.

, 2011.

2

.................................................................................................................... 14 ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... 15 .............................................................................................................. 16 ............................................................................................................................ 19

...................... 26 I .......................................... 271. ..................................................... 27 2. , ....................... 32 3. ............................................................................... 39 3.1. ...................................................................................................................... 39 3.2. ....................................... 42 3.3. .............................................................................................................. 47 3.4. ........................................................................................ 52 4. ...................................................... 59 4.1. (SBA) ................................................................................ 63 4.1.1. (SAF) .......................................... 66 4.1.2. (ESAF) .................... 66 4.1.3. (PRGF) ................................... 67 4.2. (FCL) ................................................................. 68 4.3. (PCL) ......................................................... 71 4.4. (EFF)................................................... 72 4.5. .................................. 73 4.5.1. (ECF) ....................................................... 77 4.5.2. (SCF) ........................................................... 78 4.5.2.1. (ESF)......................................................... 79 4.5.3. (RCF)................................................... 80 4.5.4. (PSI) ....................................................... 82 4.6. (HIPC) ............ 823

4.7. (MDRI) ......................................... 84 4.8. (Emergency assistance) ................................. 86 4.9. (PCDR Trust) ........................... 87 4.10. .............................................................................. 87

II ....... 891. - ................................ 89 2. ...................................................................................................................... 95 2.1. - .............................................. 97 2.2. .............................................................................. 102 2.3. ....................................................................... 105 2.4. ........................................................................... 109 2.5. - ........... 112 2.5.1. : .............................. 118 2.5.2. : ............................. 121 2.5.3. ........................................... 124 3. ................................................ 128

-, ................................................................................................................... 133 I ............................. 1341. ........................................................................................................................... 134 2. ............ 146 3. ......................................................................................... 149 3.1. - .................................................. 149 3.2. - .................................................... 154 3.3. - .................. 164 3.4. - ................................................ 169

4

II ...................................................................... 1751. - ..................................................... 175 1.1. .......................................................................................... 175 1.2. ............................................................................................ 176 1.3. ( ) ............................................................ 177 1.3.1. . 1: - ?............................................................................................................... 178 1.3.2. . 2: -? .......... 181 1.3.3. . 3: - -?........................................................................ 184 1.3.4. . 4: (. , , ,...) -?........................................................................................... 186 1.3.5. . 5: - ( )? ......................................................................... 188 1.3.6. . 6: ? .......................................................................................................... 190 1.3.7. . 7: , ? ............................................................................................ 192 1.3.8. . 8: 10 ?............................................... 194 1.3.9. . 9: -, ?........................ 195 1.3.10. . 10: -? .... 197 1.3.11. . 11: - ( )?................ 198 1.3.12. . 12: , -, ? ................................................................................................................................. 201 2. - ...................................................... 202

III ...................................................................... 2081. ... 208 1.1. ............................................ 210 1.2. ................... 214 2. (, , ) ................................................................................................................... 215

5

3. ................................................................................................... 218 3.1. ....................................................................... 221 3.2. .......... 223 3.3. .............................................. 226

............................................................................ 229 I ...................... 2301. - .............. 230 1.1. - ................................................................. 230 1.2. - ................... 235 1.3. - ........................................................... 241 2. - ......................................................................................................................... 246 3. - ............. 251

II - . 2641. .................................................. 264 1.1. ........................................................... 264 1.2. ........... 267 2. ................................................................................................. 270 2.1. ( , , ) ......................................................................................................... 272 2.2. ................................ 275 2.3. ....................................................................................... 277 2.4. .................................................................................................. 279 2.5. ....................................... 282 2.6. ......................................................................................... 284

6

2.7. , , ................................................................................................................... 287 2.8. ............................................... 290 2.9. ............................................................................ 292 3. ...................................................................................... 297 ................................................................................................................. 301 ..................................................................................................................... 311 1: - ...................... 312 2: ................................................ 314 3: - ... 315 4: , 2009. 2011. ........................................................... 318 5: : , - ......... 319 6: - ( ).............................................. 321 ............................................................................................................. 323

7

, I : . 1: - . 2: - , . 3: (-20) . 4: , 1981-2015. . 5: . 6: () . 7: () . 8: - . 9: - . 10: . 11: - 1953-1998. . 12: - 20002009. . 13: - - (SBA), (FCL) (EFF) - 2010. . 14: , 2000-2014. . 15: PRGF . 16: . 17: PRGF - 2010. . 18: MDRI : . 1: - : . 1: - . 2: - . 3: II : . 1: - , 1952-1998.

8

. 2: . 3: - , . 4: a, e e e . 5: , 1991-2003. . 6: - , 1991-2001. : . 1: , 1976-1993. . 2: , 1970-1988. . 3: . 4: . 5: , 1990-2000. . 6: , , , , . 7: , , , 2006-2009. . 8: -27 I : . 1: , 2008-2011. . 2: , 2007-2011. . 3: , 2007-2011. . 4: - . 5: - - . 6: - . 7: - . 8: : , , , , , . 9: , . 10: - . 11: -

9

. 12: - . 13: - - . 14: - . 15: - - . 16: - , . 17: : , , , , , . 18: : , , . 19: - . 20: - - : . 1: , 2005- 2010. . 2: I a 2007- II a 2010. . 3: , 2005- 2010. . 4: , III a 2008 I a 2010. ( : , ; , ) . 5: , III a 2008 I a 2010. ( : , ; ) . 6: , , 2003-2008. . 7: , 1995 2007. . 8: , 2003-2008. . 9: - , 2003-2009. . 10: , - , 2001-2006. . 11: , 2001-2010. . 12: , 2001-2010. . 13: : , , . 14: , . 15: , - , 2001-2006. . 16:

10

( - ) . 17: - ( ) . 18: , . 19: , - - . 20: - ( ) . 21: (% ) . 22: : , , . 23: : , , . 24: , - . 25: - ( ) II : . 1: : . 1: . 2: - . 3: - . 4: ( -) ? . 5: ? . 6: -, ? : . 1: SWOT - III : . 1:

11

. 2: - 2008. : . 1: , I II 2010. . 2: , 2008. I : . 1: M- . 2: -, . 3: -, 31.12.2010. . 4: -, 2001-2011. 5: -, 31.12.2010. . 6: -, 31.12.2010. . 7: SBA -,11.3.2009. . 8: -, 01. 1992. 31. 2010. . 9: -, 01.01.2005. 31.08.2010. . 10: -, 31.12.1992. 31.12.2010. . 11: - 01.01.2010. 31.12.2010. . 12: , 2006-2010. - ( ) . 13: : , 2009-2010. . 14: , 2010. : . 1: , 1980 1990. . 2: - ( 11.06.2001. 15.04.2011. ) . 3: , 2008- 2011. . 4: -

12

II - : . 1: , 2002-2008. . 2: . 3: ( 31.12.2010) . 4: - 2010 2009. . 5: : . 1: , 1999-2010. . 2: . 3: , 1995-2008. . 4: ( 31.12.2009. 01.11.2010. ) . 5: 2009. . 6: , 2006- 2010. . 7: ( 31. 2010) . 8: , 2008-2010.

13

, . , , , , . , , () . , - . , , . , , (. , , , .) , - .

: , -, , -, , , , , (), , .

14

THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND IN A CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC CRISIS

ABSTRACT

International Monetary Fund was created with the purpose of normalizing the international financial and monetary situation in the world, and with respect to sovereign rights of all states of the world. Over time, this financial institution has upgraded and developed its financial instruments, adjusting itself to the needs of the contemporary society, and with the start of the last global financial crisis, numerous questions concerning the need for a new role for the International Monetary Fund in the future and for its further participation in the world financial architecture raised. The purpose of the doctoral thesis titled Role of the International Monetary Fund in the contemporary economic crisis is to provide a critical evaluation of importance of the IMF arrangements made to date and of those expected, in development of the world economy, in establishing higher fairness and stability in the global economy, as well as in strengthening multilateralism of payment in the world economy by enhancing the special drawing rights and by introducing additional (new) currencies in the world monetary system. Having in mind also the critical reviews of the world economists and the practical examples of specific countries, this work is focused on defining importance of the IMF arrangements for Serbia. The importance of arrangements can be viewed within the framework of direct benefits reflecting in aims to be pursued with the arrangement itself, achieved effects, fund utilisation rates etc. The importance of arrangements can be also viewed within the framework of indirect benefits, that can be even higher and more significant for the state economy, through the increased inflow of funds from the other international institutions (e.g. Paris Club, European Union, European Investment Bank, etc.) and foreign investors, that, on the basis of the IMF presence, arrive at the conclusion that the macroeconomic situation in the country is under control, stable and that there are favorable conditions for investments.

