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Economic Liberalisation,Qualifications and Livelihoods inSri LankaS. T. Hettige aa Department of Sociology , University of Colombo ,Colombo 03, Sri LankaPublished online: 09 Jun 2010.

To cite this article: S. T. Hettige (2000) Economic Liberalisation, Qualifications andLivelihoods in Sri Lanka, Assessment in Education: Principles, Policy & Practice, 7:3,325-333, DOI: 10.1080/09695940050201334

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Assessment in Education, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2000

Economic Liberalisation, Quali� cationsand Livelihoods in Sri LankaS. T. HETTIGEDepartment of Sociology, University of Colombo, Colombo 03, Sri Lanka

ABSTRACT Sri Lanka experienced a rapid expansion of population in the � rst few decadesfollowing Independence in 1948. Population growth far outstripped the rate of growth of theeconomy which remained mostly dependent on primary production for export and domesticconsumption. Introduction of universal free education pre-dated political independence andled to rapid school enrolments. In a slow-growth economy, dominated by state enterprises,education became the main avenue of upward social mobility for many underprivilegedyoung people. Increasing competition for education and white-collar employment in the thendominant state sector in the 1960s and the 1970s necessitated policy interventions that werenot necessarily fair to all competing social and ethnic groups.

In the late 1970s, the policy focus shifted from education to liberal economic reformsaimed at generating economic growth and employment creation. Early gains in terms ofeconomic expansion were slowed down by the ethnic con� ict that erupted in 1983 andcontinues to retard economic development in the country. While the af� uent strata continueto gain from the open economic and liberal educational environment in terms of income andlucrative employment opportunities, many young people from lower social strata who possessconventional paper quali� cations live in despair looking for scarce white-collar jobs. Thosewho have resources to invest in overseas training and/or foreign quali� cations are in anadvantaged position in the competition for private and transnational sector employment.

Background

Universal free education was introduced in Sri Lanka in 1944, several years prior topolitical independence. This was considered by the then political leaders as anessential component of social reform. Universal free education was supposed tofacilitate upward social mobility of individuals irrespective of their birth status interms of caste, class, religion and ethnicity. As will be discussed below, the processof mass social mobility that was set in motion did not unfold smoothly as it came upagainst certain obstacles. It is these obstacles that have provided a strong basis foragitation on the part of disadvantaged youth constituencies over the last severaldecades. Here it is necessary to look at how post-colonial opportunity structureswere shaped in order to accommodate dominant political constituencies agitating formore and more opportunities. It is also necessary to note the ethnic and culturaldiversity of the island’s population. The Sinhalese, the largest ethno-linguistic

ISSN 0969-594X print; ISSN 1465-329X online/00/030325-10 Ó 2000 Taylor & Francis Ltd

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326 S. T. Hettige

community (74%) are mostly Buddhists. The largest minority of Tamils, with itsown regional, religious and other divisions, comprises about 18% of the population.The other signi� cant minority is Muslims. They comprise about 7% of the popu-lation.

As is well documented, newly independent Sri Lanka inherited a post-colonialeconomy often described as a dual economy, comprising a vast subsistence-orientedpeasant sector and a highly commercialised, export-oriented plantation sector(Snodgrass, 1966). At the time of independence, peasant agriculture was the largestsector in terms of income and subsistence and continued to be so in the � rst fewdecades thereafter. Dominated by smallholdings, this sector did not offer opportuni-ties for upward social mobility. In fact, many young people belonging to peasantfamilies wished to move away from peasant agriculture, in part because populationgrowth after 1946 exerted considerable pressure on productive land, leading towidespread land fragmentation and landlessness in the countryside [1].

The export-oriented plantation sector was also labour intensive but did not offermany opportunities for social mobility for two main reasons. Firstly, the sector didnot absorb many ‘outsiders’ as the resident plantation population, comprisingmostly Tamils who are descendants of early migrant workers from South India,more than reproduced itself over many decades. Secondly, managerial positions onthe plantations were often given to people who belonged to the social circle of theirowners and higher executives.

State-oriented development strategies adopted in the late 1950s did not facilitatethe growth of the private, corporate sector. Moreover, many of the private enter-prises that existed also remained family based and were not open to those outsidetheir social circle. Post-Independence regimes took measures to expand the statesector in keeping with the widely popular socialist ideology at the time. The rapidexpansion of state institutions, including public enterprises such as factories, banks,and infrastructure projects, enabled many people to move up the social ladderthrough formal education. In other words, state sector employment became theprimary target of many young people with educational quali� cations hailing fromnot so well-to-do families. It did not take long before the demand for suchemployment far outstripped the supply due to various circumstances.

With the introduction of free education, school enrolments in the country in-creased substantially (Jayaweera, 1988; Sumathipala, 1968). Improved health andsocial conditions resulted in rapid population growth from the mid-1940s, leading toa substantial expansion of the younger population and a swelling of the school-goingpopulation in the country. The school-going population, which stood at 3.4 millionin 1981, increased to about 4.2 million in 1999. With increasing school enrolments,the number of people leaving schools with paper quali� cations also increased rapidlyover the last few decades. For instance, the proportion of the population over 30years of age with educational quali� cations of GCE O-level and above increasedfrom 5.4% in 1963 to about 25% in 1994. A similar expansion has taken place inthe sphere of university education (see Tables I, II and III).

At the same time, increasing educational attainment in the country contributed tohigh rates of unemployment among the educated youth. There were several reasons

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Economic Liberalisation in Sri Lanka 327

TABLE I. Growth of the school system in Sri Lanka

No. of No. of No. of Pupils perYear schools students teachers teacher

1945 5726 867,309 25,240 34.41954 6728 1,617,093 48,468 33.41964 9285 2,403,403 84,573 2841974 9385 2,596,588 98,691 26.31984 9629 3,608,551 139,199 25.91994 10,270 4,282,207 191,152 22.4% Increase 79.4 393.7 657.3(1945–94)

Source: Ministry of Education, Colombo, Sri Lanka.

TABLE II. Educational attainment of the population aged 30 years and over

1963 1981 1994

Educational Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male FemaleAttainment (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100No Schooling 29.1 16.2 44.7 18.0 10.4 26.0 9.6 5.4 13.7Primary 39.7 46.5 31.4 14.6 15.4 13.8 25.2 25.8 24.7Secondary 20.3 24.9 14.7 56.3 62.4 50.0 40.2 42.8 37.8GCE(O/L)/SSC 3.7 4.6 2.6 7.6 8.3 6.7 17.2 17.5 16.8GCE(A/L)/HSC 1.3 1.5 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.4 5.9 6.1 5.7Degree or Higher 0.4 0.6 0.1 1.1 1.4 0.7 1.9 2.4 1.5Other 5.8 5.3 1.0 0.6 1.4 — — —

Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Colombo.

TABLE III. Growth of undergraduate enrolment in Sri Lanka

Year Total Increase (%) Male No. Male (%) Female No. (%)

1942 904 — 813 89.9 91 10.11952 2,232 147 1,752 78.5 480 21.51962 6,232 181 4,541 72.4 1,729 27.61972 12,050 92 6,907 57.3 5,143 42.71982/83 18,009 49 11,390 63.2 6,619 36.81992/93 30,764 71 16,818 54.7 13,946 45.3

Note: Except the faculties of Arts, Engineering, Agriculture and Veterinary Science of thePeradeniya University.

Source: Statistical Handbooks, University Grants Commission, Colombo.

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328 S. T. Hettige

for the high rate of unemployment among the youth in the 1960s and the 1970s.Firstly, the economy did not expand in keeping with the high rate of populationgrowth. The state-centred economy that was established in the late 1950s under thein� uence of a vibrant socialist movement at the time did not expand rapidly owingto its inherent characteristics as well as the inhospitable, external environment.Secondly, the highly academically oriented school system in the country preparedstudents for certi� cate-oriented examinations without equipping them with life skillsand practical capabilities. Educated youth were not prepared for skill-oriented jobs;they were mostly looking for white-collar jobs in the public sector. Thirdly, statesector employment, in particular regular, salaried employment, continued to be farmore attractive than other jobs owing to various privileges and prestige associatedwith it (Hettige, 1996).

The competition for public sector, white-collar jobs increased rapidly as thedemand for such jobs grew at a much higher rate than their supply. This exertedpressure on the political system. Many unemployed persons tended to use politicalconnections to � nd their way into state sector institutions, while politicians tendedto allocate public sector jobs on the basis of political loyalty. This naturallymarginalised many unemployed youth who did not have access to seats of power orwho belonged to political parties of the opposition.

Growing Unemployment Among Educated Youth and Policy Issues

Language [2] and ethnicity are two factors that have played a signi� cant part in thecompetition for highly valued white-collar employment in the state sector. Swab-hasha (own-language)-educated youth and their political patrons naturally agitatedfor the change of the of� cial language, so that the former could gain state sectoremployment without much dif� culty. This demand was granted in 1956 whenEnglish was replaced by Sinhalese as the of� cial language, enabling educated youthto secure state sector employment. However, this policy change adversely affectedthose whose education had been entirely in the Tamil medium. This was a gravesituation, as it happened at a time when the country’s economy was comingincreasingly under the purview of a centralised state. Given the increasingly patron–client nature of politics in the country the allocation of resources, including employ-ment, tended to be guided by ruling party politicians and their close associates. Thisnaturally alienated those who did not belong to the ruling party. Those who were soalienated usually belonged to smaller or minority parties.

The adoption of Sinhalese as the of� cial language opened avenues for socialmobility for the Sinhalese-educated youth, encouraging them to secure educationalquali� cations and seek employment in the state sector. But, as mentioned above, thedemand for such employment soon far outstripped the supply, leading to a high rateof unemployment among the educated Sinhalese. This situation was conducive tothe emergence of anti-systemic movements such as the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna(JVP, People’s Liberation Front). However, this is not to suggest that unemploy-ment was the sole factor behind the emergence of the latter (Obeyesekare, 1974).In fact, ideological factors, as well as social unrest arising out of a complex

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Economic Liberalisation in Sri Lanka 329

post-colonial situation, also played a major part in the emergence of violent youthmovements. In the case of the JVP, the commitment on the part of its followers toa revolutionary, socialist ideology has been a strong basis for collective action.Post-independence youth movements in the country have also been in� uenced bynationalist ideologies.

Many of the youth who joined anti-systemic movements did not perceive theirinability to secure employment as a product of demand and supply. These politicallyconscious youth, most of whom were monolingual, having received their educationin Swabasha, subscribed to the theory that the adoption of Sinhalese as the of� ciallanguage had not dislodged the Westernised elite from their privileged position andthat the latter continued to dominate national politics, the business world and thehigher echelons of bureaucracy. This perception, coupled with their marginalisationwithin a system of patron–client politics that guided the allocation of public goodsincluding public sector jobs, propelled them into violent, anti-systemic politics.

The position of monolingual, Tamil-educated youth was worse. They developeda strong sense of relative deprivation and marginalisation within a centralisedpolitical system which was dominated by the representatives of the majority Sin-halese community. The language policies adopted in the late 1950s gave them theimpression that they would not be treated equally and would not have equalopportunities. This situation was critical because the tendency at that time wastowards greater concentration of resources in the hands of the state. Some ofthe steps taken by the then government to pacify the upwardly mobile, restlessrural Sinhalese youth, such as the standardisation of university admissions, furtheraggrieved the Tamil youth in the North. The standardisation of university admis-sions replaced an all-island selection on the basis of merit (aggregate marks) by anallocation of places on the numerical strength of different language groups. A districtquota system was also introduced to favour disadvantaged rural students (Little,1999, p. 97) These developments resulted in a reallocation of university places infavour of Sinhalese-medium students and this contributed to the emergence of anincipient Tamil youth military in the North in the mid 1970s (De Silva, 1974).

The socio-economic roots of Tamil youth military described above werenot recognised by the policy makers and, therefore, no speci� c policy responsesemanated from the latter. This was largely due to the fact that the speci� c grievancesof the Tamil youth were overshadowed by the larger issues of the growing ethniccon� ict in the country. Subsequent developments, particularly the rapid spread ofethnic violence in the early 1980s, pushed speci� c youth grievances into thebackground and have remained overshadowed by wider political issues to date.

The Post-1977 Economic Reforms and their Impact on Education andLivelihoods

The government elected in 1977 embarked upon a programme of liberal economicreforms, removing many of the protectionist barriers that restricted the in� ow andout� ow of � nancial capital, consumer goods and labour. In response, many inter-national lending agencies came forward to � nance a number of major infrastructure

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FIG. 1. Historical overview of socio-economic transformation in Sri Lanka.

projects in the country. Market forces were allowed to operate freely even in suchareas as education and health. Relaxation of exchange controls allowed the well-to-do to send their children abroad for education and training. Privatisation of stateenterprises and the corresponding establishment of many private � rms resulted in amajor expansion of the hitherto small private corporate sector.

As mentioned above, prior to economic liberalisation, the state sector remainedthe main source of employment for youth with educational quali� cations. Thesewere mostly white-collar positions in public institutions and state bureaucracy. Thepicture has changed signi� cantly over the last two decades. The education systemitself has become highly differentiated, into three distinct arenas, namely public(state-funded), private (market-driven) and transnational. Students who rely onthese different systems end up having differential life chances which contribute tofurther social differentiation

So far in the present paper, an attempt has been made to outline the developmentsin Sri Lanka over the last 50 years, in particular the changes of 1977. Figure 1attempts to provide a concise picture of the complex changes that have taken placeduring this period. As is shown, the state, which played a dominant role in theallocation of educational certi� cates and distribution of life chances among theeducated youth through its policies and programmes, no longer plays the same role.

Privatisation and Commercialisation of Education

Today, the market has begun to play a major role in the provision of education,educational certi� cation and allocation of life chances. This has helped to forge astrong link between the class structure, the hierarchy of educational institutions andthe structure of the economy. In fact, there is a close correspondence between thesocial class structure [3] and access to educational opportunities. In turn, differentialaccess to educational opportunities determines, to a great extent, access to employ-ment opportunities in different sectors of the economy (see Fig. 2).

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Economic Liberalisation in Sri Lanka 331

FIG. 2. Social class, education and life chances.

Figure 2 suggests that the new hierarchy of educational institutions facilitates aclose correspondence between the class structure and the structure of the economyin terms of the allocation of life chances among youth. This leaves limited room forstate-mediated upward mobility of youth. Given the fact that state-sponsored highereducational institutions have continued to expand in recent years without anysigni� cant attempts being made to improve the quality of education, these develop-ments can only lead to greater unrest among lower-class, yet educated, youth.

It would be wrong to state that, before the implementation of economic reforms,the social class of an educated youth did not in� uence his or her life chances. Socialcontacts, school background, knowledge of English and additional quali� cations nodoubt helped youth from privileged urban families to secure more lucrative jobs inthe state sector. Yet many jobs which were allocated purely on the basis ofeducational certi� cates, or the results of competitive recruitment tests, were avail-able to youth irrespective of their social background. There were other jobs whichwere allocated by a combination of educational and political criteria.

With the increasing integration of the Sri Lanka economy with the outside worldover the last two decades, such attributes as computer literacy and knowledge ofEnglish have become widely accepted, additional criteria for recruitment even in thepublic sector. So, those who possess such attributes have a much greater chance ofobtaining certain jobs even in the state sector [4]. This does not apply to lower-rungpositions in state institutions as they are often allocated on the basis of politicalpatronage.

This is understandable because many state agencies today have establishedinternational links through collaborative projects, technical assistance agreements,etc. As a result, monolingual youth with educational quali� cations, who usually hailfrom underprivileged backgrounds, do not have ready access to higher positionseven in public institutions. However, in comparison with the corporate privatesector, these educated youth have access to entry-level white-collar jobs which theycan use as stepping stones for higher positions over a period of time. In the private

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332 S. T. Hettige

sector this is often not possible, as entry requirements are more elaborate anddemanding.

In the new liberal economic environment, social class has become a decisive factorfacilitating the acquisition of readily marketable quali� cations and other attributesand access to lucrative employment. This, in turn, has either reinforced or neu-tralised factors such as gender and ethnicity. A recent survey of a number of publicand private sector institutions undertaken by the author revealed that the expandingprivate sector, unlike the public sector, has not restricted the entry of youthbelonging to minority ethnic groups provided they posses the right attributes. On theother hand, private sector � rms do not readily offer high positions to women. Thesituation is quite different in the state sector, where many women have been able tosecure higher managerial positions.

