Earthquake RiskManagement:

Mitigation SuccessStories

California SeismicSafety Commission

Proposition 122 Seismic Retrofit Practices Improvement ProgramProduct 2.2 Earthquake Risk Management Tools for Decision-MakersSSC Report 99-05

1999 California Seismic Safety CommissionALL RIGHTS RESERVED

No part of this document may be reproduced or transmitted in anyform or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photo-copying, recording, or by any information storage and retrievalsystems, without permission in writing from the California SeismicSafety Commission.

California Seismic Safety Commission1755 Creekside Oaks Drive, Suite 100

Sacramento, California 95833 PHONE: (916) 263-5506

FAX: (916) 263-0594

http:\\www.seismic.ca.gov

1

Earthquake RiskManagement:

Mitigation SuccessStories

Seismic Safety Commission

State of CaliforniaGray Davis, Governor

Funded by

Proposition 122 Seismic Retrofit Practices Improvement ProgramProduct 2.2 Earthquake Risk Management Tools for Decision-Makers

SSC Report 99-05

EQE International, Inc.1111 Broadway, 10th FloorOakland, CA 94607-5500

http:\\www.eqe.com

Prepared by

2 success stories

Acknowledgments

Anheuser-Busch Company

Arrietta Chakos, City of Berkeley

Lewis Jones, Berkeley Unified School District

David Lee, P.E., East Bay Municipal Utility District

Los Angeles Unified School District

Joel McDonald, California Department of GeneralServices

Andrea Pook, East Bay Municipal Utility District

Adapted text and photos courtesy of the following:

Berkeley Unified School District

California Department of General Services

California Governors Office of Emergency Services

East Bay Municipal Utility District

EQE International, Inc.

EQUIIS Photographic Database

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Henry Reyes, S.E. California Seismic SafetyCommission

Special acknowledgment and thanks are due to thefollowing individuals and organizations that providedmany constructive suggestions and examples for thiscollection of seismic mitigation success stories:

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Introduction

Californias next earthquakecould affect your com-munity or business!

To answer this question, you must have a clear understanding of your potential seismic risk. A comprehen-sive earthquake risk assessment, in conjunction with anearthquake loss reduction program, is the best way to pro-tect the lives, property, and economic resources for whichyou are responsible.

This collection of Mitigation Success Stories demonstratesthat effective earthquake risk reduction programs can besuccessfully implemented by public or private organiza-tions. It introduces you to others in your community whohave taken responsibility for actually reducing future losses.

This document provides five examples of how earthquakerisk is actively managed in diverse communities across thestate:

East Bay Municipal Utility District

Los Angeles Unified School District

Anheuser-Busch Van Nuys Brewery

Berkeley Unified School District

California State Building Seismic Program

These stories describe the complexities and nuances as-sociated with the successful implementation of earthquakeloss reduction programs. The practical aspects of the riskmanagement decision-making process are highlighted tooffer valuable lessons and insight into the process. Finally,

introduction

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Are you prepared?

4 success stories

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these studies show that earthquake risk management canbe a financially viable endeavor, especially when all thecosts of potential losses, direct or otherwise, are consid-ered.

A brief summary of each case study follows:

East Bay Municipal Utility District. Highlighted hereare the actions of a large public utility in northern Califor-nia that demonstrate the importance of clearly under-standing the scope and magnitude of risk before makinga decision to accept or mitigate it. Risk ranking is dis-cussed, as is the importance of developing a methodicalapproach to assessment and mitigation.

Los Angeles Unified School District. This study illus-trates the steps taken by a large school district in south-ern California to deal with the non-structural elements inits many school buildings that contributed to its earth-quake vulnerability. The study demonstrates the impor-tance of mitigating non-structural falling hazards as ameans of reducing the life-safety risk to building occu-pants.

Anheuser-Busch Van Nuys Brewery. The actions of asingle privately owned facility in southern California arethe subject of this case study. Illustrated is the impor-tance of non-direct costs (business interruption and lossof market share) in influencing the benefit-cost equationin favor of mitigation. Risk screening and ranking meth-odologies were employed to help focus mitigation effortsto achieve maximum loss reduction. Finally, this mitiga-tion program was tested by an actual moderate-magni-tude earthquake and passed with flying colors.

Berkeley Unified School District. Described here is asituation in which public pressure and questions aboutschool building safety prompted a small school districtin northern California to initiate a risk assessment study.Perceptions of earthquake risk, prior to the assessment,underestimated the actual magnitude of the vulnerabil-ity. Also discussed are the funding difficulties and politi-cal hurdles that many public agencies must face to imple-ment their loss reduction program.

5introduction

+ California State Building Seismic Program. This casestudy presents a project of the Division of the State Ar-chitect (DSA) to assess and mitigate the earthquake vul-nerabilities of nearly 16,000 state-owned buildings. Thisstudy reveals how an organization with a large buildinginventory reviewed and effectively screened out low-riskstructures, making the loss reduction effort for the high-risk ones more cost-effective and manageable.

The varying complexity of these Mitigation Success Sto-ries illustrates the diversity of earthquake mitigation and lossreduction measures being undertaken across the state. Thestories show that mitigation programs can greatly reducethe potential for casualties, decrease the amount of directand indirect damages, and minimize the disruption causedby, and funds necessary for, response and recovery opera-tions.

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The SuccessStories: Understanding the Potential Risk

A Case Study of the East BayMunicipal Utility District

east bay municipal utility district

The 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake sent a clear messageto the East Bay Municipal Utility District: an accurateunderstanding of the districts seismic risk was badly needed.Although the magnitude 7.1 earthquake was centerednearly 70 miles outside of the districts service area, it caused113 breaks in distribution lines, including one in a 60-inchdiameter raw water line. Loma Prieta caught the attentionof district officials, who recognized the quakes disruptionas a small foretaste of high-probability major earthquakes

EBMUD Service Area and Water Supply

8 success stories

EBMUD service area is traversed by twosignificant faults ...

EBMUD Service Area Earthquake Hazard Map

on the Hayward fault. That the district was at riskwas quite clear, but the full extent of the risk was not.

EBMUD

The East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD)serves about 1.2 million water customers and600,000 wastewater customers residing in portionsof Alameda and Contra Costa Counties. The watersystem includes a network of reservoirs, aqueducts,treatment plants, and other distribution facilities,stretching from the Sierra Nevada foothills to theeastern side of San Francisco Bay. The service areaof 325 square miles includes 20 incorporated citiesand 15 unincorporated communities.

The EBMUD service area is traversed by two sig-nificant faults, the Hayward and Calaveras, with athird, the Concord fault, located immediately to the

9east bay municipal utility district

EBMUD SeismicAssessment Process

East. A study completed by the California Working Groupon Earthquake Probabilities in 1990 indicated that the north-ern segment of the Hayward fault has a 28% chance of pro-ducing a magnitude 7.0 earthquake by the year 2010. Whenthe three other most active San Francisco Bay Area faultsare included, the probability for a magnitude 7.0 earthquakereaches 67% during the same period of time.

The Seismic Risk Assessment

In 1991, EBMUD undertook a comprehensive seismic risk assessment of its water supply, wa-ter treatment, and water distribution facilities. Theoverall program allowed for the systematic analy-

sis of every critical system to ensure the protection of livesand rapid restoration of services to customers.

To guide the effort, specific service goals for post-earth-quake performance were established. These goals in-cluded protecting public safety from direct damage (i.e.,reservoir failure), maintaining water quality, ensuring firefighting capacity, servicing hospitals and critical care fa-cilities, as well as providing domestic water to residentialand commercial customers. The abilities of the varioussystems to achieve the goals served as the framework

through which post-earthquake performance was evaluated.

The seismic assessment began by assembling informationon the existing facilities, developing the necessary seismo-

logical and geographic guidelines, es-tablishing design criteria, and determin-ing how facilities would fail. The infor-mation was processed using probabilis-tic concepts to develop an overall pictureof the damage to be expected. All facili-ties were reviewed according to their im-portance within the system they sup-ported. In addition, areas without suffi-cient redundancy were also identified.

