Do Populist Radical Right Parties pose a threat to Europe?

The case of France, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

100016729Undergraduate Dissertation

April 2015

School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies

Dissertation Supervisor: Dr. Vassiliki Koutrakou

Word Count: 8748

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ABSTRACT

The following dissertation presents a study on the threat that the rise of Populist

Radical Right Parties poses to the functioning of the European Union. The

outcome of the 2014 European Parliamentary elections yielded an outstanding

result for the Radical Right, whose doctrine and rhetoric could provide a

detrimental effect in the progressive stance of European Union politics. The

Front National, Lega Nord and United Kingdom Independence Party are used as

case studies to portray the rise of new populism in Europe.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Vassiliki Koutrakou for always shining a light on the

right path, my friends for the endless support, and lastly my family who even

when far, is always by my side.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 5

METHODOLOGY 8

CHAPTER 1 – LITERATURE REVIEW 9

1.1 INTRODUCTION 91.2 POPULISM THROUGH HISTORY 91.3 POPULISM AS AN IDEOLOGY 101.4 POPULISM AS A SYNDROME 111.5 POPULISM VS. DEMOCRACY 121.6 RADICAL RIGHT POPULISM 141.7 POPULISM AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH EUROSCEPTICISM 17

CHAPTER 2 – CASE STUDIES 19

2.1 INTRODUCTION 192.2 FRONT NATIONAL 19

2.2.1 HISTORY 192.2.2 IDEOLOGY 212.2.3 LEADER 22

2.3 LEGA NORD 242.3.1 HISTORY 242.3.2 IDEOLOGY 262.3.3 LEADER 28

2.4 UNITED KINGDOM INDEPENDENCE PARTY 292.4.1 HISTORY 292.4.2 IDEOLOGY 302.4.3 LEADER 32

2.5 THE MAY 2014 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 33

CHAPTER 3 – ANALYSIS 35

3.1 INTRODUCTION 353.2 EFFECTS OF PRRP ON EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 353.3 EFFECTS OF PRRP ON NATIONAL POLITICS 37

CONCLUSIONS 40

APPENDICES 42

APPENDIX 1 – THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TREND 42APPENDIX 2 – THE ELECTORAL RESULTS OF PRRP AT THE 2014 EP ELECTIONS COMPARED TO THE 2009 EP ELECTIONS ACROSS EUROPE 43APPENDIX 3 – FRENCH PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT THE EU 44APPENDIX 4 – ITALY’S SUPPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION 45APPENDIX 5 – DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 46

BIBLIOGRAPHY 47

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Introduction

The development of the European Union (EU) has since its creation relied

heavily on the compliance of its Member States’ populations and leaders.1 The

economic and political integration process along with the enlargement of the

Union, however has witnessed increasing opposition throughout the years

especially after Member States failed to ratify the 2004 Maastricht Treaty.2 The

term Euroscepticism, believed to have been popularised by British political

discourse around the 1980s,3 refers to a phenomenon that has gained popularity

in academia over the last decade due to the increased levels of opposition to

integration coming from Member States and their populations, along with

political parties and their leaders.4 Despite the recently gained notice, however

theorists continue to struggle to give it a set definition due to the broadness of

the concept. Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak attempted to define it by

identifying two different types: Hard and Soft Euroscepticism. The former, a

principled opposition to the European Union and the European Integration

project as a whole and the latter, the concern over one or multiple policy areas,

which often leads to the expression by political parties of qualified opposition to

the EU.5

It is because of the recent rise of Euroscepticism, that this dissertation

will explore one of the loudest and most successful voices in the debate over the

integration of the European Union. In recent years Europe has witnessed the

birth and rise of Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRP). These parties make up the

most prevalent and successful party family to have emerged in post-war Europe

and have gained momentum across Western and Eastern Europe threatening

1 Taggart, Paul, and Aleks Szczerbiak. 2008. 'Introduction: Opposing Europe? The Politics Of Euroscepticism In Europe'. In Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics Of Euroscepticism, 1st ed., 1-2. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p 1-42 Vasilopoulou, Sofia. 2009. 'Varieties Of Euroscepticism: The Case Of The European Extreme Right'. Journal Of Contemporary European Research 5 (1): 3-23. p.33 Milner, Susan. 2000. 'Introduction: A Healthy Scepticism?'. Journal Of European Integration 22 (1): 1-13. 4 Vasilopoulou, Sofia. 2009. p. 3-45 Taggart, Paul and Aleks Szczerbjak. 2008 p. 8

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mainstream politics and infiltrating National and European Parliaments.6

Populist Radical Right Parties use doctrinal and rhetorical elements of ethno-

nationalism and xenophobia, authoritarian views on socio-cultural matters,

political and cultural populism as well as prevalent Hard Euroscepticism, in

order to gain popularity.7 Since their humble beginnings commentators have

warned against the dangers that this new party family could pose to European

political stability.8 The literature on Populist Radical Right Parties is growing and

is closely backed by the vast and established theories that regard the political

and socio-economic phenomenon of populism.9 As defined by Cas Mudde,

populism is:

“an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two

homogenous and antagonistic groups: the pure people against the corrupt elite. It

is an ideology that argues that politics should be an expression of the ‘volonté

générale’ of the people, rather than in the hands of the [political] elite.10”

Populism has become instrumental for European Radical Rights and it is a

phenomenon that has become increasingly widespread since its first

manifestation.11

The 2014 European Parliamentary Election results are proof that

Euroscepticism and Populist Radical Right Parties are becoming increasingly

prevalent.12 Soft Eurosceptic parties won seats in 23 out of 28 Member States,

assembling 212 Eurosceptic Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) out of

6 Mudde, C. 2014. 'Fighting The System? Populist Radical Right Parties And Party System Change'. Party Politics 20 (2): 217-226.7 Rydgren, J. 2003. 'Meso-Level Reasons For Racism And Xenophobia: Some Converging And Diverging Effects Of Radical Right Populism In France And Sweden'. European Journal Of Social Theory 6 (1): 45-68. 8 Mudde, Cas. 2012. 'Three Decades Of Populist Radical Right Parties In Western Europe: So What?'. European Journal Of Political Research 52 (1): 1-19. p. 39 Canovan, Margaret. 1981. Populism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. p.310 Mudde, Cas. 2004. 'The Populist Zeitgeist'. Government And Opposition 39 (4): 542-563. p. 54311 Canovan, Margaret. 1981. p.312 Treib, Oliver. 2014. 'The Voter Says No, But Nobody Listens: Causes And Consequences Of The Eurosceptic Vote In The 2014 European Elections'. Journal Of European Public Policy 21 (10): 1541-1554. p. 1543

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751 total members. 13 Populist Radical Right Parties gained the majority vote in

countries like the United Kingdom, France, Lithuania, and Finland, and won

multiple seats in many others.14 The rise of PRRP, a party family that unfailingly

has Eurosceptic attitudes, is closely linked to the wave of Euroscepticism that has

hit Europe over the last few years.15 (See Appendix 1 for Euro-barometer)

The following paper will explore the rise of Populist Radical Right Parties

(PRRP) in three European countries and will attempt to identify whether these

parties pose a threat to European political stability. The elusive use of the term

Europe in this paper’s title was purposely left ambiguous as to encompass both

European politics as well as the National politics of European member states.

The subjects of this study will be: the British United Kingdom Independence

Party (UKIP), France’s Front National (FN) and the Italian Lega Nord (LN). This

paper will be divided into three main chapters. The first chapter will review the

extensive literature on populism, identifying where it comes from (1.2), its lack

of a coherent ideological base (1.3, 1.4), its relationship with democracy (1.5)

and Euroscepticism (1.7), and the Populist Radical Right of modern day Europe

(1.6). The second chapter will explore the three case studies by analysing each

party’s history, current political ideology, past and present leader, and its result

in the 2014 European Parliamentary Elections. In the third chapter an analysis of

the findings will be presented that will ultimately determine whether these

parties pose a threat to European political stability. It will be determined what

the impact of PRRP is on the European Parliament as well as their impact on

national politics and national parties, which will ultimately determine how these

parties are changing the European political scenario. Conclusions will be drawn

from the research that will ultimately identify whether their Hard Eurosceptic

tendencies could overturn the European integration process.

13 Treib, Oliver. 2014 p. 1542-154514 Ibid.15 'Public Opinion In The European Union'. 2014. Standard Eurobarometer 84 (Spring 2014). p. 7

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Methodology

Due to the nature of this paper there are many topics that unfortunately

are beyond its scope. A more in depth study would include an assessment of

whether every self-proclaimed Populist Radical Right Party poses a threat to

Europe, and a stronger focus on modern day European populism, both left and

right wing. Instead, this paper will only focus on three of the numerous PRRP

that exist in Europe in order to both explore the inner-party intricacies while still

providing an overarching view of this trend around Europe. The choice of taking

into consideration UKIP, FN and LN will provide an introductory approach to

analysing modern day Euroscepticism and populism. The following research will

stress the importance of the populist elements in exploring the rise of the

Populist Radical Right, through an in depth review populist literature.

