Dreamer and the Yogin

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The Dreamer and the Yogin: On the relationshipbetween Buddhist and Śaiva idealisms

Isabelle Ratié

Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies / Volume 73 / Issue 03 / October 2010, pp437 - 478DOI: 10.1017/S0041977X10000406, Published online: 29 October 2010

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0041977X10000406

How to cite this article:Isabelle Ratié (2010). The Dreamer and the Yogin: On the relationship betweenBuddhist and Śaiva idealisms. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,73, pp 437-478 doi:10.1017/S0041977X10000406

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The Dreamer and the Yogin: On the relationshipbetween Buddhist and Śaiva idealisms1

Isabelle RatiéAustrian Academy of Sciences, [email protected]

AbstractThe Pratyabhijñā system, elaborated in the tenth and eleventh centuries bythe Kashmiri philosophers Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, presents arational justification of the metaphysical principles contained in theŚaiva nondualistic scriptures. However, contrary to what one might expect,many arguments to which Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta resort whendefending their idealism belong to Buddhist rather than Śaiva sources.This article examines the profound influence, in this respect, of theBuddhist “logico-epistemological school” on the Pratyabhijñā system.But it also shows that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta are not unknowinglyor unwittingly influenced by their Buddhist opponents: they systematicallyemphasize this influence, thus taking full responsibility for appropriatingtheir rivals’ concepts. Moreover, they highlight their fundamental diver-gence regarding the way consciousness manifests a seemingly externaland diverse universe, most notably by replacing the Vijñānavādins’ tra-ditional analogy: according to the Śaivas, perceived objects should notbe compared to dreamt objects, but to yogins’ creations.

Introduction

Is perception the awareness of objects that have an independent existence andthat consciousness simply reveals, just as a lamp lights objects that were alreadypresent in the dark? Or are perceived objects mere appearances that do notbelong to any reality outside of consciousness, just as dreamt or imaginedobjects? This question pervades the whole of Indian philosophy, dividing itinto externalist2 doctrines (according to which perceived objects exist outsideof the consciousness that perceives them) and idealistic doctrines (accordingto which consciousness, when perceiving, is aware of objects that are in fact

1 I would like to thank Ulrich Pagel and the Circle of Tibetan and Himalayan Studies forinviting me to give a lecture at SOAS on the subject “Buddhist arguments in a Śaiva dem-onstration: the influence of Dharmakīrti’s School on the Pratyabhijñā’s idealism” (the pre-sent article is an expanded version of this talk, given on 11 March 2009); AlexisSanderson, with whose generous help I read many passages of the ĪPV quoted below;Vincent Eltschinger, for sharing his forthcoming articles and for engaging in friendly dis-cussions that led to several improvements in this paper; Harunaga Isaacson, for kindlyreading a draft and correcting several mistakes; Lyne Bansat-Boudon, for bringing severalrelevant passages of the PS and PSV to my attention; and the anonymous reviewer,whose elegant suggestions also led to important improvements.

2 On my use of this term, see Ratié (forthcoming, n. 4).

Bulletin of SOAS, 73, 3 (2010), 437–478. © School of Oriental and African Studies, 2010.doi:10.1017/S0041977X10000406

mere aspects of itself). The Pratyabhijñā philosophy expounded by the ŚaivasUtpaladeva3 and Abhinavagupta4 belongs to the second category. This positionis of course in keeping with the religious background on which this philosophi-cal system was elaborated: according to Śaiva nondualistic scriptures, the worldand the subjects within it are in fact nothing but a single, all-encompassing andomnipotent consciousness. However, contrary to what one might expect, manyof the arguments to which Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta resort when justifyingtheir idealism belong to Buddhist rather than Śaiva sources.

This article seeks to evaluate the extent of the influence, in this regard, ofa Buddhist school often designated by modern scholars as the“logico-epistemological school” of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. The crucial rolethat it has played in the formation of the Pratyabhijñā system in general hasalready been outlined,5 but I would like to examine here more particularly itsimpact on Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta’s idealism6 – as well as the waythe two Śaivas deal with this influence: in what measure are they aware of it?When conceptually elaborating their idealism, do they knowingly exploitBuddhist concepts, or are they passively affected by them? And do they endup sharing with their Buddhist rivals a common understanding of the relationbetween consciousness and its objects?

3 Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–975 AD) has written the ĪPK and two commentaries on his ownverses: the short Vr̥tti, and a much more detailed Vivr̥ti or T

˙īkā, of which only fragments

are known to date.4 Abhinavagupta (fl. c. 975–1025 AD) has left a particularly imposing body of work that

includes two commentaries on Utpaladeva’s ĪPK, Vr̥tti and Vivr̥ti: the brilliant synthesisof the ĪPV, and the fascinating but very long and difficult ĪPVV. Towards the end of theseventeenth century, Bhāskarakan

˙t˙ha wrote a commentary on the ĪPV that has come

down to us (see Bhāskarī; on its date, see Sanderson 2007, 422). Unless otherwise stated,the text of the ĪPV quoted here is that of the Kashmir Series of Text and Studies (KSTS)edition. Wherever I have proposed an emendation, I have indicated within brackets themanuscript(s) and/or edition(s) bearing the adopted reading, followed (after a colon)by alternative readings.

5 See e.g. J. Naudou’s cursory remarks (Naudou 1968, 102–03) and the pioneering articlethat R. Torella (1992) has devoted to this question; more detailed analyses can be foundin Torella’s remarkable edition and annotated translation of the ĪPK and Vr̥tti (Torella1994).

6 One could question my use of the term “idealism” here; “internalism” might seem lessambiguous and more appropriate, especially since Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta them-selves call the rival theory a bāhyārthavāda – literally, a “theory [according to which] theobject [of consciousness] is external”, which I will translate as “externalism” in the fol-lowing pages. However, using the term “internalism” to designate Utpaladeva’s positionmight be misleading, since it may give the impression that the Pratyabhijñā philosophers,while considering that objects of consciousness exist only inside consciousness, do notpass any judgement on what might exist outside of it. But Utpaladeva andAbhinavagupta are not internalists in this sense: they explicitly state that there is nothingoutside of consciousness, and for them, leaving open the question whether or not thereare things outside of consciousness would still amount to admitting that there is somekind of space, whether empty or full of things so to speak, outside of consciousness. Itherefore prefer to use the term idealism, by which I mean any doctrine according towhich the very distinction between externality and internality is irrevlevant with respectto consciousness since nothing exists outside of it.

438 I S A B E L L E R A T I É

The main argument from the Vijñānavāda: the necessityof being simultaneously aware of the object and its cognition

The echoes of two distinct types of Buddhist argument justifying idealism canbe detected in the Pratyabhijñā texts. The first of these arguments borrowedfrom the Vijñānavāda7 belongs to the great Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti.8

Thus, in chapter I, 5, Utpaladeva states:

bhinne prakāśe cābhinne sam˙karo vis

˙ayasya tat /

prakāśātmā prakāśyo’rtho nāprakāśaś ca siddhyati // 9

If the manifesting consciousness (prakāśa)10 were different (bhinna)[from the object that it manifests] and if it were undifferentiated (abhinna)[in itself], [there would follow] the confusion of [whatever is] an object; asa consequence, the object that is made manifest (prakāśya) has as itsessence the manifesting consciousness; and that which is not the manifest-ing consciousness cannot be established.

Abhinavagupta interprets the first hemistich of the verse as meaning that anyexternalist has to be a proponent of the theory according to which consciousnessis devoid of aspects (nirākāratāvāda). If consciousness is different (bhinna)from the objects that it manifests, it must be undifferentiated (abhinna), ordevoid of various aspects (ākāra), because if consciousness is similar to alamp lighting things from outside, it remains unaffected by the various objectsthat it manifests: it must be a pure light (prakāśamātra) devoid of the

7 Literally, “the doctrine of consciousness”, i.e. the doctrine according to which everythingis consciousness. I use the term Vijñānavāda (rather than Yogācāra) because Utpaladevaand Abhinavagupta themselves favour it (see e.g. ĪPV I, 78; and for the termVijñānavādin, ĪPV, I, 167; ĪPV, II, 164; ĪPVV, II, 92; ĪPVV, II, 122; ĪPVV, II, 144; etc.).

8 Admittedly, modern scholars are struck by the fact that many of Dharmakīrti’s works canbe read both from the point of view of the Vijñānavādins and from that of anotherBuddhist school defending a kind of externalism, that of the Sautrāntikas; and it isnow widely believed that this ambiguity was deliberately maintained by Dharmakīrti.Examining this ambiguity and its various interpretations is of course beyond the scopeof this article (for such examinations see e.g. Dreyfus 1997, 98–105, Franco 1997,74–93, Dunne 2004, 53–79 or Arnold 2008). However, it is equally important to keepin mind that for Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta (as for many other Indian philosophers,Buddhist or not), there is no such ambiguity: the two Śaivas obviously considerDharmakīrti not only as a Vijñānavādin, but as the Vijñānavādin par excellence; theyconsistently quote passages of his works that clearly defend idealism and they immedi-ately interpret any passage that could bear several meanings in the strongest possibleidealistic sense.

9 ĪPK I, 5, 3.10 The word literally means “light”; however, Pratyabhijñā philosophers clearly distinguish

the “light” of consciousness from material light (āloka), hence my tentative translationhere as “manifesting consciousness”, for consciousness is prakāśa in so far as it mani-fests (prakāśayati) things, and it manifests them while manifesting itself: just likelight, consciousness illuminates objects while being self-illuminating (svaprakāśa). Onthe exploitation by the Pratyabhijñā philosophers of this notion of self-manifestation bor-rowed from Buddhist epistemology, see Torella 1988; 2007; Ratié 2006, 60–65; 2007,321–2.

T H E D R E A M E R A N D T H E Y O G I N 439

differences belonging to the objects.11 However, as he shows in theVivr̥tivimarśinī, such a view is highly problematic:

prakāśabalāc ca nīlapītayor bhedo’bhyupagantavyah˙. sa ca prakāśa

ubhayatrāpy abhinnas tulyah˙. tadanugrahād yadi nīlam

˙tat, pītam

˙na

kasmāt? na vā nīlam˙, nāpi pītam.12

And the difference (bheda) between blue and yellow must be admitted tobe due to the manifesting consciousness (prakāśa); and this manifestingconsciousness, [if it is] undifferentiated (abhinna), must be the same inthe two cases [of blue and yellow]. [But] if this is blue thanks to this[undifferentiated manifestation], why is it not yellow [as well]? Or [rather,one should say that this object] is neither blue nor yellow!

How could an entity that is perfectly devoid of difference make differencesmanifest? If consciousness manifested external objects while remaining purely

11 See ĪPV, I, 160–61: yady arthād anya eva jñānātmā prakāśo’ta eva bhinno’rthatas tarhisvātmani tasya prakāśamātrarūpatvād abheda eva. tathā hi nīlasya prakāśah

˙, pītasya

prakāśa iti yo nīlām˙śah˙

pītām˙śaś ca, *sa tāvaj jñānasya na svarūpam

˙[P, D, S1,

SOAS: sa tāvaj jñānasya svarūpam˙

KSTS, J, L, S2: sa na tāvaj jñānasya svarūpam˙Bhāskarī (conj. Pandey)] bhedavādatyāgāpatteh

˙. “If the manifesting consciousness

(prakāśa) which consists in a cognition is radically other (anya) than the object, [andif] for this very reason, it is ‘different’ from the object, then in itself, it is absolutelydevoid of differentiation (bheda), since it consists in nothing but a manifesting con-sciousness (prakāśamātra). To explain: obviously, in the ‘manifesting consciousnessof blue’ [or] in the ‘manifestating consciousness of yellow’, the aspect (am

˙śa) ‘blue’

and the aspect ‘yellow’ are not the nature of cognition – [otherwise] one should abandonthe doctrine of difference (bhedavāda).” Bhāskarakan

˙t˙ha identifies the externalists to

whom Abhinavagupta is referring here to the Vaiśes˙ikas (see Bhāskarī, I, 205:

bhedavādatyāgāpatter iti – vaiśes˙ikā hi bhedanis

˙t˙hā eva, jñānārthayoś ca tair

ekasvarūpatve’n.gīkr̥te svābhīs˙t˙asya bhedavādasya tes

˙ām˙

tyāga eva syāt, tathācāpasiddhāntāpattis tes

˙ām˙

syād iti bhāvah˙. “‘[Otherwise] one should abandon the doc-

trine of difference’ – this is the meaning [of this passage]: for the Vaiśes˙ikas rely exclu-

sively on difference, and if they admitted that cognition and its object have one and thesame nature, they would necessarily abandon the doctrine of difference which they pre-cisely want [to establish], and thus there would follow a conclusion opposed to their doc-trine”). However, Abhinavagupta seems to be targeting a much more important group ofopponents (both Buddhist and Brahmanical) who consider that there is a differencebetween consciousness and its objects as well as between the various objects appre-hended by consciousness (see ĪPV, I, 162, quoted below, where this bhedavāda isascribed to a Buddhist Sautrāntika); and he is arguing that such a position entails (orshould entail) the acceptance of the “doctrine according to which [consciousness] isdevoid of aspects” (nirākāratāvāda) rather than the “doctrine according to which [con-sciousness] has aspects” (sākāratāvāda). According to him, an externalist, because heconsiders that consciousness is different (bhinna) from the various objects that it mani-fests, must hold that consciousness is in itself undifferentiated (abhinna), i.e. devoid of(various) aspects (nirākāra), since differences pertain to the objects themselves (cf. e.g.ĪPVV ad loc., II, 79: nirākāratve ca. . . , “And if [consciousness] is devoid of aspects. . .”,or ibid., p. 80: nirākāratāpaks

˙e. . ., “In the doctrine according to which [consciousness] is

devoid of aspects. . .”). On the opposition between nirākāratāvāda and sākāratāvāda, seee.g. Mimaki 1976, 38–40, 71–3 and n. 329.

12 ĪPVV, II, 77.


undifferentiated, we would never become aware of the differences distinguishingobjects from one another. We must therefore admit that cognitions are not simi-lar to a perfectly homogeneous light that would illuminate these objects whileremaining profoundly different from them and alien to their diversity – other-wise the awareness of this diversity could never occur. On the contrary, wemust assume that this diversity does not exist independently of consciousness;rather, it is an appearance taken on by consciousness itself, as Abhinavaguptaconcludes in the same passage of the Vivr̥tivimarśinī:

tataś ca sākāratākr̥ta eva niyamah˙. yathāha: tatrānubhavamātren

˙a

jñānasya sadr̥śātmanah˙/ bhāvyam

˙tenātmanā yena pratikarma vibhajyate

// iti; tasmān nīlākāro’pr̥thagbhūto bodhāt.13

And as a consequence, the restriction (niyama) [of a cognition to a particu-lar object which is distinct from the other objects] must be due to the factthat [the cognition] takes on the aspect [of this object] (sākāratā). As[Dharmakīrti] has said: “Because [otherwise], the nature of cognitionwould remain the same with respect to any [object], since it would be apure experience (anubhavamātra), it must be [cognition] itself thanks towhich [the cognition] is differentiated according to each object”.14

Therefore the aspect (ākāra) which is blue is not distinct from the cogni-tion (bodha).

Consciousness takes on various aspects, and these aspects are what we call“external objects”; if it were not the case, we could never be aware of any diver-sity.15 Abhinavagupta himself is emphasizing the origin of this reasoning byquoting Dharmakīrti’s Pramān

˙avārttika.

13 ĪPVV, II, 79.14 PV, Pratyaks

˙apariccheda, 302. Cf. PVV: anyathānubhavamātratayā sarvatra vis

˙aye

sadr̥śam˙

jñānam˙

prativis˙ayam

˙katham

˙bhedena vyavasthāpayitum

˙śakyeta? “If it were

not the case, this cognition (which would be similar with respect to any object, becauseit would consist in nothing but experience), how could we establish that it is differentaccording to each object?”

15 Including diversity in the way we perceive things, and not only in the objective contentof our cognitions. See ĪPVV, II, 79–80: nirākāratve ca sam

˙vedanam

˙nīle yat pat

˙u, tan

mandatvenānubhavo yasyety evam abhimatasya mandena vānubhavenābhimatasyapītasyāpi sam

˙bandhitayā pat

˙īyastvenaivābhimatam syāt, nīlasyāpi vā sam

˙bandhitayā

mandatvena, yadi vā dvaye’py apat˙umandatvena. na hi nirākāratāpaks

˙e sam

˙vedanasya

ko’pi viśes˙ah˙. sa eva pat

˙umandatādinā sam

˙kara uktah

˙. “And if [the cognition] were

devoid of any [particular] aspect (nirākāra), the cognition [which has as its objectboth blue and yellow, and] which is vivid as regards blue [and indistinct as regards yel-low], should be considered as relating [vividly] to yellow as well, [whereas yellow] is, [asUtpaladeva says in the Vivr̥ti, mandānubhavābhimata-, i.e.] ‘considered as that which isexperienced indistinctly’ – or, [if the compound is analysed differently,] ‘considered asthat which is [produced] by an indistinct experience’. [But] it is in a particularly vividmanner [that this vivid cognition of blue should relate to yellow, although yellow isonly indistinct in it]; or [this cognition should be considered] as relating to blue too inan indistinct manner, [since yellow is indistinctly manifested in it]; or [it should be con-sidered] as being neither vivid nor indistinct as regards both [yellow and blue]! For in thedoctrine according to which [the cognition] is devoid of any [particular] aspect(nirākāratāpaks

˙a), the cognition has no particularity whatsoever. [Utpaladeva] is here


Of course, an obvious objection could be raised against this reasoning: it isperfectly possible that consciousness takes on the various aspects (ākāra) ofobjects without admitting that there are no objects at all outside of conscious-ness. Thus for instance, one may suppose, as the Buddhist Sautrāntikas do,16

denouncing the same confusion [that he had already mentioned regarding differencesinherent in the objects, but this time] insofar as [the very manifestation of these differ-ences] must be both vivid and indistinct, etc.” Cf. ĪPV, I, 162–3 (the following conjec-ture rests both on the context and on the parallel passage of the ĪPVV just quoted): tathā*nirākāratāvāde [conj.: kāran

˙atādivāde KSTS, J, L, P, D, S1, S2, SOAS: karan

˙atādivāde

Bhāskarī] śikharasthajñānam˙

bahutaranīlādijanyam ekatra pat˙v anyatra mandam iti

katham˙

bhedah˙? prakāśaśarīrasyābhedāt. “In the same way, in the doctrine according

to which [consciousness] is devoid of aspects (nirākāratāvāde), how [could one explain]this difference (bheda): the cognition of [someone] standing at the top [of a mountain],caused by a multiplicity of [objects] such as blue, etc., is vivid as regards some [objects,and] indistinct as regards others? For there is [supposedly] no difference in the form ofthe manifesting consciousness!” The same reasoning applies in the case of memory: ifconsciousness is undifferentiated, one cannot understand how we can remember onlyone particular element of a past perception. See ĪPVV, II, 80: samakālam eva yo nīle pītecānubhavas tena dattah

˙sam˙skāro yadā nīlamātradarśanena prabodhyate, tadā sa

prācyo’nubhavo nirviśes˙ah˙prabuddho nīlasyaiva, na pītasyeti niyamābhāvāt pītaprakāś-

ātmāpi bhaved iti pīte’pi smr̥tih˙

sā syāt. na ca śikharasthajñānaparidr̥s˙t˙abhāvavaiś-

varūpyasya punar ekatamabhāvadarśanaprabuddhasam˙skārasya samastapūrvānubh

ūtavis˙ayā smr̥tir. “When a residual trace (sam

˙skāra) left by a [past] experience of blue and

yellow which were simultaneously [perceived] is awakened by the sight of [something]that is only blue, the past experience, which is [supposedly] devoid of distinctions, is awa-kened as [the experience] of the blue only, and not [as the experience] of yellow. [Andyet,] because there is no restriction [of consciousness to a particular aspect, this rememberedexperience] should concern the yellowaswell; but on the contrary, there is nomemoryaimingat the whole past experience in [someone] who has seen a multiplicity of objects in a [single]cognition while standing on a peak, when a residual trace has been awakened in him by thesight of only one of these objects.”

