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Apstrakt

Privredna društva čije se akcije nalaze na listingu berzi i njihovi direktori i službenici snose povećan rizik pasivne procesne legitimacije po suparničnim tužbama akcionara. Zbog toga što suparnične tužbe podrazume-vaju velike iznose nadoknada, od suštinskog značaja za sve stranke u postupku je da tuženi direktori / službe-nici i privredno društvo raspolažu odgovarajućim osi-guranjem direktora i službenika. Bez adekvatnog po-krića, direktori i privredno društvo bi mogli da dođu u situaciju da u celini ili delimično sami snose isplatu nadoknade štete. Ako oni ne mogu da isplate nadokna-du štete, što je obično slučaj zbog velikih iznosa tužbe-nih zahteva kod suparničnih tužbi, oštećena lica neće naplatiti ništa ili će ostvariti delimičnu nadoknadu šte-te, pa suparnična tužba neće ostvariti svoj cilj. To ima negativne posledice po efi kasnost u odštetnom pravu. Osiguranje direktora i službenika je zato bitno za par-nične stranke kod suparnične tužbe i za društvo. Ipak, može doći do sukoba interesa između tuženog privred-nog društva i direktora u pogledu nadoknade nastale obaveze ako su podosigurani. Može doći i do sukoba in-teresa između brojnih osiguravača, što može negativno da utiče na osiguravajuće pokriće i isplatu obaveze na-stale po suparničnoj tužbi. Prvi sukob interesa između privrednog društva i direktora može se ograničiti uba-civanjem ili klauzule o alokaciji ili klauzule o redosledu isplata. Može se izvršiti i izbor u pogledu (veće) podele Odeljaka A i C osiguravajućeg pokrića u polisi osigura-nja direktora i službenika ili se može zaključiti poseb-na polisa osiguranja po Odeljku A. Potencijalni efekti sukoba interesa između brojnih osiguravača direktora i službenika mogu se smanjiti ubacivanjem adekvatno formulisanih klauzula o istovetnosti forme i klauzula o vodećem osiguravaču. U tom kontekstu, ali takođe ne-

zavisno, po mišljenju autora treba da se primenjuje i di-rektna obaveza savesnog i korektnog postupanja prvog osiguravača prema osiguravačima viška štete, a takođe i obaveza dužne pažnje osiguravača viška štete.

Ključne reči: osiguranje direktora i službenika, su-parnična tužba, odeljak A i odeljak B osiguravajućeg pokrića, klauzula o istovetnosti forme, klauzula o vo-dećem osiguravaču, direktna obaveza savesnog i korek-tnog postupanja prvog osiguravača

1. UVOD

Velika šteta i njena nadoknada od strane većeg broja lica često je bila predmet pažnje u pravnoj teoriji u po-slednjih nekoliko godina. Visoki odštetni zahtevi neiz-bežno se tiču velikog broja lica koja su pretrpela štetu ili koja su učestvovala u rešavanju spora sa jednim fi -zičkim ili pravnim licem ili grupom lica odgovornih za štetu, a koji spor se tiče istog ili sličnog činjeničnog os-nova, zakonske odgovornosti ili drugih pitanja (Cam-pos, 2012, 1065; Nagareda, 2008, xii; Cashman, 2007, 1; Hensler, 2000, 3; Hensler, 1993, 966). Velika šteta se če-sto rešava kroz suparničarstvo, umesto vođenja pojedi-načnih parnica. Sudska praksa pokazuje da se povećao broj suparničnih tužbi. Posebno je to slučaj u fi nansij-skom sektoru gde se suparnične tužbe sve češće podižu protiv akcionarskih društava. Zahtevani odštetni iznosi u tim parnicama kao i stvarno dosuđeni iznosi protiv akcionarskih društava u severnoj Americi i Evropi su (veoma) visoki.

Na primer, u istraživanju Cornerstone survey obav-ljenom u periodu 1996–2010 prosečan iznos nadokna-de po suparničnim tužbama u SAD iznosio je 40 mi-liona dolara (Cornerstone Research, 2011a, 2), dok se iz drugih istraživanja došlo do prosečnih iznosa od 45 i 48 miliona dolara (Baker, Griffi th, 2010, 22; Klausner, Hegland, 2010, 1). Svake godine u periodu od 2000. do

ČLANCI

Doc. dr Wim WETERINGS

Mogući sukobi interesa kod osiguranja direktora i službenika u slučaju suparnične tužbe akcionara

UDK: 368.6:347.72Primljeno: 11.8.2013.Prihvaćeno: 17.9.2013.Pregledni naučni rad

Univerzitet u Tilburgu, Pravni fakultet; advokat u advokatskoj firmi Dirkzwager Advocaten & Notarissen N.V., Arnhem, e–mail: wim.weterings@uvt.nl / weterings@dirkzwager.nl.

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WIM WETERINGS

2009. u proseku jedna od petnaest kompanija sa ber-zanske liste S&P 500 pojavljivala se u svojstvu tuženog / satuženog u suparničnim tužbama (Cornerstone Rese-arch, 2011b, 12). Ovaj odnos od jedne od 8,5 kompanija u fi nansijskom sektoru bio je još izraženiji. Promene u vezi sa suparničnim tužbama protiv kompanija sa berze takođe se mogu uočiti i u Evropi. Na primer, u Holan-diji, najmanje 13 suparničnih tužbi pokrenuto je u pos-lednjih nekoliko godina protiv kompanija čije akcije su kotirane na holandskoj berzi akcija (koja ima akcije 75 kompanija), po kojima se isplata nadoknade kretala između 1 milion i 1 milijardu evra (Van Abeelen, Wete-rings, 2013, 35).

U najkraćem, rizik za kompanije, čijim akcijama se trguje na berzi, da budu upletene u suparnični spor sa akcionarima ili povodom nekih drugih pitanja je vi-sok. Takvi slučajevi neminovno podrazumevaju viso-ke sume nadoknada ili iznose vansudskog poravnanja. Pored kompanija, cilj suparničnih tužbi akcionara često je usmeren na ličnu odgovornost direktora. Direktori i članovi nadzornih odbora sve češće se suočavaju sa suparničnim tužbama, te zato pronalaženje zaštite od ovog rizika odgovornosti sve više dobija na značaju.1

U svetlu ogromnih tužbenih zahteva, od suštinske je važnosti za sve strane da direktori i kompanija koji su tuženi imaju adekvatno osiguranje od odgovornosti di-rektora i službenika. Bez osiguranja ili dovoljnog osigu-ranja, tuženi direktori i kompanija će možda morati da u celosti ili delimično sami snose teret isplate tužbenog zahteva. Ako oni to ne budu mogli da ispune, što se dešava često uzimajući u obzir visinu tužbenog zahteva, suparnična tužba neće postići svoj cilj. To takođe ima negativne posledice na domet prava građanskopravne odgovornosti. Sve zainteresovane strane u suparničnoj tužbi imaju interes za postojanjem adekvatnog osigura-nja direktora i službenika, pri čemu može doći do suko-ba interesa između tužene kompanije i direktora. Pored toga, može da dođe i do sukoba interesa između raznih osiguravača direktora i službenika, što može da nega-tivno utiče na osiguravajuće pokriće i isplatu po osno-vu tužbenog zahteva. Osiguranje direktora i službenika mora da bude tako organizovano da bude u interesu ne samo zainteresovanih strana, već i društva, kako bi se u najvećoj meri sprečili potencijalni sukobi interesa.

Interes i uloga adekvatnog osiguranja direktora i službenika za slučaj suparnične tužbe akcionara de-taljnije se razmatra u poglavlju 2. Zatim će se detalj-nije analizirati pokriće po polisi osiguranja direktora i službenika pre mogućeg sukoba interesa između (i)

1 U SAD, akcionarske suparnične tužbe su godinama bile najčešći pojavni oblik odštetnih zahteva protiv kompanije sa berze i njenih direktora (Towers Watson, 2011, 19; Baker, Griffi th, 2010, 21).

kompanije i njenih direktora i (ii) raznih osiguravača u poglavlju 3. Diskutovaće se o mogućim rešenjima, kao što je ograničenje prvog mogućeg sukoba ubacivanjem klauzula o alokaciji ili klauzule o redosledu plaćanja, ili (većom) podelom Odeljaka A i C polise osiguranja. Takođe, biće istaknuti argumenti u prilog tvrdnje da se bolja veza između raznih osiguravača odgovornosti di-rektora i službenika može postići ubacivanjem ispravno defi nisane klauzule o istovetnosti forme. Pored navede-nog, biće obrazloženo zašto se potencijalni sukobi in-teresa između raznih osiguravača prilikom isplate po-vodom suparnične tužbe mogu umanjiti ubacivanjem adekvatne klauzule o vodećem osiguravaču (lideru) i, nezavisno od toga, prihvatanjem direktne obaveze sa-vesnog i poštenog ponašanja prvog osiguravača prema osiguravačima viška šteta (i takođe, obaveze dužne pa-žnje osiguravača viška šteta). Poslednje poglavlje za-ključujemo kratkim rezimeom.

2. ULOGA OSIGURANJA DIREKTORA I SLUŽBENIKA KOD SUPARNIČNIH TUŽBI

AKCIONARA

2.1. Veza između osiguranja direktora i službenika i suparničnih tužbi akcionara

Kolektivna nadoknada velike štete poželjnija je u od-nosu na pojedinačne nadoknade svim oštećenim stra-nama. Ekonomska prednost, sa parnicama ili bez njih, podizanja suparnične tužbe je očigledna. Za tužene strane i njihove osiguravače, korisno je da se sprovodi samo jedna parnica umesto velikog broja pojedinačnih sudskih postupaka, što ima koristan efekat na troško-ve odbrane (Hensler, 2000, 121; Rosenberg, 1987, 571). Druga važna prednost za zainteresovane strane leži u tome što kod kolektivne isplate, postoji veća sigurnost u odnosu na broj odštetnih zahteva i visinu, te tako i u odnosu na njihove obaveze na nadoknadu vis–à–vis oštećenih. Takođe, jedna parnica sprečava konfrontira-nje sa kontradiktornim ili nedoslednim odlukama suda. Za oštećena lica, prednost leži u tome što ona primaju nadoknadu u kratkom ili kraćem roku bez potrebe da svaki pojedinac vodi skupu, dugu, tešku i neizvesnu parnicu (Bone, 2012, 69–70).

Kolektivna isplata promoviše usklađenost prava i time smanjuje prostor između tzv. ponavljača i poje-dinca – oštećenika u vezi sa važnošću pobede u parnici, know-how i fi nansija – takođe poznato kao „nadokna-da za neravnopravnost” (Bone, 2012, p. 69; Rosenberg, 2000, 393; Hensler, 2000, 4). Preventivni efekat supar-nične tužbe takođe se može navesti kao važna prateća nuspojava (Bone, 2012, 71; Scherer, 2012, 27). Posto-

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Mogući sukobi interesa kod osiguranja direktora i službenika u slučaju suparnične tužbe akcionara

janje suparnične tužbe može da ima efekat odvraćanja zbog čega su potencijalni prekršioci standarda podsta-knuti da se povinuju pravilima, te zato suparnična tuž-ba više nije potrebna (više o ovome u poglavlju 2.2).

Ipak, suparnična tužba akcionara iz fi nansijskog sektora se jedino može rešiti kolektivno ili pojedinač-no ako tuženi direktor i / ili kompanija mogu da snose moguću nadoknadu (bilo kroz isplatu ili na drugi na-čin). Imajući u vidu visoke sume kod suparničnih tužbi, direktori često neće moći sami da ispune sve ili veliki deo tih troškova. Isto važi i za kompaniju, jer će u pro-tivnom nadoknade koje treba da plati imati (izrazito) negativne posledice na fi nansijsko poslovanje kompa-nije. To je izvesno tačno za mlade kompanije (Bondt, 2010, 621). Iz tog razloga, posedovanje polise osigura-nja odgovornosti od vitalnog je značaja za uspešnost i efi kasnost suparnične tužbe i kolektivne nadoknade.