System performance levels were evalu-ated under four scenario earthquake events. Three of thescenario earthquakes were chosen to represent severe

10 success stories

Fire damage to the com-munity associated with the disruption of firefighting abilities following the scenario Hay-ward earthquake could total $140 millionfor a day with calm winds.

shaking in maximum credibleevents on the Hayward fault. Suchquakes would be expected to oc-cur once every several hundredyears. A fourth earthquake ofsmaller magnitude, but with greaterfrequency, was also considered asrepresentative of the seismicityalong the Hayward fault. Thissmaller earthquake would be ex-pected to occur once every 20 to 50years. These four scenarios werejudged to represent the seismic haz-ard in the district.

The picture that emerged from the seis-mic assessment was sobering. About

70% of the districts customers are located west ofthe Hayward fault, with most of the supply comingfrom the east. Four routes were available for waterdelivery: three water conveyance tunnels and a pipe-line. Two of the tunnels bisected the Hayward fault,while the outlet pipe from the third tunnel and pipe-line crosses over the fault. Severe damage to allfour routes was predicted in a rupture of the Hay-ward fault. Additionally, many of the water pumpingplants critical to the districts distribution ability werebuilt in the 1920s and 1930s, before the advent ofmodern seismic codes. Even episodes of moderateshaking could inflict severe damage on these facili-ties.

The overall vulnerability of its facilities, the lack ofredundancy in several of the critical systems, andthe significant earthquake hazard, made the risk toEBMUD operations considerable. For the scenariomagnitude 7.0 earthquake on the Hayward fault, forinstance, it was anticipated that two-thirds of thedistricts customers would be immediately withoutwater. After about three days, continuing loss of sup-plies from sustained damage would raise that levelto nearly three-quarters of customers. Furthermore,

11east bay municipal utility district

The key policy decision facing theEBMUD Board of Directors was toselect an appropriate level of post-earthquake system reliability androbustness.

it was estimated that it would take nearly six months to re-store limited service to all affected customers.

The economic losses associated with this Hayward sce-nario earthquake were also staggering. Estimates of directdamage and repair costs for the EBMUD facilities rangedbetween $196 million to $245 million. Fire damage associ-ated with the disruption of fire-fighting abilities could total$140 million for a day with calm winds. This figure becomesconsiderably higher if the winds are high the day of thequake. The economic loss to the communities during thisextended period of service disruption was conservativelyestimated to exceed $1.5 billion. It was clear to the districtthat complete shutdown of its system would have an unac-ceptable impact on its community.

The Mitigation Strategies

Four different capital improvement packages (CIPs) weredeveloped, as was a priority package for essential up-grades. The packages re-flected the range of possiblechoices for the EBMUDBoard of Directors. The pri-ority package included allthe high benefit-cost mitiga-tion measures: equipmentanchoring/bracing andemergency response plan-ning; it was considered to bethe minimum effort that thedistrict should undertake. Allof the high-cost fixes, such asstructural strengthening andconstruction of redundantsystems, were included inother CIPs. The key policydecision facing the EBMUD

Board of Directors was to select an appropriate level of re-liability and robustness for post-earthquake system perfor-mance.

However, before any decision could be made, the range of

12 success stories

To ensure public backing, EBMUDdeveloped an extensive public outreach andeducation program.

Public Outreach Results

Do you support the proposedprogram?

PresentationQuestionnaires

Written Responses

Voice Mail

Composite of All Three

Yes 91%

Yes 92%

Yes 91%

Yes 85%

No 9%

No 9%

No 8%

No 15%

mitigation alternatives had to first be presented tothe public, since the district customers would ulti-mately pay for the program chosen. In addition, eachof the seven elected board members must answer tothe voters. To ensure public backing, EBMUD de-veloped an extensive outreach and education pro-gram.

To assess what the voters might think of the programoptions and the proposed funding mechanisms, dis-trict staff made numerous presentations to commu-nity groups. The voters were most interested in thepost-earthquake performance of the system and inhow the program would improve reliability. The sec-ond most important concern was that the cost of im-provements be fairly allocated by benefits received.Other frequent questions included how soon the im-provements could be implemented (almost all favor-ing as soon as possible), how much water bills wouldincrease, and when the next earthquake was ex-pected. Interestingly, the cost of the program to thecustomer was less important to the voters than whenthe program would be completed.

Following every presentation, the public was askedif they approved of the proposed plans. An over-whelming 91% of the respondents favored imple-menting the mitigations, even with the knowledgethat they would have to pay for it.

The Decision

The board chose an intermediate alternative,which greatly improved the districts capacity forensuring operations following severe earthquakes.The approach was seen as best balancing the miti-gation of seismic risk with the cost of implementa-tion. This option provides a system that will meet thegoals of providing adequate water for fire fighting aswell as for drinking following the worst of the earth-quake scenarios considered.

After board adoption, a detailed implementation plan,called the Seismic Improvement Plan (SIP), was

13east bay municipal utility district

Workers use wire wrapping toimprove hoop strength of thereservoir tank.

developed for accomplishing the proposed upgrades in aten-year program. This plan divided the program into sevensubprograms for tracking and reporting purposes. In ad-dition, an independent operating group was created fromwithin the EBMUD organization for the sole purpose ofconsulting, managing, and designing the seismic mitiga-tion effort.

Creation of this separate group was considered a crucialstep in the success of the seismic improvement program.Seismic mitigation monies were separated from other capi-tal project funds to ensure that the badly needed upgradeswould be installed without delay. The separation mini-mized the temptation to divert mitigation funding to otherprojects. Separation also ensured that there would con-tinue to be an advocate for seismic strengthening withinEBMUD, even when the issue of earthquake risk has lostthe attention of the customers.

Funding the Mitigation Program

As noted above, the seismic improvement program wasfunded through direct charges to the customer waterbills. The average residential customer would pay about$20 per year for the next 30 years for these improvements.

The factors used in fairly assigning costs to various usersconsidered the two major benefits of the program: post-earthquake fire flow capacity and post-earthquake drink-ing water supply capacity, where each factor representsone-half the total program cost. The fire flow must beadequate to reasonably protect property from fires follow-ing earthquakes. The drinking water supply must be suf-ficient to ensure adequate water for essential usesdrink-ing and sanitation. Uses such as landscape watering wereconsidered to be non-essential following severe earth-quakes.

Mitigation Program Status

Now entering its fourth year of implementation, theEBMUD Seismic Improvement Program is in fullswing, on track to meet its aggressive ten-year goal of

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An EBMUD crew practices the deploymentof flexible hoses to bypass a damaged sec-tion of a main water distribution line cross-ing a fault.

completion. Over 155 facilities have been upgraded,at a cost of about $34 million, or 17% of the total pro-gram budget.

Below is a status summary of the major seismic miti-gation tasks included in the SIP:

n Planning and preliminary design for the ClaremontWater Conveyance Tunnel is underway.

n The Southern Loop, a new large pipeline, is be-ing designed to allow EBMUD to shuttle waterbetween east and west in the southern part of thedistricts service area.

n Many of the older reservoirs that are either notanchored or inadequately anchored to their foun-dations are being reinforced.

n Many reservoir valve pits, which hold criticalvalves and instruments and have unstable cov-ers, are being upgraded.

n Isolation valves with emergency bypasses forpipelines crossing the Hayward and Calaverasfaults are being installed with the ability to toler-ate the expected 3-5 feet of displacement on the

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Hayward fault, and 2-3 feet of displacement onthe Calaveras fault.

n Designs have been completed for the anchor-ing of critical equipment and storage shelves atthe district office, maintenance, and warehousebuildings. Installation will start in conjunctionwith the building structural upgrades.

n Vulnerable treatment plant systems are beingseismically upgraded.

n Several of the oldest, most vulnerable pumpingplants are being strengthened.

Lessons Learned

Although not quite halfway through the com-plete project, EBMUD officials have learnedseveral important lessons:

n Establishment of specific post-earthquake per-formance goals is a prerequisite in defining thescope and cost of mitigation alternatives neces-sary for responsible decision-making.

n Emphasis on system reliability, rather than indi-vidual facility performance, produces a cost-ef-fective mitigation program.

n To ensure public backing of the mitigation efforts,use outreach and education to develop aware-ness of both the earthquake threat and the po-tential impact on daily life.

n Separating the seismic mitigation monies andmanagement from other capital improvementprojects helps to facilitate cost and scheduletracking, as well as to ensure that an advocatefor seismic risk reduction is always present inthe overall organization.

Photos and text adapted from EBMUD.

Special thanks to Mr. David Lee, P.E, andAndrea Pook of EBMUD for their assistancein developing this case study.