16 Although the term “Sautrāntika” is often used by late doxographers and modern scholarsto refer to one of the four representative schools of Indian Buddhism, little is knownabout the Sautrāntikas’ identity and beliefs. See Kritzer (2003a, 2003b and 2005, pp.xxvi–xxx): the term seems to appear first in the Abhidharmakośabhās

˙ya, and

Vasubandhu seems to be “inserting Yogācāra ideas into the Abhidharmakośabhās˙ya

under the guise of the Sautrāntika” (Kritzer 2005, p. xxviii): having shown that“there is a close relation between Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika ideas and the Yogācārabhūmi” (ibid., p. xxviii–xxix), Kritzer concludes (ibid., p. xxx) that “in theAbhidharmakośabhās

˙ya Vasubandhu uses the term Sautrāntika to designate positions

in the Yogācārabhūmi that he prefers to those of orthodox Sarvāstivāda. . . .Vasubandhu . . . adjusts the traditional Sarvāstivādin abhidharma so that it no longer con-flicts with the central theories of Yogācāra . . . . Attributing an opinion to a Sautrāntikamay simply be Vasubandhu’s way of claiming that it is based on a more valid interpret-ation of sūtra than its Sarvāstivādin counterpart”. The evolution of the meaning of theterm between Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti (and his commentators) is still obscure; how-ever, by the time the Pratyabhijñā philosophers were writing, the Sautrāntikas werethought to hold a philosophical system of their own, a system opposed to theYogācāra/Vijñānavāda. The reader should therefore bear in mind that the Sautrāntikasdealt with here are only, so to speak, those of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta (althoughtheir depiction of the Sautrāntika doctrine had already become standardized among ear-lier Brahmanical philosophers: see below, n. 18 and 23; for a Buddhist description of thisdoctrine written shortly after Abhinavagupta’s, see e.g. Kajiyama 1998, 139–40; for a


that consciousness bears different aspects, but that it bears them preciselybecause of the existence of objects outside of consciousness, just as a mirror,while being in itself undifferentiated, takes on a variety of aspects caused bysome objects existing outside of the mirror:17 according to the Sautrāntikas,by definition, we can never have any direct access to external objects (sincewhat is external to consciousness cannot become conscious without ceasing tobe external), and yet we must infer their existence in order to account for ourawareness of phenomenal diversity.18 Dharmakīrti had anticipated this objectionin his Pramān

˙avārttika:

yadi buddhis tadākārā sā’sty ākāraviśes˙in˙ī /

sā bāhyād anyato veti vicāram idam arhati //19

If the cognition has the aspect (ākāra) of the [object], it is particularized bythis aspect. [Now] this deserves examination: is it [thus particularized]because of an external object (bāhya), or because of something else?

Should we assume that consciousness takes on a blue aspect because, some-where beyond consciousness, there is some external blue object causing it toappear thus? Or is this particular aspect of consciousness caused by somethingelse? Here is Dharmakīrti’s answer:

darśanopādhirahitasyāgrahāt tadgrahe grahāt /darśanam

˙nīlanirbhāsam

˙nārtho bāhyo’sti kevalam // 20

classical account of Sautrāntika presuppositions in Vasubandhu’s idealistic works, seeSchmithausen 1967).

17 On this theory, ascribed to the Sautrāntikas, according to which the various aspects borneby consciousness are similar to the reflections of external objects in a mirror, see e.g.ĪPVV, I, 170: nanu sautrāntikāh

˙sam˙vidi nīlādipratibimbam upayanti. “But the

Sautrāntikas consider that there is a reflection (pratibimba) of [external objects] suchas blue, etc., in consciousness!”

18 See e.g. Utpaladeva’s description of the Sautrāntikas’ position in ĪPK I, 5, 4:tattadākasmikābhāso bāhyam

˙ced anumāpayet / na hy abhinnasya bodhasya

vicitrābhāsahetutā // “If [a Sautrāntika objected that] the manifestation of this or that[particular object], [inasmuch as it is apparently] devoid of any cause, must lead us toinfer (anumāpayet) an external [reality], because consciousness, which is [in itself]undifferentiated (abhinna), cannot be the cause of the various phenomena . . .”. Cf.the summary of the Sautrāntika’s inference of the external object by Jayanta Bhat

˙t˙a

(NM, II, 492): jñānasya svatah˙

svacchasvabhāvatvena nīlapītādyavabhāsah˙

paropādhir eva bhavitum arhati, sphat

˙ikasyeva lāks

˙ādinārun

˙imādyanuvedhah

˙. atah

˙pr̥tha

gananubhūyamāno’pi bāhyo’rthah˙

sākārajñānāvabhāsānyathānupapattyā’numīyate.“Because the nature of cognition is in itself pure (svaccha), the manifestation of [variousobjects] such as blue, yellow and so on must be a particularity due to some other [entity],just as, thanks to lacquer for instance, a crystal, [although colourless,] is pervaded by red-ness [when placed next to some red substance]. For this reason, although the externalobject is never experienced separately [from consciousness], it is inferred (anumīyate)because of the impossibility, if [it did] not [exist], of [accounting for] the fact that a cog-nition is manifest while having a [particular] aspect (ākāra).”

19 PV, Pratyaks˙apariccheda, 334.

20 PV, Pratyaks˙apariccheda, 335.


Because there is no apprehension of an [object that would be] devoid ofthe particularity that is perception; and because there is an apprehension[of an object] when there is an apprehension of its [perception, onemust conclude that] it is perception that bears the aspect “blue”; there isno external object that would exist independently [of its cognition].

Consciousness does not manifest the world as a mirror reflects things that areexternal to it. For we can see the things that the mirror reflects directly, withoutlooking at their reflection in the mirror – and we can compare these things withtheir reflections in the mirror. But we cannot step outside of consciousness so asto meet some external reality that would be “the blue in itself”, the noumenon ofblue devoid of the consciousness of blue, and then come back to consciousness.Thus Abhinavagupta explains in the following way why the Sautrāntika’s under-standing of the relation between consciousness and its objects is invalid:

atha nīlākāro’sau tad yadi pratibimbabalāt taddvitīyabimbānavabhāsādayuktam. athābhedah

˙, tarhi tyakto bhedavādah

˙.21

But if [a Sautrāntika answered] that this [manifesting consciousness con-sisting in a cognition] has as its aspect the blue, [we would answer inturn that] it is impossible if, [as the Sautrāntika contends, the cognitiontakes on the aspect “blue”] due to a reflection (pratibimba) [of the externalobject onto the cognition] – because the reflected object (bimba) of whichthis [reflection] is [supposedly] a double is not manifest! Alternatively, if[the Sautrāntika answered] that there is no difference [between the aspect“blue” of the cognition and the blue object,] he would thereby renouncehis doctrine of the difference [between cognitions and their objects].

The Sautrāntika agrees with the Vijñānavādin that the objects of our awarenessare only aspects taken on by consciousness,22 but he considers that these aspectsare caused by an external reality of which they are reflections. However, asAbhinavagupta explains here, such a theory is absurd, because we consider thatan object is reflected by another when we can see it independently of its reflection,whereas we cannot even think about an external reality without making it an objectof consciousness – that is, an internal aspect of consciousness.23 Therefore there is

21 ĪPV, I, 162.22 This is why, as Arnold has noted (2008, 5), we should consider that the expression “episte-

mic idealism”, sometimes employed to describe Dharmakīrti’s Vijñānavāda, also applies tothe Sautrāntikas: the real difference between the Sautrāntika and the Vijñānavādin theorieslies rather in the extra assertion that they make (i.e. according to the Vijñānavādins, weshould consider not only that the objects of our awareness are aspects of consciousness,but also that there is no external reality beyond consciousness; whereas according to theSautrāntikas, we should consider not only that the objects of our awareness are aspects ofconsciousness, but also that these aspects reflect an external reality).

23 Cf. NM, where a Sautrāntika has just expounded his theory according to which the exist-ence of external objects must be inferred as the cause of phenomenal variety (see n. 18); aVijñānavādin then replies that any relation of cause and effect is established through “apositive and negative concomitance” (anvayavyatireka) – that is, if we experience thatan entity exists when another is present (anvaya) and does not exist when the other isabsent (vyatireka); but such a concomitance cannot be determined in the case of the


no such thing as an external object existing independently of consciousness: con-sciousness and its object are not ultimately two distinct realities, because the objectis nothing but an internal aspect of consciousness.24

This reasoning is summed up in a famous passage of Dharmakīrti’sPramān

˙aviniścaya that Abhinavagupta quotes while again insisting that here,

Utpaladeva wants to reach the conclusion already drawn by the Buddhist logician:

etad dhi sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyor iti vijñānākāramā-tram

˙nīlādi prasādhayitum

˙nirūpitam.25

For all of this has been explained in order to make it clear that [the variousobjects] such as blue are nothing but aspects (ākāra) of consciousness, accord-ing to [the principle stated by Dharmakīrti]: “because of the necessity [for blueand the cognition of blue] to be perceived together (sahopalambhaniyama),there is no difference (abheda) between blue and the cognition of [blue]”.26

external object. See vol. II, p. 492: arthe hi sati sākāram˙

nirākāram˙

tadatyaye /nityānumeyabāhyārthavādī jñānam

˙kva dr̥s

˙t˙avān // “For where has the proponent of

the thesis according to which the external object must always be inferred(nityānumeyabāhyārthavādin) ever seen a cognition having a [particular] aspect(sākāra) when an object is present, [and] devoid of aspect (nirākāra) when the objecthas disappeared?” The Vijñānavādin portrayed by Jayanta Bhat

˙t˙a adds a further verse

(ibid.): arthena rajyamānam˙

hi nirākāram˙

nisargatah˙

/ jñānam˙

na khalu paśyāmah˙lāks

˙ayā sphat

˙ikam

˙yathā // “For indeed, we do not see a cognition being coloured by

an object, [and then] devoid of aspect when [the object] disappears, as [we can see] acrystal [coloured] by lacquer, [and then colourless when the lacquer disappears].” Cf.the way the Vijñānavādin presented by Kumārila Bhat

˙t˙a refutes the inference of external

objects (ŚV, Śūnyavāda, 37–8): niścandre’bimbarūpam˙

hi dr̥s˙t˙am˙

yena divā jalam / sarātrau khe ca tam

˙dr̥s˙t˙vā jānāti pratibimbatām // vijñāne na kadācit tu prān.-

nirākāradarśanam / bāhye vākāravattādhīr yenaivam˙

kalpanā bhavet // “For someonewho has seen, during the day, an [expanse of] water devoid of the form of the lunardisc (bimba) when [the sky] is moonless, [and then], during the night, the [expanse ofwater] and [the moon] in the sky, knows that [the moon visible in the water] is a reflec-tion (pratibimba); but as regards consciousness (vijñāna), there is never any perception[of it as] devoid of any [particular] aspect (nirākāra) before [the perception of conscious-ness as endowed with a particular objective aspect]; and as regards the external object,there is never any cognition of the fact that it possesses a [particular] aspect [indepen-dently of consciousness], thanks to which one could make such a supposition(kalpanā) [of the existence of the external object].”

24 The Sautrāntika’s inference is therefore invalid, because it requires that one has previousexperience of the external object devoid of any cognition, which is impossible (cf. thebeginning of ĪPK I, 5, 8: anumānam anābhātapūrve naives

˙t˙am . . . , “One can absolutely

not accept an inference regarding [something] that has never been manifested before. . .”).However, the Sautrāntika could reply that some inferences concern objects that can neverbe directly perceived. Such is the inference of the indriyas, the imperceptible parts of thesense organs which act as intermediaries between the body and the perceived objects: wehave to infer their existence, otherwise we could not account for the fact of perception,and yet we can never perceive them. For an examination of this argument andUtpaladeva’s response, see Ratié forthcoming.

25 ĪPVV, II, 78.26 PVin I, 54ab. Discussing the exact meaning of this famous half-verse is of course beyond

the scope of this article. However, one may question whether Utpaladeva andAbhinavagupta are overinterpreting it. Thus the sahopalambhaniyama argument only


Additional arguments from the Vijñānavāda: the contradictorynature of the external object

The Pratyabhijñā philosophers borrow a second set of idealistic arguments fromthe Buddhist conceptual arsenal, but they mention them in a more allusive man-ner. In the Vivr̥tivimarśinī, Abhinavagupta explains why Utpaladeva does notbother explaining these arguments in detail:

etad upasam˙harati vijñānavādibhir iti. ālambanaparīks

˙ādau dain.nāge,

*vijñaptimātratāsiddhau vāsubandhvām˙

[corr.: vijñaptimātrādisiddhāvās-abandhanyām

˙KSTS], prajñālam

˙kārādis

˙u bhāt

˙t˙adarśanes

˙u, tatra tatra

cānyatra vitatyāyam artha ukta iti.27

This is what [Utpaladeva] sums up [in his Vivr̥ti, in the passage beginningwith] “by the Vijñānavādins”. That is to say: this point has [already] beenexplained in detail in various places – in the Ālambanaparīks

˙ā and other

works by Dignāga, in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi by Vasubandhu, in thePrajñālam

˙kāra and other teachings of the Master; and elsewhere too.

Here again, the Pratyabhijñā philosophers themselves insist that they are merelyborrowing Buddhist arguments; and the passage is particularly interesting,since Abhinavagupta hardly ever gives Utpaladeva’s sources with suchprecision. The presence of Dignāga and Vasubandhu among the Vijñānavādinsto whom he refers is not surprising, but the end of the passage is worthy of

proves that the cognized object is in fact an aspect of the cognition, but not that there isno such thing as a reality external to consciousness or that objects are nothing but theobjective aspects of consciousness: the Sautrāntikas, for instance, agree that perceivedobjects are nothing but aspects of consciousness, and yet they consider that these aspectsare causally determined by an external reality that exists independently of consciousness.Thus S. Matsumoto notices that although “the inference seems to have been regardedexclusively as the inference presented by the Vijñānavādins in order to prove their theoryof vijñaptimātratā”, the argument is formulated so as to be acceptable both toVijñānavādins and Sautrāntikas (Matsumoto 1980, 290), and indeed, Dharmakīrti stipu-lates that “because of this [necessity of being simultaneously perceived], even if there isan external object, there is no difference between the manifested object and its cognition”(PVin I, 58ab: bāhye’py arthe tato’bhedo bhāsamānārthatadvidoh

˙/ ). However, that

Dharmakīrti formulates his argument so as to be acceptable to both parties may alsobe understood as a strategic choice that forces the Sautrāntikas to accept an ideawhich ultimately leads to the Vijñānavāda, insofar as the impossibility of perceivingany object independently of consciousness renders impossible the establishment ofany causal relation (which implies the previous experience of both the cause and itseffect) between an imperceptible object and consciousness; and the Sautrāntikas cannoteven argue that an external reality must be postulated as the cause of phenomenal variety,which would otherwise remain unexplained, since phenomenal variety can be accountedfor just as well through the Vijñānavādins’ theory of impregnations (vāsanā), asDharmakīrti explains in the same passage (in PVin I, 58d and auto-commentary adloc., see Ratié forthcoming, n. 29). In any case, here as elsewhere, Utpaladeva andAbhinavagupta interpret the argument in its strongest idealistic sense.

27 ĪPVV, II, 144.


attention, for Abhinavagupta also mentions the author of the Prajñālam˙kāra, the

Kashmirian Śan.karanandana28 – and this rather mysterious character29 is perfectlyrepresentative of the very close and somewhat ambiguous relations between Śaivaand Buddhist philosophical circles in medieval Kashmir.30

As for the idealistic arguments to which Utpaladeva was alluding in hisVivr̥ti, Abhinavagupta sums them up in the following way in his Vimarśinī:

abhyuccayabādhakās tv avayavino vr̥ttyanupapattih˙

samavāyāsiddhih˙kampākampāvaran

˙ānāvaran

˙araktāraktadigbhāgabhedādiviruddhadhar-

mayogah˙.31

As for the additional arguments against [the existence of objects outsideof consciousness], they are: the impossibility of the existence of a whole(avayavin); the fact that the inherence (samavāya) [of the whole in itsparts] is not established; the fact that the [external object must] possesssome contradictory properties, such as movement and the absence ofmovement, being covered and being uncovered, being coloured and

28 Here, as often, Abhinavagupta only refers to him as “the Master” (bhat˙t˙a), but in the cor-

responding passage of the ĪPV (I, 181, quoted below in n. 32), he designates him asācāryaśan.karanandana.