KEY WORDS: The International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement, Republic of Serbia, programs (IMF), loans and lending (IMF), conditions and conditionality, Memorandum on Economic and Financial Policies, Stand-by Arrangements (SBAs), Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), voters and voting, an economic crises.

15

AfDF ARM BP BRIC/ CA CACs CCFF CFF CCL CEI CIEZ CVA EFF () EMU ECF ESAF ESF FCL FDI () FSAP FSSA GAB () GDP () / (African Development Fund) / (adjustable rate morgage) / (balance of payments) : , , / (current account) / (collective action clauses) (compensatory and contingency financing facility) (compensatory financing facility) / (Contingent Credit Line) / (Central European Initiative) (currency value account)

(Extended Fund Facility) E / (Economic and Monetary Union) /(Extended Credit Facility) (Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility) () (Exogenous Shocks Facility) / (Flexible Credit Line) (Financial Sector Assessment Program) (Financial Sector Stability Assessment) () (General Arrangements to Borrow ) () / (GrossDomestic Product) / (General Resources Account) (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative) - (Inter-American Development Bank) (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development)

GRA ()HIPC IaDB IBRD

IDA IMFC LIC

(International Development Association) - (International Monetary and Financial Committee) / (Low-Income Countries)

16

MBS MDRI

/ (mortgage backed security) (Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative) MM (IMF) / (International Monetary Fund) MRC / (Millennium Development Goals) NAB () (New Arrangements to Borrow) OFF / (Oil Fund Facility) PCL (Precautionary Credit Line) PCDR Trust

(Post-Catastrophe Debt Relief Trust)PRGF PRG PRSP PSI RCF SAF SBA SB (WB) SCF SDA (SDRs) SRF STF e (Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility) (Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust) (Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers) / (Policy Support Instrument) / (Rapid Credit Facility) / (Structural Adjustment Facility) / (Stand-by Arrangement) / (World Bank) / (Standby Credit Facility) / (Special Drawing Rights) / (Supplemental Reserve Facility) (systematic transformation facility) TF / (Trust Fund) / (United Nations) (United Nations Development Programme) / (World Economic Forum) / (value added tax)

UN UNDP WEF VA

: Articels of Agreement MM-a Band (upper limit, lower limit) ( , ) bank rate () base rate basic rate of charge Basel Capital Accord basic rate of pay - Buffer stock financinf facility Buy-back

17

Cash crunch - Capital flight Congation Convertibility Plan Crawling peg - Credit crunch Currency mismatches Debt equity swaps Debt intolerance Emergency assistance - Emergency Natural Disaster Assistance - Emergency Post-conflict Assistance - ex ante conditionality - ex post conditionality - exceptional access exchange rate - export-led strategies external debt external financing gap financing insurance review financial framework - FY high-access component - indikativ targets interest- free repayment lack of capital lender of last resort - () net foreign assets- nonperforming loans quantitative performance criteria (QPCs) - overexpose precautionary access precautionary arrangement price-specie-flow mechanism - rapid-access component - rate of exchange rate of interest rates and taxes - Real Plan - Resceduled - service charge ( ) service the foreign debt sovereign dept standstill structural performance criteria - tax exemptions threshold value venture capital -

18

, . , , , , . , , , . -, , , . , . , (. , , , ), . , , , . Stiglitz , . - . Meltzer, - . , , , , , . : , , , ( ) , .

19

, . 1990- , , , , , . , , . , . , , , , , a priori, , , . , , - , . , . , . , , . . : 1. , ?

20

2. . , , . (. ) , , . 3. , . . 4. . 5. . , , , ( 3 , . 250 750 ) . 6. ; , ; , . 7. . . , , , , - . 8. , . 9. , , . 10. , , , , , , , . . 11. , ,

21

. , . , : - . . -, . . . . - I - II - - -, - I - - II - - III - - - I - O - II - - . , , , ,

22

. , : , , , , , . , , . . , , . , - , : , . , - . , . ( 2010. ) - , 21. 2010. , : IMF, World Economic and Financial Surveys, Regional Economic Outlook Europe, Building Confidence, October 2010. , -. Bas Bakker, Outlook and Policy Issues for Emerging European Economies, - Yuko Kinoshita, , Emerging Europe and the Global Crisis: Lessons from the BoomBust. . , . , . , , : , , . . , , . , . .

23

. . (, , ), . , . , , - , , , - - . - . -, , . . , , . . , , : , , - , . , . . - , . , : - , , , . . - ( , , , ): , , , , , , : , , , , . ,

24

, , , , , . - , . - (, ) (, , , ). , , . , , , , . - , , . - , . , . , . , , . - , , : ; ; . , , , , . , , , , . , . K , . () () , , , . , - . - - , , - , .

25

26

I

1.

22. 1944. (Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, ) . , , ( ) ( ). , , , (, , ) . 27. 1945. 29 -, . ( ), , , . , - , , . ( , I , 1986, . 1038). . , ( ) , John Maynard Keynes, . , . (John Maynard Keynes, 1971, . 149154). , , . , . ,

27

, . , (), , . (Preliminary Draft Proposal for a United Nations Stabilization Fund and Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the United Nations and Associated Nations), Harry Dexter White, . 26 ( 23 ), 5 ( 2 ). , , 1940-, - , . 8,8 , 2,75 . - . , , 1947. 1953. 13 , -. . -, . . , - (+ - 1%). . , , , . . , - . , , -, . , . , . 1950- 1960- , . 1971. . , , , ,

28

. 1973. , , - . , 1970 , . , . - , 1954. - . , , ( , ) -, 1956. . . 1: -

............. , , ( ) ( ) : James Raymond Vreeland, 2007, . 10

29

, 30. 1976. , 28. 1990. , I , : (i) . (ii) , , . (iii) , . (iv) . (v) , , , , . (vi) . ( , 2004, . 784). , - : 1) , 2) (. ) 3) . , . -, . , , , 1950- ( . 1: -). 1) (surveillance monitoring) ( ) . ) , . ( IV - ), , , , , , . , 2007. , .

30

) , . . ) , ( ) . ) (FSAP), - , , , . , , - (World Economic Outlook), (Global Financial Stability Report). , , , . 2) , . . ( ) -, . , , , . , , , . 3) , . , , , : 1) e - , e, e , ; 2) - , , , , ; 3) , ; 4) . , , , .

31

2. ,

187 , , () 192 . -, : , , , . , . , . , , , -. 1944. , . , - 1945. , ( ) 1949. , ( ). -. 1950. , -, (IMF Annual Report, 1950, . 102; : James M. Boughton, 2001, . 965). , , 1954. . - 1964. . , . . 1: - 27. 1945. . 31. 35 , . - : : -: Summary Proceedings of the First Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, September 27 to October 3, 1946.

32

- . - 1972. . 1956. , 1975. . 1980. , . - 1982. , 1986. . , . , -, , -. . 1990- . , () ? - , . 85% . - , -. ( ). . . , , . - , , . : , , ( -, XII, 1. ). , . - , ( ) 187 . . - () , ( , , . 59/2010), : 1. , . 2. , , .

33

- ( - 02.02.2011. (www.imf.org), Board of Governors / Serbia). . - , , . . 85% . . 1: -

- 7 - 20 - 24

- IMFC

, ,

/ ,

,

-, ,

: Martinez-Diaz, 2008. ( -: Governance Structure) http://www.imf.org/external/about/govstruct.htm , a , .34

- 24 -. . 187 , - -: , , , , ( 1971. , . 40 ), . . : , , , . , , . , , , . , . , . . 24 ( ) 1,4% , 17,08% . (James Raymond Vreeland, 2007, . 16). , Ren Weber, : , , , , , , . 4.927 . 62.728 2,82% . ( -: IMF, Executive Directors and Voting Power, January 07, 2011). , , , . IMFC, . , . , : , , . (David D. Driscoll, 1997, . 9). , - , . . , , , , . 6. 1946. , - , , , Dominique Strauss - Kahn , 1. 2007. . (IMF website, Managing Directors). - 2.400 , . , , .

