provocations capitalizing on angertowards Syrian refugees.

• The biggest concern among peopleliving close to the borders is their per-ceived vulnerability to terrorist attacks.

• The fact that Syrians live together in theghettos is a challenge to the integrationprocess. This situation may cause secu-rity problems in the future.

Effects of Syrian refugees on public servicesin Turkey:

• Hospitals in border provinces offer ap-proximately 30% to 40% of their servicesto Syrian refugees. Thus, there are ca-pacity issues in the hospitals.

• Municipality services (garbage collec-tion, cleaning, public transportation,water distribution, controls, etc.) areplanned according to the population.Thus, the services are not sufficientbecause of the rapid influx of refugees.

• Municipalities receive their budget ac-cording to their population. But theactual population of bordering citiesincreased critically. Therefore thesemunicipalities are forced to serve peo-ple with limited supplies and budgets.

Conclusion and recommendations:

• The initial presence of Syrian refugeeson Turkish territory, which was consid-ered temporary at the beginning of thecrisis, has now become a permanentone. The permanent nature of the situa-tion is now affecting the psychology andreactions of both the host communityand the Syrians.

• Syrians will stay in Turkey for an ex-tended period of time, and some mightspend their whole life in Turkey. If Syr-ian refugees are to become permanentand a reality for Turkey, measures that

will minimize the negative consequenc-es and maximize the benefits need to beintroduced.

•

It is crucial to create an immigrationpolicy that includes the prevention ofreactions from the local communities.The issue should be considered as a so-cial integration problem. There shouldbe a holistic policy covering education,working conditions, accommodation,social services and improving the re-ceptivity of the host community.

• If the integration process works effec-

tively, the Syrian refugee situation mightcontribute to the diversity and the development of a multicultural structurein Turkey in the long run. In addition,the presence of Syrians can strengthenbonds with neighboring countries andhelp provide a better environment foreconomic and political cooperation inthe future.

• With the above realities in mind, manypoints of action need to be taken intoconsideration: officially registering allSyrians, increasing the capacity of localhospitals and educational facilities, fa-cilitating work permits, providing moreauthority to local administrations, co-ordinating between local and centralauthorities, generating extra capacityand budget for municipalities, creatingcommunity leader groups among Syri-

ans, preparing booklets and webpages inArabic, opening up new living areas inthe border cities, increasing internation-al aid, increasing border security, fairlysharing or distributing the refugee bur-den, developing programs for Turkishpeople to accept Syrian refugees, cor-recting the Syrian stereotype, creatinga database to understand refugee move-ments, looking at the issue objectively

without political concerns, preventingbegging, bolstering the efficiency in lawand order, building a capacity for Syrianrefugees are the main points of actionthat should be considered carefully bythe authorities.



CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

ORSAM


ORSAM

The humanitarian factor is one of the cru-cial aspects of the Syria conflict that haslasted now for nearly four years. Accord-ing to the UN’s official numbers, 191,000people lost their lives. On the other hand,according to the Syrian NGOs’ unofficialnumbers, 283,000 people lost their lives

so far. Approximately four million peoplehad to flee from Syria and around 6 mil-lion have left their homes in order to settlein secure areas in the country. More thanhalf of the refugees outside the countryconsist of children and youth under the ageof eighteen. A majority of these refugeesstruggle to survive under challenging con-ditions outside the refugee camps. Syrianrefugees have been struggling to find basicnecessities such as security, food, shelterand health services, let alone basic modesof comfort. In addition, the refugee influxhas caused problems for host countries.Tension caused by economic hardships,social problems and changing ethnic andsectarian balances have resulted in con-flicts between the host country nationalsand the Syrian refugees.

Turkey hosts the largest population of

Syrian refugees among the countriesneighboring Syria. According to the lat-est official numbers, Turkey hosts over1.6 million Syrian refugees as of Novem-ber 2014. However, the actual numberof refugees could be around 2 million. Inmany cities, chiefly those along the bor-der, there are many Syrians who have en-tered the country through illegal ways andhave not been registered yet. The issue of

refugees in Turkey should be investigatedunder two headings, namely Syrians liv-ing in the camps and those living outside

the camps. The majority of refugees livingin camps have better conditions in termsof access to the basic services and socialenvironment than the ones living outsidethe camps. It can be stated that under thecoordination of AFAD, Turkey set an ex-ample for the world in the manner it es-

tablishes and manages camps in such adire situation.

Although the camps might be a goodplace for refugees who live inside theseareas, approximately 85% of all Syrianslive outside them. Thus, the real or crucialsituational factors for refugees occur out-side the camps, especially in the city cent-ers where the majority of Syrians live. It isa mistake to assume that the integration ofthe Syrian community with the locals is aneasy and straightforward process. The ini-tial presence of Syrian refugees on Turkishterritory, which was considered tempo-rary at the beginning of the crisis, has nowbecome a permanent one. The permanentnature of the situation is now affecting thepsychology and reactions of both the hostand incoming communities. Accordingly,this study focuses on the impacts of the

Syrian refugees on Turkey.

To understand the effects of refugee influxon Turkey, four different field studies wereconducted in the provinces of Adana, Os-maniye, Hatay, Kilis, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa,Mersin and Kahramanmaraş during a pe-riod of three months. In these provinces,NGOs, local authorities, community lead-ers, academics, members of chambers of

commerce and industry, local citizens andSyrian refugees were interviewed. This re-port, titled “Effects of the Syrian Refugees

INTRODUCTION




ORSAM


ORSAM

on Turkey” was prepared with observa-tions and data collected from field stud-ies. First, an overview of the situation ofSyrian refugees in Turkey is presented. Inthe second chapter, the effects of the Syr-ian refugees on Turkey will be examinedin relation to the economy, social life, se-

curity and politics. Because of the unique

nature of these effects in each city, thethird chapter is dedicated to a detailedexamination of different provinces. In thelast chapter, a general conclusion of thestudy and recommendations for improve-ment of the Syrian refugees’ situation will

be presented.




ORSAM


ORSAM

The influx of Syrian refugees to Turkeybegan in April 2011. Turkey announcedat that time that it would apply an “open-door policy” for these refugees. WhenAFAD made their first announcement re-garding the Syrian refugees in June 2011,they reported that there were 8,535 indi-

viduals living in the camps established inHatay, Yayladağı and Altınözü. Accordingto AFAD statistics, the number of Syrianrefugees in Turkey reached 78,409 in Au-gust 2012. When this number was deter-mined, Turkey announced that a criticalthreshold would be around 100,000. How-ever, the refugee flow from Syria has ex-ceeded all predictions. Turkey continuedto accept Syrian refugees, even though thenumbers have increased dramatically. Ac-cording to official numbers, by November2014, the number of Syrians under tempo-rary protection reached 1,645,000. Thereare 16 different tent cities in 10 differentprovinces, 1 temporary admission centerand six container cities that host 221,447Syrians. The majority of Syrian refugeesnot in these centers try to live in the citiesamong local populations. Turkey is nowhosting many times more Syrians than itscritical threshold, which makes it confronta multi-faceted refugee problem.

When the economic side of the refugeeissue is investigated, it can be observedthat Turkey has spent 4.5 billion dollars onrefugees. More than 500,000 people havebeen sent to hospitals from the refugeecamps and, according to the Ministry ofHealth, nearly 35,000 Syrians have givenbirth in Turkey. Humanitarian aid which

comes from the UN and European coun-tries amounts to only 246 million dollars.

Even though the conditions in camps aresatisfactory, life is challenging for thosewho live outside the camps in the cities.Because Turkey accepted the 1951 Ge-neva Convection on the legal status ofrefugees with geographical limitations, itcannot accept Syrians as legal refugees.Even though the individuals inside andoutside the camps can get their temporaryprotection identification cards, because ofthat reservation, they encounter the geo-graphical limitations. Because of the geo-graphical limitation, only people comingfrom Europe with the fear that they willbe prosecuted for their nationality, ideas,

religion, political views or membership tocertain groups can get refugee status inTurkey. The situation of those who applyfor refugee status in Turkey is negotiatedwith the United Nations High Commis-sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and if theseindividuals are eligible, they are trans-ferred to a third country. Thus, Syriansin Turkey do not have refugee status andthey are considered guests in the formalterminology.

With the decision of the Ministry of Inte-rior Affairs in October 2011, Syrians regis-tered in Turkey get “temporary protectionstatus.” Under the temporary protectionregime protection and aid is provided toSyrians, covering regulations on indefi-nite residence, protection against beingsent back under coercion, and meetingemergency needs. In addition, those living

I. GENERAL SITUATION OF THE SYRIAN REFUGEES IN TURKEY




ORSAM


ORSAM

in camps are provided education, water,food, shelter and health services. The majority of those living outside the camps areonly provided free healthcare and medica-

tion if they are registered. Those who arenot registered, often for various reasons,do not have any rights.