2.2. Značaj osiguranja direktora i službenika kod suparničnih tužbi (za akcionare, direktore,

kompanije i društvo)

U svetlu rizika moguće lične odgovornosti i gubitka njihove privatne imovine, direktori i članovi nadzornog odbora kompanije sa berze automatski raspolažu veli-kim interesom da zaključe polisu osiguranja direktora i službenika. Najveći broj kompanija sa berze zaključuje takvo osiguranje za svoje direktore i službenike (Baker, Griffi th, 2010, 44).

Kod suparnične tužbe akcionara, polisa osiguranja direktora i službenika će takođe biti jedino sredstvo za kompaniju (Katz, 1996, 31). U tim slučajevima, osi-guranje trgovačke opšte odgovornosti često ne pruža nikakvu zaštitu jer se osiguravajuće pokriće „jedino” pruža za odgovornost za telesne povrede i štete na stva-rima (Kalis, Reiter, Segerdahl, 2013; Maniloff , 2012). Odštetni zahtevi akcionara, međutim, tiču se isključivo čiste fi nansijske štete. Ne postoji standardno pokriće odgovornosti kompanije u osiguranju direktora i službenika, ali se pokriće može proširiti tako da i kom-panija bude osiguranik (više o ovome u poglavlju 3.1).

Pored navedenog, osiguranje direktora i službenika sa adekvatnim pokrićem može da predstavlja dobar način za kompanije sa berze da privuku i zadrže dobre i iskusne direktore i službenike koji će kritički pratiti najnoviji razvoj kod suparničnih tužbi akcionara – pos-redan interes kompanije (Kalis, Reiter, Segerdahl, 2013, 11; Baker, Griffi th, 2007, 502; Black, Cheffi ns, Klausner, 2006, 1140; Parr, 2004, 13). Takođe, polisa osiguranja direktora i službenika sprečava direktore da zbog straha od odgovornosti i suparničnih tužbi postupaju pre-komerno oprezno i da se zato dovoljno ne upuštaju u preduzetničke rizike, kada vođenje posla u stvari po-

drazumeva preuzimanje prihvatljivih rizika u interesu akcionara i drugih zainteresovanih strana (Baker, Grif-fi th, 2010, 57; Black, Cheffi ns, Klausner, 2005, 169).

Akcionari takođe imaju veliki interes u osiguran-ju direktora i službenika. Oni su, zapravo, osiguranici kojima se po suparničnoj tužbi dosuđuje nadoknada bez obzira na vrednost njihovih akcija koje su svakako nepovoljno pogođene u celini ili u najvećoj meri nado-knadom koja treba da se isplati.

Osiguranje direktora i službenika nije jedino važno za direktore, akcionare i kompaniju, već takođe ima i širi društveni značaj. Postojanje osiguranja direktora i službenika obezbeđuje da postoje solventne, odgovor-ne strane ako se desi da direktori (i službenici) i / ili kompanija budu proglašeni odgovornim vis–à–vis ak-cionara.2 Ta unapređena sredstva nadoknade imaju po-zitivan uticaj na kompenzatorne i preventivne funkcije prava građanskopravne odgovornosti (Hensler, 2000, 121–122; Rosenberg, 1987, 563–566). Kod suparničnih tužbi, kompenzatorna funkcija ima važnu ulogu jer se, sa jedne strane, odštetni zahtevi po osnovu krivice za štetu objedinjuju kako bi se obezbedila efi kasna is-plata i pojačan pristup obligacionom pravu (ili drug-oj vrsti prava), dok sa druge strane, ukupna utužena suma je često velika ili prekomerna (Hensler, 2000, 3–4). Ta kompenzatorna funkcija može, međutim, jedino ispravno da se postigne ako postoji dovoljno osiguravajuće pokriće.

Ideja za preventivnu funkciju građanskopravne odgovornosti leži u tome što su direktori i kompanije, zbog straha od odgovornosti i obaveze da nadoknade štetu svojim akcionarima, podstaknuti da pažljivo po-stupaju i spreče nastanak štete za akcionare (Griffi th, 2012, 337; Shavell, 2004, 268). Međutim, ako direktor i / ili kompanija nemaju dovoljno sredstava da mogu da plate nadoknadu štete, što se posebno ne može is-ključiti kod suparničnih tužbi akcionara, odvraćajući uticaj građanskopravne odgovornosti ne bi bio dovolj-no robustan. Razlog je što relevantna strana ne može isplatiti nadoknadu štete na bilo koji način, ispravno ponašanje koje je trebalo primeniti nije unapred pozna-to (problem dokaza za donošenje presude). Uticaj ne-postojanja odvraćajućeg uticaja postaje još veći ako se akcionari unapred odreknu prava na nadoknadu štete zbog nepostojanja dovoljno sredstava direktora i kom-panije. U slučaju polise osiguranja direktora i službeni-ka, biće moguće da direktori i kompanija mnogo češće

2 U SAD (gde se relativno govoreći pojavljuje mnogo više internih odštetnih zahteva iz osnova odgovornosti), u teoriji se pojavilo stanovište da upravo iz tog razloga polisa osiguranja direktora i službenika je više u interesu pravnih lica / akcionara nego u interesu direktora za koga je kompanija zaključila tu vrstu osiguranja (Boyer, 2005; Gutiérrez, 2003; Romano, 1991).

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14 budu proglašavani odgovornim u datim okolnostima, te je zato tada jača motivisanost na pažljivo postupa-nje. Sa druge strane, postoji takođe nekoliko podsticaja na postupanje sa dužnom pažnjom u slučaju postojanja polise osiguranja direktora i službenika, jer direktori ili kompanije više ne moraju da sami u celini ili delimič-no, snose štetu (Shavell, 2005, 63–77; Parsons, 2003, 448–471; Dionne, 2000, 153; Baker, 1996, 267; and Pa-uly, 1968, 531–537). Ipak, osiguravači preduzimaju sve mere kako bi te aspekte građanskopravne odgovornosti što više iskoristili u uslovima osiguranja – maksimalna suma osiguranja, isključenja, franšize, suma premije, kontrola ponašanja, itd (Weterings, 2012).

Konačno, adekvanta polisa osiguranja direktora i službenika proizvodiće pozitivne posledice po cilje-ve suparnične tužbe: (i) efi kasno i efektivno rešavanje suparničnih tužbi vansudskim poravnanjem u kojem oštećena lica ostvaruju razumnu nadoknade štete; (ii) izbegavanje brojnih pojedinačnih parnica povodom istog osnova; i (iii) pojačano ostvarivanje uloge zakona.

3. MOGUĆI SUPROTNI INTERESI U OSIGURANJU DIREKTORA I SLUŽBENIKA

KOD AKCIONARSKIH TUŽBENIH ZAHTEVA

3.1. Osiguravajuće pokriće direktora i službenika

Polisa osiguranja direktora i službenika u osnovnom pokriću pruža zaštitu od odštetnih zahteva protiv di-rektora ili članova nadzornog odbora radi nadoknade štete prouzrokovane njegovim radnjama ili propusti-ma u vršenju nadležnosti direktora ili člana nadzornog odbora (Kalis, Reiter, Segerdahl, 2011, 9, 11, 12). Ovo bi moglo da se odnosi na odštetne zahteve kompanije prema direktoru gde direktor radi ili je radio (interna odgovornost). Takođe, postoji pokriće odštetnih zah-teva trećih lica kao što su stečajni upravnik, klijent ili konkurent – eksterna odgovornost (Weterings, 2012). Odštetni zahtevi akcionara, uzimajući u obzir potpuno pokriće za internu i eksternu odgovornost direktora ili druge vrste odgovornosti, takođe će biti pokriveni bilo po pojedinačnoh tužbi, bilo po suparničnoj tužbi. Osi-guranjem su pokrivene nadoknade koje potiču od ta-kvih odštetnih zahteva kao i troškovi odbrane od istih (Kalis, Reiter, Segerdahl, 2011, 11–25; Baker, Griffi th, 2007, 500).

Pokriće za direktore i službenike, a koje se odnosi na rizik lične odgovornosti za radnje uprave, naziva se pokrićem po Odeljku A polise. Pored navedenog, postoji i Odeljak B polise, koji je poznat kao korpora-tivno pokriće (Kalis, Reiter, Segerdahl, 2011, 11–19; Baker, Griffi th, 2007, 46–47 i 499; Mathias, 2006, 6–18).

Većina kompanija sa berze izvršila je obeštećenje svo-jim direktorima i službenicima i na toj osnovi su preu-zele rizik odgovornosti direktora / službenika kao i nadoknade štete i eventualne troškove odbrane. Za Odeljak B polise kompanija koja, na osnovu emitova-nog obeštećenja, mora da snosi troškove odbrane i /ili nadoknade u slučaju odgovornosti direktora može da računa na to da ti troškovi budu pokriveni polisom osiguranja direktora i službenika (O’Leary, 2007, 37).

U većini polisa osiguranja direktora i službenika, Odeljak A i B su standardno pokriveni. Pored toga, postoji mogućnost proširenja osiguranja direktora i službenika sa Odeljkom C (Griffi th, 2012, 339; Mathias 2006, 6–20). To pokriće štiti kompaniju od odštetnih zahteva koji se direktno postavljaju protiv kompanije (Baker, Griffi th, 2010, 47–48; Baker, Griffi th, 2007, 499; Philips, 2007, 698). Pokriće se često ograničava na tzv. odštetne zahteve vlasnika hartija od vrednosti, ug-lavnom, defi nisane kao odštetni zahtevi vlasnika sred-stava obezbeđenja korporativnog osiguranika (Kalis, Reiter, Segerdahl, 2011, 11–10).

Ovaj Odeljak C polise (i njegov predmet) važan je za kompanije čije su akcije listirane na naciona-lnom i međunarodnom berzanskom tržištu radi omogućavanja da se zaštite od rizika podnošenja suparnihčnih tužbi akcionara. Dalje, ako pokriće po Odeljku C nije zaključeno ili je nedovoljno, to je štetno za akcionare. Tužena kompanija će u tom slučaju mo-rati da plati odštetne zahteve u celini ili delimično iz „svog džepa”, što negativno utiče na imovinu kompa-nije. Konačno, to može da utiče ili će uticati na funk-cionisanje i vrednost kompanije (vrednost akcija). To bi moglo da ima za posledicu da akcionari u celini ili delimično snose sopstveni gubitak. Takođe, umanjenje imovine kompanije može da nepovoljno pogodi dru-ge akcionare, kao što su poverioci i zaposleni. Ako se posmatra iz ovog ugla, polisa osiguranja direktora i službenika sa Odeljkom C pokrića je poželjna za svaku kompaniju sa berze.

3.2. Zaštita direktora u odnosu na zaštitu kompanije – problemi podele pokrića

Iako polisa osiguranja direktora i službenika redov-no pruža tri vrste zaštite, samo Odeljak A polise osigu-ranja štiti direktora. Glavna mana istovremene zaštite i kompanije od odgovornosti (Odeljak C polise) je u tome što veliki odštetni zahtev protiv kompanije može da smanji ili iscrpi sumu osiguranja, zbog čega direktori mogu da postanu podosigurani ili da se nađu u situaciji da uopše nemaju osiguranje ako se tokom istog perioda osiguranja podnese još jedan odštetni zahtev. Takođe, može se desiti da akcionari podnesu odštetne zahteve

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15 protiv kompanije i direktora, ali pošto je suma osigu-ranja nedovoljne visine za isplatu u ime i kompanije i direktora ili je u celini nedovoljna da pruži pokriće za samo jednog osiguranika iz suparnične tužbe, akciona-ri neće biti obeštećeni (Bordon, 1998, 170). Suparnične tužbe često se odnose na ogromne iznose (desetine ili stotine miliona dolara, odnosno evra), što je odavno postao sasvim realan scenario. To je još izvesnije zbog toga što se suma osiguranja prvo koristi za plaćanje troškova odbrane, jer su advokatske provizije kod su-parničnih tužbi (veoma) visoke da bi se prvo počelo sa njihovim isplatama (Eisenberg, 2004, 51–54; Alexan-der, 1991, 511–512). U tom slučaju, razna osigurana lica, kompanija i direktori, imaju suprotstavljene inte-rese u vezi sa razdvajanjem sume osiguranja ili rezer-vacijom.