35

. 2: - IMFC .. -

.

.

.

.

.

.

. .

.

. . ,

.

.

.

: IMF, IMF Annual Report 2009, IMF Organization Chart, . 77 ( 30. 2009. )

36

, - -, , : , , , , , , . , , : ( 44 ), ( 33 ), ( 46 44 -), ( 31 ) ( 44 ); : , , . . 2, . - - -. - ( . 2). . 2: - , 7 8 10 15 20 24 77

: 5 22 33

: 20. 1961. , . Stand-by . 13.12.1961. ( ): , , , , ,

37

, , , . . GAB (General Arrangement for Borrowing) 6 Stand-by kredita . . . . . 1964. ( ). -10 : (), , . (-20) -7 1999. , . , , , , . , -20 , -20 . . 3: (-20) (-20)

-20 -7, - . , - , IMFC , -20 ex-officio .

38

3.

3.1.

1973. . , . . 90.5 , 2.917,1 (pocetkom septembra 2011. ). ( 31. 2010. ) 109,6 . , - 1978. , - : 1) , 1944. , 25 , , -; 2) ( ) ; 3) -. - 1970. 1971. ; 4) - . - 1978. . , () - . - . , , . - . , ( ) , . - 85 . , , ( ,39

, , ), . - 31. 1975. . , 35 , , -. 85% . -, - , . - : , , 1957. 1970. . , 1970- 1971. . , , (1956-1972). -, . (50 ) , . , 35 , , , (Trust Fund), . "" 1976. 1980. . 1999. , - 14 , (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries - HIPC) -. , 1999. 2000. , , , 12,9 , - ( ), . , , . , , , . , , , .

40

, . , 18. 2009. 403,3 (12,97 ), . , 2008. , : (I) a, (12.965.649 , 403,3 , -). (II) . (III) . , . , . (IV) , . . (V) , , (, , ). - , , : , , . , - 18. 2009. . . ( -: Gold in the IMF, 18.01.2011. ). 2009. , ( ), 400 2.000 27. 2009. , 403,3 . .

41

, , . 2009. , 212 : 200 Reserve Bank of India 19. 30. 2009. , 2 11. 2009. 10 23. 2009. . 2010. , 191,3 . 7. 2010. 10 , . , . . , .

3.2. Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)- , . . 1967. 1968. () . ( 1960. 20%), . , 1967. , (), (). ( , 1983, . 331). 1969. , -. , , . ( , 2009, .337) : 1. - ,

42

, , 2. -, 3. . ( 0,888671 ). , 1974. . 16 , 4 (, , ). , , . . , , , , .(Allen Mark, IMF). . 10 , . ( , : ekonomist.org). , . , .(Peter Bakvis, ITUC, Washington). . 4: , 1981-2015. ( 1 ) 1981-1985. 1986-1990. 1991-1995. 1996-1998. 1999-2000. 2001-2005. 2006-2010. 2011-2015.* USD 0.540 (42%) 0.452 (42%) 0.572 (40%) 0.582 (39%) USD 0.5820 (39%) 0.5770 (45%) 0.6320 (44%) 0.6600 (41,9%) DEM 0.460 (19%) 0.527 (19%) 0.453 (21%) 0.446 (21%) EUR 0.3519 (32%) 0.4260 (29%) 0.4100 (34%) 0.4230 (37,4%) JPY 34.0 (13%) 33.4 (15%) 31.8 (17%) 27.2 (18%) JPY 27.2 (18%) 21.0 (15%) 18.4 (11%) 12.1000(11,3%) GBP 0.0710 (13%) 0.0893 (12%) 0.0812 (11%) 0.1050 (11%) GBP 0.1050 (11%) 0.0984 (11%) 0.0903 (11%) 0.1110 (9,4%) FRF 0.740 (13%) 1.020 (12%) 0.800 (11%) 0.813 (11%)

*IMF: Press Release No. 10/434, November 15, 2010. : - : IMF Determines New Currency Weights for SDR Valuation Basket, September 29, 2010.43

50% 60% , , , . . ( , , ). , . 2005. , , 1. 2006. . ( 2000-2005) 30. 2010. , 01. 2011. . , . . 70 , 70 5 . : - ; - , - , . ( , 1981, . 319). . . . 4% , 6%. , , . . . , . 01.01.2011. : 41,9%, 37,4%, 11,3% 9,4%. 2002. 1 1,27 , 2006. 1,48 , 19.01.2011. 1 1,55 (1 = 0.643514 ).

44

. 5: - 19.01.2011. * O-1 0.4230 12.1000 0.1110 0.6600 1.34590 82.24000 1.59930 1.00000 0.569316 0.147130 0.177522 0.660000 1.553968 1 = 0.643514 1 = 1.55397 *** * (JPY) 1 , ** 0-2() - . . , . , . *** , . : . 3, ( ). , , . : IMF, SDR Valuation, January 19, 2011. ( 1970-1972) 9,3 . ( 2/3 1973. ), . 1973. 6% (IMF, International Financial Yearbook, 1989).**

- EUR - JPY - GBP

45

12,1 . 1979. 1981. , , 21,4 . , 28. 2009. (161,2 ) 9. 2009. (21,5 ), 204,1 . , 110 , 20 . (: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2009/NEW090509A.htm, 09.09.2010.). 1970- ( , 2006, . 122). , . , 1,5% ( ). . . , , , , , . , . ( , 2010, . 403 408). , 85% , ( ), . , , , , , , , . , . , , . ( - , -, 2009, . 424)

46

. , . , - . , 30% . , , 20 , 20 , 60 . , , . ( , 2010, . 404- 405). , . , , . ( , ). 3.3. , 2007. , . -20, 2. 2009. , , 250 750 . , ( ), , - . - (General Arrangements to Borrow GAB) 1962. . . 2007. ( 2008. ). - 11 ( ), , . , 1983. ( 1982. ) (). 17 . ( 1983. 6 . ), 1,5 . . ( -: IMF Standing Borrowing Arrangements, September 29, 2010).

47

. 6: () (1962 - 1983) ( ) -Bundesbank 2 1

(1983 2008) ( ) 595 893 2.380 1.700 1.105 2.125 850 383 1.020

143 165 1.476 395 235 1.161 244 79

Sveriges Riksbank ( )1 2

565 1.883 6.344

1.700 4.250 17.000 1.500

30. 1982. 250.000 23. 1976. : . : IMF, IMF Standing Borrowing Arrangements, September 29, 2010 1994. , 7 (Halifax Summit) 1995. 10 - . - , , 17. 1997. (New Arrangements to Borrow), 1998. . - 26 - 34 . ( . 7: - ).

48

. 7: () ( ) 1. 801 2. 408 3. 340 4. 957 5. 1.381 6. 367 7. 3.519 8. 340 9. 2.549 10. 340 11. 1.753 12. 3.519 13. 340 14. 341 15. 340 16. 340 17. 1.302 18. 379 19. 1.761 20. 340 21. 665 22.Sveriges Riksbank 850 23. 1.540 24. 340 25. 2.549 26. 6.640 1 34.0001

: IMF, IMF Standing Borrowing Arrangements, September 29, 2010 , , . , 2009. 51 . ( 70 . ) , 17 . - 34 . -. - , 1998. , 9,1 . , 2,9 . . - . 1998.

49

6,3 . , 1,4 . . - 1999. , , . , 2007. , 2008. . 2009. , 191 . . ( -: Where the IMF Gets its Money, 29. , 2010. ). . 2009. . - 100 . ( 68 . ). - . , . . 20, 2. 2009. , . 20 - , 250 . , -. - 12. 2010. - 367,5 , 13 , . ( . 8: - ). - , -, - . -, - - : (1) , 80 - (2) -, - 26 39 . -, 85 . . - 2002. -. -. , -. , - , .

