DNV-OSS-315: Verification of Onshore LNG and Gas … VERIFICATION OF ONSHORE LNG AND GAS FACILITIES ... offshore units and installations, and onshore industries worldwide, and carries

SERVICE SPECIFICATION

DET NORSKE VERITAS

DNV-OSS-315

VERIFICATION OF ONSHORE LNG AND GAS FACILITIES

APRIL 2010

FOREWORDDET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV) is an autonomous and independent foundation with the objectives of safeguarding life, prop-erty and the environment, at sea and onshore. DNV undertakes classification, certification, and other verification and consultancyservices relating to quality of ships, offshore units and installations, and onshore industries worldwide, and carries out researchin relation to these functions.DNV Codes consist of a three level hierarchy of documents:— Service Specifications. Provide principles and procedures of DNV classification, certification, verification and consultancy

services.— Standards. Provide technical provisions and acceptance criteria for general use by the industry as well as the technical basis

for DNV services.— Recommended Practices. Provide proven technology and sound engineering practice as well as guidance for the higher level

Service Specifications and Standards.DNV Codes are offered within the following areas:A) Qualification, Quality and Safety MethodologyB) Materials TechnologyC) StructuresD) SystemsE) Special FacilitiesF) Pipelines and RisersG) Asset OperationH) Marine OperationsJ) Cleaner EnergyO) Subsea Systems

Amendments and Corrections This document is valid until superseded by a new revision. Minor amendments and corrections will be published in a separatedocument normally updated twice per year (April and October). For a complete listing of the changes, see the “Amendments and Corrections” document located at: http://webshop.dnv.com/global/.The electronic web-versions of the DNV Codes will be regularly updated to include these amendments and corrections.

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Service Specification DNV-OSS-315, April 2010Introduction – Page 3

BackgroundThe experience gained from past projects specific to onshoreLNG and Gas installations is incorporated in this Service Spec-ification.

IntroductionThe suit of inter-related DNV-OSS documents consist of ageneral description of the verification systematics (DNV-OSS-300) and object specific documents. This DNV-OSS-315offers the reader the application of the common framework and

overview of processes in risk verification, to process facilities.This Service Specification:

— Introduces a levelled description of verification involve-ment during all phases of an asset's life.

— Facilitates a categorisation into risk levels High, Mediumand Low, assisting in an evaluation of the risk level.

— Assists in planning the verification through the making ofa Verification Plan, and describes the DNV documentationof the process throughout.

— Provides an international standard allowing transparentand predictable verification scope, as well as defining ter-

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Service Specification DNV-OSS-315, April 2010Page 4 – Introduction

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Service Specification DNV-OSS-315, April 2010 Contents – Page 5

CONTENTS

Sec. 1 General .................................................................. 7

A. General....................................................................................7A 100 Introduction....................................................................... 7A 200 Objectives ......................................................................... 7A 300 Scope of application for verification ................................ 7A 400 Structure of this document ............................................... 7

B. Risk Based Verification..........................................................7B 100 General.............................................................................. 7B 200 Verification’s Role in Hazard Management ..................... 7B 300 Risk-based Verification Planning ..................................... 8B 400 Certificate of Conformity.................................................. 8

C. Definitions and Abbreviations................................................8C 100 General.............................................................................. 8C 200 Abbreviations.................................................................... 8C 300 Verbal forms ..................................................................... 9C 400 Definitions ........................................................................ 9

D. References ............................................................................10D 100 List of Internal References.............................................. 10D 200 List of External References............................................. 10D 300 List of Technical Specifications ..................................... 10

Sec. 2 Principles of Risk Based Verification ............... 11

A. Purpose of Section ................................................................11A 100 Objectives ....................................................................... 11

B. Verification Principles ..........................................................11B 100 Purpose of Verification................................................... 11B 200 Verification as a Complementary Activity ..................... 11B 300 Risk-based Levels of Verification .................................. 11

C. Selection of Level of Verification ........................................11C 100 Selection Factors............................................................. 11C 200 Overall Verification Objective........................................ 12C 300 Assessment of Risk......................................................... 12C 400 Technical Innovation and Contractor Experience .......... 13C 500 Quality Management Systems ........................................ 13

D. Communications...................................................................13D 100 Notification of Verification Level .................................. 13D 200 Obligations...................................................................... 13

Sec. 3 Service Overview ................................................ 14

A. General..................................................................................14A 100 Objectives ....................................................................... 14

B. Service Process .....................................................................14B 100 General Principles........................................................... 14B 200 Simplified verification planning ..................................... 14B 300 Selection of level of verification..................................... 14B 400 Codes, standards and reference documents .................... 14

C. Project Initiation ...................................................................14C 100 Verification during conceptual design............................ 14

D. Project Execution..................................................................15D 100 General............................................................................ 15D 200 Verification of overall project management ................... 15D 300 Verification during design .............................................. 15D 400 Verification during construction..................................... 15

E. Verification Documents........................................................17E 100 General............................................................................ 17

App. A Selection of Verification Level........................... 18

A. General..................................................................................18A 100 General principles ........................................................... 18

B. Trigger Questions .................................................................18B 100 Overall project objective and goals ................................ 18B 200 Assessment of risk .......................................................... 18B 300 Technical innovation ...................................................... 18B 400 Contractors’ experience .................................................. 18B 500 Quality management systems ......................................... 18

App. B Generic Detailed Verification Scopes of Work Tables........................................................ 20

A. Purpose .................................................................................20A 100 Introduction..................................................................... 20

B. Critical Elements ..................................................................20B 100 Critical Elements and Components ................................ 20

App. C Examples of Verification Documents ............... 51

A. Verification Documents........................................................51A 100 Validity of verification documents ................................. 51A 200 Statement of Compliance ............................................... 51A 300 Verification Reports........................................................ 51A 400 Verification Comments .................................................. 51A 500 Audit report..................................................................... 51A 600 Survey Reports................................................................ 51

B. Use of quality management systems.....................................52B 100 General............................................................................ 52B 200 Quality plans................................................................... 52B 300 Inspection and test plans................................................. 52B 400 Review of quality management programme................... 52

C. Document forms ...................................................................52C 100 Introduction..................................................................... 52C 200 Statement of Compliance................................................ 53C 300 Verification comments sheet .......................................... 54C 400 Survey report .................................................................. 55

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Service Specification DNV-OSS-315, April 2010 Page 6 – Contents

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Service Specification DNV-OSS-315, April 2010 Sec.1 – Page 7

SECTION 1GENERAL

A. GeneralA 100 Introduction101 This Service Specification (DNV-OSS-315) gives thecriteria for and guidance on verification of the integrity (safety,environmental and reliability) of parts of onshore LNG (bothimport and export) and gas receiving facilities during variousphases of new developments and modifications.102 This document is an object-specific Service Specifica-tion conforming to the philosophy defined in the top level doc-ument DNV-OSS-300 Risk Based Verification.

A 200 Objectives201 The objectives of this specification are to:

— describe DNV’s verification services for onshore LNGand gas receiving facilities during design, construction,and commissioning,

— provide guidance for the Client and other parties for theselection of the level of involvement of those carrying outverification activities, whether quantitatively as a result ofa quantitative risk assessment or qualitatively by simpletrigger questions.

— provide a common platform for defining and manage thescope and extent of verification activities.

A 300 Scope of application for verification301 This specification may be adopted for the verification ofparts of onshore liquefied natural gas and gas receiving facili-ties during the project development phase starting fromdetailed design up to and including commissioning and start-up.302 The LNG and gas facilities covered in this specificationcomprise the following critical systems:

— support structures and foundations— non-cryogenic critical vessels, piping and equipment— cryogenic critical vessels, piping and equipment (includ-

ing transfer piping)— LNG storage tanks— open hazardous drains— pressure relief systems— ignition prevention and control systems— emergency shutdown system— blowdown system— fire and gas detection system— fire and blast protection— emergency power supply— escape and evacuation means— emergency communication systems— environmental control.

which are applied in various configurations and tailored toeach particular project’s specific requirements. The specification does not cover the following:

— Jetty, Mooring and Marine related facilities (with theexception of the shore based transfer systems and associ-ated safety equipment. Jetty structures are covered byDNV-OSS-304).

— the import and export pipelines within plant battery limits(this is covered under DNV-OSS-301)

303 Compliance to CE Marking Directives such as PressureEquipment Directive (PED/97/23/EC), Machinery EquipmentDirective 98/37/EC and Explosion Proof Devices ATEX 94/9/

EC which are applicable in the European Community are notcovered in this specification.304 This OSS describes the principle of a levelled verifica-tion involvement, where the extent of verification involvementis linked to the risks associated with part or all of the facility.305 The primary scope of DNV’s verification work is theverification of the integrity of gas facilities and the safety of itspersonnel and those in close proximity to it. Other aspects,such as the verification of the environmental safety of the facil-ity, or its ability to meet the Client’s business objectives, maybe included in DNV’s scope of work if desired by the Client.306 Statutory verification (or certification) of onshore gasfacilities to the requirements of National Authorities is notincluded specifically in the scope of application of this OSS.Such verification (or certification) shall be governed by theregulations of the relevant Authority. However, if detailed pro-cedures are not given by these Authorities, this OSS shall beused by DNV as a guideline for its work.

A 400 Structure of this document This document consists of three sections and 3 appendices:

— Section 1 explains the relationship between this documentand DNV’s overall risk-based verification process.

— Section 2 explains the principles of DNV’s verificationprocess with its risk-based levels of involvement, and howthe level of involvement for a particular project is defined.

— Section 3 describes the verification process and the activ-ities for each of the project phases.

— Appendix A gives guidance on the selection of verificationlevel, preferably as the result from a quantitative riskassessment or alternatively, qualitatively as a result of theposing of trigger questions.

— Appendix B gives a generic detailed scope of work tablesfor all phases and all levels of involvement. These tablesare the basis for the development of project-specificscopes of work tables.

— Appendix C gives example verification documents anddescribes the documents issued during and as a result ofthe verification process. The use of quality managementsystems is addressed here also.

B. Risk Based VerificationB 100 General101 This OSS describes the principles of verification of thesafety and integrity of natural gas facilities for all phases.The risk based verification concept is described in DNV-OSS-300 and visualized in Figure 1 overleaf.102 The Verification Plan is the pivot element, with theAsset Specification, Risk Assessment and Definition ofInvolvement Level as input and the Verification Executionbeing the implementation.

B 200 Verification’s Role in Hazard Management201 Major Accident Hazards are identified in a safetyassessment by an analysis of the risks to the facility’s person-nel using suitable definitions of such accidents.202 Critical Elements are those parts of the facilities andsuch parts of the facilities (both hardware and software), or anypart thereof:

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Service Specification DNV-OSS-315, April 2010 Page 8 – Sec.1

— the failure of which could cause or contribute substantiallyto; or

— a purpose of which is to prevent; or limit— the effect of a major accident and/or impact on project spe-

cific objectives.

203 Performance requirements are statements which can beexpressed in qualitative or quantitative terms, of the perform-ance required of a system, item of equipment, person or proce-dure, and which is used as the basis for managing the risk– e.g.planning, measuring, control or audit – through the lifecycle ofthe facilities. It can be:

— a criterion or a standard of performance with whichassessed performance may be compared

— an availability/reliability standard; a probability that anHSE or Business Critical system will be available for itsrequired function under a defined load

— an endurance period: a period of time over which an HSEor Business Critical function is stated to remain functionalunder a defined load

— an impairment criterion/threshold: a specified condition,which defines impairment of an HSE or Business Criticalfunction.

204 Verification Plan is a document describing the processand activities required for verifying that all Critical Elementsmeet project objectives. This will form the scope of work forthe Verifier.205 Verification is the process whereby DNV as an inde-pendent and competent party assesses that a Critical Elementwill be, has been, and will continue to be suitable to meetproject performance requirements.A graphical representation of this process is shown in Figure 1.