Zbog toga se u polise osiguranja direktora i služ-benika ubacuju klauzule o alokaciji i / ili klauzule o redosledu plaćanja. Ako je upotrebljena klauzula o redosledu plaćanja (poznata i pod nazivom „klauzula o prioritetnim isplatama”), prvo se nadoknada mora isplatiti direktorima (Mathias, 2006, 6–14). Većina po-lisa osiguranja direktora i službenika sadrži pomenutu klauzulu. To će imati efekat samo ako odštetni zahtevi protiv direktora i kompanije budu postavljeni istovre-meno. U suprotnom, primeniće se princip „prvi u vre-menu, jači u pravu”, kao što će isto važiti i u slučaju da te klauzule nema u polisi osiguranja. U slučajevima kada ova klauzula funkcioniše u korist osiguranih direktora, mana za osiguranu kompaniju vidi se iz toga što ona može u celini ili delimično da ostane bez zaštite u slu-čaju podnošenja suparnične tužbe. Uprkos zaključenoj polisi osiguranja od odštetnih zahteva akcionara (Ode-ljak C polise), kompanija bi mogla da bude prinuđena da na kraju snosi troškove ukupne ili dela nadoknade kao i troškove odbrane, što će negativno uticati na nje-nu vrednost akcija.

Kada se radi o klauzuli o alokaciji, osiguranici mo-raju da se, što je moguće u većoj meri, potrude da do-govore pošteno i adekvatno podelu sume osiguranja (nadoknada štete i troškovi odbrane), ako je ona nedo-voljna za nadoknade svim osiguranim licima (Ostrager, Newman 2010, 1531; Ferrara, 2005, 13–29; Bordon, 1998, 170).3 Kada je „nevolja” podeljena između raznih osiguranih lica, svako se onda suočava sa podosiguran-jem.

3 Slučajno ili ne, klauzula o alokaciji često se tiče razdvajanja osiguranih i neosiguranih suma između, na primer, osiguranog direktora i neosigurane kompanije (jer odštetni zahtevi akcionara nisu pokriveni Odeljkom C uslova osiguranja). Ipak, postoji nekoliko klauzula koje se odnose na razdvajanje osiguranih suma.

U tom slučaju, pomenutim klauzulama pokušava se adekvatno regulisanje problema podele sume osigura-nja u slučaju podosiguranja po polisi osiguranja direk-tora i službenika (sa kombinovanim pokrićem Odelja-ka A–B–C). Međutim, čini se mnogo poželjnijim da se razdvoje pokrića po Odeljcima A i C i da se u što većoj meri teži sprečavanju nastanka podosiguranja. Sprovo-đenje osiguranja direktora i službenika počelo je prvo samo sa pokrićem po Odeljku A radi prodaje zaštite direktorima i službenicima od rizika lične odgovorno-sti. Osiguranje se, iz dobrog razloga, zvalo „Osiguranje odgovornosti direktora i službenika.” Zaštita kompa-nije dodata je kasnije radi pokrića po polisi osiguranja direktora i službenika (Odeljci B i C). To je druga vr-sta pokrića, za drugog osiguranika i drugačije situaci-je. Zato je poželjnije praviti podelu između pokrića za direktora, za koje je osiguranje direktora i službenika prvo i bilo namenjeno i pokrića za kompaniju od od-štetnih zahteva akcionara, od kojeg rizika je teško do-biti zaštitu van polisa osiguranja direktora i službenika (O’Leary, 2007, 36).

3.3. Podela pokrića po Odeljcima A i C

U okviru osiguranja direktora i službenika može se izvršiti navedeni izbor. To može da se uradi ubaciva-njem odvojenih podlimita. U tom slučaju, na snazi su odvojene sume osiguranja za Odeljke A i C. Iako je to najjednostavnije rešenje, postoji mogućnost da pokriće za direktore bude privremeno ili trajno pogođeno od-štetnim zahtevima protiv kompanije ili obrnuto. To se dešava u slučaju nesolventnosti kompanije, zbog toga što ili stečajni upravnik otkaže celu polisu osiguranja direktora i službenika ili ako stečajni upravnik i / ili po-verioci smatraju da je polisa osiguranja direktora i služ-benika deo imovine kompanije, bez obzira da li je ona solventna. Pored toga, isticanje prigovora odgovornosti u vezi sa radnjama kompanije, kao što su neprijavljiva-nje informacija, može da utiče na celu polisu i, samim tim na pokriće po Odeljku A.

Poželjnije rešenje je u tome da se razdvoje polise osi-guranja za Odeljak A na jednoj strani od Odeljka C (i Odeljka B) sa druge strane. U nekim slučajevima, osi-guravači polisa osiguranja direktora i službenika nude odvojenu polisu osiguranja direktora i službenika samo sa Odeljkom A (samostalno pokriće po Odeljku A) za ličnu odgovornost direktora. U drugim slučajevima, postoje redovne polise osiguranja direktora i službeni-ka sa Odeljcima A, B i C u kojima se višak sume osi-guranja koristi kao deo pokrića po Odeljku A (Kalis, Reiter, Segerdahl, 2013, 11–41; Philips, 2007, 720). Ovaj višak pokrića koristi se čim se iscrpe druge sume osigu-ranja osnovnog pokrića iz polise osiguranja direktora

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16 i službenika. U tom slučaju, višak pokrića važi samo za direktora (Rossi, 2005, 7). U oba slučaja mogu da se primenjuju širi uslovi osiguranja po Odeljku A od onih koji su uobičajeno mogući u polisama osiguranja direk-tora i službenika (sa Odeljcima A–B–C), kao što su širi opis šteta, manji broj isključenja radnji drugih osigura-nih lica i isključenja koja ne utiču na troškove odbrane.

Iz istraživanja koje je sproveo Willis (Th e Willis D&O A–Side Purchasing Survey), američki broker u osiguranju, vidi se da oko 55%–60% kompanija sa li-ste Fortune 100 i 35%–40% kompanija iz Evrope sa li-ste Fortune 500 imaju neku formu odvojenog pokrića Odeljka A (Willis, 2004).4 U većini slučajeva podela pokrića se tiče polise osiguranja A–B–C uz dodatno pokriće viška po Odeljku A. Ono što je neuobičajeno u pogledu tih rezultata odnosi se na to da su u periodu istraživanja (2002–2003) nadoknade po suparničnim tužbama bile najviše, te da su se prilikom produženja polise osiguranja brojne kompanije sa berzi odlučile na zaključenje šireg pokrića po Odeljku A (višak pokrića). Sve ovo je potvrđeno u istraživanju kompanije za kon-salting o upravljanju rizicima Towers Watson (Towers Watson, 2008, 15, 16 i 18). Prema tom istraživanju 41% kompanija sa berze u 2008. godini imalo je odvojena pokrića Odeljka A i ono se primenjivalo na 80% veli-kih poslovnih aktivnosti. U 2011. godini taj procenat je iznosio78% (Towers Watson, 2011, 16–17).

U Evropi je uobičajeno da se zaključuju tradicional-ne, kombinovane polise osiguranja sa Odeljcima A–B–C, bez odvojenog pokrića po Odeljku A. U izuzetnim slučajevima, kada se zaključuje odvojeno pokriće, ono se tiče osiguranja viška po Odeljku A. Očekivanje je, međutim, da će u slučaju povećanja broja suparničnih tužbi, doći do povećanja tražnje za odvojenim pokri-ćem po Odeljku A ili pokriću viška štete po Odeljku A jer to pruža direktorima i službenicima najbolju zaštitu od podosiguranja usled iscrpljenja suma osiguranja u korist kompanije. U tom slučaju, takođe će biti lakše da kompanije sa berzi privuku direktore i službenike pa će one biti manje podstaknute da postupaju suviše pažljivo. Pored toga, to će pružiti najbolju zaštitu od odgovornosti kompanija sa berze ako imaju odvojene polise osiguranja Odeljka C, makar odvojenu (samo-stalnu) polisu osiguranja Odeljka A, zbog čega pokriće po Odeljku C se sporije i manje iscrpljuje.

Uopšteno govoreći, kompanija je ugovarač osigu-ranja. Ona zaključuje ugovor o osiguranju direktora i službenika sa osiguravačem. Ipak, kompaniju zastupaju odbor direktora, koji je, u stvari, strana koja zaključu-je ugovor o osiguranju direktora i službenika. Ako se osiguranje direktora i službenika zaključuje bez pokrića

4 Willis D&O A–Side Purchasing Survey 2004. Ovi rezultati su potvrđeni u istraživanju 2007. godine.

po Odeljku C kao i / ili bez odvojenih odeljaka A i C, akcionari će moći da se koriste prigovorom da direktor nije postupao u interesu kompanije i njenih akcionara, što može da predstavlja samostalan ili povezan osnov za odgovornost direktora. Sledstveno tome, za direkto-ra kompanije sa berze, ako postoji velik rizik od toga da akcionari podignu suparničnu tužbu, važno je ugovo-riti dovoljno pokrića po Odeljcima A i C. Pošto se taj interes povećao poslednjih nekoliko godina i doći će do njegovog daljeg povećavanja, očekuje se da to aktivira i promeni evropsko tržište osiguranja direktora i službe-nika. U tom kontekstu, direktor mora da obezbedi da suprotni interesi kompanije i direktora u polisi osigura-nja budu uravnoteženi i da postoji dovoljno pokriće za direktore i kompaniju. Angažman brokera u osiguranju mogao bi da bude nepoželjan iz prostog razloga što ako bi ga angažovano direktor, broker bi se suočio sa pro-blemom da mora da daje konfl iktne preporuke o po-kriću kompaniji i direktorima. Brokeri zato moraju da izvršavaju svoje obaveze sa dužnom pažnjom prilikom savetovanja o programu i sumama osiguranja kako bi izbegli sopstvenu odgovornost.

3.4. Mogućnost nepoklapanja pokrića različitih osiguravača direktora i službenika

Ako su polisu osiguranja direktora i službenika za-ključile kompanije sa berze i / ili njihovi direktori od rizika suparničnih tužbi, odnosno u vezi sa visokim odštetnm zahtevima, može doći do sukoba interesa ve-likog broja osiguravača. Po pravilu, u osiguranje direk-tora i službenika sa visokim sumama osiguranja, uklju-čeno je nekoliko osiguravača. Veće kompanije sa berze u Evropi često imaju pokriće između 100 i 200 miliona evra, dok manje kompanije sa berze imaju pokriće koje počinje od 50  miliona evra (Weterings, 2010, 166). Osiguravači, međutim, imaju maksimalni kapacitet koji je uobičajeno manji od tog iznosa. Često postoji maksimalni kapacitet pokrića od 10, 15 ili 25 miliona evra (sa izuzetkom od 50 miliona evra).5 Budući da je kompanijama čije su akcije listirane na berzi, po pra-vilu, potrebno, a i one same žele da imaju više sume osiguranja (na primer, 100 miliona evra), pokrivanje sume osiguranja mora da se podeli na više različitih osiguravača.

To se može obaviti na nekoliko različitih načina. Kada se radi o saosiguranju, suma osiguranja se deli horizontalno. Postoji samo jedna polisa osiguranja sa jedinstvenom sumom osiguranja, a razni osigurava-či preuzimaju pokrivanje troškova odbrane i moguću

5 Isto važi i za američke osiguravače o odgovornosti direktora i službenika (Griffi th, 2012, 340; Anderson, Stanzler, Masters, 2002, 13–19).