50

. 8: - 1 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.1 2

Sveriges Riksbank 2

( ) 4.370,41 3.579,24 1.360,00 7.861,85 7.624,43 3.207,78 25.370,81 2.231,76 18.657,38 340 13.578,03 65.953,20 6.583,44 341,29 970,59 340,00 9.043,72 3.870,94 11.126,03 1.276,52 6.702,18 4.439,74 10.905,42 340,00 18.657,38 69.074,27 1.542,13 500,00 8.740,82 31.217,22 340,00 1.654,51 8.740,82 1.885,52 4.994,76 624,34 340,00 8.740,82 340,00 367.467,36

340 . .

: IMF, IMF Standing Borrowing Arrangements, September 29, 2010.

51

3.4. - . - . , : (I) - ; (II) - -; (III) - 200 600 , . , , () , , (, ) . , . , , . , , , . . , 1963. . , ( ), . -, 25% ( , , , ) 75% . , , , . () . , . 25%, 125% . , , , ( ). , . - 25% - , - (uper credit tranches).

52

, . , ( ) 100 ( ). -, , - 200% . 75% , - 125% , . - 200% . , -, , ( -) 75% (Dominick Salvatore, 2009, . 794 , 2008, . 102). - (. ), (. ) - 75% , - , . . , , -, - (net IMF position). , - - . . , , . ( , 2010, . 396 399). () 5 , , .... () . ( - 30. 1978. , III, 2. - ). 1951. 8 . 25-50%.

53

. 9: - ( 2010. ) ( ) 1958/1959.* 1959. 60,7 1965. 30,7 1970. 35,4 1976. 33,6 1978. 50,9 1983. 47,5 1990. 50,5 1998. 45,0 ( 2003) ( 2008) 100,0 ** * ** , -, . o: IMF, General Quota Reviews, November 5, 2010. 1990. - 50%, 90 135 . 1991. , 85% -. , , -, 1992. . 2008. , . : (1) , : (50%), (30%), (V) (15%) (5%);

54

(2) (Y) - , : - 60%, - 40%; (3) () 0,95 . (4) () (, , ) . (5) () ( , , - ). 0,95 , ( ) . . (Q) : Q = (0,5*Y + 0,3* + 0,15*V + 0,05*R)k

(: -: Quota formula) . , 2008. , , -. - 28. 2008. . , 2008. : ; ad-hok 54 , ; , , ; - ; . , 112 - 85 . Ad hoc , , . 2008. .

55

2009. , , 2011. , . - 5. 2010. 14. . 100 , . , 14. : 238,4 476,8 ( 755,7 ); 6 , 3. -, (, , ) 10 ; . PRGT - 1.135 2008. ( - IDA) . , 14. , 2013. 2014. . .

56

. 10: - 14.01.2011. : : . 1,49 32.614 1,47 2,12 46.302 2,08 1,40 30.611 1,38 2,93 63.942 2,88 3,72 81.151 3,65 4,94 107.635 4,85 5,98 130.332 5,87 1,91 41.832 1,88 3,24 70.805 3,19 6,12 133.378 6,01 1,35 29.523 1,33 1,45 31.778 1,43 2,37 51.874 2,34 2,73 59.704 2,69 3,21 70.105 3,16 1,40 30.739 1,38 1,10 24.205 1,09 1,59 34.835 1,57 4,94 107.635 4,85 17,09 371.743 16,74 1,22 26.841 1,21 72,3 27,7 100,0 0,22 0,08 0,17 0,01 0,03 0,11 0,03 1.577.584 643.501 2.221.085 4.927 1.941 3.901 525 939 2.567 840 71,05 28,95 100,00 0,22 0,09 0,18 0,02 0,04 0,12 0,04

3.236,4 4.605,2 3.036,1 6.369,2 8.090,1 10.738,5 13.008,2 4.158,2 7.055,5 13.312,8 2.927,3 3.152,8 5.162,4 5.945,4 6.985,5 3.048,9 2.395,5 3.458,5 10.738,5 37.149,3 2.659,1 157.233,4 60.200,1 217.433,5 467,7 169,1 365,1 27,5 68,9 231,7 59,0

21 166 (187 )

: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm#s

57

. - 250 100.000 . , 31% 17% 2008. . , 37,1 . 371.743 , . 16,74% , 85- , . . , 6,12% , (5,98%), (4,94%) (4,94%). 1,8 (0,001%), 268 (0,01% ). -, , 2008. ad-hok 9,55% 217,4 . ( . 5). : , , , . - 1969. , 85% - , , . 21, () . - 1978. , , : 70% 80% , . 53. ( -, -, 2009, . 424-427)

58

4.

, , , . 1970- 1980- -. 1990- , , . 2000-, 2008. , , . - . - , . () , , , . - . , - (letter of intent) , , . ( : ). , "", , , , . , -, -, , . , "" - . - : -. , , , . : (Extended Credit Facility - ECF), (Standby Credit Facility - SCF) (Rapid Credit Facility - RCF). (Stand-By Arrangements - SBA), (Flexible Credit Line - FCL) (Extended Fund Facility EFC), .59

(Emergency assistance), . (IMF Factsheet, IMF Lending, : 19.08.2010). , (PRGT), , 2010. . a . . , , . PRGT . , , PRGT, . PRGT 100 300 . . , , . (The Extended Credit Facility - ECF) (Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility - PRGF) e e , . , 5 , 10 . (Standby Credit Facility - SCF) . SCF (Exogenous Shocks Facility - ESF) , . . 4 , 8 . (Rapid Credit Facility - RCF), , , , . RCF . , 5 , 10 . (SBA). - SBA. SBA . - ( ""). SBA 12 24 , 3 5 . SBA . , , - ,

60

. SBA ( ) . (Flexible Credit Line - FCL). FCL , , . FCL . FCL 6 1 ( ), 3 5 ( SBA). , . , . FCL , SBA. , , . (Extended Fund Facility EFF). 1974. , . EFF SBA, 3 . 4 10 , . (Emergency assistance). . (basic rate of charge), . 3 5 . - 1953. 2009. . ( . 11 . 12).

61

. 11: - 1953-1998. - ( 30. ) Stand-by EFF SAF ESAF 1953. 2 2 1968. 32 32 1976. 18 2 20 1983. 27 4 31 1987. 22 10 32 1989. 12 1 4 7 24 1990. 16 3 3 4 26 1991. 13 2 2 3 20 1992. 21 2 1 5 29 1996. 19 4 1 8 32 1997. 11 5 12 28 1998. 9 4 8 21 EFF ; SAF ; ESAF . : IMF, Annual Report 2004, Appendix II: Financial Operations and transactions, . 105 . 12: - 20002009. ( 30. ) Stand-by EFF FCL PRGF ESF 2000. 2 2 2001. 32 32 2002. 13 13 2003. 18 2 20 2004. 27 4 31 2005. 22 10 32 2006. 12 1 4 7 24 2007. 16 3 3 4 26 2008. 13 2 2 3 20 2009. 9 4 8 21 EFF ; ESF (); FCL ; PRGF e . : IMF, Annual Report 2009, Appendix II: Financial Operations and transactions, . 1

62

4.1. (SBA) - . , , . SBA ( ) . , SBA 12 24 , 36 , SBA . : 1980. , 1981. 1981. . 1981. 400% (1,66 ; 2,1 ). , -, , SBA. ( ). , , . SBA , . (IMF Stand-By Arrangement, November 23, 2010). SBA : (Normal Access). , 200 12 , 600 . (Exceptional Access). , , , , -. , SBA. (Front-loaded access), . . - SBA (The IMFs Emergency financing mechanism). -. 1995. . . (Precautionary access). SBA , , (High access precautionary arrangements - HAPAs). , , . (HAPAs) , : , .

63

, . , , . . . - ( : , ). . ( ), . - , . . SBA 3 5 , , 3 , . SBA , (15 200% , 30 200% 1000% 60 1000% . , ( 50 ) . ( , 1981, . 317) 200 , 300 . 300 , 300 , -. ( ), 25% . , , 25% . , . , , , . , . -. SBA 1952. . SBA 12. 1952. , : 5 (IMF Annual Report 1953, . 52), , 1953.