Conclusions

The undeveloped, ex-colonial economy of Sri Lanka remained largely stagnant forseveral decades after independence, making education the primary means of socialand economic advancement for many lower- and lower-middle-class youth. Withrapid population growth and the steady expansion of the education system, the gapbetween the expectations of youth, on the one hand, and opportunities for upwardmobility, on the other, continued to widen in the 1960s and 1970s. Yet this did notreduce the social signi� cance of educational quali� cations in the country. Further-more, the increasing competition for educational certi� cates, and jobs in keepingwith them, has contributed to youth unrest, political con� ict and widespreadsuicides among youth. Economic liberalisation, introduced in response to continu-ing stagnation of the economy, has altered the opportunity structure in signi� cantways, giving rise to new forms of competition and con� ict. The persisting social andpolitical instability, largely arising from the ongoing ethnic con� ict, has retarded theprocess of economic development in the country. The resultant social and economicproblems such as widespread poverty, unemployment and underemployment, highcost of living and poor public services, coupled with the rapidly rising af� uence ofa small percentage of the population concentrated in the cities, have tended toreinforce persisting social and political instability. The largely stagnant privatecorporate sector is unlikely to adopt a socially inclusive recruitment policy. Underthese circumstances, a battered Third World state highly dependent on multilaterallending agencies and Western governments committed to liberal economic dogmacannot be expected to absorb even a major part of the large mass of educated youthinto its fold. Given the above situation, the educated unemployed from underprivi-leged rural backgrounds are likely to join protest movements as they did in the past.Perhaps the only way to avoid such a development is to evolve sensible policy andprogramme strategies that narrow the wide gap that has arisen in the opportunitystructure and enhance the future prospects of underprivileged youth. This wouldrequire substantial investments in skill development and educational programmesthat would facilitate social and economic advancement of underprivileged youthwho are unable to compete in a globalised educational market, where the value of

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Economic Liberalisation in Sri Lanka 333

educational quali� cations is largely dependent on the monetary investment involved.Those who return to the country with foreign quali� cations are quickly absorbed byboth private and public institutions. It should also be noted that the educatedunemployed are mostly concentrated in rural areas where poverty and lack of accessprevent students from acquiring the attributes in demand.

Notes

[1] The country’s population increased three-fold from 6.6 million in 1946 to 18.3 million in1996 (Registrar General Department, Colombo).

[2] During the period of the British rule, opportunities for upward social mobility for nativepeople expanded. State bureaucracy was perhaps the most signi� cant target for the upwardlymobile. Yet it excluded those who did not speak English. With the introduction of freeeducation in the 1940s, youth population educated in local languages increased rapidly.Hence the agitation for the abolition of English as the of� cial language after Independence.

[3] The social structure has undergone a rapid transformation over the last three decades. Underleft-leaning regimes in the 1960s and 1970s, the country’s economy and life chances cameunder increasing state control and regulation. The state sector expanded rapidly at theexpense of the private sector. The result was the emergence of a large (conventional) middleclass whose members were recruited from diverse social backgrounds. Since the of� ciallanguage policy favoured the Sinhalese in the context of employment provision, this middleclass comprised a predominantly Sinhala population. The situation began to change aftereconomic liberalisation in 1977, leading to a rapid expansion of the private sector at theexpense of the state sector. The new business opportunities that emerged in an openeconomic environment gave rise to a new urban middle class associated with the expandingprivate and transnational sectors. The members of the new urban middle class are by andlarge products of private and transnational educational institutions and often possess inter-national quali� cations (see also Hettige, 1998).

[4] In some state institutions, the practice today is to recruit computer applications assistantsinstead of conventional clerks. The former perform the functions of the latter, usingcomputers now instead of typewriters.

References

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HETTIGE, S. T. (Ed.) (1998) Globalization, Social Change and Youth (Colombo, German CulturalInstitute).

JAYAWEERA, S. (1988) Educational policies and change from the mid-twentieth century to 1977,in: Occasional Papers in Education (Maharagama, National Institute of Education).

LITTLE, A. W. (1999) Labouring to Learn; towards a political economy of plantations, people andeducation in Sri Lanka (London, Macmillan).

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SUMATHIPALA, K. H. M. (1968) History of Education in Ceylon 1796–1965 (Dehiwela, TissaPrakashakayo).

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