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17 nadoknadu štete u srazmeri njihovog udela u datom osiguranju. U većini slučajeva, suma osiguranja se kod polisa osiguranja direktora i službenika deli ver-tikalno. U tom slučaju, polisa osiguranja direktora i službenika sastoji se od „kule” sa nekoliko nivoa poli-sa osiguranja i suma osiguranja (Baker, Griffi th, 2010, 53). Osiguravač(i) u prvom nivou (osnovni osiguravač – prim. aut.) mora prvi da pruži pokriće za troškove od-brane i moguću nadoknadu štete Anderson, Stanzler, Masters 2002, 13–16). Gornji nivoi predstavljaju polise osiguranja viška štete (Stempel, 2005, 2–92 i 2–93). One se aktiviraju samo kada suma osiguranja iz donjeg ni-voa bude iscrpljena tako da se aktivira polisa osiguranja iz sledećeg nivoa za nadoknadu viška sume – suma koja premašuje nivo osiguranja iz donjeg nivoa (Richmond, 2000, 29).6

To bi trebalo da spreči osiguravače da zauzimaju ra-zličite stavove o osiguravajućem pokriću, kao i isplati odštetnog zahteva. Ta mogućnost postoji kod suparnič-nih tužbi jer će nekoliko nivoa u tom slučaju često biti aktivirani (Baker, Griffi th, 2010, 145–147). Različiti sta-vovi osiguravača onemogućavaju efi kasnu i efektivnu isplatu suparničnih tužbi. Klauzula o istovetnosti forme može se primeniti da bi se postiglo da nema velikih ra-zlika između uslova polise osnovnog osiguranja i poli-sa osiguranja viška štete (Anderson, Stanzler, Masters, 2002, 13–29). Većina programa osiguranja direktora i službenika sadrži takvu klauzulu u polisama osigura-nja viška štete (Stempel, 2005, 2–92 i 2–93). Klauzula o istovetnosti forme može, na primer, da glasi: „Na ovu polisu se primenjuju isti limiti, defi nicije, isključenja i uslovi (izuzev u vezi sa premijom, sumom i limitima odgovornosti i ako nešto drugo nije ugovoreno) koji su sadržani u njoj ili koji budu dogovoreni u osnovnim polisama pre nastanka osiguranog događaja zbog čega je postavljen odštetni zahtev.”

Ako gorenavedena klauzula uopšte nije ubačena ili nije ubačena sa adekvatnim tekstom, mogu nastati sve vrste problema što će dovesti do nedovoljnosti ili nepo-klapajućih pokrića. Konkretno, redovno dolazi do toga da se uslovi osiguranja viška štete razlikuju i, na primer, uslovi osiguranja viška štete sadrže dodatne i / ili spe-cijalne uslove koji se ne nalaze u uslovima osnovnog osiguranja ili osnovnog osiguranja viška štete, kao što je isključenje pokrića, arbitražna klauzula, izbor mero-davnog prava ili neka druga klauzula, ili kraći otkazni rok (Stempel, 2005, 2–93). Drugi je da ne mora svaki osiguravač viška štete da primenjuje uslove osnovnog osiguranja, već one koje primenjuje osiguravač viška

6 Veći broj slučajnih osiguravača može pružati pokriće u nekom nivou osiguranja, tako da horizontalno razdvajanje (saosiguranje) postoji u tom nivou (Anderson, Stanzler, Masters, 2002, 13–19).

štete iz donjeg nivoa zaštite, ili da postoji neizvesnost u pogledu toga koji se osiguravač mora slediti. Tako-đe, moguće je da iz teksta klauzule o istovetnosti forme proističe da se mora slediti osiguravač sa najužim po-krićem. U nastavku dajemo primer takve jedne klauzu-le: „Osiguravač pruža osiguravajuće pokriće u skladu sa istim limitima i uslovima osnovne polise i svim oštrijim limitima i uslovima svih drugih osnovnih polisa, izuzev ako nešto drugo nije ugovoreno.”

Da bi izbegao te probleme i da bi se ostvarilo potpu-no i skladno pokriće direktora i kompanije, u klauzuli o istovetnosti forme mora da bude jasno naznačeno da će se slediti uslovi osnovnog osiguranja ali uz istovremeno da ostavi što manje prostora za eventualne razlike u po-krićima kako ne bi bilo praznina između različitih ni-voa osiguravajućeg pokrića. Konkretno, to je čest pro-blem kod suparničnih tužbi u SAD (Stempel, 2000, 16).

3.5. Položaj različitih osiguravača direktora i službenika tokom rešavanja suparničnih tužbi

Bitno je da osiguravači osiguranih direktora i kom-panija na jednoj strani, i oštećena lica sa druge strane u najvećoj mogućoj meri sarađuju prilikom kolektivne ili individualne isplate po osnovu suparnične tužbe, umesto da rade jedni protiv drugih. Opasnost opstruk-cije je, ipak, snažno prisutna uzimajući u obzir različite interese osiguravača direktora i službenika iz različitih nivoa osiguranja i činjenice da će kod suparničnih tužbi biti aktivirano nekoliko nivoa zaštite.

Kod pojedinačne ili suparnične tužbe, osnovni osi-guravač svakako isplaćuje celokupnu sumu osiguranja kada su odštetni zahtevi visoki. To može, takođe, da važi za osiguravače na prvim nivoima viška štete. U tom slučaju, oni neće imati jak interes za isplatom nadokna-de. Ali ako je ishod u pogledu odgovornosti neizvestan, oni će brže odlučiti da se upuste u parnicu (Squire, 2012, 3 i 14). Ako te parnice budu uspešne za njih, oni neće morati da isplate nadoknadu, dok će u slučaju do-suđene obaveze na nadoknadu morati da isplate sumu osiguranja ili njen veći deo.

Ostali osiguravači, sa druge strane, imaju snažan in-teres da isplate nadoknadu jer je moguće da oni neće imati obavezu da isplate svoj ugovoreni udeo uopšte ili će to biti u manjem iznosu od ukupnog udela u pokriću (Squire, 2012, 3, 17 i 26). Parnice osiguravačima stva-raju neizvesnost u pogledu njihovog položaja i, samim tim, rizika. Direktori i kompanija će takođe neretko imati (preveliki) interes u isplati suparnične tužbe. U slučaju isplate nadoknade, iznos koji treba da se plati ćesto će u celini ili pretežnom delu biti manji od sume osiguranja, što im omogućava da štetu ne moraju da plate sami.

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18 U svakom slučaju, osigurana naknada proizlazi iz jasnoće i jednoobrazne reakcije svih osiguravača iz pro-grama osiguranja direktora i službenika u odnosu na suparničnu tužbu. Problem suprotnih interesa u „kuli osiguranja” može posle svega da dovede do kašnjenja u isplati po osnovu suparnične tužbe i propasti pregovora o isplati nadoknade koji su imali dobre izglede na us-peh (Squire, 2012, 26).

Ovaj problem se može izbeći, ili u najmanju ruku ograničiti, ubacivanjem klauzule o sleđenju, takođe poznatoj i kao klauzula o sleđenju lidera ili klauzula o vodećem osiguravaču (Meyenburg, Stahl, 2006, 22). U tom slučaju, osnovni osiguravač je ovlašćen da kontro-liše odbranu od odštetnog zahteva tako da osiguravači viška štete moraju, po pravilu, da se povinuju odluka-ma osnovnog osiguravača u vezi sa odbranom od i / ili isplatom odštetnog zahteva. Takva jedna klauzula može da ima sledeći sadržaj: „Osiguravači iz ove polise obave-zuju se da slede sve odluke osiguravača iz osnovnih po-lisa.” Ili „Za sve odštetne zahteve, obaveštenja i isplate, mora se pribaviti saglasnost vodećih osiguravača.”

Pozadina klauzule o sleđenju je jedinstvo i usmera-vanje isplate odštetnog zahteva u interesu svih zainte-resovanih strana iz polise osiguranja. U osnovi, nema ugovornog odnosa između osnovnog osiguravača i osiguravača viška štete koji bi bio osnov za ugovorne obaveze između tih osiguravača. Ugovorna veza posto-ji samo između osiguranika i osiguravača – osnovnog osiguravača ili osiguravača viška štete na osnovu ugo-vora o osiguranju. Prema mišljenju autora, moraju se pretpostaviti, uzimajući u obzir faktički odnos između osnovnog osiguravača i osiguravača viška šteta, moguće ozbiljne posledice radnji osnovnog osiguravača po osiguravača viška štete ili njegov položaj, zbog toga što vanugovorna odgovornost leži na osnovnom osiguravaču (i osiguravaču viška šteta – prim. aut.) u kontekstu odštetnih zahteva koji premašuju ili će ver-ovatno premašiti sume osiguranja osnovnog pokrića. Osnovni osiguravač, prema mišljenju autora, ima ob-avezu savesnog i poštenog postupanja ne samo prema svom osiguraniku, već i prema osiguravačima viška šteta.7 Iako se na ovu tvrdnju mogu pronaći prigovo-ri u retkim precedentima i teoriji, takođe je prisut-no i drugo stanovište u precedentnom pravu SAD u vezi sa vansudskim poravnanjem i odlukama o ispla-ti, ali direktna obaveza savesnog postupanja osnov-

7 Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Country Mutual Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 1175, 1178 (7th Cir. 1994): „ogromna većina američkih precedenata opisuje obavezu koju prvi osiguravač ima prema osiguravaču viška šteta kao obavezu koja potiče od obaveze prvog osiguravača koju on ima prema osiguraniku.” Videti i: Anderson, Stanzler, Masters, 2002, 11–76.

nog osiguravača prema osiguravaču viška štete nije utvrđena.8

Takve direktne obaveze mogu se ubrzo pretposta-viti kod klauzule o sleđenju. Zahvaljujući ovoj klau-zuli, izričit pravni odnos nastaje između vodećeg osiguravača (osnovnog osiguravača) i osiguravača koji ga slede – osiguravači viška štete (Meyenburg, Stahl, 2006, 22). Ovaj odnos se može tumačiti kao si-tuacija koja nastaje na osnovu punomoći, odnosno odnosa zastupanja. Osnovni osiguravači primaju „pra-vo” da se brane i isplate odštetni zahtev takođe u ime osiguravača viška štete. Davanje ovlašćenja ipak ne znači da strana koja ima punomoć – vodeći osiguravač može da vrši svoja ovlašćenja na nekontrolisan način i bez dužne pažnje. Osnovni osiguravač ima obavezu, imajući u vidu principe savesnosti i poštenja prema osiguravačima viška štete, da postupa razumno i zato on mora imati u vidu interes osiguravača koji ga sle-de (lica koja su mu dala punomoć) prilikom donošenja odluka (Schwepcke, 2004, 63). Ako vodeći osiguravač / osnovni osiguravač ispunjava svoju obavezu dužne pažnje prema osiguravačima koji ga slede, osiguravač viška rizika, prema mišljenju autora, nema slobodu drugačijeg ponašanja od onog da i on mora da sledi nji-hove odluke.9

To, po pravilu, dovodi do adekvatnog zadovoljenja raznih interesa. Osiguranik i osiguravači viška šteta na višim tačkama u „kuli osiguranja” imaju glavnu reč kada se radi o rešavanju i prihvatanju predloga za ispla-tu odštetnog zahteva koji bi bio previsok sve dotle dok odštetni zahtev ne dopire do njihovog ugovora (Spier,

8 To se primenjuje u većini saveznih država SAD. – Federal Ins. Co. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co., 843 So.2d 142 (Ala. 2002) i U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 768 N.E.2d 288 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). Međutim, direktna obaveza prvog osiguravača je uvedena u, na primer, precedentima Schal Bovis, Inc. v. Casualty Ins. Co., 732 N.E.2d 1082 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999), St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., No. 91 Civ. 6151 (CMM) (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 1994) i Colonia Ins. Co. v. Assuranceforeningen Skuld, 588 So.2d 1009, 1010–11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) rev. den. 598 So.2d 75 (Fla. 1992). U većini saveznih država primenjuje se teorija subrogacije i isti rezultat može ponekad da se postigne na indirektan način. U tom slučaju, osiguravač viška štete se subrogira u prava osiguranika prema prvom osiguravaču. Ovo omogućava manje opcija od direktne obaveze postupanja u dobroj veri. Videti i: Anderson, Stanzler, Masters, 2002, 11–76.