29 For a list of his works see Bühnemann 1980, Steinkellner and Much 1995, 80–84,Krasser 2001 and Eltschinger forthcoming A.

30 Thus his possible conversion from Buddhism to Śaivism or from Śaivism to Buddhismhas been the object of scholarly debate. According to the Tibetan historian Tāranātha, heconverted from Śaivism to Buddhism (see Naudou 1968, 107; Naudou does not give hisopinion on this “conversion hypothétique”). According to Raniero Gnoli (1960, p. xxvi)he rather converted from Buddhism to Śaivism; more recently, Funayama (1994, 372)has expressed the opinion that Śan.karanandana wrote his works “as a Hindu” and “com-posed his Buddhist texts without conversion”, whereas Krasser has defended the hypoth-esis of his conversion from Śaivism to Buddhism, arguing that, while finding someappeal in Buddhism early on, “it was only after the completion of Abhinavagupta’sĪPVV [. . .] that he must have made the break with Śaivism and written a number ofworks setting out his Buddhist point of view” (2001, 500). This hypothesis wouldexplain why Abhinavagupta mentions him as a Buddhist (saugata) in his TĀ (3, 55)and yet speaks “very highly” of him in his later ĪPVV (ibid., 504; cf. Krasser 2002,144–5). However, even if we admit the historical reality of this conversion, the hypoth-esis according to which it would have taken place only after Abhinavagupta wrotehis ĪPVV does not seem to be grounded on sufficient evidence: Abhinavagupta indeedrefers to him with great respect in this work – but Abhinavagupta refers with suchgreat respect to Dharmakīrti, who is not to be suspected of Śaivism. Besides, asEltschinger notes (forthcoming A), in the passage of the ĪPVV quoted above,Abhinavagupta presents Śan.karanandana’s Prajñālam

˙kāra as dogmatically equivalent

to Dignāga’s Ālambanaparīks˙ā or Vasubandhu’s Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. Finally, on

the basis of an examination of the opening and/or final verses in Śan.karanandana’s pre-served works, Eltschinger demonstrates (ibid.) that these works are all unambiguouslyBuddhist. It therefore seems that one should not conclude from the fact thatAbhinavagupta refers to Śan.karanandana as a “master” that Śan.karanandana had to bea Śaiva at that time – but rather, that the Śaiva philosophers had sufficient admirationfor their Buddhist counterparts openly to consider them as masters. (For a tentative expla-nation of the fact that Śan.karanandana bears a Śaiva name and is frequently designated asa bhat

˙t˙a, see Eltschinger 2008, n. 11).

31 ĪPV, I, 178–9.


being colourless, a difference between parts according to [the six] direc-tions (digbhāgabheda), etc.

The passage lacks clarity because Abhinavagupta is assuming that the readeris familiar with the ideas to which he alludes.32 The line of argument, typicallyBuddhist, shows that however one tries to understand the external object, itremains perfectly absurd because it cannot be accounted for rationally33 –

and because of this absurdity, one should conclude that it has no existence ofits own, but is, rather, a mental product.

The absurdity of the external object is first put forward by targeting theNyāya-Vaiśes

˙ika conception34 of the external object as a whole (avayavin)

different from its parts (avayava). The Vaiśes˙ikas consider that perceived objects

exist independently of consciousness. But these objects can be analysed intodifferent elements: a cloth is made of threads, and these threads are made offibres, which can in turn be analysed into particles so tiny they cannot be per-ceived. So saying that the external object is in fact nothing but the parts ofthe totality we call, for instance, “cloth”, would amount to stating that in fact,we do not perceive the cloth, but the parts of the cloth that we do not perceive!The Vaiśes

˙ikas and Naiyāyikas therefore consider that the whole is distinct from

its parts and just as real; and this whole is the object of perception.35 However, a

32 Cf. ĪPV, I, 181: abhyuccayabādhakam˙

cedam iti nātrāsmābhir bharah˙kr̥tah

˙. vistaren

˙a

ca prajñālan.kāre darśitam ācāryaśan.karanandanena. “And we did not take the trouble[to explain] here this [series of] additional arguments; and [these arguments] have beenexpounded in detail by the master Śan.karanandana in his Prajñālam

˙kāra.”

33 Thus these arguments are mentioned in the commentaries on the end of ĪPK I, 5, 6,which asks: . . . kim anyena bāhyenānupapattinā // “. . . What could be the point of [pos-tulating the existence of] another [entity], [namely] the external [object], which is not[even] logically possible (anupapatti)?”

34 Cf. the end of the parallel passage in the ĪPVV (II, 140), which explicitely mentions thedoctrine of the author of the Vaiśes

˙ikasūtra: evam

˙kān˙ādasam

˙matam

˙bāhyam

˙dūs˙ayitvā

. . . “Having thus refuted the external [object as it is] conceived by the followers ofKan

˙āda . . .”.

35 See e.g. NS II, 1, 34 (quoted by Abhinavagupta in ĪPVV, II, 130): sarvāgrahan˙am

avayavyasiddheh˙. “Nothing would be grasped, if the whole (avayavin) did not

exist”, and NBh ad loc., 75: yady avayavī nāsti sarvasya grahan˙am˙

nopapadyate.kim˙

tat sarvam? dravyagun˙akarmasāmānyaviśes

˙asamavāyāh

˙. katham

˙kr̥tvā?

paramān˙usamavasthānam

˙tāvad darśanavis

˙ayo na bhavaty atīndriyatvād an

˙ūnām.

dravyāntaram˙

cāvayavibhūtam˙

darśanavis˙ayo nāsti. darśanavis

˙ayasthāś ceme

gun˙ādayo dharmā gr̥hyante. te tu niradhis

˙t˙hānā na gr̥hyeran. gr̥hyante tu kumbho’yam

˙śyāma eko mahān sam˙yuktah

˙spandate’sti mr̥nmayaś ceti. santi ceme gun

˙ādayo dharmā

iti tena sarvasya grahan˙āt paśyāmo’sti dravyāntarabhūto’vayavīti. “If there is no whole

(avayavin), [then] nothing can be grasped. What are all [these things that cannot begrasped]? They are: substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and inherence.With respect to what [are these things impossible to grasp if the whole does notexist]? First of all, the state of atoms (paramān

˙u) cannot be the object of perception,

because atoms are beyond the scope of sense organs. And [if no whole exists, thewhole being in fact nothing but its atomic parts, then] no other substance whichwould consist in a whole (avayavin) can be the object of perception. And [we] graspthese properties that are quality and so on as residing in the objects of our perceptions;but they could not be grasped while being devoid of a substrate; and they are grasped [insuch a form] as ‘this is a pot, which is black, one, big, in contact [with something else]; it


Buddhist would immediately reply to such a contention that one can never findsuch a thing as a whole existing over and above the parts that constitute it (if onetakes away all the trees of a forest, what remains of the forest?)36 – hence the“impossibility of the existence of a whole” alluded to by Abhinavagupta.

The Vaiśes˙ikas usually answer this kind of argument by saying that although

the whole cannot be separated from its parts, it does have an existence of itsown, by virtue of a relation of inherence (samavāya) linking together entitiesthat are distinct and nonetheless cannot be separated from each other.37 TheVijñānavādins in turn point out the absurd consequences to which this theoryleads: as a result, the external object must possess contradictory properties.Abhinavagupta explains why:

avayavadharmen˙a yady avayavī na samāviśyate, na kadācid avayavini

calatīty āvriyata iti rajyata iti vā buddhir bhavet. na hy avayavasparśamavadhūya sāks

˙ād avayavini kaścit kampāvaran

˙arāgādīn upadadhyāt.

atha samāviśyate, tad ekāvayave kampādimati yathā taddharmasamāve-śād avayavī kampādimān, tathā kampādyanāvis

˙t˙āvayavadharmasamāve-

śād akampādimān.38

If the whole were not pervaded by the property [belonging to this or that]part [because of its inherence in the parts], the cognition “[this] is mov-ing”, “[this] is hidden” or “[this] is coloured” could never occur. Fornobody can ascribe movement (kampa), being covered (āvaran

˙a), or col-

our (rāga), etc., to a whole directly, without taking into account the contact

is moving; it exists; and it is made of clay’. And since we grasp ‘all’ [these properties],since these properties – quality, etc. – exist, we see that the whole exists as a substancethat is distinct [from its parts].”

36 Cf. e.g. Vasubandhu’s remark in the Vr̥tti ad Vim˙śatikā 11: na tāvad ekam

˙vis˙ayo bha-

vaty avayavebhyo’nyasyāvayavirūpasya kvacid apy agrahan˙āt. “First of all, the object is

not a unitary [entity], because one never perceives in any circumstance the form of awhole (avayavin) that would be different (anya) from [its] parts (avayava).”

37 See PDhS, p. 14: ayutasiddhānām ādhāryādhārabhūtānām˙

yah˙sam˙bandha ihapratyaya-

hetuh˙

sa samavāyah˙. “Inherence (samavāya) is the relation between [entities] that are

inseparable (ayutasiddha) [and] are [respectively] supported and supporting – [a relation]which is the cause of the cognition [of something as being] in this [other thing].” Cf.NBhV, p. 475: vr̥ttir asyāvayaves

˙v āśrayāśrayibhāvah

˙samavāyākhyah

˙sam˙bandhah

˙.

sa katham˙

bhavatīti yasya yato’nyātrātmalābhānupapattih˙

NBvH sa tatraiva vartataiti. na khalu kāran

˙adravyebhyo’nyatra kāryadravyam ātmānam

˙labhata iti. “The mode

of existence of this [whole] in the parts is the relation between [entities that are respect-ively] supported and supporting – [i.e.], the relation called inherence (samavāya). Howdoes this [relation] occur? It occurs in that which cannot exist anywhere but in some [par-ticular other entity]. [For] surely, a substance that is an effect does not exist anywhere butin the substances that are [its] causes.” It is therefore the whole that inheres in its parts,and not the contrary, since the whole is considered as the effect (kārya) of its parts(cf. ibid., 474: yat tāvad avayavā avayavini vartanta iti tan na, anabhyupagamāt. nahi kāran

˙am˙

kārye vartate’pi tu kāran˙e kāryam iti. “As for the [statement that our

opponent ascribes to us], according to which the parts exist in the whole – this is not[true]; for [we] don’t admit [this]. For [we] do not [consider] that the cause exists inits effect, but rather, that the effect exists in its cause”).

38 ĪPVV, II, 138–9.


with the parts. But if [theVaiśes˙ika answers that thewhole] is indeed pervaded

[by the parts’ properties], then if one part only possesses [a property] such asmovement, [or being covered, or being coloured], a whole, while possessingmovement or [the other properties just mentioned] because it is pervadedby the properties of this [particular part], nonetheless does not possessmovement, etc., because it is also pervaded by some properties belongingto some parts to which movement and so on do not extend!

If only one part of a whole is moving, covered or coloured, the whole,supposedly inherent in each and every part, must be both mobile and immobile,covered and uncovered, coloured and colourless – here again, Abhinavagupta’sexplanations echo some Buddhist texts.39

Finally, when talking about “contradictory properties” necessarily belongingto the external object, Abhinavagupta mentions “the difference between the partsaccording to the [six] directions” (digbhāgabheda). His target has just shiftedfrom the Vaiśes

˙ikas to some Buddhists whom Abhinavagupta designates as

Vaibhās˙ikas.40 According to them, the external objects are ultimate particles

that cannot be divided, that is to say, atoms (an˙u, paramān

˙u); and these

atoms, by definition partless (niravayava), are not parts of a whole (avayavin)which would have any kind of distinct independent existence.41

In his Vimarśinī, Abhinavagupta criticizes this theory in the following way:

an˙usam

˙cayabāhyavāde’pi sam

˙cayasyānyasyābhāve’n

˙ava eva, te ca yadi

sam˙yujyante nirantaratayā tad avaśyam

˙digbhāgabhedah

˙; *anyathā

devanāks˙e [conj.: devanāks

˙e KSTS, Bhāskarī, J, L, P, S1, S2, SOAS;

p.n.p. D]42 s˙at˙su diks

˙u sam

˙cīyamānes

˙v s˙at˙sv an

˙us˙u, madhyamasya

39 For instance Dharmakīrti’s PV, Pramān˙asiddhipariccheda, 86–7 (the passage was prob-

ably rephrased in Śan.karanandana’s Prajñālam˙kāra, see above, n. 32): pān

˙yādikampe

sarvasya kampaprāpter virodhinah˙

/ ekasmin karman˙o’yogāt syāt pr̥thak siddhir

anyathā // ekasya cāvr̥tau sarvasyāvr̥tih˙

syād anāvr̥tau / dr̥śyeta rakte caikasminrāgo’raktasya vā gatih

˙// “When there is a movement (kampa) of a hand for instance,

since it is contradictory that the whole [i.e. the body] may obtain movement [whereasthe other members remain immobile], there must be a separate existence [of the wholeand its parts, and not a relation of inherence between them], because otherwise, actioncould not concern one [part only]. And when one [part only of the body] is covered(āvr̥ti), [if the whole is inherent in every part], the whole should be covered, even though[some parts] are uncovered; and when one [part only] is coloured, one should see colour(rāga) [everywhere in the whole], or there would be a perception [of the whole] as being[entirely] colourless.”

40 See the parallel passage in the ĪPVV (II, 140): evam˙

kān˙ādasam

˙matam

˙bāhyam

˙dūs˙ayitvā vaibhās

˙ikaparibhās

˙itam api dūs

˙ayati. “Having thus refuted the external [object

as it is] conceived by the followers of Kan˙āda, [Utpaladeva] also refutes [the external

object as it is] expounded by the Vaibhās˙ikas.”

41 The ĪPVV thus distinguishes the Vaiśes˙ikas’ thesis from the Vaibhās

˙ikas’ by saying that

according to the latter, external objects are partless. See ĪPVV, II, 140, immediately afterthe sentence explaining the shift from the first opponents to the second (see above, n. 40):atheti niravayavā iti. “[Utpaladeva writes:] ‘But if [the opponent considers rather that. . .]’ – [i.e. if objects] are partless (niravayava).”

42 Here, given the meaning of the compound digbhāgabheda for Vasubandhu and the con-sequence that, according to Abhinavagupta, follows from the supposition which he is


paramān˙or yatraiva dhāmny eko lagnas tatraiva yady aparas tad

ekaparamān˙umātratā. athānyatraiko’nyatrāparas tad avaśyam

˙bhāgabhedāpattir iti bhāga eva paramārthasan, tasyāpy es˙aiva saran

˙ir

iti na kim˙cid avaśis

˙yate bāhyam

˙tattvatah

˙.43

And in the doctrine according to which external [objects] are aggregates(sam

˙caya) of atoms (an

˙u), since there is no aggregate that would be other

than [the atoms themselves], only atoms exist. And if these [atoms] are incontact without any interval, then necessarily there must be a differencebetween parts according to the [six] directions (digbhāgabheda); otherwise,since the six atoms which are aggregated according to the six directionsform a cube, at the very place of the central atom where a second [atom]is in contact [with this central atom], if there is a third [atom], then [theyall] have the size of a single atom! If, on the other hand, [the opponent con-siders that] one atom is in one [place, and] another [atom], in another[place], then necessarily there must follow a difference between the parts[of each atom] (bhāgabheda); therefore only that part [of the so-calledatom] exists in the ultimate sense (paramārtha), and one can make thesame reasoning as regards this [part] as well, so that no external [entity]whatsoever remains [that would] really [exist]!

Once more, the Śaivas’ reasoning is extremely close to that developed in theVim˙śatikā, where Vasubandhu shows that the Vaibhās

˙ikas’ conception of the exter-

nal object is just as absurd as that of the Vaiśes˙ikas. In order to understand the

argument, one has to imagine an atom in contact with other atoms situated accord-ing to the six spatial directions (diś): north, south, east, west, up and down. Thismeans that only a part of the central atom is in contact with the atom above;that another part of the central atom is in contact with the atom below; that athird part is in contact with the atom in the north, etc. Vasubandhu explains thatthe central atom must thus be considered to have six different “parts” (am

˙śa) cor-

responding to the six directions; otherwise, if all the surrounding atoms were incontact with the same part of the central atom, they would all exist in the samelocus and together would be the size of a single atom – so that one could not under-stand how aggregates of atoms could ever become perceptible, nor how the atomscould ever be in contact with each other.44 But an atom is partless by definition,

now making (i.e. the fact that all atoms must have the size of one atom), the passageseems to require an anyathā (“otherwise”). Bhāskarakan

˙t˙ha thus notes that the sentence

beginning after digbhāgabhedah˙supposes the refusal of the consequence just mentioned.

See Bhāskarī, I, 224: nanu paramān˙ave digbhāgabhedena na tis

˙t˙hanti, kintv ekasya

madhyagasya sthāne lagantīty ata āha s˙at˙sv iti. “[– An objector:] But atoms do not

exist while being differentiated into parts according to the [six] directions(digbhāgabheda)! Rather, they are in contact where the central atom is. It is becauseof this [objection] that [Abhinavagupta] says: ‘the six atoms . . .’.” K. C. Pandey under-stands the sentence in the same way, since he inserts “for, otherwise” in his translation(without indicating that nothing in the edited Sanskrit text corresponds to these words).

