Effective Macroprudential Policy: Cross-Sector ...Effective Macroprudential Policy: Cross-Sector Substitution from Price and . Quantity Measures . By Janko Cizel, Jon Frost, Aerdt

WP/16/94

Effective Macroprudential Policy: Cross-Sector Substitution from Price and

Quantity Measures

By Janko Cizel, Jon Frost, Aerdt Houben, and Peter Wierts

IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to

elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those

of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF

management.

© 2016 International Monetary Fund WP/16/94

IMF Working Paper

Monetary and Capital Markets Department

Effective Macroprudential Policy: Cross-Sector Substitution from Price and Quantity

Measures1

Prepared by Janko Cizel, Jon Frost, Aerdt Houben, and Peter Wierts2

Authorized for distribution by Karl Habermeier

April 2016

Abstract

Macroprudential policy is increasingly being implemented worldwide. Its effectiveness in

influencing bank credit and its substitution effects beyond banking have been a key subject of

discussion. Our empirical analysis confirms the expected effects of macroprudential policies on

bank credit, both for advanced economies and emerging market economies. Yet we also find

evidence of substitution effects towards nonbank credit, especially in advanced economies,

reducing the policies’ effect on total credit. Quantity restrictions are particularly potent in

constraining bank credit but also cause the strongest substitution effects. Policy implications

indicate a need to extend macroprudential policy beyond banking, especially in advanced

economies.

JEL Classification Numbers: E58, G10, G18, G20, G58.

Keywords: Financial cycle, macroprudential regulation, financial supervision, shadow banking.

Author’s E-Mail Address: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected];

[email protected].

1 The authors would like to thank Erlend Nier, Miguel Savastano, Stijn Claessens, Jakob de Haan, Dirk Schoenmaker,

Niklas Nordman, Win Monroe, IMF staff in MCM, SPR and RES, and participants at a workshop of the Bank of

International Settlements (BIS) Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), a meeting of the ESRB Instruments

Working Group (IWG) and an IMF MCM Policy Forum. We thank Netty Rahajaan, Sonia Echeverri, and Adriana Rota for

assistance with typesetting. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the

position of De Nederlandsche Bank or the IMF. All errors are our own.

2 Janko Cizel is at VU University Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute. This paper was initiated during a secondment at DNB

and finalized while at the IMF, and the ECB. Aerdt Houben is at De Nederlandsche Bank and University of Amsterdam;

Jon Frost and Peter Wierts are at De Nederlandsche Bank and VU University Amsterdam.

IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to

elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are

those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board,

or IMF management.

mailto:[email protected]




3

Table of Contents Page

Abstract _______________________________________________________________ 2

Glossary _______________________________________________________________ 5

I. Introduction __________________________________________________________ 6

II. Data ________________________________________________________________ 9

A. Private Credit to the Nonfinancial Sector ______________________________________9

B. Macroprudential Policy Events _____________________________________________11

C. Macroeconomic Fundamentals _____________________________________________12

III. Cross-Sectoral Substitution Due to Macroprudential Measures ________________ 12

A. Methodology ___________________________________________________________12

B. Results ________________________________________________________________14

IV. Event Study of Macroprudential Policy Interventions _______________________ 15

A. Methodology ___________________________________________________________15

B. Results ________________________________________________________________17

V. Robustness Checks ___________________________________________________ 19

A. Placebo Tests ___________________________________________________________20

B. Effect of Macroprudential Policies Events Prior to and During the Global Financial

Crisis ________________________________________________________________20

VI. Concluding Remarks _________________________________________________ 21

References ____________________________________________________________ 23

Figures

1A. Bank Credit Flows in Advanced and Emerging Market Economies ________________27

1B. Nonbank Credit Flows in Advanced and Emerging Market Economies _____________28

1C. Substitution Between Bank/Nonbank Credit Flows_____________________________29

2. Histogram of the Substitution Between Bank/Nonbank Credit Flows ________________30

3. Activation of Macroprudential Policy Measures ________________________________31

4. Cumulative Excess Credit Growth Rates Around Macroprudential Policy Measures ____32

5. Cumulative Excess Growth of Nonbank FIs' Assets Around Macroprudential Policy

Measures _______________________________________________________________33

6. Impact of Macroprudential Policy Measures on Bank Credit ______________________34

7. Impact of Macroprudential Policy Measures on Nonbank Credit ___________________35

8. Impact of Macroprudential Policy Measures on Total Credit ______________________36

9. Impact of Macroprudential Policy Measures on Net Sectoral Credit Flows ___________37

4

Tables

1. Summary Statistics on Credit, Macroprudential Policies and Macroeconomic Indicators 38

2. Classification of Macroprudential Policies _____________________________________39

3. Substitution from Bank to Nonbank Credit ____________________________________40

4. Substitution from Bank to Nonbank Credit and Quantity Measures _________________41

5. Drivers of Growth in Credit, Investment Fund Assets and Domestic Private Debt

Securities _______________________________________________________________42

6. Summary of Event Study Results ____________________________________________43

Appendix

I. Placebo Tests ____________________________________________________________44

5

Glossary

AEs Advanced Economies

ESRB European Systemic Risk Board

BIS Bank for International Settlements

CEGR Cumulative Excess Growth Rates

CGFS Committee on the Global Financial System

DTI Debt-to-Income Ratio

EMEs Emerging Market Economies

EU European Union

GFC Global Financial Crisis

GMPI Global Macroprudential Policy Instruments Database, IMF

IFs Investment Funds

LTI Loan-to-Income Ratio

LTV Loan-to-Value Ratio

MaPs Macroprudential Policies

SIFI Capital surcharges on systemically important financial institutions

WEO World Economic Outlook

6

I. INTRODUCTION

Macroprudential policy is alive and kicking. It is being used actively both in emerging

market economies and—following the global financial crisis—in advanced economies.3 It

includes measures that apply directly to lenders, such as countercyclical capital buffers or

capital surcharges, and restrictions that apply to borrowers, such as loan-to-value (LTV) and

loan-to-income (LTI) ratio caps. Most macroprudential measures activated around the globe

between 2000 and 2013 apply to the banking sector only, including borrower-based measures

(IMF, Global Macroprudential Policy Instruments Database, 2013).

The widespread use of macroprudential policy is aimed at reducing systemic risks. Yet the

use of national sector-based measures may be subject to a boundary problem, causing

substitution flows to less regulated parts of the financial sector (Goodhart, 2008; Aiyar et al.,

2014). Specifically, macroprudential policy may have the consequence of shifting activities

and risks both to: (i) foreign entities (e.g., bank branches and cross-border lending); and

(ii) nonbank entities (e.g., shadow banking, also referred to as market-based financing).

Whereas several papers have estimated intended effects of macroprudential policies (MaPs)

on variables such as credit growth and housing prices, and whether measures leak to foreign

banks, cross-sector substitution effects have—to the best of our knowledge—not yet been

tested empirically.

This paper aims to fill this gap. It investigates whether macroprudential policies lead to

substitution from bank-based financial intermediation to nonbank intermediation. In addition,

it uses event study methodology to shed light on the timing of the effects of policy measures

on bank and nonbank intermediation around activation dates. Moreover, we contribute to the

literature by distinguishing between the effects of quantity versus price-based instruments

and lender versus borrower-based instruments, given that the effects may differ. We also

check whether results differ for advanced economies (AEs) versus emerging market

economies (EMEs) and bank versus market-based financial systems.

Our results support the hypothesis that macroprudential policies reduce bank credit growth.

In our sample, in the two years after the activation of MaPs, bank credit growth falls on

average by 7.7 percentage points relative to the counterfactual of no measure. This effect is

much stronger in EMEs than in AEs. Beyond this, our results suggests that quantity-based

measures have much stronger effects on credit growth than price-based measures, both in

advanced and emerging market economies. In cumulative terms, quantity measures slow

bank credit growth by 8.7 percentage points over two years relative to the counterfactual of

no policy change. These results are of the same order of magnitude as those of Morgan et al.

(2015), who find that economies with LTV polices (which we classify as a quantity

constraint) have experienced residential mortgage loan growth of 6.7 percent per year, while

non-LTV economies have experienced 14.6 percent per year. For bank credit, our results

have the same order of magnitude as those of Cerutti et al. (2015), who find stronger effects

in emerging market economies than in advanced economies, just as we do.

3 In the European Union (EU), no less than 47 substantive macroprudential measures were adopted in 2014

(ESRB, 2015).