9 To se takođe susreće u precedentnom pravu SAD. Većina sudova zauzela je stav da osiguravač viška štete, po pravilu, nema osnov za podizanje tužbe protiv prvog osiguravača ako je prvi osiguravač odbio da isplati nadoknadu zbog čega je osiguravač viška štete, umesto njega, morao da isplati nadoknadu. Tužba će biti uspešna jedino ako je prvi osiguravač nepotrebno izbegao da isplati nadoknadu zbog čega je došlo do presude na štetu koja premašuje sumu osiguranja osnovne polise osiguranja. – Fortman v. Safeco Ins. Co., 221 Cal. App. 3d 1394, 271 Cal. Rptr. 117 (2d Dist. 1990).

WIM WETERINGS

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19 2007, 331; Keeton, 1954, 1138). Kada taj aspekt nestane, osnovni osiguravač donosi odluku pri čemu mora da uzme u obzir interese ostalih osiguravača (obaveza sa-vesne isplate štete). Njega mogu tužiti drugi osiguravači zbog takvog ponašanja. Imajući u vidu da kršenje oba-veze dužne pažnje znači kršenje ugovora o zastupanju ili vanugovornoj odgovornosti, može se sankcionisati nadoknadom štete (štete zbog nesavesnog postupanja). Zato je velika mogućnost pokretanja sudskog postup-ka od strane osnovnog osiguravača ili odbacivanja ra-zumnih predloga za vansudsko poravnanje uklonjena, odnosno smanjena (Sykes, 1994, 77; Syverud, 1990, 1113 and 1127). To je još jasnije zbog činjenice da oba-veza savesnog i poštenog postupanja osnovnog osigura-vača, koja nastaje iz ekskluzivnog prava osiguravača da kontroliše odbranu i isplatu odštetnog zahteva, takođe podrazumeva da se osiguravačima koji slede moraju dostaviti dovoljne informacije i da se oni informišu o toku pregovora o isplati nadoknade i drugim važnim događajima – obaveza savesnog informisanja osigura-vača viška štete o pregovorima o isplati i nepovoljnim događajima (Lanzone, Ringel, 1982, 280–281). Obave-za dužne pažnje osnovnog osiguravača dovodi, prema mišljenje autora, do toga da osiguravači koji slede, ako se to želi, imaju pravo na konsultacije u vezi sa važnim odlukama i odlukama sa značajnim fi nansijskim po-sledicama – obaveza savesnosti prilikom odlučivanja o tome da li da se prihvati odštetni zahtev (Lanzone, Ringel, 1982, 280–281). Do raspravljanja ovog pitanja sigurno može da dođe kod suparničnih tužbi.

Međutim, klauzula o sleđenju ne postoji u svim pro-gramima osiguranja direktora i službenika sa nekoliko nivoa zaštite. Pored toga, moguće je da se koriste razli-čiti jezici, što može da dovede do nemogućnosti da se ostvari prethodno opisani cilj. Tekst odredbe mora biti sastavljen tako da onemogućava njegovo preširoko tu-mačenje a da istovremeno osiguravaču viška štete omo-gućava slobodu da postupa nezavisno. U vezi sa tim re-dovno dolazi do diskusija između brojnih osiguravača u praksi SAD, ali i u drugim državama.

Autor je stava da ako klauzula o sleđenju (ili neka slična) ne postoji u ugovoru, njena pravila svakako pro-izlaze iz obaveze savesnosti i poštenja osnovog osigura-vača i osiguravača viška štete da su (i) osiguravači dužni da prihvate opasan odštetni zahtev, i (ii) da osiguravači imaju obavezu da ispune svoju obavezu u „kuli” polisa osiguranja. To podrazumeva sa jedne strane da osnovni osiguravač ili drugi osiguravači ne smeju da dozvole da se parnice pokreću odmah ili naknadno ako protiv njih postoji rizična suparnična tužba (sa dobrim šansama na uspeh) i ako postoje dobri razlozi da se prvo istraži mo-gućnost vansudskog poravnanja. Na drugoj strani, to

znači da osiguravači viška štete ili drugi osiguravači ne smeju da izbegavaju isplatu svojih udela u nadoknadi štete ako je određena suma nadoknade razumna i zbog toga aktivirana njihova polisa osiguranja.

4. ZAKLJUČAK

Međunarodna praksa suparničnih tužbi pokazuje da su ove tužbe najviše usmerene na akcionarska društva i njihove direktore i službenike. Danas se akcionarska društva i njihovi direktori ne suočavaju samo sa od-štetnim zahtevima svojih akcionara, već i sa druigim ogromnim odštetnim zahtevima. Zbog toga pronalaže-nje načina kako da se takvi odštetni zahtevi rešavaju na efi kasan i efektivan način dobija na značaju. Odgova-rajuće osiguranje direktora i službenika obezbeđuje da se plati osnovan odštetni zahtev ili suparnični tužbeni zahtev akcionara i da tako ne samo da vrši zaštitu inte-resa privrednog društva, njegovih direktora i akcionara, već i obavlja jednu društvenu funkciju.

U zavisnosti od datog slučaja, zaštita koju pruža osi-guranje direktora i službenika može da se razlikuje. Do problema može da dođe, pored ostalog, prilikom raz-dvajanja sume osiguranja između privrednog društva, sa jedne strane, i direktora i službenika, sa druge strane. Problem se pokušava rešiti primenom klauzule o redo-sledu isplata, ali nažalost, ona ne pruža uvek idealno rešenje. Samostalna polisa osiguranja Odeljka A ili osi-guranje viška štete Odeljka A pruža bolju zaštitu.

Drugi problem tiče se činjenice da se visoki iznosi odštetnih zahteva postavljaju u suparničnim tužbama. Osiguranje direktora i službenika akcionarskih društa-va, po pravilu, se sastoji iz nekoliko nivoa osiguranja, te zato u slučaju suparnične tužbe osigurani direktori i ak-cionarsko društvo postavljaju odštetne zahteve prema nekoliko osiguravača. Ipak, brojni osiguravači mogu da pružaju različita pokrića. Pored toga, mogu da postoje različiti interesi kod osiguravača koji se mogu pojaviti u slučaju suparničnih tužbi. Ovi aspekti mogu da ote-žavaju efi kasno i efektivno upravljanje suparničnim tužbama i moraju se, uzimajući u obzir interese velikog broja stranaka i društva u adekvatnom osiguranju di-rektora i službenika, sprečiti što je moguće više. Klau-zula o istovetnosti forme, pod uslovom da je ispravno formulisana, i klauzula o vodećem osiguravaču mogu da pruže rešenje za ova pitanja. Obaveza postupanja na savestan i pošten način prvog osiguravača i osiguravača viška šteta ima takođe važnu ulogu.

Preveo: prof. dr Slobodan JOVANOVIĆe–mail: nsbob@sezampro.rs

Mogući sukobi interesa kod osiguranja direktora i službenika u slučaju suparnične tužbe akcionara

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Summary

Listed companies and their directors and offi cers run an increasing risk of becoming involved in a shareholders’ class action. Since class actions involve significant compensation amounts, it is of vital importance to all parties involved that the directors/offi cers and the company being sued have adequate Directors & Officers (D&O) insurance. Without suffi cient insurance, these directors and the company might have to bear compensation in whole or in part themselves. If they are incapable of doing so to one extent or another, which is usually the case in light of the extensive compensation amounts with class actions, the injured parties will receive nothing or incomplete compensation and the class action will not realise its goal. Th is also has a negative eff ect on the scope of liability law. D&O insurance is therefore relevant for both the parties involved in the collective action and for society. Nonetheless, confl icts of interest can arise between the company and the directors being sued in respect of the cover if they are underinsured. In addition, confl icts of interest between the various D&O insurers could also arise which can negatively aff ect both the insurance cover and the settlement of a promising class action. D&O insurance must be set up in such a way – given the various interests and in light of the goals of a collective action and liability law – that these potential confl icts of interest are prevented as much as possible. Th e fi rst confl ict of interest between the company and directors can be restricted through the inclusion of either an allocation clause or an order of payment clause. In addition, a choice can be made to make a (greater) division between the Side A and Side C coverage within the D&O insurance policy or to take out a separate Side A policy altogether. Th e potential eff ects of the confl icting interests between the various D&O insurers involved with regard to the cover and

the claim settlement can be mitigated by incorporating a properly defi ned follow form clause and an adequate leading underwriter clause. In that context, but also independently thereof, in my opinion a direct duty of good faith and fair dealing of the primary insurer(s) toward excess insurers (and also a duty of care of excess insurers) should be adopted.

Key words: Directors & Offi cers insurance, class action, shareholders claims, Side A–coverage, Side C–coverage, follow form clause, leading underwriter clause, direct duty of good faith of primary insurer.

LITERATURA (REFERENCES)

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Black, B., Cheffi ns, B., Klausner, M. (2005). Liability Risk for outside directors: a cross–border analysis, European Financial Management, 11(2), 153–171.

Wim WETERINGS, PhDAssistant Professor, Faculty of Law, TilburgAttorney at Law, Dirkzwager Advocaten & Notarissen N.V., Arnhem

Possible confl icts of interest with D&O insurance in event of shareholders’ class actions

UDC: 368.6:347.72 Systematic scientifi c work

ARTICLES

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Possible confl icts of interest with D&O insurance in event of shareholders’ class actions

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WIM WETERINGS

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Van Abeelen, D., Weterings, W. (2013). De rol van de D&O–verzekering bij collectieve acties door aandeelhouders, Tijdschrift voor Ondernemingsbestuur [Journal of Corporate Governance], 5(2), 31–43.

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Weterings, W. (2012). Directors’ & Offi cers’ liability, D&O Insurance and moral hazard: more control of moral hazard by D&O insurers needed to increase the incentives of directors and supervisory board members, SSRN working paper: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2153129.

Weterings, W. (2010). De aansprakelijkheidsverzekering voor bestuurders en commissarissen in de (verzekerings)praktijk [Liability insurance for directors and officers in (insurance)practice], Verzekerings–Archief [Journal of Insurance Sciences], 88(4), 161–171.

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Abstract

Listed companies and their directors and offi cers run an increasing risk of becoming involved in a shareholders’ class action. Since class actions involve significant compensation amounts, it is of vital importance to all parties involved and society (seen the goals of a collective action and of liability law) that the directors/offi cers and the company being sued have adequate Directors & Offi cers (D&O) insurance. Nonetheless, confl icts of interest can arise between the company and the directors being sued in respect of the cover. In addition, confl icts of interest between the various D&O insurers could also arise. D&O insurance must be set up in such a way that these potential confl icts of interest are prevented as much as possible. Th e fi rst confl ict of interest can be restricted through the inclusion of either an allocation clause or an order of payment clause. In addition, a choice can be made to make a (greater) division between the Side A and Side C coverage within the D&O insurance policy or to take out a separate Side A policy altogether. Th e potential eff ects of the confl icting interests between the various D&O insurers involved can be mitigated by incorporating a properly defi ned follow form clause and an adequate leading underwriter clause. In that context, but also independently thereof a direct duty of good faith and fair dealing of the primary insurer(s) toward excess insurers should be adopted.

Key words: Directors & Offi cers insurance, class action, shareholders claims, Side A–coverage, Side C–coverage, follow form clause, leading underwriter clause, direct duty of good faith of primary insurer.

1. INTRODUCTION

Large–scale loss and the collective settlement thereof have received a lot of attention in legal literature in the past few years. Mass tort claims invariably concerns large numbers of parties incurring a loss that are involved in the settlement of a dispute with a single person or entity responsible for the loss or a limited group thereof, which dispute forms the basis of the same or similar factual and legal liability or other questions (Campos, 2012, 1065; Nagareda, 2008, xii; Cashman, 2007, 1; Hensler, 2000, 3; Hensler, 1993, 966). Large–scale loss is frequently collectively settled instead of via individual proceedings. Legal practice shows that the number of class actions has increased. Th e fi nancial sector in particular is where the instrument of the class action is increasingly being brought to bear against listed companies. In the process, the claimed compensation amounts as well as the actual settlement amounts for class actions against listed companies in North America and Europe are (very) high.