ORSAM


ORSAM

Source: AFAD (The Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency of Turkey)

City Camps OpeningDates

Number of Containerand Tents

CampPopulation

Altınözü1 Tent City 09.06.2011 263 (divided) 1,372Altınözü2 Tent City 10.06.2011 622 2,578Yayladağı1 Tent City 30.04.2011 546 (Triple divided) 2,816Yayladağı2 Tent City 12.07.2011 510 3,004Apaydın Tent City 09.10.2011 1,181Containers 4,965Reyhanlı Admission Center Changes according to

daily data.Hatay Total 573 Divided+1.368

Tents +1.181 Containers14,735

Öncüpınar ContainerCity

17.03.2012 2,065 13,414

Elbeyli Container City 03.06.2013 3,589 24,164Kilis Total 5,654 37,578

Ceylanpınar Tent City 01.03.201 4,771 19.199Akçakale Tent City 06.07.2012 5,000 26,416Viranşehir 4,100 19.986Harran Tent City 13.01.2013 2,000 14,064

Şanlıurfa Total 13,871 Tents + 2,000Containers

79,665

Islahiye Tent city 17.03.2012 1,888 9,984Karkamış Tent City 28.08.2012 1,686 7,641

Nizip1 Tent City 03.10.2012 1,858 10,674

Nizip2 Tent City 11.02.2012 1,000 (Containers) 5,029

Gaziantep Total 5,369 Tents + 1,000Containers

33.070

Kahramanmaraş TentCity

01.09.2012 3,318 17,215

Kahramanmaraş Total 3,318 17,215

Cevdediye Tent City 09.09.2012 2,012 7,597

Osmaniye Total 2,012 7,597

Adıyaman Tent City 22.09.2012 2,292 9,854

Adıyaman Total 2,292 9,854

Sarıçam Tent City 28.01.2013 2,162 11,124

Adana Total 2,162 11,124

Midyat Tent City 19.06.2013 1,300 2,858

Nusaybin Tent City UnderConstruction

Mardin Total 1,300 2,858

Beydağı ContainerCity 12.06.2013 2,083 7,493Malatya Total 2,083 7,493

Chart- 1 Basic Data About The Refugee Camps Hosting Syrian Refugees (November 2014)




ORSAM


ORSAM

Chart- 2: Syrian Refugees Living Outside the Refugee Camps (November 2014)(Cities with 1000 or more Syrians are listed. These numbers only include registered Syrianrefugees. Numbers in the report include unregistered Syrians based on estimates by localauthorities and NGOs).

Source: Ministry of Interior Affairs

City Number of Syrian refugees

İstanbul 330.000Gaziantep 220.000Hatay 190.000Şanlıurfa 170.000Mardin 70.000Adana 50.000

Kilis 49.000Mersin 45.000Konya 45.000Kahramanmaraş 44.000Ankara 30.000Bursa 20.000Batman 20.000Şırnak 19.000

Kocaeli 15.000İzmir 13.000Osmaniye 12.000Antalya 10.000Kayseri 9.500Diyarbakır 5.000Adıyaman 2.500Samsun 1.230

Niğde 1.100Aydın 1.000




ORSAM


ORSAM

In the initial phases of the crisis, Syrianrefugees were living in and around bordercities. Later, they began spreading aroundthe country. According to the data fromthe Ministry of Interior, there are onlyeight cities without any Syrian refugees.Today, the majority of the refugees are liv-

ing in the border cities, leaving aside thebig cities. As a result, the 10 million peo-ple who reside in these borders cities havebeen struggling to host approximately 1.2million refugees. Inevitably, the situationis causing issues all around the country,especially in border cities. The effectscan be categorized as follows: social, eco-nomic, political, security-oriented effectsand the effects of accessibility to publicservices.

a. Social Effects

The issue of Syrian refugees in Turkey isprimarily one of social adaptation. Thedifference in culture, language and livingstyle is one of the main reasons for vari-ous reactions from the local communities.Besides, the increase in polygamy, a higherdivorce rates because of polygamy, women

and child abuse, social and sectarian po-larization and urban sprawl can be listedas the social effects of Syrian refugees inTurkey.

A conservative culture is predominant inTurkish border cities. Local communitiestend to react to incidents that might clashwith the local culture. One of the mostprominent changes affecting the localculture is the frequent marriage betweenTurkish men, be they elderly or young ormarried or single, with young Syrian wom-en. These occurrences have been happen-ing mainly in Kilis, Şanlıurfa and Hatay.The marriages cause reactions among thelocals, especially among women of these

urban areas. In all the three cities, divorcerates have increased because of marriagesbetween Syrian women and Turkish men.In the official data, these marriages donot seem high since most of them occurunder the religious traditions, somethingthat may not result in official registra-

tion. For example, in Kilis, the causes of20% of the divorces are speculated to bebecause of Turkish men marrying Syrianbrides. Women have been complainingthat the fear of losing their husbands toSyrian women has brought great pressureon them. Also, the women of these citiesblame Syrian women for deceiving theirhusbands. The most negative aspect of theissue is that there is a market surroundingthe arranged marriages. Men who want tomarry Syrian women pay a middleman toarrange a marriage, and then pay a dowryprice to the bride’s family. Syrian familiesoften consider arranged marriages to bean efficient way to make money and alsoto secure a daughter’s future. This phe-nomenon has been observed in Şanlıurfaand Kilis at greater rates than in other cit-ies. Another negative aspect of these typesof marriages is that many of the brides are

minors, and these marriages may result inchild abuse.

Many Syrians living in cities prefer lowquality suburbs and neighborhoods be-cause this means lower rents. Multiplefamilies live together in the same housein dire conditions. This situation mainlycauses unplanned settlements and con-struction of shantytowns. With the expec-tation of extra income, locals often startthe construction of illegal building aroundtheir houses or fields. They may also addextra floors to their apartments. These il-legal buildings put more pressure on thealready irregular city structures. Con-nected to this issue is the fact that this sort

II. EFFECTS OF THE SYRIAN REFUGEES ON TURKEY




ORSAM


ORSAM

of illegal activity provides an environmentthat may cause Syrians to get involved incriminal activities. For example, becauseof the harsh living conditions, some youngSyrian men end up being caught in druguse or trafficking, while women may fall victim to prostitution.

Another social issue caused by large refu-gee populations is child labor. Only a smallgroup of the children outside the campshave access to education. The first rea-son for this is the inability of the Turkishgovernment and NGOs to offer sufficient

education to the refugee children. An-other major factor is that Syrian parentsoften have their children work instead ofsending to school. The economic and so-cial desperation of many families results inan increase of child labor. Many childrenfrom Syrian backgrounds end up workingin factories, selling goods on the street orbegging in public.

Another concern in the border cities is

the rapidly changing demographics. Therapid change and constant flow of peo-ple tends to cause feelings of insecurityamong the local community. This senti-ment might not be so prominent in everycity, but citizens living in cities such as Ki-lis, Hatay, Şanlıurfa and Gaziantep sufferfrom a feeling of insecurity in a tangiblemanner. Kilis is one city where this issue isquite apparent. The city consists mainly of

Turkmens. Since it accepted a large num-ber of refugees who are mostly Arab, thelocal community has had the sense thatthey are now the minority in their home-town. In Hatay, the same sentiment can beobserved among the Arab Alewite popu-lation. The fact that most Syrian refugeesare Sunni is changing the demographicalmosaic of the city. This change has, inturn, caused feelings of lack of securityamong the Arab Alewite population.

b. Economic Effects

When the effect of Syrian refugees on theeconomy is closely examined, it is appar-ent that risks and opportunities are inter-

twined, and it can be observed that Syr-ians contribute in an important way to thelocal and national economy. The most vis-ible and common effect of the new popu-lation in all cities is an increase in rentalprices. The increase is an advantage and again for the landlords, whereas it is yet an-other burden for those low income peoplewho rent. With an increasing demand andhigher rental prices, it is becoming diffi-cult for renters to find affordable accom-modation. Landlords prefer to rent theirproperties to Syrians in some cases, be-cause they can offer higher rent payments.

There are even rumors that some of thelandlords were forcing Turkish tenants toleave so they can rent their houses to Syr-ians for a higher price. It is apparent thatlandlords use the demand created by Syr-ian refugees as an opportunity. Anothereffect created by the influx of Syrian refu-gees is the increase in the living costs. Theprices for basic food products and housesfor rent have increased, as there is moredemand. Therefore, statistics show aboveaverage inflation rates in cities such as Ki-lis and Gaziantep.

The second complaint frequently men-tioned is the use of Syrian workers in theindustry, agriculture and small businesssectors as illegal, cheap labor. Accordingto the survey findings of a report investi-gating the economic effects of Syrians onTurkey by ORSAM, 40% to 100% of the

people who lost their jobs in border citiesbelieve that they lost their jobs because ofthe Syrians. This perception causes strongreactions from the local community be-cause they think that Syrians are stealing job opportunities. In reality, however,there seem to be both positive and nega-tive effects of the Syrians entering intothe domestic work force. In most cases,a large part of those locals losing jobs doso because of normal economic develop-ments.

Employers want the Syrians to enter the job market, but they want regulations tobe able to hire them legally. Given the pos-sibility of accidents in the work place, un-






ORSAM


ORSAM

turers contribute to the local economy.Of course, these types of businesses ap-peal mostly to Syrians because they offerproducts Syrians are accustomed to. Al-though they might seem positive at firstglance, another reality of these enterprisesis that they are predominantly illegal. Thiscreates disturbance among locals becausethese underground businesses create un-fair competition. As a result, there havebeen a number of disputes between theSyrian and Turkish business owners.