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Chapter 1 – Literature Review

1.1 Introduction

In order to understand the advent of Populist Radical Right Parties on the

European political scenario, the phenomenon of populism must be explored first.

The following chapter will review the extensive literature on populism, taking

into consideration its roots, its development and what it represents today.

1.2 Populism through history

One of the most influential pieces written about the phenomenon of

populism is Margaret Canovan’s “Populism” published in 1981. This

comprehensive study highlights the different and ever changing faces of

populism and puts the theory in historical context, exploring where and when

the populist movement originated. Canovan explores the rise and fall of the

People’s Party of late 19th century United States, a populist movement born in

response to the failure of mainstream politics to respond to the grave agrarian

grievances in the Western and Southern American territories.16 As a result,

farmers took the roles of politicians in a struggle to get their voices heard. The

People’s Party demanded greater manifestation of a democratic popular control

over the government and the abolition of the country’s political elite.17 Canovan

also explores the advent of the Russian Narodnichestvo, a movement of a small

group of radical intellectuals alienated both from the elite and from the group on

to whom they projected their aspirations.18 Their aim was the achievement of an

ideal society built upon peasant traditions and values, and they hoped for a

popular revolution from Imperial Russia’s overwhelming majority serf

population.19 While theorists argue that the Russian Narodnichestvo and the

United States’ People’s Party did not communicate with an important degree with

16 Canovan, Margaret. 1981. p.40-4617 Canovan, Margaret. 1981. p. 5818 Canovan, Margaret. 1981. p. 60-6119 Canovan, Margaret. 1981. p. 61-63

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modern day populism,20 it can be argued that these movements stand at the

heart of contemporary populism. Populism’s malleability allows it to have

common traits with political movements as contrasting as Maoism, Nazism,

Peronism, and Nasserism.21 While the history of populism is vast, this paper will

explore the movement that Paul Taggart referred to as “new populism”; a

phenomenon that is not classified as a single party or movement, but rather a

series of different political parties in different countries arising during the same

period and characterised by similar themes.22

1.3 Populism as an ideology

It is widely agreed that although populism is studied as an ideology, it is

not considered as refined or consistent as mainstream theories like liberalism or

realism.23 While ‘full ideologies’ are internally diverse on the basis of clear and

comprehensible core concepts, populism is difficult to translate into a coherent

logical tradition.24 As an ideology, populism can only exhibit a restricted core,

attached to a narrower range of political concepts and therefore lacks in

consistency, often proving unable to provide answers to certain aspects of

political theory.25 While elitism wants politics to be an expression of the ‘moral’

elite” rather than the ‘amoral people,’ populism places its trust in the common

people.26 One of the reasons for populism’s narrowness as an ideology is the

plasticity of the concept of ‘the people.’27 Populism is predicated upon an

antagonistic relationship between the elite and the people, however theorists

struggle to pin down who ‘the people’ are. Paul Taggart believed the term the

20 MacRae, Donald. 1969. 'Populism As An Ideology'. In Populism. Its Meanings And National Characteristics, 1st ed.,. Letchworth: The Garden City Press. p. 15321 Laclau, Ernesto. 1977. Politics And Ideology In Marxist Theory. London: NLB. p.143-14422 Taggart, Paul A. 2000. Populism. Buckingham [England]: Open University Press. p. 7323 See: Mudde, Cas. 2004. 'The Populist Zeitgeist'., Taggart, Paul A. 2000. Populism., Stanley, Ben. 2008. 'The Thin Ideology Of Populism'., Canovan, Margaret. ‘Populism’ 1981., etc.24 Stanley, Ben. 2008. 'The Thin Ideology Of Populism'. Journal Of Political Ideologies 13 (1): 95-110. p. 9625 Mudde, Cas. 2004. p. 54526 Taggart, Paul A. 2000. p. 1-327 Stanley, Ben. 2008. p. 95-96

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people is derivate of the “deeply embedded, if implicit, conception of the

heartland.”28 The vagueness of the term ‘people’ impedes the development of an

intellectual tradition within the ideology, strongly limiting its capacity to become

whole, and therefore restricting it to remain a ‘thin ideology.’29 As an ideology,

populism is also impractical due to the low plausibility of what it promises to

deliver. Populism promises complete and unprecedented power to the common

people, limiting its possibility to succeed in the real world.30 It is this very

thinness that allows populism to be so malleable yet so incapable of being

translated into a comprehensive policy offer.31 Identifying populism as an

ideology therefore can prove to be unproductive and equivocal.

1.4 Populism as a Syndrome

Theorist Peter Wiles wrote: “virtue resides in the simple people, who are

the overwhelming majority, and in their collective traditions.” 32 His piece, A

Syndrome, not a Doctrine: Some elementary Theses on Populism collected a list of

24 points that attempt to set limits and definitions to the phenomenon of

populism, and suggests the idea of looking at it as a syndrome rather than an

ideology.33 Wiles writes that populism tends to be a moral outlook rather than a

definite programme, and that populist movements often lack a precise ideology.

Populists are believed to need leaders in ‘mystical contact’ with their people and

expect these leaders to share their way of life.34 He elaborates that as a

phenomenon that is easily corrupted by success, populism is anti-intellectual,

anti-establishment, and it arises among people who feel themselves outside the

centre of power. It does not encourage class war or glorify any type of violence.35

28 Taggart, Paul A. 2000. p.9529 Stanley, Ben. 2008. p. 10630 Stanley, Ben. 2008. p. 10731 Stanley, Ben. 2008. p. 10632 Wiles, Peter. 1969. 'A Syndrome, Not A Doctrine'. In Populism. Its Meanings And National Characteristics, 1st ed., Letchworth: The Garden City Press. p. 16633 Canovan, Margaret. 1981. p. 29034 Ibid.35 Ibid.

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In economic terms Wiles identifies populist movements as being

sympathetic towards small businesses and hostile to financiers. They favours

monetary inflation, cooperative organisation, and state aid and oppose inequality

produced by other institutions failing to support complete equality amongst

their own constituency. In societal terms, populist movements are religious but

anti-religious establishment, often rural and often hostile to science. 36 They are

nostalgic of the past, isolationist, anti-militarist and have a strong tendency to

mild racism as they favour the good common people of the heartland.37

While at times simplistic, vague, and ambiguous, Wiles’ 24 points

represent a rudimentary framework portrayal of populist movements. Wiles’

approach was innovative, and it isolated populist elements forming a syndrome,

supporting the view that populism should be used in combination with other

ideologies. Populism is therefore much more applicable as an emphasis or a

dimension of political culture in general, then simply as a particular kind of over-

arching ideology.38

1.5 Populism vs. Democracy

In relation to democracy, theorists often treat populism as a pathological

and unavoidable symptom or disorder that requires a sociological

explanation.39,40 Many believe populism’s main threat to democracy is the fact

that it is illiberal.41 Others have suggested that the very character and practices of

populism directly derive from a harmful vision of democracy; its displacement of

equality for unity and its opposition to social and political pluralism attempt to

transform the political community into a singular popular decision-making

36 Ibid.37 Summary of Peter Wiles’ 24 points from Margaret Canovan’s ‘Populism’ 1981 p. 29038 Worsley, Peter. 1969. 'The Concept Of Populism'. In Populism. Its Meanings And National Characteristics, 1st ed., 245. Letchworth: The Garden City Press. p. 24539 Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser,. 2014. 'The Responses Of Populism To Dahl's Democratic Dilemmas'. Political Studies 62 (3): 469-487. p.470 40 Canovan, Margaret. 1999. 'Trust The People! Populism And The Two Faces Of Democracy'. Political Studies 47 (1): 2-16. P.41 Urbinati, Nadia. 1998. 'Democracy And Populism'. Constellations 5 (1): 110-124. p. 116

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body.42 Populism’s redemptive vision of the people as the legitimate and only

sovereign entity clashes with the very institutions needed for modern day

democracy to function.43

However, while many theorists brush aside the potential that populism

has in explaining the nature of democracy, a growing number of scholars believe

that depicting populism simply as ‘bad’ and democracy as ‘good’ is

counterproductive.44 A growing consensus on the utility of populism in

understanding democratic theory and exposing its flaws can be observed by

authors like Margaret Canovan, who writes: “populism accompanies democracy

like a shadow.45” In her piece Trust the People, the relationship between

populism and democracy is explored through an assessment of our current view

of democracy as redemptive and pragmatic. Canovan claims populism thrives on

the tension between these two faces of democracy and explores three cases in

which populism and populist movements arise when democracy fails. In the first

case she explores that when the gap between democracy and politics becomes

too large, populism manifests itself, filling the gap and promising “a better world

through action by the sovereign people.”46 A second case manifests itself when

the promise of ‘power to the people’ made by politicians, does not reflect the

‘actual performance’ of an elected democratic government. Lastly, populism

arises when the tension between democratic institutions and their alienation of

the common people becomes too evident. Populists exploit this gap by

empowering charismatic leaders who promise to break the routine of the

bureaucratic institutions and turn politics into a more ‘personal experience.’47

Benjamin Arditi compliments her argument by defining the relationship as a mix

between a “visitation and a haunting;” populism can be considered as a

dimension of representation and as a mode of participation in a democracy, but

can also represent a danger to established democratic government by inciting

42 Urbinati, Nadia. 1998. p. 11743 Stanley, Ben. 2008. p.10144 Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser,. 2014. p. 471-47245 Canovan, Margaret. 1999. p.1046 Canovan, Margaret. 1999. p.1147 Canovan, Margaret. 1999. p.14