7

Our main contribution to the literature relates to substitution effects: we find that the effect of

MaPs on bank credit is always substantially higher than the effect on total credit to the

private sector. Whereas bank credit growth falls on average by 7.7 percentage points relative

to the counterfactual of no measure, total credit growth falls by 4.9 percentage points on

average. The reason for this is the increase in nonbank credit growth. We also find significant

differences between country groups and instruments. First, substitution effects are stronger in

AEs. This is in line with expectations given their more developed financial systems, with a

larger role for market-based finance. Second, substitution effects are much stronger in the

case of quantity restrictions, which are more constraining than price-based measures. Finally,

we find strong and statistically significant effects on specific forms on nonbanking financial

intermediation, such as investment fund assets.

Our paper builds on a rapidly expanding literature. While the concept of macroprudential

policy can be traced back at least to the late 1970’s (Clement, 2010), it has become a

common part of the policy lexicon in the first decade of this millennium. The global financial

crisis has led not only to much more interest in the macroprudential approach, but also to

active use of macroprudential instruments around the world. Galati and Moessner (2013,

2014) provide an overview of the literature, emphasizing the objectives, instruments and

analytical underpinnings of the macroprudential approach. The European Systemic Risk

Board, ESRB (2014) has released a handbook for operationalizing the macroprudential

toolkit and the IMF (2014b) a staff guidance note.

The active use of instruments has spawned a growing empirical literature on the effectiveness

of macroprudential policies, in individual country, regional and global settings (Arregui et

al., 2013). The most comprehensive study is that of Cerutti et al. (2015), who use an IMF

survey to document macroprudential policies in 119 countries over the 2000–13 period. They

find that the implementation of such instruments is generally associated with the intended

lower impact on credit, but that the effects are weaker in financially more developed and

open economies. Bruno and Shin (2014) find that macroprudential policies employed in

Korea to deal with the effects of cross-border capital flows—such as the “macroprudential

levy”—helped to reduce the sensitivity of capital flows into Korea to global conditions.

Krznar and Morsink (2014) establish that recent rounds of macroprudential policy tightening

in Canada have reduced mortgage credit growth and house price growth. Lim et al. (2011)

show that for 49 countries reviewed, macroprudential instruments helped reduce pro-

cyclicality, meaning a reduced sensitivity of credit conditions to GDP growth.

Because of the inherent difficulties in establishing the effects of measures at a macro level, a

number of studies have used micro-level data to identify more precisely the behavioral

effects of macroprudential policies. For example, by exploiting bank-specific shocks to

capital buffers, Jiménez et al. (2012) show that Spain’s dynamic provisioning requirements

helped smooth cycles in the supply of credit. With Korean data on housing and mortgage

activity, Igan and Kang (2011) find that the tightening of DTI and LTV limits have a

significant and sizeable impact on transaction activity and house price appreciation.

8

Yet, in addition, to its intended effects, macroprudential policy may leak. Aiyar et al. (2014)

and Reinhardt and Sowerbutts (2015) find that foreign borrowing increases after home

authorities adopt macroprudential measures affecting domestic banks’ capital. Similarly,

Cerutti et al. (2015) find some evidence of greater cross-border borrowing after

macroprudential measures are taken. But macroprudential policy may also increase cross-

sector substitution (Goodhart, 2008). A recent study by the IMF (2014a) finds that more

stringent capital requirements are associated with stronger growth of shadow banking. Our

paper uses both net flow measures and an event study methodology to shed light on the size

and timing of cross-sector substitution effects. Our empirical framework builds on work that

has sought to explain credit growth, for instance to understand credit rationing and the

monetary transmission mechanism (Berger and Udell, 1991; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1992;

Kashyap et al., 1993). As done by Frost and van Tilburg (2014), we control for

macroeconomic fundamentals to filter out effects of policy on credit growth in a cross-

country panel setting.

Our results do not allow us to assess whether substitution effects reduce or increase systemic

risks. A lowering of systemic risks may be expected, as risks may shift to institutions that are

less leveraged and less subject to maturity mismatch. But this need not be the case, as market

failures and systemic risks may also arise outside the regulated banking sector. Specifically,

nonbank financial institutions may contribute to procyclical leverage (Adrian and Shin, 2009,

2010); may amplify the impact of price changes and flows (Feroli et. al., 2014), and may be

subject to misaligned incentives that influence the overall risk in the system (Rajan, 2006). A

proper macroprudential approach should aim to address these systemic risks in a broad,

consistent manner (Adrian, 2014; FSB, 2014; IMF, 2014b). Overall, our findings underline

the relevance of such a broad approach to monitoring and addressing systemic risks,

especially for advanced economies. Earlier findings on cross-border leakages indicate that

macroprudential policy should not take a narrow national perspective, as this would fail to

internalize cross-border substitution effects. Our results on cross sector substitution

complement these findings, and suggest that macroprudential policy should not take a narrow

sectoral perspective. The results support proposals like that by Schoenmaker and Wierts

(2015) for an integrated approach for highly leveraged entities and activities across the

financial system. A similar approach can be envisaged for maturity and liquidity mismatches,

interconnectedness and misaligned incentives related to too-big-to fail (ESRB, 2013).

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the data. Section III

investigates the degree of substitution between bank and nonbank credit in a larger sample of

countries by estimating whether macroprudential measures affect the flows of bank and

nonbank credit as a percentage of total credit. Section IV provides a complementary

approach, by estimating the effect of macroprudential policies on both variables (and other

balance sheet data on nonbank entities) directly with an event study methodology. It also

distinguishes between different types of macroprudential measures (price versus quantity-

based, and borrower versus lender-based) and different country groups. Robustness checks

are presented in Section V. Section VI concludes.

9

II. DATA

The empirical analysis in this paper is based on three types of country-level data:

(a) information on bank and nonbank credit; (b) dates and types of macroprudential policy

measures adopted in the sample countries; and (c) indicators of macroeconomic

fundamentals. The dataset is available in the online appendix of this paper.4

A. Private Credit to the Nonfinancial Sector

Our measures of bank and nonbank credit come from the BIS database on private non-

financial sector credit (Dembiermont et al., 2013). The database contains quarterly series of

private credit data for 40 economies for a period covering the last 40 years. The measure of

private credit covers all loans and debt securities to non-financial corporations, households

and non-profit institutions serving households. Bank credit is defined as all loans and debt

securities held by domestic and foreign banks (subsidiaries and branches). Nonbank credit

encompasses loans and debt securities held by all other sectors of the economy (e.g., insurers,

pension funds, investment funds, other firms, households, etc.) and, for some countries,

direct cross-border lending by foreign banks. The presence of direct cross-border lending in

the nonbank credit measure may hamper the cross-sectoral focus of this study because it may

conflate loans by domestic nonbanks and foreign banks abroad. In the online appendix we

show, however, that the direct cross-border lending amount to less than 5 percent of nonbank

credit for the aggregate sample of BIS reporting countries. For this reason, movements in the

nonbank credit series are expected to primarily reflect the changes in the provision of credit

by nonbank financial institutions, rather than by foreign banks.

A shortcoming of the BIS database is its limited geographic coverage of only 40 (mostly

advanced) economies. In addition, the database provides no information on the breakdown of

nonbank credit providers. We thus complement the private credit data from the Bank for

International Settlements (BIS) with information on the size of the balance sheets of banks

and of various types of nonbank financial institutions, which we obtain from the World

Bank's Financial Development Database (Cihak et al., 2012). The cross-section coverage of

the database ranges from about 80 countries in the case of investment and pension funds, to

over 100 countries in the case of banks and insurance companies. The database covers the

period 1980–2012 for different series.5

To put our results into context, Panel A of Table 1 provides summary statistics on bank and

nonbank credit and financial institutions’ assets in AEs and EMEs for the period 1997–2014

(1997–2012). Banks are an important source of credit in both AEs, where it represents

85 percent of GDP, and in EMEs (60 percent of GDP). Nonbank credit, on the other hand, is

much more important in AEs, at 56 percent of GDP, compared to just 9 percent of GDP in

4 The online appendix can be found at http://www.jankocizel.com/research/macroprud/.

5 In what follows, AEs and EMEs are defined according to the most recent IMF World Economic Outlook

(WEO) classification. Market-based financial systems have a share of nonbank credit in total credit is above the

sample-wide median. For more analysis on market versus bank-based systems, see Gambacorta et al. (2014).

http://www.jankocizel.com/research/macroprud/

10

EMEs. We also note a relatively high reliance of AEs on financing provided by investment

funds (IFs): IF assets in these countries represent close to a third of GDP, about five times the

size as in EMEs. Nominal credit growth, measured by year-to-year percentage changes in the

nominal stock of sectoral credit, is on average higher in EMEs than in AEs. In EMEs, bank

and nonbank credit grew by 10.5 percent and 11.6 percent, whereas in AEs they grew by

6.5 percent and 7.4 percent. Total credit grew at an average annual rate of 6.7 percent in AEs

and 9.8 percent in EMEs.