Smuggling in the border cities existed be-fore the Syrian conflict; however, with theadvent of the crisis, it has increased con-siderably. Smuggling is now beneficial foronly a minority portion of the population,while before the conflict it was an incomesource for a broader group of individu-als. This situation is especially apparentin Kilis. Before the uprising, smugglingwas considered as a source of income bypeople in Kilis. Families from Kilis used tocross the border, fill their tanks with gas

and buy as many products as they couldfor sale upon return to Turkey. After thecivil war, this trade disappeared becauseof security concerns. However, now some villages smuggle products in great scale.Thus, while smuggling used to be an activ-ity from which a larger group of people re-ceived their income, now it has become abig income source for only a limited groupof people.

At the macroeconomic level, Syrians havehad an effect on budget and unemploy-ment rates. Turkey has spent around 4.5billion dollars on the Syrian refugees sofar. Also, in November, the unemploy-ment rate reached double digits with arate of 10.1%. It is possible that Syriansentering the job market has also had an ef-fect on the unemployment rates in Turkey.

c. Political and Security Effects

The effects of the Syrian refugees on poli-tics can be analyzed in two different ways.First, there is the effect of Syrians on thepolitical environment. The possibility of

a conflict with locals, increasing securityconcerns among the locals and politicalpolarization can be seen as the possibleeffects on the Turkish political environ-ment. Also, the political environment inTurkey has a definitive influence on howthe Syrians are viewed in general. Politi-cal views sometimes cause people to ap-proach Syrians in a more tolerant manner.However, it also causes people who arenot in direct contact with Syrians to reactharshly to the issue of refugees, simply be-cause of political preferences. Therefore,it can be argued that the issue of Syrian

refugees is a topic that feeds an alreadyexisting, polarized political discussions inTurkey.

One possible security concern that couldbe caused by the Syrian refugees is a vio-lent mass uprising that might be causedby provocations stemming from the ex-isting anger and frustration towards Syr-ian refugees. Minor examples of suchbehavior have already occurred in almost

every Turkish border city. If the currentconditions continue, it is possible thatthe events that happened in Gaziantepand Kahramanmaraş in July 2014 couldhappen again in other cities. The mostdangerous consequence of such reac-tions from the locals is that the Syriansfeel the need to organize themselves andprovide for their security and justice. Re-cently, Syrians have been discussing thepossibility of organizing in order to pro-tect themselves. Such a development mayresult in small judicial issues turning intolarger scale conflicts. The possibility ofthe organization of Syrian groups amongthemselves is causing reactions even fromformerly friendly communities. It is alsocreating polarization among the localsand the refugees, and this polarizationmay emerge as a barrier to integration.

One of the biggest fears of the locals is thefeeling of being vulnerable to terrorist at-tacks. Locals have the belief that amongthe Syrian refugees there are people whomight want to punish Turkey and createprovocations. Some locals also believe




ORSAM


ORSAM

that it is very possible that there are in-dividuals among the Syrian refugees whoare closely associated with Assad, ISISor the PKK. These beliefs are especiallywidespread in the border cities such asKilis and Şanlıurfa. Any judicial reprisalor terrorist attack perceivably committedby Syrians could affect the Turkish per-ception of all Syrians in a critical manner.An event of that kind has the possibility ofturning into a bigger security issue. Thus,it is crucial that local tensions be observed very carefully.

Refuges living in cities continue their livesin the ghettos of these urban areas. Thissituation causes a serious challenge forthe integration process, but it also cre-ates an environment that might producesecurity issues in the long term. Also,living under harsh conditions makes Syr-ians open to the possibility of getting involved in criminal and violent acts. It canbe said that youth growing up in poverty,who have a sense of being outcasts or who

have identity crises, could be a source ofcrime in the future. The locals state that ifprecautions are not taken soon, these lostgenerations might be the reason for an in-crease in criminal acts in the future. Thispossibility means that even if it is not felt yet, there may be more serious security is-sues in the near future.

d. Effects on Public Services

Syrian refugees living in the camps haveno difficulty in accessing basic servicessuch as health and education. If registered,refugees in the camps can also have freehealth services in public hospitals. Publichospitals around the border cities servethe refugees, which may take up around30% to 40 % of their capacities. Becauseof the high rate of service to the refugees,hospitals in these areas have significant

capacity problems. In these hospitals, notonly the locals and refugees, but also peo-ple who are injured in clashes across theborder are treated. Because of the highnumber of patients, hospitals are suffer-ing from insufficient capacity in terms of

the operational conditions and personnel.Furthermore, locals who believe that theyare not getting the services they want andneed further aggravate the existing nega-tive reactions. Another issue related tothe health service problem is the negativeeffect on the health of the community atlarge. Some diseases such as polio, whichwas eliminated in Turkey many years ago,have been newly detected. In addition,Gaziantep reported the highest rates ofmeasles in Turkey in 2013.

Only the refugees who enter with a pass-port or have a residence permit can attendgovernment schools. However, there is alanguage challenge for new students fromSyria who attend public schools. Otherthan public schools that are supportedby the initiatives of Turkish NGOs and various Syrians, other limited educationservices are provided. Overall these initia-tives are only a beginning. Nevertheless,only about 10% of the Syrians living inTurkish cities can access formal educa-

tion. It is therefore clear that there is notmuch immediate pressure on the edu-cational sector. But, a lack of educationmight cause a risk in terms of social issuesin the long term.

Another effect of the Syrians on Turkishcities is the challenge of municipal services. With the influx of Syrians refugeesthere has been a great burden on mu-nicipalities that oversee garbage collec-tion, building inspections, traffic, publictransport, water supply, city cleanliness,city police and cultural events. There areburdens on the municipalities in two dif-ferent ways. Firstly, since municipalitiesare provided a budget according to theirpopulation, with the flow of Syrians, theynow have to serve many more people withan already limited budget. Secondly, theinfrastructure in the cities is designed to

serve only a certain amount of people.With the rapid rush of huge number ofSyrians, several cities, such as Kilis whosepopulation doubled in a year, have en-countered problems meeting the demandfor services.




ORSAM


ORSAM

The cities around the border differ interms of demographic structure, econo-my, culture and politics. Thus, the bordercities hosting Syrian refugees have uniqueexperiences. More specifically, each cityhas had a unique reaction to the Syrianrefugees and has been affected in uniqueways by the refugee crisis. In this section,eight cities will be studied and evaluatedas regards the various effects elaborated inthe previous section.

a. Gaziantep

There are 220,000 registered Syrian refu-gees in Gaziantep. It is estimated that thenumber might be closer to 280,000 in real-ity, which is the highest refugee populationafter Istanbul. In fact, people have beenimmigrating to the city from all aroundTurkey since the 1980s. The potential ofeconomic growth is the main reason fordomestic immigration. The ever-growingeconomy is also a main reason for an easyintegration process. Groups of peoplefrom different cultures and sub-identitieshave come together with a common pur-pose, i.e. benefiting from stable economic

growth. By directing people towards pro-ductivity and integrating them into themanagement of the city, integration issueshave been solved naturally. According tothe people in Gaziantep, “the insurance ofthe city is the industry.”

The economic dynamism of Gaziantepcan be advantageous for the integration ofthe Syrian refugees, but it could also be-come a risk factor. Because the economy isthe main bond in the city, any damage orinstability on economic sphere can causepolarization, not just between Syrians andlocals but also among the locals. There-fore, it is imperative for the city to sustain

economic growth and stability in order toprevent negative consequences.

Because of the reasons mentioned above,business people in Gaziantep who areaware of the problems with Syrian refu-gees decided to keep the events of July2014 contained. Business groups are and

were aware of the fact that increasing ten-sion in the city could destroy economicgrowth. Furthermore, they have been try-ing to persuade the relevant stakeholdersto act in a responsible manner to solve is-sues related to the Syrian communities inthe city. Business people know that evenif the conflict ends in Syria, a majority ofthe refugees will remain in Turkey. Thus,they believe that plans for long-term in-

tegration should be implemented as soonas possible. Considering the destructiveresults of instability, business people fromGaziantep do not care about cheap labor.In contrast, they believe that regulationsfor refugees to work legally in Turkeyshould be in place as soon as possible.Such a step is believed to be a step to-wards decreasing the existing tension inthe city, while also helping the integrationand providing a strong labor force for theeconomy. In conclusion, business peoplebelieve that Syrians should be integratedinto the society and the economy.

In Gaziantep, it is believed that Syrianscontribute to the economic growth be-cause of their involvement in productionas well as consumption. Also, an importantnumber of Syrian investors have decidedto stay in Gaziantep. Before the revolu-tion, there were only 60 Syrian companiesregistered with the Gaziantep Chamber ofCommerce, but the number has reached209 as of October 2014. These compa-nies include traders and manufacturers.It is not certain how much of an invest-

III. ANALYSES OF CITIES




ORSAM


ORSAM

ment has been made by Syrians, althoughit can be said that the increasing amountof investment might hold an insignifi-cant place in the city’s booming economy.Since many of the Syrian investors couldnot get any business assurance, accordingto local accounts, they decided to investin other places. These missed investmentchances might be a lost opportunity forthe city, in terms of turning a crisis into anopportunity.

Exports from Gaziantep have been recap-tured, after experiencing the shock of the

initial instability in the region. BetweenJanuary and July of 2014, export figuresincreased 21% compared to the same termin 2013. Of course, there are some disad- vantages, such as increasing inflation be-cause of the refugees. Kilis and Gaziantepshowed the highest inflation rates in thecountry. While the avarage inflation ratewas 7.4% in Turkey, Gaziantep, Adıyaman,and Kilis regions had a higher rate with8.51%. Even if it has one of the highestinflation rates in the country, Gaziantepdoes not show any serious symptoms ofa bad economy. City entrepreneurs areactually more worried about the effectsof social risks related to the Syrian refu-gee influx and its effects on the overalleconomy.