For instance, in the Cornerstone survey from 1996–2010 the average settlement amount for class actions in the United States amounted to USD 40  million (Cornerstone Research, 2011a, 2); average amounts of USD 45 million and USD 48 million followed from other surveys (Baker, Griffi th, 2010, 22 respectively Klausner, Hegland, 2010, 1). Each year from 2000 to 2009 saw an average of 1 in 15 companies from the S&P 500 index as a defendant / respondent in a class action (Cornerstone Research, 2011b, 12). Th e ratio in1 the fi nancial sector was even more pronounced at 1 in 8.5 companies. Developments in respect of class actions against listed companies can also be seen in Europe. For instance, in the Netherlands, at least 13 class actions were initiated in the past few years against companies that had been listed on the Dutch stock market (which lists 75 companies), whereby the settlement amounts varied roughly between EUR1  million and EUR1 billion (Van Abeelen, Weterings, 2013, 35).

Wim WETERINGS

Possible confl icts of interest with D&O insurance in event of shareholders’ class actions

UDC: 368.6:347.72Received: 11.8.2013.Accepted: 17.9.2013. Systematic scientifi c work

Assistant Professor, Tilburg University, Faculty of Law, Tilburg, and attorney at law, Dirkzwager Advocaten & Notarissen N.V., Arnhem, e–mail: wim.weterings@uvt.nl / weterings@dirkzwager.nl.

ARTICLES

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In short, the risk is high for listed companies of becoming involved in a security or other class action. In these cases, it concerns very high levels of compensation or settlement amounts. Th e focus of shareholders’ class actions is oft en aimed at, aside from the listed company, holding the directors personally liable. Individual directors and supervisory board members are confronted more oft en than before with a class action; consequently, fi nding protection against this liability risk is gaining importance.1

In light of the extensive compensation amounts, it is of vital importance to all parties involved that the directors and the company being sued have adequate D&O (Directors & Offi cers) liability insurance. Without insurance or suffi cient insurance, the directors and company being sued might have to bear compensation (in whole or in part) themselves. If they are unable to do so, which is oft en the case given the amounts being sued for, the class action will not realise its goal. Th is also has a negative eff ect on the scope of liability law. All parties involved in a class action have an interest in an adequate D&O insurance policy, but a confl ict of interest can arise between the company and the directors being sued. In addition, confl icts of interest between the various D&O insurers involved could also arise which can negatively aff ect both the insurance cover and the settlement of a promising class action. A D&O insurance policy must be set up in such a way – in the interest of not only the parties involved but also society – that these potential confl icts of interest are prevented as much as possible.

Th e interest and the role of adequate D&O insurance in the event of shareholders’ class actions is fi rst discussed in greater detail below (§ 2). Th en the cover under the D&O insurance policy is addressed before the possible confl ict of interest between (i) the company and its directors and (ii) the various D&O insurers is described in greater detail (§ 3). Possible solutions will be discussed, such as the limitation of the fi rst possible confl ict through the inclusion of an allocation clause or an order of payment clause, or the addition of a (greater) division between the Side A and Side C coverage. It is also argued that a better connection can be created between the cover of the various D&O insurers by implementing a properly defi ned follow form clause. Further, it will be set out that the potential eff ects of the confl icts of interests between the various D&O insurers in the settlement of (promising) class actions can be mitigated through the inclusion of an adequate leading

1 In the United States, a shareholders’ class action has been the most frequently occurring claim against a listed company and its directors for years already (Towers Watson, 2011, 19; Baker, Griffi th, 2010, 21).

underwriter clause and, independently thereof, the adoption of a direct duty of good faith and fair dealing of the primary insurer(s) toward excess insurers (and also a duty of care of excess insurers). I conclude section 4 with a short summary.

2. D&O INSURANCE AND SHAREHOLDERS’ CLASS ACTIONS

2.1 Connection D&O insurance and shareholders’ class actions

The collective settlement of large–scale loss is preferential to individual settlement(s) for all parties involved. The economic benefits, associated with the proceedings or not, of bringing a class action are evident. For the parties being sued and their insurers, it is benefi cial that only one set of proceedings has to be followed instead of multiple lawsuits, which has a benefi cial eff ect on the defence costs (Hensler, 2000, 121; Rosenberg, 1987, 571). Another important advantage for these parties is that in a collective settlement they have more security regarding the number of claims and the scope thereof and, consequently, their compensation obligations vis–à–vis the injured parties. It also prevents them from being confronted with confl icting or inconsistent rulings. For injured parties, it is benefi cial that they receive compensation in the short or shorter term without every party needing to conduct expensive, time–consuming, burdensome and uncertain proceedings (Bone, 2012, 69–70).

Collective settlement promotes the unity of law and reduces furthermore the gap between the so–called repeat player and the individual injured party in respect of the importance of winning the proceedings, the know-how and the fi nancing (Bone, 2012, 69; Rosenberg, 2000, 393; Hensler, 2000, 4). Th e preventive eff ect of the class action can also be mentioned as a important side eff ect (Bone, 2012, 71; Scherer, 2012, 27 et seq). Th e existence of the instrument of the class action can have a deterring eff ect as a result of which potential violators of standards are encouraged to comply with the regulations and a class action is ultimately no longer necessary (more on this in § 2.2).

Nonetheless, a fi nancial shareholders’ class action can only in fact be settled collectively or individually if the director and/or company being sued can bear possible compensation (on the basis of a settlement or not). Given the high amounts involved in a class action, directors will oft en not be able to meet all or a large portion of these costs themselves. Th e same holds true for the company, or compensation to be paid will have a (strongly) negative eff ect on the fi nancial

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Possible confl icts of interest with D&O insurance in event of shareholders’ class actions

position of the company. Th at certainly holds true for young companies (Bondt, 2010, 621). For this reason, the presence of a liability insurance policy is of vital importance for the success and eff ectiveness of a class action and collective settlement.

2.2 Importance of D&O insurance in event of a class action

In light of the risk of possible personal liability and exposure of their private assets, directors and supervisory board members of a listed company automatically have a major interest in a D&O insurance policy. Most listed companies take out such insurance for their directors and offi cers (Baker, Griffi th, 2010, 44).

In a shareholders’ class action, the D&O insurance policy will also be the only resort for the company involved (Katz, 1996, 31). In such cases, a Commercial General Liability Insurance (GCL) policy oft en fails to provide any solace since cover is ‘only’ off ered for (liability for) bodily injury and property damage (Kalis, Reiter, Segerdahl, 2013; Maniloff , 2012). Shareholders’ claims, however, concern purely pecuniary loss. Th ere is no standard cover for the company’s liability under the D&O insurance, but the policy can be expanded, so that cover for the company is also included (more on this in § 3.1).

Furthermore, a D&O insurance policy with adequate cover can be a good way for a listed company to be able to attract and keep good and experienced directors and officers who will critically follow the recent developments regarding shareholders’ class actions – the company’s indirect interest (Kalis, Reiter, Segerdahl, 2013, 11; Baker, Griffi th, 2007, 502; Black, Cheffi ns, Klausner, 2006, 1140; Parr, 2004, 13). In addition, a D&O insurance policy prevents the fear of liability and class action from causing directors to act excessively cautiously and not to take enough entrepreneurial risks, where running a business in fact assumes taking acceptable risks in the interest of the shareholders and other stakeholders (Baker, Griffi th, 2010, 57; Black, Cheffi ns, Klausner, 2005, 169).

Shareholders too have a major interest in D&O insurance. In that way they are, aft er all, assured that in the event of a class action, compensation will take place without the value of their shares being negatively aff ected at all or too much by the compensation to be paid.

D&O insurance is not only important for the directors, shareholders and the company concerned, but it also has a societal relevance. Th e presence of D&O insurance ensures that there are solvent, liable parties in

the event directors (and offi cers) and/or the company are held liable vis–à–vis shareholders.2 Th ese improved means of recovery have a positive eff ect on both the compensatory and preventive functions of liability law (Hensler, 2000, 121–122; Rosenberg, 1987, 563–566). In class actions, the compensatory function plays an important role, as on the one hand liability claims are bundled to ensure that effi cient settlement takes place and access to liability law (or other law) is increased, while on the other hand the total amount sued for is oft en signifi cant to very extensive (Hensler, 2000, p. 3–4). Th at compensatory function can, however, only be properly fulfi lled if there is suffi cient insurance cover.

Th e idea behind the preventive function of liability law is that directors and companies, out of fear of liability and the obligation to pay compensation to their shareholders, are encouraged to act carefully and to prevent loss for the shareholders (Griffi th, 2012, 337; Shavell, 2004, 268 et seq). However, if a director and/or company do not have suffi cient assets to be able to pay the compensation, which in particular cannot be ruled out in shareholders’ class actions, the deterring eff ect of liability law will not be robust enough. Since the relevant party cannot pay anyway, the right behaviour incentives are not given (judgment proof problem). Th e lack of a deterring eff ect becomes even greater if shareholders waive the right to a claim in advance due to insuffi cient assets on the part of the directors and the company. In the event of a D&O insurance policy, it will be possible for directors and companies to be held liable more oft en in appropriate circumstances and the incentives to act carefully are stronger then. On the other hand, there are also fewer stimuli to act with due care due to the presence of the D&O insurance policy, since the directors or companies no longer have to bear the loss themselves in whole or in part (Shavell, 2005, 63–77, Parsons, 2003, 448–471, Dionne, 2000, 153 et seq., Baker, 1996, 267 et seq., and Pauly, 1968, 531–537). Nonetheless, insurers are taking measures to retain as much of those incentives from liability law as possible, amongst others a maximum insured sum, exclusions, deductibles, scope of the premium, monitoring behaviour, etc (Weterings, 2012).

Finally, a proper D&O insurance policy will have a positive eff ect on the goals of class actions: (i) effi ciently and eff ectively settling class actions out of court, whereby injured parties receive reasonable compensation; (ii)

2 In the United States (where relatively speaking many more internal liability claims occur), it has even emerged in the literature that for that reason a D&O insurance policy is more in the interest of the legal entity/shareholders than in the interest of the director for whom the D&O insurance policy was taken out by the company (Boyer, 2005; Gutiérrez, 2003; Romano, 1991).

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26 avoiding many individual lawsuits pertaining to the same issue; and (iii) increasing access to the law.

3. POSSIBLE OPPOSITE INTERESTS OF PARTIES REGARDING TO COVERAGE

3.1. D&O insurance cover

A D&O insurance policy initially covers claims against a director or supervisory board member for the purpose of compensating loss caused by his/her acts or omissions in his/her capacity of director or supervisory board member (Kalis, Reiter, Segerdahl, 2011, 9, 11, 12). Th is could relate to a claim against the director by the company where the director is or was working: internal liability. Th ere is also cover for claims of third parties, such as a receiver, a client or a competitor – external liability (Weterings, 2012). Shareholders’ claims – given the ample cover for both internal and external directors’ or other liability – will also be covered in the event of either an individual action or a class action. Both the compensation to be paid that could ensue from such claims and the defence costs against claims are covered (Kalis, Reiter, Segerdahl, 2011, 11–25 et seq; Baker, Griffi th, 2007, 500).

Th e cover for directors and offi cers, related to the risk of personal liability for acts of management, is referred to as Side A coverage. In addition, Side B coverage also generally exists, which is also known as corporate reimbursement cover (Kalis, Reiter, Segerdahl, 2011, 11–4 and 11–9; Baker, Griffi th, 2007, 46–47 and 499; Mathias, 2006, 6–18). Most listed companies have issued an indemnification to their directors and offi cers and on the basis thereof assume the liability risk of the director/offi cer as well as the compensation and defence costs possibly associated therewith. For a Side B coverage, a company that – on the basis of an issued indemnifi cation – must, in the event of a liability claim vis–à–vis a director, bear the defence costs and/or the compensation can have these costs covered by the D&O insurance policy (O’Leary, 2007, 37).

In most D&O insurance policies, both Side A and Side B are covered as standard. Further, the option exists of expanding the D&O insurance with Side C coverage (Griffi th, 2012, 339; Mathias 2006, 6–20). Th is corporate entity cover protects the company against claims that are brought directly against the company itself (Baker, Griffi th, 2010, 47–48; Baker, Griffi th, 2007, 499; Philips, 2007, 698). Th e coverage is oft en limited to so–called securities claims, mostly defi ned as claims by securities holder of the corporate policyholder (Kalis, Reiter, Segerdahl, 2011, 11–10).