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The SuccessStories:

A Case Study of the LosAngeles UnifiedSchool District

Nonstructural Mitigation Measures

los angeles unified school district

Suspended, unbraced ceiling light-ing typically found in LAUSD class-rooms and vulnerable to damage

Unsecured contents, fixtures, and architectural elementscan be significant life-safety hazards during episodesof strong earthquake ground motion, even when the build-ing they are in has low collapse potential. Although struc-tural strengthening is most often considered the only pathto reduced seismic vulnerability, nonstructural upgrades area necessary and economical protection for people and

property.

There are many relatively simple and cost-ef-fective measures available to reduce the haz-ard from nonstructural items and ensure greateroccupant safety. The suspended lighting retro-fit project conducted by the Los Angeles Uni-fied School District is an example of one suchapproach.

LAUSD

The Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) is second in size only to the NewYork City School District. At present, the dis-trict is composed of over 900 schools, with apopulation of over 800,000 students, andemploys 57,000 full-time and 24,000 part-

time staff. The LAUSD provides public education servicesto a 708 square-mile area, serving the cities of Los Ange-les, Bell, Carson, Cudahay, Gardenia, Huntington Park,Lomita, Maywood, San Fernando, South Gate, Vernon, and

18 success stories

Collapsed pendant light system, typical of dam-age sustained in the 1994 Northridge earth-quake.

West Hollywood; portions of 18other cities; and the unincorporatedareas of Los Angeles County.

The 1994 NorthridgeEarthquake

In the 1994 Northridge earth- quake, 5500 buildings owned byLAUSD were damaged, with totallosses currently estimated at $134million. Seven hundred and fifty-twoclassrooms were deemed unsafe at64 district schools. The vast major-ity of damage was to nonstructuralelements, with suspended ceilingand embedded pendant lightingsystems being the primary contribu-tor. In the week following the earth-quake, 88% of the school sites werereopened, but clean-up efforts wereextensive throughout the district.

At the time of the Northridge earth-quake, the LAUSD facilities con-sisted of about 50 million square feetof building space, of which about 15million square feet were illuminatedwith suspended ceiling and embed-ded pendant lighting systems. Manysuch lights fell from classroom andhallway ceilings during the strongshaking. The quake struck at 4:31am, so no one was in the schools,but had students and teachers beenpresent, some would have been in-jured or killed by the falling light fix-tures.

The Northridge earthquake showedjust how hazardous the existinglighting systems were to buildingoccupants. LAUSD decided to ret-

19los angeles unified school district

Faulty lighting fixtures similar to those foundwithin LAUSD classrooms

rofit or replace the high-risk sus-pended ceiling and embeddedpendant lighting systems in itsclassrooms to reduce the highrisk of injury to the more than800,000 school children duringfuture earthquakes.

The MitigationProgram

A detailed benefit-cost analy- sis was completed for thenonstructural mitigation projectprior to its implementation as atool to help guide the decision-making process. The analysisconsidered not only the obviousfinancial costs of direct classroomdamage and disruption associ-ated with light system collapse,but also the difficult-to-quantify is-sue of student safety. Becauseearthquakes can occur at any timein the 24-hour cycle, the probabil-ity that people will be present andinjured tends to be relatively lowbecause most classrooms are oc-cupied for about a third of the dayduring three-quarters of a year.However, if earthquakes were tostrike during school hours, the in-jury and death rates would bemuch higher than the average as-sumed for a 24-hour or 365-dayperiod. Given the potential forhigh school-hour injury and deathrates, the mitigation project wasconsidered both worthwhile andvery cost-effective.

R o b e r t T . S t a f f o r d D i s a s t e rRelief and Emergency Assistance Act

FEMA provides funding for hazard mitigation activitiesthrough the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, P.L. 93-288,which was amended in 1988 by P.L. 100-707 (the RobertT. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency AssistanceAct.) Two distinct sections of the act provide fundingfor loss reduction measures: Section 404 and Section406.

Section 404Section 404, the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program(HMGP), enables FEMA to make grants to eligible ap-plicants to fund cost-effective measures aimed at pre-venting future damage. The HMGP assists state andlocal communities in implementing long-term mitiga-tion measures.

Section 406Section 406 provides funding for mitigation measuresto be added to the repair or replacement of public fa-cilities damaged in a declared disaster. This funding isabove and beyond the cost to repair the facility to itspre-disaster conditions.

20 success stories

The estimated project costs for replacingor strengthening the vulnerable lightingsystems district-wide averaged approxi-mately $3 per square foot.

Robert T.

Under Section 406 of the Stafford Act, the FederalEmergency Management Agency (FEMA) paid $3.1million to repair the LAUSD lighting systems dam-aged in the Northridge earthquake. In addition, $45million was obligated under Section 404 of theStafford Act (the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program)to reinforce the lights of the same vulnerable designthat did not sustain damage. The estimated projectcosts for replacing or strengthening these lightingsystems district-wide averaged approximately $3 persquare foot.

With the expenditure of these funds, LAUSD is con-fident that the 800,000 school children enrolled dis-trict-wide are in a much safer environment and havemuch less chance of injury or disruption of their edu-cation should other earthquakes strike.

Text adapted from Federal Emergency Man-agement Agency (FEMA) publication, Reduc-ing Risk through Mitigation: Report onCosts and Benefits of Natural HazardMitigation.

Photos courtesy of the EQUIIS PhotographicDatabase and Henry Reyes, S.E., CaliforniaSeismic Safety Commission.

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The SuccessStories:

anheuser-busch van nuys brewery

A Case Study of the Anheuser-Busch Van Nuys Brewery

Where Business Interruption Matters

Aerial View ofthe Van Nuys Brewery

Earthquake mitigation is beneficial for individuals, busi-nesses, and governments. Of the three, businessestend to focus most on the associated economic benefits ofmitigation. If the functioning of a single facility supports alarge segment of a business profit base, it is critical to pro-tect against disruption of its operations. Consideration ofthe benefits associated with avoiding large business inter-ruption losses makes seismic risk mitigation more economi-cally appealing.

The Brewery

Anheuser-Busch operates a large brewery in Van Nuys,California, just a few miles from theepicenter of the January 17, 1994Northridge earthquake. This facility wasoriginally constructed in 1954 and was laterexpanded in 1981. The complex serves thecompanys markets throughout the South-west and Pacific regions, with an annual pro-duction of nearly 12 million barrels. The com-plex includes a number of large buildings witha total replacement value of more than $1.3billion.

Anheuser-Busch has a unique understandingof its seismic risk. In the 1971 San Fernandoearthquake, the Van Nuys brewery was dam-

aged and beer production was interrupted for a prolonged

22 success stories

Anheiser-Busch SeismicRisk Reduction Program

period of time. During this disruption, competitorswere able to make large gains into the Anheuser-Busch market share. This significant financial lossmotivated Anheuser-Busch to place greater value onseismic design in both repaired and new facilities.

In fact, a new Anheuser-Busch brewerybuilt in Fairfield, California, in the mid1980s was designed to seismic standardsmuch higher than those provided in thethen-current building code.

The Risk AssessmentProgram

In the early 1980s, Anheuser-Busch ini- tiated a comprehensive risk reductionprogram for the older Van Nuys breweryto control future damages by decreasingthe vulnerability of the buildings and equip-ment within the facility. The goal was toensure that production following future se-vere earthquakes would be minimally in-terrupted. This tolerance level was es-tablished from reviewing the results of

numerous benefit-cost analyses that consideredmany different mitigation options. All of the analy-

ses attended to the ben-efits associated with pre-venting a prolonged lossof production capacity andminimizing any potentialloss of market share fol-lowing severe earth-quakes. These benefitswere balanced in the ben-efit-cost analysis with thedirect costs of installingthe building and equip-ment upgrades.

The brewery buildings andequipment were assessed for risk, and those withunacceptable levels were seismically upgraded,

23anheuser-busch van nuys brewery

Beer Vat Supports Before andAfter being Braced

New Bracing

Typical Damage Sustained to theLow-risk, Unstrengthened Build-ings during 1994 NorthridgeEarthquake

Minor loss ofArchitectural Finish

without affecting daily operations. Seismic reinforce-ments were designed for a number of buildings andthe critical equipment therein, including buildingshousing beverage production and large horizontaltanks for beer fermenting, storage, and aging. Otherlow-risk buildings, less important to operations andjudged not to be life-safety hazards, were screenedout of the process, thereby ensuring the most effi-cient use of limited resources. The total cost of thestrengthening program was about $11 million, less

than 1% of the total facility replacement cost.