In terms of social integration, initially,Gaziantep approached the Syrian com-

munity in a positive manner, but recentlythe refugees have been considered as anunwanted group. Syrians have settled inthe ghettos of the city which used to havehigh immigration anyway. Attack towardsSyrians in July 2014 began in these neigh-borhoods, which had high crime rates inthe past. Thus, it can be stated that one ofthe main issues in Gaziantep is that sincethe Syrians settle in the ghettos with highcrime rates, they are more likely to be at-tacked. Even if the attacks were limited tothese neighborhoods, their effects spreadcitywide. After the attacks, there was ten-sion in the streets, shopping centers andin other common areas. It can be said that

with the advent of these recent events,there is now a trust issue between the twocommunities. Even if some of the refugeeshave left after the events, many have re-mained in the city, but they usually do notsocialize outside their communities.

It was mentioned in interviews with Syr-ians that locals in the city had helped thema lot; however, the perception has changedwith the long-lasting process of furtherinflow of Syrians. The biggest result ofthe violent events of July 2014 is that theSyrians do not feel completely safe in the

city. The community’s reaction has causedSyrians to consider organizing in orderto protect themselves. If the organizationprocess cannot be controlled in a way thatkeeps a balance between the local com-munity and the refugees, there is the pos-sibility that conflicts will occur due to pos-sible provocations or misunderstandings.

Although the recent clashes were limitedto the ghettos, it is apparent there is adisturbance all around the city. There arenumerous causes for disturbance such ascultural and linguistic differences, eco-nomic reasons, the reality that Syrianrefugees will stay for long periods, crimi-nal acts committed by Syrians, and a feel-ing of unfairness, because aid is given torefugees but not to the locals in need. Inthe events of Gaziantep, socioeconomicfactors might have played an important

role, although provocations were a lead-ing cause, as well. To provoke unrest, so-cial media is frequently used. False newsspreading through social media such as“Syrians poisoned the water system” or“Syrians killed a police officer” caused re-action that led to the reactions in the city.It should not be ignored that the situationin Gaziantep is extremely vulnerable toprovocation.

b. Şanlıurfa

In the city center and in towns surround-ing Şanlıurfa, there are approximately150,000 registered and unregistered Syr-




ORSAM


ORSAM

ian refugees living outside the camps. Inaddition to that number, there are around80,000 refugees living in the camps. De-spite the high volume of Syrians, the situa-tion in the city is relatively calm. There aretwo reasons for the low occurrence of ten-sions in the city. First of all, the majorityof people in the city have familial relation-ships with the refugees. The city mainlyconsists of Turkish citizens of Kurdish andArab origins, so are the refugees who cameto the city. Therefore, Syrian refugees areusually hosted by locals who are relativesfrom the same tribe. If a disturbance oc-

curs, it is generally resolved without es-calating into a serious dispute, becauseof adherence to tribal law. Even if thereis no blood relationship, the refugees aretreated with respect because they share acommon identity with the locals. Hence, abenefit of the city’s demography is that itis easier to solve integration problems be-cause of the similar culture and language.

Another reason easing tensions in the cityis the efficiency of the NGOs in playing aleadership role in the community. NGOshave been bringing together communityleaders among Syrians, who played a cru-cial role in directing their communitiesinto more conciliatory approach. Com-munity leaders have been making sugges-tions such as urging them for integrationand staying out of crime, arguing that thewrongdoings of a few would be blamed on

all Syrians. These suggestions have helpedrefugees to be more sensitive and positivein their behavior. Thus, it is almost impos-sible to mention any issues of disordercaused by the refugees. In conclusion, dis-turbance or unrest is not a high possibilityin Şanlıurfa.

Low tension does not mean that there areno problems in the city. Almost all Syriansbelong to low-income group. It is possibleto observe a certain annoyance among thelocals, due to the perception of losing jobsto cheap labor provided by poor Syrianworkers. Although the increase in rentalprices is an issue, it is not as apparent as in

other cities in this study, since the city hasalways had higher rates.

The growing idea that the Syrian refugeeswill not go back has also caused some ver-bal disagreement. The biggest risk for thecity is the fact that the number of Syriansexceeds 10% of the total population. In ef-fect, the city does not want more increasesin the refugee population. It is believedthat decreasing the number by resettlingthe refugees could be beneficial. Anothersour point with the locals is related to thehealthcare or lack thereof, and this is a

main cause of negative reaction from thepublic.

It can be said that the biggest issue inŞanlıurfa is security. There is a commonbelief in the public that there might besome among Syrians who might want tocause instability. Because of its locationon the border, this fear has reached criti-cal levels. Şanlıurfa has the longest borderwith Syria and friendly forces do not ex-ist across the border. There is a feeling of vulnerability towards terrorist attacks be-cause across from Akçakale ISIS is activeand across from Suruç, the PYD, an exten-sion of the PKK, has strongholds. The big-gest fear of NGOs is the risk of a change inthe peaceful acceptance of Syrian refugeesbecause of a terrorist act.

The most critical social issue related to

Syrian communities in Şanlıurfa is thesecond marriages. Due to these marriages,there have been disturbances among localwomen. Some of the men leave their fami-lies to marry Syrian women. As a result,there might be social disturbances due tothe harm to the family structure.

In economic terms, the effect of the cri-sis is limited in Şanlıurfa because of itsalready limited business connection withSyria. As a disadvantage, it can be said thatthe investment environment in Şanlıurfahas been negatively affected by the crisisin Syria. Besides, there has been a de-crease in the exports from Şanlıurfa due




ORSAM


ORSAM

the crises in Syria and Egypt. However, theimportance of exports in the city’s over-all economy is low, so the decrease in ex-ports does not have much general effect.Actually, many entrepreneurs think thatthe refugees contribute to the economyinstead of harming, because they do the jobs locals are not willing to do. There arenot many rich Syrians living in Şanlıurfa,so there has only been 2 million dollarsworth of Syrian investments in the indus-trial district of Şanlıurfa, according to lo-cal estimates. These investments are onlya fraction of the city’s overall economy.

Although there is not much contributionin a large scale, Syrians still participatein the economy by opening small shopsand other retail centers. Also, the campscontribute to the city economy, becausesupplies for these camps, which house arefugee population of 80.000 people, areprovided by local companies.

c. Kilis

The population in the city center of Kilisis 84,000 and the overall population of theprovince is around 129,000. By October2014, the population of registered Syrianrefugees reached 98,000 in the city center.NGOs estimate the number of Syrian ref-ugees living outside the camps at around120,000. In addition to these numbers,there were 15,000 refugees in Öncüpınarrefugee camp and 24,000 in Elbeyli refu-gee camp. The refugees living in the cityexceed the local population of Kilis. Asa result, Kilis is one of the most affectedplaces by the refugee influx. It can even besaid that the people of Kilis feel like theylive in a sort of buffer zone between Syriaand Turkey.

Because the local population of Kilis ismainly Turkish and the refugees comingto Kilis are mainly of Arab descent, sometroubles were observed as a result of therapid mixing of the city’s demography interms of culture and language. Actually,since Kilis is situated on a main route thatleads to both a pilgrimage and commercial

center, there always has been historicaltolerance towards foreigners. Being oneof the first cities to accept refugees fromSyria, Turks approached refugees as gen-erous hosts. They even collected funds forSyrian refugees and some accommodatedSyrians in their extra homes. While help-ing new guests, locals thought that the sit-uation was only temporary. They expectedSyrians to either return home or settle inthe refugee camps. With the realization ofthe fact that these Syrians would not beable to go back for a long time or could notbe settled in the refugee camps, the gen-

eral attitude towards Syrians has changedconsiderably for the negative. Moreover,the uncertainty of the process adds to thealready existing negative sentiments to-wards the Syrians. As a result, most of theaid that was once thriving for Syrians bythe local community has started to dimin-ish.

Kilis has also been struggling with the is-sues caused by its proximity to the bor-der. The local community fears that theremight be criminals or escaped convictsamong the Syrians who might commitcrimes such as kidnapping. They thinkthat in the case of an event like kidnappingthey will not be capable of doing anything.So far, there has not been any kidnappingof a local. However, other refugees kid-napped some Syrians for ransom. There-fore, Kilis feels the negative effects of the

uncontrolled border between Syria andTurkey in the most apparent way. In ad-dition, locals believe that Kilis has turnedinto a hinterland and a buffer zone for theSyrian opposition. The fear of provoca-tion and having people from the PKK orISIS around them is widespread in Kilis.The biggest threat is the fact that the cityis vulnerable to mass protests that couldoccur with little provocation.

The economy of the town has been nega-tively affected by the refugee influx. Firstof all, exports, which reached 30 milliondollars previously, fell to 10 million beforerising again to 20 million dollars. Howev-






ORSAM


ORSAM

towns close to the border are added to thisamount.

Hatay has a heterogeneous demography.The city is proud of its heritage. Peoplefrom different ethnic groups, cultures andreligions live together in peace there. Gen-erally, the population of Hatay consists ofTurks, Alawite Arabs, Sunni Arabs, Kurdsand Christian Arabs. The town’s demog-raphy means that it is a more sensitiveplace for Syrian refugees. The biggest fearin Hatay is losing the balance in the popu-lation in favor of a certain group. This fearis especially present for Alawites.