43 ĪPV, I, 179–80.44 Cf. Vim

˙śatikā 12ab (s

˙at˙kena yugapadyogāt paramān

˙oh˙

s˙ad˙am˙śatā / “Because of [its]

simultaneous contact with six [other atoms], an atom must have six parts (am˙śa)”, and


and the Buddhist Vaibhās˙ika has adopted the atomic theory so as to avoid the con-

tradictions that inevitably arise when one postulates the reality of a whole made ofparts. He must, however, acknowledge that what he considers as an “ultimateelement” (paramān

˙u) is in fact made of parts as soon as he considers that

atoms have a spatial extension (vaitatya), for as Abhinavagupta says in hisVivr̥tivimarśinī, “extension is [nothing but] having a difference between partsaccording to the [six] directions” (vaitatyam

˙digbhāgabhedavattvam)45 – here

too, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta are only paraphrasing Vasubandhu’sargument.46

If the Vaibhās˙ika admits that atoms possess different parts, since he considers

that wholes do not exist as entities distinct from their parts, he must concede thatthe so-called atoms do not have any real existence insofar as they are made ofparts. It means that the central atom described by Abhinavagupta does notexist: the only existent entities are the parts of it which are connected to otherparts of the atom. But one can repeat this reasoning as regards the parts them-selves:47 the part of the central atom that is connected with the part of theatom above is also extended, so that it also has parts according to the spatialdirections, and therefore it cannot be considered the ultimate element; and itsparts too can be divided, etc. In this perpetually dissolving universe, there isnothing left to which the Vaibhās

˙ika (who has admitted that only that which

is not made of parts exists) could cling as being a genuine external entity.

the Vr̥tti ad loc.: s˙ad˙bhyo digbhyah

˙s˙ad˙bhih

˙paramān

˙ubhir yugapadyoge sati paramān

˙oh˙s

˙ad˙am˙śatā prāpnoty ekasya yo deśas tatrānyasyāsam

˙bhavāt. “Since there is a simul-

taneous contact with six atoms according to the six directions (diś), the atom musthave six parts, because of the impossibility of another [atom existing] at the place ofthe first [atom].” Vim

˙śatikā 12cd emphasizes the absurd consequence that follows if

one refuses to admit that the so-called atom has six parts: s˙an˙n˙ām˙

samānadeśatvātpin˙d˙ah˙

syād an˙umātrakah

˙// “If six [atoms] have the same place, their aggregate must

have the size of a [single] atom”). Cf. Vr̥tti ad loc.: atha ya evaikasya paramān˙or

deśah˙sa eva s

˙an˙n˙ām˙. tena sarves

˙ām˙

samānadeśatvāt sarvah˙pin˙d˙ah˙paramān

˙umātrah

˙syāt parasparāvyatirekād iti na kaścit pin˙d˙o dr̥śyah

˙syāt. naiva hi paramān

˙avah

˙samyu-

jyante niravayavatvāt. “But if [the opponent replies that] the same place which belongs toone atom also belongs to the six [other atoms], then, since they all have the same place,the whole aggregate must have the size of an atom, since they are not distinct from eachother. Therefore no aggregate should be perceptible; for atoms are not at all in contact,since they are partless.”

45 ĪPVV, II, 140.46 See Vim

˙śatikā 14ab: digbhāgabhedo yasyāsti tasyaikatvam

˙na yujyate / “That which pos-

sesses a difference between parts according to the [six] directions (digbhāgabheda) can-not have a unity.” Cf. the Vr̥tti ad loc.: anyo hi paramān

˙oh˙

pūrvadigbhāgo yāvadadhodigbhāga iti digbhāgabhede sati katham

˙tadātmakasya paramān

˙or ekatvam

yoks˙yate? “To explain: since there is a difference between the part according to the

spatial directions (digbhāgabheda) – that is to say, since an atom has a part in the direc-tion of the east, [and other parts in the directions of the south, west, north, up] and finallydown, how could the atom, which consists in these [parts], have any unity?”

47 Cf. the parallel passage in ĪPVV, II, 141: bhāga evān˙ur iti cet, tatrāpy es

˙aiva vārtā. “If

[the opponent answers] that it is this part [of the atom] which is the [real] atom, the samereasoning applies to this [part] as well!”


The Pratyabhijñā philosophers’ strategy to distancetheir idealism from the VijñānavādaUtpaladeva and Abhinavagupta thus make extensive use of arguments devel-oped by Vijñānavādins to justify their own idealism – and they make no secretof it. But they also endeavour to distance themselves from the Vijñānavāda.

The most conspicuous difference between the two systems lies in a disagree-ment regarding the unity of consciousness: according to the Vijñānavādins, con-sciousness is a series (santāna) of momentary conscious events or cognitionsthat remain irreducibly multiple, whereas the Pratyabhijñā philosophers agreewith the Brahmanical philosophers that consciousness has a profound unityand continuity and that its existence transcends that of momentary cognitions.The structure of Utpaladeva’s treatise emphasizes this difference: following anintroductory chapter, chapters I, 2 to I, 4 are devoted to the refutation of theBuddhist conception of consciousness as a mere series of cognitions.48

However, up to that point, Utpaladeva’s criticism of Buddhism remains generalenough to concern not only the Vijñānavādins, but also a variety of externalistBuddhist schools.

Divergence regarding the cause of phenomenal variety –

criticizing the theory of impregnations and the dream model

It is only in chapter I, 5 that Utpaladeva, after exploiting some Vijñānavādinarguments in order to establish his idealism, endeavours to criticize theVijñānavāda: what he targets specifically is the Vijñānavāda’s explanation ofthe fact that we are aware of an external world made of an infinite variety ofdifferent objects, although supposedly there is no such external world.

The Vijñānavādins account for this phenomenal variety by comparing thewaking state to that of a dreamer. For according to the traditional Indian expla-nation of dreams (svapna), the objects we perceive in our sleep are the outcomeof residual traces or impregnations (vāsanā) that have been left in the cognitiveseries by previous experiences.49 Accordingly, most Indian philosophicalschools consider that when we dream, the various elements of our dreams arein fact entities that have been experienced during some previous waking state:dream perceptions are thus understood as memories that are not recognized assuch when occurring. In the same way, according to the Vijñānavādins, ourperceptions are nothing but the product of such a mechanism of residual traces:50

dreams become the model through which any conscious state can be

48 For an analysis of these chapters see Ratié 2006.49 On the role played by these residual traces in memory and the disagreement between the

Buddhists and the Pratyabhijñā philosophers in this respect, see Ratié 2006, 49–56 and59–60. On their role in dreams (and imagination), see e.g. Ratié 2010.

50 See e.g. Vim˙śatikā 17cd: svapne dr̥gvis

˙ayābhāvam

˙nāprabuddho’vagacchati // “In

a dream (svapna), someone who has not awakened yet does not understand the non-exist-ence of objects of perception.” Cf. the Vr̥tti ad loc.: evam

˙vitathavikalpābhyāsavāsanānidrayā prasupto lokah˙svapna ivābhūtam artham

˙paśyann

aprabuddhas tadabhāvam˙

yathāvan nāvagacchati. “Thus people, overcome by a sleepdue to impregnations (vāsanā) [in turn due to] the repetition of conceptual constructions


explained.51 Accordingly, the Vijñānavāda’s explanation of phenomenal varietyis thus summarized in the Vivr̥tivimarśinī:

vāsanānām anādikālopanatānām abhinavanīlādyābhāsotthāpanaśaktīn-ām˙

yo vicitrah˙

prabodhah˙, sa evātra kramikābhāsavaicitrye hetutām eti

prathamatah˙; caramam

˙tu sam

˙skārātmanām

˙prabodho vikalpanasmaran

˙-

ādyābhāsanāhetutām etīti sam˙bhāvayate vijñānavādī.52

There is a varied (vicitra) awakening (prabodha) of impregnations(vāsanā) that are [beginningless (anādi), i.e. that] do not occur for thefirst time [at a particular moment], [and] that are powers (śakti)53 of bring-ing to existence phenomena (ābhāsa) – such as blue and so on – that arenew (abhinava) [and not remembered]. It is this [varied awakening ofimpregnations] that initially constitutes the cause of the variety (vaicitrya)of phenomena that occur consecutively; and then [only], the awakening ofthese [impregnations] which consist of residual traces (sam

˙skāra) becomes

the cause of manifestation [in such cognitions as] concepts, memories andso on. Such is the hypothesis formulated by the Vijñānavādin.

that are erroneous, perceiving, as in a dream (svapna), an object that [in fact] does notexist, do not understand as they should the non-existence of this [object] as long asthey have not awakened.” Cf. e.g. PV, Pratyaks

˙apariccheda, 336 (kasyacit kin.cid

evāntarvāsanāyāh˙prabodhakam / tato dhiyām

˙viniyamo na bāhyārthavyapeks

˙ayā // “It

is only a certain [cognition] that awakens a certain impregnation (vāsanā) inside [the cog-nitive series]; there is a restriction (viniyama) of cognitions [to their particular respectiveobject] thanks to this, and not with respect to any external object”), and PVV ad loc.,331: tatra vāsanāyāh

˙sāmartham

˙svapnādāv upalabdham, na tu bāhyasya

nityaparoks˙atvāt. “As regards the [question: ‘what determines the particular objective

aspect affecting a given cognition?’, we answer that] it is the power of impregnationthat [we] experience in such [states] as dreams (svapna) – and not the external [object],because it is forever imperceptible.”

51 Brahmanical texts also insist on the importance of this dream model in theVijñānavādins’ discourse. See NS IV, 2, 31: svapnavis

˙ayābhimānavad ayam

˙pramān˙aprameyābhimānah

˙. “[– A Vijñānavādin:] This belief in the means and object

of knowledge (pramān˙aprameya) [of the waking state] is just as the belief in the objects

of dreams (svapna).” Cf. NSBh, p. 273: yathā svapne na vis˙ayāh

˙santy atha cābhimāno

bhavati, evam˙na pramān

˙āni prameyān

˙i ca santy atha ca pramān

˙aprameyābhimāno bha-

vati. “Just as, in a dream, objects do not exist, and yet, there is a belief (abhimāna) [inthem], in the same way, means and objects of knowledge do not exist, and yet, there is abelief in these means of knowledge and objects of knowledge.” Cf. ŚV,Nirālambanavāda, 23: stambhādipratyayo mithyā pratyayatvāt tathā hi yah

˙/ pratyayah

˙sa mr̥s˙ā dr̥s

˙t˙ah˙

svapnādipratyayo yathā // “[– A Vijñānavādin:] The cognition of [anyobject] such as a pole is false, because it is a cognition; for [we] see that cognition isillusory – for instance, the cognition of dream (svapna), etc.” As J. Taber has observed,the Naiyāyikas and Mīmām

˙sakas thus tend to present this dr̥s

˙t˙ānta not as an analogy

illustrating a hypothesis that the Vijñānavādins would then endeavour to demonstrate(for instance through the arguments mentioned in the first part of the present article),but as a mere example illegitimately used as an inferential reason, which enables themto consider that in the Vijñānavādin’s reasoning, “there is no demonstration, due tothe absence of reason” (hetvabhāvād asiddhih

˙, NS, III, 2, 33; cf. Taber 1994, 28–31).

52 ĪPVV, II, 92.53 On this definition of impregnations as śaktis in Buddhist texts, see e.g. Eltschinger forth-

coming B, I, n. 53. Cf. ŚV, Śūnyavāda, 17, and NR ad loc., p. 194, quoted below, n. 55.


Even an externalist admits that memory (smr̥ti) does not require the presenceof an external object corresponding to the cognition’s object; for according to awidely accepted theory among Indian philosophical schools, a memory occurssimply because a past experience has left a residual trace (sam

˙skāra) that,

when stimulated (literally, when “awakened”, prabodhita) by some external fac-tor, triggers the return to consciousness of the past manifestation. One can there-fore assume that perception in general happens in the same way: since residualtraces can account for the objects of memories, they can also account for objectsof experiences that appear to us as new. And this mechanism is “beginningless”(anādi)54 – it would therefore be useless to look for some original object thatwould not be a mere aspect of consciousness determined by an impregnation.Thus there is no need to assume the existence of an external object to explainthe variety of aspects taken on by cognitions: cognitions and impregnationsare mutually causes, and this circular causality is not a logical defect, preciselybecause the process is beginningless.55

In order to refute this theory, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta adopt a strategyoften used by Indian philosophers when they want to get rid of two opponentsat the same time: they have these two opponents refute each other. ThePratyabhijñā texts therefore show, quite amusingly, two Buddhists arguingagainst each other – a Vijñānavādin and a Sautrāntika. The Vijñānavādin refutes

54 For another Śaiva description of this theory, see PSV, 27, 59: vijñānam iti bodhamātrameva kevalam anupādhi, nāmarūparahitam apy anādivāsanāprabodhavaicitryasā-marthyān nīlasukhādirūpam

˙bāhyarūpatayā nānā prakāśata iti vijñānavādinah

˙. “The

Vijñānavādins [consider] that ‘consciousness’ (vijñāna), [i.e.] a pure consciousness(bodhamātra) with no relation [to anything else] (kevala) [and] devoid of particularities(upādhi), appears in various ways (nānā) in the form of external [objects], becausealthough it is devoid of names-and-forms (nāmarūpa), it takes the [diverse] forms [ofvarious objects] such as ‘blue’, ‘pleasure’, etc., thanks to the power [inherent in] the var-iety of the awakening of impregnations that are beginningless (anādivāsanāprabodha).”

55 Cf. the Vijñānavādin’s speech in ŚV, Śūnyavāda, 15–17: matpaks˙e yady api svaccho

jñānātmā paramārthatah˙

/ tathāpy anādau sam˙sāre pūrvajñānaprasūtibhih

˙// citrābhiś

citrahetutvād vāsanābhir upaplavāt / svānurūpyen˙a nīlādi grāhyagrāhakarūs

˙itam // pra-

vibhaktam ivotpannam˙

nānyam artham apeks˙ate / anyonyahetutā caiva jñānaśaktyor

anādikā // “According to my doctrine, although the essence of cognition is in factpure, nonetheless, in the endless (anādi) cycle of rebirths, because of a confusion dueto the impregnations (vāsanā) that were born from previous cognitions [and] that are var-ied (citra), because they have causes that are [themselves] varied, the blue or [any otherobjective aspect taken on by the cognition,] stained by [the distinction between] theapprehended [object] and the apprehending [subject], arises while being seemingly dif-ferentiated in conformity [with its cause]; it does not require any other object [that wouldbe external to the cognition]. And this relation of mutual causality (anyonyahetutā)between the cognition and the power (śakti) [that constitutes the impregnation] isbeginningless (anādika).” Cf. NR ad loc., p. 194: śaktir iti vāsanocyata iti. ekayāvāsanayaikam

˙jñānam

˙janyate, tenāpy anyā vāsanā, tayāpy anyaj jñānam iti

netaretarāśrayam. na ca sarvādyasya katham˙

siddhir iti vaktavyam, anāditvātsam˙sārasyeti. “‘Power’ means ‘impregnation (vāsanā)’ [here]. A cognition arises from

an impregnation; from this [cognition] arises another impregnation, [and] from this[other impregnation,] another cognition, [etc.]; therefore there is no logical circle(itaretarāśraya). And one does not have to ask how the very first (sarvādya) [elementof this series] arises, because the ‘cycle of rebirths’ is ‘endless’ (anādi).”


the Sautrāntika’s externalism (with the arguments already mentioned),56 but theSautrāntika refutes the Vijñānavādin’s way of accounting for the appearance ofan external world.

Thus in his verses, Utpaladeva presents the Sautrāntika’s criticism of theVijñānavādin’s theory of impregnations in the following way:

na vāsanāprabodho’tra vicitro hetutām iyāt /tasyāpi tatprabodhasya vaicitrye kim

˙nibandhanam // 57

The varied (vicitra) awakening of impregnations (vāsanā) cannot be thecause of this [phenomenal variety; for] what would be the cause, inturn, of the variety of these [impregnations’] awakening?

Abhinavagupta, while explaining the verse, has the Sautrāntika begin by noti-cing that in the case under investigation, it is not memory that must be explained,but perception:

smr̥tijanakah˙sam˙skāro vāsaneti tāvat prasiddham, iha tv anubhavavaici-

trye hetuh˙paryes

˙an˙īyo vartate.58

First of all, it is well known that the residual trace (sam˙skāra), which is an

impregnation (vāsanā), produces memories; but in the case at hand, it is thecause of the variety of experience that is the object of [our] investigation!

Residual traces may account for memory; however, the Vijñānavādin’sassumption of an impregnation that would also explain experience is perfectlygratuitous, because residual traces are indeed generally considered as thecause of memory, but not of all experiences.59

The Sautrāntika goes on, and this time, he strikes harder:

astu vā nīlādyābhāsasam˙pādanasāmarthyarūpā jñānasya yogyatātmikā

śaktir vāsanā, tasyāś ca svakāryasam˙pādanaunmukhyam

˙prabodhah

˙,

tato bodhes˙v ābhāsavaicitryam iti. tatrāpi tu brūmah

˙: yady apy

ābhāsānām˙

jñānāntarvartinām apāramārthikam sam˙vr̥tisattvam

ucyetāpi, tathāpi yad es˙ām˙kāran

˙am˙tad vastusad evān.gīkāryam avastunas

sarvasāmarthyavirahitālaks˙an˙asya kāryasam

˙pādanaprān

˙itasāmarthyātm-

akasvabhāvānupapatteh˙. evam

˙sthite yā etā vāsanā ābhāsakāran

˙atvenes

˙-

56 In fact the Pratyabhijñā philosophers claim to refute the Sautrāntikas’ view even betterthan the Vijñānavādins do, but examining this long passage is beyond the scope ofthis article (see Ratié forthcoming).