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opposition.48 Others believe that the reason for populism’s prevalence in

democracy is the very nature of the latter: an open-ended process of perpetual

incompleteness, which allows for ways to improve itself to arise, populism

allegedly being one of them.49

1.6 Radical Right Populism

When talking about populism as a political movement it is important to

state that many parties nowadays use elements of populist rhetoric and doctrine

to appeal to voters.50 Despite the move towards a more ‘catch-all’ profile from

mainstream parties, not all parties should be considered populist. As a matter of

fact, most mainstream political parties in Europe are ideologically in line with

the pluralist worldview of liberal democracy and merely use elements of

populism as a more modern way to appeal to voters.51 It is also crucial to state

that populism should not be associated with either left wing or right wing

ideology.52 As a matter of fact with the recent rise of PRRPs throughout Europe,

the rise of Populist Radical Left Parties has also been observed in Southern

European countries.53 Leftist parties like Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain,

are paving the way for a new political family, which holds at its core the

elimination of the corrupt elite and the abolition of European austerity measures,

using strong elements of populism and Hard Euroscepticism.54 It would therefore

be wrong to assume due to this paper’s emphasis on the rise of the Populist

Radical Right, that populism aligns and identifies itself exclusively with right

48 Arditi, Benjamin. 2004. 'Populism As A Spectre Of Democracy: A Response To Canovan'. Political Studies 52 (1): 135-143. p. 14049 Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser,. 2014. p. 48050 Canovan, Margaret. 1999. p. 260-261 51 Mudde, Cas. 2004. p. 56052 Canovan, Margaret. 1981. p. 29453 Prentoulis, Marina, and Lasse Tomassen. 2015. ‘The winds are changing: A new left Populism for Europe’. Analyze Greece! News And Left Politics. http://www.analyzegreece.gr/news/item/95-the-winds-are-changing-a-new-left-populism-for-europe.54 Barriere, Manel, Andy Durgan, and Sam Robson. 2015. 'The Challenge Of Podemos'.International Socialism. http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=1028&issue=145.

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wing ideology and rhetoric.55 Neither should populism be associated solely with

Euroscepticism, as populist rhetoric and anti-EU rhetoric have not always gone

hand in hand.56

In Europe, the Populist Radical Right Parties constitutes a true political

family which over the last few decades, has become a seemingly permanent

feature of the European party system.57 While the advent of populist and Hard

Eurosceptic rhetoric and doctrine is a relatively new phenomenon in European

politics, Radical Right Parties are not new to the European political scenario. The

Poujadist movement in France during the 1950s, the German National

Democratic Party in the 1960s, and the significant rise of electoral support for

the Italian Social Movement, suggest that right wing radicalism existed in most, if

not all, post-war European industrial societies.58 However, since their first surge

in support in the 1980s and 1990s, these ‘new populist parties,’59 have opposed

the development of the heavily bureaucratised welfare state and the increasing

corruption and collusion of the established political elite.60 The Populist Radical

Right Parties’ ideas concentrate on reconstructing politics around issues of

taxation, immigration, nationalism and for some, regionalism.61

This new type of populism, similarly to populist movements that

preceded it, is chameleonic as it takes the aspects of the environment of which it

finds itself in.62 Paul Taggart in Populism explores how populist parties push

different ‘buttons’ in order to appeal to voters. In Northern Europe, Populist

55 Mudde, Cas. 2004. p. 56056 Missiroli, Antonio. 2011. The Rise Of Anti-EU Populism: Why, And What To Do About It. Brussels: European Policy Centre. Online Version.57 Bale, Tim, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, André Krouwel, Kurt Richard Luther, and Nick Sitter. 2009. 'If You Can't Beat Them, Join Them? Explaining Social Democratic Responses To The Challenge From The Populist Radical Right In Western Europe'. Political Studies 58 (3): 410-426. p. 412 58 Betz, Hans-Georg. 1994. Radical Right-Wing Populism In Western Europe. New York: St. Martins Press. p. 2259 Taggart, Paul A. 2000. p. 7360 Taggart, Paul A. 2000. p.74-7561 Ibid.62 Taggart, Paul A. 2000. p.76

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Radical Right Parties oppose high taxation and liberal immigration policies,

issues that stand at the core of domestic popular discontent. In Southern and

Eastern European countries where there are significant regional and ethnic

divisions, populists focus on ethnic diversity. In countries where immigration

policies are highly politicised and covered by the media, the new immigrant

communities are targeted by PRRP and become scapegoats for all the ills in the

country.63 Contemporary PRRP have often been described as opportunistic

political agents, whose political programmes reflect little more than the latest

trends in public opinion.64 Ernesto Laclau, a post-Marxist theorist, puts emphasis

on the fact that these populist parties are often the expression of a specific and

determinate social class, which itself characterises the movement.65

Most PRRP are defined radical due to their rejection of the already

established social, cultural and political system. 66 They hold a strong belief in the

free market, and a drastic reduction in the role of the state for an increased

democratic representation from the people.67 Populism as a movement has a

fundamental ambivalence to representative politics, due to their belief in the

corrupt and mis-representation that political institutions establish. It therefore

seeks to avoid habitual political involvement and it engages with politics only

when a crisis is perceived.68 Therefore, as a political movement populism can be

observed to express anti-political and anti-establishment rhetoric, along with

volatility in its core ideology for the newest and most popular issue that causes

discontent in the electorate. Populism’s rhetorical preoccupation with the

concept of ‘the people’ is a powerful political weapon and it ultimately has the

effect of structuring debate through politics of simplicity, popular sovereignty

and dichotomy.69

63 Taggart, Paul A. 2000. p.7764 Betz, Hans‐Georg, and Carol Johnson. 2004. 'Against The Current—Stemming The Tide: The Nostalgic Ideology Of The Contemporary Radical Populist Right'. Journal Of Political Ideologies 9 (3): 311-327. p. 31265 Laclau, Ernesto. 1977. Politics And Ideology In Marxist Theory. London: NLB. p. 14466 Betz, Hans-Georg. 1994. p.467 Ibid. 68 Taggart, Paul A. 2000. p.369 Taggart, Paul A. 2000. p.112

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1.7 Populism and its Relationship with Euroscepticism

While the term Euroscepticism is popular amongst scholars, the media,

and the general public, it remains ambiguous.70 Richard Katz blames the

unpopularity and failure of scholars to study Euroscepticism on the fact that

throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the predecessors of the European Union, the

European Economic Community and the later European Community, were

involved in a lower range of policy making and their budget was lower than 1%

of the member states aggregate GDP.71 The EEC and EC were also only studied by

Europhiles and the general consensus of the elite and the public was in favour of

further integration. Opponents and critics, or Eurosceptics, to the European

integration programs were often considered as being merely on the wrong side

of history.72

Hanspeter Kriesi suggests that the rise of populism in Europe is a

productive force that may serve as the catalyst for a much needed and profound

realignment of the Western European Party system bringing the current out-

dated system more in line with the transformed conflict structures of modern

Western European Politics.73 This argument is also supported by Jack Hayward,

who sees the rise of populism as a response to the perceived shortcomings of

European democratic elitism.74 In the case of the EU, he believes that the elites

are no longer acting in the public interest and that the continuous decline of

major parties’ ability to identify themselves with the people is an open invitation

for populist parties to counteract the democratic deficit in the EU. Hayward goes

on to conclude that despite the major parties’ disapproval of it and opposition to

coexist with it, populism represents a crucial aspect of modern day democracy in

70 De Vries, C. E., and E. E. Edwards. 2009. 'Taking Europe To Its Extremes: Extremist Parties And Public Euroscepticism'. Party Politics 15 (1): 5-28. p. 1071 Kalz, Richard. 2008. 'Euroscepticism in Parliament: A Comparative Analysis of the European and National Parliaments.’ In Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics Of Euroscepticism, 1st ed., 1-2. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p 15172 Kalz, Richard. 2008. p. 154-15673 Kriesi, Hanspeter. 2014. 'The Populist Challenge'. West European Politics 37 (2): 361-378. p. 36274 Hayward, Jack Ernest Shalom. 1996. Elitism, Populism, And European Politics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. p.10, 21.

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Europe. 75 It is therefore agreed that populism emerges out of the failure of

existing social and political institutions to confine and regulate political subjects

into a relatively stable social order.76 Populists see themselves as true democrats,

voicing the popular grievances and opinions that are systematically ignored by

governments, and their presence in politics is usually caused by distrust in the

political system and the political parties in power.77 The recent surges in the

manifestation of populism across Europe are closely linked to the rise in

Euroscepticism. This can be observed in the ‘Eurobarometer’ included in

Appendix 1.