Figures 1A and 1B depict the behavior of (average) bank and nonbank credit flows, both in

AEs and EMEs. While the series show a large degree of co-movement, there is nonetheless a

more cyclical pattern for bank credit than for nonbank credit.

We measure the substitution of credit between banks and nonbanks as the quarterly net

sectoral credit flow, defined as the difference between the quarterly change in bank credit

and the quarterly change in nonbank credit, scaled by total credit:

, 4

1 1[ Bank Credit] [ Non-Bank Credit]

4 4 [Quarterly Net Sectoral Credit Flow] 100*[Total Credit]

YtY YtY

ct ct

ct

c t

Positive values of the measure indicate that growth in bank credit outpaces growth in

nonbank credit, while negative values indicate a faster growth in credit by nonbanks.6 The

nominal net flows in credit (the numerator) are scaled by the previous years’ stock of total

credit (the denominator). For the whole sample period, the measure is positive both in AEs

and EMEs, but is higher in EMEs (Table 1, Panel A). This is as expected given that the

numerator of our measure contains level changes, and the share of bank credit in total credit

is much higher in EMEs than in AEs.

Figure 1C provides further insight into the dynamics of the measure both for AEs and EMEs.

It shows a cyclical pattern in net sectoral credit flows. Figure 2 provides a histogram of the

net credit flow measure. The distribution of the measure is positively skewed, with the mean

and the mode slightly above 0.

To limit the influence of outliers, we winsorize all credit-related variables, i.e., replace

outliers with a value corresponding to the 1 percent level for each tail of their distribution.

We also exclude the observations for Argentina, which experienced a prolonged sovereign

distress episode covering much of our sample period.

6 A drawback of measuring the relative shift between bank and nonbank credit is that this does not indicate

whether the shift is driven by one of these components or both. We therefore complement this analysis with

estimates of the direct effect of MaPs on bank and nonbank credit.

11

B. Macroprudential Policy Events

The information on the use of macroprudential policies (MaPs) across countries and over

time comes from Cerutti et al. (2015), who select indicator variables to measure the use of

various MaPs in 120 countries on an annual basis over the period of 2000–13. Their database

is constructed from responses to the IMF’s Global Macroprudential Policy Instruments

(GMPI) survey, provided by the participating countries’ financial authorities (IMF, 2013).

The analysis covers 12 categories of MaPs, listed in Table 2. This yields 12 dummy

variables, which take on a value of 1 in each year that a certain measure is used, and 0 if it is

not used in that country and year. Cerutti et al. (2015) classify these as lender-based or

borrower-based. Lender-based policies are those aimed at financial institutions’ assets or

liabilities and include, for example, loan-loss provisioning practices, leverage, and capital

buffers. Borrower-based measures are those aimed at borrowers’ leverage and financial

positions, and cover LTV and LTI caps. Limits on foreign currency and domestic currency

loans and reserve requirements have been most common in EMEs, whereas leverage ratios

and limits on interbank exposures are most frequently applied in AEs. Overall, the most

popular lender-based MaPs in both AEs and EMEs are concentration limits, which restrict

the fraction of bank assets tied to a particular type of borrowers.

Inspection of the underlying qualitative answers in the IMF GMPI database indicates that all

MaPs are primarily aimed at depository institutions (banks), including the borrower-based

measures. Our hypotheses on substitution effects between bank and nonbank credit can

therefore be tested by including all MaPs simultaneously.

The effect of MaPs on credit activity will be somewhat different depending on whether a

measure acts as a quantity constraint on credit, which limits the volume of a particular

activity, or as a price constraint, which affects the average cost of engaging in this activity.

We thus categorize MaPs in the dataset into price and quantity-based measures and perform

all empirical analyses both for an aggregate measure, and treating both groups separately.

Table 2 also provides this classification. Examples of price-based policies include dynamic

provisioning requirements and taxes on financial institutions. Examples of quantity-based

measures are limits on interbank and foreign currency exposures, both of which act as a cap

on the balance sheet exposures to the particular asset classes. The distinction between

quantity and price classifications is admittedly fuzzy in some cases. For example, assuming

that the supply of bank capital is constrained, we classify the leverage ratio as a quantity

measure, since it effectively caps the balance sheet size of the affected entity. A leverage

ratio cap could however also be seen as a price-based measure, since the bank could in

principle expand its balance sheet by raising new capital, which would affect the average cost

of funding. As a robustness check, we perform the analyses with alternative price/quantity

classifications; the corresponding results are reported in the online appendix.

Panel B of Table 1 provides summary statistics for the MaP indices. The indices are the sum

of MaPs of a given classification used by a country in a given period. On average, AEs and

EMEs have 1.6 and 2 MaPs in place in a given year, respectively.

12

We define MaP events as the adoption of a new measure—i.e., a policy tightening.7 Figure 3

provides an overview of MaP events across countries in the dataset. Circles in the graph mark

the periods of the adoption of MaPs. The circle size corresponds to the number MaPs

activated by a country in that year. The color of circles denotes the percentage of quantity-

based MaPs. In total there are 171 MaPs in the dataset, 77 percent of which are quantity-

based. Most events, in particular in AEs, are clustered during the period 2007–13. Prior to

that MaPs were activated mostly in EMEs.

C. Macroeconomic Fundamentals

In the empirical analysis, we try to explain the baseline growth rates of credit, using a

number of macroeconomic variables as controls. While it is inherently difficult to distinguish

between factors influencing the demand and supply for credit, we expect that higher GDP

growth would be associated with higher demand for credit by firms and households. We also

expect that credit supply would be positively related to foreign capital inflows (into the

banking sector and capital markets), and negatively related to inflation (which makes lenders

wary of committing to nominal claims) and higher government borrowing (due to crowding

out effects). The sources of these variables are the IMF’s World Economic Outlook and

International Financial Statistics databases. Panel C of Table 1 provides the summary

statistics for the macroeconomic indicators used in the regressions.

III. CROSS-SECTORAL SUBSTITUTION DUE TO MACROPRUDENTIAL MEASURES

A. Methodology

This section studies the cross-sector leakages of MaPs in the provision of credit to the private

sector. In line with the “boundary hypothesis,” the activation of a MaP directed at banks is

expected to shift the relative provision of credit towards unregulated or less regulated credit

providers, i.e., nonbanks.8

We measure the substitution of credit with the net sectoral credit flow measure defined in the

previous section. To the extent that MaPs increase the relative cost of bank credit, we expect

them to prompt a decline in the net sectoral credit flow measure, which indicates a relative

shift from bank to nonbank credit. (Section IV also estimates the direct effect of MaPs on

different credit categories.)

Trying to estimate the relationship between cross-sector credit substitution and MaPs raises

identification issues. For example, cross-sector shifts in credit supply may be the outcome of

other factors asymmetrically impacting the cost of capital or expected investment returns of

7 The database of Cerutti et al. (2015) records the number of MaPs of a particular type used by a country at a

given point in time. Macroprudential policy events occur when any measure goes from 0 to 1.

8 Conceptually, the flow of finance between bank and nonbank sectors should depend on the expected risk-

adjusted rate of return to investors in the two sectors. A shock that reduces the expected returns in one sector

should shift the supply of credit towards the (relatively) unaffected sector.

13

different credit providers. If such factors move in tandem with MaP activation this creates an

identification problem.

Two factors in particular may tend to create a spurious correlation between our net sectoral

credit flow measure and MaPs. The first are banking crises. As noted above, most MaPs in

AEs were used during and after the global financial crisis (GFC), which was particularly

detrimental to the balance sheets of banks. Indeed, the severity of the GFC for banks may

have resulted in cross-sector shifts in credit provision even in the absence of MaPs.

Moreover, authorities in many countries responded to the GFC with a set of expansionary

monetary and fiscal policies, aimed inter alia at restoring the viability of and confidence in

the banking sector. To the extent that these policies coincided with the adoption of MaPs,

their separate impact would be difficult to identify.

Second, changes in monetary policy—through policy rates and unconventional measures—

may have asymmetric effects on different categories of credit providers, in a direction that is

not clear a priori. For example, periods of low policy interest rates may directly benefit bank

credit, but may also motivate banks to “search for yield,” by investing in alternative high-

yield and high-risk investments (see Buch et al., 2014 for banks; see Azis and Shin, 2015 for

debt market issuance and asset managers). Likewise, the changes in central bank balance

sheets stemming from unconventional monetary policy may reflect either direct funding to

banks, or changes in holdings of publically traded securities or nonbank debt.