57 ĪPK I, 5, 5.58 ĪPV, I, 167.59 Cf. ĪPVV, II, 93: *vāsanā smr̥tijanakah

˙[corr.: vāsanāsmr̥tijanakah

˙KSTS] sam

˙skārah

˙prasiddho na tv apūrvānubhavaprasādhaka iti. “The residual trace (sam˙skāra), which

is an impregnation (vāsanā), is well known as that which produces memories, but notas that which produces a new experience.” This criticism is formulated in variousBrahmanical sources (see e.g. ŚV, Nirālambanavāda, 181ab: sam

˙vittyā jāyamānā hi

smr̥timātram˙

karoty asau // “For this [impregnation (vāsanā)] which arises from a cogni-tion produces only a memory!”).


yante, tāsām˙

bodhād yadi bhinnam˙

rūpam, tac ca paramārthasat, tadayam

˙śabdāntarapracchanno bāhyārthavādaprakāra eva. atha sam

˙vr̥tisat,

tarhi tena rūpen˙a kāran

˙atānupapattih

˙.60

But let us admit [for a moment, as the Vijñānavādin does,] that the impreg-nation is [indeed] a śakti, that is to say, a power consisting in a capacity ofconsciousness to bring about [various] phenomena such as the blue; andthat the “awakening” (prabodha) of this [impregnation] is the fact thatit undertakes to bring about its effect; and that the phenomenal varietyin cognitions comes from it. But even if it is so, we [externalists] answer:even if the [Vijñānavādin] also explains that phenomena, which occur[only] inside cognitions, have a reality only in a relative sense (sam

˙vr̥ti-

sattva), and not in an absolute sense (pāramārthika), [he] still has toadmit that their cause necessarily exists as a real entity (vastu), becauseit is impossible that that which is not a real entity – and is [therefore]characterized by the absence of any power – may have a nature consistingin a power the essence of which would be to produce an effect! Since it isso, if these impregnations that [the Vijñānavādin] considers as the cause ofphenomena have a nature distinct from consciousness, and [if as a conse-quence,] this [nature of impregnations] exists in the absolute sense(paramārthasat), then [the Vijñānavāda] is nothing but a variety of extern-alism (bāhyārthavāda) disguised under a different name. But [if theVijñānavādin had rather consider that the nature of impregnations] existsonly in a relative sense (sam

˙vr̥ttisat), then [impregnations] cannot be

causes in this form [which exists only in a relative sense].

According to the Vijñānavādin, the objects of our perceptions are not entitiesthat would exist independently of consciousness but aspects of it, so that theyonly have an “existence in a relative sense” (sam

˙vr̥tisattva). But then how should

we apply this distinction between relative and absolute reality to the impreg-nation itself? Whether phenomena exist in an absolute sense or not, they musthave a real cause. Therefore impregnations, insofar as they must cause thephenomenal variety, must exist in an absolute sense – that is, independentlyof consciousness. But then the Vijñānavāda is nothing but a “disguised” (prac-channa) externalism, since in order to explain phenomena, it must acknowledgethe existence of entities outside of consciousness. If, on the other hand, theVijñānavādin considers that these impregnations only have a relative reality,he cannot maintain that they are causes, for only a real entity can produceany effect;61 and even if he contends that while having no independent

60 ĪPV, I, 167–8.61 Admittedly, the Vijñānavādin could reply that unreal causes sometimes have a real effect.

Thus Vasubandhu shows, in his Vim˙śatikā, that even dream objects have an efficiency

(see the beginning of Vim˙śatikā 4: svapnopaghātavat kr̥tyakriyā. “The efficiency [of

an object that does not exist outside of consciousness is established], as in the case ofthe [sperm] emission [caused by] a dream”, and the Vr̥tti ad loc.: siddheti veditavyam.yathā svapne dvayasamāpattim antaren

˙a śukravisargalaks

˙an˙ah˙svapnopaghātah

˙. “One

must understand [the verse by supplying: the efficiency] ‘is established’. Thus, forinstance, in a dream, [although] there is no union of a couple [outside of consciousness],


existence, these impregnations are indeed real insofar as they are ultimatelynothing but consciousness, then they are real only insofar as they are absolutelyundifferentiated, since this is the nature of consciousness according to theVijñānavādin. Therefore their variety cannot be real, so that they cannot bethe causes of phenomenal variety:

atha yena rūpen˙āsām

˙pāramārthikatā tena kāran

˙atā, tat tarhi

jñānamātram˙

tac cābhinnam iti nīlādyābhāsarūpasya kāryabhedasyāsid-dhih

˙. evam

˙vāsanānām avicitratve tatprabodho vicitra iti kā pratyāśā?62

But if [the Vijñānavādin answers that] the form in which the [impregnations]are real in the absolute sense is [precisely] the [form] in which they arecauses, then this form is nothing but consciousness ( jñānamātra) – andthis [pure consciousness] is undifferentiated (abhinna). Therefore [theimpregnations] cannot justify the existence of the differentiation whichthey [supposedly] produce in the form of phenomena such as blue, etc.Since thus, there is no variety of the impregnations [themselves], howcould we expect their awakening [too] to be varied?

So what does the Vijñānavādin mean when he says that the cause of phenom-enal variety is the “varied awakening” of impregnations? If he means the awa-kening of varied impregnations, such an awakening is impossible, becauseimpregnations are nothing but consciousness, which is undifferentiated. But ifhe means that the impregnations are awakened by various causes, he must con-front yet another highly problematic consequence:

bhavantu vā vāsanā bhinnāh˙; *tathāpi tu [J, P, S1, S2, SOAS: tathāpi

KSTS, Bhāskarī, L; p.n.p. D] bodhamātrātiriktasya deśakālabhāvādeh˙prabodhakābhimatasya vicitrasya kāran

˙asyābhāvāt prabodho’vicitra ity

eka eva prabodha iti samam eva nīlādivaicitryam˙

bhāseta. athasvasantānavartīni bodhāntarān

˙i vicitrān

˙i prabodhakāran

˙ānīti, tad asat,

sukhaduh˙khanīlapītādipūrvāparādideśakālabhedasya vijñānamātrarūpatve

vijñānasya ca prakāśamātraparamārthatāyām˙

svarūpabhedāsam˙bhave

bodhavailaks˙an˙yānupapatteh

˙.63

But let us admit [for a moment] that there are indeed differentiated impreg-nations. However, even if it is the case, since there is no varied cause thatwould be something over and above pure consciousness (bodhamātra),that would exist in a [particular] place and time, etc., [and] that couldbe considered as that which awakens [these impregnations], the awakening(prabodha) [of these impregnations must be] devoid of variety. Therefore

there is nonetheless an ‘emission [caused by the] dream’ – that is, a sperm emission”).However, this kind of argument would hardly be of any use here, since inVasubandhu’s example, the dreamt union, although unreal in the ultimate sense, hasan effect insofar as the dreamer is conscious of it; whereas residual traces supposedlyhave an effect on the cognitive series while remaining unconscious.

62 ĪPV, I, 168.63 ĪPV, I, 168–9.


there must be a single awakening [of all these impregnations]; so the variety ofblue and [all the other phenomena] should be manifest only simultaneously,[and not according to a particular spatial and temporal order]. And if [theVijñānavādin were to explain] that the varied causes that awaken [the impreg-nations] are other cognitions that occur in the same series [of cognitions, wewould answer:] this is not the case, because there cannot be any differencebetween the cognitions, since this difference – [such as] a place and a timethat are anterior or posterior, etc., or pleasure and pain, blue and yellow, etc.– must consist of nothing but consciousness vijñānamātra), and since con-sciousness cannot bear differences in its nature, insofar as its reality in the absol-ute sense amounts to a pure manifestation (prakāśamātra).

Even if we admit the existence of various impregnations, since nothing existsapart from them and an undifferentiated consciousness, the cause of their awa-kening cannot be diverse, which means that all impregnations should be awa-kened by one and the same cognition. But if it is so, this single cognitionshould stimulate all impregnations simultaneously, so that all phenomena shouldarise simultaneously: one single cognition should be followed by an infinitenumber of different cognitions arising at the same time.

The Vijñānavādin could answer that the impregnations are awakened bythe various causes constituted by the different cognitions – but since consciousnessis undifferentiated, one does not see how cognitions could differ from each other,unless they have been differentiated by the impregnations. Of course, for theVijñānavādin, this is not a problem, because according to him, the mechanismof impregnations is “beginningless” (anādi): the present cognition of blue (C1)is the outcome of the impregnation of blue (I1) which is the outcome of a past cog-nition of blue (C2) which is the outcome of an impregnation of blue (I2) – and soon, ad infinitum. However, for this explanation to be valid, the variety of impreg-nations must be real: the awakening of impregnations can have varied causes onlyif the impregnations themselves are varied. But the externalist has already shownthat the Vijñānavādin has retreated into an impossible alternative: either theimpregnations do not exist independently of consciousness – and then they mustbe undifferentiated; or they do exist independently of consciousness – but thenthe Vijñānavādin is just another externalist, because he acknowledges the existenceof external objects which he calls impregnations.

The Sautrāntika thus undermines the Vijñānavādins’ explanation of ourawareness of the universe by showing that these mysterious impregnationshave a particularly ambiguous status: they are nothing but consciousness –

and yet we are not conscious of them; and they are nothing but consciousness –and yet they are more than consciousness, since they comprise a variety thatremains alien to consciousness. He concludes that “thus, the varied impreg-nations [invoked by the Vijñānavādins as the causes of phenomenal variety],as well as the varied causes of their awakening, are strictly impossible”,64 and the

64 ĪPV, I, 175: evam˙

vāsanānām˙

tadudbodhahetūnām˙

ca vicitrān˙ām anupapattir eva.

Between the last passage of the ĪPV quoted above and this conclusion, Abhinavaguptadevelops a long discussion on the problem of the other subjects’ existence in theVijñānavāda (see Ratié 2007).


strategy he has adopted to achieve this conclusion is similar to that of Brahmanicalexternalists belonging to the Mīmām

˙sā65 or the Nyāya66 – having exploited

Buddhist idealistic arguments in order to establish their own idealism, thePratyabhijñā philosophers exploit just as conspicuously some externalist arguments,whether Buddhist or Brahmanical, in order to refute the Vijñānavāda.

Putting forward another model: the yogin’s creation

But Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta are not contented just with rejecting thevāsanā-theory (and therefore the dream model that it entails) in the guise of aSautrāntika; they also suggest another model for their own idealism.Utpaladeva presents it as follows:

cidātmaiva hi devo’ntah˙sthitam icchāvaśād bahih

˙/

yogīva nirupādānam arthajātam˙

prakāśayet // 67For the Lord (deva), who consists of nothing but consciousness, mustmanifest externally the totality of objects which is [actually] internal [tohim] by virtue of his free will (icchā), without any material cause(nirupādāna), just as a yogin.

65 Thus Kumārila too insists that in the Vijñānavāda, there can be no cause of the universe’svariety. See ŚV, Nirālambanavāda, 178–9: na cāsti vāsanābhedo nimittāsambhavāt tava/ jñānabhedo nimittam

˙cet, tasya bhedah

˙katham

˙punah

˙// vāsanābhedataś cet syāt,

prāptam anyonyasam˙śrayam / svacchasya jñānarūpasya na hi bhedah

˙svato’sti te //

“And there is no difference between impregnations, because for you [Vijñānavādins],there can be no cause [of this difference]. If [you answer] that the cause [of this differ-ence] is the difference between cognitions, how is this difference itself possible? If [youanswer] that it must come from the difference between impregnations, you will obtain alogical circle; for according to you, the form of cognition, which is pure (svaccha), doesnot have any difference in itself.” Kumārila also notes that if nothing exists outside ofconsciousness, the impregnations too must have only a “reality in a relative sense”(sam

˙vr̥tisatya), but that no effect can arise from an unreal cause. See ibid., 198cd–

199ab: tasmāt sam˙vr̥tisatyais

˙ā kalpitā nāsti tattvatah

˙// na cedr̥śena bhāvena kāryam

utpadyate kvacit / “Therefore this [impregnation] has a reality only in a relative sense(sam

˙vr̥tisatya), it is mentally constructed (kalpita) – it does not exist in reality. But no

effect is ever produced by such a [non-existent] entity!”66 See e.g. Jayanta Bhat

˙t˙a’s criticism (that Abhinavagupta sometimes seems to be para-

phrasing) in NM (II, 511): yac coktam˙

vāsanābheda eva jñānavaicitryakāran˙am

itaretarakāryakāran˙abhāvaprabandhaś ca bījān.kuravad anādir *jñānavāsanayor

[corr.: jñānayāsanayor] iti tad apy aghat˙amānam. keyam

˙vāsanā nāma? jñānād

avyatiriktā cet sāpi svaccharūpatvān na jñānakālus˙yakāran

˙am˙

bhavet. jñānavyatiriktāced vāsanā tadvaicitryahetuś ca so’rtha eva paryāyāntaren

˙oktah

˙syāt. “And what [the

Vijñānavādin] says, namely: ‘it is the difference (bheda) between impregnations(vāsanā) which is the cause of cognitions’ diversity (vaicitrya), and this series [whichconsists of] a mutual relation of cause and effect (itaretarakāryakāran

˙abhāva) of the

cognition and impregnation is beginningless (anādi), as [that] of the seed and sprout’– that too is inconsistent. [For] what is this so-called impregnation? If [theVijñānavādin considers] that it is not distinct (avyatirikta) of the cognition, because itsnature is pure (svaccha), it cannot be the cause of the cognition’s stain either. [But] if[the Vijñānavādin prefers to consider] that the impregnation is distinct (vyatirikta)from the cognition, and that it is the cause of the [cognition’s] variety, it must be the[external] object itself that he is referring to under a different name!”

67 ĪPK I, 5, 7.


According to a belief shared by many Indian philosophical schools, someaccomplished yogins are capable of creating at will a variety of objects that,while being the mere product of their consciousness, become perceptible to ordin-ary people: their imaginary creations instantly materialize, so that they are able toshow entire cities or armies to an audience without using any material trick.68

Whether or not the Vijñānavādins themselves have used such an image to givean idea of their idealism, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta present this model ofthe creating yogin as their own, in contrast to the Vijñānavādins’ dream model.69

Abhinavagupta explains thus this new analogy:

tatra yogisam˙vida eva sā tādr̥śī śaktir yad ābhāsavaicitryarūpam

arthajātam˙

prakāśayatīti. tad asti sam˙bhavah

˙: yat sam

˙vid evābhyupaga-

tasvātantryāpratīghātalaks˙an˙ād icchāviśes

˙avaśāt sam

˙vido’nadhikātmat-

āyā anapāyād antah˙sthitam eva sad bhāvajātam idam ity evam

˙prān

˙a-

buddhidehāder vitīrn˙akiyanmātrasam

˙vidrūpād bāhyatvena ābhāsayatīti.

tad iha viśvarūpābhāsavaicitrye cidātmana eva svātantryam˙

kim˙

nābhyu-pagamyate? svasam

˙vedanasiddham; kim iti hetvantaraparyes

˙an˙āprayāsena

khidyate? evakāren˙edam āha: sarven

˙a tāvad vādinā vis

˙ayavyavasthā-

68 Cf. ĪPV, I, 182–3: iha tāvat svapnasmaran˙amanorājyasam

˙kalpādis

˙u

nīlādyābhāsavaicitryam˙

bāhyasamarpakahetuvyatireken˙aiva nirbhāsata iti yady apy asti

sam˙bhavas tathāpi tadābhāsavaicitryam asthairyāt sarvapramātrasādhāran

˙yāt

pūrvānubhavasam˙skārajatvasam

˙bhāvanād avastv iti śan.kyeta; yat punar idam

˙yoginām

icchāmātren˙a purasenādivaicitryanirmān

˙am˙

dr̥s˙t˙am, tatropādānam

˙prasiddhamr̥-

tkās˙t˙haśukraśon

˙itādivaicitryamayam

˙na sam

˙bhavaty eva. “In this world, indeed, although

one can assume that in a dream (svapna), in amemory (smr̥ti) or in an imaginary construction(manorājyasam

˙kalpa), etc., the variety of phenomena such as blue, etc., is manifest

whereas there is no external cause responsible [for this manifestation], nonetheless,one might object that the variety of these phenomena is not real (avastu), because itdoes not last, because it is not shared by all subjects, [and] because one could assumethat it arises from a residual trace (sam

˙skāra) [left] by a previous experience. But in

the case of the yogins’ creation of a variety such as a city, an army, etc., which isseen [by everybody and] is due to the yogins’ sole will (icchā), there is absolutely noroom for the supposition that [there might be] a material cause (upādāna) [of this variety]which would [itself] consist of a variety, such as clay, wood, sperm, blood and so on,which are well known [material causes].”

69 At least in the Pratyabhijñā texts. Elsewhere, Abhinavagupta occasionally makes use of thedream model; see e.g. PS, 48: mayy eva bhāti viśvam

˙darpan

˙a iva nirmale ghat

˙ādīni /

mattah˙

prasarati sarvam˙

svapnavicitratvam iva suptāt // “It is in me that the universeappears, just as [objects] such as a pot [appear] in a stainless mirror; it is from me thatthe universe springs, just as the variety (vicitratva) of dreams (svapna) [springs] fromsleep.” Cf. Yogarāja’s gloss, PSV, 99: yathā nidritāt pramātuh

˙svapnāvasthāyām

˙bāhyapadārthābhāve’pi puraprākāradevagr̥hādi nānāścaryam˙

svapnapadārthavaicitryamavidyādiparikalpitakāran

˙āntarābhāvāt svasam

˙vidupādānam eva prasarati, tathaiva

tīrthāntaraniyamitakāran˙āntarānupapatter anavacchinnacidānandaikaghanād aham iti

rūpād viśvam iti. “Just as in the dreaming state, although there is no external object, the var-iety of the dream objects – [i.e.] a variegated wonder comprising cities, walls, temples and soon – springs from the sleeping subject while having as its only material cause (upādāna)self-consciousness, because no other cause – such as nescience (avidyā) for instance –can be imagined [for this varied manifestation]; in exactly the same way, the universe[springs] from the ‘I’ (aham) form which is an undivided mass of unlimited consciousnessand bliss, because the other causes [of the universe] determined by other schools of thoughtare impossible.”


panam˙

70 sam˙vidrūpam anapahnavanīyam ādisiddham

˙hi tad iti uktam.

tasya ca svātantryam eva devaśabdanirdis˙t˙am˙

cidrūpatvam, iti kimaparakāran

˙ānves

˙an˙avyasanitayā?71

In this case [of the yogin’s creation], the power (śakti) of the sole conscious-ness of the yogin is such that it manifests a group of objects consisting of avariety of phenomena. Therefore here is the hypothesis [that one might for-mulate by analogy]: it is consciousness alone, provided that its freedom(svātantrya) is acknowledged, that manifests the totality of objects by virtueof a particular will (icchā) characterized by a [total] lack of hindrance – [andthese objects] exist only [insofar as] they reside within [consciousness],because [they] do not lose their absolute identity (anadhikātmatā) with con-sciousness [even when they are thus manifested. Consciousness manifeststhem] in the form “this” (idam) – [i.e.] as being external to the vital breath,the intellect, the body and [the void with which the limited subjects identify,and] which [therefore] consist of a consciousness limited to its particular[object] (vitīrn

˙akiyanmātra).72 This freedom of that which is “nothing but

consciousness” with respect to the variety of phenomena forming the uni-verse, why don’t [you] admit it? [For] it is established through [mere] self-consciousness; what is the point of getting exhausted in an effort to seekanother cause [of this phenomenal variety]? This is what [Utpaladeva]expresses with the particle eva [in “the Lord, who consists of nothing but con-sciousness”]; for [we] have [already] said that obviously, no protagonist in aphilosophical dialog (vādin) can deny that the act establishing the object’sexistence (vis

˙ayavyavasthāpana) is consciousness, since it is always already

established (ādisiddha). And consisting in consciousness is nothing but thefreedom of this [act – a freedom] indicated by the word “Lord” (deva); sowhat is the point of this evil passion (vyasanitā) for seeking another cause[of phenomenal variety]?