64

, 1952. . (IMF Annual Report 1953, . 50). : 1947. , . . , SBA : (1956. ), (1956), (1957) (1959). , . , . SBA 19. 1962. , 11. 1964. . SBA 22. 1963. 1964. . SBA 1970. 2. 1979. . SBA ( ) ( 6. 1978. 5. 1979. ) ( 7. 1983. 28. 1985. ). SBA: - 1954. , - , , - 1956. , - , - 1957. , - , , , 1958. , - 1959. . SBA , . , SBA , . 18. 1954. 17. 1958. , . . . . . . 13 1965. 1977. ; 14 19761989, 15 (1963-1977). 18 1954. 1971. , : 1977-1980, 1982-1985, 1993-2004. 1968. 1987. (20 ) 1992. 2002. . , 7 , 19611967, 1970. 1989. , 1995. 1999. . : 1962-1969, 1971-1981, 19832000. , 1963. (EFF - Extended Fund Facility)

65

. 1980-, 1986. 1987. : (SAF Structural Adjustment Facility) (ESAF Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility). , EFF, . , EFF . , SBA 75% -.

4.1.1. (SAF) , , MM 1970- (Trust Fund). 1977. 1981. 3 ( 3,8 ). (Struktural Adjustment Facilit SAF) 1986. , . . , 1986. 1995. 1,8 (. 2,4 ). ( ) : 0,5%, 5 , 10 . , . . (IDA), SAF . SAF 1996. . (IMF, IMF Annual Report 2005).

4.1.2. (ESAF) (Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility ESAF) 1987. . ,

66

. 40 , , . MM- . , , MM- ESAF . ESAF , , . 1987. 1999. 7,6 ( 10,7 ), 90 ESAF, 52 . (IMF: IMF Concessional Financing through the ESAF). 56 , , 1 . e (PRGF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility). , - , .

4.1.3. (PRGF) e (Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility - PRGF) (ESAF). , , . e , , . PRGF 1999. . , , . PRGF. ( PRGF : IMF, Review of PRGF Program Design Overview, 2005). PRGF , (PRSP).

67

- , HIPC . PRGF . 2008. , 78 PRGF , : , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , . - , IDA ( 2007. 1.095 ). PRGF 0,5%, , 5 10 . 280 - . PRGF 370 . (IMF: The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, July 31, 2009). , ; . . MM- , MM PRGF ECF. . , PRGF . PRGF (ECF).

4.2. (FCL) (Flexible Credit Line FCL) , . FCL . . 6 . , SBA. (IMF: IMFs Flexible Credit Line (FCL), October 5, 2010). FCL , , . FCL: , .

68

MM- . FCL . , FCL : ( ) . ( ) . FCL , . FCL, 3 5 . FCL . , ( - commitment fee), . 24 27 , 500 1000 . MM-, FCL . , FCL ( SBA) 500 1000 , 2,3 2,9 . . 300 MM-, 3 , 2,7 3,6 . FCL MM- . : - , - , , - , - . FCL : - , - , - , - ( FCL ), - , , - , ,

69

-

( ), , .

. 13: - - (SBA), (FCL) (EFF) - 2010. - 858,9 1.014,6 6.966,0 1.094,5 513,9 2.376,8 820,5 49,2 31.528,0 184,8 13.690,0 11.443,0 19,8 1.653,6 72.213,6 165,6 651,4 270,0 2.067,4 2.268,3 5.422,7 77.636,3

27 SBA 26 SBA 12 FCL 28 SBA 36 SBA 24 SBA 27 SBA 36 SBA 12 FCL 36 EFF 12 FCL 24 SBA 36 EFF 20 SBA

23.11.2009. 8.07.2009. 11.05.2009. 9.11.2009. 17.03.2010. 24.02.2010. 4.02.2010. 4.12.2009. 25.03.2010. 29.01.2010. 6.05.2009. 4.05.2009. 23.12.2009. 24.07.2009. 22.06.2009. 29.06.2009. 6.08.2009. 7.08.2009.

* 28 Stand-By 15 Stand-By 33 Stand-By 25 Stand-By 27 Stand-By

15.05.2009. * : IMF, IMF Finance Department, 2010.

70

4.3. (PCL) . (PCL) . : FCL - ex-post High-Access Precationary Stand-By Arrangement (HAPA) . FCL HAPA , FCL . PCL ( FCL), ex-post , . . PCL , . PCL , 500 1000 12 , . , PCL . , , . PCL : ; - - , . PCL , FCL , : (i) , (ii) , (iii) , (iv) ; (v) . , PCL . PCL: (i) ,

71

, (iii) , ( ); (iv) () . PCL . PCL . PCL , (3 5 ), FCL SBA. , , . 24 27 500 1000 . PCL . , . , 300 , 200 . 300 , 300 . -. , FCL ( SBA) 500 1000 2,1 2,7 , 2,5 3,4 3 .

(ii)

4.4. (EFF) (Extended Fund Facility EFF) , ( ), . 1974. . , , SBA, . EFF -, . EFF , : , . : 200 - 600 ; , . EFF , .

72

( ), EFF . EFF- SBA , EFF- , 3 4 . , 4 10 , , 12 . EFF , . (IMF, IMFs Extended Fund Facility, October 5, 2010).

4.5. - je 23. 2009. (LICs) , . , () PRGF-ESF Trust. , , . 7. 2010. , PRGF-ESF Trust . 2014. , 11,3 (17 ) 2,5 2008. - ( 4,7 ). , 9 (14 ) 1,5 (2,8 ). 1,8 10,8 2010. , . , , . , , -, - 18. 2009. , 0,2 0,4 , . 11,3 (17 ) 2014. , 8 . , 2011. .

73

2009. - 2,5 (3,8 ), 0,8 (1,2 ) 2008. . , 2,7 (4 ) 2010. . ( . 14: , 2000-2014). , 1,5 , . . , 11,3 2014. . . 14: , 2000-2014. - 2009. 1 2009. 2010. 2011. 2012. 2013. 2014. 2009-14. 2000-08. 0,7 2,7 2,7 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5 11,4 1,0 4,0 4,0 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,3 17,2 1/ 2/

. 1,5 .

10,8 (16 ) . 2010. , 1,1 . , . . 15: PRGF ( , 2010. ) 10,8 : 9,0 memorandum items , 1/ 1

1,8 1,1 9,7 6,5

: ,

2,5 NPV 2008. , 4,7 ( . 16: 74

). 11,3 , 2011. , a , . PRGF ESF Trust, 1,5 (2,8 ). . 16: ( ; -2008. NPV ) 2.5 : 1.0 1.5 PRGF-ESF 0.62 0.2-0.4 RGF-ESF ( 3 ) 0.15-0.2 1 0.5-0.61/

10 .

, - 0,2 0,4 . , , 2010. , PRGF-ESF Trust PRGF-ESF Trust PRGT. , 0,15 0,2 . - 0,62 0,7 2014. - 2015. . - 0,5 0,6 , . , 850 . , . - , , .

75

, , . , , PRGT. , . : (i) PRGT, (ii) (GLA) PRGT , , Trust , (iii) (GSA) Trust PRGT, . , PRGT , PRGT . : (ECF) (PRGF) , ; (SCF), , SBA, (RCF), , , . (Trust Fund) , ( 1: ): . 3: PRGT RCF . SCF . ECF . GLA GSA ECF SCF RCF ESF

RCF

SCF

PRGF,ESF ECF

1/

PRGF, ESF ECF

SCF

RCF

ESF

1/

76

(GLA): PRGT. , , PRGF-ESF Trust, . PRGT . : PRGT . , , PRGT . . . (GSA): , PRGT. , . 4.5.1. (ECF) (Extended Credit Facility ECF) . ECF (Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust - PRGT), ECF PRGF , , . PRGF, ECF . ECF PRGT, . ECF 3 , 2 . ECF , ECF . ECF , , , (access norms), 120% 75% 100% , . PRGT 100 , 300 .

77

. , . ECF, . , , . , , , (PRSP) ECF . , , , , . ECF , , . , . , , , , , . . , -, . , . ECF , , 10 . 4.5.2. (SCF) (Standby Credit Facility - SCF) . e PRGT . SCF - (ESF-HAS). , , , . (IMF, IMF Standby Credit Facility (SCF), September 27, 2010). , , , . SCF . SCF PRGT, , ( )

78

. SCF 1 2 . SCF , 2 5 . , SCF , . , , SCF . . , , , . SCF , . , . SCF 0,25%, 2011. . SCF 4 8 . 15 , , .