B 300 Risk-based Verification Planning301 The selection of the level of verification shall depend onthe level of risk a particular item adds to the overall risk to thefacility. The planning can be simplified or detailed. This is fur-ther described in DNV-OSS-300.302 This Service Specification addresses both approaches asinput into the preparation of a verification plan.

Guidance note:Risk can be evaluated based on safety, environmental impact,business, schedule, public relations, reputation or other criteriaset by the Client.The generic scopes of work tables are generated based on safetyand integrity risks. Where other risks, such as environment orbusiness, are required by the Client to be considered during theverification process, the principles set out in this document maybe used to modify the generic scopes of work tables given inAppendix C.

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303 In view of the complexity of many gas facilities, DNVrecommends strongly that the verification level be derivedfrom the results of risk assessments of the facility.

Guidance note:Only for simple natural gas facilities, with consequently lowerlevels of risk would DNV consider that simplified verificationplanning using the trigger questions and generic Verificationscope set out in Appendices A and B to be justifiable.For novel technology for which there are no applicable standardsto verify against, Technology Qualification according to proce-dures as defined in "DNV-RP-A203 Qualification Procedures fornew Technology" can be used as input for Verification.


Figure 1 DNV risk based verification Flow-Chart

B 400 Certificate of Conformity401 A Certificate of Conformity may be issued by DNV toconfirm compliance according to the scope of work. An exam-ple is given in Appendix C.402 The DNV Certificate of Conformity confirms that, afterperforming verification according to a DNV defined scope ofwork, DNV has found the natural gas facility to conform to agiven DNV Standard or acceptable international standards.403 Usually DNV performs the complete scope of work forall phases. However, in some circumstances, DNV may acceptexternal Independent Review Certificates, for example forpressure vessels. This shall be reflected in the text of the Cer-tificate.404 A Statement of Compliance is issued in all otherinstances where Certificate of Conformity is not applicable.See Appendix C for further details.

C. Definitions and AbbreviationsC 100 General101 Relevant definitions in EN 1473:2007 also apply to thisOSS.

C 200 Abbreviations

ALARP = As Low as Reasonably PracticableC&E = Cause and EffectCFD = Computational Fluid DynamicsD&ID = Ducting and Instrumentation DiagramEC = European Community

Asset Specification includ ing overa ll company ac ceptance criteria ,

perform ance requirem ents and verification objectives

R isk Assessm ent inc luding identification of hazards and

ranking of hazards based on risk evaluation

D efinition of Verification Involve ment inc lud ing detailing of acceptance criteria , and

performance requirements

Verification P lan

inc luding lis t of verification activ ities

Verification Execution inc luding reporting of com pliance or

non-compliance

Asset Planned

A sset C om pleted

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ESD = Emergency Shutdown SystemESDV = Emergency Shutdown ValveESSA = Emergency Systems Survivability AnalysisFERA = Fire and Explosion Risk AnalysisFGS = Fire and Gas SystemHAZID = Hazard Identification (Assessment)HAZOP = Hazard Operability (Study)HVAC = Heating, Ventilation and Air ConditioningHIPPS = High Integrity Pressure Protection SystemICS = Integrated Control SystemLNG = Liquefied Natural GasMPQT = Manufacturing Procedure Qualification TestingMPS = Manufacturing Procedure SpecificationNDT = Non-Destructive TestingOSS = (Offshore) Service SpecificationPCS = Process Control SystemPFD = Process Flow DiagramPFP = Passive Fire ProtectionPSD = Process Shutdown SystemQRA = Quantitative Risk AnalysisRAM = Reliability Availability MaintainabilitySIL = Safety Integrity LevelUPS = Uninterruptible Power SupplyVAR = Verification Activity ReportWPS = Welding Procedure SpecificationWPQR = Welding Procedure Qualification Record

C 300 Verbal forms301 “Shall”: Indicates requirements strictly to be followed inorder to conform to this OSS and from which no deviation ispermitted. 302 “Should”: Indicates that among several possibilities, oneis recommended as particularly suitable, without mentioningor excluding others, or that a certain course of action is pre-ferred but not necessarily required. Other possibilities may beapplied subject to agreement.303 "May": Verbal form used to indicate a course of actionpermissible within the limits of the OSS.

C 400 Definitions401 Client: DNV’s contractual partner. It may be the pur-chaser, the owner or the contractor. 402 Construction phase: All phases during construction,including fabrication, installation, testing and pre-commis-sioning, up until the installation or system is mechanicallycomplete and safe to receive and/or export gas or LNG. In rela-tion to onshore facilities, this include both onsite and offsitefabrication, site assembly and integration, tie-in, pressure test-ing, pre-commissioning and repair.403 Commissioning phase: Activities after pre-commission-ing when gas or LNG are introduced into the installation upuntil the complete installation is rendered safe and operable forintended operations.404 Critical Element: Parts of an installation which prevent,control or mitigate identified major hazards and the failure ofwhich could cause or contribute substantially to impairment ofthe defined safety objectives. Safety Critical Elements repre-sent the barriers which prevent, control or mitigate the majoraccident scenarios.405 Critical Equipment: Item of equipment or component orassembly the failure of which could cause or contribute sub-stantially to impairment of the defined safety objectives.406 Design: All related engineering to design of the onshorefacilities, including structural supports, pressure containment,safety systems, as well as material and corrosion aspects.407 Design phase: An initial phase that takes a systematicapproach to the production of specifications, drawings andother documents to ensure that the onshore installation meetsspecified requirements (including design reviews to ensure

that design output is verified against design input require-ments).408 Fabrication: Activities related to the assembly ofobjects with a defined purpose. In relation to the onshore facil-ities, fabrication typically refers to the process of assembly ortransformation of e.g. plates, profiles and pipes etc into pro-duction equipment and facilities. These may be built fully on-site or built offsite in parts and transferred to site for assemblyor integration. 409 Hazard: A deviation (departure from the design and oper-ating intention) which could cause damage, injury or other formof loss (Chemical Industries Association HAZOP Guide).410 HAZID (HAZard Identification): A technique for theidentification of all significant hazards associated with the par-ticular activity under consideration. (ISO-31010 Risk Manage-ment - Risk Assessment Techniques).411 HAZOP (HAZard OPerability study): The application of aformal systematic critical examination to the process and engi-neering intentions of new or existing facilities to assess the haz-ard potential of mal-operation or mal-function of individualitems of equipment and their consequential effects on the facilityas a whole (Chemical Industries Association HAZOP Guide).412 Manufacture: Making of articles or materials, often inbulk. In relation to onshore facilities, this typically refers toactivities for the production of various components under con-tracts from one or more contractor or supplier.413 Major Hazard: A deviation (departure from the designand operating intention) which could cause unacceptable dam-age, injury or other form of loss.414 Onshore Gas facilities: Onshore process plants forregasification of LNG or receiving, treatment and/or liquefac-tion of natural gas415 Operations (phase): The phase when the gas facilitiesare being used for the purpose for which it was designed.416 Performance Requirement: A description (qualitative orquantitative statement) of the essential requirements to be met,maintained or provide on demand by a system or item of equip-ment in order for it to satisfactorily fulfil its purpose.417 Risk: The qualitative or quantitative likelihood of anaccident or unplanned event occurring, considered in conjunc-tion with the potential consequences of such a failure. In quan-titative terms, risk is the quantified probability of a definedfailure mode times its quantified consequence.

Guidance note:Risk is not only related to physical failure modes, but also tooperational errors, human errors and so on. For some risks thefunctional failures or physical failure modes contributes less than20% while more than 80% of the risk relates to other devices.


418 Risk Reduction Measures: Those measures taken toreduce the risks to the operation of onshore facilities and to thehealth and safety of personnel associated with it or in its vicin-ity by:

— reduction in the probability of failure— mitigation of the consequences of failure.

Guidance note:The usual order of preference of risk reduction measures is:

— inherent safety— prevention— detection— control— mitigation— emergency response.


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419 Project Objectives: The safety, integrity and businessgoals for the design, construction, operation and decommis-sioning of the gas facilities including acceptance criteria forthe level of risk acceptable to the Client.420 Safety Objectives: The safety goals in terms of function-ality, reliability/availability and survivability for the design,construction and operation of the natural gas facility includingacceptance criteria for the level of risk acceptable to the Client.421 Statement of Compliance: A statement or report signedby a qualified party affirming that, at the time of assessment,the defined onshore installation phase, or collection of activi-ties, met the requirements stated by the Client.422 Verification: An examination to confirm that an activity,a product or a service is in accordance with specified require-ments.

Guidance note:The examination shall be based on information, which can beproved true, based on facts obtained through observation, meas-urement, test or other means. It should be noted that there is a distinct difference between ver-ification and certification.The scope of work for verification is ultimately decided by thecustomer, while the scope of work for certification is ultimatelydecided by DNV (or the national authorities when DNV issuescertificates on their behalf).ISO 8402: 1994 definition: Verification: Confirmation by exam-ination and provision of objective evidence that specifiedrequirements have been fulfilled.


423 Verification Plan: A plan which defines the scope of thework (sow) for verification. It includes; verification objectives,elements to be verified, performance requirements, level ofinvolvement by party and type of verification activity. (ref.DNV-OSS-300 Sec.2 C)

D. ReferencesD 100 List of Internal References

— DNV-OSS-300 Risk Based Verification, 2004, Det Nor-ske Veritas

— DNV-OSS-301 Certification and Verification of Pipe-lines, 2000, Det Norske Veritas

— DNV-OSS-304 Risk Based Verification of OffshoreStructures, 2006, Det Norske Veritas

— DNV-OSS-307 Verification of Process Facilities, 2004,Det Norske Veritas

— DNV-OSS-309 Verification, Certification and Classifica-tion of gas export and receiving terminals, 2009, Det Nor-ske Veritas

— DNV-RP-A203 Qualification Procedures for New Tech-nology

D 200 List of External References

— A Guide to Hazard and Operability Studies, 1979, Chem-ical Industries Association Limited, London

— ISO 8402 Quality – Vocabulary, 1994, InternationalOrganization for Standardization, Geneva

— BS 4778 Quality Vocabulary, Part 2 Quality Concepts andRelated Definitions, 1991, British Standards Institute,London

— EN 45011 General Criteria for Certification Bodies Oper-ating Product Certification, 1998, European Committeefor Standardization, Brussels

D 300 List of Technical SpecificationsRelevant technical specifications which can be used as refer-ences are given in Appendix B.The main standards for LNG facilities addressed in this docu-ment are:

— EN1473 Installation and equipment for liquefied naturalgas - Design of Onshore Installations

— NFPA 59A Standard for Production, Storage and handlingof Liquefied Natural Gas.

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SECTION 2PRINCIPLES OF RISK BASED VERIFICATION

A. Purpose of SectionA 100 Objectives101 The objectives of this section are to provide:

— an introduction to the principles of verification the safetyand integrity of onshore LNG and gas receiving facilities

— an introduction to the principles of risk-based levels ofverification activity and

— guidance on the selection of levels of verification.

B. Verification PrinciplesB 100 Purpose of Verification101 Verification constitutes a systematic and independentexamination of the various phases in the life of a natural gasfacility to determine whether it has sufficient integrity to meetits safety objectives.102 Verification activities are expected to identify errors orfailures or non-compliance to agreed performance require-ments in the safety and integrity-related work associated withthe natural gas facility and to contribute to reducing the risksto its operation and to the health and safety of personnel asso-ciated with it or in its vicinity. 103 Verification is primarily focused on integrity and humansafety, but business risk (cost and schedule) may be addressedalso if required by the Client.