To address the above identification challenges, we take the following steps. First, we control

for banking crises by including the banking crisis indicator of Laeven and Valencia (2013) as

a control variable in all subsequent empirical specifications. The crisis indicator flags those

country-quarter observations during which a country experienced a systemic banking crisis.

Since banking crises in Laeven and Valencia (2013) are defined by the application of various

crisis management tools, such as deposit guarantees and government recapitalizations of

failed banks, the inclusion of this indicator deals with the concern that the coefficient on

MaPs might be picking up the effects of those other policies.

Second, we control for changes in monetary policy in two ways. First, our empirical

specifications include year-on-year changes in the monetary policy rate as an explanatory

variable. Second, we control for unconventional monetary policies by including a variable

that measures year-to-year changes in central banks’ balance sheet size relative to GDP (see

Pattipeilohy et al., 2013).

With these considerations in mind, we estimate the following specification:

, 1 , 2 , 3 , ,c t c t c t c t c t c tNetFlow BankCrisis MonetaryPolicy MaP ò

where is the net sectoral credit flow (defined in Section II) for country c and year

t and α and β are country and time dummies. BankCrisis is a dummy variable capturing

systemic banking crises. In line with the above discussion, its expected sign is negative.

MonetaryPolicy indicates changes in the central bank policy rate and the central bank

14

balance sheet size. The expected sign of the coefficient is ambiguous for both. We estimate

the coefficients in the above specification using the within panel estimator and we cluster the

standard errors by country to allow for serial correlation in residuals. MaP indicates the

adoption of macroprudential policies, as previously defined. We expect that MaP events will

lead to higher cross-sectoral leakages and thus lower values of the net sectoral credit flow. As

discussed in Section II, we also distinguish between quantity and price-based measures.

B. Results

Table 3 reports estimation results on the impact of the overall changes in macroprudential

policies. In line with the boundary hypothesis, MaP coefficients are negative across all

regressions, indicating that net sectoral credit flows move in favor of nonbanks following the

adoption of macroprudential policies directed at banks. The magnitude of the coefficient for

the overall sample is -0.26, implying that during the first year following MaP activation the

net sectoral credit flows move by about 1 percentage point (hereafter pp) of total credit in

favor of nonbanks.9 The coefficient is statistically significant in most regressions, except for

the sample of EMEs.

As expected, the estimated coefficients for the banking crisis indicator are negative and

statistically significant. Banking crises thus appear to hit bank credit to a much larger extent

than nonbank credit—likely through credit supply. The impact of banking crises is large: on

average they reduce net credit flows from banks by about 5pp of total credit per annum. The

effect is particularly strong in EMEs, where it amounts to about 10pp per annum.

The relationship between net credit flows and central bank interest rates is ambiguous: while

it is positive in AEs, it is negative in EMEs and insignificant in the pooled sample. Expansion

in central bank balance sheets is negatively related to net credit flows in most specifications.

In the overall sample, a 1 percent increase in central bank assets is associated with 2pp per

annum shift in net credit flows originating from banks. That is: increases in central bank

balance sheets appear to stimulate a relative shift from bank to nonbank credit. The

association is particularly strong in AEs and in bank-based financial systems.

Table 4 reports the results for the specifications that distinguish between quantity and price-

based MaP measures. The estimated coefficients are negative and statistically significant for

quantity measures, and positive but not statistically significant for price measures. In the

overall sample, the effect of quantity measures suggests a 2pp relative shift in the provision

of credit towards nonbanks during the first year after a Map is adopted. The effect is

particularly strong in market-based economies (3pp).

9 Since the net sectoral credit flow is measured on a quarterly basis, the regression coefficient for

YtY MaP

measures the average quarterly increase in the net flow measure during the first year after the policy activation.

To obtain the annual increase in the measure during the first year after the activation, one has to multiply the

coefficient by four.

15

Taken together, the results in this section provide evidence broadly consistent with the

boundary hypothesis: the adoption of macroprudential policies results in a relative shift in the

provision of credit from banks to nonbanks. The substitution effect is especially pronounced

for quantity-based MaP measures directed at banks and is not detectable for price measures.

IV. EVENT STUDY OF MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY INTERVENTIONS

A. Methodology

This section further examines the effects of MaPs by studying the behavior of bank credit,

nonbank credit, total credit, and net sectoral credit flows, before and after the activation of

MaPs. Concentrating on the timing of the effects is important given that market participants

may react to measures that have been announced but that have not yet taken effect.

Moreover, authorities may respond to periods of high or low credit growth by tightening or

easing MaPs. To account for these effects we adopt a leads-and-lags model (Atanasov and

Black, 2016), which is suitable to check pre-treatment and post-treatment trends relative to

control groups of entities (in our case countries). Intuitively, pre-treatment trends that are

found to be statistically different from 0 may be indicative of endogeneity problems, as the

occurrence of the event (in our cast the activation of MaP measures) may then be explained

by the abnormal movements in the dependent variable (in our case credit) during the pre-

event period.

As discussed in Section II, MaP events are defined as the year in which a country activates a

macroprudential tool. To isolate the movements in credit flows that can be attributed to

MaPs, we adjust the actual credit growth by a counterfactual rate of credit growth that would

have prevailed in absence of a MaP. We then use event study methodology to examine the

divergence between the resulting adjusted and actual growth rates around MaPs.

Let ysc,t denote credit growth by sector s in country c at time t. The excess growth rate

is

defined as:

, , ,ˆ [ ]s s s

c t c t c ty y E y

We assume that the expected rate of growth, E[ysc,t] is a linear function of a covariate vector

x, which controls for macroeconomic conditions within a country. We also allow for country-

specific time-invariant determinants of credit/asset growth, c, as well as for common

shocks, αt. The resulting specification for the expected credit/asset growth in sector s is then:

, ,[ ]s s s s

c t t c c tE y x

where βs denotes a vector of coefficients of the covariate vector x. There is currently no

consensus on the set of economic variables that determine the “normal” or expected rate of

credit growth for banks and nonbanks. As a result, theory offers only limited guidance on the

composition of the covariate vector x. Our choice of the covariate vector x thus draws on the

existing empirical literature that explores the determinants of total credit (e.g., Frost and van

Tilburg, 2014) and bank credit (e.g., Berger and Udell, 1991; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1991;

16

Kashyap et al., 1993); we are not aware of comparable studies explaining nonbank credit or

net sectoral credit flows. Specifically, we control for the presence of systemic banking crises,

GDP growth, the current account balance, gross capital inflows, central bank interest rates

and the growth in central bank assets.

Next, let denote a time at which a MaP event takes place, and define an indicator function

Iτ that equals 1 if a MaP event occurs between i and 1i time units from time t , and zero

otherwise:

A set of excessive growth rates around MaP events can then be obtained by estimating the

following expected growth rate (EGR) specification:

, , ( , 1] ,1s s s s s s

c t t c c t i t i t i c t

i

y x ò .

In the above specification, i measures the excessive growth in sector s of countryc , i

periods before (for negative values of i) or after (for positive values of i) the MaP event. We

estimate the coefficients in the above specification using the within panel estimator and we

cluster the standard errors by country to allow for serial correlation in residuals. We lag all

variables in the covariate vector x by one year, to mitigate concerns of endogeneity.

The main remaining identification assumption required for this procedure, after controlling

for the set of observables in x , is the that the authorities’ decision on the activation of MaPs

is independent from any additional factors that might jointly determine the growth of the

bank and nonbank sectors. To the extent that this assumption holds, any systematic

movements in the excess growth rates of credit following the activation MaP measures may

be interpreted as being causally related to these MaPs.

We study the effect of MaPs on credit growth in the bank and nonbank sectors by examining

the cumulative behavior of excessive growth rates starting three years prior to the activation

of a MaP and tracing its path until three years after. Specifically, for a time interval between

a and b periods relative to MaP activation, we compute cumulative excess growth rates

(CEGR) as follows:

[ , ]

[ , ]s s

i

i a b

CEGR a b

Under the null hypothesis that MaPs have no impact on credit or asset growth, CEGR is

expected to be statistically indistinguishable from 0 both in the periods before and after the

activation of MaPs. To the extent that the actions of banks and nonbanks are influenced by

MaPs, CEGRs are expected to systematically diverge from 0, and if the decision on MaPs is

anticipated before their actual activation (and this triggers behavioral changes in financing

I

17

patterns of banks and nonbanks), the divergence is expected to arise prior to the activation

date. We test the hypotheses related to CEGR by performing a series of Wald tests on the

sums of coefficients in the specification.