Th is Side C coverage (and the scope thereof) is important for nationally and internationally listed companies for the purpose of ensuring they are able to protect themselves against the risk of shareholders’ class action claims. Moreover, in the event the Side C coverage is absent or insuffi cient, that is detrimental to the shareholders. Th e company being sued will in that case have to pay the claims in whole or in part out of „its own pocket” – which negatively aff ects the company’s assets, possibly in a signifi cant manner. Ultimately, that can or will have an impact on the functioning and the value of the company (share value). Th is could result in the shareholders, as it were, bearing their own loss in whole or in part. In addition, a decline in corporate assets could also aff ect other stakeholders, such as creditors and employees. If viewed in this light, a D&O insurance policy with Side C coverage is desirable for every listed company.

3.2 Protection of directors versus protection of company

While a D&O insurance policy regularly provides three types of protection, only Side A coverage protects the director. A major disadvantage of also protecting the company against liability (Side C) is that a major claim against the company can reduce or even exhaust the insured sum, as a result of which the directors become underinsured or end up having no cover at all if they are then confronted with another claim in the same insurance year. It can also occur that the shareholders file claims vis–à–vis both the company and the directors, but that the insured sum is insuffi cient to make a payment on behalf of both the company and the directors, or is entirely insuffi cient to provide cover for one of the insured parties in a class action (Bordon, 1998, 170). Class actions often involve extensive amounts (many dozens or hundreds of  millions of dollars/euros) and this is a realistic scenario. Th is is even more the case since the insured sum is used to pay for the defence costs fi rst, and the lawyer’s fees for class actions are (very) high to begin with (Eisenberg, 2004, 51–54; Alexander, 1991, 511–512). In that case, the various insured parties – the company and the directors – have confl icting interests in respect of the division of the insured sum or what remains thereof.

It is for that reason that allocation clauses and/or order of payment clauses are incorporated into the D&O insurance policy. In the event of an order of payment clause (also called a priority of payment clause), the directors must be paid fi rst (Mathias, 2006, 6–14). Most D&O insurance policies contain such a clause. Th at will only have an eff ect, however, if claims

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27 against the directors and the company are running concurrently. Otherwise, the principle of “fi rst come, fi rst served“ will be in eff ect, as is the case in the event such a clause is absent from the policy. Moreover, whereas this clause can be advantageous to the insured director(s), the disadvantage to the insured company is that it could be left partially or wholly out to dry in the event of a shareholders’ class action. In spite of the insurance taken out against shareholders’ claims (Side C), the company might be forced aft er all to bear all or part of the compensation and the defence costs itself, which will negatively aff ect its share value.

For an allocation clause, the insureds must endeavour as much as possible to arrive at an honest and appropriate division of the insured sum (payment and defence costs), if it is insuffi cient in satisfying every insured party (Ostrager, Newman 2010, 1531; Ferrara, 2005, 13–29; Bordon, 1998, 170).3 Whereas the pain is then shared by the various insured parties, each one is then confronted with underinsurance.

In such an event, these clauses attempt to properly regulate the problem of division in the event of underinsurance under the D&O insurance policy (with a combined Side A–B–C coverage). It appears more desirable, however, to separate the Side A and Side C coverage and to strive to prevent underinsurance as much possible. At some point, D&O insurance was introduced with only Side A coverage for the purpose of off ering directors and offi cers protection against the risk of personal liability. Th e insurance is called “Directors’ and Offi cers’ Liability Insurance” for good reason. Th e protection of the company was added later to the cover provided by the D&O insurance policy (Side B and Side C). Th at is another type of coverage, for another insured party, for other situations. Th at is why it is preferable to make a division between the cover of the director – for whom the D&O insurance was originally intended – and the cover of the company against shareholders’ claims – against which risk it is diffi cult to obtain protection beyond the D&O insurance policy (O’Leary, 2007, 36).

3.3 Division of Side A and Side C coverage

A choice can be made to make that division within the D&O insurance. Th is can be done by including separate sub–limits. In that case, separate insured sums

3 Incidentally, an allocation clause oft en concerns a division of insured and uninsured amounts between, for instance, the insured director and the uninsured company (because shareholders’ claims are not covered on the basis of Side  C). Th ere are, however, also clauses that relate to the division of insured amounts.

are in eff ect for both the Side A and Side C coverage. Whereas that is the simplest solution, there is a chance that the cover for the directors will be temporarily or permanently aff ected by claims against the company (or vice versa). Th is can be the case in the event of an insolvency of the company, for instance, because either the receiver cancels the entire D&O insurance policy or the receiver and/or creditors believe that the D&O insurance policy is part of the assets of the company, whether it is insolvent or not. Furthermore, claiming exclusion [of liability] in connection with acts of the company, such as a failure to disclose information, can aff ect the entire policy and, consequently, the Side A coverage too.

It is preferable to opt for separate insurance policies for Side A on the one hand and Side C (and Side B) on the other hand. In some cases, D&O insurers off er a separate D&O insurance policy with only Side A insurance (stand-alone Side A coverage) for the personal liability of directors. In other case, there is a regular D&O insurance policy (with Side A, B and C coverage), whereby an excess cover is used for the Side A portion (Kalis, Reiter, Segerdahl, 2013, 11–41; Philips, 2007, 720). Th is excess cover is called on as soon as the cover limits have been reached for the primary cover under the D&O insurance policy. In that case, that excess coverage is there only for the directors (Rossi, 2005, 7). In both situations, there can be broader policy conditions under the Side A coverage than is usually possible for a D&O insurance policy (with A–B–C coverage), such as a broader description of loss, a more limited exclusion for acts of other insured parties and exclusions which have no eff ect on defence costs.

It is evident from a survey conducted in the US by insurance broker Willis that roughly 55%–60% of the companies from the Fortune 100 and 35%–40% of the companies from the Fortune 500 have some form of separate Side A coverage (Willis, 2004).4 In most cases it concerns an A–B–C insurance policy with a supplemental excess Side A coverage. What is striking about these results is that in the period of the survey (2002–2003) the settlement amounts resulting from shareholders’ class actions were the highest, and upon renewal of the insurance policy many listed companies opted for a broader Side A coverage (excess cover). All this was confi rmed in a survey by Towers Watson, a risk management consultancy fi rm (Towers Watson, 2008, 15, 16 and 18). From this survey it emerged that 41% of the public limited companies in 2008 had a separate Side A coverage and that this applied to 80% of the large cap businesses. In 2011 those fi gures came in at 78% and 78%, respectively (Towers Watson, 2011, 16–17).

4 Th ese results were confi rmed in the 2007 survey.

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28 Th is is oft en diff erent in Europe, where it is common to have a traditional, combined A–B–C coverage without a separate Side A coverage. In exceptional instances, the latter is the case though, and then it concerns an excess Side A coverage. Th e expectation is, however, that in the event class actions increase, demand will increase for a separate Side A coverage or an excess Side A coverage given that this provides directors and offi cers with the best protection against underinsurance (due to the exhaustion of the insurance limits by the company). In that case it will also be easier for listed companies to attract directors and offi cers and they will be less encouraged to act excessively cautiously. In addition, it will also give the listed company the best protection against liability if they have a separate Side C insurance policy, at least a separate (stand–alone) Side A insurance policy, as a result of which the Side C coverage is burdened less quickly and less heavily.

Generally speaking, the company is the policyholder. It enters into an insurance contract with the D&O insurer. The company, however, is represented by the (board of) director(s), which is in fact the party that takes out the D&O insurance. If D&O insurance is taken out without Side C coverage as well and/or without separate Side A / Side C, the shareholders will possibly argue that the director has not acted in the interest of the company and its stakeholders, which can be a separate or related ground for directors’ liability. Consequently, for a director of a listed company, where a signifi cant risk of a shareholders’ class action is present, it is pertinent to make arrangements for both suffi cient Side A coverage and suffi cient Side C coverage. Since that interest has increased in the past few years and will strongly increase in the future, the expectation is that this will also activate and change the European D&O insurance market. In that context, the director must ensure that the confl icting interests of the company and the directors in the insurance package are in balance and that suffi cient cover is present for both the directors and the company. A role for the insurance broker could also be laid away here. Engaged by the director, the broker might nonetheless encounter the problem that it must make (confl icting) recommendations concerning the cover to both the company and the directors. Brokers must therefore perform their work with due care when advising on the insurance structure and the insured sums, for the purpose of avoiding being held liable.

3.4 Possibility of no matching covers of diff erent D&O insurers

If a D&O insurance policy is relied upon by listed companies and/or their directors due to class actions

– and therefore in connection with high claims – a confl ict of interest can arise between the various D&O insurers. D&O insurance policies with high insured sums generally involve several insurers. Th e larger listed companies in Europe oft en have a coverage between EUR 100 million and EUR 200 million, while the smaller listed companies have a coverage starting at EUR 50  million (Weterings, 2010, 166). Insurers, however, have a maximum capacity that is usually below this. Th ere is oft en a maximum capacity of EUR 10  million, EUR 15  million or 25  million (and on exception EUR 50  million).5 Since a listed company usually needs and desires to have a higher insured amount (for instance EUR100  million), the insured sum must be shared amongst the diff erent insurers.

Th at can take place in a variety of ways. In the event of coinsurance, the insured amount is divided horizontally. There is one insurance policy with a single insured sum, whereby different insurers assume the defence costs and possible compensation in proportion to their share of the insurance. Mostly, however, the insured amount is divided vertically for a D&O insurance policy. In that case, the D&O insurance policy consists of a „tower” with many layers of insurance policies and insured sums (Baker, Griffi th, 2010, 53). Th e insurer(s) on the fi rst layer (the primary insurer) must be fi rst to provide cover for defence costs and possible compensation (Anderson, Stanzler, Masters 2002, 13–16). Th e layers above this are excess insurance policies (Stempel, 2005, 2–92 and 2–93). It is only when the insured amount under a layer has been exhausted that the insurance policy at the next level can be called upon to pay for the excess (Richmond, 2000, 29 et seq.)6

Th is should then prevent the various insurers from taking a diff erent position in respect of the cover, as well as the settlement of the claim. Th at chance exists in the event of a class action given that several layers will oft en be called upon in that case (Baker, Griffi th, 2010, 145–147). Deviating positions of the insurers concerned could frustrate an effi cient and eff ective settlement of a class action. A follow form clause can be used to ensure that there is no substantive diff erence between the conditions of the primary insurance policies and those of the excess insurance policies (Anderson, Stanzler, Masters, 2002, 13–29). Most D&O insurance packages contain such a clause in the excess insurance policies

5 Th is is also the case for American D&O insurers (Griffi th, 2012, 340, Anderson, Stanzler, Masters, 2002, 13–19).

6 Incidentally, various insurers can be involved in an insurance layer, so that a horizontal division (coinsurance) exists within that level (Anderson, Stanzler, Masters, 2002, 13–19).

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29 (Stempel, 2005, 2–92 and 2–93). A follow form clause can, for instance, read as follows:

“Th is Policy is subject to the same terms, defi nitions, exclusions and conditions (except as regards the premium, the amount and Limits of Liability and except as otherwise provided herein) as are contained in or as may be added to the Underlying Policies prior to the happening of an occurrence for which claim is made hereunder.”If a clause has not been incorporated at all or

properly, all kinds of problems can arise which will result in insuffi cient or deviating covers. Specifi cally, it regularly occurs that the policy conditions of an excess insurer deviate and, for instance, the excess insurance policy contains supplemental and/or special conditions that are not included in the conditions of the primary insurance policy or an underlying excess insurance policy, such as an exclusion of cover, an arbitration clause, a choice-of-law or another clause, or a stricter notifi cation period (Stempel, 2005, 2–93). Another problem is that possibly not every excess insurer must adhere to the conditions of the primary insurer, but rather to those of an excess insurer from a layer below, or that uncertainty exists as to which insurer must be followed. It is also possible that it can be derived from the text of the follow form clause that the insurer with the narrowest cover must be followed. Th e following is an example of such a clause:

“Th e insurer will provide the insured coverage in accordance with the same terms and conditions of the primary policy and any more restrictive terms and conditions of any other underlying policy, except as otherwise provided herein.”In order to avoid such problems and to realise

complete and matching cover for the directors and the company, a follow form clause must therefore clearly indicate that the conditions of the primary insurer will be followed and must leave as little room as possible for deviating covers, so that there is no gap between the various layers. Specifi cally, this is a frequently occurring problem in class actions in the United States (Stempel, 2000, 16).