B 200 Verification as a Complementary Activity201 Verification shall be complementary to routine design,construction and operations activities and not a substitute forthem. Therefore, although verification will take into accountthe work, and the assurance of that work, carried out by the Cli-ent and its contractors, it is possible that verification will dupli-cate some work that has been carried out previously by otherparties involved in the natural gas facility.202 The verification plan shall be developed and imple-mented in such a way as to minimise additional work, and cost,to maximise its effectiveness. The development of the verifica-tion plan shall depend on the findings from the examination ofquality management systems, the examination of documentsand the examination of project activities.

B 300 Risk-based Levels of Verification301 To achieve a DNV Certificate of Conformity for a natu-ral gas facility a verification of the activities described by thescope of work defined within this OSS first shall take place.302 The level of verification activity is differentiated accord-ing to the overall risk to the facility and to individual parts ofit. If the risk to the facility (or a particular part) is higher, thelevel of verification involvement is higher. Conversely, if therisk to the facility (or a particular part) is lower, the level ofverification activities can be reduced, without any reduction intheir effectiveness.303 The extent of verification of gas facilities is categorisedinto Low, Medium and High. A summary of the levels ofinvolvement is given in Table 2-1.304 It is the prerogative of the Client of the natural gas facil-ity to decide the level of verification. The selection should con-sider the factors given in Sec.2 C. The selection of the mostsuitable verification level may be guided by using the informa-tion gained from a Quantitative Risk Assessment, or alterna-

tively qualitatively by trigger questions, as described inAppendix A. Further guidance is provided in DNV-OSS-300Risk Based Verification.305 Where DNV is issuing the Certificate of Conformity forthe facility, DNV will decide on the appropriate scope and usethe same type of questions to evaluate the suitability of theselected level.306 Different levels of verification can be chosen for differ-ent phases of the natural gas facility’s design, construction orcommissioning, or even within the same phase if necessary.For example, the design of a particular component or unit maybe innovative and considered high risk whereas the construc-tion and installation methods are well-known and consideredlow risk. The converse might be true also.307 The level of verification can be reduced or increasedduring a phase if the originally chosen level is considered toorigorous or too lenient, as new information on the risks to thenatural gas facility becomes available.308 Verification should be planned in close co-operationwith the Client and each of its contractors, to provide a scopeof work that is tailor-made to the schedule of each productionprocess or activity, i.e. to make the verification activities, sur-veillance and hold points, an integrated activity and not adelaying activity.

Guidance note:Many contractors have adequate quality control systems andquality control departments, with competent personnel to per-form, for example, inspection at pressure vessel manufacturers.In that case, not all verification work need be done by DNV per-sonnel. Where applicable, the various inspections may be carriedout by competent persons other than DNV personnel.In that situation DNV’s verification activities may comprise:

— reviewing the competence of the contractor’s personnel— auditing their working methods and their performance of

that work— reviewing the documents produced by them.


309 Verification will direct greatest effort at those elementsof the natural gas facility whose failure or reduced perform-ance will have the most significant impact on safety and integ-rity. 310 The degree of confidence placed in a certificate by itsusers depends on their degree of confidence in the verificationcarried out. Therefore, the level of verification will be stated onthe Certificate of Conformity for the facility.311 If more than one verification level has been used for aphase, then the lowest level will be reported on the facility’scertificate, and the additional verification activities will beidentified and described in the verification report.

C. Selection of Level of VerificationC 100 Selection Factors101 The selection of the level of verification shall depend onthe criticality of each of the elements that have an impact onthe management of hazards and associated risk levels of thefacility. This is illustrated by Figure 1 below.102 The contribution of each element shall be judged quali-

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tatively and/or quantitatively and shall use, where possible,quantified risk assessment data to provide a justifiable basis forany decisions made.103 Selection factors are the:

— overall safety objectives for the facility

— assessment of the risks associated with the facility and themeasures taken to reduce these risks

— degree of technical innovation in the facility— experience of the contractors in carrying out similar work— quality management systems of the Client and its contrac-

tors.

Figure 1 Selection of the Required Level of Verification

C 200 Overall Verification Objective201 An overall verification objective covering all phases ofthe natural gas facility from design to operation shall bedefined by the Client. The objective should address the mainintegrity goals as well as establishing acceptance criteria for

the level of risk acceptable to the Client. Depending on thefacility and its location, the risk could be measured in terms ofhuman injuries as well as environmental, political and eco-nomic consequences.

C 300 Assessment of Risk301 A systematic review should be carried out to identifyand evaluate the probabilities and consequences of failures inthe natural gas facility. The extent of the review shall reflectthe criticality of the facility, the planned operation and previ-ous experience with similar facilities. This review shall iden-tify the risk to the operation of the facility and to the health andsafety of personnel associated with it or in its vicinity.Once the risks have been identified, their extent can be reducedto a level as low as reasonably practicable by means of one orboth of:

— reduction in the probability of failure,— mitigation of the consequences of failure.

302 The result of the systematic review of these risks ismeasured against the safety objectives and used in the selec-tion of the appropriate verification activity level.The result of the systematic review of these risks is measuredagainst the safety objectives and used in the selection of the

Table 2-1 Levels of Verification - Summary of InvolvementLevel Description of involvement Guidance for application on the level of involvement

Low — Review of general principles and production systems during design, construction and commissioning

— Review of principal design documents, construction and commissioning procedures and qualification reports

— Site attendance only during system testing— Less comprehensive involvement than level Medium

— Proven facility designs with relatively harmless contents and/or installed in benign environmental conditions

— Established design; manufacturing and installation by experienced contractors

— Low consequences of failure from a safety point of view (or environmental or commercial, if required)

— Relaxed to normal completion scheduleMedium — Review of general principles and production systems during

design, construction and commissioning— Detailed review of principal and other selected design docu-

ments with support of simplified independent analyses— Detailed review of construction and commissioning proce-

dures— Full time attendance during (procedure) qualification and

review of the resulting reports— Audit-based or intermittent presence at site

— Facilities in moderate or well-controlled environmental conditions

— Facilities with a moderate degree of novelty— Medium consequences of failure from a safety point of

view, (or environmental or commercial, if required — Ordinary completion schedule

High — Review of general principles and production systems during design, construction and commissioning

— Detailed review of most design documents with support of simplified and advanced independent analyses

— Detailed review of construction and commissioning proce-dures

— Full-time attendance during (procedure) qualification and review of the resulting reports

— Full time presence at site for most activities— More comprehensive involvement than level Medium

— Facilities with a high degree of novelty or large leaps in technology

— Extreme environmental conditions— Inexperienced contractors or exceptionally tight comple-

tion schedule— Very high consequences of failure from a safety point of

view (or environmental or commercial, if required

Note:High, Medium Low Verification Involvement refers to the degree or intensity of verification involvement.

Completion schedules affect verification involvement in an indirect but important way. The effect of a tight completion schedule is pressure on the project team to take less time to carry out the various tasks. Tight completion schedules are more prone to run late, thus adding more pressure on the project team. Problems which have been encountered in this situation in the past have included:

— design reviews not carried out— incomplete welding— non-destructive testing incomplete— missing structural members— commissioning incomplete.

Consequence of Failure

Probability of Failure

Low

High

High

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appropriate verification activity level.

C 400 Technical Innovation and Contractor Experience401 The degree of technical innovation in the natural gasfacility system shall be considered. Risks to the facility arelikely to be greater for a facility with a high degree of technicalinnovation than with a facility designed, manufactured andinstalled to well-known criteria in well-known locations.Similarly, the degree of risk to the facility should be consid-ered where contractors are inexperienced or the work scheduleis tight.402 Factors to be considered in the selection of the appropri-ate verification level include:

— degree of difficulty in achieving technical requirements— knowledge of similar facilities— knowledge of contractors’ general experience— knowledge of contractors’ experience in similar work.

C 500 Quality Management Systems501 Adequate quality management systems shall be imple-mented to ensure that gross errors in the work for facilitydesign, construction and operations are limited.502 Factors to be considered when evaluating the adequacyof the quality management system include:

— whether or not an ISO 9001 or equivalent certified systemis in place

— results from external audits— results from internal audits— experience with contractors’ previous work— project work-force familiarity with the quality manage-

ment system, e.g. has there been a rapid expansion of thework force or are all parties of a joint venture familiar withthe same system.

D. CommunicationsD 100 Notification of Verification Level101 An assessment of the required level of verification for aproject should be made by the Client before preparing tenderdocuments for design and construction activities. The Clientcan then specify this level in Invitations to Tender. This willgive contractors clear guidance and reference when estimatingthe extent and cost of efforts associated with verification activ-ities.102 The required level of verification can be assessed by theClient using this OSS. However, if the Client requires the Con-tractor to carry out this assessment as part of his response to anInvitation to Tender the Client should provide the necessaryinformation to enable the Contractor to carry out this work.

This information should include overall safety objectives forthe natural gas facility as well as particulars, such as tempera-tures, pressures, contents and environmental criteria, com-monly contained in a design brief.

D 200 Obligations201 To achieve the purpose and benefits of verification theinvolved parties shall be mutually obliged to share and actupon all relevant information pertaining to the verificationscope.202 The Client shall be obliged to:

— Inform DNV about the basis for selecting the level of ver-ification and the investigations and assumptions made inthis context.

— Give DNV full access to all information concerning theverification scope for the natural gas facility and ensurethat clauses to this effect are included in contracts for par-ties acting on behalf of the Client and parties providingproducts, processes and services covered by the verifica-tion scope. If information is proprietary and not available,exclusion from verification shall be mutually agreed withDNV.

— Ensure that DNV is involved in the handling of deviationsfrom specified requirements within the verification scope.

— Act upon information provided by DNV with respect toevents or circumstances that may jeopardise the safety orintegrity of the facility and/or the purpose and benefit ofverification.

— Ensure that the Safety Objective established for the facilityis known and pursued by parties acting on behalf of theClient and parties providing products, processes and serv-ices covered by the verification scope.

203 Second parties shall be obliged to:

— Perform their assigned tasks in accordance with the safetyobjectives established for the project.

— Provide the Client and DNV with all relevant informationpertaining to the verification scope.

204 DNV will be obliged to:

— Inform the Client if, in the opinion of DNV, the basis forselecting the level of verification or the assumptions madein this respect are found to be in error or assessed incor-rectly.

— Inform the Client of events or circumstances that, in theopinion of DNV, may jeopardise the safety or integrity ofthe facility and/or the purpose and benefit of verification.

— Effectively perform all verification work and adjust thelevel of involvement according to the actual performanceof parties providing products, processes and services cov-ered by the verification scope.

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SECTION 3SERVICE OVERVIEW

A. GeneralA 100 Objectives101 The objectives of this section are to provide:

— an overview of the verification activities — details of DNV’s verification services for onshore LNG

and Gas facilities during design, construction and com-missioning phases.

B. Service ProcessB 100 General Principles101 The description of the process of DNV’s verification ofLNG and gas receiving onshore facilities is based on distinctproject phases and the recognition of key milestones.102 Verification performed by DNV normally progressesthrough one or more of these project phases and may includeall or selected aspects of the project. Prior to commencementof work, the scope shall be defined in terms of the facilities tobe verified (battery limits to be specified), applicable codesand standards and performance requirements, the agreed veri-fication levels and phases to be covered in the VerificationPlan. 103 Credit may be given in the Verification Plan, in terms ofreduction in the Verification scope, for compliance to Nationalregulations for example EC Pressure Equipment, MachineryDirective and ATEX Directives certified by a Notified Body.This is relevant for projects in the European Union in whichthe EC Directives are applicable.104 The risk based verification process is described in rela-tion to the normal project phases:Project initiation:

— conceptual design.

Project Execution:

— project Management— detail design— construction— manufacturing of process facilities— manufacturing and fabrication of process facilities compo-

nents and assemblies— site assembly and integration— project completion (pre-commissioning)— commissioning— issue of as-built and as-installed documentation,— issue of operation manuals.