The Earthquake

The 1994 Northridge earthquake produced verystrong ground motion, causing partial col-lapses and extensive damage to many buildingsin the immediate vicinity of the brewery. However,post-earthquake surveys conducted by Anheuser-Buschs engineering consultants showed that noneof the retrofitted structures sustained significant dam-age, nor did equipment essential to the brewerysoperations. Additionally, there were no major em-ployee injuries associated with the earthquake. Otheron-site buildings and equipment that had not beenstrengthened in the 1980s did sustain damage, re-quiring about $17 million in repairs. The brewery wasquickly returned to nearly full operation in seven daysfollowing minor cleanup and repairs, and the resto-ration of the off-site water supply. Anheuser-Buschlost none of their pre-earthquake market share,which had been the overriding goal of the seismicrisk reduction program.

The Payoff

Anheuser-Busch estimated that their facility would have suffered a direct property loss of about$350 million from the Northridge earthquake had there beenno seismic strengthening. This averted damage is morethan 30 times the actual cost of the brewerys loss controlprogram. Conservative estimates of direct and businessinterruption losses at the breweryhad there been no

24 success stories

strengtheningcouldhave exceeded $750million, over 60 times thecost of the mitigationprogram. In turn, marketshare losses wouldhave exceeded the di-rect and business inter-ruption losses. Clearly,the loss control program

paid for itself in theNorthridge earthquake.The Anheuser-Busch casestudy shows how effec-tively mitigation measurescan protect corporate bal-ance sheets.

In Contrast . . .

The Hakutsuru Sake Brewery in Kobe,Japan, was subjected to severe groundshaking in the 1995 Great Hanshinearthquake. The very strong groundshaking intensities at the Hakutsurusite were comparable to those at theAnheuser-Busch Van Nuys Brewery ayear earlier. However, theunretrofitted sake fermentation tanks,similar to the Van Nuys beer vats,collapsed because of the lack of brac-ing, resulting in a complete shutdown ofsake production for nearly 8 months.In contrast, the well-braced Van Nuysbeer vats sustained no damage in theNorthridge earthquake and beer pro-duction was not disrupted.

New Shear Walls

Photos courtesy ofEQE International, Inc.

Failed Fermentation Tank Supports

Hakutsuru Sake Brewery

After

Before

The Brewhouse Beforeand After Seismic Ret-rofitting.

25berkeley unified school district

The SuccessStories: Public Leadership and Expectations

A Case Study of the BerkeleyUnified School District

50% Almost none/None28% All or nearly all

10% More or about half9% Less than half3% Unknown

51% Almost none/None19% Unknown

11% More or about half11% Less than half8% All or nearly all

Public School Seismic Safety Survey

A survey reported in June 1999 by the University of Cali-fornia, Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism for theLos Angeles Times of nearly 200 public school districts inthe nine Bay Area counties, as well as Los Angeles andOrange counties, revealed the following:

Structural Evaluations:Only 28% of the surveyed districts have seismically evalu-ated all or some of their buildings. Nearly 50% had evalu-ated none or nearly none.

Retrofits Needed:Yet, nearly 51% of the surveyed districts believe their build-ings do not need any seismic retrofitting.

Earthquake preparedness and hazard mitigation are notthe most pressing daily problems for most public andprivate institutions in California. Public school districts are

no exception. Most school administratorsand teachers have many other items on theirTO DO lists. Many also hold the popular,but incorrect, idea that school buildings con-structed under the auspices of the Califor-nia Field Act are safe by definition. Manyschool officials and parents think that pre-paredness consists of having water bottlesand granola bars stored at school sites. Simi-larly, they point to some bookcases and filecabinets bolted to walls as evidence of ahazard mitigation program.

Without some other motivation, earthquakepreparedness and hazard mitigation wouldcontinue to remain a low priority. In the caseof the Berkeley Unified School District(BUSD), the Loma Prieta earthquake startedthe seismic safety ball rolling. BUSD initi-ated its earthquake risk assessment andhazard mitigation program because parentsand the school board became concernedabout potential school damages in earth-quakes. The BUSD story shows how a com-munity came together to make earthquakepreparedness a top district priority.

26 success stories

Cragmont Elementary School is locatedwithin the Alquist-Priolo Earthquake FaultZone.

Most of BUSDs buildings were older, builtmostly in the 1920s and 1930s.

BUSD

The Berkeley Unified School District (BUSD)serves about 9,500 students primarily within theCity of Berkeley, California.BUSD is a typical, older ur-ban school district, compris-ing twelve elementaryschools, three middleschools, one high school, analternative school campus,and several support build-ings. The districts newestbuilding, Cragmont Elemen-tary School, was con-structed in 1965, but most ofits other schools were builtin the 1920s and 1930s.

BUSD is located inAlameda County, one of the most seismically activeareas in the country. The Hayward fault cuts throughthe eastern edge of the district boundary, and sev-eral of the districts campuses are located in closeproximity to the fault trace. Within the Alquist-PrioloEarthquake Fault Zone, an area about mile widealong known faults in California, new constructionmust be reviewed and specially engineered.Cragmont Elementary is within the Alquist-PrioloEarthquake Fault Zone for the Hayward fault.

The Earthquake

The October, 1989, Loma Prieta earthquakecaused little damage in Berkeley, but it did alerta number of parents to how poorly prepared theschool district was for a future, more proximate earth-quake. In late October of that same year, severalinquisitive PTA mothers queried the principal of theirchildrens school about its earthquake preparednessplans and emergency supplies. Dissatisfied with thesituation at that school, they took their concerns tothe School Board. In talks with a high-ranking dis-

27berkeley unified school district

The Katz Bill

Adopted in 1984, the Katz Bill (Cali-fornia Education Code Sections35295, 35296, & 35297) requiresthat all public and private elemen-tary, middle and high schools withenrollments of 50 or more studentsestablish an earthquake emergencysystem. Specifically, the bill re-quires schools to develop earthquakeresponse and recovery plans, con-duct periodic duck-and-cover drills,train staff and students for earth-quake safety and response, and miti-gate seismic hazards in school build-ings. However, since no funding hasbeen appropriated by the State Leg-islature to support school prepared-ness efforts and there is no real pen-alty for non-compliance, very fewCalifornia schools have developedand implemented comprehensiveearthquake preparedness and miti-gation programs as intended by thebill.

trict administrator, they determined that the districts emer-gency plans were out-of-date, teachers and staff werenttrained in disaster response, communications equipmentwas scarce and outmoded, and few first aid, water, or foodsupplies were stored in any facility.

The mothers took this information back to their PTA groupand, in November 1989, the individual PTA involved thelarger PTA Council in discussions with the school board.The board shared the parents concern for the lack of re-sources. During December 1989 and January 1990, thePTA Council members gathered information on earthquakerisk from various Bay Area seismic safety informationsources. A wealth of the collected information was pre-sented to the school board every time it met in those months.

Among the salient points consistently mentioned by theparents were: (1) the high probability of a damaging earth-quake on the Hayward fault, (2) the location of a few ofBUSDs schools near that fault, and (3) the potential forstrong ground shaking all over Berkeley during an earth-quake centered on that fault. The PTA Council also re-

minded board members of the Katz Bill, the Californialaw requiring that schools plan for earthquakes andmitigate their nonstructural hazards.

Finally, in part because the geologic observations andrisk information were persuasive, and in part becauseof the PTA lobbying efforts, the school board decidedin February 1990 to spend $193,000 for comprehen-sive earthquake planning and preparedness. The fund-ing came from the Districts Reserve for Economic Un-certainties, an emergency fund required by the state ofall school districts.

Following both the specifications of the Katz Bill andthe recommendations in a 1989 California State De-partment of Education report, BUSD undertook the fol-lowing tasks:

n Developing a comprehensive, district-wide disasterpreparedness plan and site-specific plans for allschools and all departments.

... in part because of the PTA lob-bying efforts, the school board de-cided in February 1990 to spend$193,000 for comprehensive earth-quake planning and preparedness.

28 success stories

n Training all staff in the elements of the plans, aswell as an instruction program in first aid and CPRstaffed by district personnel.

n Acquiring and stockpiling emergency and medi-cal supplies for all district schools, back-up com-munications equipment using a variety of powersources, and two days worth of food and water ateach school.

n Completing an engineering study of the structuralhazards at several schools and nonstructural haz-ards at each school.