75 Hayward, J. 1996. p. 2776 Panizza, Francesco. 2005. 'Introduction'. In Populism And The Mirror Of Democracy, 1st ed., London: Verso. p.977 Canovan, Margaret. 1999. p. 294

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Chapter 2 – Case Studies

2.1 Introduction

The following chapter explores three cases of Populist Radical Right

Parties: the Front National, the Lega Nord, and the United Kingdom Independence

Party. A framework of analysis was used in order to study the three parties and it

is divided in three sections that each explore: the history, ideology, and

leadership of the PRRP. The last subchapter explores the electoral success of

each party at the 2014 European Parliamentary Elections.

2.2 Front National

2.2.1 History

Front National’s (FN) electoral breakthrough in 1984 is often considered

to be the beginning of the rise of the previously marginalised Populist Radical

Right in Europe. Polling at 11% at the 1984 European Parliamentary Elections,78

FN’s win was the first of its kind to gain such support at the European level and it

is believed to have started a cross-national diffusion of a new master frame.79

Founded in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen as a fundamentally anti-communist

movement dedicated to the defence and protection of French national identity80,

the Front National ushered a new era in the history of the French Right and

attempted to unify many of the marginalised French Radical Right movements.81

Notions from the Nouvelle Droite were adopted by the party, including ‘ethno-

pluralism’ or the belief that mixing cultures leads to cultural extinction. Front

National adopted a populist anti-political establishment strategy previously used

by the 1950s Poujadist movement, and tried to appear anti-democratic by

78 Swyngedouw, Marc, and Gilles Ivaldi. 2001. 'The Extreme Right Utopia In Belgium And France: The Ideology Of The Flemish Vlaams Blok And The French Front National'. West European Politics 24 (3): 1-22. p. 279 Rydgren, Jens. 2005. 'Is Extreme Right-Wing Populism Contagious? Explaining The Emergence Of A New Party Family'. Eur J Political Res 44 (3): 413-437. p.41680 Hainsworth, Paul. 2004. 'The Extreme Right In France: The Rise And Rise Of Jean‐Marie Le Pen's Front National'. Representation 40 (2): 101-114. p.10581 Shields, James. 2007. The Extreme Right In France. London: Routledge. p.6

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constructing the image of being the exact opposite to the corrupt political class

and the elite.82

The party leaders realised the potential value of anti-immigration rhetoric

among the working class and utilised it to gain popularity amongst the

unemployed.83 FN portrayed itself as the sole defender of French national

identity and called for the ‘defence of the West’ through the creation of anti-

immigration legislations and stricter laws on non-French citizens. They

explicitly blamed the principal cause of unemployment on the “massive presence

of foreign workers on French soil”84 and by the mid 1980s, anti-immigration

rhetoric constituted the centrepiece of the party’s doctrine. In its programme, a

15-page chapter was dedicated to holding immigrants responsible for most ills of

contemporary France, from crime and unemployment, to the economic

recession, to the declining state of the French educational system..85 By 1997 the

party had established itself as an integral part of the French party system and

was gaining up to 15% at the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections.86 The

strong belief against European integration amongst the party became

increasingly popular through the years and by 2002, it was a main focus of the

party’s ideology.87 The Hard Eurosceptic rhetoric that Front National has

adopted in recent years, is believed to have been caused by the increasing

economic, social and political integration of the European project and the party’s

backlash is often blamed on its desire to protect French national sovereignty,

identity and power from outside influence.88

82 Rydgren, Jens. 2005. p. 42883 Shields, James. 2007. p. 18584 Shields, James. 2007. p. 18685 Shields, James. 2007. p. 21286 Taggart, Paul A. 2000. p. 7887 Hainsworth, Paul. 2004. p. 10688 Williams, C., and J.-J. Spoon. 2015. 'Differentiated Party Response: The Effect Of Euroskeptic Public Opinion On Party Positions'. European Union Politics. p. 8

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2.2.2 Ideology

In 1972, when Jean-Marie Le Pen created the Front National, he was

effectively restoring the legacy of the Populist Poujadist movement and

combining it with a militantly nationalistic anti-immigrant message, that found

real electoral resonance in France.89 Looking at Front National’s manifesto today,

one can observe that its aspirations and promises can be traced back to its roots,

but the core pledges that formed its agenda in the 1980s and 1990s have

completely disappeared. FN no longer desires to repatriate millions of legally

resident and unemployed immigrants also due to the complete implausibility of

this promise.90 Its 106 page long programme concerns itself with five main areas:

the State Authority, the Future of the Nation, Foreign Politics, Social and

Economic Recovery, and the ‘Refondation Républicain’ or the Rebuilding of the

Republic.91 Being a Hard Eurosceptic party and having campaigned multiple

times on anti-EU rhetoric, FN’s programme strongly highlights the disadvantages

and shortcomings that France has had to endure due to its membership of the

European Union. In regards to the European Monetary Union, Front National

believes France should be the one in charge of its currency and, after a

referendum, it promises the reintroduction of the French Franc, to be used

alongside with the Euro until the stability of the French economy can be

guaranteed.92 The renegotiation of all economic agreements between the EU and

Maghreb nations is also in the FN’s plan, only to be negotiated if North African

migration into France is curbed.93

In Marine Le Pen’s Presidential Programme of 2012, Front National

promised to gradually decrease its input in the European budget, until finally

ending all participation ensuring France gains of up to €11.7 billion over five

89 Taggart, Paul A. 2000. p.7790 Shields, J. 2012. 'Marine Le Pen And The 'New' FN: A Change Of Style Or Of Substance?'. Parliamentary Affairs 66 (1): 179-196. p.18191 Front National,. 2015. (1) 'Le Projet Du Front National'. http://www.frontnational.com/le-projet-de-marine-le-pen/.92 Front National,. 2012. Mon Projet Pour La France et Les Français. Marine Le Pen: La Voix Du Peuple, L'esprit De La France. Paris: RCS. p. 2,1593 Front National,. 2015. (1) p. 5

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years.94 FN blames the EU of forcing a ‘globalised liberalism’ by eliminating the

natural ‘economic patriotism’ of the French economy. 95 This ‘mandate’ on the

French economy that the European Union imposes, allegedly harms all French

citizens and diminishes French economic power.96

In regards to immigration, FN promises to decrease the number of

immigrants entering French national soil, from 200,000 per year to 10,000,

blaming immigration for lowering French salaries and creating a €40.8 billion

deficit in French family’s incomes.97 The complete scrapping of the Schengen

Agreement is also in the party’s plans.98 As the party continues to promise the

protection of French national identity, it guarantees: ‘Un état fort et libre’99

appealing to the very values of freedom, liberty and republicanism that the

French state is founded upon.100 The manifesto goes on to declare that the French

courts will reclaim their superiority over the European ones and will retain the

power to overrule European treaties and legislations.101

2.2.3 Leader

Founder Jean Marie Le Pen‘s personality and leadership style were the

key to the success of the party throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Le Pen led the

party with authority, concentrating most of the power on himself. 102As

previously explored, theorists often place the success of Populist parties on their

leaders. Today the Front National is lead by Jean Marie Le Pen’s daughter Marine

whose ascent to power began around 2002.103 Marine Le Pen took over

leadership in 2011 and is believed to have brought a complete realignment in the

94 Front National,. 2015. (2) Notre Projet - Programme Politique Du Front National. Front National. p. 8595 Front National,. 2015. (2) p. 596 Front National,. 2015. (2) p. 3797 Front National,. 2015. (2) p. 8598 Front National,. 2015. (2) p. 1199 un etat fort et libre = a state strong and free100 Front National,. 2015. (2) p. 6101 Front National,. 2015. (2) p. 5102 Taggart, Paul A. 2000. p.78103 Shields, J. 2012 p. 191

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party’s policies especially regarding the role of women in society, as the party

previously felt ‘suspicious’ of feminism, and conjured the female role-model

image of the housewife and ‘mother of the nation.’104 She also steered views on

issues concerning abortion, gender parity in electoral candidacies and the pacte

civil de solidarité (PACS) recognising same-sex civil partnerships.105 The

dediabolisation106 of the Front National has given the party a new, less radical

image. She promoted respectable young technocrats to management positions

and barred Nazi sympathisers from rallies and old ‘party-die-hards,’ but most

importantly tamed the Front National’s rhetoric. In 2011, she publicly

condemned the Holocaust, an event that her father had always referred to as “a

mere detail in the history of World War II.107” Often referred to as la fille du

diable,108 she appears to be down to earth and in touch with her electorate, traits

that have allowed one in five women to vote for her in 2012.109 In more recent

times, a feud between the founder Jean-Marie and his daughter have sparked

controversy, as rumors that a party split is in the making.110

104 Hainsworth, Paul. 2004. p.102105 Shields, J. 2012 p. 191106 dediabolisation = de-demonisation 107 Alduy, Cecile. 2013. 'The Devil's Daughter'. The Atlantic. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/10/the-devils-daughter/309467/.108 Fille du diable = daughter of the devil, the devil being her father Jean Marie.109 Alduy, Cecile. 2013.110 Chrisafis, Angelique. 2015. 'Le Pen Family Feud Is A Battle For The Soul Of The Front National – And France'. The Guradian Online. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/10/le-pen-feud-family-drama-in-battle-for-the-soul-of-front-national-and-france.

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2.3 Lega Nord

2.3.1 History

Lega Nord (LN) represents a different kind of Populist Radical Right Party

to the Front National. As previously explored, Populist parties are known for

using specific ‘buttons’ to appeal to voters, and the chameleonic nature of

populism allows it to adapt to most political, social, and economic situations. One

of the most successful, colourful and controversial Italian Populist Radical Right

Parties to appear on the European stage in recent years is the Lega Nord.

Until 1989, the Italian party system was fundamentally shaped by the

Cold War.111 The governing parties, the Democrazia Cristiana (DC)112 and the

Partito Communista Italiano (PCI)113 averaged 64.3% of the vote between 1946

and 1992 and represented the expression of the profound ideological division

running through Italian society.114 In the period subsequent to 1976, the Italian

electorate started to become more volatile and fragmented, as voters began to

protest by abstaining or casting blank or spoiled ballot papers.115 In December

1989 Umberto Bossi, also known as il Senatúr,116 created the Lega Nord, a party

that allied different regional Northern Italian leagues and movements. Similarly

to Le Pen’s Front National, the Lega Nord, from the start flatly denied that a

multicultural society was possible or desirable. They argued that immigrants

who did enter the workforce had to “earn their place in Italian Society and not

expect hand-outs and easy access to social services.117” The Lega was born as an

111 Newell, James. 2000. Parties And Democracy In Italy. Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate. p. 15112 Democrazia Cristiana = Christian Democracy, the main centre party that included both right and left-leaning factions. Dissolved in 1994.113 Partito Communista Italiano = Italian Communist Party, the main left party in Italy. Dissolved in 1991.114 Newell, James. 2000. p. 15115 Newell, James. 2000. p. 20 116 Il Senatúr = nickname given to Umberto Bossi, founding leader of the Lega Nord, which is a dialect rendition of the Italian word for senator. The nickname was given to the leader after he became a member of the italian Senate at the 1987 General Elections. 117 Cento Bull, Anna, and Mark Gilbert. 2001. The Lega Nord And The Northern Question In Italian Politics. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave. p. 20-21

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expression of the discontent of Northern Italy, a region also known as Padania,

with the centralised political decisions that Rome was imposing on the rest Italy,

and demanded the creation of a federal state as well as the secession from the

Southern Italian regions. Since its creation the Lega Nord’s populist rhetoric

concentrated upon the demonization of four main issues in Italian society.

Firstly, they believed the corruption and misgovernment of the political elite was

endangering small businesses and manufacturing industries in Padania, and

therefore advocated for the overthrowing of the current political system.

Secondly, they believed the South of Italy was living off the charity of the North

as allegedly taxes collected in the North ended up in the hands of the Italian

Mafia and criminal gangs. Thirdly, since most mainstream political parties were

involved in corruption or connected to organised crime, a complete tabula rasa

would be needed to revolutionise and sweep away the current political class.

Lastly, the Lega Nord strongly opposed the increasing influx of immigration from

Maghreb countries and Albania.118

The discontent of the Italian electorate with the political system was

mostly due to the fact that Italian public finances worsened dramatically from

the 1980s onwards. By 1989, Italy’s public spending had reached 54% of the

total wealth produced annually.119 Despite the exorbitant public spending, the

nation continued to struggle to function as Italy had poor levels of provision in

about every public sector. The Lega Nord therefore promised a complete and

economic and financial reorganisation of the state. LN’s federalist and regionalist

aspirations were expressed in its belief that Northern regional autonomy was the

only way for the North to prosper again. They also developed the ability to

convince Northern Italian voters that the centralization of political authority and

economic resources in Rome, had disregarded and harmed the development and

preservation of Northern Italy’s interests and identity.120In reality, the idea that

the North alone produces wealth and the South alone spends it, is a distortion of

the truth.121 In contrast to the Italian State which had always favoured the

118 Cento Bull, Anna, and Mark Gilbert. 2001. p. 14119 Cento Bull, Anna, and Mark Gilbert. 2001. p. 15120 Betz, Hans-Georg. 1994. p. 115-116121 Cento Bull, Anna, and Mark Gilbert. 2001. p. 17

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development of major businesses and international companies, Lega Nord like

most Populist Radical Right Parties, promoted itself as being the champion of

small and medium-sized companies, artisans, professionals and individual

entrepreneurs as it acknowledged them as the backbone of the Italian

economy.122 Support for the Lega Nord continuously grew over the 1980s and by

1992 won 9.7% of the vote at the National Elections.123

Having been the principle spearhead for the popular protest involved in

the collapse of the First Republic124, in 1994 Umberto Bossi’s Lega, became a

huge contributor to the ‘Berlusconization’ of Italy.125 The demise of the

Democrazia Cristiana after tangentopoli, revolutionised the political scene in Italy

which allowed the creation of Silvio Berlusconi’s Populist Forza Italia and the

start of the Second Italian Republic.126 In 1994 Bossi, agreed to make an alliance

with Berlusconi that lasted until the party’s loss in popularity after an expenses

scandal in 2012.127

2.3.2 Ideology

Lega Nord today, is a different party to the one Umberto Bossi laid the

bases for. Since the appointment of its new leader, Matteo Salvini, the Lega Nord

has become a hard Eurosceptic party. Most of the rhetoric in its new campaigns

revolves around their slogan: ‘Basta Euro.’128 Salvini defined the Euro as a “crime

against humanity”129 and blames the current economic crisis that has hit the

European markets, on the shared currency.130 In the publication Stop the Euro. 31

122 Betz, Hans-Georg. 1994. p. 115-116123 Taggart, Paul A. 2000. p.81124 Bull, Martin J, and James N Newell. 2005. Italian Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press. p. 57125 Cento Bull, Anna, and Mark Gilbert. 2001. p. 31126 Cento Bull, Anna, and Mark Gilbert. 2001. p. 31127 Cento Bull, Anna, and Mark Gilbert. 2001. p. 32128 Basta Euro = Stop the Euro129 ANSA,. 2013. 'Lega, Salvini Contro Euro: 'Crimine Contro L'umanità''. http://www.ansa.it/web/notizie/rubriche/politica/2013/12/15/Lega-Salvini-contro-euro-Crimine-contro-umanita-_9781968.html.130 Lega Nord, 2014. Basta Euro. Come Uscire Dall'incubo. Un'altra Europa È Possibile. Milano: Boniardi Grafiche. p. 2

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Questions and 31 Answers They’re not Telling You the Truth about, a 36 page

manifesto explaining Lega Nord’s plans for the future and its role in the

European Union, the party states that it does not desire to leave the EU, but

merely reshape it by abolishing ‘the EU of the Euro.’ The party believes an exit

from the European Union, that would come after a failure to reform, would

ultimately allow Italy to once again make its own decisions regarding

immigration and its economy, stressing a particular attention to small and

medium sized businesses.131 The manifesto concerns itself with most social,

political, and economic issues that might arise with Italy’s exit from the

European Monetary Union, and reassures Italians that with the abolition of the

Euro, the Italian economy would once again flourish.132 In point 17 of the

manifesto, the party very simplistically highlights why the Euro damages Italy

more than other countries, and in particular why it damages the North of Italy

the most. The shift from rhetoric about independence and federalism to a more

anti-Euro and anti-immigration one, has managed to restore the support the

Lega used to have prior to its decline in the late 2000s.

The ideology and rhetoric that stood at the foundations of the party, is

still present in todays manifestos. Lega Nord makes many promises for the North

in its manifesto: 12 Progetti Concreti per far ripartire il Nord133 including the

creation of a ‘North Euroregion,’ a constitutionally autonomous region, that

makes its own political decisions and works to jumpstart the efficiency and

development of its economy. Other promises include “Burocrazia Zero134” a

project which aims to eliminate bureaucracy in politics, “Politica Costo Zero135” a

project which sees the halving of Italian parliamentarians, the reduction of

Regional councillors, the realisation of a ‘zero cost’ Federal State and the

abolition of all public financing to parties.136

131 Lega Nord, 2014. Basta Euro p. 11-14132 Lega Nord, 2014. Basta Euro. p. 15133 12 Progetti Concreti per far ripartire il Nord = 12 Concrete projects for the North to restart134 Burocrazia Zero = Zero Bureaucracy 135 Politica Costo Zero = Zero Cost Politics136 Lega Nord,. 2012. I 12 Progetti Concreti Per Far Ripartire Il Nord. Online.

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2.3.3 Leader

Once again, the importance of the strong leader can be observed as crucial

in successful Populist Radical Right Parties. Umberto Bossi, the first and most

successful Lega Nord Federal Secretary, possessed the great advantage of being

an agitator and a propagandist in the late 1980s and it was his very aggressive

conduct that led the party to successes in Northern Italy.137 Known for his

unpleasantness, he was the loudest voice in critiquing the nature of the Italian

state.138 Bossi was viewed as a man of unique and extraordinary powers and his

followers were emotionally attached to him.139 While his leadership skills are

undoubtedly what brought the Lega to the electoral successes and his alliance

with Silvio Berlusconi allowed the Lega Nord to be an influential voice in

parliament, its current leader Matteo Salvini completely revolutionised the

rhetoric of the Lega. He campaigned for the 2014 European Parliamentary

Elections in his ‘Basta Euro Tour,’ where he visited Italian cities on a camper-van

rallying and campaigning around Italian squares. Salvini, in order to gain support

in Southern Italian regions, apologised for the Lega’s history and its

demonization of the South.140

2.4 United Kingdom Independence Party

2.4.1 History

In 1991 Doctor Alan Sked created a small pressure group called the Anti-

Federalist League. The League’s only policy and goal was to assemble opposition

to the Maastricht Treaty within British mainstream political parties and

137 Leganord.org,. 2015. 'Lega Nord'. http://www.leganord.org/index.php/il-movimento/organi-federali/15-il-movimento/consiglio-federale/20-membri-del-consiglio-federale.138 Cento Bull, Anna, and Mark Gilbert. 2001. p. 15-16139 McDonnell, Duncan. 2015. 'Populist Leaders And Coterie Charisma'. Political Studies, 1-15 p. 6140 Corriere Della Sera,. 2015. 'Salvini (Contestato) A Palermo Chiede Scusa Ai Siciliani Ed Elogia I Cannoli'. http://www.corriere.it/politica/15_febbraio_08/salvini-contestato-palermo-chiede-scusa-siciliani-ed-elogia-cannoli-af04a4d2-afa3-11e4-bc0d-ad35c6a1f8f9.shtml.

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therefore to stop the UK from becoming “a province of a United European Super-

state.”141 The League’s initial failures to attract attention from the general public

and the movement's internal disagreements and tension were tested when 17 of

their candidates ran at the 1992 General Elections. Claiming to make such an

impact that Conservatives would be forced to adopt their harder brand of

Euroscepticism, the movement failed to gain momentum and lost its only target

seat. It is due to these initial failures that Sked decided to transform his

movement into a ‘full on’ Populist political party142 and on September 3rd 1993,

the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) was born.143

The party was criticised since its creation for having fascist, racist, and

anti-Semitic associations, and it was often, at times unfairly, associated by other

parties, the media, and the general public with the British National Party.144

UKIP’s initial rise was also hindered when in November 1994, Sir James

Goldsmith announced the creation of the Referendum Party, a political party with

no intention other than to secure a national referendum about the UK’s

membership in the EU.145 At the 1997 General Elections, voters were presented

with two single-issue parties that both advocated the same Eurosceptic beliefs,

and due to Goldsmith’s aggressive media campaign and substantially larger

funds, UKIP was bulldozed aside.146

As the party struggled to stay united, it continued to perform poorly at

European Parliamentary Elections and even worse at the General Elections.

UKIP’s rise to the mainstream political scenario was slow and challenging and it

was not until the 2004 European Elections that the United Kingdom

Independence Party delivered successful results. Believed to be only thanks to

141 Ford, Robert Anthony, and Matthew Goodwin. 2014. Revolt On The Right. Abingdon: Routeledge. p. 21142 Tournier-Sol, Karine. 2014. 'Reworking The Eurosceptic And Conservative Traditions Into A Populist Narrative: UKIP's Winning Formula?'. J Common Mark Stud 53 (1): 140-156. p. 149143 Ford, Robert Anthony, and Matthew Goodwin. 2014. p. 24144 Ford, Robert Anthony, and Matthew Goodwin. 2014. p. 23145 Ford, Robert Anthony, and Matthew Goodwin. 2014. p. 27146 Ford, Robert Anthony, and Matthew Goodwin. 2014. p. 30-31

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the leadership of Jeffrey Titford and then Roger Knapman, the newfound party

stability and broadening of its policy base allowed UKIP to win 2.6 million

votes.147 The party gained 16% of the National Vote marking a high point in the

party’s existence, surpassing the Liberal Democrats, ending up in third place with

only seven points behind the Labour Party.148

2.4.2 Ideology

Despite the fact that UKIP has very much maintained its roots in today’s

political aims, the party has come a long way. Criticised over time for being a

single-issue party and sympathising with the extreme right,149 UKIP has always

been a Hard Eurosceptic party.150 However, today the party has evolved from a

handful of fanatics wanting to convert Conservatives to their radical views about

Europe, to a professional Populist political party with a clear strategy for

attracting voters and a clear sense of its electoral potential. Today, UKIP tailors

to “Eurosceptic, anti-immigrant appeal for dis-advantaged, working class voters

who feel under threat from the changes that surround them, and alienated from

a seemingly unresponsive and disengaged political class.”151 The evolution of the

party’s policies has extensively broadened including the famous opposition

against a UK military intervention in Syria in 2013.152

In its 2014 Manifesto, UKIP incited the voters to “create an earthquake.”153

In this very informally written manifesto UKIP presents itself as being ‘a real

alternative.’ Divided in two sections, “Regaining Control” and “Repairing the UK,”

the United Kingdom Independence Party’s manifesto blames most of modern

Britain’s ills on its European Union membership.154 In “Regaining Control,” the

147 Usherwood, Simon. 2008. 'The Dilemmas Of A Single‐Issue Party – The UK Independence Party'. Representation 44 (3): 255-264. p. 256-257148 Ford, Robert Anthony, and Matthew Goodwin. 2014. p. 48149 Usherwood, Simon. 2008. p. 260 150 Tournier-Sol, Karine. 2014. p. 141151 Ford, Robert Anthony, and Matthew Goodwin. 2014. P. 97152 Ford, Robert Anthony, and Matthew Goodwin. 2014. p. 96153 United Kingdom Independence Party,. 2014. UKIP Manifesto 2014. Heathfield: UKIP. p.4154 United Kingdom Independence Party,. 2014. p.4

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manifesto states that the EU no longer represents “the trading bloc the United

Kingdom signed up for” but it now constitutes “a bureaucratic organisation

writing UK’s laws and costing the UK £55 million per day.” The manifesto states,

“The only way to regain control is to leave the European Union.” Therefore, the

platform used for the 2014 European Parliamentary election campaign was Hard

Euroscepticism. It accused the EU of controlling Britain’s borders and claimed:

“anyone in the EU can come to the UK and live, claim welfare and government

services they have not contributed to.” UKIP even went as far as accusing other

parties of being committed to expanding the EU to include Turkey, Albania,

Moldova and “many more”.155 UKIP believes mass immigration is putting a strain

on schooling, the UK’s National Health Services (NHS) and on ‘green spaces,’

which are threatened by the over-development of immigrant housing.156In

“Repairing the UK,” UKIP ultimately vowed to: cut and control immigration,

reduce fuel poverty, reclaim UK waters, save taxpayers money, provide “local

homes for local families,” insure the NHS remains accessible for Britons first,

ensure global and Commonwealth trade upon exit from the EU, and cheaper

petrol and diesel. UKIP also promised lighter regulation on small and medium

sized businesses, and swore, “only outside the EU can the UK have more job

creation and regulation flexibility.157” This new manifesto replaced the previous

468 pages of “drivel nonsense” as described by its current leader Nigel Farage,

which was allegedly not read by him or by any other party leader. 158 It is

however widely believed that despite 13 years of existence, the party still does

not have a clear direction and purpose other than the British exit from the

European Union.159

155 Ibid.156 United Kingdom Independence Party,. 2014. p.7157 Ibid.158 Wintour, Patrick. 2014. 'Ukip's Manifesto: Immigration, Europe – And That's It'. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/may/20/ukip-manifesto-europe-immigration.159 Usherwood, Simon. 2008. 'The Dilemmas Of A Single‐Issue Party – The UK Independence Party'. Representation 44 (3): 255-264. p. 264

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2.4.3 Leader

Strongly influenced by Margaret Thatcher’s 1988 Bruges Speech, Alan

Sked’s Eurosceptic tendencies and ideas for UKIP began in the 1980s.160

However, as the party grew, resentment between members of the party and its

leaders haunted UKIP and became a cycle characteristic of the party. In 1999

accused of leading in a dictatorial style, criticised for failing to strike a deal with

the Referendum Party, and blamed for letting the extreme right infiltrate the

party, Alan Sked, founder of UKIP, left the leadership and was replaced with

Michael Holmes.161A series of leadership crises similar to the 1999 one followed.

UKIP struggled to keep united and it was not until 2006 that its current leader

Nigel Farage took control.162 As soon as he came to power he focused on

broadening UKIP’s domestic appeal, and now defines UKIP’s stance as radical

rather than left or right wing. Nigel Farage portrays himself to the public and the

media as a charismatic, funny, determinedly good-natured and essentially

cheerful leader.163 He speaks with immense energy and animation, and it is

believed that the attraction to Farage and his party, especially from working-

class voters that make up most of UKIP’s electorate, is that he is “unashamedly

himself.”164 Farage knows how to articulate his doctrine in simple, direct,

accessible language, a technique that Mudde refers to as the “politics of the

pub.”165 He is also known for mocking his opponents, and portraying them as the

“insular career politicians” claiming “they’ve never had a job in their life”166 even

160 Ford, Robert Anthony, and Matthew Goodwin. 2014. p. 21161 Ford, Robert Anthony, and Matthew Goodwin. 2014. p. 33162 Ford, Robert Anthony, and Matthew Goodwin. 2014. p. 71163 Aitkenhead, Decca. 2013. 'Nigel Farage: 'I'd Rather Have A Party Of Eccentrics Than Bland, Ghastly People''. The Guardian Online. http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jan/07/nigel-farage-party-eccentrics-ukip.164 Cowley, Jason. 2014. 'Nigel Farage: “I’M Not On The Right Or Left. I’M A Radical”'. Newstatesman. http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2014/11/nigel-farage-i-m-not-right-or-left-i-m-radical.165 Mudde, Cas. 2004. p. 542166 Closing statement from the 2015 General Election debate. Phipps, Claire. 2015. 'Leaders' Debate: All You Need To Know About The Seven-Way Clash'. The Guardian Online. http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/apr/03/leaders-debate-all-you-need-to-know-about-the-seven-way-clash.

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though he himself is a privately educated former financier whose party is

bankrolled by hedge-fund millionaires.167

2.5 The May 2014 European Elections

The May 2014 European Parliamentary Elections were characterised by

the success of PRRP.168 The Front National confirmed the expectations and

became the largest party in France gaining 24.86%169 of the vote crushing the

mainstream centre-right UMP and the centre-left PS.170 Front National’s victory

was so extensive that the party not only quadrupled their vote share in

comparison with the 2009 European Parliamentary Elections, but they also

gained 15 percentage points compared with the 2012 Presidential Elections. The

Lega Nord’s results were among the most outstanding in Italy. 171 Despite

winning a mere 6.15%172 and losing four points and two seats compared to the

2009 European Parliamentary Elections,173 Salvini’s Lega gained 300,000 votes

(+21%) compared to the 2013 Italian General Elections, gaining 2.1 percentage

points in the overall vote. A very unusual result was Lega Nord’s 109.1%

increase in votes in Central Italian Regions gaining 3.6% of the vote and its

306.3% increase in Southern Italian Regions gaining 1% of the vote. These

regions had previously been demonised by the Northern inclined rhetoric of the

167 Cowley, Jason. 2014. 168 Halikiopoulou, Daphne, and Sofia Vasilopoulou. 2014. 'Support For The Far Right In The 2014 European Parliament Elections: A Comparative Perspective'. The Political Quarterly 85 (3): 285-288. p.285169 Results of the 2014 European elections - Results by country - France - European Parliament,. 2015. 'Results Of The 2014 European Elections - Results By Country - France - European Parliament'. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-fr-2014.html.170 Russo, Luana. 2014. 'France: The Historic Victory Of The Front National'. In The European Parliament Elections Of 2014, 1st ed., Roma: Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali, p. 182-183171 Maggini, Nicola. 2014. ‘I risultati elettorali: il Pd dalla vocazione all’affermazione maggioritaria.’ In Le Elezioni Europee 2014, 1st ed., Rome: CISE. (Italian Version) p. 308.172 Results of the 2014 European elections - Results by country - Italy - European Parliament,. 2015. 'Results Of The 2014 European Elections - Results By Country - Italy - European Parliament'. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-it-2014.html.173 Maggini, Nicola. 2014. p. 308.

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Lega Nord.174 UKIP came first in the United Kingdom, winning 4.3 million votes

totaling 26.77%175 of the vote. Farage’s UKIP triumphed in their largest and most

successful victory, in the first nationwide election win from a new party in the

United Kingdom since 1929 Labour party win.176

174 Maggini, Nicola. 2014. p. 121175 Results of the 2014 European elections - Results by country - United Kingdom - European Parliament,. 2015. 'Results Of The 2014 European Elections - Results By Country - United Kingdom - European Parliament'. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-uk-2014.html.176 Ford, Robert, and Matthew Goodwin. 2014. 'Understanding UKIP: Identity, Social Change And The Left Behind'. The Political Quarterly 85 (3): 277-284. p. 277

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Chapter 3 – Analysis

3.1 Introduction

In assessing whether PRRP pose a threat to European stability, the

following chapter explores their impact on European and National Politics.

3.2 Effects of PRRP on European Parliament

The rise of populism across Europe has brought extremism of various

kinds into the European Parliament. The increase in support for these parties

could change the balance of power between the institutions, and be detrimental

to EU policies, legislation and funding especially in all fields that concern

themselves with the nurture of an open society, the promotion of human rights,

and the overall ideals the European Union was founded on.177 It is however

important to highlight a few misconceptions regarding the result of the 2014

European Parliamentary Elections. The result for the Radical Right was not

linear and support for the party family declined in many European member

states.178 While very successful in France and the United Kingdom where UKIP

and the FN came first, PRRP lost support in Belgium, Bulgaria, the Netherlands,

Romania and Italy, where the Lega Nord lost two of its six 2009 MEPs.179 (See

Appendix 2)

Despite their relatively good performances in the elections, Eurosceptic

PRRP have not had a significant effect on the functioning of the European

Parliament for a number of reasons in the past.180 Firstly, Eurosceptic Radical

177 Grabbe, Heather. 2014. 'Populism In The EU: New Threats To The Open Society?'. Challenge Europe 22 (September 2014): 80-83. p. 80178 Halikiopoulou, Daphne, and Sofia Vasilopoulou. 2014. 'Support For The Far Right In The 2014 European Parliament Elections: A Comparative Perspective'. The Political Quarterly 85 (3): 285-288. p. 286179 Halikiopoulou, Daphne, and Sofia Vasilopoulou. 2014. p. 287180 Benedetto, Giacomo. “Explaining the Failure of Euroscepticism in the EP” in Szczerbiak, Aleks, and Paul A Taggart. 2008. Opposing Europe? Volume II Comparative And Theoretical Prosepectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.131

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Right parties have always constituted a small minority in the European

Parliament.181 Mainstream European political groupings like the centre-right EEP

and the centre-left S&D, continue to have the majority with 221 and 191 MEPs

respectively.182 Secondly, Euroscepticism fails to unify radical right parties due to

their heterogeneous beliefs, therefore making their voices weaker at the

European level. There exist many differences within the Populist Radical Right

Party family, which often make them incompatible with one another. In Western

Europe, for example, parties like the Lega Nord, UKIP, and the Front National,

concentrate on issues of opposition to immigration and promotion of nativism.

In post-communist European nations however, PRRP rhetoric and doctrine is

targeted at ethnic minorities like the prevalent Roma population, making PRRP

cooperation often very challenging.183 While the Lega Nord and the Front

National swiftly started cooperation talks together with other Western PRRP to

attempt to form a political grouping prior to the 2014 Elections,184 UKIP refused

to join.185 The group failed to become a reality and the FN and the LN are

currently in the ‘Non-Inscrit’ or ‘Not Attached’ group, and do not associate

themselves with any political grouping, while UKIP is part of the Europe for

Freedom and direct Democracy, a Hard Eurosceptic grouping that previously

included the Lega Nord.186 While the grand coalition, or the ‘nascent Euro-

parties,’ continues to form majority and to have a strong influence on the

Parliamentary agenda, due to the success of Hard Eurosceptic Populist Right

181 Ibid.182 Europarl.europa.eu,. 2015. 'Previous Elections'. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/20150201PVL00021/Previous-elections.183 van Kessel, Stijn, and Andrea L. P. Pirro. 2014. 'Discontent On The Move: Prospects For Populist Radical Right Parties In The 2014 European Parliament Elections'. Intereconomics 49 (1): 14-18. p. 16184 van Kessel, Stijn, and Andrea L. P. Pirro. 2014. p. 17185 Maggini, Nicola. 2014. p 311186 Results of the 2014 European elections - Results by country - United Kingdom - European Parliament,. 2015. 'Results Of The 2014 European Elections - Results By Country - United Kingdom - European Parliament'. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-uk-2014.html.