B 200 Simplified verification planning201 The steps in the simplified verification planning are asfollows:

— Use trigger questions to assess the overall risk level of theproject (or manageable elements thereof).

— Evaluate the risk against the relevant project acceptancecriteria (often this can be directly tied to the Client’s corevalues, objectives or a sub-set of these) and decidewhether the general verification involvement shall beLow, Medium or High.

— Use the example detailed scope of work tables in Appen-dix B to make a first draft of a Verification Plan.

— Generate the project specific Verification Plan by includ-ing a project specific engineering judgment or risk analy-sis to adjust the table to suit the project.

— Perform the verification execution according to the Verifi-cation Plan, making revision to the plan if and when nec-essary.

— Report the verification.

202 The trigger questions are included in Appendix A.203 Generic scopes of work for verification are suggested atthe three levels of verification:

— low (L)— medium (M)— high (H).

These are given in the tables in this section.204 Project specific detailed scope of work descriptionsshould be made identifying all relevant activities to be verified.Examples of the level of detail are given in Appendix B.205 It is the tables in this Sec.3 that give the principle differ-ence between the levels of verification involvement. Thedetailed example tables in Appendix B are to be treated asexamples only. They shall not be used without a project spe-cific confirmation of their completeness based on an assess-ment of the prioritised risks.206 The project specific scope of work definition, derivedfrom the tables in Appendix B (or similar), shall be part of thefinal DNV verification report.

B 300 Selection of level of verification301 The selection of the level of verification for the simpli-fied verification planning is facilitated by the trigger questionsincluded in Appendix A.

B 400 Codes, standards and reference documents401 The verification process described in this DNV-OSS isnot tailored to a specific technical standard, code or referencedocument.402 It is recommended to use internationally recognisedcodes or standards. Where combinations of standards andexternal criteria are used the exact terms of reference and doc-uments to be issued shall be agreed at the beginning of theproject and formally defined in the contract.403 It is strongly recommended not to mix standards due tothe possible differences in safety philosophies. The use ofEuropean standards (EN) is required for compliance to ECdirectives.

Guidance note:Most standards are a coherent collection of requirements for allthe relevant aspects of a process system. These aspects, e.g. loadand resistance, are normally among themselves adjusted to givean overall acceptable safety level. To pick requirements from dif-ferent standards can then easily result in unpredictable (low) lev-els of safety and non-uniform level of safety.


C. Project InitiationC 100 Verification during conceptual design101 Verification during the conceptual and or feasibilitystudies of a project and in the early stages of a project can

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reduce the need for verification during the design and con-struction phases, and can reduce costs during the long termoperation, inspection and maintenance phases.

D. Project ExecutionD 100 General101 All design, construction and commissioning aspects, rel-evant to an onshore LNG and Gas Facility, shall be covered bya verification process.102 In this specification the split in the scope of workbetween design and construction is made between sets of per-formance requirements developed during design and a descrip-tion of the steps necessary to satisfy the specification(procedures) showing how construction verification activitieswill be implemented.

Guidance note:The split between design and construction phases may vary, butit is useful to spend some time on the definition to reduce inter-face problems later.


D 200 Verification of overall project management201 Verification of the overall project management is theexamination of the means of controlling the entire onshoreLNG and Gas Facilities development project, or the phase forwhich verification is undertaken.202 This verification should confirm that the necessary con-trols are in place to ensure adequate information flow acrossthe various interfaces. It is especially important where separatecontractors have been employed for different phases of theproject such as design and installation.203 Typically, the documentation produced is expected to bein line with ISO 9000 requirements.

204 The verification of the overall project management qual-ity system and documentation is optional. The reviews andaudits should typically be performed if an extensive verifica-tion of a project is performed, while may be omitted for smallersub-phase verifications.

D 300 Verification during design301 Design verification is the examination of the assump-

tions, methods and results of the design process and is per-formed at the specified level of verification to ensure that thespecified requirements of the onshore facilities will beachieved.302 Design verification should consist of one, or more, of thefollowing:

— review of specifications for design (asset specifications)— review of design reports and drawings— review of technology qualification program and associ-

ated results (for new technology)— performing independent calculations— audit of project quality management system— review of specifications for construction, installation and

operations, resulting from design.

303 The documents that shall be produced in the projectshould as a minimum satisfy the requirements of the selectedcode applicable for the project. 304 Definition of scope of work for verification of designshould follow Table 3-3.

Guidance note:Design verification activities may be split up between BasicDesign and Detailed Design, or other sub-phases, depending ontype of contract.


D 400 Verification during construction401 The construction phase comprises procurement, fabrica-tion, manufacturing, sub-unit and unit integration testing,assembly, erection and commissioning. An important elementis to ensure that the contractual design requirements are incor-porated in the purchase documentation, and that correct mate-rials, joining and corrosion control, have been applied, and thatpressure rating, capacity and function are meeting the require-ments as per approved specifications and procedures. It is

Table 3-1 Scope of work for initial verification plan Verification activity Level

L M HReview of the project conceptual designReview of initial design x x xReview of environmental aspects x xReview of project schedule risks x xReview of business risk x x

Table 3-2 Scope of work for verification of overall project management

Verification activity LevelL M H

Review of the project management process by:Review of project quality management documentation. x x x

Audit of project quality management system x xReview of sub-contractor control x xReview of interface controls x xReview of methods of information flow including document control x x

Table 3-3 Scope of work for verification of design Verification activity Level

L M HReview of specifications for design by:— Review of the design basis with emphasis on the

design criteria x x x

Review of design reports and drawings by:Review of the main documentation to ensure that the main load conditions have been accounted for in design, that the governing conditions are identified, and that the chosen design philosophies are in accord-ance with specified codes and standards

x x x

Evaluation of the main methods used and spot checks of the input data and the calculation results x x

Detailed review of main design reports xPerforming independent calculations by:Check of pressure containment or overall integrity x x xSimplified independent analysis and calculation(s) performed by spot checks x x

Advanced independent analysis and calculation(s) performed by spot checks x

Review of specifications for construction and operation by:Spot check of critical aspects x x xReview of main specifications x xThorough review of main specifications xReview of specific operational challenges (e.g. flow assurance etc.)general principles x x xReview of main documents supported by simplified analyses

x x

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imperative that relevant preparations for this is started as earlyas possible, e.g. by the appointment of a vendor supply verifi-cation co-ordinator.402 Verification during construction is carried out by meansof full time attendance, audits, inspection or spot checks of thework, as appropriate, in sufficient detail to ensure that the spec-ified requirements of the facility will be achieved.403 Verification of these activities relates not only to thecontractor’s work but also to the monitoring of this work car-ried out by others.404 Construction verification should consist of one, or some,of the following:

— reviewing the construction process— reviewing construction procedures— reviewing qualification process— surveillance during construction activities— reviewing final documentation.

405 The documents that should be produced in the projectand submitted for review prior to start up are typically:

— Manufacturing Procedure Specification (MPS)— manufacturing procedures and method statements, includ-

ing test requirements, test procedures and acceptance cri-teria, repairs, personnel qualification records etc.

— material specifications and data sheets— quality plans including Inspection and Test Plans (ITP)— Welding Procedure Specifications (WPS) and Welding

Procedure Qualification Record (WPQR)— NDT procedures— Manufacturing Procedure Qualification Test (MPQT)

results.— manufacturer’s and fabricator’s quality system manual.

406 The “as-built” documentation to be submitted after man-ufacturing should include but not be limited to:

— manufacturing procedures including test requirements andacceptance criteria, repairs, personnel qualificationrecords etc.

— Material certificates— production test records (visual, NDT, test samples, dimen-

sional, heat treatment etc.)— hydrostatic test report— FAT (Final Acceptance Test) report— commissioning report.— as-built drawings— relevant statistics of chemical composition, mechanical

properties and dimensions for the deliveries.— relevant logs.

407 Definition of scope of work for verification of construc-tion should follow Table 3-4 for manufacturing and fabricationof critical (high-risk) components, Table 3-5 for manufactur-ing and fabrication of components not considered critical,Table 3-6 for verification of site construction and Tables 3-7and 3-8 for final testing, pre-commissioning and completion.

Guidance note:Materials may be ordered with certificates of varying degrees ofindependent 3rd party verification (e.g. 3.2 according to EN10204). This can this be integrated in the overall verificationactivities, so as not to duplicate work.


Table 3-4 Scope of work for verification of manufacturing and fabrication of critical equipment


Review of the manufacturing and fabrication processReview of manufacturing and fabrication management systems x x x

Audit of the quality management system x xReview of manufacturing and fabrication proceduresReview manufacturing, fabrication and inspection pro-cedures for confirmation of compliance with the manu-facturing specification

x x x

Review method statements x xReview of qualification processReview the Manufacturing Procedure Specification, (MPS), Manufacturing Procedure Qualification Test (MPQT), as applicable

x x x

Full time attendance during MPQT, as applicable, or first day production x x

Surveillance during manufacturing and fabrication activitiesVisit-based attendance during testing, to ensure, based on spot checks, that the delivered products have been produced in accordance with the manufacturing specifi-cation

x x x

Visit-based or full-time attendance during manufactur-ing and fabrication to ensure, based on spot checks, that the delivered products have been produced in accord-ance with the manufacturing specification

x x

Full-time attendance during manufacturing and fabrica-tion to ensure, based on spot checks, that the delivered products have been produced in accordance with the manufacturing specification

x

Review of final documentation x x x

Table 3-5 Scope of work for verification of manufacturing and fabrication of non-critical components


Review of the manufacturing & fabrication process— Review of manufacturing and fabrication manage-

ment systems x x

Review of manufacturing & fabrication procedures— Review manufacturing, fabrication and inspection

procedures for confirmation of compliance with the manufacturing specification

x x

Review of qualification process— Review the Manufacturing Procedure Specifica-

tion, (MPS), Manufacturing Procedure Qualifica-tion Test (MPQT), if applicable

x x x

— Full time attendance during MPQT, if applicable, or first day production x

Surveillance during manufacturing and fabrication activities— Visit-based attendance during testing, to ensure,

based on spot checks, that the delivered products have been produced in accordance with the manu-facturing specification

x x

— Visit-based attendance during manufacturing and fabrication to ensure, based on spot checks, that the delivered products have been produced in accord-ance with the manufacturing specification

x

Review of final documentation x x x

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E. Verification DocumentsE 100 GeneralThe hierarchy of verification document is given in DNV-OSS-300 Appendix C. The descriptions of the content of these doc-uments as well as examples of Reporting templates are givenin Appendix C to this specification.

Table 3-6 Scope of work for verification of site constructionVerification activity Level

L M HReview of the construction processReview of construction management systems x x xAudit of the quality management system x xReview of construction proceduresSpot check of construction procedures, including erec-tion procedures x x x

For critical operations (identified from the FMEA and HAZOP studies or QRA) review the method statements x x

Review of qualification processFor critical operations, review the qualification process, e.g.- welding- non-destructive testing- site heat treatment

x x x

Full time attendance during qualification tests x xSurveillance during construction activitiesVisit-based attendance during start of each critical oper-ation x x x

Full time attendance during each critical operation x xFull time attendance for all construction operations xReview of final documentation x x x

Table 3-7 Scope of work for verification of site commissioning and start-upVerification activity Level

L M HReview of the commissioning processReview of commissioning management systems x x xAudit of the quality management system x xReview of commissioning proceduresSpot check of commissioning procedures x x xFor critical operations (identified from the FMEA and HAZOP studies or QRA) review the method statements x x

Surveillance during commissioning activitiesVisit-based attendance during start of each critical oper-ation x x x

Full time attendance during each critical operation x xFull time attendance for all commissioning operations xReview of final documentation x x x

Table 3-8 Scope of work for verification of final testing for operation, including as-built survey and project completion


Review of proceduresReview of the procedures for commissioning tests to ensure that the procedure adequately covers the system in accordance with the design requirements x x x

Surveillance during testing and completion activitiesFull time attendance during commissioning x xFull time attendance during specific tests testing and audit based attendance during ongoing testing x

Review of test results x x xReview of final documentationSpot check of as-built documentation x x xReview of as-built documentation x

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Service Specification DNV-OSS-315, April 2010 Page 18 – App.A

APPENDIX A SELECTION OF VERIFICATION LEVEL

A. GeneralA 100 General principles101 The selection of the level of verification depends on therisk level of each of the elements that have an impact on themanagement of risks to the asset.102 Verification shall direct greatest effort at those elementsof the asset where the risk is highest and whose failure orreduced performance will have the most significant impact onthe project objective and goals, e.g.:

— safety risks— environmental risks— business risks.