The EngineeringStudy

The results of the engineeringstudy for the first six schoolswere delivered to the school dis-trict in September, 1990. The re-port indicated that two of thedistricts elementary schools,Whittier/Arts Magnet andCragmont Elementary, were po-tential collapse hazards in a seri-ous Hayward fault earthquake.This news was especially distress-

ing since Cragmont was the flagship Berkeley school.Prior to retrofitting the school, the site required fur-ther geological investigation. The geological inves-tigation revealed a number of problems that made

Jefferson Junior High School inLong Beach was one of many publicschool buildings that sustained heavydamage in the 1933 Long Beach earth-quake and initiated numerous early effortsto improve public school seismic safety.

Whittier/Arts Magnet School was identi-fied as being a high-risk structure with thepotential for collapse in a serious Haywardearthquake.

29

In 1990, United States GeologicalSurvey (USGS) estimated thatthere was a 67% chance for a dam-aging earthquake on a major BayArea fault in the next 30 years.

All of the BUSD schools were builtunder older Field Act provisions.

berkeley unified school district

Luther Burbank School in LongBeach sustained significant

damage in the 1933 Long Beachearthquake.

seismic retrofitting of the existing school almost impossible.

Many people were surprised and shocked by the engineer-ing report, perhaps because they believed in the inherentsafety of Field Act schools. The Field Act, enacted follow-ing the 1933 Long Beach earthquake, when many schoolbuildings were severely damaged, established the practiceof building California schools to more rigorous standards

than those offered in the conventional building code.Act provisions have been updated many times overthe last 60 years as the understanding of earthquakesand building response has improved. However, aschool that met the 1965 Field Act design and con-struction regulations might not meet the 1991 regu-lations, and may be considered unsafe.

Additionally, with the seismic report of the first sixsites already in print, the school board was advisedthat it had a legal imperative to act to protect thechildren in the hazardous schools. In the meantimeand quite coincidentally, the United States Geologi-cal Survey (USGS) published, and disseminatedin millions of Sunday newspapers, a tabloid book-let called The Next Big Earthquake in the Bay AreaMay Come Sooner Than You Think. This bookletreported the new results of geological studies onBay Area earthquake probabilities: they were evenhigher than previously estimateda 67% chancefor a damaging earthquake on a major Bay Area

fault in the next 30 years.

Further impetus to close the hazardous schools came fromtwo additional players. The Office of the State Architect (OSA,now the Division of the State Architect), the California stateagency responsible for the structural safety of Californiaschools, reviewed the engineering report and concurred withits conclusions. It happened also that the parent of a childin one of the suspect schools was a prominent structuralengineer. Not only did he agree with the findings, but healso wrote a long letter to the district and met with the As-sistant Superintendent. His ability to speak as both a tech-nical specialist and a concerned parent had an immediateeffect. The Superintendent recommended closure of the

30 success stories

Following the engineering survey, theseismically unsafe Cragmont Elemen-tary School was ordered vacated bythe School Board.

high-risk buildings at both school sites. The SchoolBoard approved this recommendation. The boardfurther voted to evaluate all the other buildings inthe district.

The district was faced with challenges in financingthe engineering study, the movement of the students,and the preparation of space to house the students.The Associate Superintendent, Anton Jungherr, pro-vided the financial and operational leadershipneeded to finance the improvements and organizethe efforts of the district facilities staff and the com-munity process. A key hire was the leader of the

PTA who had been instru-mental in raising publicawareness of the issue.She proved invaluable inpressuring the State of Cali-fornia into helping the be-leaguered district fund aportion of the costs.

In February, 1991, BUSDreceived the structural riskassessment reports for therest of its school sites and

the news was not good. The engineers had identi-fied significant structural deficiencies in six additionalbuildings. Three more elementary schools werefound to be potentially hazardous, two of which werenon-ductile concrete frame buildings, and one wasa wood frame structure built in the 1920s. The non-ductile concrete cafeteria at Berkeley High Schoolwas also ranked as a serious collapse hazard. Inresponse to these reports, the district changed theuse or completely vacated the newly identified high-risk structures.

Finding the Funding

BUSDs first financial move was to issue Certifi-cates of Participation (COPs). This is a methodof borrowing against the property value of the school

BUSDs first move to finance the pro-gram was to issue Certificates of Par-ticipation (COPs).

31

SAB was consistently reluctant tofund BUSD seismic strengtheningproject and create a new state-wide precedent.

berkeley unified school district

Alquist-Priolo Act

Passed in 1972, the Alquist-Priolo EarthquakeFault Zoning Acts main purpose is to preventthe construction of buildings used for humanoccupancy on the surface trace of activefaults. This state law was a direct result ofthe 1971 San Fernando Earthquake, which wasassociated with extensive surface fault rup-tures that damaged numerous homes, com-mercial buildings, and other structures.

The Act specifically prohibits public schoolbuildings from being constructed within the so-called Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zones(Special Studies Zones prior to January 1,1994), regulatory regions around active faultsthat average about one-quarter mile wide.

district. The COPs paid for the relocation effort necessaryto immediately address the student safety issue, as well asthe district-wide engineering study. The Associate Super-intendent worked against an extremely tight schedule inorder to receive this financing in time to avoid finishing thefiscal year with a deficit.

At the same time, an application was made to the State Al-location Board (SAB) for grants to modernize theseismically unsafe portions of the two schools already foundto be hazardous. The State Allocation Board is a state

agency that allocates state funding for schoolfacilities in California.

The chief concerns of the SAB with respect toBUSDs request were that funding BUSDwould set a precedent for other urban schooldistricts in California to request retrofit money.BUSD, like many urban districts in California(and the rest of the country), consists of typi-cally older school buildings whose safety isconsidered to be questionable because: (1) thebuildings were built before the 1971 SanFernando earthquake, which brought about adramatic change in seismic building codes,and (2) they were sometimes sited in faultzones before the 1972 Alquist-Priolo Earth-quake Fault Zoning Act prohibited that forschools. It was also thought by those in chargeat the SAB to be a most inopportune time for

the State of California to be setting such a precedent, sinceit was becoming clear that the state budget deficit was ap-proaching $13 billion.

The school district also applied to the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA) for hazard mitigation grants.In the counties affected by the Loma Prieta earthquake,FEMA offered matching funds to public and private sectororganizations proposing hazard reduction projects. By 1998,the BUSD had been promised more than $6 million inmatching funds from FEMA for its seismic strengtheningprogram.

The State Allocation Board is astate agency that allocates statefunding for school facilities inCalifornia.

32 success stories

BUSD determined that it was necessary tofloat a local bond issue to finance a 10-year-phased school reconstruction plan.

... BUSD raised serious questions aboutthe equity of school facilities funding inCalifornia

Over time, and despite repeated requests, the SABwas consistently reluctant to fund the BUSD seis-mic strengthening project; on one occasion it refusedapproval on the grounds that the relatively newer1965 Cragmont school buildings were less than 30years old and therefore not eligible under SAB policyguidelines for modernization. Matching funds for theother high-risk school building were also not ap-proved because modernization projects are usuallynot allowed to use more than 5% of total monies forstructural rehabilitation. The state further constrainsthat the total expenditure on modernizing and struc-turally retrofitting a school building does not exceed75% of the buildings total replacement value (asdefined by the state); the potential costs for the struc-tural upgrades would approach that cap.

Nonetheless, the district continued initiatives to getmoney from the state. In so doing, it has raised seri-

ous questions about the equity ofschool facilities funding in Cali-fornia in the recent past. Nearlyall of the State Allocation Boardfunds to school districts go to buildnew schools in suburban areas, yetit is the voters in urban areas thatgive the school bonds their winningmargins. Before 1992, $4.9 billionin state school bonds had been ap-proved by California voters, but lessthan 10% of those funds were givento older urban districts. For example,prior to 1992, Alameda County re-

ceived one-quarter of 1% of the total and San Fran-cisco County received 1%.

In response to this perceived inequity, legislators fromthe East Bay succeeded in adding, to a pending stateschools bond on the June, 1992 ballot, two proposi-tions (152 and 155) to increase monies available toolder urban districts. Proposition 152, for example,allowed for up to $570 million of its total $1.9 billionto be used for financing the seismic upgrade of oldschool structures.