4.5.2.1. (ESF) (Exogenous Shocks Facility ESF) 2006. (). , , , , . ESF PRGF , . PRGF. ( -: IMF, Establishment of an Exogenous Shocks Facility Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Trust, 2005). ESF 2008. 2009. , . 50% , . 150% , . , PRGF. ESF (PSI) . K .

79

, , , . 25% 50% , . - (ESF-HAC) 2008. , (SCF). ESF-HAC , . (IMF, The Exogenous Shocks Facility High Access Component (ESF-HAC), March 25, 2010). ESF 2011. (0,25% ), , 5 10 .

4.5.3. (RCF) (Rapid Credit Facility RCF) , ( ) ( ) ( ). RCF PRGT. (IMF Rapid Credit Facility (RCF), - : 23.08.2010). RCF (emergency assistance), , , , , . ( /, : ). RCF . , , , RCF ECF . RCF . RCF 25 75 , RCFs shocks window (50 100 ). RCF , . RCF , , 10 .

80

. 17: PRGF - 2010. - ECF* - 21.09.2009. 13,6 11.12.2009. 346,5 15.07.2009. 387,5 18.04.2010. 8,8 19.02.2010. 52,1 15.03.2010. 77,3 29.01.2010. 184,8 1.070,4 ECF ** 24.06.2009. 9,3 14.12.2009. 33,1 . 29.06.2009. 25,1 19.02.2010. 4,7 3.06.2009. 4,4 27.01.2010. 65,5 17.06.2009. 10,4 01.05.2009. 171,2 323,6 ESF - 26.08.2009. 153,8 4.12.2009. 8,2 30.06.2009. 113,6 29.05.2009. 218,8 494,3 ESF 19.06.2009. 72,8 ESF 2.07.2009. 92,85 10.07.2009. 3,28 29.05.2009. 135,7 7.12.2009. 5,8 . 27.07.2009. 6,89 . 15.05.2009. 3,735 248,3 2.209,4 * e e (PRGF) ** : IMF, Annual Report 2010, . 26

81

4.5.4. (PSI) (Policy Support Instrument- PSI) -, . PRGT, . PSI , , . (IMF, The Policy Support Instrument, March 31, 2010). PSI - . , , , , . PSI 1 3 , 4 . PSI ECF, , PSI RCF SCF. PSI RCF SCF, PSI a SCF. PSI SCF, . , . . , ( ). - 2010. PSI , : 17.10.2005, 01.02.2006. 15.12.2006, Cape Verde 01.8.2006, 16.02.2007, 26.6.2007. 2.11.2007. .

4.6. (HIPC) (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries - HIPC) MM- . 2010. , 36 (30 ), 72 . (IMF, Debt Relief Unter the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, July 30, 2010).

82

, . MM . HIPC MM- 1996. . , , , , . , . . . , . (MRC) , HIPC 2005. (MDRI). MDRI 100 - MM, (AfDF) - HIPC . - (IaDB) 2007. HIPC , HIPC . , . , , . HIPC , : 1) IDA , ; ECF MM-, , . 2) , . 3) , MM . 4) (PRSP), . , MM- , . , .

83

: 1) MM - , 2) , 3) . , . , , . , . HIPC , , , HIPC , .

4.7. (MDRI) (MDRI) 100% . , -8 ( 2005. ) MM, , HIPC . (IMF, The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, March 9, 2010). , . 2015. . HIPC , per capita 380 , MDRI . , MM- : (1) , (2) (3) . per capita 380 , HIPC , , MM MDRI-I. HIPC 380 MDRI , MM MDRI-II. MDRI , , .

84

. 18: MDRI MDRI-II ( 380 ) - MDRI, 19. 2010. HIPCs: 28 , , , , completion , , , , point HIPC , , , , , , , , , , , So Tom and Prncipe, , , , , , : 2.185 . (3.168 .*) -HIPC (2) , 380$ - : 126 . (182 .*) : 2.311 (3.350 *) HIPC (Enhanced HIPC Initiative) HIPCs: 7 , , decision point , -, HIPC 1/ 5 , , HIPC . . 2004. 1/ MDRI MM -HIPC MM . * / MDRI-I ( 380 )

: IMF, The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, March 9, 2010. 2009. HIPC MDRI 117,13 . , HIPC 71,95 . , MDRI 45,18 . . ( : IDA, IMF, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) Status of Implementation, 2009, .44) MDRI MM- 2004. , . 2005. .

85

MM- MDRI 15. 2009. 4 . , MM- 530 (867 ), . -8 . , -8 100 MM- PRGF-ESF MDRI.

4.8. (Emergency assistance) (emergency assistance) . , -. 1962. . 1960- . , 1962. , . , 1963. , . 17 , 4 : 1963. 1973. ; 1966. 1974. . (James M. Boughton, 2001, . 744-755). 1995. , , . 1995. (post-conflict situations). , . . . . 25% -, , , 50% .

86

4.9. (PCDR Trust) , 2010. , (Post-Catastrophe Debt Relief -PCDR), , 2010. . , , PRGT. (IMF, The IMFs Post-Catastrophe Debt Relief Trust, July 21, 2010). PCDR , PRGT, , . , IDA . PCDR : 1) , 2) , , , : , 100 -. -, . - , . . PCDR. , PCDR 280 ( 422 ) -, , . 21. 2010. PCDR 178 ( 268 ), -. 4.10. (compensatory financing facility CFF) -, 1963. , . ,

87

. -. , , , ( ). , . (Agnus Hooke, 1981, 48-49). , / , . 1981. . 1982/1983 CFF, 47 5,4 . , . (compensatory and contingency financing facility CCFF) 1988. CFF 12 , 29 . CCFF , : , , . . (buffer stock financing facilityBSFF) 1969. . (, ). , . - 24. 2010. IMF Overhauls Nonconcessional Lending Facilities and Conditionality, PIN, No. 09/40 (CFF), . (il facility) 1970- , , - . . 1974. , , . 25% , , , . , 50% ( 20 ). , 1982. - , , . 25% . -, , (), . . 1991. .

88

II

1. -

- : -? - . , . , : , -, , - 1990. ; , a , , - 1983. ( ). (James Raymand Vreeland, 2003, . 321 343). : -? , -, , , (, 1997, V 3, -). , -, , -. , - , , (Bird Graham, 1996, . 1755). - -, . , ... () -. (Robert Putnam, 1988, . 457). 1952. 1998. , 168 , 4 : - , - -.

89

. 1: - , 1952-1998. - - / - 689 487 - 942 1144

: : , World Development Report 2000. , (487) - , (942) -. - . 1990.- -, . , 1952. 1990. , 47,9%, 89,7% 1985. 9,9% 1990. ( 1979. 23,3%). 1990. , (112,5% 1990. ). ( 1989. 3% 1984. ). . , , , , , . . , , , , -. - 1990. , 18- 150 . 1% 22%, 17% 20,5% 10% 15%. 2,5% , , 0,37% 1990. .

90

( ), , , . - , , . , - 1990/1991 . 1990. 0,91% 1991. , . . , . , . , , , , . 70% . -, (. 23% - ), ( 1990. 2%). . 1: , 1976-1993. (- % )

- (Signed IMF agreements) - (No IMF program) : James Raymand Vreeland, 2003, . 331

91

, 1992. , , . 1990. , . , 1991. 14% 1993. 1994. . , , 1% 1990. 8% 1992. . , . , , -, . , -, - . , . a -, -, . 1983. , -. .2: , 1970-1988. ( )

------ : James Raymand Vreeland, 2003, . 331

92

, , . , 1974. - , 1978. 1979. 1980. . , , -, , 1983. . , . 1983. 1985. , 1986. , , -. , , 70- - , . , , - (Oil Fund Facility), 6,3 (IMF Survey, 1974). , , , . 1975. 10,5 . - . . , . . 1979. , , . Julius Nyerere , , (Andrew Kiondo, 1992, . 24), . 1980. - de La Rosiere, 179,6 , 327% . , , . , : 50% 60%, , , , , . 1982. . 1983. , , , .