103 Suitable selection factors include, but are not limited to,the:

— overall safety and other objectives for the asset— risks associated with the asset and the measures taken to

reduce these risks— degree of technical innovation in the asset— experience of the contractors— quality management systems for the Project and its con-

tractors.

104 Due to the diversity of various installation facilities,their contents, their degree of innovation, the geographic loca-tion, etc, it is not possible to give precise guidelines on how todecide what level of verification is appropriate for each partic-ular LNG and gas receiving onshore facility.105 Therefore, guidance is given as a series of questions thatshould be answered when deciding the appropriate level ofverification for an onshore gas facility. This list is not exhaus-tive and other questions should be added to the list if appropri-ate for a particular onshore gas facility.106 It must be emphasised that the contribution of each ele-ment should be judged qualitatively and/or quantitatively.Wherever possible quantified risk assessment data should beused to provide a justifiable basis for any decisions made.107 Depending of the stage of the project, the activities maynot have taken place yet in which case the questions can alsobe posed in another form, i.e. “Is …. planned to be?”

B. Trigger QuestionsB 100 Overall project objective and goals

a) Does the overall verification objective address the mainproject objectives?

b) Does the verification objective establish acceptance crite-ria for the level of risk acceptable to the Client?

c) Is this risk (depending on the onshore LNG and gas facilityand its location) measured in terms of safety, as well asenvironmental, economic and reputation consequences?

B 200 Assessment of risk

a) Has a systematic review been carried out to identify andevaluate the probabilities and consequences of failures inthe onshore gas facilities?

b) Has this review judged the contribution of each elementqualitatively and or quantitatively and used, where possi-

ble, quantified risk assessment data to provide a justifiablebasis for any decisions made?

c) Does the extent of the review reflect the risk level of the(onsite and offsite) onshore gas installation, the plannedoperation and previous experience with similar facilities?

d) Does this review identify the risk to the operation of theonshore gas facilities and to the health and safety of per-sonnel associated with it or in its vicinity?

e) Has the extent of the identified risks been reduced to alevel as low as reasonably practicable by means of one orboth of:

— reduction in the probability of failure?— mitigation of the consequences of failure?

f) Has the result of the systematic review of the risks beenmeasured against the Client’s safety (or other) objective?

g) Has the result of this review been used in the selection ofthe appropriate verification activity level?

B 300 Technical innovation

a) Has the degree of technical innovation in the onshore gasfacilities been considered?

b) Has it been considered that risks to the onshore gas facili-ties are likely to be greater with a high degree of technicalinnovation than with an onshore gas facility designed,manufactured and installed to well-known criteria in well-known locations?

c) Have factors been considered in the selection of the appro-priate verification level such as:

— Degree of difficulty in achieving technical require-ments.

— Knowledge of similar onshore LNG and gas facilities— Effect of the new onshore LNG and gas facility on the

surrounding area.

B 400 Contractors’ experience

a) Has the degree of risk to the onshore LNG and gas facili-ties been considered where design, construction or instal-lation contractors are inexperienced?

b) Has the degree of risk been considered where the contrac-tors are experienced but not in similar work?

c) Has the degree of risk been considered where the workschedule is tight?

B 500 Quality management systems

a) Have all parties involved in the onshore LNG and gasfacilities implemented an adequate quality managementsystem to ensure that gross errors in the work are limited?

b) Do these parties include the:

— client?— design contractor?— construction contractors?— installation contractor?— operator?

c) Do the factors being considered when evaluating the ade-quacy of the quality management system include:

— Whether or not an ISO 9000 or equivalent certifiedsystem is in place?

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Service Specification DNV-OSS-315, April 2010 App.A – Page 19

— Results from external audits?— Results from internal audits?— Experience with contractors’ previous work?— Project work force familiarity with the quality man-

agement system?

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Service Specification DNV-OSS-315, April 2010 Page 20 – App.B

APPENDIX B GENERIC DETAILED VERIFICATION SCOPES OF WORK TABLES

A. PurposeA 100 Introduction101 This appendix gives the format of the generic detailedscope of work tables for onshore LNG and Gas facilities. 102 The Verification Plan shall be developed based on thetables provided in this Appendix. The Tables shall be supple-mented and updated by input from Project Risk Assessmentswhen developing the Plan.103 The appropriate level of verification involvement basedon the principles outlined in Sec.3, is further defined in theVerification Plan. 104 For gas facilities with aspects or components not cov-ered in this Appendix, similar tables, with the same degree ofdetail, shall be developed.

B. Critical ElementsB 100 Critical Elements and Components101 Based on the results of the HAZID, HAZOP or other riskassessments, gas facilities are likely to have many or most ofthe critical elements listed in 104 below.102 Verification of design is broken down into considerationof these critical elements and components in isolation but themany interactions between them must not be forgotten.103 Typical Critical Elements for an onshore LNG and gasfacilities are shown in Table B-1. These Critical Elements shallbe modified to suit a specific facility and the Project Objec-tives.

Table B-1 Onshore LNG and Gas facilities - Typical Critical Elements and associated componentsFunction Critical Elements Component

Inherent Safety Measures

Layout Area classification

Hydrocarbon Inventory/Leak Source Minimisation All

Hazard Prevention Measures

Offloading and Loading Facilities Integrity

Ship-Shore InterfaceLoading Arms and Transfer FacilitiesLNG Transfer PipelinesJetty and Moorings

Process Facilities Integrity

Support Structures and Foundations Relief Valves and Relief SystemProcess SystemsCryogenic Pressure Vessels, Piping and EquipmentNon-Cryogenic Pressure Vessels, Piping and EquipmentLNG Storage Tanks

Dropped Object and Impact Protection Critical components

Hazard Detection and Control Measures

Control of Ignition

Bunding and DrainsFired Heaters, Hot Surfaces and ExhaustElectrical items (explosion proof rating, electromagnetic compatibility, ingress protection)Lightning Protection, Static and Earthing

Fire and Gas Detection

Smoke and Gas Detection for Site BuildingsFire and Gas Detection - External AreasFire and Gas Detection - Machinery EnclosuresFire and Gas Control System

Control Room Control SystemsHVAC Ventilation System, Fire Dampers pressurised enclosures

Hazard Mitigation Measures

Active Fire Fighting Systems

Fire Water StorageFirewater PumpsFirewater Distribution Ring mainFirewater and Foam SupplyGaseous Fire Fighting SystemsFire-fighting Vehicles

Blast and Passive Fire Protection Critical componentsBunding and Drainage Closed drains, open drains, tank bundsBlowdown & Flare System Flare, Blowdown valves, knock-out drum, relief valves

Emergency Shutdown System (ESD)ESD Control SystemEmergency Shutdown Valves (ESDVs)

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Service Specification DNV-OSS-315, April 2010 App.B – Page 21

104 The following Tables P1 to P7, C1 to C4, M1, E1 to E3and N1 provide a template of verification activities which canbe used for Verification activity planning. These give genericperformance requirements and verification activities for typi-cal Critical Elements:

— P1 Support Structures and Foundations — P2 Installation Layout— P2 Non-Cryogenic Pressure Vessels and Equipment— P4 Cryogenic Pressure Vessels and Equipment— P5 LNG Tanks— P6 Open Hazardous Drains

— P7 Pressure Relief Systems— C1 Ignition Prevention and Control System— C2 Emergency Shutdown System— C3 Blowdown System— C4 Fire and Gas System— M1 Fire and Blast Protection Systems— E1 Emergency Power System Supply— E2 Emergency Escape and Evacuation — E3 Emergency Communications— N1 Environmental Protection

Emergency Response Measures

Egress and Evacuation SystemPersonnel Protection, Breathing ApparatusEscape Routes

Emergency Services

Muster AreaEmergency LightingEmergency Power, uninterruptible power supplyEmergency Communications and Alarms

Environmental Protection

Emission and Waste Control Systems Emission and Discharge Controls Waste Heat Recovery Waste Heat Recovery Units

Table B-1 Onshore LNG and Gas facilities - Typical Critical Elements and associated components (Continued)Function Critical Elements Component

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Table P1 – Support StructuresHSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: STRUCTURAL INTEGRITYSupport Structures

HAZARD MANAGEMENTPrevention Control Mitigation Emergency Environment

OBJECTIVES: The objectives of the Structural Integrity performance requirement are:1) To ensure that foundations will adequate support of surface structures and equipment2) To ensure that surface structures are able to support the weight of the installation facilities and equipment and transfer all operating and environmental loads to the foundations;- support escape routes to allow personnel to escape from the process Installation to the muster areas and then evacuate to a place of safety;- prevent escalation following a major accident by maintaining the integrity of equipment supports; LIMITS and BOUNDARY:Foundations of support structures include the following major items of equipment: a) Slug catcher b) Storage tanks (Condensate, LPG, LNG) c) Major Rotating Equipment d) Buildings (local and central control room), e) Critical Utility Systems (electricity, heating and cooling, fuel gas) f) Flare Stack g) Pipe rack in process areah) Firewater retention pond bund i) Scrubbers j) Columns (distillation, contactors, wash) k) Vaporizersl) Major Heat Exchangers (cold box) m) Condensors n) Stair towers and escape routes

RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONSEN1473 Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas - Design of Onshore InstallationsEN1992 Design of Concrete StructuresEN1993 Design of Steel StructuresEN1994 Design of Composite Steel and Concrete StructuresNFPA 59A Standard for Production, Storage and handling of Liquefied Natural GasEN14620-1, Design and Manufacture of Site Built Vertical Cylindrical Flat bottomed Steel Tanks for the Storage of Refrigerated Liquefied Gases with operating temperatures between 0°C and -165°C – Part 1 General

Performance Requirement Specification

Document Types: Phase Verification Activity

Foundations

Foundations to be designed such that they adequately support the struc-tures under all realistic loading con-ditions as per code requirements for:

— slug catcher— storage tanks (condensate, LPG,

LNG)— major rotating equipment— buildings— critical utility systems— flare stack— pipe-racks/supports— firewater retention pond bund— scrubbers— columns— vaporizers— re-condensors— major heat exchangers (cold

box)— stair towers and escape routes

Guidance: Heat tracing system to prevent frost heave of LNG Tank foundations is a critical system which requires sufficient reliability.

- Basis of Design- Detail design calculations (including compu-ter input/ output if applicable)- Soil or Geotechni-cal reports- AFC foundation drawings

Design

Confirm by review of civil foundation design that the foundation will adequately support the structure under all realistic loading conditions. Including the following as relevant to the specific foundation design:Review foundation piling design for a given soil condition for the maximum and minimum governing loading cases. Check:

— Resistance to differential settlement— Sliding resistance if relevant— Frost heave of tank foundations to be avoided if relevant — Seismic/earthquake— Review design of concrete foundation base, reinforcement

requirements and check that the material specified is suitable— Review foundation construction drawings for compliance

with the design— Design of tank connections to foundation base.