33berkeley unified school district

... the Oakland-Berkeley hillscaught on fire in October 1991.

Demolition of seismically unsafeCragmont Elementary Schoolwas done to accommodate theconstruction of a new, moderncampus after passage ofBerkeleys Measure A.

A New Funding Approach

The school district determined that it was neces-sary to float a local bond issue to finance a ten-yearphased school reconstruction plan. The plan included bothseismic retrofitting for the vulnerable structures and neededmodernization for all the schools in the district. The mod-ernization would involve, by law, bringing all the schoolsup to speed with fire codes, other pertinent structural codes,child welfare regulations, and disabled accessibility stan-dards. School board members and school administratorsbegan to think strategically about the best time to put themeasure on the local ballot, especially in light of the grow-ing budget crisis and recession in California. They werefurther worried about their prospects for getting the neces-sary 67% approval to pass the measure, since similar bondreferenda had recently fallen a little short of that figure inneighboring communities.

As they were considering all the possibilities, the Oakland-Berkeley hills caught on fire in October 1991. Though noschools were damaged, some came frightfully close. Thatthe fire burned the area underlain by the Hayward fault didmuch to remind people that earthquakes cause fires too,

and to raise the hazard aware-ness of the citizens in the commu-nity. The fire in their own back-yards showed people, as the dis-tant Loma Prieta earthquake hadnot, of how vulnerable theschools were to catastrophe.Shortly after the smoke cleared,the school board decided to putMeasure A for Schools on theJune 1992 ballot. The measureproposed to raise $158 million forschool reconstruction, of which

$90 million was to be spent on seismic retrofitting.

The fire, as well as an effective campaign, led the voters ofBerkeley to pass Measure A by 70.7%, one of the largestvictory margins for any bond measure in the State of Cali-fornia. On the same day, the State School Facilities Bond

34 success stories

Seismically upgrading the two BerkeleyHigh School buildings was the first schoolearthquake retrofit project to be fundedwith California school bond money.

Measures, Propositions 152 and 155, also passedby a significant margin. For the first time since theuse of state bond measures, older urban districtsgained access to SAB-distributed funds for substan-tial renovation projects.

At the end of June, the SABfinally authorized a state con-tribution to the Whittier/ArtsMagnet modernization project,a project first proposed in Oc-tober 1990. Later, near theend of June 1993, the SABapproved the repair of twoBerkeley High School build-ings the first school seismicretrofit project ever to befunded with California schoolbond money.

Project Status

Earthquake planning and hazard mitigation in theBerkeley Unified School District did not happenquickly, and required commitment and hard work.

However, BUSD person-nel, students, and their par-ents are better preparedand trained for the next bigearthquake now than theyever were before. Andthey are all working, study-ing, and teaching in amuch safer environment.

Seismic strengthening ofall of the high and moderate risk schools, 13 cam-puses in all, will be completed or nearing comple-tion by the ten-year anniversary of the Loma Prietaearthquake.

35berkeley unified school district

The new Columbus ElementarySchool replaces its seismicallyunsafe predecessor.

The lessons from the BUSD experience are clear:

n Ordinary citizens can take the initiative to ensure that ad-equate seismic preparations have been made by thepublic agencies in their community.

n Understanding the potential risk is key to sound deci-sion-making.

n The public has high expectations of school performancein earthquakes, but voters are willing to contribute to im-proving school safety.

n Diligent pursuit of public funding is required for success.

Text adapted from the California Governors Office ofEmergency Services Earthquake Program publication,Unacceptable Risk: Earthquake Hazard Mitigationin One California School District.

For their assistance and support in the development ofthis case study, special thanks are due to ArriettaChakos, City of Berkeley, and Lewis Jones, BerkeleyUnified School District.

Photos courtesy of the EQUIIS Photographic Data-base and Berkeley Unified School District.

37

The SuccessStories:

The California State BuildingSeismic Program

ca state building seismic program

Managing Mitigation for Large Inventories

The Jesse Unruh Legislative Of-fice Building in Sacramento wasidentified as being seismicallyvulnerable and was strengthenedusing Proposition 122 monies.

Many organizations with large building inventories areaware that they have a significant earthquake risk.However, due to the inventorys size, the problem may seemtoo big to manage. Fearing that the cost of upgrade for somany buildings may be much higher than could reason-ably be financed, many organizations elect to manage theproblem after the factby repairing damage when it occurs.However, this is not prudent management; it leaves the or-ganization vulnerable to extensive asset loss and may place

their employees and the public at substantial risk.

In most large inventories, the principal sources of seis-mic risk will be concentrated in a relatively small por-tion of the portfolio. A thorough risk assessment canhelp to make the problem manageable when it in-cludes screening to eliminate from consideration prop-erties at negligible risk and to focus available re-sources on properties at the most significant risk.Once the principal sources of risk have been identi-fied, the mitigation program can be coordinated with

the organizations overall asset management plan so thathigh-risk structures can be mitigated through normal attri-tion and acquisition procedures.

The efforts undertaken by the California Division of the StateArchitect to assess and mitigate the earthquake vulnerabili-ties of nearly 16,000 state-owned buildings is an excellentexample of how a seemingly overwhelming problem ofmanaging earthquake risk can be methodically reduced anddealt with.

38 success stories

Proposition 122

In 1990, the California Legislature enacted theEarthquake Safety and Public Buildings Rehabili-tation Bond Act (SB 1250, Torres), authorizing $300million in general obligation bonds through Proposi-tion 122. Most of the bond monies - $250 million -were earmarked for financing the, retrofit, reconstruc-tion, repair, replacement or relocation of State build-ings (exclusive of UC and CSU buildings and otherleased facilities which are addressed under sepa-rate legislation) identified as seismically hazardous.

The remaining $50 million was allocated to local gov-ernments through financial assistance to help miti-gate their essential service buildings. The Divisionof the State Architect (DSA) was assigned the taskof evaluating the inventory of buildings and manag-ing the mitigation program, in consultation with theSeismic Safety Commission and its Public BuildingsPriority Committee.

39ca state building seismic program

The Library and Courts Buildingin Sacramento was identified asa high-risk building by the DSA 5-Step process. To mitigate theseismic risk, as well as preserveits historical significance, the roofof the building was removed toaccommodate the installation ofnew strengthening measures.

Developing the Evaluation Process

In order to fulfill its mandate, DSA developed a comprehensive building risk evaluation andmitigation prioritization process. The pro-cess was designed to identify the potentialvulnerability for each of the 16,000 build-ings, and to evaluate its seismic risk rela-tive to other buildings in the inventory.Recognizing that the number of buildingsin need of seismic retrofitting would re-quire a budget exceeding the availablefunding, DSA placed particular empha-sis on ranking the buildings to determinewhich ones were high priorities for ret-rofit or replacement.

The first step was a building vulnerability assessment, whichincluded consideration of site soil type; potential groundshaking intensity and other geotechnical factors; the struc-tural, mechanical and electrical systems capabilities to with-stand earthquakes; and the occupancy, function, and futureuse of each building.

To consistently rate the seismic risk for the many differentbuildings of various functions, DSA established a risk-rank-

ing matrix. Each building was assigned a RiskLevel ranging from I for a buildingwhich is expected to have nearly perfectperformance, to VII for a building whichis considered unsafe in its current condi-tion (even without an earthquake) andshould be vacated immediately. Theserisk levels served as a common yardstickalong which the consulting structural engi-neers could place each building they stud-ied.

Once a specific risk level was assigned to abuilding, the acceptability of that risk was

judged against the buildings function. Essential facilitieswere defined as less tolerant of risk. For instance, hospi-tals and emergency communications centers should remainoperational following a major earthquake. On the other hand,

40 success stories

The former Broadway department store building in downtown Los Angeles wasmodernized and seismically strengthened to house more than a dozen stateagencies currently scattered throughout the city in other high-risk buildings.

a warehouse or other less important facility wouldbe allowed to sustain greater damage, resulting ingreater downtime and disruption of use. The gen-eral principle was established that all buildingsshould withstand earthquakes without collapse, withoccupants able to exit safely, and such that functionscan be resumed or relocated in a timely manner con-sistent with the need for services after earthquakes.