93

- 11,8% 8,9% , . 1964. . - 32 1969. 21 1974. , 1975. . 1970. . , . - . 1980- - , 1982. . 1982. , . - , . , - . , , , 1982-1985. . 1982. -. , 12%, 20%, , , , 26%. . . 1985. , 18- -, 64,2 (60% ). - , - , . , . , , ... , . (Fisher Stanley, 1999). -, . 1983. -, -, . , , 1986. . , . , -, . , , , . , -. , . ,

94

, . , , - , . -. , , -, . ( , , , ). (IMF, 2001, . 41). , , , , .

2.

60 - . , . , / . , , . (Bruno Sergi, ). , , , , , , , ( Charlie Kindleberger ). . , . . ( ) (Lipworth Nystendt, 2001). , -, , . ,

95

( , (venture capital)), , . . ( , 2010, . 624). . , . , , , , . . : - , 1983. - , 1992. - 1994. - , 1972. - 1998. - 1999. - 2001 . - - 2007. , . , 2007. , , ( lender of last resort). . , . , , . (: (Basel Capital Accord) . , , ). : , . , , , . . (self-fulfiling) , . 2007. ,

96

, , , . 2007. , , . -, , . - . (lender of last resort). 2007. , , . , -20 2009. - . 20 ( 2008 ), ... , , ... -. (G20 Communique, 2009). , . , , . , , : ?

2.1. - 60- , . 1963. , , . . 40 , GDP per kapita 10. . . , , 1960- , 1970- 1980- , , . IX , .97

. , , , , , . , . : , , . (Paul A. Samuelson, William D. Nordhaus, 2009, . 588): , . . 20 . , , . . , , . . 2: - , 1965-1998 1990. 5,7 35 2,7 19 1,3 17 -0,3 9 : World Bank, The East Asia Miracle: Economic Growth and Government Policies, 1993; World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2000. , , . , , 1980- . , , . Jeffrey Sachs Andrew Waerner (Jeffrey Sachs Andrew Waerner, 1995, . 42-43). ,

98

( ) . 1990. , , , . , 1990- , , . , . , . , , , . (Charles Kindleberger, Robert Aliber, 2006, . 246). . 3: - - , / 1990 3,79 11,62 3,90 7,24 9,28 9,01 1991 9,21 8,11 5,69 6,95 9,71 9,55 1992 14,19 8,08 6,09 6,46 5,77 8,89 1993 14,00 8,25 6,04 6,82 6,33 9,90 1994 13,10 8,99 6,01 7,54 8,77 9,21 1995 10,90 9,24 2,29 8,22 8,93 9,83 1996 10,00 5,90 4,19 7,82 7,19 10,00 1997 9,30 4,70 5,77 7,32 -1,37 5,06 1998 7,80 -10,51 -6,03 -13,13 -5,71 -7,36 1999 7,60 4,45 2,56 0,79 10,73 6,14 2000 8,34 4,75 7,95 5,35 8,80 8,68 2001 8,29 2,17 0,50 3,64 3,97 0,52 2002 9,10 5,32 1,84 4,50 7,15 5,39 2003 10,10 7,14 3,01 4,78 2,80 5,79 2004 10,09 6,34 8,47 5,03 4,62 6,78 2005 11,29 4,60 7,08 5,69 3,96 5,33 2006 12,69 5,15 7,02 5,50 5,18 5,85 2007 14,19 4,93 6,38 6,35 5,11 6,48 2008 9,59 2,46 2,16 6,01 2,30 4,71 2009* 9,10 -2,25 -2,76 4,55 0,29 -1,71 2010* 10,46 7,52 6,04 6,00 6,06 6,72 * : IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2010.

6,87 7,86 7,56 6,73 7,59 6,38 5,54 5,48 3,47 5,97 5,79 -1,65 5,26 3,67 6,19 4,70 5,44 5,98 0,73 -1,91 9,32

99

, 2. 1997. , . , . , 1996. , , . 1997. , 2. 15%. . 1994. , , , . ( ), . , 1997. . , , . , , , , . , , , . , , - . , : - - , - - . . 4: a, e e e - ( ) - 3,9 1,9 2,2 12,1 20,1 10,1 4,5 3,5 22,0 40,1 * 21,0 10,0 4,0 22,0 57,0 35,0 16,4 9,7 56,1 117,2 5 $ * : John Burton, South Korea gets $55 billion rescue Package, Financial Times, December 4, 1997. : (BIS), Annual Report, . 68, . 134.

100

, 1994/1995 50 . , . -, , ( 6% 1996. ), 1998. . (Paul Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld, 2009, . 644). - 1998. - , (1999. ) . , , , , . . 85% 1998. , . , , . , , . , , . , , . , . , , , , , . (Joosten Wink, 2004, . 26-28). , 1997. . , 280%. , . . , . ( , 2010, . 602). , . . - , -, . ( , 2008, . 415). , , 1998. , ,

101

. , , ( ). , , . , , . , V. 1998. , 1998. . 1999. , . , , . , . , . - , , , , .

2.2. , , , . 1989. . , . . , , ( , ) , . (Joseph Stiglitz, 2002, .155). . . , . , . (Joseph Stiglitz, 2002, .165).

102

: . , (Joseph Stiglitz, 2002, .182). , Olivier Blanchard (Olivier Blanchard, 1997, . 5) , , . . . . . . , , . 90- , , , , . 1940- , , . ( ) , . . 5: , 1991-2003. - : , 1991 2003. 1991. 1992. 1993. 1994. 1995. 1996. 1997. 1998. 1999. 20002003. - 9,0 - 14,5 - 8,7 - 12,7 - 4,1 - 3,4 1,4 - 5,3 6,3 6,8 - 7,0 2,0 4,3 5,2 6,8 6,0 6,8 4,8 4,1 2,6 92,7 1.734, 878,8 307,5 198,0 47,7 14,8 27,7 85,7 18,0 7 70,3 43,0 35,3 32,2 27,9 19,9 14,9 11,8 7,3 4,6 : IMF, World Economic Outlook, 1990-, . , , 90- .

103

1997. -, . , . , , 1998. , . , . -, 17 , . Stiglitz -: . 1998. , , . 1998. , . . , , . , ( ). , . , , . . . 1999. , . (Paul Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld, 2009, . 644-646). . 3: ( )

: IMF Working Paper: Russias Output Collapse and Recovery: Evidence from the Post-Soviet Transition, WP/10/89, April 2010, . 3.

104

( 1979. ) . 1997. 1998. , . , 1998. , , 17. 1998. , 6 1 26 1 . 13,5 . ( ) . . , 1998. . ( , 2010, . 603). . , .

2.3. , 1991. . , , , , . , 1991. , () , (10.000 =1 ). 1992. , . , . , . , , , , . (Convertibility Plan) . 800% 1990. 5% 1995. . , , 30% 1990. 1995. , . (Paul Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld, 2009, . 635). 400 1991. 11,1 1995. , 4,5% .

105

1995. 1997. , . , 3,5% , 1996. 2001. . , 2001. , ( ) 20%, 50%, . 20 2001. . , . . ( , 2010, . 606-607). 2001. , , . 2002. , . . . , , , . 2002. 4 1 , 300%. (Thomas Pugel, 2009, . 526). . 1990- , SBA (1991, 1996, 2000. ) - EFF (1992,1998. ), -, , , , -. . 6: - , 1991-2001. - 70,1 439 361,2 4.020 46,8 613 135,3 0 800 9.756 287,5 5.875

SBA EFF SBA EFF SBA -SRF

29.7.1991. 31.3.1992. 12.4.1996. 4.02.1998. 10.3.2000. 12.1.2001.

30.3.1992. 30.3.1996. 11.1.1998. 10.3.2000. 23.1.2003. 11.1.2002.

780 4.020 720 2.080 16.937 6.087

: Independent Evaluation Office (IEO), The IMF and Argentina, 1991-2001, 2004, . 77

106

, 2002. . , , , ( ). 1995. , , , . , 2001. , . (Michael Mussa, 2002, . 20). , 80% , . , , . , , . , , , . - 18% 21%, . , , . , 1995. , , -. - (Independent Evaluation Office, 2004) The IMF and Argentina, 1991-2001, : , . , , . , : 1) 1994-2001 . , . 2) - , . , .

107

, ( 1990- , ). . 4: (-%)

(- %)

: Independent Evaluation Office - IMF, The IMF and Argentina, 1991-2001, 2004, . 31. - . - () , . . ( ), , . . , . ( , 2008, . 410).