At the same time, each group recognizesthey will be affected the first and most bythe unrest in the city. Some of the divi-sions created by the presence of the Syr-ians have already manifested themselveson the streets. Granted, there is broadacknowledgement that the communityleaders and city officials are handling thecrisis well. After the above-mentionedstreet manifestations, the idea of further-ing peace and togetherness in the city isimproving.

Although there were some issues regard-ing the refugees’ arrival, there has notbeen any widespread reaction or protestapart from the off-shoots of Gezi protestsin Hatay. It is important to mention thatthere was not big unrest even after theterrorist attack in Reyhanlı in May 2013.Even if there were rumors that some refu-gees left the city because of negative re-actions following the attack, the numbersand the current situation in the city doesnot reflect that. However, there is concernthat some reports in local and nationalnews about Hatay are provoking unrestand might cause discomfort in the com-munity. For example, speculative newsabout Syrians creating problems or aboutsome Syrians not paying their bills in ho-tels and restaurants perpetuates the dis-satisfaction of the locals.

The historical family relationships be-tween Syrians and locals keep the socialenvironment stable and prevent any massdisturbance in the community. Localsmaintain that 20% of the Syrians living incity center stay with their relatives, wherethey also receive emotional and physi-cal support. Still, there are reports thatHatay is like a ticking time bomb. Differ-ent groups have the common view that ifthere is a spark of unrest, this could leadto major problems. The fear of losing thepeace is a predominant sentiment aroundthe city. This fear actually prevents many

issues from being resolved.

In addition, the economic effect of Syr-ian crisis on Hatay is more severe thanin many other cities. Many citizens in thecity mentioned that Hatay has sufferedfrom the crisis more than any other cityin Turkey. Every branch of business hasexpressed the fact that they have sufferedfrom the early stages of the crisis in Syria.It is possible to categorize the economiceffects of Syrian crisis on Hatay in fourcategories:

Direct trade: Hatay’s exports to Syria,which amounted to nearly 118 milliondollars in 2010, fell to 56 million dollarsin 2012. Even if this number is expected toincrease in 2014, it does not seem possiblefor exports to reach pre-war levels.

Transportation/transit crossings: Before2011, Hatay housed the biggest logisticscompanies after Istanbul because of thecity’s trade with Syria. The logistics firmsprovided countless jobs for the region di-rectly and indirectly. Problems startingafter the crisis reached their peak whenthe border was officially closed on July 20,2012. Only a few logistics companies wentbankrupt, but if a solution is not provided

or alternative routes opened, this sectormight face dire problems.

Frontier trade/Informal economy: The wareconomy was initiated in Hatay as it haseverywhere, with the advent of the war. In




ORSAM


ORSAM

fact, smuggling has not stopped as somesuggest. In reality, only the products andthe smugglers have changed with the cri-sis.

Tourism: The tourism has mostly diedout in the city. However, the Syrian refu-gees mostly spend their money locally,thus it provides a balancing effect for theeconomy. Also, most of the humanitariansupplies are provided by locals business,so the economy still has some dynamism.

In addition to the sectors mentioned

above, banking also took a hard hit afterthe crisis. It is reported that some Turk-ish citizens moved their funds elsewherebecause of security concerns. Contrary tosome other cities, real estate prices havegone down because of the city’s secu-rity issues. A majority of the refugees inHatay do not have the funds to make biginvestments. Some of them participate inthe economy by opening small businesseslike barbershops or grocery stalls in openmarkets.

Syrians in Hatay have done well in getting jobs in entry levels. Of course, unregis-tered labor is still an issue, and there aresome groups who are disturbed with Syr-ians getting jobs in the city. It is believedthat people who can find a job in Antakyawill stay there even after the crisis. Thecultural and linguistic similarities make

integration easier for them.

In terms of security and order, the beliefthat individuals from the Syrian opposi-tion regularly come to Hatay has causedsome security concerns among the public.Thus, the security forces increased theirregulations and checks. Although thereare not many Syrians opposition mem-bers in the city, concerns about this havenot totally vanished. A lot of people be-lieve that it is impossible to totally blockand check the border. Thus, some peoplecome and go across the border in order tofight or work. Even if there is a sense ofhelp or protection for the refugees, there

are some concerns about Syrian fightersin the city.

There have been some judicial cases be-tween Syrians and locals. The numberof cases was approximately 200 by June2014, which is lower than expected con-sidering the city’s demographic and cul-tural structure. One of these cases was ahomicide committed by a Syrian against alocal. Such cases can spread through ru-mors and cause disturbance in the city. Itis believed that familial relationships helpmaintain the order in the city. Since the

family and relatives offer a kind of pro-tection, crimes such as theft remain low.However, there is a perception that childabuse and domestic violence towardswomen is very high in Hatay. Also, it isbelieved that there has been an increase inmultiple, informal marriages.

The life standards of Syrians living inHatay might not be high, but their inte-gration process is better than many othercities. Many of the refugees have foundaccommodation thanks to their family re-lationships. In addition, it is evident thatthe higher population of Arabic speakersin the city has prevented possible lan-guage barriers to a great extent. Educationis still an issue in the city though the ini-tiatives in this sector have increased.

e. Adana

Adana is less affected by the Syrian crisisbut the issue of Syrians has been a majoritem on the local agenda. According to of-ficial numbers, there are around 40,000Syrian refugees living in Adana. 11,292of these refugees live in Sarıçam tent city,and the rest live in the city center. Accord-ing to unofficial numbers, Adana hostsover 50,000 refugees.

The community in Adana is generallycautious and can, at times, be judgmental.Thus, any kind of issue caused by Syrianscan easily turn into mass disturbance.Contrarily, there is an atmosphere of sym-




ORSAM


ORSAM

pathy and generosity in Adana. Whencompared to the other cities, the effectsof Syrian on Adana in terms of economyand social life is very limited. However,there are a number of people in Adanawho claim that they have been affectedfrom Syrians in a negative manner. Themain cause of the complaints is the ideathat Syrians are contributing to an alreadyexisting unemployment and causing secu-rity problems.

The social effect of Syrians in Adana islimited, compared to other cities. There

has not been any ethnic-sectarian con-flict in Adana as of yet, although there areconcerns about it. Especially Alawite Ar-abs, who are a large group in the city, arecautious and disturbed by the presence ofSyrian refugees. Thus, refugees do not set-tle in Alawite-dominated neighborhoodsin the city. Besides the Alewites, there aresome who are opposed to Syrians living inthe city because of nationalist ideas andtendencies.

Syrians generally live in big groups inneighborhoods with limited opportuni-ties and low-income populations. Even ifit has not happened yet, the possibility ofmore Syrians arriving and creating theirown neighborhoods is a matter of conten-tion in the city.

When the economic effect is observed,situations can be encountered where thelocals are victims or abusers of the refugeepopulation. The general public opinion isthat it is harder to get a job and the wagesare lower due to the Syrians in the city. Inaddition, the firms affirm that some com-panies create unfair competition by hiringillegal refugees. Upon closer examination,the situation is different than what thepublic states. The average unemploymentrate in the city might be high but there are

job opportunities in different basic jobsectors. Many people believe that thereare some individuals who are used to liv-ing on welfare and who are picky about jobs. It is believed that they only use the

Syrian case as an excuse. According tosome Syrians, they are simply filling thepositions locals do not want to take. Still,it can be said that stronger regulations forSyrians to work in Turkey could help boththe public and the employers.

There is not much investment by Syriansin Adana. When direct commerce is ex-amined, the rate of exports, nearly 43 mil-lion dollars in 2011, dropped down to 24million in 2012. After the refugee crisis,exports have picked up and have actuallyreached higher levels than before the cri-

sis.

In terms of security there are no signs ofany serious crimes committed by Syrians.There have been small fights or conflicts,but these are common among the locals,as well. There might be rumors that Syr-ians cause some tension, but there is nosolid evidence of this. Until the middle of2014, there have only been forty Syrians

involved in disturbances. There might besome reaction from the community, but itis only done verbally.

There are instances of child labor. Theinsufficient education and lack of supervi-sion of children make them vulnerable tosuch problems. It is possible that childrengrowing up without an education mightcause bigger issues in terms of securityand order in the city in the future if nec-essary social and economic opportunitiesare not provided. In fact, begging in orderto survive is already causing some prob-lems in Adana.

When the living conditions of Syriansare examined, it is apparent that the pri-mary issue is accommodation. Syriansliving outside the camps are already ontheir own in meeting their needs, with

the exception of health services. Health is,seemingly, the least problematic issue inAdana. Registered refugees are able to goto hospitals free of charge and can get freeprescriptions, as well. There have been no






ORSAM


ORSAM

py, but it upsets the tenants. It is believedthat there are problems related to the realestate sector in the city, but there havebeen some initiatives to remedy this.

In terms of law and order in the city, offi-cially there have not reported many casesinvolving Syrians; however, there are ru-mors in the community about Syrians dis-turbing order. In 2013, there were 24 casesinvolving Syrians and in 2014 there wereonly 26 Syrians involved in court cases.Many of these cases were resolved beforegoing to the court. Another issue men-

tioned in Osmaniye is that there mightbe some refugees going across the bor-der to fight and then coming back. Thesecases are considered security problem andcause some distress among the public.

There is no major report about the abuseof women, but many confirm that unof-ficial marriages are occurring. One of themajor issues reported by the public, espe-cially from women, is that marriage withSyrian women is quite common.