Method StatementsITPMaterial CertificatesConcrete Strength Test Records

Construction

Review construction procedures for piling, pile caps and rafts to confirm compatibility with industry practiceConfirm by audit that the properties and origin of materials for piles, pile caps and rafts (steel, reinforcement, aggregates, con-crete mixes) are according to specifications and/or as specified on drawings.Review records and monitor construction to: Confirm that pile layout, position, dimensions and depths are in accordance with design;Confirm by sampling review of test results that strength of con-crete piles, pile-caps, rafts meet minimum requirements.

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Support Structures

Support against all loading antici-pated through the design life of the installation:flare structureprocess equipment pipe-work supportsfirewater retention pond bund

Guidance: Loads include environ-mental, dead loads, live loads, acci-dental loads as specified in the risk assessment, seismic and operational loads

Basis of DesignLoad analysisDetail design calcu-lations (including computer input & output if applicable)Drawings

Design

Confirm by review of design basis that all relevant design condi-tions are being considered, the correct loads have been combined for each load case, and the load combinations and allowable limits conform to the requirements of an applicable and recognised code.Review Mooring Analysis to ensure that the loads for the range of vessels anticipated to berth at the Jetty are considered for design.

Design

Confirm by review of the structural analyses, weight reports and environmental data or by independent analysis that:

— the loads and load cases identified in the design basis for all the design conditions have been correctly incorporated

— the thermal loads induced by the flare radiation have been correctly assessed and included in the load combinations

— in conjunction with the structural drawings that the structural and material properties have been correctly assessed and incorporated

— the response to the applied loads has been correctly assessed and stresses do not exceed the values specified in the code specified in the design basis

— suitable materials have been specified.

Method StatementsITPWPQR and NDT RecordsFabrication Dossiers

Construction Review fabrication specification for the support structures to con-firm that it is compatible with the relevant industry practice

ConstructionConfirm by surveillance that the properties and origin of all mate-rials within this CE are assured and that material properties are at least equivalent to those specified in the fabrication drawings.

Construction

Review records and monitor fabrication to:

— Confirm compliance with the design and fabrication specifi-cation with any deviation documented & justified and that dimensions are within tolerances defined in the specification.

— Confirm that welding procedures are in accordance with the fabrication specification.

— Confirm by document review that NDT and inspections are being carried out in accordance with the requirements of the fabrication specification and design requirements.

Support structures for enclosures with critical functions or containing critical equipment or normally occu-pied by people shall maintain integ-rity for the time required to complete their safety critical actions under:

(a) fire loading and following a design explosion [as defined in the FERA]. Plastic deformation is acceptable providing integ-rity is maintained

(b) other accidental events as spec-ified in the design basis or as required in code requirements.

(c) accidental spillage of LNG and cryogenic liquids causing brit-tle fracture

QRAFERAFire and Blast Structural analysesPFP Specifications

Design

Review the FERA (or other appropriate study) to confirm that fire and blast scenarios and fire and blast loads are appropriate. Con-firm that these scenarios have been incorporated into the design basis.

Design

Confirm by review of safety studies that the time required for essential safety equipment to complete safety critical actions has a) been identified; and b) been considered in the design

DesignConfirm by review of the fire and blast structural analyses that the structure is adequate or has adequate PFP to withstand the scenar-ios identified in the FERA, for the required period, and conforms to the requirements of a recognised code.

DesignConfirm by review of PFP specification and reports (type approval certificates, test reports etc) that PFP specified is ade-quate and sufficient.

Design

Confirm that support structures and escape ways that maybe exposed to accidental spillage of LNG (if considered a credible event) are protected against brittle failure if failure of such struc-tures can result in escalation. e.g. water curtain, drip trays, thermal protection of steel structures.

Method StatementsITPSpecificationsProduct Certificates

ConstructionConfirm by monitoring and review of records that measures to provide protection from blast overpressure, fire (PFP) and LNG spillage have been implemented and conform to the structural drawings.



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Table P2 - Installation LayoutHSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: PROCESS CONTAINMENTInstallation Layout


OBJECTIVES: The layout of facilities in the Installation shall:

— Ensure safe working conditions and access for personnel and equipment for operation and maintenance.— Prevent ignition by separation of ignition sources from fuel sources and non hazardous area from hazardous area (Note: Hazardous area

classification is addressed in HSE Critical Element P7 Ignition Prevention and Control).— Minimise the consequence of fire and explosion, in particular with respect to escalation and ease of access for fire fighting personnel and

equipment.LIMITS and BOUNDARY:All equipment and unit layouts within installation battery limits. RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONSNFPA 59AEN1473IP part 15



Fire Zone limits shall be selected such that the consequences of a fire, a flammable gas leak or an explo-sion corresponding to the credible event likely to occur in the con-cerned fire zone shall not impact other fire zones to an extent where their integrity could be put at risk.

HAZID StudySafety ConceptImpacted, Restricted Area and Fire Zone Lay-out

Design

Confirm by review of the scenario’s taken in the HAZID Study that all worst case and fire zone limit defining cases have been correctly selected and modelled as required.

HAZID StudySafety ConceptImpacted, Restricted Area and Fire Zone Lay-out

Design

Confirm by review of the HAZID Study results against the fire zone layout plots and fire zone safety distance layouts that all appropriate fire zone safety distances have been complied with, unless deviations are noted and approved. Compliance shall be confirmed with respect to the above relevant Project Specifica-tions.

Areas affected permanently by nor-mal operation of the facility or exceptionally by the consequences of an emergency situation caused by a major failure shall be designated as “Restricted Areas” which shall be confined to within the boundaries and control of the Installation.

Guidance: Areas affected perma-nently implies areas defined by flare and vent dispersion and radiation by Hazardous Area Classification or by legislation.

HAZID/HAZOP StudySafety ConceptImpacted, Restricted Area and Fire Zone Lay-outInstallation and Equip-ment Plot Plans

Design

Confirm by review of the scenarios considered in the HAZID Study that all worst case and restricted area defining cases have been correctly selected and modelled as required.Confirm by review that simultaneous operations (e.g. mainte-nance activities, truck loading) cannot cause additional unaccept-able situations.

HAZID StudySafety ConceptImpacted, Restricted Area and Fire Zone Lay-outInstallation and Equip-ment Plot Plans

Design

Confirm by review that all buildings and equipment located within the Restricted Areas are correctly identified as being suit-able for the applicable Restricted Area requirements. Restricted areas extending beyond the Installation boundary shall be ade-quately addressed through Risk Assessment.The criteria for equipment and buildings design when located inside the restricted areas are provided in the relevant project specifications.

Facility, equipment and building layout shall meet the general requirements of the Client.

Safety ConceptInstallation and equip-ment Plot Plans

DesignConfirm by review of Installation equipment layouts that mini-mum spacing requirement with respect to the project require-ments are complied with.

Safety ConceptBuilding LayoutsPlot Plans

DesignConfirm by review of building area layouts that general spacing and equipment locations comply with the minimum project requirements.

Working platforms, walkways, stairs, step-ladders, guard-rails and fixed ladders shall meet the safety requirements of the Client and local regulations.

Safety ConceptWorking environmentInstallation and equip-ment Building LayoutsPlot Plans

Design

Confirm by review of Installation equipment and building area layouts that minimum fixed means of access requirement with respect to the project and regulatory requirements are complied with.

Construction drawings Construc-tion

Review Specification for Fabrication and Construction of the Installation and building area and confirm that it is in compliance with specifications or compatible with industry practice.satisfactory level of inspection and possible measurement will be performed by all parties; fabrication acceptance criteria are in accordance with Specifica-tion for Fabrication and InstallationConfirm by review of Installation equipment and buildings that Hazardous layout on site complies with all project requirements.

DET NORSKE VERITAS


Table P3 – Non-cryogenic pressure vessels, piping & equipmentHSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: PROCESS CONTAINMENTNon-Cryogenic Pressure Vessels, Piping and Equipment


OBJECTIVES: To provide appropriate and effective pressure containment systems and process equipment that shall eliminate or minimise likelihood of release of hazardous material or loss of containment. LIMITS and BOUNDARY:Pressure vessels, storage tanks, equipment and pipe-work where significant levels of hydrocarbon are present or could be present during nor-mal operations. ‘Significant’ is defined as those vessels, pipe-work or equipment requiring active mitigation in the event of loss of contain-ment.The process installation equipment including pressure vessels heat exchangers and process equipment are those associated with the following systems: Slug-catcher, Pig Launcher / Receivers, Inlet Separator, Gas Conditioning, Gas Compression, Condensate Stabilisation and Storage, LPG Storage, Chemical Storage, Fuel Gas, Produced Water, Closed Drains and Hot Oil System- Safety Critical Rotating Equipment are as follows: Condensate Pumps, Gas Compressors, Flare Liquid Pumps, Diesel / Hydraulic / Lube

Oil Pumps, Methanol Pumps, Produced Water and Closed Drains Pumps.- The Safety Critical Pressure Vessels are those associated with the following systems: Scrubbers, Gas Coolers, Gas Conditioning (Amine

unit, Molecular Sieve unit, Sulphur recovery unit)- The Safety Critical Tanks are those associated with the following systems: Condensate Storage Tanks, Closed Drains Collection Tank,

Methanol Storage & Diesel (large volumes).- Piping systems refers to all pipe-work, fittings, flanges, manual valves, tubing, flexible hoses, etc. downstream of the inlet isolation valve

associated with the following systems:- Process Gas, Fuel Gas, Relief, Vent and Flare, Diesel, Hydraulic and Lube Oil, Chemicals, Hot-oil Systems, Cooling Medium System,

Produced Water and Closed Drains.Notes: Piping Systems in high-pressure utility systems (e.g. Utility Air) are considered Safety Critical if their failure is likely to damage the hydrocarbon envelope in the immediate vicinity.For the ESD Valves the process containment is covered in C1 Emergency Shutdown Systems

RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONS- project specific documents- Regulatory requirements- International standards

Pressure Vessels:

— ASME VIII— PD5500

Heat Exchangers:

— API 660 Shell and Tube Heat Exchangers for General Refinery Service— API 661 Air Cooled Heat Exchangers for General Refinery Service— API 662 Plate Heat Exchangers for General Refinery Service— ASME VIII— TEMA

Rotating Equipment:

— API 610 Centrifugal Pumps for Petroleum, Petrochemical and Natural Gas Industries— API 611 General Purpose Steam Turbines for Petroleum, Chemical and Gas Industry Services— API 616 Gas Turbines for the Petroleum, Chemical and Gas Service Industries— API 617 Centrifugal Compressors for Petroleum, Chemical and Gas Service Industries— API 618 Reciprocating Compressors for Petroleum, Chemical and Gas Service Industries— API 672 Packaged Integrally Geared Centrifugal Air Compressors for Petroleum, Chemical and Gas Service Industries

Tanks:

— API 620 Design and Construction of Large, welded, Low pressure storage tanks— API 650 Welded Steel Tanks for Oil Storage

API RP 686 Recommended Practices for Machinery Installation and Installation DesignAPI 2510 Design and Construction of LPG InstallationsPiping Systems: ASME B31.3Relief Systems: API 14CASME B31 Standards of Pressure PipingEN13480 Metallic Industrial Piping

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The process facilities shall safely contain all hydrocar-bons at the maximum and minimum foreseeable pres-sures, design temperatures and operating forces.

Design BasisPFDsP&IDSLine List

Design

Confirm by review of process basis of design, PFDs, line lists and P&IDs that specified design conditions are correct for all lines and equipment.

- Materials

P&IDsPiping Class SpecificationMaterial Selection ReportMaterial Specifications

Design

Review material selection and corrosion control philosophies and coat-ing specifications to confirm that piping class is suitable for the worst case conditions, that suitable allowance for internal corrosion is speci-fied and that significant external corrosion is prevented by suitable pro-tective coatings.

- PipingStress Analysis ReportsISOsCritical Line List

Design

Review piping design to confirm that:

— the correct design conditions are considered— suitable criteria are set for identifying which systems/lines require

calculations of stresses— the criteria has been correctly applied in accordance with the appro-

priate design codes— there is sufficient piping flexibility inherent in the design.