41ca state building seismic program

Division of State Architect5-Step Evaluation Process

To Legislature for FinalFunding Approval

Step 1

Preliminary StructuralReview & Screening

~16,000buildings

Step 2

Detailed StructuralReview

~450buildings

~1,242buildings

50buildings

Step 3

Initial RiskRanking

Step 4

Cost Modelling

Step 5

Final Ranking &Recommendations

50buildings

The 5-Step Evaluation Process

The evaluation methodology employed by DSA wasnamed the 5-Step Evaluation Process, where eachsubsequent step entailed a more rigorous level of technicalevaluation.

Step 1 Preliminary Structural Review & Screening

First, DSA distributed a general building survey to all stateagencies that owned buildings. This was intended to col-lect the basic data necessary to conduct a preliminary struc-tural assessment and to screen out the structures with obvi-ously low vulnerabilities. As a first step, 2,000 buildingswere eliminated from further consideration either becausethey were slated for vacating or demolition within the nextfive years, they were small (less than 1,500 square feet), orhad little or no occupancy. Of the remaining 14,000 build-ings, only 1,242 (8%) with the highest rankings were for-warded to the next step.

Step 2 - Structural Review

In the second step, DSA staff engineers reviewed each for-warded building survey to determine respective seismicvulnerabilities. This involved additional engineering analy-sis based upon available drawings, soils reports, structuralcalculations, and expected site seismicity. Structures withthe most significant performance concerns, about 450 build-ings (36%), were passed onto the next step.

Step 3 - Initial Risk Ranking

The principal intent of the legislation and the bond act wasthe reduction of the population at risk due to earthquakes.It was therefore necessary to consider population in orderto assist in establishing mitigation priorities. As expressedby effective occupancy, population for each building wasdefined as the product of its allowable occupancy as estab-lished in the California Building Code (CBC) and the hoursof use.

Following calculation of the population at risk in each build-ing, the combined factors of building vulnerability and popu-lation were used to prioritize the properties in terms of seis-

42 success stories

The new Hyram W. Johnson State OfficeBuilding in San Francisco was built toreplace several high-risk buildings thatpreviously housed several state agencies.The new building is immediately adjacentto the historically significant old StateOffice Building, which also was strength-ened and modernized to reduce its seis-mic risk.

mic risk. The resultant list identified the buildingsrepresenting the highest potential risk to occupantlife safety.

The 50 most vulnerable buildings from that exercisewere then selected and assigned to private consult-ants for more detailed evaluation and assignment ofa risk level in accordance with DSA criteria. Thenumber selected for more detailed evaluation wasdetermined in light of limited time and funds for miti-gation. Initially, approximately 100 buildings were

cons ide red ,using an allow-ance of $100per square footas a guide topotential retrofitcosts. Those100 wouldhave required atotal of approxi-mately $800million for up-grade, whichvastly ex-ceeded the$250 mill ionprovided byP r o p o s i t i o n122. The final

50 buildings selected required $300 million in miti-gation costs, a value more consistent with the avail-able funds.

Step 4 - Cost Models

In the fourth step, cost models were developed forthree mitigation scenarios: (1) structural retrofit only(for buildings that may have recently undergone re-cent building system renovation); (2) full retrofit of thestructure and other building systems; and (3) com-plete replacement of the building. These cost mod-els considered the anticipated hard costs for thestructural and mechanical upgrades, all soft costs

43ca state building seismic program

The East Block Building at SanQuentin Prison was identified asbeing a high-risk building requir-ing retrofitting.

for fees and inspections, and other related costs for mov-ing, temporary leasing, relocation of telephone and data sys-tems, and other applicable items.

Aware of the difficulties of accurately calculating remodel-ing and retrofitting costs, DSA and the cost estimators de-

cided that it was impractical and in-effective to attempt to develop de-tailed cost estimates for each build-ing and option. Therefore, a series ofgeneric unit costs was developed toprovide a reasonable estimate of theprobable cost of each element withinthe total cost. These unit costs werederived from a database of actualcompleted state projects.

Based on the estimate of potentialcosts, Benefit-Cost Ratios (BCR)were developed to help determinethe most cost-effective utilization of

the available mitigation monies and to set priorities. TheBCR was defined as the cost of mitigation divided by theeffective occupancy. If all the buildings were at the samerisk level (with similar anticipated performance in an earth-quake), the BCR could be stated as dollars expended inrelationship to the number of lives protected.

Step 5 - Final Recommendations

The final step of the evaluation process involved assigningpriorities to buildings for retrofit or replacement, and forward-ing those recommendations to the Department of Financeand the Legislature for consideration. Life safety was theoverriding priority of the State Building Seismic Program.The final recommendations were intended to mitigate thebuildings with the greatest threat to life safety, which meantchoosing buildings with the highest risk level.

Once a building was identified as high risk, DSA had torecommend the type of mitigation to use. To determinewhether a building should be retrofit or replaced, as well asto ensure consistency in the recommendations, DSA es-tablished certain thresholds. If the cost of retrofitting ex-

Life safety was the overriding pri-ority of the State Building SeismicProgram.

44 success stories

California Asset Manage-ment Coordinating Council

In 1991, Governor Wilson signed ExecutiveOrder W-18-91, creating the CaliforniaAsset Management Coordinating Counciland outlined the criteria for creation ofthe first long-term strategic plan for theState of Californias office space needs.The result is a series of regional plansacross the State which provide forcomprehensive management of the Statesreal estate assets. The regional plans arethe basis of the Governors AssetManagement Program (administered bythe Real Estate & Building Division) andis intended to cut costs and improveefficiency.

In deciding whether a building should beretrofitted or replaced, certain thresholdswere established by the DSA.

ceeded a certain percentage of the replacement cost(cost of new construction), the final recommendationfavored replacement, as a new building with a longerperiod of usage was considered more desirable. Aseries of graduated thresholds was developed fordifferent types of building functions. For instance, ifthe retrofit costs for an office building were less than60% of the estimated replacement cost, retrofittingwould proceed. Similarly, the threshold for hospitalswas set at 80%.

Asset Management

The application of sound asset management principles was an integral part of Californias state-wide mitigation efforts. As buildings are consideredfor mitigation, it is essential to consider the long rangeneeds of the various agencies and their capital out-lay plans. Therefore, the Governors Asset Manage-ment Program and the State Building Seismic Pro-gram worked together as partners in the reduction ofseismic risk in state-owned buildings.

DSA carefully coordinated identifying state buildingsfor use of Proposition 122 funding with the AssetManagement Program and with the planning effortsof affected agencies. Many of the state-owned build-ings recommended for mitigation by DSA were al-ready designated by the Department of General Ser-vices (DGS) for replacement or renovation under theAsset Management Program. The Asset Manage-ment Program has access to a variety of fundingsources and approaches, which eased the demandfor seismic mitigation funds. Additionally, utilizationof private sector development techniques and fund-ing resources helped enable completion of moreprojects in a shorter period of time. Thus, the part-nership with the Asset Management Program al-lowed for addressing seismic risk reduction in a ho-listic manner, effectively accomplishing more thanthe seismic funds alone would have allowed.

45ca state building seismic program

The strengthening of East BlockBuilding at San Quentin Prison.

Since final legislative approval in1997, nine of the 50 buildings iden-tified as being high seismic riskshave been mitigated. Twelve moreare in the process of being strength-ened or replaced, and the remain-der are in the planning and designstages, with work scheduled to be-gin within the next few years. Of the$250 million dollars allocated to theState Building Seismic Program,about $40 million remainsunallocated, allowing for thestrengthening of ten additional build-ings ranked as seismically vulner-able and a high-risk to occupants.

Special thanks are due to Joel McRonald, CaliforniaDepartment of General Services, for his assistanceand support in developing this case study.

Photos courtesy of the California Department of Gen-eral Services, Turner/Vanir Construction Management,Page & Turnbull, and EQE International, Inc.

47conclusions

The SuccessStories:

Conclusions

The preceding Mitigation Success Stories illustrate theefforts of Californians to improve earthquake safety andminimize the potential for future catastrophic losses in theircommunities. The stories provide snapshots of public andprivate earthquake loss reduction and risk managementprojects completed or currently underway in California. Theydemonstrate that many Californians believe it is both pos-sible and important to protect lives, property, and economicwell-being against the impacts of Californias inevitable nextearthquake.

Review of these case studies can provide valuable insightsinto the earthquake risk management decision-making pro-cess:

Earthquake risk is real. In all five case studies, keydecision-makers recognized the potential for strongearthquake shaking, large enough to cause injury ordeaths, extensive damage, and prolonged disruptionof normal operations. Nearly every location withinCalifornia is vulnerable to damaging earthquakes andcould lose buildings and infrastructure. Every man-ager in California, whether in the public or privatesector, has a responsibility to understand and man-age this risk.