When the living conditions of the refugeesare analyzed, the fact that Osmaniye is asmall city enables humanitarian aid to bemore efficient and coordinated. However,accommodation and education are stillcrucial issues as they are in other cities.2,000 children living in camps have accessto education, while the ones living in the

city lack educational opportunities. Thereis a school that will be opened soon with12 classrooms that will serve 2,000 chil-dren, but this may not be sufficient.

g. Kahramanmaraş

In Kahramanmaraş, there are 17,000 refu-gees in camps and 40,000 in the city, total-ing approximately 57,000 registered refu-

gees. It is estimated that the real numberof refugees is around 75,000. The reasonfor the difference between the numbers isthe unregistered refugees living in the ru-ral parts of the province. Kahramanmaraş

has a homogenous population becauseof its limited domestic immigration. Thepopulation is very conservative and in-clusive. The reaction to the Syrians ismainly determined by the helpful but eas-ily provoked structure of the community.On the one hand, Kahramanmaraş is theleast likely place where a negative reactiontowards Syrians may occur. On the otherhand, there is the risk that one little inci-dent could turn into a mass disturbance inthe city. Mass disturbance may occur notbecause the city is at risk for this type ofevent but, rather, because the community

can be easily provoked. The one factorthat stabilizes the situation is the efficien-cy of NGOs in keeping the public frommoving in a negative direction. In addi-tion, the painful legacy of the 1978 inci-dents in Maraş has made the public, localauthorities and NGOs more responsibleand cautious.

After the incidents in July 2014 against agroup of Syrians, the city is better now. Infact, these events helped the city decreasetensions afterwards. The reason for thedecrease in tensions is the improvementmade in answering complaints from thelocals. It can be said that the reactionsbefore the incident had multiple reasons.The flow of refugees, who came with adifferent culture and a different language,caused a reaction from the conservativeand closed segments of the community.For example, Square Park in the center ofthe city has become a place used by Syr-ians daily. Square Park and other parks areeven named Syrian parks because the Syr-ians are often using them. Moreover, us-age of the parks till late hours, the largecrowds, the noise and some other behav-ior, which are not in line with the local cul-ture, have caused a negative verbal attitudetowards Syrians. Also, this city, which had

little crime and beggars before, has manybeggars in the streets. This is one reasonfor the negative attitude towards Syrians.After the July incident, Syrians are lessapparent in city life. They have also devel-




ORSAM


ORSAM

oped more acceptable behaviors that havebeen adapted to the local culture. Localauthorities have also taken precautions toprevent street begging. For these reasons,it can be said that the atmosphere in thecity is calmer and a risk of a major distur-bance is very low.

The biggest fear of community leaders isthe possibility of provocations that seek totrigger disturbance in the city, by capitaliz-ing on domestic or international politicaldevelopments. For example, reports sur-faced that urban myths played a big role

in the July incidents. An erroneous pieceof news titled “A Syrian killed a police of-ficer” was the spark of the incident. Also,articles such as “Syrians cut open a preg-nant woman” caused mass protests. As inGaziantep, provocations were the mainreason for major disturbance. In addition,the cultural layout of the city is open toprovocations. For example, during theevents of the July, most of the protestorswere young people between the ages of 12and 20 who were easily provoked and act-ed irrationally. Another worry for locals isthat, on the one hand, they are concernedabout the fact that they are willing to helpSyrians as victims of war but, on the otherhand, that they may react if Syrians be-have inconsiderately towards the localculture. The perception of Syrians as vic-tims is weakened by crimes, organizationagainst locals, and actions that go against

local culture. In contrast to the percep-tion of the local community, involvementin crime is rare in the Syrian community.The real worry is that one criminal actcommitted by a single Syrian might beused as impetus to act against the entireSyrian community.

Another reason for negative reaction to-wards Syrians is the economy. Many Syr-ians have opened their own stores in thecity, and often these entrepreneurs do notpay taxes, something that causes unfaircompetition with local stores. In addition,the increasing numbers of small business-es such as shops and bakeries have affect-

ed other businesses. As a result, this hascaused problems with local business own-ers. Attacks on stores with Arabic signsduring the July incidents were a result ofthis problem. It was speculated that localbusiness owners were the primary instiga-tors of these incidents.

In spite of the reactions from small busi-ness owners, big businesses do not showany signs of contention with Syrian refu-gees. It can even be said that they needand depend on the Syrian work force. Thepublic has made suggestions that Syrians

are stealing local jobs, but no real datashows any indication of that. The unem-ployment in Kahramanmaraş is lowerthan the national average. The work forceis needed to work in factories and in theregion’s agricultural sector. In addition,there is a new industrial district beingbuilt which will need workers. Businesspeople in the city think that Syrians couldbe a good resource for the new work force,and that their legal issues regarding workpermits should be resolved immediately.Consequently, it can be said that Syrianscontribute to the city’s economy. Anothersmall contribution is that a few Syriansmade investment through local business-es. There are two Syrian textile factories,but their contribution to the overall econ-omy is not crucial. These two companiesemploy only Syrians.

A staggering 150% increase in rental pric-es, a lack of available housing, and the factthat landlords attempt to get rid of Turk-ish tenants to rent places to Syrians arecommon problems in Kahramanmaraş. Itcan be stated that Syrians cause less issuesin terms of security and social problemsin Kahramanmaraş than in other cities.There has been no considerable increasein the crime rates either. The city’s ho-mogenous demography has played a rolein keeping the peace, as well. However, inthe long term, an inclusion of an addition-al 10% Arab population to the city mightcause problems. Thus, business sectorparticipants, who are not concerned but,




ORSAM


ORSAM

rather, happy with the existing Syrianwork force, still do not want a new wave ofSyrians into the city.

h. Mersin

Mersin has experienced domestic im-migration because of the Gulf War andthe situation in the southeastern regionof Turkey. Thus, the refugee flow is notits first experience with foreigners. Theincreasing population in Mersin mightbe considered positive factor by some,though there have been complaints about

the change in daily life in the city. The pri-mary complaint is the fact that the city’sinfrastructure remains unchanged eventhough the population is increasing be-cause of the refugee influx.

Official numbers from November 2014show that there are 58,800 Syrian refugeesliving in Mersin. 41,801 of these refugeeshave either gotten their residence permitsor identification or they are on the waitinglist. However, it has been repeatedly re-ported that the actual number of refugeesmight actually be closer to 200,000. Themajority of the refugees are Sunni Arabs,Turkmen or Kurds.

The local population considers Syrians tobe a negative factor on the life in the city.Locals also complain that refugees createuncontrolled living environments. It is be-

lieved that wealthy Syrians prefer Mersin,so the overall situation in this city is muchbetter than in others. This evaluation hassome truth in it since there have been sig-nificant investments in the city after thecrisis. Nonetheless, the number of thesewealthy Syrians is only a small portion ofthe refugee population when we considerthe size of the refugee population in thecity. Therefore, it is hard to suggest thatthings are positive in Mersin. There hasbeen a considerable increase in the al-ready existing malaise about immigrationwith more and more Syrians entering thecity. Most of the interviewees claim thatfrom the social life to traffic, Syrians have

had negative effects on the city. It has beenrepeatedly stated that Syrians try to live intheir own ways in isolated areas, and thissometimes disturbs the locals to some ex-tent. Some interviewees mentioned thatSyrian youth spending time together inpublic areas have caused some concernsamong public.

In terms of the city’s economy, it can bestated that Mersin turned the Syrian cri-sis into an opportunity, and the effects ofwealthy Syrians in the economy is quite visible. The number of Syrian firms ac-

tive in Mersin was 25 in 2009 and by 2014the number reached 279. Additionally, theportion of Syrian firms in Mersin was 6.3%in 2009, and it increased to 31% by 2014.

A positive effect can also been in the com-merce with Syria. When commercial ac-tivities between Syria and Mersin in thelast five years are examined, there was adrop in 2010 and 2011 and an increase in2012 and 2013. Before the crisis, exportsfrom Mersin to Syria totaled 19 milliondollars in 2010. The number rose to 75million dollars in 2013. The increase inexports was 331% in 2013 compared to theprevious year. With the increase, exportsreached their highest point in the last 5 years. It can be said that exports have con-tinued at this pace during 2014.

The reason for the substantial Syrian in-

vestment and increasing export in Mersinis due to the relationships created beforethe crisis with Latakia and the advertise-ment campaigns in Latakia before theuprising. It is evident that the merchantswho settled in Mersin have continuedtheir trading with their old contacts viaMersin. It has been reported that espe-cially highly needed products such asfood and emergency supplies can be sent

to Syria from Mersin by using individualswith contacts in Syria. This also gives aboost to the economy.