- Critical Equipment Pack-ages

Supplier DataFAT ReportsManufacturer Dossiers

ProcurementReview of recognised Independent Third Party Certification and design data to confirm that all procured safety critical equipment have been designed, constructed and tested in accordance with a recognised inter-national code or standard.

- Bulk Items Supplier Data ProcurementReview manufacturing records and quality certification to confirm all bulk items (fittings, flanges etc) have been designed and fabricated to a recognised international code or standard.

- Storage Tanks (Non-Cryogenic)

Method StatementsProceduresITPs

Construction

Review Specification for Fabrication, Installation and Testing of the Installation and confirm that it is in compliance with specifications or compatible with industry practice.satisfactory level of inspection will be performed by all parties; fabrication acceptance criteria are in accordance with Specification for Fabrication, Installation and Testing of Piping

Method StatementsITPsWPQRMaterial CertificatesTest PacksCommissioning reports

Construction

Survey to confirm that:

— the equipment nozzles are installed in accordance with design, and any deviations documented and justified

— the piping system is installed in accordance with the design and any deviations have been documented and justified including stress analysis where necessary

— all piping systems are fabricated and pressure tested in accordance with the design, and any deviations documented and justified

— piping spools are installed and that field welds are completed and tested in accordance with the design, and any deviations docu-mented and justified

— hydrocarbon containment systems installed are leak tested and proof tested satisfactorily.

Design BasisDesign ReportsMaterial SpecificationsP&IDs

Design

Confirm by review of design documentation that any hydrocarbon con-taining storage tanks have been designed in accordance with a recog-nised code or standard.

Method StatementsITPsWPQRMaterial Certificates

Construction

Confirm by survey that any hydrocarbon containing storage tanks have been fabricated in accordance with the design documentation and fabri-cation is to the required project specification.

Systems shall be provided with adequate and appropri-ate safety devices to prevent overpressure or other proc-ess deviations which may result in unsafe operation (including exposure to excessive temperatures and fire).

HAZOPHAZIDThermal Relief StudySurge Analysis ReportPSV Data SheetsP&IDs

Design

Confirm by review of P&IDs and HAZOP Study that adequate and appropriate safety devices to prevent overpressure resulting from proc-ess upsets (including blocked outlet, excessive temperature or fire expo-sure) which may result in unsafe operation are specified and comply with specifications.

P&IDsITPsTest Procedures

Commission-ing

Confirm by inspection that all piping components and safety devices are correctly installed in accordance with P&IDs, correctly calibrated and set points are correct.

DET NORSKE VERITAS


Rotating equipment to be provided with adequate seal system to prevent loss of containment of hydrocarbon.

Supplier DataVendor P&IDs

DesignConfirm by review of specifications that rotating equipment has ade-quate seal systems provided and that appropriate monitoring is provided with necessary executive actions specified.

Commission-ing

Confirm by review of commissioning records that rotating equipment have adequate seal systems provided and appropriate monitoring is pro-vided and executive actions are undertaken as specified by design.

All hydrocarbon contain-ment non-cryogenic equip-ment and piping with the potential to give rise to sig-nificant escalation hazards are to withstand the effects of an explosion followed by fire impingement with no loss of containment before the Installation inventory has been reduced to a safe level (blowdown is complete) and personnel have escaped to a place of safety.. Guidance: plastic deforma-tion is acceptable providing there is no loss of integrity and no low cycle fatigue fail-ure.

Safety Studies

Design Review the safety studies to confirm that the proposed fire and explosion loadings are justified.

Design

Confirm by design review of equipment details, layout drawings and details of passive fire protection that specified equipment will survive specified explosion overpressure and fire impingement with no loss of containment in the period while the Installation inventory is being reduced to a safe level (blowdown is complete) and personnel are escap-ing.

Testing & Commission-ing

Confirm by inspection and review of records that any required passive fire protection has been installed as per the design.



Table P4 – Cryogenic vessels, equipment and pipingHSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: PROCESS CONTAINMENTCryogenic Vessels, Equipment and Piping


OBJECTIVES: To provide appropriate and effective cryogenic fluid containment systems and equipment that shall eliminate or minimise likelihood of release of hazardous material or loss of containment. (Cryogenic vessels, storage tanks, equipment and pipe-work where significant levels of LNG are present or could be present during normal operations.)Significant is defined as those vessels, pipe-work or equipment requiring active mitigation in the event of loss of containment.LIMITS and BOUNDARY:LNG Loading ArmsHeat Exchangers (Vaporisers, Re-condensors, shell and tube- plate fin, spiral wound)Process Vessels (Scrubbers, Separators, Columns)Piping and valvesCold BoxesRotating Equipment (Pumps, Turbo compressors and expanders)Refrigerant and liquid Nitrogen StorageNote: LNG Storage Tanks are covered by separate Table P5RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONSEN1160 Installations and equipment for liquefied natural gas – General characteristics of liquefied natural gasEN1474-1 Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas - Design and testing of loading/unloading armsEN1532 Installation and Equipment for Liquefied Natural Gas – ship to shore interface EN1473 NFPA 59AEN12567 Industrial Valves – Isolating Valves for LNG Specification for suitability and approval verification test(EN1626 Cryogenic Vessels, valves for cryogenic service, EN12300 Cryogenic vessels, cleanliness for cryogenic service, BS6364 Valves for cryogenic service)EN ISO 10497 Testing of valves – Fire type-testing requirementsASME VIII div 2ASME B31.3Pressure Equipment Directive (only applicable in the EU)API520 and API521

DET NORSKE VERITAS



Document Types Phase Verification Activity

LNG Loading Facilities

Marine transfer arms Marine transfer arms shall load or unload the LNG and the vapour return in a safe and controlled man-ner between LNG carrier and the onshore LNG Installation

Design basisHazard studies

Design codeDesign reports (calculations and analysis for all components of marine transfer system)Material specifi-cationDrawingsCritical Equip-ment list

Design

Confirm by review of design basis and hazard studies that the design philosophy is in compliance with the requirements prescribed in a recognized design standard (EN 1474-1, SIGGTO or relevant code)

Confirm by Technology qualification or for proven design a review of design documentations (reports, design basis, material specifica-tions) that marine transfer arms are designed in accordance with a recognized design standard (EN 1474-1 or relevant code)The review should comprise:

— structural design — pressure containment, including thermal and hydraulic loads

- swivel joints- valves, connectors - materials, fittings, piping.

— motion envelope— ESD and Safety system, including the ship shore interface— hydraulic and electric control system— electrical systems, cables— accessories.

Purchase requisitions

Supplier DataFAT ReportsManufacturer DossiersITPs

Procurement

Review of purchase requisitions for compliance with the design basis.Review Specification for Fabrication, Installation and Testing of the Marine transfer arms and confirm that it is in compliance with spec-ifications or compatible with industry practice.Satisfactory level of inspection will be performed by all involved parties; review of recognised Independent Third Party Certification and design data to confirm that the Marine transfer arms have been designed, constructed and tested in accordance with a recognised international code or standard. Monitoring, fabrication, assembly and testing of loading arms for compliance with the design basis.

Method State-mentsProceduresITPs

Construction

Review Specification for Fabrication, Installation and Testing of the Marine transfer arms and confirm that it is in compliance with spec-ifications or compatible with industry practice.satisfactory level of inspection will be performed by all parties; fabrication acceptance criteria are in accordance with Specification for Fabrication, Installation and Testing

ITPsWPQRMaterial Certifi-catesCommissioning reports

Construction


— the equipment is installed in accordance with design, and any deviations documented and justified.

— all piping is fabricated and pressure tested in accordance with the design, and any deviations documented and justified.

— all safety systems are installed inspected and tested.Test protocols and acceptances crite-riaCommissioning reports

Commis-sioning

Confirm by review of test protocols and acceptance criteria that these are in accordance with the protocols and acceptance criteria specified in a recognized design standard (EN 1474 -1 or relevant code) Witness SAT in accordance with the relevant design code.

DET NORSKE VERITAS


Vaporisers

For all types of vaporizers (water stream open rack/closed, intermedi-ate fluid atmospheric water bath/forced flow condenser vaporizer, submerged combustion and atmos-pheric vaporizer); systems shall be provided to control the vaporiser’s operational process parameters in a safe and controlled manner.

Supplier data/Data SheetsDesign Code

DesignConfirm by review of design basis and specifications that the design philosophy is in compliance with the requirements prescribed in a recognized design standard (e.g. EN1473)

P&IDsSpecifications

-Methods-HSE-Operation Manuals

Design

Confirm by review of specifications that the vaporiser has appropri-ate monitoring and executive actions are undertaken as specifiedThe review should comprise:

— Vaporiser gas outlet temperature and water flow rate (open rack type)

— Flow rate and temperature of the water (closed type, forced flow type)

— Water bath temperature and heat supply (atmospheric water bath)

— Intermediate flow rate and LNG temp at outlet (condenser/vaporiser type)

— Bath water temperature and level, gas outlet temperature, extinction of flame, gas detection in incoming air, air fan trip-ping (submerged combustion type vaporiser),

- ITP- Commissioning reports

Commis-sioning

Confirm by review of commissioning records that the specific vaporiser has appropriate monitoring and executive actions are undertaken as specified by design.For example with respect to Submerged combustion type vaporisers that the water pH is regularly monitored, safety devices that initiate shutdown are implemented and a program for testing of legionella and a plan to avoid bacterial growth is in place.

The vaporizer shall safely contain all hydrocarbons at the maximum and minimum foreseeable pres-sures, design temperatures and operating forces.

-Supplier Data-Data Sheets-Procurement specifications

Procurement

Review of purchase requisitions for compliance with the design basis.Review Specification for Fabrication, Installation and Testing of the Vaporiser and confirm that it is in compliance with specifications or compatible with industry practice.Satisfactory level of inspection will be performed by all involved parties; Review of recognised Independent Third Party Certification and design data to confirm that the Vaporiser will be designed, con-structed and tested in accordance with a recognised international code or standard.Monitoring fabrication, assembly and testing of loading arms for compliance with the design basis.

-FAT-ITP-Drawings-Material Certificates-WPQR

Design

Review Specification for Fabrication, Installation and Testing of the Vaporiser and confirm that it is in compliance with specifications or compatible with industry practice.Satisfactory level of inspection will be performed by all parties; fabrication acceptance criteria are in accordance with Specification for Fabrication, Installation and Testing

-Fabrication Dossiers Construction


— the equipment is installed in accordance with design, and any deviations documented and justified.

— all piping and components are fabricated and pressure tested in accordance with the design, and any deviations documented and justified.

— all safety systems are installed inspected and tested.To avoid over-pressure, any vapor-iser that could be isolated shall be served with sufficient, adequately sized, relief devices such that the system may not be over-pressured.

See verification activity P7 – Pressure Relief Systems

Cold Boxes

Cold Box are to be designed and fabricated to contain the equipment and provide containment of insula-tion

-Drawings-Insulation specifications

DesignReview specifications and drawings from supplier covering insula-tion material and insulation containment

-Material Certificates-Drawings-ITP-FAT-Fabrication dossier

Construction

Review Cold Box fabrication to confirm:

— Verify the identity of the components being installed within the Cold box

— Suitable materials have been used— Compliance with the design and fabrication specification with

any deviation documented and justified and that dimensions are within tolerances defined in the specification

Cold box to be provided with ade-quate and appropriate safety devises to prevent overpressure within Cold Box enclosure

-Drawings DesignReview Cold Box design to ensure:That appropriate safety relief (e.g. burst disc or vent panels) is installed

-Drawings Construction Verify that appropriate safety relief (e.g. burst disc or vent panels) is installed



DET NORSKE VERITAS


Rotating equipment (Pumps and Turbo compressors/expanders)

Rotating equipment are to be according to manufacturers code and requirements and provided with adequate seal system (where rele-vant) to prevent loss of containment of hydrocarbon.