According to the dream model, the diversity of appearances that constitute theworld can be attributed to a mechanism of residual traces over which conscious-ness has no control. By way of contrast, for the Pratyabhijñā philosophers, thevariety of the universe is not the outcome of an unconscious and impersonal

70 It seems to me that given the context, one should keep the KSTS reading (also found inthe Bhāskarī edition and in the consulted manuscripts J, L, P and S1) in spite of the factthat the parallel passage in the ĪPVV (II, 144–5) and two consulted manuscripts (P andS2) have the reading vis

˙ayavyavasthāsthānam

˙. This latter reading could be the result of

the omission of -pa- (cf. the SOAS manuscript reading: vis˙ayavyavasthānam

˙) and of a

dittography of -sthā.71 ĪPV, I, 184–5.72 vitīrn

˙akiyanmātra- literally means “extended to that much only”, so that one may under-

stand that the subjects identifying with these objective entities (vital breath, intellect andso on) are strictly limited to these objects; but it also designates a trifle, a quasi non-existent entity. Bhāskarakan

˙t˙ha considers that one must understand both meanings

here; cf. Bhāskarī, I, 228: kiyanmātram – svavis˙ayagrahan

˙amātrasamartham

˙leśarūpam, sam˙vidrūpam

˙yasya tādr̥śāt. “‘[Which consist of a consciousness limited]

to that only’, [i.e.] which consists of a consciousness that takes the form of a trifle(leśa), capable only of apprehending its own object.”


mechanism – the sovereign freedom (svātantrya) of consciousness or its freewill (icchā) is the only cause for this diversity, just as a yogin supposedly createsby virtue of his free will and without depending on any external cause. Thusaccording to Abhinavagupta, the choice of the term “Lord” (deva) to designateconsciousness, combined with the particle eva, expresses consciousness’s essen-tial and self-evident freedom. Using that particle enables Utpaladeva to insistthat the Lord is “nothing but” consciousness, and according to a semantic analy-sis traditional in the Trika,73 the term deva, since it means he who “plays”(krīd

˙ati)74 as well as he who “wants to dominate” (vijigīs

˙ate),75 expresses first

and foremost freedom.76 So Abhinagupta considers that saying “the Lord,who consists of nothing but consciousness” is the same as arguing that freedomand consciousness are one and the same thing. And by alluding thus to thissemantic analysis of the term deva, he reminds us in passing of Utpaladeva’sunderstanding of freedom as the power to create without being determined todo so by any external cause – nor even by any internal lack or need still directedtowards some external reality – in a perfectly autonomous way; for playing(krīd

˙ā) is this perfectly autonomous activity that has no goal beside itself.77

73 See Kahrs 1998, 70.74 See TĀV, I, 144: krīd

˙eti dīvyati [corr. Isaacson, cf. Kahrs 1998, 70, n. 43: devyati KSTS]

krīd˙atīti devah

˙. “[Abhinavagupta mentions his] ‘play’ (krīd

˙ā) because the Lord (deva) is

he who ‘plays’ (dīvyati = krīd˙ati).” The word deva is thus analysed as a transformation of

the root ‑div, “to play”. Cf. Bhāskarī, I, 229: devo hi krīd˙āśīla ucyate krīd

˙aiva ca

svātantryam. “For he who has playing (krīd˙ā) as his natural activity is called deva,

and freedom is nothing but playing.”75 See TĀV, I, 145: dīvyati vijigīs

˙ata iti devah

˙. “The Lord (deva) is he who ‘wants to dom-

inate’ (dīvyati = vijigīs˙ate).”

76 Cf. the famous semantic analysis (nirvacana) of the term deva in TĀ 1, 101:heyopādeyakathāvirahe svānandaghanatayocchalanam / krīd

˙ā sarvotkars

˙en˙a vartanecchā

tathā svatantratvam // “[Because the deva ‘plays’, his activity] is an outpouring, in theabsence of all the fictions regardingwhatmust [supposedly] be avoided or sought, as an undi-vided mass of one’s own bliss – [i.e.], a play (krīd

˙ā); [and because he ‘wants to dominate’,

dīvyati = vijigīs˙ate, he has] awill (icchā) to exist while exerting his domination on everything

– and thus, freedom (svatantratva).”77 Cf. Bhāskarī, I, 229: ata eva yadi kaścid bruyāt kim artham

˙bhāvanirmān

˙a īśvarah

˙pravr̥tta iti tasyānenaiva mukhamudrā jāyate. na hi krīd˙āśīlasya paryanuyogyogo

yuktah˙. “For this reason, if someone asked: ‘why does the Lord undertake to create

objective entities?’, he would be reduced to silence by this very [statement]; for [his]question does not apply as regards someone whose natural activity is playing (krīd

˙ā).”

Jayaratha, while commenting on TĀ 1, 101 (see n. 76), explains (TĀV, 144) that thedeva is an outpouring, “in the absence of all the fictions regarding what must [suppo-sedly] be avoided or sought” (heyopādeyakathāvirahe) because “his playing (krīd

˙ā) is

nothing but [an outpouring, i.e.] the act of shining forth as taking the form of the entireuniverse from [the ontological category of] Śiva down to [that of] the earth”(śivādiks

˙ityantāśes

˙aviśvātmanollāsanam evāsya krīd

˙ā), but also because “as far as he

is concerned, the motive (nimitta) is not something over and above playing (krīd˙ā);

this is what [Abhinavagupta] expresses with the [passage] beginning with heya. . .”(na cātra krīd

˙ātiriktam

˙nimittam ity āha heyetyādinā). The creation of consciousness

is thus the mere product of consciousness’s blissful awareness of its own fullness. Cf.ibid., 144–5: na hi kim

˙cid upādātum

˙hātum

˙vā jagatsargādāv īśvarah

˙pravartate, ata

eva svānandaghanatvam evātra hetur upāttah˙, ata eva cāsya svatantratvam eva. “In

the emission of the universe as in [the other cosmic activities of maintaining and destroy-ing the world, concealing reality and bestowing grace], the Lord does not undertake to


This freedom constitutes the crux of the divergence between the Vijñānavādaand the Pratyabhijñā’s idealism, as Abhinavagupta had already pointed out inthe Vivr̥tivimarśinī while commenting on some previous verse:

etac ca sākāraks˙an˙ikajñānasantānanaye vaks

˙yamān

˙anītyā vāsanāsamar-

thanānirvahan˙ād anupapannam

˙sarvānubhavāntarmukhaikasvatantra-

sam˙viddarśane tūpapannam.78

And in the doctrine according to which a series of momentary cognitionstakes on various aspects, according to a reasoning which [we] are going toexplain, this [phenomenal diversity] is not rationally possible, because ofthe impossibility of impregnations exerting any power; whereas it is poss-ible in the doctrine [according to which] consciousness is turned inwardsin all experiences,79 one, and free (svatantra).

Perception or the freedom to be passive

Of course, this is a highly paradoxical statement; because when we perceive,we do not experience freedom. In perception – as opposed to imagination forinstance – we are not creators: we do not get to choose what we perceive, weare rather affected by something that we experience as being alien to us andthat imposes its presence. So how can Abhinavagupta present conscious-ness’s free creation of the perceived universe as the most immediate ofexperiences – that which is established through mere self-awareness(svasam

˙vedana)?

The reason for this lies in the Pratyabhijñā philosophers’ understanding offreedom and passivity: they believe that we experience passivity only insofaras we agree to be passive. Thus, the spectators of a theatre play know that whatthey see is only a fiction, since they do not jump on the stage in order to rescuesomeone about to be murdered there; and yet they go through all the emotionsof the main character, tasting his sadness when the hero supposedly experi-ences sadness, or being relieved when he overcomes all the obstacles, etc.So the spectators are fooled by the play – but only because they are willingto be fooled, and because they take pleasure in it. According to Utpaladevaand Abhinavagupta, in the same way, we are bound to our existence insam˙sāra for the simple reason that we agree to be bound – and we believe

that there is an external world of objects to be sought and avoided becausein us, the infinite and omnipotent consciousness chooses to believe that it isbound.80

seek or avoid anything; this is why [with the compound svānandaghanatayā,Abhinavagupta] gives the reason for this: he is an undivided mass with his own bliss,and precisely for this reason, he is absolutely free (svatantra).”

78 ĪPVV, II, 80–81.79 i.e., it only appears to be turned outwards, towards an external object.80 On the idea, crucial in the Pratyabhijñā, that consciousness only playfully pretends to be

fooled by its own fiction in some sort of cosmic theatre play (nāt˙ya), see e.g. ĪPVV, III,

244, quoted and translated in Ratié 2009, n. 42.


ThePratyabhijñā philosophers therefore endeavour to show that in fact perceptionis not a passive experience. Thus in a famousverse (kārikā I, 5, 11),Utpaladeva statesthat any consciousness – including that of perceived objects – has as its essence anactive “grasp” or a “realization” (vimarśa) that distinguishes it from inert entities( jad

˙a) capable of reflecting other entities.81 A mirror manifesting a blue patch

remains irremediably unconscious of this manifestation, whereas as soon as a con-scious subject sees the blue patch, he is immediately aware of being aware of theblue patch. Consciousness thus differs from themirror insofar as it does not passivelyreflect things but actively becomes aware of itself as manifesting them.82

This means that consciousness is in essence an action, which seems to contradictour familiar experience of perception as a passive encounter with some externalentity. Abhinavagupta therefore adds to his explanation of kārikā I, 5, 11:

sarvam˙

tu vastuto vimarśātmakapramātr̥svabhāvatādātmyāham˙parāma-

rśaviśrānter ajad˙am eva pūrvāparakot

˙yoh˙. yad uktam: idam ity asya

vicchinnavimarśasya kr̥tārthatā / yā svasvarūpe viśrāntir vimarśah˙so’ham ity ayam // iti. madhyāvasthaiva tv idantāvimr̥śyamānapūrvāpara-

kot˙ir vimūd

˙hānām

˙māyāpadam

˙sam˙sāra iti vimarśa eva pradhānam

˙bhaga-

vata iti sthitam.83

But in reality, everything is perfectly spontaneous (ajad˙a)84 at the very

beginning and end (pūrvāparakot˙i) [of a perception], because [everything

then] rests in the grasp (parāmarśa) in the form “I” – [i.e. in the grasp] ofthe identity (tādātmya) [of the object with] the nature of the knowing sub-ject, who [precisely] exists in a grasp (vimarśa). This is what [Utpaladeva]has stated [in Ajad

˙apramātr̥siddhi, 15]: “The accomplished state

(kr̥tārthatā) of the grasp [of an object] in the form ‘this’ distinct [fromthe subject] – [an acomplished state] that is a rest in one’s own nature –

is the grasp [of subjectivity] in the form ‘this is me’.” But it is the

81 svabhāvam avabhāsasya vimarśam˙

vidur anyathā / prakāśo’rthoparakto’pisphat

˙ikādijad

˙opamah

˙// “[The wise] know that the nature of manifestation is a grasp

(vimarśa); otherwise, the manifesting consciousness (prakāśa), while being colouredby objects, would be similar to an inert entity ( jad

˙a) such as a crystal or [any other

reflective object].” See e.g. Alper 1987, Torella 1994, xxiv–xxv, Ratié 2006, 87,n. 138, and Ratié 2007, 339–40, n. 59.

82 Cf. ĪPV, I, 198–9: aham evam˙

prakāśātmā prakāśa iti hi vimarśodaye svasam˙vid eva

pramātr̥prameyapramān˙ādi caritārtham abhimanyate na tv atiriktam

˙kān.ks

˙ati,

sphat˙ikādi hi gr̥hītapratibimbam api tathābhāvena siddhau pramātrantaram apeks

˙ata

iti nirvimarśatvāj jad˙am. “For when the grasp (vimarśa) arises [in the form] ‘I, who con-

sist of a manifesting consciousness (prakāśa), am manifest thus’, it is a mere self-consciousness (svasam

˙vit) which considers that the knowing subject (pramātr̥), the

object of knowledge (prameya), the means of knowledge (pramān˙a) and the [result

of knowledge (pramiti)] have achieved their goal; and it does not require anythingelse. For although a crystal for instance receives a reflection (pratibimba), it requiresanother knowing subject so that it may be established to exist thus, [as a crystal reflectingsomething else] – therefore it is inert ( jad

˙a) because it is devoid of any grasp.”

83 ĪPV, I, 199.84 The word jad

˙a means both “insentient” and “inert”, and the Pratyabhijñā philosophers

play with this ambiguity so as to emphasize that sentiency involves an act of becomingaware.


intermediary state (madhyāvasthā), [which constitutes] objectivity, [and] inwhich one does not grasp the very beginning and end (pūrvāparakot

˙i), that

[forms] the domain of māyā – [i.e.] the cycle of rebirths (sam˙sāra) – for

those who are confused (vimūd˙ha). It is therefore established that the

essence of the Lord is precisely that grasp.

According to Abhinavagupta, any perception, at its very beginning and end –

literally, at its “edges”–, is perfectly spontaneous (ajad˙a), for we usually pay

attention only to the intermediary state (madhyāvasthā) between these two van-ishing moments. In this intermediary state, we apprehend the manifested objectas “this” and not as “I” – as an entity external to the subject, distinct from him,and inert ( jad

˙a); and we also apprehend ourselves as inert insofar as conscious-

ness then grasps itself as passive in front of the object that affects it. This state isnonetheless preceded by a state of desire (icchā) to know, and ends in the aware-ness of one’s own knowledge.85 These three stages of the knowledge processsucceed one another so quickly – and so continuously, for they constitute thedevelopment of a single reality86 – that we usually remain unaware of the initialand final edges. However, in these initial and final stages, consciousness restsentirely on the awareness of itself as an absolute freedom: the object is graspedas an aspect of the subject, and the subject as a limitless creative will. Thus thereason why we are not aware of our freedom of perception is that we choose tosink into a fascination for the intermediary, completely objectified state of cog-nitions, disregarding the two other states and forgetting that the distinctionbetween the subject and the object, far from being the essence of perception,is only a stage or a stopping place “comparable to the foot of a tree [where atraveller stops] on his way to the village”.87 However, someone who manages

85 Cf. Bhāskarī, I, 243: pūrvāparakot˙yoh˙

– grahan˙ecchāsamaye grahan

˙ānantaram

˙ca,

ajad˙atvam eva. “‘At the very beginning and end’ (pūrvāparakot

˙i) – [i.e.] at the moment

of the desire (icchā) to apprehend, and at the moment that immediately follows the appre-hension, there is perfect spontaneity (ajad

˙atva).”

86 Such a representation of the cognitive act is of course incompatible with theVijñānavāda’s principle of the absolute momentariness (ks

˙an˙ikatva) of each cognition,

and involves a different conception of time.87 See ĪPV, I, 221–2 (where Abhinavagupta alludes again to APS, 15): etad uktam

˙bhavati:

parāmarśo nāma viśrāntisthānam˙

tac ca pāryantikam eva pāramārthikam˙

tac cāham ityevam

˙rūpam eva. madhyaviśrāntipadam

˙tu yad vr̥ks

˙amūlasthānīyam

˙grāmagamane

tadapeks˙ayā sr̥s

˙t˙atvam ucyata iti ko virodhah

˙? anena nīlāder apīdam

˙nīlam iti

madhyaparāmarśe’pi mūlaparāmarśe’ham ity eva viśrānter ātmamayatvamupapāditam eva. nīlam idam vedmīty api hy aham

˙prakāśa itīyat tattvam, yathoktam

idam ity asyety ādi. mūd˙has tu nīlādivimarśād evārthakriyādiparitos

˙ābhimānīti

nīlādeh˙

svātantryanirmuktatvam uktam. “Here is what [Utpaladeva] means. What wecall a grasp (parāmarśa) is a place of rest; and it is only the final [place of rest] thatis real in the absolute sense (pāramārthika); and this [grasp] has as its only form ‘I’.On the contrary, [something] is said to be ‘created’ [i.e. objective] with respect to theintermediary (madhya) resting place, which is comparable to the foot of a tree [wherea traveller stops] on his way to the village. Therefore what contradiction could therebe? Thus it is demonstrated that [objects] such as blue too, even in the intermediarygrasp (madhyaparāmarśa) ‘this is blue’, are nothing but the Self, because [they] reston the original grasp (mūlaparāmarśa) that has as its only form ‘I’. For even the realnature of [the experience] ‘I know the blue’ consists of this only: ‘I am manifesting


to concentrate on these edges can achieve a full identity with absolute conscious-ness. Here, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta’s sources are no longer Buddhist:they are obviously Śaiva. Thus this analysis of the edges of cognition can befound in Somānanda’s Śivadr̥s

˙t˙i (and Utpaladeva’s commentary on it),88 and

it clearly belongs to the Krama tradition.89

Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta thus establish their idealism not only byexploiting some Vijñānavādin arguments, but also by having recourse to some

myself (prakāśe) [as blue]’, as [Utpaladeva] has said [in APS, 15] which begins withidam ity asya. However, because someone who is confused (mūd

˙ha) considers himself

satisfied, from the point of view of efficiency (arthakriyā) for instance, with the solegrasp of [the object] such as blue and so on, [we] say that [objects] are devoid of freedom(svātantrya).” The empirical subject wrongly identifies with a particular object (his bodyfor instance) and therefore acquires an individuality only insofar as he believes that he isa particular entity limited by time and space. Some needs arise from this limitation, andthe individual does not pay attention (nādriyate) to the initial and final edges of cogitionbecause the intermediary stage is enough to satisfy those needs. Cf. ĪPVV, II, 216:pramātā ghat

˙ādyarthakriyām arthayamānas tām

˙bhinnaparāmarśasam

˙pādyām

evābhimanyata iti pāryantikam ahantāparāmarśam adasīyam˙

nādriyate. “The subject,desiring the efficiency (arthakriyā) [of an object] such as a pot, considers that this [effi-ciency] can be accomplished only thanks to the grasp (parāmarśa) of that which isdistinct [from the subject]; therefore he does not pay attention to the final grasp as I(ahantāparāmarśa).”