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parties, they will need to put aside their ideological differences in order to

maintain the governability of the European Parliament.187

3.3 Effects of PRRP on National Politics

Populist Radical Right Parties also influence national politics in a number

of ways. The 2014 European Elections were characterised by what many believe

to be a shift from second-order election to first-order election.188 For the first

time in the European Election’s history, mainstream parties responded to public

attitude towards the elections, which suggests that a future shift and stronger

focus on campaigning from these parties can be expected at the 2019 EP

Elections.189 While previous research identified European Elections as second-

order, meaning that voters paid little to no attention to the elections, a shift can

be observed in the 2014 EP Election.190

It is also widely agreed that at the 2014 European Parliamentary

Elections, PRRP succeeded in redefining the debate on European integration and

immigration. Front National for example ran its fervently anti-European election

campaign almost unopposed, as both the right wing Union pour un Mouvement

Populaire and President Hollande’s Parti Socialiste, received less votes than

Marine Le Pen’s FN. The party dictated the terms of the electoral campaign with

its strong and clear anti-EU, anti-Euro, anti-Schengen and ‘more to France’

rhetoric. The influence of the FN in the elections was so extensive, that the UMP

itself made similar promises such as the abolition of the Schengen Treaty and

transferring half of the European competences back to the member states.191 The

Conservative Party leader and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom David

Cameron followed this example, and during the campaign stated that: “Brussels

has got too big, too bossy, too interfering,” promising significant reforms at the

187 Grabbe, Heather. 2014. p. 83188 Kroh, Chris. 2014. 'Stability Amid Change: Impact Of The 2014 European Parliament Elections At The European Level'. Electoral Studies 36: 204-209. p. 205189 Williams, C., and J.-J. Spoon. 2015. 'Differentiated Party Response: The Effect Of Euroskeptic Public Opinion On Party Position'. European Union Politics. p. 13190 Williams, C., and J.-J. Spoon. 2015. p. 2191 Russo, Luana. 2014. p. 182

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EU level and tougher immigration policies at the domestic level.192 Their success

triggered a response from mainstream parties who echoed the far right in their

adoption of stricter immigration policies, devolution of the European Union, and

calls for more power to the state.

PRRP are also believed to upset the left-right balance of national politics.

With the use of populism, Radical Right Parties appeal to blue-collar workers, an

electorate normally attracted to the European lefts. Their right wing ideals and

increase in popularity also shift the political discourse to issues not normally at

heart with the social democratic left, and they often facilitate the formation of

anti-left wing national governments by allying themselves with right wing

parties.193 Suggestions on ways for mainstream parties to reverse the rise of

PRRP include: de-legitimization due to their incompatibility with democratic

values, isolation by excluding them from electoral or executive alliances, or

simply embracing the rise in the hope that populism in power will demonstrate

its professional inability and the impossibility to fulfil the expectations of its

voters as a governing party. 194

However, like other parties, the Populist Radical Right proposes a

response to a number of essential political questions. Reduced to its core, the rise

of PRRP ideology could be explained as the response to the erosion of the system

of ‘ethno-national dominance’ that characterised the European states. 195 This is

why in more recent years parties like the Front National, the Lega Nord and the

United Kingdom Independence Party have been increasingly popular with social

groups that felt neglected by political parties that once defended their interests

and feel threatened by their loss of relative privilege. 196 It is this very rise of

Populism that shows the difficulties that modern European politics face. Citizens

are increasingly becoming alienated and increasingly feel negative attitudes

192 Halikiopoulou, Daphne, and Sofia Vasilopoulou. 2014. p.285193 Bale, Tim, et al. 2009. p. 422-423194 Pelinka, Antonia. 2014. 'Right-Wing Populism'. In Right-Wing Populism In Europe, 1st ed., 17. London: Bloomsbury.195 Betz, Hans‐Georg, and Carol Johnson. 2004.196 Ibid.

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towards the European Union and its politics due to their inability to answer their

concerns.197 The nationalist and racist rhetoric that have successfully infiltrated

both European and National Parliaments, pose a threat not only to the

integration process, but also to the overall progressive stance of the European

Union.198

197 Taggart, Paul A. 2000. p 88198 Grabbe, Heather. 2014. p. 81

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Conclusions

As representative politics allows the expression of a range of political

positions,199 these parties are entitled to voice their beliefs. Despite their views

on European integration, immigration, and society, being harmful to the

advancement of the European Union’s progressive stance, their popularity voices

the concern of European citizens who feel increasingly alienated and alone both

from their National and European politics. The case studies used in this paper

portray some of the many different faces of the Populist Radical Right. The

success of the Front National can be attributed to the 73% disapproval rate 200of

President Hollande as well as a climate in the French economy when the crisis is

till yielding high unemployment and financial instability.201 While their rise to the

spotlight could suggest the end of France’s push for European integration, FN’s

win is observed by many simply as a protest vote, as the Eurobarometer 82

announced an improvement in the way French citizens see the European Union

with 41% approval rating.202 (See Appendix 3) The most worrisome party is

UKIP, not so much for the European Union as their presence in Parliament has

become more of nuisance than a threat, but for United Kingdom’s National

politics as their promise of a in-out referendum on the UK’s EU membership

could ultimately end up harming both actors involved. The Lega Nord’s support

is substantially smaller as the party at present does not present a considerable

danger on the National or European level. The ‘Basta Euro’ campaign won a mere

6.15% at the EP Elections and support for the European Monetary Union in Italy

remains relatively high at 54%.203 (See Appendix 4)

199 Taggart, Paul A. 2000.  p.113200 Ipsos.fr,. 2015. 'Le Baromètre De L'action Politique Ipsos / Le Point'. http://www.ipsos.fr/sub-sites/barometre-politique/.201 Lequesne, Christian. 2014. France And The European Union: A Story Of Reason Rather Than Love. Norwegian Institute Of International Affairs. Oslo: NUPI. p.3 202 'L’Opinion Publique dan L’Union Europeeéne - Raport National - France'. 2014. Standard Eurobarometer 82 (Autumn 2014). p. 4203 'L'Opinione Pubblica Nell' Unione Europea - Rapporto Nazionale - Italia'. 2014. Standard Eurobarometer 82 (Autumn 2014). p. 6

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There are a number of reasons as to why Populist Radical Right Parties do

not pose a substantial danger to European political stability. Firstly, these parties

continue to be the minority both at the National and European levels. While the

most recent European Parliamentary elections showed an increase in support for

such parties, PRRP have a long way to go before becoming a majority. Secondly,

the rise of Eurosceptic PRRP lacks a transnational dimension, as the multitude of

expressions of Euroscepticism, opposition to immigration and radical right

values, makes them vary in every European Member State. Thirdly, these parties

are still far from being normalized on the National and European level due to

their radical views.

That being said, it is still vital that we examine these parties in depth, as

was done here, and keep assessing and re-assessing their role in the European

political sphere. While this paper has suggested that they are not necessarily

dangerous at this point in time, we must not let this conclusion legitimise us

letting our guard down, as history has shown that parties can quickly turn from a

loud radical minority to a legitimate powerful majority.

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Appendices

Appendix 1 – The Future of the European Union Trend204

204 'Public Opinion In The European Union'. 2014. Standard Eurobarometer 84 (Spring 2014). p. 7

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Appendix 2 – The electoral results of PRRP at the 2014 EP Elections compared to the 2009 EP Elections across Europe205

205 Halikiopoulou, Daphne, and Sofia Vasilopoulou. 2014. 'Support For The Far Right In The 2014 European Parliament Elections: A Comparative Perspective'. The Political Quarterly 85 (3): 285-288. p. 286

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Appendix 3 – French Public Opinion about the EU206

206 'L’Opinion Publique dan L’Union Europeeéne - Raport National - France'. 2014. Standard Eurobarometer 82 (Autumn 2014). p. 4

The Image of the EU in France

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Appendix 4 – Italy’s Support for the European Monetary Union207

207 'L'opinione Pubblica Nell' Unione Europea - Rapporto Nazionale - Italia'. 2014. Standard Eurobarometer 82 (Autumn 2014). p. 6

Are you Pro or Against the EMU under a single currency, the Euro?

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Appendix 5 – Dictionary of terms and abbreviations

1 British National Party = an extreme right movement born from the 1970s

National Front; openly racist and advocates against liberal democracy.

2 Bruges Speech = Margaret Thatcher warned the British people and the

Conservative government that any further integration of the European

project would suppress British nationhood, concentrate power at the centre

of a European conglomerate, and turn nations into some sort of identikit

European personality.

3 Democrazia Cristiana = (Christian Democracy) main centre-right party in

Italy. Dissolved in 1994.

4 Forza Italia = (Go Italy) main centre-right party in Italy. Dissolved in 2009

5 narodnichestvo ( ) = populism народничество6 Nouvelle Droite = New Right intellectual group inspired by Antonio

Gramsci’s notion of cultural hegemony; popular during the late 60s and 70s;

born to counter the intellectual and cultural dominance of the left in France.

7 PACS = French civil partnerships

8 Podemos = (We Can) a Hard Eurosceptic Spanish Radical Left Party that

believes in the abolition of austerity measures and the restructuring of the

Spanish Political scenario.

9 Parti Socialiste = (Socialist Party) main centre-left party in France

10 Syriza (ΣΥΡΙΖΑ) = (Acronym of the words “Synaspismos tis Rizospastikis

Aristeras” meaning Radical Coalition of the Left) Syriza is a coalition of 20+

smaller leftist parties in Greece

11 Tangentopoli = (Scandal city) - a series of trials which convicted the

Democrazia Cristiana party leaders, a party that had dominated the political

scene since the end of the Second World War.

12 Union pour un Mouvement Populaire = (Union for a popular movement)

main centre-right party in France

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