In spite of the positive effects on the econ-omy, it is hard to see any positive effects




ORSAM


ORSAM

in the public sphere. As in other cities,small and medium-sized businesses inMersin hire illegal Syrians and give them very low wages. In addition to this, mostof the Syrians do not shop in local stores.It has been observed that the positive per-ceptions related to previous immigrationhave started to turn into negative onesrecently. A decrease of the shopping in lo-cal stores by Syrians, coupled with the factthat they are starting to shop in their ownstores, might be a reason for the change inattitude. The fact that most of the Syrianbusinesses are not registered is also prob-

lematic for local businesses.Although suggestions were made that un-employment in Mersin is caused by Syr-ians, it is impossible to make a valid evalu-ation of that. It is frequently mentionedthat illegal workers not only harm thelocal economy but also cause problemsin the social structure by getting involvedin crime and disturbing the peace. Whenthe statistics on law and order were ex-amined, the rates of criminal involvementand criminal disturbance do not seem ashigh as previously thought, however. UntilJuly 2014, there were 519 Syrians involvedin crime in the city. There have also been alot of complaints about unregistered Syr-

ian vehicles getting involved in accidents.Citizens claim that these drivers often donot take any responsibility for their ac-tions. It has also been stated that, in con-trast to periods before the Syrian crisis,there has been a considerable increase inthe abuse of women, drug use, theft, andgang activity at present. It is evident thatthe locals are concerned about these is-sues. Another security issue is the beliefthat several radical groups exist in Mersin.Related to this, lack of sufficient securityin the city is also a concern for the public.

When the living conditions of Syriansare investigated, the results seem to bebetter than in many other Turkish cities.However, there are still problematic is-sues concerning education, food suppliesand accommodation. Humanitarian aidis organized by NGOs, but it is not stableand sufficient. According to local citizens,there are five schools in Mersin serving

Syrians. These schools educate 4,484 chil-dren and, in addition, nearly 1,000 stu-dents attend government schools. Healthservice provision is not of the highestconcern. Registered refugees can get freehealth service and drug prescriptions.




ORSAM


ORSAM

The Syrian refugee situation in Turkeyhas become an integration and securityissue with social, economic and politicaldimensions. As a result, it has been gener-ally accepted that a policy based only onproviding the basic needs of the refugeesis unsustainable. Upon realization of this,

the institutions tasked with administeringthe issue have been working on this di-mension recently. Under AFAD coordina-tion, camps have been set up in way thatcan be an example for the world. However,the life standards of Syrians living outsidethe camps need to be reexamined andchanges need to be made. The suggestionsbelow may help in the establishment of apolicy on social integration of Syrians inTurkey.

1. First of all, the studies on the num-ber of Syrian refugees and those whowill remain in Turkey should be con-ducted in a more realistic manner. Theresults of such studies can make a bet-ter contribution to policies and to thesteps that need to be taken. This studyshows that many Syrians will remainin Turkey for a long time and some

may not go back even if the conflict inSyria is resolved. If these permanentguests are a reality for Turkey, meas-ures that will minimize the negativeconsequences and maximize the ben-efits need to be introduced.

2. If we assume that Syrian refugeesare permanent, there should be acomprehensive Syrian refugee policythat also includes actions to preventreaction from local communities. TheSyrian refugees issue should be con-sidered as a social integration issue.Accordingly, there should be a holisticpolicy that includes work force devel-

opment, educational development,accommodation aid, health servicerestructuring, a betterment of munici-pality services, and progress in termsof host community understanding.

3. If the integration process can be

managed successfully, it can contrib-ute to the diversity and improvementof a new multicultural structure inTurkey. Also strengthening bondswith neighboring countries can helpprovide a better environment for eco-nomic and political cooperation in thefuture.

Based on this assessment, the non-ex-haustive suggestions listed below couldbe considered in future policies directedtoward Syrians:

• Registration of Syrian refugees: Thereis a common perception in the publicsphere that Syrian refugees can com-mit crimes without punishment. Forexample it was frequently mentionedduring interviews that cars with Syrianplates often simply leave the scene when

they are involved in accidents and that,consequently, locals are unable to makecomplaints. Also, there is a belief thatSyrians can cross the border and comeback when they commit a crime in thecities where they live. These situationscreate security concerns among people.Therefore, registering Syrian refugees isextremely important for the integrationprocess. Registration has been handledby AFAD and the Police Department. Itwas noted that a considerable numberof Syrians are still not registered. Onereason for this is that the registrationprocess started only recently. Addi-tionally, refugees living in villages and

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS




ORSAM


ORSAM

rural areas are not informed about thebenefits of registration. Therefore, in-formational sessions and mobile regis-tration services might be of great use.In addition, a registration process forSyrian vehicles may also prevent nega-tive reactions from locals.

• Building extra capacity for health andeducation: Construction of new hospi-tals or increasing capacity in existinghospitals can help ease the burden onthe existing system. In addition, thereis a need for more personnel in everydepartment of the local hospitals. Byallowing Syrian doctors to work in thehealth sector may bear many benefits.For instance, if the Syrian doctors canwork in basic health centers located inneighborhoods populated largely by theSyrians, it will both serve those peopleand ease the burden on the health sys-tem.

• Education can be the most importantpart of preventing social exclusion. Alost generation without good educationcan lead to serious social issues, out oflow income of feelings of social exclu-sion. If the education problem can be re-solved, a generation which contributespositively to society and to the economycan emerge. Therefore, the biggest stepto turn the Syrian refugee problem intoan advantage for both refugees and forTurkey is education. There have been

important steps taken regarding university education. The Syrians whohave a high school degree or who haveattended college have the opportunityto attend Turkish universities free ofcharge and without entrance exams.Besides this, the Presidency of TurksAbroad and Related Communities havebeen providing scholarships, free ac-commodation and university educationfor a number of Syrian students. Thereare two options for primary and highschool students. First, Syrians can gettheir education in public schools withTurkish students. In this case, studentscan start their first grade with Turkish

children in mixed groups. Others whostart at a higher-level can get a year ofpreparatory class to learn Turkish. Theadvantage of this particular approach isthat Syrian children can learn Turkishand schooling can commence sooner.However, the approach entails a 15%extra burden in student populations onpublic school systems in the area. Withthe developments made in Turkey inrecent years on educational quality,the average class size has dropped to29 students per classroom. However, ifSyrians students start attending school,

the class sizes will considerably increase.The increase might cause negative re-actions from the local communities.Therefore, new schools have to be builtand new teachers have to be hired at thegovernment’s expense. Another risk isthe discrimination between Syrian andTurkish children. Yet another risk is thatthe project might increase the possibil-ity that more families decide to staylonger in Turkey. Therefore, an optionmight be the creation of a special systemfor Syrian children. In that case, therewould be challenges related to provid-ing a Turkish education in Syrian cur-riculum and training Arab teachers. Inaddition, Turkish and Syrian curriculashould be modified according to theneeds of Syrian students.

• Work Permits: Providing work permitsfor refugees is a common demand ofbusinesses in every city. The busi-ness sector suggests that a 10% quotashould be given to businesses in orderto hire refugee workers so that nega-tive reactions from the community canbe prevented. Especially in Gaziantep,Kahramanmaraş and Şanlıurfa there isa need for a strong workforce. Provid-ing work permits for refugees while ena-bling them to keep their foreign status

can eliminate unfair competition andproblems derived from it. In addition,unfair competition between Turkishand Syrians workers can be eliminated.Currently, there is unfair competitionbetween Syrian and Turkish workers




ORSAM


ORSAM

because employers do not pay taxes onSyrian positions. The plan can benefitthe government in terms of ending taxlosses, as well. In addition, work per-mits can help the integration process.Preventing unregistered businessesopened by Syrians can also ease tensionsbetween Syrians and Turks. (As of thewriting of this report, Ministry of Inte-rior and Ministry of Work and SocialSecurity have been working a regulationto allow for work permit.)

• Giving more authority to local govern-ments and enabling coordination be-tween local governments and provincialauthorities: One of the biggest chal-lenges in the struggle with the Syrianrefugee crisis is the lack of coordinationbetween central and local authorities.Actually, local governments have betterinformation about the issue. However,for different reasons, they are unwillingto take a risk by acting without direc-tives from the central government. It

could be beneficial to give more author-ity to the local governments in handlingthese kinds of issues. NGOs also have abetter understanding of both the refu-gee situation and local communities. Anaction plan to target each city’s prob-lems considering their unique environ-ments with the partnership of NGOscan be more effective in solving variousissues. Also, the burden of multi-facetedissue of refugees should be distributedto different government institutions.The establishment of the DirectorateGeneral of Migration Management un-der the Ministry of Interior Affairs andCoordinator Governorship dealing withthe Syrians is a helpful step.

• Building more capacity and providingextra budget for municipalities: The cit-ies with dense refugee populations havea 10% extra budgetary burden on theirmunicipal services. Therefore, there isa need for an infrastructure and a work-force to build it. The budget is given tothe cities according to their populations,but the populations have increased criti-

cally with the refugee influx of recent years. Thus, a rearrangement of citybudgets should be considered. Theproblem here is that any extra budgetfor cities with refugees can mean cutsfor other cities, which might create un-expected results.

• Bring together groups of Syrian commu-nity leaders: Many of the problems withSyrian refugees are due to a differencein culture and life style. Thus, directingSyrians towards adapting to local cultureis of great importance. Local authoritiesand NGOs are doing a good job direct-ing the Turkish population; however,directing the refugees is still an issue.If a group of community leaders can bechosen among Syrian refugees it mighthelp overcome some issues. There is acurrent practice by AFAD that might bean example for this. In the camps, therehave been some mechanisms createdso that Syrians can become involved inaddressing problems and finding solu-tions. Similar practices developed fromsuch experiences can be used to addressthe issues of Syrians living outside thecamps and help ease tension in society.

• Booklets and Webpages in Arabic : Syr-ians are experiencing problems withsocial relationships, in contacting gov-ernment institutions, with reachingbasic services. Opening up web pagesin Arabic, publishing informative hand-outs or creating awareness programsthrough NGOs can help overcome theseissues. These types of programs can helprefugees learn about where, when andhow to apply for something that canhelp them better integrate into localculture. This could also enable them tolearn what to be careful about in certaincontexts.