B. Results

The estimated coefficients of the control variables in the regressions for the expected growth

rate of credit are reported in Table 5. Results are generally in line with the empirical

literature on determinants of credit growth. For example, GDP growth shows the expected

positive effect on both banking and nonbank credit, while a banking crisis has a negative

impact on most sources of credit (except for investment fund growth and domestic private

debt issuance). Again, this may reflect that a banking crisis prompts bank deleveraging

(decline in credit supply by banks), and thus a shift by borrowers to capital markets.

Comparing the explanatory power of the expected growth model across various sectors, we

note that the macroeconomic fundamentals explain a much higher proportion of variation in

the growth rates of bank credit than nonbank credit.

Overall effect of macroprudential policies

Next, we analyze the behavior of the residuals from the expected growth rate regressions in

Table 5 in the periods before and after the activation of MaPs. Panels A-D in Figure 4 plot

CEGRs around MaP events for bank, nonbank, and total credit flows, as well as for the net

sectoral credit flows as defined in Section II. CEGRs are plotted over the period of

14 quarters before and 12 quarters after the activation of MaPs; in each figure we also report

the result of Wald tests on CEGR two years prior to the activation of a MaP and two years

after activation. The former tests for an anticipation effect of MaPs on bank and nonbank

intermediation, whereas the latter tests for a post-activation effect.

The trajectory of the CEGR for the bank credit equations (Figure 4A) shows a statistically

significant downward effect of MaPs: during the two years following MaP activation, the

growth rate of bank credit is about 8pp below the baseline level, even after controlling for

systemic banking crises and other macroeconomic variables. This finding is statistically

significant with a p-value below 1 percent. The effect on the growth rate of bank credit

begins to gather pace several quarters prior to MaP activation, suggesting a pre-emptive

slowing of credit supply by banks.

The CEGR for nonbank credit growth exhibits almost the opposite pattern to that of bank

credit growth (Figure 4B): during the two years following a MaP event it rises on average by

about 10pp above baseline growth (from a lower level than bank credit). The effect is

statistically significant at the 1 percent significance level. The post-activation decline in bank

credit and the contemporaneous rise in nonbank credit is consistent with the cross-sector

substitution in credit found in the previous section.

Figure 4C shows the impact of MaP measures on the excess growth in total credit. In line

with existing studies (e.g., Cerutti et al., 2015), we find that total credit declines in the two

years following the adoption of MaP measures. Specifically, our estimates suggest that total

18

credit growth declines by about 5pp below the baseline, which indicates that the rise in

nonbank credit does not fully compensate the decline in bank credit. 10

Figure 4D shows the behavior of net sectoral credit flows around MaP measures and provides

direct evidence of the substitution effect. Prior to MaP events the series is statistically

indistinguishable from the baseline (p=0.31), whereas during two years following the event,

the series moves about 4pp below the baseline (note that net credit flows are denominated in

terms of total credit). The absence of a pre-existing trend further supports the hypothesis of

the causal impact of MaP events on net sectoral credit flows.

Effect of macroprudential policies on alternative sources of nonbank finance

We explore the effects of MaPs on the dynamics of specific types of nonbank finance in

Panels A and B of Figure 5. These panels plot CEGRs around MaP events for the equation on

the rate of growth of investment fund assets (Panel A) and domestic private debt issuance

(Panel B). In line with the results on nonbank credit, investment fund assets exhibit strong

positive growth around MaP activation. The CEGR of investment fund assets begins to pick

up 6 quarters prior to the activation, accelerates during the period 3 quarters before and

3 quarters after the policy measure, and decelerates thereafter. Over the two years following a

measure, investment fund assets rise on average by 20pp above the baseline of no MaP

policy (p-value=0.019). Domestic private debt issuance also exhibits a strong positive growth

up to 6 quarters following the MaP activation (p=0.00). Two years after the policy event, the

domestic private debt issuance is 55pp above the baseline. The large magnitude of CEGRs is

partially attributable to low initial levels of investment fund assets and private debt issuance

in some of the countries in the sample (for example, investment funds in EMEs on average

comprise only about 6 percent of GDP).11

Effect of macroprudential policies across samples and tools

As in Section III, we also examine whether the effect of MaPs varies across different

instruments and countries. Specifically, we re-do the event study for (1) AEs and EMEs;

(2) quantity and price-based MaPs; and (3) the combination of the two. As before, we report

event study results for bank credit (Figure 6), nonbank credit (Figure 7), total credit (Figure

8), and net sectoral flows (Figure 9). Table 6 summarizes the results presented in Figures 6–9

10

Cerutti et al. (2015) investigate the effects on real growth in bank credit, while we use nominal credit growth

as the dependent variable. If we add average inflation rates to the results in Cerutti et al. (2015), the size of the

effect in both EMEs and AEs is very similar to our estimate.

11 The following example helps illustrate this point. Suppose that the initial level of bank credit in country A is

10 local currency units (LCU), and that of a nonbank sources is 1 LCU. Next, suppose that the activation of a

MaP results in a shift in credit provision from banks towards nonbank sources of 1 LCU. The post-MaP event

credit provision is then 9 LCU for banks and 2 LCU for nonbanks. Assuming that during the same period, bank

and nonbank credit in countries without policy intervention grew by 0 percent, the post-MaP CEGR in country

A is -10 percent for banks and +100 percent for nonbanks.

19

by listing the effects for two-year post-event windows for various samples of countries and

tools.

The results in the table show that the intended effect of MaPs on bank credit is statistically

significant and generally stronger in EMEs than in AEs. In AEs bank credit slows by 3.2pp

below the baseline two years after the adoption of MaPs, whereas in EMEs the slowdown is

close to 10pp. The results for quantity and price-based measures show that most of the

decline in bank credit in both AEs and EME comes from quantity-based constraints: in AEs

(EMEs), quantity-based measures lead to a 6.6pp (10.4pp) contraction below the baseline

during the two years after the event. This supports the view that quantity limits are more

binding than measures that increase the cost of credit. Moreover, bank credit growth is above

the baseline before the activation of quantity-based measures. This suggests that authorities

respond to periods of high credit growth by implementing stronger constraints. Price-based

measures have no statistically distinguishable impact on banks in AEs or EMEs.

With regard to the effects of MaP measures on total credit, the effect is negative both in AEs

and EMEs, but statistically significant only in EMEs. The difference in the effects on bank

credit and total credit is larger in AEs, especially for quantity constraints. A possible

explanation is that substitution effects are larger in countries with more developed financial

systems that offer a broader range of opportunities for substitution between forms of finance.

Table 6B summarizes the event-study results for net sectoral credit flows across countries

and MaPs. On average, the impact of MaPs is statistically negative in both AEs and EMEs,

but only in the case of quantity-based measures.

In summary, the event study methodology applied in this section yields the following results:

1. MaP measures tend to slow the growth rate of bank credit.

2. MaP measures tend to increase the growth rate of nonbank credit.

3. MaP measures tend to reduce the net sectoral credit flow (i.e., stimulate cross-sector

substitution to nonbank credit).

4. MaP measures tend to reduce the growth rate of total credit (i.e., substitution effect do not

fully compensate the impact on bank credit).

5. Substitution effects are stronger in AEs than in EMEs.

6. The effects of MaPs are stronger when the measures directly constrain credit.

V. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

We perform several tests to check the robustness of our results.

20

A. Placebo Tests

We examine the validity of the empirical approaches used in Sections III and IV with a series

of placebo tests. In this case, placebo testing involves generating a series of “fake”

macroprudential policy shocks, and then testing the behavior of credit measures around those

shocks. Since the shocks are generated at random, one expects to observe no abnormal

movements in credit outcomes either prior or after the shocks. The presence of such

movements would suggest the existence of unexplained trends in the data, and would thus

call for changes in the identification methodology.

To conduct these tests we take the following steps:

1. For each country-year observation in the original Cerutti et al. (2015) dataset we draw a

Bernoulli distributed indicator to simulate the placebo dates of policy changes. We repeat

this process for each of the 12 MaP tools in the original database. We match the

distribution of the simulated and the actual MaP events by setting the Bernoulli

probability parameter to the relative frequency of the corresponding measure in the

original dataset.

2. Using the simulated MaP we compute the aggregate MaP indices, which, in turn, are used

to derive MaP event indicators. Figure A1 in the appendix provides an overview of the

simulated MaP measures. As in Figure 3, circles mark the periods of MaP activation, the

circle size corresponds to the number of policies implemented by a country in that year

and the color of circles indicates the percentage of quantity-based MaPs.

We repeat the event study in Section IV, using the simulated set of MaP indicators in Figure

A1.

Table A1 reports results of the event study with the simulated MaP events. Impact window

effects are in most cases statistically indistinguishable from zero. This suggests that the

results reported in the previous sections are not driven by spurious trends in the data.

B. Effect of Macroprudential Policies Events Prior to and During the Global Financial

Crisis

As noted, many of the MaPs in our sample were adopted in the run-up to and immediate

aftermath of the GFC. A concern about the effects found in the previous sections is that they

capture not only MaPs, but also a host of other factors that took place during that time. While

our previous analysis tries to control for these factors by explicitly accounting for the

presence of banking crises, changes in monetary policy, and other macroeconomic

fundamentals, there may be remaining omitted factors that affect credit to the private sector

and are also correlated with the timing of MaP activations.

We thus examine the effectiveness of macroprudential policies before and after the onset of

the GFC. Specifically, we repeat the event studies in Section IV for the periods before and

after the onset of the GFC, which we take to be the third quarter of 2007. The results of the

21

exercise are reported in Table A2. Because of the lack of price-based MaP events prior to the

GFC, we only report the results for the quantity-based measures for the pre-GFC period.

In line with our previous analysis, quantity-based tools during the pre-GFC years are found

to reduce bank credit growth in both AEs and EMEs. Furthermore, cross-sector substitution

towards nonbanks is statistically and economically significant in both groups of countries,

both before and after the GFC. Interestingly, in AEs, the cross-sector substitution associated

with the activation of quantity-based measures is larger during the pre-GFC era.

VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Macroprudential policies are being activated in advanced and emerging market economies

both to boost the resilience of the financial system and to dampen the financial cycle. This

paper examines the effectiveness of those policies with a battery of empirical techniques. Our

results suggest that macroprudential policies are effective to reduce bank credit growth: on

average, bank credit falls by almost 8 percentage points in the two years following the

adoption of macroprudential policy measures. We also find evidence of substitution effects:

credit provision shifts from banks towards nonbanks following the adoption of MaPs. Cross-

sector substitution is particularly pronounced following the adoption of quantity-based MaPs,

in advanced economies and bank-based financial systems. The growth of investment funds

and of capital market debt issuance following macroprudential measures illustrates how these

measures are offset by new forms of credit growth outside the banking sector.

Concern about cross-sector substitution effects of macroprudential policies can be tempered

by a number of factors. First, nonbank financial institutions are generally less leveraged and

have less liquidity risks than the banking sector; they are also separated from systemic

functions related to the payments infrastructure. Second, the nonbank financial sector

generally does not have access to public sector safety nets, such as deposit insurance and

central bank liquidity support. In this light, policymakers may welcome a shift to market-

based financing, which can function as a “spare tire” in the supply of credit in times of

systemic banking crises (IMF, 2015). In fact, these considerations underly the proposals for

the creation of a European Capital Markets Union (European Commission, 2015).

Cross-sector substitution may, however, entail new systemic risks. When a credit bubble

shifts from banks to financial markets, and households or corporates continue to accumulate

debt, macroeconomic vulnerabilities continue to rise and may result in a crisis, even if the

debt is owed to investment funds or to capital markets. Similarly, when investment funds

purchase illiquid debt securities while promising liquidity to end investors, debt markets

become vulnerable to refinancing risks and sudden price shocks. Moreover, when the

nonbank financial sector is interconnected with the formal banking sector (e.g., through

credit lines, participation in banks’ debt issuances, or ownership links), shocks in the former

reverberate through the latter.

For macroprudential policymakers, there is thus work to be done. While macroprudential

policy mitigates banking sector risks, there is a need to extend its scope beyond banking. The

focus should be on systemic risks, and not on substitution per se. In some cases, activity-

based instruments, which target the risk of an activity regardless of where it is conducted, can

22

address risks more effectively. In other cases, instruments similar to those applied to banks

can be applied to nonbank institutions. For example, margin requirements for securities

financing transactions may perform a similar function as leverage requirements for banks and

LTV limits for mortgages (Schoenmaker and Wierts, 2015). Similarly, limits on leverage and

liquidity transformation can ensure that investment funds engaging in bank-like activities and

taking on bank-like risks face comparable requirements.

23

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27

Figure 1A. Bank Credit Flows in Advanced and Emerging Market Economies

Advanced Economies

Emerging Market Economies

Source: BIS, authors’ calculations

Note: The actual growth rates are represented by dots. The blue lines show the locally weighted least squares regression (LOESS) fitted curve, with the smoothing parameter set to 0.1, and the 95 percent confidence interval around the fitted values.

-2.0

-1.0

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

1987 1993 1998 2004 2009 2014

Year-

on-y

ear

Gro

wth

in B

ank

Cre

dit (in

%, q

uart

erly)

-6.0

-4.0

-2.0

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

1987 1993 1998 2004 2009 2014

Year-

on-y

ear

Gro

wth

in B

ank

Cre

dit (in

%, q

uart

erly)

28

Figure 1B. Nonbank Credit Flows in Advanced and Emerging Market Economies

Advanced Economies


Source: BIS, authors’ calculations.

Note: Actual growth rates are represented by dots. The blue lines show the locally weighted least squares regression (LOESS) fitted curve, with the smoothing parameter set to 0.1, and the 95 percent confidence interval around the fitted values.

-1.0

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

1987 1993 1998 2004 2009 2014

Year-

on-y

ear

Gro

wth

in

No

n-B

ank C

red

it (

in %

, q

uart

erly)

-10.0

-5.0

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

1987 1993 1998 2004 2009 2014

Year-

on-y

ear

Gro

wth

in

No

n-B

ank C

red

it (

in %

, q

uart

erly)

29

Figure 1C. Substitution Between Bank/Nonbank Credit Flows

Advanced Economies


Source: BIS, authors’ calculations.

Note: Net sectoral credit flows are defined as follows:


4 4 [QuarterlyNet Sectoral Credit Flow] 100*[Total Credit]

, 4

YtY YtYct ct

ctc t

.

Actual flow rates are represented by dots. The blue lines show the locally weighted least squares regression (LOESS) fitted curve, with the smoothing parameter set to 0.1, and the 95 percent confidence interval around the fitted values.

-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

1987 1993 1998 2004 2009 2014

-6.0

-4.0

-2.0

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

1987 1993 1998 2004 2009 2014

30

Figure 2. Histogram of the Substitution Between Bank/Nonbank Credit Flows

Source: BIS, own calculations.

Note: The measure is defined as:



, 4

YtY YtYct ct

ctc t

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

0.30

0.35

-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

31

Figure 3. Activation of Macroprudential Policy Measures (2000–2013

Source: Cerutti et al. (2015).

Note: Blank spaces refer to no new MaPs in a country in a given year.

32

Figure 4. Cumulative Excess Credit Growth Rates Around Macroprudential Policy Measures

4A. Bank Credit 4B. Nonbank Credit

CEGR[-8,0] = -2.95 (p-value = 0.055)

CEGR[0,8] = -7.70 (p-value = 0.000)

CEGR[-8,0] = 2.03 (p-value = 0.436)

CEGR[0,8] = 9.90 (p-value = 0.000)

4C. Total Credit 4D. Net Sectoral Credit Flows

CEGR[-8,0] = -2.43 (p-value = 0.060)

CEGR[0,8] = -4.95 (p-value = 0.000)

CEGR[-8,0] = -0.99 (p-value = 0.310)

CEGR[0,8] = -4.22 (p-value = 0.000)

Source: Authors’ calculations.

-16

-14

-12

-10

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

CE

GR

(in

%)

Quarters relative to event date

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

CE

GR

(in

%)


-12

-10

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

CE

GR

(in

%)


-8

-7

-6

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

CE

GR

(in

%)


33

Figure 5. Cumulative Excess Growth of Nonbank FIs' Assets Around Macroprudential Policy Measures

A. Investment Fund Asset Growth

CEGR[-8,0] = 23.18 (p-value = 0.011)

CEGR[0,8] = 19.77 (p-value = 0.019)

B. Domestic Private Debt Issuance

CEGR[-8,0] = 13.30 (p-value = 0.290)

CEGR[0,8] = 54.94 (p-value = 0.000)

Source: Author’s calculations.

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

CE

GR

(in

%)


-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

CE

GR

(in

%)


34

Figure 6. Impact of Macroprdential Policy Measures on Bank Credit

A. Advanced Economies

6A1. Quantitative Measures 6A2. Price Measures

CEGR[-8,0] = 1.57 (p-value = 0.344)

CEGR[0,8] = -6.65 (p-value = 0.000)

CEGR[-8,0] = 3.15 (p-value = 0.212)

CEGR[0,8] = 2.08 (p-value = 0.414)

B. Emerging Market Economies

6B1. Quantitative Measures 6B2. Price Measures

CEGR[-8,0] = 0.36 (p-value = 0.891)

CEGR[0,8] = -10.36 (p-value = 0.000)

CEGR[-8,0] = -0.06 (p-value = 0.978)

CEGR[0,8] = 1.47 (p-value = 0.508)

Source: Author’s calculations.

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

CE

GR

(in

%)


-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

CE

GR

(in

%)


-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

CE

GR

(in

%)


-6

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

CE

GR

(in

%)


35

Figure 7. Impact of Macroprudential Policy Measures on Nonbank Credit



CEGR[-8,0] = 4.79 (p-value = 0.263)

CEGR[0,8] = 7.81 (p-value = 0.056)

CEGR[-8,0] = 0.87 (p-value = 0.801)

CEGR[0,8] = 6.97 (p-value = 0.046)



CEGR[-8,0] = 8.54 (p-value = 0.292)

CEGR[0,8] = 3.72 (p-value = 0.661)

CEGR[-8,0] = 22.55 (p-value = 0.086)

CEGR[0,8] = 23.09 (p-value = 0.079)


-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

CE

GR

(in

%)


0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

CE

GR

(in

%)


-14

-12

-10

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

CE

GR

(in

%)


-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

CE

GR

(in

%)


36

Figure 8. Impact of Macroprudential Policy Measures on Total Credit



CEGR[-8,0] = -0.91 (p-value = 0.577)

CEGR[0,8] = -1.51 (p-value = 0.358)

CEGR[-8,0] = 0.71 (p-value = 0.756)

CEGR[0,8] = 2.12 (p-value = 0.358)



CEGR[-8,0] = 0.25 (p-value = 0.915)

CEGR[0,8] = -6.88 (p-value = 0.004)

CEGR[-8,0] = -1.22 (p-value = 0.843)

CEGR[0,8] = -2.77 (p-value = 0.652)


-1

-0.5

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

CE

GR

(in

%)


-0.5

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

CE

GR

(in

%)


-12

-10

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

CE

GR

(in

%)


-10

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

CE

GR

(in

%)


37

Figure 9. Impact of Macroprudential Policy Measures on Net Sectoral Credit Flows


9A1. Quantity Measures 9A2. Price Measures

CEGR[-8,0] = 0.03 (p-value = 0.978)

CEGR[0,8] = -4.59 (p-value = 0.000)

CEGR[-8,0] = 2.91 (p-value = 0.116)

CEGR[0,8] = -1.15 (p-value = 0.539)


9B1. Quantity Measures 9B2. Price Measures

CEGR[-8,0] = -1.43 (p-value = 0.417)

CEGR[0,8] = -6.48 (p-value = 0.000)

CEGR[-8,0] = -1.05 (p-value = 0.730)

CEGR[0,8] = 1.11 (p-value = 0.715)

Source: BIS, authors’ calculations. Note: Net sectoral credit flows are defined as:

-8

-7

-6

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

CE

GR

(in

%)


-1.5

-1

-0.5

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

CE

GR

(in

%)


-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

CE

GR

(in

%)


-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

CE

GR

(in

%)




, 4

YtY YtYct ct

ctc t

38

Table 1. Summary Statistics on Credit, Macroprudential Policies and Macroeconomic Indicators

(Mean values across sub-samples and full sample; standard deviations in parentheses)

Source: See individual series. Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.

Advanced Economies Emerging Market Economies Whole Sample

Panel A: Credit Series

Bank Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP), Source: BIS 84.79 60.41 77.83

(36.86) (42.48) (40.08)

Non-Bank Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP), Source: BIS 55.78 9.32 42.49

(41.25) (14.18) (41.39)

Investment fund assets to GDP (%), Source: WB-GFDD 31.11 6.38 21.74

(68.26) (9.68) (55.43)

Bank Credit, YtY % Change, Source: BIS 6.47 10.53 7.65

(11.18) (16.35) (13.03)

Non-Bank Credit, YtY % Change, Source: BIS 7.33 11.59 8.57

(13.95) (31.87) (20.90)

Total Credit, YtY % Change, Source: BIS 6.68 9.78 7.59

(9.98) (15.10) (11.79)

Net Sectoral Credit Flow , % of Total Credit, Source: BIS 1.29 5.76 2.59

(6.36) (11.10) (8.29)

Panel B: M acroprudential Policy Indices

Overall Index, Source: Cerutti et al. (2015) 1.56 2.00 1.83

(1.41) (1.63) (1.56)

Quantity-Based Regulatory Index, Source: Cerutti et al. (2015) 1.57 1.96 1.81

(1.43) (1.52) (1.50)

Price-Based Regulatory Index, Source: Cerutti et al. (2015) 0.16 0.25 0.22

(0.38) (0.51) (0.46)

Panel C: Other M acroeconomic Indicators

Inflation, average consumer prices, Source: IMF-WEO 2.91 7.27 6.00

(2.75) (7.45) (6.74)

YtY Real % Grow th in GDP, Source: IMF-IFS 3.58 5.59 5.00

(7.48) (7.78) (7.75)

Current account balance, Source: IMF-WEO 1.90 -5.03 -3.04

(11.53) (10.35) (11.15)

General government net lending/borrow ing, Source: IMF-WEO -0.10 -2.14 -1.54

(7.28) (5.56) (6.18)

Equity inflow s, % of GDP, Source: IMF-IFS 6.17 1.43 2.79

(11.56) (4.81) (7.71)

Debt inflow s, % of GDP, Source: IMF-IFS 11.78 1.52 4.47

(33.73) (8.11) (19.89)

CB Lending Rate (in %), Source: IMF-IFS 7.26 16.73 13.82

(4.65) (9.93) (9.70)

YtY % Grow th in CB Assets, Source: WB-GFDD 8.97 13.00 11.81

(47.49) (43.89) (45.02)

GDP per capita, current prices, Source: IMF-WEO 29042 2943 10433

(17691) (2951) (15342)

Banking crisis dummy 0.19 0.03 0.07

(1=banking crisis, 0=none), Source: WB-GFDD (0.39) (0.16) (0.26)

1997–2014, Quarterly

39

Table 2. Classification of Macroprudential Policies

Sources: IMF GMPI Survey, Cerutti et al. (2015)

Abbreviation Name Number of Events Borrower/Lender-Based Price/ Quantity Restriction

[Percent]

LTV Loan-to-Value Ratio 32 [18] Borrower Quantity

DTI Debt-to-Income Ratio 23 [13] Borrower Quantity

DP Time-Varying/Dynamic Loan-Loss Provisioning 10 [5] Lender Price

CTC General Countercyclical Capital Buffer/Requirement 6 [3] Lender Price

LEV Leverage Ratio 13 [7] Lender Quantity

SIFI Capital Surcharges on SIFIs 7 [4] Lender Price

INTER Limits on Interbank Exposures 16 [9] Lender Quantity

CONC Concentration Limits 22 [12] Lender Quantity

FC Limits on Foreign Currency Loans 15 [8] Lender Quantity

RR Reserve Requirement Ratios 12 [7] Lender Quantity

CG Limits on Domestic Currency Loans 7 [4] Lender Quantity

TAX Levy/Tax on Financial Institutions 17 [9] Lender Price

40

Table 3. Substitution from Bank to Nonbank Credit

Source: Authors’ calculations. Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

ALL AE EME Market-Based Bank-Based

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Banking Crisis Dummy -1.18*** -0.59*** -2.48*** -0.55*** -1.37***

(0.11) (0.09) (0.36) (0.20) (0.14)

YtY Change in MaP Index -0.26** -0.27*** -0.30 -0.34* -0.24*

(0.13) (0.10) (0.29) (0.21) (0.16)

YtY Change in CB Lending Rate 0.00 0.04*** -0.09*** 0.03*** -0.08***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)

YtY Change in Log of CB BS Size -0.46*** -0.68*** 0.54* -0.08 -0.58***

(0.11) (0.08) (0.35) (0.18) (0.14)

Constant 0.61*** 0.63*** -0.15 0.26 0.78**

(0.23) (0.16) (0.83) (0.33) (0.31)

R-squared 0.133 0.123 0.289 0.154 0.153

Obs. 3224 2291 933 1061 2163

# of Countries 31 22 9 10 21

Net Bank/NonBank Credit Flow

41

Table 4. Substitution from Bank to Nonbank Credit and Quantity Measures


Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

ALL AE EME Market-Based Bank-Based

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Banking Crisis Dumny -1.20*** -0.61*** -2.51*** -0.59*** -1.40***

(0.11) (0.09) (0.36) (0.20) (0.14)

YtY Change in MaP Quantity-Based Index -0.49*** -0.45*** -0.38 -0.69*** -0.42**

(0.15) (0.12) (0.34) (0.25) (0.18)

YtY Change in MaP Price-Based Index 0.56** 0.12 0.81 0.36 0.71**

(0.26) (0.20) (0.74) (0.42) (0.34)

YtY Change in CB Lending Rate 0.00 0.04*** -0.09*** 0.03*** -0.08***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)

YtY Change in Log of CB BS Size -0.46*** -0.68*** 0.52* -0.09 -0.58***

(0.11) (0.08) (0.35) (0.18) (0.14)

Constant 0.62*** 0.63*** -0.15 0.26 0.79**

(0.23) (0.16) (0.83) (0.33) (0.31)

R-squared 0.137 0.125 0.292 0.158 0.158

Obs. 3224 2291 933 1061 2163

# of Countries 31 22 9 10 21

Net Bank/NonBank Credit Flow

42

Table 5: Drivers of Growth in Credit, Investment Fund Assets and Domestic Private Debt Securities


Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < .1,

** p < .05,

*** p < .01.

1-Year Growth

in Bank Credit

to Private

Sector

1-Year Growth

in NonBank

Credit to

Private Sector

1-Year

Growth in

Total Credit to

Private Sector

1-Year

Growth in

Investment

Fund

Assets

Issuance of

Domestic

Private Debt

Securities

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Inflation (YtY % change in CPI) 0.25 0.18 0.17 0.05 0.94*

(0.18) (0.19) (0.15) (0.41) (0.51)

YtY % Real GDP growth 0.85*** 1.05*** 0.76*** 0.63*** 0.31**

(0.14) (0.22) (0.12) (0.23) (0.16)

Current account balance (% of GDP) -0.01 -0.06 0.02 -0.89*** -0.54*

(0.18) (0.15) (0.16) (0.31) (0.29)

General government net lending/ 0.62** 0.16 0.50** 0.20 0.72

borrowing (% of GDP) (0.28) (0.30) (0.23) (0.40) (0.50)

Equity inflows (% of GDP) -0.11*** -0.11 -0.06 0.03 0.15

(0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.14) (0.09)

Debt inflows (% of GDP) 0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.00

(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)

CB Lending Rate (in %) -0.20 0.29 -0.07 -0.16 -0.21

(0.13) (0.34) (0.13) (0.18) (0.37)

YtY % Growth in CB Assets -0.02** 0.01 -0.01 -0.05*** -0.03

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)

Log GDP per capita -9.13*** 4.51 -6.71*** -22.50** 0.19

(2.64) (4.15) (2.11) (9.03) (6.31)

Banking crisis dummy -5.73*** -5.68** -6.19*** 1.23 4.24***

(1.73) (2.36) (1.65) (4.57) (1.34)

Constant 101.97*** -32.42 78.19*** 239.85*** 5.87

(24.44) (38.76) (19.25) (81.62) (61.34)

R-squared 0.427 0.183 0.430 0.331 0.231

Observations 2433 2421 2425 3539 2852

Number of Countries 34 34 34 72 43

Expected Growth Rate Regressions

43

Table 6. Summary of Event Study Results

Panel A. Effects on Bank and Total Credit

All Instruments Quantity Measures Price Measures

Bank Credit Total Credit Bank Credit Total Credit Bank Credit Total Credit

All -7.7*** -4.9*** -8.7*** -4.1*** 1.7 1.2 AEs -3.2** -1.6 -6.6*** -1.5 2.0 2.1 EMEs -9.9*** -6.5*** -10.4*** -6.9*** 1.5 -2.8

Source: Authors’ calculations. Note: The table reports the effects of MaP events on the average cumulative credit growth rates during the 2-year period following the activation of macroprudential policies. Growth rates are adjusted for the baseline rates of growth implied by countries' macroeconomic fundamentals.

Panel B. Cross-Sector Credit Substitution


All -4.3*** -5.2*** 2.3 AEs -4.1*** -4.6*** -1.2 EMEs -6.2*** -6.5*** 1.1


Notes: The table reports the effects of MaP events on the net sectoral credit flow cumulated over the 2-year period following the activation of macroprudential policies. The measure is defined as follows:

1 1

[ Bank Credit] [ Non-Bank Credit]4 4 [QuarterlyNet Sectoral Credit Flow] 100*

[Total Credit], 4

YtY YtYct ct

ctc t

.

* p < .1,

** p < .05,

*** p < .01. Standard errors in parentheses.

The emerging market economy group consists of: Brazil, China, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Mexico, Malaysia, Thailand, Turkey, and South Africa. The advanced economy group consists of: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sweden, and the United States.

44

APPENDIX I. PLACEBO TESTS

Table A.1. Event Study Using Placebo Event Dataset—Summary of Results


Post-implementation Effect of Macroprudential Policies

All Instruments Quantity Measures Price Measures Bank Credit Total Credit Bank Credit Total Credit Bank Credit Total Credit

All 0.9 1.1 -0.8 0.1 1.6 -0.2 AEs 2.0 1.8 -0.2 0.3 2.9 -0.9 EMEs -4.5 -6.0* -4.2 -6.6 -7.9 -8.4

Note: The table reports the effects of MaP events on the average cumulative credit growth rates during the 2-year period following the activation of macroprudential policies. Growth rates are adjusted for the baseline rates of growth implied by countries' macroeconomic fundamentals.



All -0.1 -1.2 4.4* AEs 1.5 0.2 5.4* EMEs -3.8 -6.2 0.7


Notes: This table reports the effects of MaP events on the net sectoral credit flow cumulated over the 2-year period following the activation of macroprudential policies. The measure is defined as follows:

1 1

[ Bank Credit] [ Non-Bank Credit]4 4 [Quarterly Net Sectoral Credit Flow] 100*

[Total Credit], 4

YtY YtYct ct

ctc t

Note: * p < .1,

** p < .05,

*** p < .01 (Standard errors in parentheses).


45

Table A.2. Event Study on MaP Effects Prior and During the GFC—Summary of Results


Effects prior to 2007Q3

Effects after to 2007Q3

Note: Panel A reports the effects of MaP events on the average cumulative credit growth rates during the 2-year period following the activation of macroprudential policies. Growth rates are adjusted for the baseline rates of growth implied by countries' macroeconomic fundamentals.


All -8.8*** -4.7** -8.8*** -4.7** NA NA

AEs -7.3** -6.5* -7.3** -6.5* NA NA

EMEs -9.2** -3.3 -9.2** -3.3 NA NA

Post-implementation effect of MaP



All -3.7** -1.7 -4.8*** -2.8** 4.1* 5.8**

AEs -1.3* 0.4 -1.6* 0.4 1 2.2

EMEs -9.6*** -7.5*** -10.5*** -8.6*** 3.5 5.8*

Post-Implementation Effect of MaP


46


Effects prior to 2007Q3

Effects after 2007Q3


Notes: Panel B reports the effects of MaP events on the net sectoral credit flow cumulated over the 2-year period following the activation of macroprudential policies.

Notes: * p < .1,

** p < .05,

*** p < .01 (Standard errors in parentheses).



All -3.7** -1.7 -4.8*** -2.8** 4.1* 5.8**

AEs -1.3* 0.4 -1.6* 0.4 1.0 2.2

EMEs -9.6*** -7.5*** -10.5*** -8.6*** 3.5 5.8*

Post-Implementation Effect of MaP


All

AEs

EMEs

-5.7*** -5.7*** NA

-6.0*** -6.0*** NA


-6.1*** -6.1*** NA

47

Figure A1. Simulated Macroprudential Policy Measures Used in the Placebo Tests

Source: Authors’ calculations. Note: Dots correspond to simulated MaP events. Blank spaces refer to no new MaPs in a country in a given year.

Documents

Effective Macroprudential Policy: Cross-Sector ...Effective Macroprudential Policy: Cross-Sector Substitution from Price and . Quantity Measures . By Janko Cizel, Jon Frost, Aerdt