3.5 Position of diff erent D&O insurers during settlement of class actions

It is also relevant for the insured directors and the company on the one hand and the injured parties on the other hand that in the collective or individual settlement of a fi nancial class action the various insurers work together as much as possible instead of against each other. Th e risk of obstruction is, however, strongly present given the diff ering interests of the D&O insurers

at the various layers and the fact that in class actions several insurance layers will be called upon.

In the event of an individual or class action, the primary insurer will lose its entire insured sum anyway when high levels of compensation have been claimed. Th is might apply to the insurers on the fi rst excess layers as well. In that case, they will not have a strong interest in a settlement. But if the outcome is uncertain in respect of liability, they will be sooner inclined to go to court (Squire, 2012, 3 and 14). If those proceedings are successful, they need not pay out, whereas in the case of a settlement they will have to cough up the insured sum or a large portion thereof.

Th e other insurers, on the other hand, have a strong interest in a settlement given that in that case their insured sum is not called upon at all or only in part (Squire, 2012, 3, 17 and 26). Proceedings generate uncertainty for them regarding their position and, consequently, a risk. Th e directors and the company will also oft en have (too great of) an interest in a settlement of a class action. In the event of a settlement, the amount to be paid will oft en wholly or largely come in below the insured sum, which prevents them from having to pay compensation themselves.

In any case, the insured benefi t from clarity and a unifi ed response from all insurers within the D&O insurance package as a result of an announced class action. Th e deviating interest problem within the ‘insurance tower’ can, aft er all, produce delays in the settlement of a (promising) class action and even result in the breakdown of settlement negotiations that had good prospects (Squire, 2012, 26).

Th is problem can be avoided, or at least limited, through the inclusion of a to follow clause, also called the follow the leader clause or Leading Underwriter Clause (Meyenburg, Stahl, 2006, 22). In that case the primary insurer is authorized to control the defence of claims, so that the excess insurers must, in principle, follow the decisions of the primary insurer in respect of the defence against and/or the settlement of the claim. Such a clause can have the following contents:

“The underwriters of this policy shall bind themselves to follow any decision taken bythe underwriters of the Underlying policies.”

or

“All claims, advices and settlements to be agreed by the Leading Underwriters.”

Th e background of the follow clause is unity in and streamlining of the settlement of a claim in the interest of all parties involved in the policy. Basically, there is no contractual relationship between a primary insurer

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30 and an excess insurer that gives rise to contractual obligations between these insurers. There are contractual obligations only between the insured and the insurer – the primary or the excess insurer – created by the insurance contract. In my opinion, it must be assumed – given the factual relationship between primary and excess insurers and the possible major consequences of the acts of a primary insurer for an excess insurer or the position thereof – that direct, non–contractual duties lie with primary insurers (and excess insurers) in the context of claims that exceed primary limits or are likely to do so. Th e primary insurer owes, in my opinion, a duty of good faith and fair dealing not only to its insured but also to excess insurers.7 Whereas that is argued in the sparse case law and literature, another viewpoint is also regularly assumed, certainly in US case law, in respect of settlement negotiations and settlement decisions; unfortunately no direct duty of good faith is seen from primary insurers toward excess insurers.8

Such direct duties can sooner be assumed in the event of to follow clause. Th anks to this clause, an explicit legal relationship arises between the leading/primary insurer and the following/excess insurers (Meyenburg, Stahl, 2006, 22). It can be viewed as a situation in which a power of attorney exists, an agency relationship as it were. Th e primary insurer receives a “right” to defend and to settle the claim also on behalf of the excess insurer(s). Granting a power of attorney does not yet mean, however, that the party having a power of attorney – the leading insurer – can exercise its powers in an uncontrolled manner and without due care. Th e primary insurer has – given his duty

7 Cf. in respect of the United States, for instance, Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Country Mutual Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 1175, 1178 (7th Cir. 1994): “overwhelming majority of American cases describe the duty that a primary insurer owes an excess insurer as one derivative from the primary insurer’s duty to the insured.” See also: Anderson, Stanzler, Masters, 2002, 11–76.

8 Th at applies in most states in the US. See, for instance, Federal Ins. Co. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co., 843 So. 2d 142 (Ala. 2002) and U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 768 N.E.2d 288 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) . However, a direct duty was imposed on the primary insurer in, for instance, Schal Bovis, Inc. v. Casualty Ins. Co., 732 N.E.2d 1082 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999), St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., No. 91 Civ. 6151 (CMM) (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 1994), and Colonia Ins. Co. v. Assuranceforeningen Skuld, 588 So.2d 1009, 1010–11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) rev. den. 598 So.2d 75 (Fla. 1992). In most states, the doctrine of equitable subrogation is in fact applied and the same result can sometimes be achieved via a circuitous route. In that case, the excess insurer is subrogated to the rights of the insured against the primary insurer. Th is provides fewer options than a direct duty of good faith. See Anderson, Stanzler, Masters, 2002, 11–76.

of good faith and fair dealing to also excess insurers – to act reasonably and for that reason must take the interest of the following insurers (the parties issuing the authorisation) into consideration when making decisions (Schwepcke, 2004, 63). If the leading/primary insurer complies with its duty of care toward the followers, the following excedent insurer does not have, in my opinion, any freedom of movement and must simply follow.9

Th at results, in principle, in a proper consideration of the various interests. Th e insured and the excess insurers higher in the ‘insurance tower’ have, aft er all, a major incentive to settle and to accept a settlement proposal that might be too high, as long as it does not affect them (Spier, 2007, 331; Keeton, 1954, 1138). Whereas that aspect disappears when the primary insurer makes the decision, it must take into consideration the interests of the other insurers (duty of good faith to settle) and it can be sued by the other insurers upon a violation thereof. Since the violation of the duty of care results in a breach of contract of agency or a tort, it can be sanctioned with compensation (damages for bad faith liability). As a result, the strong incentive for the primary insurer to initiate proceedings, or at least to reject reasonable settlement proposals, is removed/mitigated (Sykes, 1994, 77; Syverud, 1990, 1113 and 1127). Th is is even more the case because the duty of good faith and fair dealing of the primary insurer, which arises from the insurer’s exclusive right to control the defence and settlement of claims, also entails that the following insurers must be furnished with suffi cient information and that the following insurers are kept abreast of the course of the settlement negotiations and other important developments: the duty of good faith to keep the excess carrier informed of settlement negotiations and adverse developments (Lanzone, Ringel, 1982, 280–281). Th e duty of care of the primary insurer(s) results, in my opinion, in the fact that the following insurers, if desirable, have a right to consultation regarding fundamental decisions and decisions with signifi cant fi nancial implications: the duty of good faith in deciding whether to settle (Lanzone, Ringel, 1982, 280–281). Th is could defi nitely come up for discussion in class actions.

However, a to follow clause is not contained in all D&O insurance packages with several layers. Further,

9 Th at can also be found in US case law. Th e majority of courts are of the opinion that an excess carrier has, in principle, no cause of action against a primary insurer where the primary insurer has refused to settle a case causing the excess insurer to step in. An action will only be successful where the primary’s unreasonable failure to settle has resulted in a verdict in excess of the primary policy limits. See for example Fortman v. Safeco Ins. Co., 221 Cal. App. 3d 1394, 271 Cal. Rptr. 117 (2d Dist. 1990).

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31 diff erent language is possible, which can result in the inability to realise the goal described above properly or at all. Th e text of the provision must be drawn up in such as way as to prevent it from being phrased too broadly and for an excess insurer to have the freedom ensuing therefrom to act independently in part. In connection with this, discussions between the various insurers occur regularly in US practice or elsewhere.

Incidentally, I am of the opinion that if a to follow clause (or a proper one) is absent, it already ensues from the duty of good faith and a fair dealing of primary and excess insurers that (i) insurers are obliged to accept a risky claim, and (ii) the insurers concerned have a duty to contribute in the event of a “tower” of insurance policies. Th is entails on the one hand that a primary or other insurer must not allow proceedings to take place immediately or later if a risky class action exists (with a good chance of success) and on account thereof there are good reasons to fi rst explore the possibility of a reasonable settlement. On the other hand, this means that excess or other insurers must not attempt to avoid making a contribution to a settlement if a specifi c settlement amount is reasonable and their policy is called upon as a result thereof.

4. CONCLUSION

Th e international class action practice shows that class actions are increasingly being aimed at holding listed companies and their directors and officers liable. Nowadays listed companies and their directors are not only being confronted with shareholders’ liability claims more frequently than before, but also with significant extensive compensation amounts. Consequently, fi nding ways to deal with such claims in an effi cient and eff ective manner is also gaining importance. A proper D&O insurance policy ensures that a valid or other shareholders’ class action can also be paid, and it not only guarantees the interests of the company, its directors and its shareholders, but it also has a societal function.

Th e protection that D&O insurance provides can, however, vary depending on the case. Problems can arise, among other things, in the division of the insured amount between the company on the one hand and the director and offi cers on the other hand. An order of payment clause strives to resolve this problem, but, unfortunately, does not always provide solace. A separate Side A insurance policy or an excess Side A coverage provides better protection.

Another problem also concerns the fact that high levels of compensation are being claimed in class

actions. A D&O insurance policy of a listed company generally consists of several layers of insurance; in the event of a class action, several insurers are called upon by the insured directors and the company. Nonetheless, the various insurers can have deviating covers. In addition, diff ering interest can exist at the insurers involved in respect of the approach to the class action. Th ese aspects can frustrate an effi cient and eff ective handling of a promising class action and must – given the interests of the various parties involved and of society in proper D&O insurance – be prevented as much as possible. A follow form clause – one that is properly formulated – and a leading underwriter clause can provide a solution for such issues. Th e duty of good faith and fair dealing of both the primary insurer and the excess insurer play an important role as well.

Summary

Listed companies and their directors and offi cers run an increasing risk of becoming involved in a shareholders’ class action. Since class actions involve significant compensation amounts, it is of vital importance to all parties involved that the directors/offi cers and the company being sued have adequate Directors & Officers (D&O) insurance. Without suffi cient insurance, these directors and the company might have to bear compensation in whole or in part themselves. If they are incapable of doing so to one extent or another, which is usually the case in light of the extensive compensation amounts with class actions, the injured parties will receive nothing or incomplete compensation and the class action will not realise its goal. Th is also has a negative eff ect on the scope of liability law. D&O insurance is therefore relevant for both the parties involved in the collective action and for society. Nonetheless, confl icts of interest can arise between the company and the directors being sued in respect of the cover if they are underinsured. In addition, confl icts of interest between the various D&O insurers could also arise which can negatively aff ect both the insurance cover and the settlement of a promising class action. D&O insurance must be set up in such a way – given the various interests and in light of the goals of a collective action and liability law – that these potential confl icts of interest are prevented as much as possible. Th e fi rst confl ict of interest between the company and directors can be restricted through the inclusion of either an allocation clause or an order of payment clause. In addition, a choice can be made to make a (greater) division between the Side A and Side C coverage within the D&O insurance policy or to take

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32 out a separate Side A policy altogether. Th e potential eff ects of the confl icting interests between the various D&O insurers involved with regard to the cover and the claim settlement can be mitigated by incorporating a properly defi ned follow form clause and an adequate leading underwriter clause. In that context, but also independently thereof, in my opinion a direct duty of good faith and fair dealing of the primary insurer(s) toward excess insurers (and also a duty of care of excess insurers) should be adopted.

Key words: Directors & Offi cers insurance, class action, shareholders claims, Side A–coverage, Side C–coverage, follow form clause, leading underwriter clause, direct duty of good faith of primary insurer.

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