• Opening up new living areas: It is neces-sary to build new areas for accommo-dation because increasing rents, higherreal estate prices, and the struggle tofind accommodation are serious con-cerns both for refugees and locals.




ORSAM


ORSAM

• International aid: If we consider therefugees’ desire for migration to othercountries from Turkey, the crisis can beseen as an international issue. EspeciallyUNHCR, other international organiza-tions and western countries have an ob-ligation to help with the Syrian refugeecrisis. The countries can do more by notonly providing basic aid but by develop-ing educational and health projects.

• Increasing the border controls: Anotherreaction from the public is the threatof terrorist attacks. Because of uncon-trolled crossings, locals have doubtsabout the identities of Syrians. Increas-ing work on the control of the bordersand on the registration process candecrease worries about attacks in thecommunities.

• Enhancing public receptivity of theSyrians in Turkey: People living in thebordering cities of Turkey should be re-assured. Authorities should explain to

locals that Syrians might stay for a longperiod of time. There should be someexplanation about living with Syriansand the reasons why Syrians are in Tur-key. NGOs can play an important role inthis process because they have a consid-erable effect on the communities. NGOsfurthered this process by nurturing hostand guest relationships. Now, they canhelp with the integration process. Also,the local media is very effective and canplay a role in shaping public opinion andawareness.

• Ameliorating the Syrian stereotype:Many Syrians come from rural areas,so the perception of a Syrian is negativein the community. Also, the images ofSyrian beggars on the street have causeda negative stereotype that might harmintegration. To change these percep-tions, some socio-cultural events canbe organized by showing aspects of dif-ferent cultures and life styles to the com-munity. Studies showing the social andcultural contributions of Syrians canalso be shared with the public.

• Distributing the burden of refugee popu-lations in border cities: Another reactionto the Syrian refugees is the density ofthe refugee population in certain cities.Cities with limited resources are forcedto handle the socio-economic effects ofthe refugee crisis. Therefore, a balanc-ing redistribution of refugees can havea considerable effect on improving therefugee crisis.

• Persuading the skilled Syrian labor forceto stay in Turkey: It is critical that aneconomic elite may emerge from withinthe Syrians community which will fa-cilitate the solution of integration prob-lems. Gaziantep is a striking exemplefor that. This city with its dense popu-lation of refugees has solved challengesof social integration by integrating theSyrians into administration of theirproblems and by directing them towardsproduction. Providing opportunities toSyrian businessmen is very important,as well. Such an approach can contrib-

ute to both the integration process andthe resolution of economic challenges.Another issue is that skilled Syrian labormoves to the western countries whileunskilled labor and low-income groupsstay in Turkey. There are many doctors,academics, teachers, lawyers and engi-neers among the refugees. These peopleare unable to do their jobs in Turkey.Most of them either leave the coun-try or work in entry-level jobs. Thesepeople can be used to create a group ofcommunity leaders among the Syrians.Additionally by providing them withwork permits, they can work in Turkeyand meet the demand for skilled labor.Lastly, Syrians might be allowed to joinlabor force, which will facililtate thesolution of the issues stemming fromunemployment or cooperation with thegovernment.

• Approaching the refugee crisis independ-ent of the political arguments: Discus-sions about Syrians are mainly political-ly charged. People who are responsiblefor bringing attention to the refugee




ORSAM


ORSAM

issue might come under different ac-cusations due to political bickering.Also, some people who have never meta refugee can be against Syrian refugees just because of the influence of politics.The reaction of Turkish people towardsSyrian refugees should be examined in-dependently and objectively withoutany political bias. Solutions should beoffered based on objective evaluations.Also, reducing the social events only toprovocations and ignoring some rootcauses can lead to bigger problems inthe future. The provocation and manip-

ulation factor is evident in some socialreactions, but the fact that the environ-ment is very vulnerable to provocationsshould not be ignored. Protests are usu-ally organized by limited groups of peo-ple; however, the whole city is affectedby them. Therefore, events should beinvestigated in detail without being sim-ply looked over.

• Creating a database on changes in the

demographics of Syrians and possibleimmigration movements: It is impor-tant to have information on the demo-graphics of Syrians, immigration back toSyria or other countries and their social,educational and health developments. Ifthis information can be collected, it canbe useful to tackle future problems. Inthis regard, plans should be preparedaccording to different possible scenariosfor mid-term (5-7 years) and for the longterm (20-25 years). Having such a da-tabase on Syrians can help to developplans by using objective information.

• Preventing begging: With the influxof Syrian refugees into Turkish cities,begging has dramatically increased. Theincrease has caused security concernsbeyond simple disturbances. The num-ber of Syrian beggars on the streets, intraffic and in parks has caused worriesthat theft, burglary, pick pocketing androbberies could happen at any time.Also, the issue of begging negatively af-fects the perception of Syrian people in

the eyes of their Turkish neighbors. Pre-cautions by the local authorities couldbe very effective in this case. For exam-ple, in Kahramanmaraş, the authoritiespicked up beggars after the July protestsand took them to refugee camps. Theseactions helped ease tension in the city.

• Preventing the abuse of women and chil-dren: The negative effects in the familyand the abuse of women and childrenhave played a great role in creating anegative perception towards Syrians inthe Turkish community. This type ofabuse is also a serious problem for theSyrian community. Awareness activitiesand suggestions from community lead-ers to denounce this kind of abuse, alongwith formation of response teams for is-sues related to abuse, can prevent manycases from occurring. In addition, swiftaction against abusers by local authori-ties and judicial authorities can preventoffenders from repeating their actions.Opening up shelters for Syrian women

or allowing them to use existing shelterscan be a temporary but effective solu-tion to this acute problem.

• Providing effective solutions for issues of public order: In spite of the high numberof refugees, there has not been a seriouspublic order issue caused by membersof the Syrian community. The involve-ment rate of Syrians in criminal activi-ties is very low. Actually, in most of the

cases, Syrians are the victims in lawsuits.In spite of the problems, there is a self-restraining mechanism among the refu-gees and the locals in order to keep thepeace. Still, it is important to mentionthat a risk of disturbance could occur inpublic order. Some groups feel the needto replace the authorities when theythink that there are not enough pre-cautions in terms of order and security.Therefore, the judicial system and secu-rity forces should be efficient in solvingand resolving problems between localsand refugees. The authorities must dothis in a fair and judicial manner by act-




ORSAM


ORSAM

ing as fair referees in order to equallyprotect the rights of both sides.

• Creating social areas for refugees: Be-

cause of cultural and linguistic differ-ences, Syrians cannot become involvedin many cultural activities. Facilitat-ing the participation of Syrian women young, and into about social activitiescould prevent many social problems.During the integration process, creatinga positive social atmosphere in whichrefugees can benefit from many typesof social services can be a great help.One good example is in Şanlıurfa wherea mosque assigned to the refugees willbe built which has lectures in Arabic.

• Building overall capacity for Syrian refugees:Building a better capacity platformto serve Syrians can help in multipleways. If programs can be geared towardsthis goal, creating a group of communityleaders, ameliorating the Syrian stereo-type and integrating refugees into socialand economic life will be easier to real-ize. The international community is alsoreconsidering their insufficient supportand has decided to provide more aid.Directing international aid towards im-proving capacity for Syrian communi-

ties is a crucial step, as well.




ORSAM


ORSAM

APPENDIX-1: Institutions Interviewed (Chronological Order)

• Adana Chamber of Industry• Adana Chamber of Commerce• Adana AK Party (political party) Provin-

cial Headquarters• Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergence

Management Presidency (AFAD) in Ad-

ana• Adana ADYAR (Adana Humanitarian

Relief Foundation• Governorship of Adana• Adana Çukurova Development Agency • Çukurova University in Adana• Osmaniye AFAD• Osmaniye IHH (Humanitarian Relief

Foundation)• Osmaniye Doğaka Development Agency • Antakya Chamber of Commerce and

Industry • Hatay Altinozu Municipality • Antakya Newspaper• Kilis Chamber of Commerce and In-

dustry • Gaziantep Mazlum-Der (NGO)• Gaziantep IHH• Gaziantep Chamber of Industry • Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce• Gaziantep Bülbülzade Foundation

(NGO)• Gaziantep Governorship Coordinator

• Gaziantep Silk Road DevelopmentAgency

• Gaziantep Mega TV (Local TV Broad-caster)

• Municipality of Şanlıurfa• Şanlıurfa Chamber of Commerce and

Industry • Şanlıurfa NGOs’ Humanitarian Relief

Platform• Şanlıurfa IHH• Şanlıurfa Karacadağ Development

Agency • Şanlıurfa Arap-Der (NGO)• Şanlıurfa Kanal Urfa (Local TV Broad-

caster)• Syrian NGO RMTeam• Mersin Chamber of Commerce and

Industry • Mersin Kanal 33 TV (Local TV Broad-

caster)• Mersin IHH Branch• Mersin Chamber of Artist and Artisans

• Kahramanmaraş IHH• Kahramanmaraş Manşet Gazetesi

(Newspaper)• Kahramanmaraş Gündem Gazetesi

(Newspaper)• Kahramanmaraş Chamber of Com-

merce and Industry





ORSAM

Documents

Effects of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey