Educational Impacts

Educational impacts onacademic businesspractitioner’s moral reasoningand behaviour: effects of shortcourses in ethics or philosophy

EinarMarnburg

Introduction

In our society it is considered an obvious fact that

a long academic education has behavioural effects

on a graduate. But is this true of ethical behaviour

in general and of business ethics practice in

particular? The importance and effects of courses

in ethics in academic business education as well as

courses in morality and philosophy has been a

central issue in business ethics discussion

among scholars. The increased number of courses

in business ethics offered by business schools

can be seen to be a result of the great interest

in business ethics over the last 10–20 years.

Several researchers in business ethics have pointed

out the importance of teaching the subject in

business schools (e.g. DeGeorge 1987). The fact

that these courses have attained a central place in

the business schools’ curriculum can be consid-

ered a contribution from academia to ethics in

business.

This article addresses the issue of what kind of

effects, if any, courses in philosophy or morality

have on the future practitioner’s moral behaviour.

If effects can be seen – effects such as improved

abilities of reasoning, changes in recognition,

awareness or attitudes or actual behaviour – are

they possible to identify?

The effect of ethics courses

The study of the specific effects business ethics

courses may have on students is extremely

difficult. This is due to the fact that other subjects

in the curriculum may also have effects on

morality. In addition, the work environment after

graduating may have considerable influence

(McDonald and Donleavy 1995). The complexity

of this issue has given rise to discussions about

how business ethics teaching should be organised

in the business studies curriculum – i.e. as separate

or integrated (Rynning 1992, Herndon 1996).

There have also been a number of suggestions put

forward as to the ‘best’ teaching models, – e.g. the

use of case discussions (Beauchamp and Bowie

1988), the use of decision making models (Kahn

1990, Trevino 1992), the use of moral philosophic

theories and methods (Hosmer 1985, Green 1994,

Jensen, Pruzan and Thyssen 1990), or the use of

more action-based teaching (Bies 1996, Mercer

1996).

When accounting or marketing are taught, the

graduate is required not only to master the

technology of the trade, but also needs to be able

to cope with new problems and situations that the

future will bring. The same thing must also be the

case when business ethics is taught. The expected

r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UKand 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 403

Business Ethics: A European Review

effects of business ethics courses should be, in my

opinion, to honour the specific learning objectives

of a course. It seems to be common to make a

distinction between courses that seek to have

effects on awareness or attitudes on the one hand,

and reasoning abilities on the other (Weber

1990b, McDonald and Donleavy 1995, Kavathat-

zopoulos 1993). Weber (1990b) uses a distinction

between philosophically oriented courses that

train the students in reasoning, and courses that

seek to strengthen the student’s ability to recog-

nise and focus on ethical issues (attitudes/aware-

ness). The latter type of courses often seems to

have an empiricist epistemology. A third category

seeks to integrate the two objectives of higher

awareness and better reasoning.

The type of course that aims to bring about better

awareness tries to build up strong positive attitudes

towards business ethics, as well as providing

the student with analytical and decision-making

techniques. In other words, these courses have an

emotional component, in addition to a cognitive

and behavioural component. Several authors have

reported effects on attitudes (Weber 1990b, McDo-

nald and Donleavy 1995, Herndon 1996). The

general picture is that the courses have effects on

the students’ ethical attitudes immediately after the

course has ended, although these effects are not

always reported as statistically significant.

The second type of course stresses reasoning

ability and has been subjected to thorough

research in the general context as well as to some

research in business contexts. These courses have

their basis in cognitive moral stage theory, or

moral development theory (Kohlberg 1981, Rest

1979, 1986). This kind of research makes mea-

surements of the students’ increasing use of what

is called ‘principle moral reasoning’ – i.e. reason-

ing that has its basis in the rational and universal

arguments of modern moral philosophies (e.g.

Utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, Rawl’s ethics of

justice). The teaching model of such courses is

mainly based on the discussion of so-called

dilemma histories. The large number of studies

and the methodological accuracy are convincing:

these kind of courses do change the students’

ability to reason, and research into different age

groups has reported the increasing effects ex-

plained by rising age (Rest and Thoma 1986).

Concerning more specific courses in business

ethics, Weber (1990b) concludes that reasoning

courses do have at least a short-term effect,

although Glenn (1992) refers to studies where no

effects were reported. Long-term effects are, as far

as I know, not reported.

The concept of moral reasoning in

relation to ethical attitudes and decision

behaviour

Jean Piaget originally constructed moral develop-

ment theory and its methodology as a result of

studying children’s morality. In the mid 1950s

Lawrence Kohlberg expanded Piaget’s stage

model from three to six stages in order to also

draw inferences about adults. Kohlberg con-

structed, and has periodically refined, a qualita-

tive interview method. Using Kohlberg’s theory as

a basis, James Rest (1979) developed a slightly

different and more flexible theory and measure-

ment instrument (the Defining Issue Test (DIT)

questionnaire), directed at the study of children

and adults.

The theory of moral development represents a

logical and systematised approach to morality,

where the most common moral philosophies are

represented in the six stages (Kohlberg 1981). The

theory has a large and convincing empirical

reference base, also longitudinal, going back to

the mid 1950s. The six moral development stages

describe how justice is balanced in society and

how to maintain this balance (Rest 1979). The

stages are as follows:

Stage 1: Punishment and obedience;

Stage 2: Instrumentation;

Stage 3: Interpersonal relations;

Stage 4: Law and order orientation;

Stage 5: Social contract;

Stage 6: Universal principles.

Reasoning according to Stages 5 and 6 is called

principled reasoning. Research into moral devel-

opment has reported an interesting correlation

with age (younger people), with IQ-testing and

with length of education (Rest 1990). Besides the

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404 r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003

significance of length of education, the type of

education may also heighten the level of moral

reasoning. It has been reported that students with

a major in philosophy have significantly better

moral reasoning abilities than other students

(Rest 1979, 1986).

From a business ethics point of view this stage

theory has, undoubtedly, great intuitive explana-

tory value. Many important contributions to

business ethics have implemented this approach

in their modelling of, and research into, business

decision making and behaviour (Ferrell and

Gresham 1985, Hunt and Vitell 1986, Trevino

1986, Bommer, Glatto, Gravander and Tuttle

1987, Ponemon 1990, 1992, Jones 1991, Lampe

and Finn 1992). The assumption of the impor-

tance of moral reasoning ability has also resulted

in several empirical studies and reported group

differences in business environments (Goolsby

and Hunt 1992, Elm and Nichols 1993,

Jeffrey 1993, Shaub 1994, Weber 1990a). Such

comparisons are proper and relevant if research-

ers do not imply that the differences in moral

reasoning have any behavioural significance (see

discussion in Robin, Gordon, Jordan and Re-

idenbach 1996). Problems occur when reasoning

ability is used to explain behavioural variables

such as awareness, attitudes and actual behaviour

(Fraedrich, Thorne and Ferrell 1992, Robin et al.

1996, Marnburg 2001). This is due to the fact that

the relationship between moral reasoning and

other behavioural variables is not obvious. Cogni-

tive psychology tries to explain the structures by

which people think, structures that the individual

subjectively experiences as logical. This raises the

question that has haunted Western academic

history, namely ‘do people act according to their

best judgement?’ According to Plato’s Dialogues

(Plato, undated/1992) Socrates said they did.

Aristotle later pointed out that knowledge is not

enough to bridle passion and lust. The Bible also

adopts this position when it refers to the weak-

nesses of the flesh (Matt. 24:41, Romans 7:15–22).

Research in moral reasoning has not focused on

actual behaviour. However, Lawrence Kohlberg

is of the opinion that moral maturity predisposes

a person towards better moral behaviour (Colby

and Kohlberg 1984). The process behind this

maturity is the pressure and opportunity to adopt

role taking (Kohlberg 1984: 198 ff.). James Rest

(1979 and 1984) seems to be more sceptical of

assumptions like this, and specifically warns

against testing hypotheses that claim the existence

of a linear relationship between moral reasoning

and behaviour. He gives convincing theoretical

and empirical arguments for his point of view.

In spite of warnings from cognitive psycholo-

gists against using the moral development concept

as a behavioural predictor, several researchers in

business ethics have tried to do this. But the

empirical efforts of most researchers in explaining

behaviour by moral reasoning abilities have failed

(Trevino and Youngblood 1990, Goolsby and

Hunt 1992, Shaub 1994, Robin et al. 1996).

According to studies into moral reasoning there

is a problematic relationship between ethical

attitudes and moral reasoning (Marnburg 2001).

It seems that strong ethical attitudes have a

restraining effect on reasoning. For example, in

studies of moral reasoning a correlation of up to

� .60 between moral reasoning and a test of ‘Law

and Order’ has been reported. These studies tested

opinions about how much power society should

be given in order to maintain order and stability

(Rest 1979: 161 ff). Another study was reported

by Lawrence (1979) in which a group of orthodox

theology students adjusted their moral reasoning

answers in accordance with their religious rules.

Marnburg and Jenssen (2001) point out the

educational problems this may lead to. Graduates

with well developed moral reasoning abilities will

first of all have competence in producing ‘talks’

(Brunsson 1989) – i.e. ‘nice’ oral and written

statements which are only made to please the

public or other stakeholders – they have no

intention of changing in practice. On the other

hand, graduates with strong ethical attitudes will,

perhaps, behave in a naive manner, without

carrying out the proper reasoning necessary in a

given situation.

Research question and hypothesis

The research population consisted of academics

(business economists and engineers) working in


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private companies in Norway. Compulsory

courses such as ‘business ethics’ and ‘business

and society’ are relatively new in Norway, and the

empirical basis for studying the effects of such

courses was unsatisfactory in 1997 when my

research was executed. However, a special educa-

tional rule in Norway made it possible to carry

out the empirical research. Traditional university

studies in Norway demand that students have a

half-year introduction course in philosophy, logic

and psychology (called ‘Examen Philosophicum’)

in order to enter the universities’ regular pro-

grammes. Students attending universities of tech-

nology and business schools have not been

required to take this course: nevertheless, it has

been common for many young people to take this

course while making up their minds about what

kind of major they ought to take. This unique

situation in Norway enables researchers to study a

highly educated group of academics in the work-

place where some have a philosophical educational

background and others do not. Besides this type of

course other kinds of short university level courses

in philosophy or ethics are also offered in Norway.

This led to the following research question: do

theoretical courses in philosophy and/or ethics

have any effects on an academic practitioner’s

knowledge, reasoning and/or behaviour related

variables? People who have taken a course in

philosophy and/or ethics will of course have some

knowledge of these subjects after completing the

course (which is the basis for passing the

examination). The population studied here in-

clude both newly qualified graduates and all other

age groups up to retirement age. Therefore, it is

reasonable to expect, when studying the whole

group, that much of the knowledge of philosophy

and ethics will have been forgotten. It is therefore

important to investigate whether the knowledge

effects of these courses exist for the whole group,

compared to academics who have not taken a course.

H1: Academics who have taken a course in ethics

or philosophy will have more knowledge in the field

than those who have not taken such a course.

Rest (1979, 1986) reports that masters students

with a major in philosophy have significantly

better reasoning abilities than others. This can

probably be explained by the fact that their

courses included advanced theories in moral

philosophy. To expect the same knowledge level

from people who have taken a minor course is

perhaps asking too much, nevertheless the follow-

ing question is asked:

H2: Academics who have knowledge of philoso-

phy or have taken a course in ethics or philosophy

will have better moral reasoning ability than

academics with a poor knowledge of philosophy or

have not taken such a course.

Academics who started their educational ca-

reers by studying moral philosophy or ethics

probably have had, and have, a better basis for

role-taking (Kohlberg 1984: 198 ff); this should

lead to moral maturity (Colby and Kohlberg,

1984). To use Kohlberg’s references as a basis for

a hypothesis assumes that H2 is accepted (that

education in ethics or philosophy improves moral

reasoning), and that there is a correlation between

moral reasoning and moral behaviour. However,

Rest (1979, 1984) gives quite convincing theore-

tical and empirical reasons for not formulating

hypotheses that predict a linear relationship

between reasoning and behaviour. If attending a

course in philosophy or ethics and passing an

examination has any significance for behavioural

variables, this has to be explained by the fact

that the courses, in addition to teaching knowl-

edge, also awaken the participant’s recognition,

awareness or emotional involvement in current

moral issues. If so, this effect will occur as an

effect in addition to, or instead of, improved

moral reasoning ability. This implies that the

courses have trained the students not only in

philosophic reasoning but also in recognition

and awareness of moral issues (Weber 1990b).

An alternative or complementary line of argument

stresses the importance of biased recruitment.

Perhaps some people take a course in philo-

sophy or ethics because they are emotionally

involved in ethical issues and hope that the course

will give them some answers. A genuine interest

in moral philosophy may also be held by

those who have a great deal of knowledge



about philosophy, but have not attended any

course.

If the occurrence of moral recognition, aware-

ness and engagement exists, this may be shown by

the expression of attitudes towards ethics. In

order to approach the study of ethical attitudes in

a systematic way, it is essential that one is able to

differentiate between issues. Claes Gustafsson

(1988) suggests in his work that four structures

cover the most important issues of business ethics

as shown in Table 1.

The following hypothesis was proposed:

H3: Academics who have a good knowledge of

philosophy or have taken a course in ethics or

philosophy will have, due to moral recognition

abilities, awareness and emotional engagement,

stronger ethical attitudes and make more moral

correct decisions than academics with a poor

knowledge of philosophy or who have not taken a

course.

Method

The population of the study consisted of aca-

demics, business economists and engineers (with

an education corresponding to a masters degree)

working in private Norwegian companies. For

practical reasons, a sample of 1010 people was

randomly drawn from Norway’s two professional

associations of engineers and business economists.

At this educational level (masters degree) these

two groups represented the largest and dominant

group of academics in the private sector in

Norway. The reported findings in this article are

part of a larger study executed during the period

1994–97 (Marnburg 1998).

A postal questionnaire of 10 pages containing

demographic data, company data, educational

data, an attitude survey, a moral reasoning test,

an ethical decision-making test and a philosophi-

cal knowledge test was designed. The survey was

executed in the spring of 1997, the questionnaire

being sent out in February, with two follow-up

reminders. Completion of the survey was on a

totally anonymous basis and did not use any form

of explicit incentives. This resulted in 4491

completed questionnaires; a response rate of

44.5%. All age groups were represented in the

sample. The control routines revealed that the

sample was biased in some respects. Only 14% of

those sampled were women, which reflected the

proportion of female academics in the private

sector in Norway. Female professionals were

younger than their male colleagues. Besides this,

the whole group was biased towards younger age

groups – explained by the ever-increasing number

of younger people taking a higher education in

these subjects.

Moral reasoning was measured by using a

translated 3-dilemma case version of the DIT

(Defining Issue Test) according to the DIT

manual (Rest 1990). The test was pre-tested and

prepared for postal use. The statistical testing was

done by measuring differences in ‘principle

reasoning’, called P-score – which includes prin-

ciple reasoning. This took place in stages 5 and 6.

The statistical properties of the test were generally

found to be in accordance with the manual’s

reliability data. However, the mean P-score for

the group was only 30.4, which is very low for a

group of academics compared to American

studies (Rest 1990). Due to the absence of any

other explanation, the results might be explained

by the translation of the test into Norwegian.