88 See ŚD, I, 5–6ab: na param˙

tadavasthāyām˙

vyavasthais˙ā vyavasthitā / yāvat

samagrajñānāgrajñātr̥sparśadaśāsv api // sthitaiva laks˙yate sā ca tadviśrāntyā tathā

phale // “The existence [of absolute consciousness] is not only established in that stateof [transcendence of ordinary existence]; rather, even in these states of contact withthe knowing subject, at the initial moment (agra) of any cognition, it is experiencedas being indeed present; and just as well, in the result (phala) [of the cognitive act], itis [experienced] thanks to the rest in it.” Cf. ŚDV, p. 8, where Utpaladeva emphasizesthat he has integrated this aspect of the ŚD in his ĪPK: sarvavikalpādijñānānām agratautpitsāvasthāyām

˙jñānajñeyānāvilajñātr̥svarūpasam

˙sparśo’ vaśyam

˙bhāvīti tadavasthāsv

api paravyavavasthā. “The Supreme exists even in these states of [contact with theknowing subject], because at the very beginning (agratah

˙) of all cognitions – [i.e.] con-

cepts, etc. – in that state which is the desire to arise (utpitsā), the contact with the natureof the subject who has not been stained by knowledge and its object necessarily occurs.”In the same way, consciousness becomes conscious of itself as absolutely free at themoment of completion of a cognition. See ibid., 8–9: athavā yathā samagrajñānānāmārambhe, tathā phale parisamāptau tatraiva viśrāntyā. tadviśrāntim

˙vinārtho jñāta

eva na bhavati. samagratvam anekaprakāratvena jñānānām˙

madhyadaśāyām evapratyagātmatvena. pūrvāparakot

˙yos tv ekaviśuddhaśivataiva sarves

˙ām. etac

ceśvarapratyabhijñāyām˙

parīks˙yam. “Or just as, at the initial moment of all cognitions,

[one experiences absolute freedom,] in the same way, in the “result” (phala), [i.e.] at thevery moment of completion (parisamāpti) [of knowledge, it is experienced] thanks to therest (viśrānti) [in it]; without this rest, the object could not be known at all. All cognitionsexist in the form of individual subjects (pratyagātman) in many [different] ways, [but]only in the intermediary state (madhyadaśā); on the contrary, in the initial and finaledges (pūrvāparakot

˙i) [of the cognitive act], all these [cognitions] are nothing but

Śiva, one and absolutely pure. And this has been examined in [my] Īśvarapratyabhijñā.”89 On the importance of this doctrine of the edges (kot

˙i) in the Krama, see e.g. Sanderson

2007, who gives a complete description of the Krama exegesis (pp. 260–370) andremarks for instance (p. 277) that the goal of the Svabodhodayamañjarī is to bringabout liberation “by observing the process of the arising and dying away of cognition”(cf. ibid., 279).


methods, developed in Śaiva circles, which aim to expose the absolute freedomthat we constantly experience and that we nonetheless constantly discard. Theyinvite us to pay attention to this freedom in all these situations where the empiri-cal subject, brutally confronted with an unexpected or intensely emotional event,momentarily loses consciousness of the oppositions (subject/object, I/the others,etc.) that usually frame his world: in an intense joy, in terror, in orgasm, orsimply when we are all of a sudden “struck” by the idea that we have forgottento accomplish some urgent task, these oppositions dissolve, and one experi-ences, as Somānanda puts it, “a subtle vibration of all powers”.90

But this experience of freedom is revealed also through another argumentthus formulated by Utpaladeva:

90 See ŚD, I, 9–11ab (quoted in ĪPVV, II, 170): sā ca dr̥śyā hr̥duddeśekāryasmaran

˙akālatah

˙/ prahars

˙āvedasamaye darasam

˙darśanaks

˙an˙e // anālocanato

dr̥s˙t˙e visargaprasarāspade / visargoktiprasan.ge ca vācane dhāvane tathā // etes

˙v eva

prasan.ges˙u sarvaśaktivilolatā / “And this [unity of the subject and the object] can be

experienced in the area of the heart, when one [suddenly] remembers some task, whenbeing told some news [that causes] a great joy, when seeing [something that causes] ter-ror, when one sees something unexpected, when one discharges sperm, and when onepronounces the visarga; and also when one recites or when one runs – in all of thesecases there is a subtle vibration of all powers (sarvaśaktivilolatā).” In ĪPVV, II, 169–70, Abhinavagupta sums up Utpaladeva’s explanation of these verses in his lost Vivr̥tiwhile insisting that at these moments, we experience the fundamental identity of objectswith consciousness, even though this experience vanishes so quickly that, para-doxically, most of the time we must infer that it has occurred: abhinnasyapramātr̥prameyarūpasyānunmis

˙itavibhāgasyāpi yadi vastutah

˙prakāśo na syāt, tat tvar-

itam˙

lipipāt˙he vegasaran

˙e tvaritābhidhāne ca rekhāto rekhāntaram

˙deśād deśāntaram

˙sthānakaran˙ādeh

˙sthānakaran

˙āntaram

˙ca gacchatas tām

˙s tām

˙s tyaktavyān

grahītavyām˙ś ca bhāgānn aparāmr̥śatas tayoś ca tyāgopādānayoh

˙kartāram

avimr̥śatas tāni vicitrān˙i tyāgopādānāni katham

˙bhaveyuh

˙parāmarśapūrva-

katvenais˙ām˙

dr̥s˙t˙atvāt? tad imāni bhavanti svakāran

˙am˙

parāmarśam anumāpayanti.na cāsau bhedenaiva parāmarśa es

˙ām iti. bhedena hi parāmarśe vācikamānasapari-

spandaparamparāto’bhilāpasam˙ketasmaran

˙aprabandhasadbhāve tvaritataiva na nirva-

het. “If there were not in fact a manifesting consciousness (prakāśa) of that whichconsists [both] of a knowing subject (pramātr̥) and an object of knowledge (prameya)while not being differentiated – [i.e. if there were not a manifestation] of that in which thedistinction [between the subject and the object] has not developed yet, then when hastilyreading a text, when frantically running [or] when quickly pronouncing [phonemes], forsomeone who goes from one letter to the other, from one place to the other, or from onepoint of articulation to the other while not grasping (aparāmr̥śatah

˙) [the existence of]

these various elements that constitute the [successive] objects of [all these] actions ofleaving and appropriating, and for someone who does not grasp (avimr̥śatah

˙) [the exist-

ence of] the agent (kartr̥) of these actions of leaving and appropriating, how could thesevarious actions of leaving and appropriating take place, since we see that [actions] occuronly if they are preceded by a grasp (parāmarśa)? Therefore, since these [variousactions] take place, they make us infer (anumāpayanti) a grasp (parāmarśa) as theircause. And this grasp of these [different actions] does not occur in a differentiatedway; because when a grasp occurs in a differentiated way, the speed (tvaritatā) [involvedin these actions] is not possible, because of the series of [various] verbal and mentalmovements [necessarily occurring] when there is a succession [made of] speech andthe memory of the [semantic] convention [that speech implies].” The passage bearssome striking resemblances to Abhinavagupta’s commentary on ĪPK I, 5, 19 (ĪPV, I,229; see Ratié 2006, 75–6).


ātmānam ata evāyam˙

jñeyīkuryāt pr̥thaksthiti /jñeyam

˙na tu tadaunmukhyāt khan

˙d˙yetāsya svatantratā // 91

For this very reason, [consciousness] must make itself an object of knowl-edge (ātmānam. . . jñeyīkuryāt); nonetheless, the object of knowledge hasno separate existence – [otherwise, consciousness]’s freedom (svatantratā)would be ruined, because of [consciousness’s] intentionality (aunmukhya)as regards this [object].

This verse states the fundamental principle of the Pratyabhijñā’s idealism. Itdoes not only say, as the Vijñānavādins do, that the object of knowledge ( jñeya)is an aspect of consciousness, or that there is nothing outside of consciousness,but rather, that consciousness makes itself an object of knowledge:92 our aware-ness of objects is nothing but consciousness freely acting on itself so as toappear as an object.93 And according to Abhinavagupta, this verse constitutes“an additional argument” for idealism94 – an argument that does not pertainto the Vijñānavāda, precisely because it involves consciousness’s freedom.

This new argument rests on a feature of consciousness that Western phenom-enology calls intentionality – that is, the fact that consciousness is not purely andsimply consciousness, but is the consciousness of something.95 This way ofbeing turned towards or directed upon something that characterizes conscious-ness is designated by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta with the word aunmu-khya.96 But the experience of this intentionality – which, as Abhinavaguptanotes, is self-evident, for it is known through mere self-consciousness (svasam

˙-

vedana)97 – is first and foremost the experience of the fact that consciousness is

91 ĪPK I, 5, 15.92 The cvi formation ( jñeyīkr̥-) is particularly meaningful here, for it precisely expresses the

dynamism of consciousness.93 Which is the reason why, while making itself an object, consciousness remains “a non-

object” (ajñeya): it only plays at being an object. Cf. Bhāskarī, I, 268: jñeyīkaroti –ajñeyam

˙sat svayam

˙svaśaktyāsvādānarūpakrīd

˙ārtham

˙jñeyatayā bhāsayati.

“‘[Consciousness] makes itself an object of knowledge’ ( jñeyīkaroti) – [i.e.] it manifestsitself as being an object while not being an object, for the [fun] of playing (krīd

˙ārtham) –

[a playful activity] that involves relishing (āsvādāna) one’s own powers (śakti).”94 ĪPV, I, 214–5: nanv es

˙aiva kutah

˙sam˙bhāvanātmānam

˙jñeyīkarotīti? āha: pr̥thak

prakāśād bahirbhūtā sthitir yasya tādr̥g jñeyam˙

naiva bhavati. tur avadhāran˙e. tatra

coktā yuktayah˙. abhyuccayayuktim apy āha. “But where does this hypothesis according

to which [consciousness] makes itself an object of knowledge come from? [Utpaladeva]answers [in the verse]: there is absolutely no object of knowledge ( jñeya) such that itwould possess a ‘separate existence’ – [i.e. an existence] external to the manifesting con-sciousness. The word ‘nonetheless’ has the meaning of a restriction. And [Utpaladeva]has [already] stated the arguments showing this point; but he is giving here an additionalargument (abhyuccayayukti).”

95 Cf. its definition in Husserl 1913, § 84.96 Dreyfus (2007, 96), while discussing intentionality in Dharmakīrti’s thought, notices that

“this term is of Western origin and has no direct translation in the Indian context”. Whileagreeing that we should bear in mind the cultural and historical abyss separating the con-texts in which the concepts of intentionality and aunmukhya were coined, I believe thataunmukhya as used by the Pratyabhijñā philosophers has enough in common with theWestern concept of intentionality to be translated as such.

97 See ĪPV, I, 215, quoted below.


always confronting some kind of otherness: because consciousness is inten-tional, it is not self-contained, but wide open and constantly turned towardssome Other that transcends it.98 The Sanskrit word aunmukhya perfectlyexpresses this transcendence of the object experienced in intentionality: theabstract substantive is formed on the adjective unmukha which means, literally,“whose face is turned upwards”. To be unmukha, for consciousness, is to beturned towards an object that is above it or transcends it. From this point ofview, intentionality seems to betray the fundamental heteronomy of conscious-ness – the fact that it depends on this Other towards which it is constantlyturned.99 Thus Sartre for example has given it the status of an “ontologicalproof” insofar as intentionality immediately reveals the object as an entity exist-ing independently of the subject.100

However, Abhinavagupta explains that according to kārikā I, 5, 15, the fact ofintentionality does not constitute a proof of consciousness’s heteronomy withrespect to the object, but rather, of its perfect autonomy with respect to this object:

yadi vyatiriktam˙

jñeyam˙

syāt taj jñātr̥rūpasyātmano yad etaj jñeya-vis˙ayam aunmukhyam

˙svasam

˙vedanasiddham

˙dr̥śyate, tan nāsya syāt.

tena vyatiriktavis˙ayaunmukhyenānyādhīnatvam

˙nāma pāratantryam

*asyānīyeta [J: asyānīyate KSTS, Bhāskarī, L, P, S1, S2, SOAS; p.n.p.D]. pāratantryam

˙ca svātantryasya viruddham. svātantryam eva

cānanyamukhapreks˙itvalaks

˙an˙am ātmanah

˙svarūpam iti vyatiriktonmukha

ātmānātmaiva syāt. anātmā ca jad˙o jñeyam

˙prati nonmukhībhavatīti pra-

san.gah˙. tatah

˙prasan.gaviparyayād idam āyātam: avyatiriktonmukhah

˙sva-

tantrah˙sann ātmānam eva jñeyīkarotīti.101

If the object of knowledge were distinct [from consciousness], then theintentionality (aunmukhya) of the Self who is the knowing subject,which aims at the object of knowledge [and] which we experience [asbeing] established through [mere] self-consciousness, could not belongto this [Self]. [For] this intentionality aiming at something distinct [fromthe Self] would entail for the [Self] what is called “dependence on theOther” (anyādhīnatva) – [i.e.] heteronomy (pāratantrya). But heteronomyis contradictory to autonomy (svātantrya); and it is autonomy, character-ized by an absence of expectation from the Other (ananyamukhapre-ks˙itva), which is the nature of the Self; therefore a Self that would be

98 On this meaning of intentionality, see e.g. Sartre 1947, “Une Idée fondamentale de laphénoménologie de Husserl: l’intentionnalité”, where Sartre contrasts a “digestive phil-osophy” (“philosophie digestive”) according to which objects are contents of conscious-ness that consciousness assimilates, with Husserl’s phenomenology, which showsconsciousness as a fundamental opening towards the Other.

99 Thus aunmukhya is frequently translated as expectancy.100 See Sartre 1943, 28. However, Sartre acknowledges that the concept of intentionality

can be exploited in order to substantiate a diametrically opposed theory (even thoughhe immediately discards this possibility, ibid., 27), which can be found in Husserl’s“transcendental idealism” and in the correlative concept of a foundational intentionality(see Husserl 1913, §41). The Pratyabhijñā philosophers’ position is, mutatis mutandis,much closer to this latter position.

101 ĪPV, I, 215.


turned towards (unmukha) an [entity] distinct from it would not be a Self atall. And that which is not a Self, [i.e.] which is inert ( jad

˙a), does not turn

towards (nonmukhībhavati) an object of knowledge – such is the conse-quence [if the object of knowledge is distinct from consciousness]. Sothis is what follows if one reverses this [unwanted] consequence: [theSelf] makes itself an object while being free (svatantra), [i.e.] while notbeing turned towards (unmukha) an [entity] distinct [from it].

If the object were independent of consciousness, the very fact of intentional-ity, which cannot be denied, would remain inexplicable. For a Self turnedtowards a real Other – a distinct and independent entity – would be dependenton this Other: it would not be free or autonomous (svatantra) but heteronomous(paratantra).

Here, one could suspect that the argument begs the question insofar as it presup-poses the autonomy of consciousness that it aims to demonstrate. ButAbhinavagupta does not content himself with stating that a consciousnessturned towards an external object would be heteronomous – he adds that such aheteronomous entity would be incapable of intentionality: that which is inert( jad

˙a) “does not turn towards” or “does not become [object-]oriented”

(nonmukhībhavati), because aiming at an object presupposes a subjective sponta-neity. Here Abhinavagupta does not mean only that a consciousness turnedtowards an object really distinct from it would be forever trapped in it – so thatif the blue patch were an entity independent of consciousness, the consciousnessof blue would be forever stuck in the blue, incapable of struggling out of it inorder to aim at something else. He means, more importantly, that a consciousnessthat is free or spontaneous would not be a consciousness at all, because it would beincapable of any extroversion towards any Other: it would remain riveted to a self-contained identity, incapable of being anything besides itself – incapable thereforeof entering into any relationship with anything. Intentionality entails absolute free-dom – that is, the freedom not to remain confined to one’s own nature,102 thefreedom which exists in not “being merely oneself (ātmamātratā)”.103 But this

102 Cf. Abhinavagupta’s commentary on ĪPK II, 4, 19 in ĪPV, II, 176–8 (see Ratié 2007,352–3 n. 79, and 353–4 n. 82): the object, to which the principle of non-contradictionfully applies, is “confined” (parinis

˙t˙hita) to its definition, and therefore incapable of

diverging from its nature without ceasing to exist, whereas consciousness is free tomanifest itself as what it is not without ceasing to be what it is: whatever objectiveappearance it manifests (whether in imagination or in perception), it remainsconsciousness.

103 Cf. ĪPV (I, 202) ad ĪPK I, 5, 12, where Abhinavagupta defines the freedom of the Self(ātman) as consisting precisely of not being only onself (ātman): citikriyā ca citaukartr̥tā, svātantryam

˙sam˙yojanaviyojanānusam

˙dhānādirūpam ātmamātratāyām eva

jad˙avad aviśrāntatvam aparicchinnaprakāśasāratvam ananyamukhapreks

˙itvam iti.

tad evānātmarūpāj jad˙āt sam

˙yojanaviyojanādisvātantryavikalād vailaks

˙an˙yādāyīti.

“And the action [which is] consciousness (citikriyā) is the agency with regard to con-sciousness. That is to say, it is the freedom (svātantrya) which exists in associating, dis-sociating, synthesizing, etc.; it is the fact not just of resting in one’s self-confinedidentity (ātmamātratāyām eva . . . aviśrāntatvam), contrary to an inert [entity] ( jad

˙a);

the fact of having as one’s essence an unlimited manifesting consciousness(prakāśa); the absence of any expectation from the Other (ananyamukhapreks

˙itva). It


freedom in turn implies a perfect independence as regards the object: conscious-ness’s freedom as regards its own nature is conceivable only if it is not really trans-cended by an object existing independently of it. This means that there is anintentionality insofar as consciousness chooses to manifest itself as intentional,and the intentional aim is thus possible only if consciousness takes the form ofthe object aimed at while aiming at it.104 Here again, the argument seems to begrounded in the Śivadr̥s

˙t˙i’s descriptions of consciousness, for although it is not for-

mulated as such there, Somānanda describes the very beginning of consciousness’sdesire to be aware of various phenomena as an “intentionality” (unmukhitā) thatstill entails the awareness of the object’s fundamental identity withconsciousness.105

is precisely this [characteristic] that leads to the distinction between [the Self] and aninert [entity], which, being devoid of the freedom to associate, dissociate, etc., doesnot consist in a Self.”

104 Cf. ĪPVV, II, 207–08: yadi pr̥thaksthiti jñeyam˙

tadā tadaumukhye paratantro’yam ityasvatantro’yam ity asvatantro jad

˙o jad

˙asya ca katham

˙jñeyavis

˙ayam

˙svātantryam iti

prasan.gah˙. svasam

˙vitsiddham

˙cedam asya. tato’yam

˙svātantryān na paronmukha ity

ātmānam eva viśvam˙

jñeyīkarotīti prasan.gaviparyayād is˙t˙asiddhih

˙. “If the object of

knowledge has an existence distinct [from the subject], then, if there is intentionality(aunmukhya) [of consciousness aiming at] this [object], the [subject] must be ‘heter-onomous’ (paratantra), that is to say, it is not autonomous (svatantra); but thatwhich is not autonomous is inert ( jad

˙a), and how could an inert [entity] have any free-

dom (svātantrya) as regards the object? This is the consequence [that follows if theobject of knowledge has an independent existence]. And this [freedom] of the [Selfregarding the object] is established by [mere] self-consciousness (svasam

˙vit).

Therefore, since the [Self], due to its freedom (svātantrya), is not turned towards anyOther (paronmukha), it makes itself – [i.e.] the totality [of being] – an object of knowl-edge. [Utpaladeva] has thus demonstrated his thesis by reversing the [unwanted] con-sequence (prasan.gaviparyaya).”

105 See ŚD, I, 7cd–8 (quoted in ĪPVV, II, 170): yadā tu tasya ciddharma-vibhavāmodajr̥mbhayā // vicitraracanānānākāryasr̥s

˙t˙ipravartane / bhavaty unmukhitā

cittā secchāyāh˙prathamā tut

˙ih˙// “But when, due to the unfolding of the joy as regards

this [consciousness]’s sovereign power – [a sovereign power] which is the [very] natureof consciousness –, at the beginning (pravartana) of the creation of the various (nānā)effects that compose a variety (vicitraracanā), there is an intentionality (unmukhitā) thatis [still] an identity with consciousness (cittā) – that is the first moment (tut

˙i) of will

(icchā).” In his commentary, Utpaladeva insists on the elusive character of this experi-ence (see ŚDV, p. 10: sā tut

˙ih˙

sūks˙makālaparicchinna icchāprathamabhāgah

˙. “It is

tut˙i, [i.e.], the first part of desire, confined to a subtle moment (sūks

˙makāla)”). In it,

consciousness is already intentional, but still aware that this extroversion is only a play-ful way of manifesting itself, since while presenting itself as turned towards an externalentity, it remains fundamentally introverted (antarmukha). See ŚDV, p. 10: yadonmu-khitonmukhavad ācaritā vastuto dvitīyābhāvān nairapeks

˙yen˙āntarmukhitvāc cittā cai-

tanyam eva. “At that [moment] there is an ‘intentionality’ (unmukhitā), which is thefact of behaving as someone ‘whose face is turned upwards’ (unmukha), [but] in reality,independently (nairapeks

˙yena) [of any other entity], since there is no second [entity

towards which consciousness could really turn], because of [consciousness’s] introver-sion (antarmukhitva). [This intentionality is] ‘an identity with consciousness’ (cittā) –[i.e.] it is nothing but consciousness (caitanyam eva).”


Conclusion

Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta are undoubtedly influenced by the Vijñānavāda:they make extensive use of arguments borrowed from it in order to establishtheir own idealism.However, they never try to hide it: on the contrary, they system-atically emphasize the importance of the Vijñānavādins’ arguments in their ownsystem by designating and quoting their sources in an unusually explicit manner.

This is probably a way of appropriating the prestige of their illustriousBuddhist opponents;106 but in doing so they also show a will to take full respon-sibility for appropriating their rivals’ concepts instead of appearing to beunknowingly or unwittingly influenced by them.107 Last but not least, this atti-tude also enables them to highlight the real boundary between their system andits metaphysical twin, the Vijñānavāda: although the two systems share the ideathat objects do not exist outside of consciousness, they profoundly disagreeabout the cause of phenomenal variety – a disagreement embodied in the oppo-sition between the two analogies (the dreamer versus the creative yogin) chosento illustrate the two idealisms. In the Vijñānavāda, this diversity is attributable tothe fact that consciousness is determined to appear thus by an impersonal mech-anism of unconscious residual traces; in the Pratyabhijñā, it is due to the playfuland absolutely free will of consciousness – a free will that Utpaladeva andAbhinavagupta endeavour to disclose at the heart of any perception. Onemight argue that this rather subtle difference can be disregarded in light of thetwo systems’ deep idealistic affinities. But according to the Pratyabhijñā philo-sophers, this difference, however subtle, is crucial, because it has considerableconsequences from soteriological, ethical and ontological points of view.

106 See Torella 1994, p. xxii: the absorption of Buddhist doctrines and terminology “mayhave been a deliberate choice by Utp.: to increase his own prestige by assuming theways and forms of a philosophical school that was perhaps the most respected andfeared, even by the many who did not agree with it.”

107 In this respect it might be worth adding a few remarks to Torella 1992, 329: “Throughthis subtle play of declared basic disagreement with the doctrines of Buddhist logicians,a limited acceptance and purely instrumental (or thought to be so) use of them, the mas-ters of the Pratyabhijñā end up being somehow drawn into their orbit. The architectureof the Pratyabhijñā feels the effect of this. That many problems are posed, more or lessunwittingly, in Buddhist terms to a certain extent prefigures their development andreduces the number of possible solutions.” It seems to me (and R. Torella made itclear during the viva of my thesis that his remarks are in no way incompatible withthe following points, with which he agrees) that all philosophical systems can beseen as responses to previous systems that they set out to surpass, and that they arenecessarily determined by the systems against which they were built, since the solutionsthat they propose are to a great extent determined by the way in which the problems tobe solved were formulated before them. However, the very fact that Utpaladeva andAbhinavagupta declare so explicitly and repeatedly their “limited acceptance” (asmuch as their “basic disagreement”) with respect to Dharmakīrti’s thought also indi-cates how acutely aware of this determination they are. And this (acknowledged) deter-mination should not be taken as a sign that the Pratyabhijñā system lacks originality: theĪPKs are a perfect illustration of the fact that the originality of a philosophical systemdoes not lie so much in the rarity of its borrowings from other systems as in its ability totransform various alien concepts so as to integrate them into a unitary thought in whichthey acquire a new meaning.


Thus, if sam˙sāra, far from being the result of an uncontrolled and uncon-

scious mechanism of residual traces, arises from consciousness’s free will tofool itself, then consciousness is always just playing at being bound. TheŚaivas can therefore claim that liberation is easier in their system108 – becausethe only condition for obtaining absolute freedom is the recognition(pratyabhijñā) that one is already absolutely free.

The Śaivas can similarly claim that in their system, it still makes sense toendeavour to save the others out of compassion, because ultimately the otherstoo are this free consciousness playfully pretending that it is bound; whereasaccording to Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, in the Vijñānavāda, since theothers cannot be anything beyond their status of objects in my cognitive series,they do not have any existence as subjects in the ultimate sense.109

Finally, if the world is the outcome of consciousness’s essential creativity, it can-not be discarded as an unreal appearance110 because it is indeed an appearance, butthis appearance is a manifestation of the absolute. Provided that one knows that theworld is nothing but a way for consciousness to manifest itself freely, its enjoymentis no longer what binds human beings, on the contrary:111 according to Utpaladeva

108 See Utpaladeva’s claim that “the new path” of the Pratyabhijñā is “easy” (ĪPK IV, 16ab:sughat

˙a es

˙a mārgo navo. . .).

109 On the divide between Dharmakīrti and the Pratyabhijñā philosophers as regards other-ness and compassion, see Ratié 2007 and 2009.

110 From this point of view too, the shift from the model of the dreamer to that of the yoginis meaningful, as is obvious in ĪPV, I, 182–3 (quoted above, n. 68): not only does itrequire that consciousness’s production of the universe is devoid of material cause(upādāna), whereas the Śaiva Saiddhāntikas for instance claim that consciousnessmerely informs this material cause (see Sanderson 1992: 282); it also means that theresult of this production is real – whereas its comparison to a dream might be inter-preted as the affirmation that it is unreal (avastu). Cf. ĪPVV, II, 145, whereAbhinavagupta states that contrary to dreamt or imagined objects, the reality ofwhich can be doubted, the yogin’s creation is an established (siddha) fact: icchayāca nirmān

˙am˙

svapnasam˙kalpādau dr̥s

˙tam eva ghat

˙āder mr̥dādiprasiddha

kāran˙aparamparāparākaran

˙ena. tad atrāsaty aghat

˙ādir iti ced astu tāvad evam.

tathāpi yogī purasenādinirmān˙am icchāvaśād eva karotīti siddham. “And indeed, it

is a fact of experience (dr̥s˙t˙a) that the creation [occurring] at will in dreams, in imagin-

ary constructions, etc., [occurs] without the series of well-known causes of the pot forinstance (such as clay, etc.). Therefore, if [someone objected that] since this [series ofcauses] does not exist, the pot [or any other object manifested while dreaming or ima-gining] does not exist, [we would answer]: very well, let us admit that it is the case [asregards dreamt or imagined objects]; however, it is established (siddha) that the yoginproduces thanks to his sole will a creation of cities, armies and so on.”

111 See e.g. ĪPV, I, 313–5: anubhūyate ca sopadeśair avadhānadhanair yenais˙ām˙

yaiva*sam

˙sārasam

˙matā [J, L, S1, S2: sam

˙sāradaśāsam

˙matā KSTS, Bhāskarī, P, SOAS;

p.n.p. D] vyavahāradaśā saiva pramātr̥tattvaprakhyātmikā śivabhūmih˙. yad uktam

sam˙bandhe sāvadhānatety apratyabhijñātātmaparamārthānām

˙samalo vyavahārah

˙;

anyes˙ām˙

sa eva nirmalah˙. “And those who focus their attention [on the Self and]

have been initiated experience [the whole mundane existence (vyavahāra) as restingon the Lord,] so that for them, this very condition of mundane existence, generally con-sidered as the cycle of rebirths (sam

˙sāra), is nothing but the ontological level of Śiva

(śivabhūmi), which consists of the full manifestation of the true nature of the subject.This is what is said [in the VBh]: ‘[they] focus their attention on relation’. The mundaneexistence is impure (samala) for those who have not recognized (apratyabhijñāta) thetrue nature of their Self – for the others, this same [mundane existence] is pure


and Abhinavagupta, one can be fully liberated and still enjoy the beauty of the uni-verse, since being aware of beauty is nothing but recognizing one’s own free crea-tivity while contemplating the universe,112 and this enjoyment constitutes aprivileged opportunity to become aware of consciousness’s freedom: if theVijñānavāda’s ultimate goal is to awaken from the ordinary constructed world,the Pratyabhijñā’s idealism aims to become fully aware of its aesthetic nature.

References

Manuscripts mentioned

[D] Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī, [Vr̥tti and Vivr̥ti]. Delhi, National Archives of India(Manuscripts belonging to the Archaeology and Research Department, Jammuand Kashmir Government, Srinagar), n° 30, vol. 9.

[J] Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī. Jammu, Sri Ranbir Institute, Raghunath mandir, n° 19.

[L] Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī. Lucknow, Akhila Bhāratīya Sam˙skrt̥a Paris

˙ad, n° 3366.

[P] Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī. Poona, Bhandarkar Oriental Institute (BORI), n° 466of 1875–76.

[S1] Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī. Śrinagar, Oriental Research Library, n° 816 = DSO00001 5659.

[S2] Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī. Śrinagar, Oriental Research Library, n° 1035 = DSO00001 8219.

[SOAS] Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī. London, School of Oriental and African Studies(SOAS) Library, n° 207 in R.C. Dogra’s 1978 catalogue / MS n° 44255.

Primary sources[APS = Ajad

˙apramātr̥siddhi, in] Siddhitrayī and Pratyabhijñā-kārikā-vr̥tti of Rajanaka

Utpala Deva, edited with notes by Pandit M. K. Shastri. (Kashmir Series of Textsand Studies 34.) Srinagar, 1921.

[Bhāskarī] Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī of Abhinavagupta, Doctrine of DivineRecognition, vol. I and II: Sanskrit text edited by K. A. S. Iyer and K. C. Pandey(Allahabad, 1938, 1950), vol. III: English translation by K. C. Pandey (Allahabad,1954). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986.

(nirmala).” The verse alluded to here (and fully quoted in ĪPVV, II, 405) is VBh 106:grāhyagrāhakasam

˙vittih

˙sāmānyā sarvadehinām / yoginām

˙tu viśes

˙o’sti sam

˙bandhe

sāvadhānatā // “All living beings share the consciousness of the apprehended object(grāhya) and apprehending subject (grāhaka); but yogins have the particularity thatthey focus on the relation [between the apprehended object and apprehending subject].”

112 Cf. ĪPVV, II, 177–81 (unfortunately too long to be quoted here; cf. Ratié 2009 for bib-liographical references on this famous passage) where Abhinavagupta examines sensualand aesthetic pleasures and presents them as ways of becoming aware of one’s ownfreedom and bliss. In this respect, the fact that Abhinavagupta is also the author oftwo major works on aesthetics is of course no coincidence (cf. ibid., 179, where heexplicitly refers the reader to his commentary on the Nāt

˙yaśāstra: ayam

artho’bhinavabhāratyām˙

nāt˙yavedavivr̥tau vitatya vyutpādito’smābhir iti. tatkutūhalī

tām evāvalokayet. iha tu prakr̥tavighnakāritvān na vitatah˙. “I have explained this

point in detail in the Abhinavabhāratī, a detailed commentary on the Veda of theatre.Whoever is curious [to know more about] this should examine that [work], but inthis [treatise], this [subject] has not been dealt with in detail, because it would haveimpeded understanding of the subject at hand”).


[ĪPK] Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā of Utpaladeva with the Author’s Vr̥tti, critical editionand annotated translation by R. Torella (Rome, 1994). Corrected edition. Delhi:Motilal Banarsidass, 2002.

[ĪPV] Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī, edited with notes by M. K. Shāstrī (Kashmir Seriesof Texts and Studies 22 & 33). Nirnaya Sagar Press, 2 vols., Srinagar, 1918–1921.

[ĪPVV] Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivr̥tivimarśinī by Abhinavagupta, edited by M. K. Shāstrī(Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies 60, 62 & 65.) Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press,3 vols, 1938–1943.

[NBhV] Nyāyabhās˙yavārttika of Bhāradvāja Uddyotakara, Nyāyacaturgranthikā, vol.

II. Edited by A. Thakur. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1997.

[NM] Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhat˙t˙a, with T

˙ippan

˙i – Nyāyasaurabha by the editor.

Edited by K. S. Varadacharya, 2 vols. (Oriental Research Institute Series 116 and139.) Mysore, 1969–1983.

[NR = Nyāyaratnākara]: see ŚV.[NS =Nyāyasūtra] Gautamīyanyāyadarśana with Bhās

˙ya of Vātsyāyana,

Nyāyacaturgranthikā, vol. I, edited by A. Thakur. New Delhi: Indian Council ofPhilosophical Research, 1997.

[NSBh = Nyāyasūtrabhās˙ya]: see NS.

[PDhS = Padārthadharmasan.graha] Praśastapāda Bhās˙ya (Padārthadharmasan.graha)

with Commentary Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara, edited by V. P. Dvivedin (Banaras,1895), Sri Satguru Publications. Delhi, 1984.

[PS] Paramārthasāra by Abhinavagupta with the commentary of Yogarāja. Edited byJ. C. Chatterji (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies 7.) Srinagar, 1916.

[PSV = Paramārthasāravr̥tti], see PS.

[PV] Pramān˙avārttikam of ācārya Dharmakīrti, with the commentaries Svopajñavr̥tti of

the author and Pramān˙avārttikavr̥tti of Manorathanandin, edited by R. C. Pandeya.

Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1989.

[PVin] Dharmakīrti’s Pramān˙aviniścaya. Chapters 1 and 2. Critically edited by

E. Steinkellner. Beijing / Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House, AustrianAcademy of Sciences Press, 2007.

[PVSV] The Pramān˙avārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with the

Autocommentary. Text edited by R. Gnoli with Critical Notes. Rome: IstitutoItaliano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1960.

[ŚD] Śivadr̥s˙t˙i of Śrīsomānandanātha with the Vr̥tti by Utpaladeva. Edited by M. K.

Shastri (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies 54.) Srinagar, 1934.

[ŚV] Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhat˙t˙a, with the commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī

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Dreamer and the Yogin