+

48 success stories

Understanding the risk is key to respon-sible decision-making. Before any decisionsare made or mitigation actions initiated, makea methodical assessment of the size andscope of the earthquake risk. In the East BayMunicipal Utility District, Anheuser-Busch,Berkeley Unified School District, and State ofCalifornia case studies, systematic assess-ment efforts were the first step in the overallmitigation process. The assessments identi-fied specific vulnerabilities and their implica-tions for overall post-earthquake performance.This allowed for the pinpointing of critical fa-cilities, helped in prioritization of specific miti-gation tasks, and permitted the screening-outof risks considered acceptable.

All potential losses must be considered.Costs are not limited to those associated withdirect property damage. Prolonged loss ofservice or failing to meet public expectationswill impose large costs immediately and overtime following earthquakes. One of the keyinfluences on the selection of the East Bay Mu-nicipal Utility Districts mitigation schemewas the estimated $1.5 billion in communityeconomic losses that could be sustained if noaction were taken. Similarly, both the Los An-geles and Berkeley Unified School Districtshad to include in their analyses the public ex-pectation that children must be protected fromserious injury or death while at school.

Earthquake mitigation really does work.The ability of the Anheuser-Busch Van Nuysbrewery to resume full operations within a fewdays of the devastating 1994 Northridge earth-quake illustrates the benefits of mitigation.Contrasting the Anheuser-Busch success withthe losses sustained by the same facility fol-lowing the 1971 San Fernando earthquake,as well as with those sustained by a similarlyconstructed sake brewery in Japan, makes it

+

+

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49conclusions

clear that an earthquake mitigation program reducedearthquake losses and ensured a desired level ofpost-earthquake performance. The Anheuser-BuschVan Nuys brewery is the best example of a retrofittedfacility being tested by a major earthquake, and pass-ing.

Each manager must anticipate the question Are you pre-pared for Californias next earthquake?

The organizations showcased in these Mitigation SuccessStories have already answered this question, and they areclearly taking the necessary preparedness steps.

Can you make the same claim?

47conclusions

The SuccessStories:

Conclusions

The preceding Mitigation Success Stories illustrate theefforts of Californians to improve earthquake safety andminimize the potential for future catastrophic losses in theircommunities. The stories provide snapshots of public andprivate earthquake loss reduction and risk managementprojects completed or currently underway in California. Theydemonstrate that many Californians believe it is both pos-sible and important to protect lives, property, and economicwell-being against the impacts of Californias inevitable nextearthquake.

Review of these case studies can provide valuable insightsinto the earthquake risk management decision-making pro-cess:

Earthquake risk is real. In all five case studies, keydecision-makers recognized the potential for strongearthquake shaking, large enough to cause injury ordeaths, extensive damage, and prolonged disruptionof normal operations. Nearly every location withinCalifornia is vulnerable to damaging earthquakes andcould lose buildings and infrastructure. Every man-ager in California, whether in the public or privatesector, has a responsibility to understand and man-age this risk.

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48 success stories

Understanding the risk is key to respon-sible decision-making. Before any decisionsare made or mitigation actions initiated, makea methodical assessment of the size andscope of the earthquake risk. In the East BayMunicipal Utility District, Anheuser-Busch,Berkeley Unified School District, and State ofCalifornia case studies, systematic assess-ment efforts were the first step in the overallmitigation process. The assessments identi-fied specific vulnerabilities and their implica-tions for overall post-earthquake performance.This allowed for the pinpointing of critical fa-cilities, helped in prioritization of specific miti-gation tasks, and permitted the screening-outof risks considered acceptable.

All potential losses must be considered.Costs are not limited to those associated withdirect property damage. Prolonged loss ofservice or failing to meet public expectationswill impose large costs immediately and overtime following earthquakes. One of the keyinfluences on the selection of the East Bay Mu-nicipal Utility Districts mitigation schemewas the estimated $1.5 billion in communityeconomic losses that could be sustained if noaction were taken. Similarly, both the Los An-geles and Berkeley Unified School Districtshad to include in their analyses the public ex-pectation that children must be protected fromserious injury or death while at school.

Earthquake mitigation really does work.The ability of the Anheuser-Busch Van Nuysbrewery to resume full operations within a fewdays of the devastating 1994 Northridge earth-quake illustrates the benefits of mitigation.Contrasting the Anheuser-Busch success withthe losses sustained by the same facility fol-lowing the 1971 San Fernando earthquake,as well as with those sustained by a similarlyconstructed sake brewery in Japan, makes it

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49conclusions

clear that an earthquake mitigation program reducedearthquake losses and ensured a desired level ofpost-earthquake performance. The Anheuser-BuschVan Nuys brewery is the best example of a retrofittedfacility being tested by a major earthquake, and pass-ing.

Each manager must anticipate the question Are you pre-pared for Californias next earthquake?

The organizations showcased in these Mitigation SuccessStories have already answered this question, and they areclearly taking the necessary preparedness steps.

Can you make the same claim?

51references

Board of Education. 1994. Report No. 5. Los Angeles UnifiedSchool District (LAUSD). Los Angeles, CA: LAUSD.

California Department of General Services. (DGS) 1994. StateBuilding Seismic Program, Report and Recommendations.Sacramento, CA: DGS.

California Governors Office of Emergency Services (OES)Earthquake Program. 1993. Hazard Mitigation Case Study:Unacceptable Risk. Earthquake Hazard Mitigation in OneCalifornia School District. Oakland, CA: OES.

Chakos, Arrietta. 1999. Assistant to the City Manager, City ofBerkeley, California. Personal communication.

East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD). 1999a. 1998 An-nual Progress Report Seismic Improvement Program. Oak-land, CA: Seismic Improvement Program, EBMUD.

East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD). 1998b. 1997 An-nual Progress Report Seismic Improvement Program. Oak-land, CA: Seismic Improvement Program, EBMUD.

EQE International Inc. (EQE). 1994. The Northridge Earth-quake: Four examples of Proactive Risk Management. Proac-tive Risk Management. Oakland, CA: EQE.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 1997. Re-port on Costs and Benefits of Natural Hazard Mitigation. Wash-ington, D.C.: Mitigation Directorate, FEMA.

References

52 success stories

Jones, Lewis. 1999. School Construction Manager,Berkeley Unified School District (BUSD), Berkeley, Cali-fornia. Personal communication.

Lee, David. 1999. Senior Engineer, Design Section,Seismic Improvement Program, East Bay Mud UtilityDistrict (EBMUD), Oakland, California. Personal com-munication.

McRonald, Joel, 1999. Chief, Seismic and Special Pro-grams. California Department of General Services.Personal Communication.

Reiterman, Tim (Editor). 1999. Quake Risk a Big Un-known for States Public Schools. Los Angeles Times.June 27: A1, A24, A25.

References - contd

Where Can I Get MoreInformation?

Seismic Safety Commission1755 Creekside Oaks Drive, Suite 100

Sacramento, California 95833http://www.seismic.ca.gov

Phone: (916) 263-5506FAX: (916) 263-0594

Prepared for the California Seismic Safety Commission by EQE International, Inc.

Copyright 1999 California Seismic Safety Commission

State of CaliforniaGray Davis, Governor

More detailed infor-mation on earthquakerisk assessment andhazard mitigation isavailable in the Cali-fornia Seismic SafetyCommission publica-tion:

Earthquake RiskManagement:A Toolkit for

Decision-Makers(ssc report 99-04)

California SeismicSafety Commission

Proposition 122 Seismic Retrofit Practices Improvement ProgramProduct 2.2 Earthquake Risk Management Tools for Decision-MakersReport SSC 99-04

Earthquake RiskManagement:

A Toolkit for Decision-Makers

This valuableresource providesa step-by-stepapproach to theearthquake miti-gation process aswell as an in-depthdiscussion of thecritical issuesfacing any deci-sion-maker inCalifornia.

Success StoriesTitle PageIntroductionEast Bay Municipal Utility DistrictLos Angeles Unified School DistrictAnheuser Busch Van Nuys BreweryBerkeley Unified School DistrictCalifornia State Building Seismic ProgramConclusionsReferencesWhere Can I Get More Information?