108

2.4. 1980- , , , 100% 3.000%. , , . . , . 1994. (), (Real Plan), . 1995. , , . , . . 5: , 1990-2000.-

;

: Economist Inteligence Unit, The Economist, 10 April 2006. , .

109

. , , . 2.669% 1994. 10% 1997. , . (Paul Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld, 2009, . 636). , , , . , . , . . , . , . 1998. , , , 70 1998. 1998. . . 1998. 41,5 . (William Gruben, John Welch, 2001, . 15). . , . -a , , , , 8% . , 1999. , 5,6% (Maria de Lourdes Rollemberg Mollo, Alfredo Saad-Filho, 2006, . 106). 40% . , . . , . 1999. , -, . , , , . , . 2002. , , ,

110

. . - , , , . , . , . , , . , ( ), . . . 6: , , , - , = 100

-

: William Gruben, John Welch, 2001, . 17, : Mexico: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e Informatica; Brazil: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatisica; Tailand: Bank of Thailand; South Korea: Korea National Statistical Office; Indonesia: Biro Pusat Statistica.

111

2.5. - , . 20. , . , . , , , ; . 1918-1919, . , . " ". , . , . , , . , . , 1920. , , . , , . , , (, 1933). - 1922. , , 1930. (BIS). 1933. . , . , , . , , ad hoc . , . . , ( )

112

. 1942. , John Maynard Keynes Harry Dexter White . 1943. . , " " . . 45 , . -, , . -- . , , . , . , . , 1948. , 1944. . 1960. 1971. , . , . -10 , , . -10 , , , 20 -. , , . , . , , , " " , . - 1978. . 1973-74 . - , -. , , , (Oil Facility)

113

, . - . 1978. , . 1982. 1985. , , " ", , . , , . , -5 (, , , ) - -10, 1985. 1987. , . 1998. , - , , . -7 (-5 ), , - ( ), 2005. (MDRI) (PSI). 2007. . - 2007. 1929. . , , , ; , , . (Paul Krugman, 2010, . 4). . , (subprime mortgages), , , . , 2003-2006, subprime . 2,8 , 1,3 . , . ( , 2008, . 1). , , (

114

, , , , hed , ). , . , . 2007. 1,3 . U.S. Foreclosure Market Report 2008. , 2,3 , 8% 2007. 225% 2006. . (David C. Swedelson, http://www.realtytrac.com/foreclosure/foreclosurerates.html, 26.01.2009). , , . , , . , , , . 1997. 2006. 124%, , . 2008. . 2008. . . Lehman Brothers , . Merryl Lynch Bank of America. , . ( ) ( ) . (Nourel Roubini, 2008). , 700 , . 250 , . , 2008. : , , , , . (IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2008).

115

, -, 2008. , (OECD, Economic Outlook, November 2008). , . , , , . . . . , , . . , , , , . , ( ) . . , . , , . ( ) , , . " " 2008. , 1944. . 21. , 1944. - , 20. . 2008. . (James Boughton, A New Bretton Woods?, 2009). - . . , , . , , .

116

, , . , . - , 1970- . " " . , . - , , . , , , . , . , , . - . , , . , . , : Peter Kenen, 2001. Nouriel Roubini, Brad Setser, 2004. ( , , ) : 1) (exit ). 2) . , . 3) , , . 4) , , , . , , .

117

2.5.1. : , , , - 40 (30 ). (16 ) 100 (80 ) , 22,4 . 5,2%. - , , : , , ; . 13,6% , 300 , 110 . 2,6% 2014. ( 3%). , 40 (11% -), . , , , , - 19 23 , , , . 56 , , ... . , 2010. , . , , . . 750 . , - . , 500 , 250 , . , , , , , .

118

, , 125, , (no bail-out ), . . y , . , "" , , . . 7: , , , 2006-2009.

: 06.05.2010. . , . 119

2010. 26 , , . , 1500 , . 85.000 30 , , . 2011. . ( ), . , , . 2010. , 54 , . - , - , . , , , , . - 2010. SBA 26,4 (30 ), , 3.200 -. 4,8 (5,5 ), 20 . SBA, , 110 ( 145 ) SBA . : () . (IMF, Press Release 10-187, IMF Executive Board Approves 30 Billion Stand-By Arrangement for Greece, 2010). : . , : 1997/1998 : , , ; 2001. ; 2009. : Je, , , , , - . , , 72 . - . (IMF, Annual Report 2009, 24). , , : 1)

120

2) , . , , , . , , , . , . -, , , . , , . (IMF, Annual Report 2009, 24). , 9,3 2010. . e 9,8 8 2010. . 125 118 79 78 . 16 , 60 , : , , . , 750 , . , , : , , , . , .

2.5.2. : , 14,4%, - , , , . 1980- 2006. , , .

121

- 2009. , , 100 , 13% 1/3 . ( , , 16. 2010). . 8: -27

: , , 2009. 2008. , . 50 60 , . , , , . . 2010. . -, . . . ,

122

. 32% , . (12,5%) , 20% . , . . , , . 20 . , , . . , , . , , , 1.000 . - 2010. . , (EFF) . 85 , : 45 ( , ), 17,5 - , - 22,5 (19,5 ), 2.322 . -, 2014. . (IMF, Press Release No. 10/496, IMF Executive Board Approves 22.5 Billion Extended Arrangement for Ireland, December 16, 2010). " " , , . , . (2008-2010) , 3% 2008. , 8% 2009, 10% 2010. . , . 2007. , 50%, . . , , .

123

2.5.3. 1990- . ( ), . , 2007. , . ( , 2008, 13). , 2007. , : ) ; ) , , ) , , . , 2008. , : ) ; ) , ) Bear Stearns JP Morgan Chase ) . , 2008. , : ) ; ) - Lehman Brothers - Merrill Lynch Bank of America, ) . , : 1) - , 21. , ( 1%), . . 2) , , ( , ), , . 3) , , . 4) , , , . 5) , , . 6) . 7) .

124

8) - (, , ). 9) ( ). 10) , . 11) . 12) . 13) . 14) - ,, . ( , , South-East Europe Review, 3/2009, . 315-328). , , : - , - , - - . , , , , . , . , , . , , , , . , . , , ( - ), , ( ). . , , . , , . (Martin Hutsebaut, European Trade Union Institut).

125

, . , , . . , . , , , . , , . , . , , . ( ), , , , , . , , . , . , . , ( . , ). , , . ( 7.000 ), . . , . , , . - ( ), . 2004. 30% 8% , 5% (Dani Rodrik, 2006, . 4).

126

, ... , . (Martin Feldstein, 1999, . 369). 2007. ( ), j . ( , ) , . , (Paul Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld, 2009, . 652): - . - , . , . , . - - , , , . - . - , . , , : , , . -. - . ( ), .

127

3.

20. . , - 41. , 2011. . , 2010. ( , : , , , ), 2011. , , . : - 205 2010. ; ; ; ; . , , ? , , . . , , . . , , , . . , , , . ( , 2009, . 337). out-. -. . ( , , ). - - . - , ( ), / . , .128

- , . . (Krastyo Petkov, ). 1980- - . , , a o . . . , , . . ( - : , 2006, . 31-126). -. : (1) (ex ante conditionality) - ; (2) (ex post conditionality) - . . . . . (quantitative performance criteria QPCs), , : , , . , , , . (structural performance criteria) : , , . (: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/condition.htm, 12.01.2010). -: , , , . , ,

129

. , . (, ), , , , . . . ... , , . ( , http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Ekonomija/MMF-ce-traziti-obuzdavanje-potrosnje.sr.html, 3.03.2011). - . , . , , . , , , . . - -. , 2001. . ( , , 2.09.2010). -? : , . . , . , . , 114 . , , - , , . , () , . , , , -, , . , , ( ), . , , .

130

, , -, , . , , - . , (Edward Prescott), , () , . . , , . - ( ) : . , , . (Joseph Stiglitz, 2002, . 32). : , . , , . , , . , , , . , , , . : " . , . , , ". , , , - . , -, , -, , , , . , , .

131

Peter Bakvis, , : , . 1944. , -. (Peter Bakvis, ITUC, Washington). - , , Amartya Sen: ... -, , .

132

-,

133

I

1. -, 2010. 5,0%, 2011. 4,4%. , 2009. 0,6%, .