A small test of philosophic knowledge was

drawn up, including six items with a multiple

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Table 1. The four ethical structures (from Gustafsson

(1988), my translation from Swedish)

Credibility ethics cover behaviour in relation to promises

and expectations – e.g. to tell the truth, to keep your

promises, etc.

Humanistic ethics include the values of humanity, integrity

and equality among people.

Efficiency ethics is perhaps the most central type of ethics

in business, requiring an organisation and its individual

employees to produce as much as possible of value

(utility), while imposing on them industrious and

economically sound behaviour. The theoretical parallel to

this form of ethics comes from both utilitarian ethical

theory and Max Weber’s ‘ethics of Protestantism’.

Environmental ethics include all the worries and concerns

for the environment and the welfare of future generations.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .



choice of three-answer alternatives. The items

addressed well-known concepts of moral philoso-

phy such as the definition of ‘altruism’, which

philosopher described the ‘categorical impera-

tives’, what is meant by Utilitarianism, and

others. Pre-testing of this test work was very

promising. The respondents were asked not to use

any form of reference in order to get the answers

correct. However, it should be kept in mind that

in a self-reporting postal test like this, help from a

spouse or friends may occur.

An attitude questionnaire was drawn up con-

sisting of 16 items, four of which related to each of

the four ethical structures (see Table 1), resulting

in one index for each of the four ethical structures

and an overall index. The respondents were asked

to consider how important it was that their

business company related actively to the issues,

for example Item 1: the reliability of advertising

and public relations, and to mark their answers on

a scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (very

important)). The test was pre-tested and a test-

retest (with a small student sample over a period

of two months) gave Pearson’s r5 0.69. Cron-

bach’s alpha was measured at 0.89. A correlation

matrix confirmed that the four ethical structures

possessed statistical properties besides the theore-

tical basis.

The decision-making behaviour test consisted

of eight short vignettes, each describing a situa-

tion and a specific ‘ethical decision’. The respon-

dent was asked how likely it was that he or she

would have taken that ethical position on a scale

from 1 (not likely) to 5 (very likely). The

construction of the test was based on inspiration

from Cavanagh and Fritzche (1985). The test was

pre-tested, and a test-retest (with a small student

sample, a period of two months) gave Pearson’s

r5 0.83. When constructing the items a high

differentiation was emphasised which was con-

firmed by a low Cronbach’s alpha at 0.44. The

test-retest measure is therefore of most interest

(Anastasi 1988: 119). Tests like this will always

have great validity weaknesses because the test

defines what decisions are morally right and

wrong. However, using one’s own supposition

for what is morally right has long traditions in

business ethics research (Robertson and Anderson

1993, Baumhart 1961, Brenner and Molander

1977, Weber 1990a, Merritt 1991, Jones 1991).

The SPSS, version 7.5, was used, where

Student’s t-test, ANOVA and MANOVA were

employed.

Results

Table 2 shows the descriptive results concerning

level of knowledge of philosophy. It was hypothe-

sised (in H1) that academics who had taken a

course in ethics or philosophy should have a

better knowledge of philosophy. An ANOVA test

gave F(2, 347)5 4.5, po.00 and Z25 .04, with an

explained variance equal to a correlation coeffi-

cient at .20. The H0 was rejected.

It was also hypothesised (in H2) that academics

who had a good knowledge of philosophy or had

taken a course in ethics or philosophy would have

better moral reasoning ability. The mean P-score

for the whole sample was P5 30.4. Using an

ANOVA for testing the relation philosophy

knowledge and P-scores, gave F(2, 253)5 5.40,

p5 .01 and Z25 .06. The explained variance is

moderate and corresponds to a correlation

coefficient of .25. H0 was rejected.

In H2 it was also hypothesised that academics

who had taken a course in philosophy or ethics

would have a better reasoning ability. Testing of

this relationship, with a student’s t-test, gave

t5 1.44, p5 .15. H0 was not rejected.

As displayed in Table 2, P-scores rise by length

of education. Length of education explains P-

scores significantly (F(3, 301)5 2.7, po.05 and

Z25 .03), with a weak explained variance corre-

sponding to a correlation coefficient at .18.

H3 hypothesised that academics who had a

good knowledge of philosophy or had taken

a course in ethics or philosophy would have

a higher score in the attitude and decision-making

test. Table 3 gives a picture of the data concern-

ing ethical attitudes and shows small differ-

ences. Using a MANOVA test concerning the

relation ‘taken or not taken a course – ethical

attitudes’, this gave Hotelling’s T25 .002,

F(4, 346)5 0.562, p5 .93. The overall test did

not reject H0.



The test of ‘philosophic knowledge – ethical

attitudes’ gave Wilk’s lambda5 .987, F(8, 440)5

1.35, p5 .83 and Z25 .01. H0 was not rejected.

H3 also hypothesised that academics who had a

good knowledge of philosophy or had taken a

course in ethics or philosophy would make ‘more

ethical’ decisions. Mean score on the decision

making test for the whole sample was 3.79. Mean

score for academics who had taken a course

(N5 154) was 3.83 and for those without the

course (N5 290) 3.78. Testing of this difference

gave t5 1.04, p5 .30. The H0 was not rejected.

Testing the relation ‘philosophy knowledge –

decision making behaviour’ gave F(2, 341)5 0.8,

p5 .41. Also here H0 was not rejected.

Discussion

The result of the statistical testing implied that

those academics in private companies (business

economists and engineers) that have taken a

course in philosophy or ethics, have a significantly

higher score on the philosophy knowledge test

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Table 2. Knowledge of philosophy, education and P-scores

P-scores Stages

2 3 4 5 6

Variables N M SD M M M M M

Philosophy knowledge 255

0–2 correct 85 28.2 11.6 8.9 22.5 40.3 19.8 8.4

3–4 correct 113 31.1 13.6 9.3 21.0 38.7 20.7 10.3

5–6 correct 57 35.1 13.6 7.7 18.0 39.2 23.3 11.8

Taken a course in philosophy or ethics? 303

Yes 103 31.9 13.1 7.9 19.5 40.8 20.4 11.5

No 200 29.6 13.2 9.0 22.3 39.1 20.3 9.3

Length of university studies 302

Under 4 years 21 23.7 12.4 10.0 20.3 46.0 16.0 7.6

4–5 years 186 30.7 12.7 9.1 21.9 38.2 20.3 10.4

6–8 years 79 29.8 13.9 7.6 21.9 40.8 20.0 9.7

Over 8 years 16 38.5 12.7 6.3 14.4 40.8 29.0 9.6

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Table 3. Philosophical knowledge, education and ethical attitudes

All items Credibility Humanistic Efficiency Environmental

Variables N M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD

Philosophy knowledge 350

0–2 correct 120 3.15 .78 3.62 1.07 3.00 .88 2.85 .83 3.15 .99

3–4 correct 158 3.20 .68 3.64 1.06 3.12 .83 2.82 .69 3.21 .98

5–6 correct 72 3.11 .75 3.50 1.16 3.07 .80 2.74 .78 3.13 1.11

Taken a course in philosophy or ethics 449

Yes 157 3.19 .75 3.60 1.09 3.11 .82 2.83 .77 3.23 1.10

No 292 3.16 .73 3.60 1.06 3.07 .85 2.82 .78 3.17 1.00

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .



with a correlation coefficient at .20. This is a

surprising result considering that the population

covers all age groups from 24 to 69, although

younger people were to some degree over-

represented. If this indication gives an accurate

picture of the population, it indicates that short

courses teach knowledge that ‘lasts a lifetime’, i.e.

an indication that the effects of the courses are

long-term.

It is important to remember that the courses

which produce these effects are dominated by

courses of less than 1/2 year in duration. No

doubt the teaching which has been done in these

courses has been very efficient.

Knowledge of philosophy significantly ex-

plained the score of principle scores (P-scores) of

moral reasoning. This, if true, is remarkable. I do

not like to repeat myself, but let me say again that

the population represented were (presumably)

laymen in the field of philosophy and ethics. It

is therefore remarkable that the little knowledge

they possessed implied these differences.

On the other hand, the difference in mean P-

scores for those who had and those who had not

taken a course in philosophy or ethics was not

significant. Various interpretations of these find-

ings can be carried out, but it is important to

point out two possible explanations. First, many

people have a personal interest in philosophy but

perhaps no interest in taking a formal course. If

this is the case, the lack of differences in P-scores

between those with and without a course can be

explained by the fact that some people in the ‘no-

course group’ also have a good knowledge of

philosophy and ethics. Another interpretation of

the result is that some people in the ‘taken a

course group’ have had no interest in philosophy

and ethics and have therefore forgotten the whole

thing. Of course, these speculations can only be

clarified by further empirical research.

It was also hypothesised that people with a

good knowledge of philosophy and ethics had, in

addition to their knowledge, a higher degree of

awareness, recognition and emotional involve-

ment in ethical issues. This was theoretically

explained by the possible fact that the courses

also stimulated emotional engagement in ethical

issues besides teaching theories. Another line of

argument was that people with philosophic

knowledge but no course (and perhaps some of

the group that have taken the course) had taken a

self-study course or attended the philosophical or

ethics course because of their genuine interest and

concern for moral issues. If this was true, one

should expect that people who have taken the

course and/or had a good knowledge of the

subject would produce a higher score on the

ethical attitude test and decision-making beha-

viour test. This hypothesis was completely re-

jected. This implies that knowledge of philosophy

and ethics has no correlation with ethical attitudes

or moral decision-making behaviour.

Overall, it is encouraging to observe that short

introductory university courses do have a sig-

nificant effect on knowledge and that this knowl-

edge has a significant effect on one of the most

vital elements of discourse in our society – the

morality. On the other hand, it is in a way a

problematic implication that well-developed mor-

al reasoning does not seem to have any beha-

vioural effect. This means that knowledge of

philosophy only gives the competence to produce

‘talks’ – i.e. ‘nice’ speeches and well written

statements in order to please stakeholders, but

with no intention of behavioural change. To paint

a dark picture, it can be asked ‘where are the

moral actions?’ In other words, is it acceptable for

the managers of our business community to

master the thoughts and words but not to be

concerned with moral actions?

One characteristic of both business and engineer-

ing schools is the focus and willingness to make the

right decisions and take the appropriate actions in

the different fields that are taught. For example,

students do not only learn about accounting,

marketing and technology, they learn how to

handle accounting, marketing and technology.

From my point of view this focus on actions has

to be a part of the result of teaching business ethics.

In contrast to moral reasoning abilities, strong

ethical attitudes, at least to some degree, should

correlate with behaviour. However, as pointed out

in the introduction, empirical studies seem to imply

that strong ethical attitudes may have a restraining

effect on free and open-minded reasoning. The

person with overly strong ethical attitudes might



do naıve and perhaps even stupid things because he

or she does not reason before acting. Perhaps there

is a balance between sound moral reasoning and

the moral concern that is expressed through ethical

attitudes – I do not know.

Conclusion

The empirical findings reported in this article

imply that short introduction courses in philoso-

phy and/or ethics significantly explain higher

knowledge in philosophy and ethics among

Norwegian academics in private business (busi-

ness economists and engineers) of all ages. Good

knowledge of philosophy and ethics seem to

explain significantly higher moral reasoning abil-

ities. On the other hand, taking a course or having

a good knowledge of philosophy and ethics does

not have any effect on ethical attitudes or moral

decision-making behaviour. It has been pointed

out that business schools in their business ethics

teaching must also stress and focus on moral

actions – not only on producing talk. Exactly how

this should be done is not addressed in this article.

Note

1 The completion of the questionnaire’s different

parts was as follows: Ethical attitudes: N5 441;

Moral reasoning: N5 304; Decision behaviour:

N5 443; Philosophy knowledge test: N5 350.

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