-Design code-Drawings-Data sheets-Critical Equip-ment List

Design

Review purchase requisitions for Rotating equipmentReview mechanical interface with connected equipment and supportReview control and safety systemConfirm by review of specifications that rotating equipment has ade-quate seal systems provided and that appropriate monitoring is pro-vided with necessary executive actions specified

-Material Certifi-cates-Drawings-FAT-Fabrication dos-sier

Construction

Review Rotating equipment manufacturing dossiers to confirm:

— Specified materials have been used— Compliance with the design and fabrication specification with


— FAT are performed and fulfil project specifications— Where relevant, CE mark certificates are available

Guidance: DNV CMC procedures to be followed where relevant.

Supplier DataVendor P&IDs

Commis-sioning

Confirm by review of commissioning records that rotating equip-ment have adequate seal systems provided and appropriate monitor-ing is provided and executive actions are undertaken as specified by design.

Valves

The cryogenic valves shall safely contain all hydrocarbons at the maximum and minimum foreseea-ble pressures, design temperatures and operating forces.

Design codeSupplier Data Procurement

Review manufacturing records and quality certification to confirm that the valves have been designed and fabricated to a recognised international code or standard.

Method State-mentsProceduresITPs

Design

Review valve design to confirm that:

— the correct design conditions are considered— the criteria has been correctly applied in accordance with the

appropriate design codes.Relief valvesThermal relief valves for the pro-tection of equipment, piping and hoses from over-pressure resulting from ambient heat input to blocked in LNG or other light hydrocarbon liquids shall be installed.

Material Specifi-cations

Ensure material compatibility for low temperature application.In addition, see verification activity P7 –Pressure Relief Systems

Re-condensors

The Re-condensors shall safely contain all hydrocarbons at the maximum and minimum foreseea-ble pressures, design temperatures and operating forces.

Design codeSupplier Data Procurement

Review of recognised Independent Third Party Certification and design data to confirm that the Re-condensors have been designed, constructed and tested in accordance with a recognised international code or standard.

Drawings Design

Review re-condenser design to confirm that:

— the correct design conditions are considered— the criteria has been correctly applied in accordance with the

appropriate design codes.-Material Certifi-cates-Drawings-FAT-Fabrication dos-sier(s)

Construction

Review Re-condensors fabrication to confirm:

— Suitable materials have been used— Compliance with the design and fabrication specification with

any deviation documented and justified and that dimensions are within tolerances defined in the specification.



DET NORSKE VERITAS


Heat Exchangers

Design Specifica-tionsDrawings

Design

For Shell and Tube heat exchangers - See verification activity P3 – Non Cryogenic Pressure Vessels and EquipmentFor other Heat exchangers that are not regulated by codes and stand-ards, a process to be developed to ensure the equipment is delivered according to project specifications. Review design basis that the fol-lowing is considered:

— Suitable materials are specified including cryogenic tempera-tures

— Design calculations including thermal stresses— Review mechanical interface with connected equipment and

support— Review pressure relief system.

Material certifi-catesDrawingsFATFabrication Dos-sier

Construction

Review Heat Exchanger manufacturing dossiers to confirm:

— Specified materials have been used— That compliance with design and fabrication specification with


— FAT are performed and fulfil project specifications— Where relevant, CE mark certificates are available.

Pressure Vessels (for refrigerants)

Design Specifica-tions Design

See verification activity P3 – Non Cryogenic Pressure Vessels and EquipmentConfirm by review of design basis that all relevant design conditions are being considered:

— Thermal stresses— Mechanical properties at low temperatures.

Piping

The cryogenic process piping facil-ities shall safely contain all hydro-carbons at the maximum and minimum foreseeable pressures, design temperatures and operating forces.

Material specifi-cationsDesign specifica-tionsIsometric draw-ings

Design

Check that materials for piping, flanges, fittings and bolting etc are suitable for low temperature applications.Piping flexibility analysis shall take into account large temperature variations and mechanical properties at low temperatures.Check water-hammer effects arising from emergency shutdown of LNG transfer pipeline.Note: See verification activity P3 – Non Cryogenic Pressure Vessels and Equipment

Isometric draw-ingsITP

Construction

Check that required expansion joints are installed according to project specifications.Survey to confirm cryogenic containing piping installed are leak tested and proof tested as satisfactory.

Guidance: Preference is for pneumatic test if approved by local Authorities

ITP Commis-sioning

Confirm by inspection and review of records that required insulation has been installed as per the design



DET NORSKE VERITAS


Table P5 – LNG storage tanksHSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: PROCESS CONTAINMENTLNG Storage Tanks


OBJECTIVES: To provide appropriate and effective cryogenic fluid containment systems and equipment that shall eliminate or minimise like-lihood of release of hazardous material or loss of containment.

LIMITS and BOUNDARY:LNG Storage Tanks (does not include tanks covered by the Pressure Equipment Directive – EU)RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONSEN1160 Installations and equipment for liquefied natural gas – General characteristics of liquefied natural gasEN1473 Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas – Design of onshore installationsEN 14620-1 Design and manufacture of site built, vertical, cylindrical, flat-bottomed steel tanks for the storage of refrigerated, liquefied gases with operating temperatures between 0°C and -165°C – GeneralEN 14620-2 Design and manufacture of site built, vertical, cylindrical, flat-bottomed steel tanks for the storage of refrigerated, liquefied gases with operating temperatures between 0°C and -165°C – Metallic componentsEN 14620-3 Design and manufacture of site built, vertical, cylindrical, flat-bottomed steel tanks for the storage of refrigerated, liquefied gases with operating temperatures between 0°C and -165°C – Concrete componentsEN 14620-4 Design and manufacture of site built, vertical, cylindrical, flat-bottomed steel tanks for the storage of refrigerated, liquefied gases with operating temperatures between 0°C and -165°C – Insulation componentsEN 14620-5 Design and manufacture of site built, vertical, cylindrical, flat-bottomed steel tanks for the storage of refrigerated, liquefied gases with operating temperatures between 0°C and -165°C – Testing, drying, purging, and cool-downAPI Standard 620 Design and construction of Large, Welded, Low-pressure Storage TanksNFPA 59A Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)EN12567 Industrial Valves – Isolating Valves for LNG Specification for suitability and approval verification testEN1626 Cryogenic Vessels, valves for cryogenic serviceEN12300 Cryogenic vessels, cleanliness for cryogenic serviceBS6364 Valves for cryogenic serviceEN ISO 10497 Testing of valves – Fire type-testing requirementsASME Section VIII-DIV 2 Boiler and Pressure Vessel CodePressure Equipment Directive (only applicable in the EU)API 520 Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure - Relieving Devices in RefineriesAPI 521 Guide for Pressure-Relieving and De-pressuring SystemsASME B31.3 Standards of pressure piping – Process piping

Performance Requirement Specifi-cation


The LNG storage tanks shall safely con-tain all hydrocarbons at the maximum and minimum foreseea-ble pressures (as defined for this type of tanks), design tem-peratures, normal and abnormal loading conditions

Site characteriza-tion documentation (weather condi-tions, topography of the ground, site soil conditions and geol-ogy, natural (light-ning, flooding, earthquakes, tsuna-mis, etc) and man-made (projectile impact, collisions, etc) hazard poten-tial, etc.Preliminary design documents

Hazard Assessment

Hazard assessment shall be carried out during the design of the facility and it is also recommended if a major modification takes place. Methodologies (deterministic and/or probabilistic), hazard identification (external and internal origin), estimation of probabilities, and estimation of consequences shall be done in accordance to the applicable and recognised code or standard for the project.

DET NORSKE VERITAS


Design basis/speci-ficationsMaterial specifica-tionsDesign reports (including compu-ter input & output if applicable)Test reportsDrawingsConstruction proce-dures

Design

Confirm by review of design basis, reports, and drawings that all relevant design conditions and phases are being considered and the load combinations and allowa-ble limits conform to the requirements of the applicable and recognised code or standard for the project.Adequacy of following items shall be checked:

— Materials:General for all materials: Strength, fire resistance, behaviour at cryogenic tem-perature if relevant, durability

— Loads and load combinations for normal and abnormal loading condition: It shall be checked that following loads are considered:

— Dead and Live Loads— Fire loads— Other hazards

— Structural analysis: Containment structure shall be analysed as an integrated structure (foundation, wall, roof, contained liquid, liner (if acting as structural element) with due consideration of different construction stages and corre-sponding loading and discontinuities. Following aspects shall be checked:

— Material models and parameters shall reflect behaviour at cryogenic and ambient temperatures. Most critical parameter shall be used in design.

— Boundary conditions shall reflect the different stages of the structure, fric-tion coefficients for sliding connections shall be at cryogenic tempera-tures if this is more critical

— Loads, to be combined in accordance with applicable standards— Reliability of analysis tools shall be documented— Analysis simplifications shall be conservative related to actual behaviour— Seismic analysis: Methodology, effects of soil-structure interaction (if

relevant), damping, response spectra reflecting site conditions, load com-bination. Check of sloshing and adequacy of freeboard.

— Design:

— Foundation: Covered in a separate checklist. — Wall: Access openings, closure pours between precast elements (if rele-

vant), connection to foundation, pre-stressing (losses, anchorages, etc), liquid/vapour tightness, embedment loads, design for heat flux loadings due to fires, construction joints, and wall penetrations shall be checked. Walls shall be designed for missile impact. Requirements for liquid/vapour tightness are different for primary and secondary containments, if applicable. Buckling resistance considering pressure from the insulation when tank is emptied/heated shall be checked.

— Roof: Composite members, liner, sufficient thickness to provide adequate buckling resistance, design for missile impact, and thermal resistance to heat flux due to fire

— Floor: Heating system shall be designed to avoid permafrost.— Insulation: Shall be designed to avoid permafrost and to meet boil-off

requirements— Special considerations for earthquake design: Secondary containment

structure shall be designed for 1) SSE 2) SSE aft and spill, and 3) OBE— Special considerations for steel design: The “elephant’s foot” should be

checked for earthquake loadings. When non-linear analyses methods are used to determine the ultimate strength of a structure the following shall be considered:

— The software used shall be documented and tested for the pur-pose;

— The finite elements and the modelling techniques (element type, mesh, material parameters, imperfections etc.) should be calibrated against a known case (e.g. from the design code) in order to show that the failure mechanisms are adequately rep-resented. The calibration should be documented. All factors that influence the resistance shall be addressed. Such factors are material non-linearity, imperfections, residual stresses, external pressure etc.;

— The loading sequence in the analyses should be selected such that the result represents the conditions to be analysed in a safe way;

— Detailing:

— Metal components— Liners and coatings— Anchorage details to concrete base, if required



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— Instrumentation: Check that at least following items are according to relevant standards: liquid level indicators and/or switches, pressure indicators and/or switches, temperature indicators and/or switches, density indicator.

— Pressure and vacuum protection: Check that at least following items are according to relevant standards: pressure relief valves, rupture disc, gas injec-tion system, vacuum relief valves, etc.

— Safety equipment: Check that at least following items are according to relevant standards: anti-roll-over devices, protection against lightning, sensors to mon-itor temperature, heating system control, foundation settlement, leaks.

— Piping: Check that at least following items are according to relevant standards: Cool down piping, filling piping.

Construction proce-duresSpecification for fabricationInspection and test-ing plans and reportsDesign basis/specificationsMaterial specifica-tionsDesign reportsDrawingsQualification of welding procedures

Construction

Confirm by review of relevant documentation that constructions procedures are in compliance with the requirements of the applicable and recognised code or stand-ard for the project. LNG storage tanks shall be installed in accordance with design and any deviations shall be duly documented and approved.Confirm that a satisfactory level of inspection for all systems is performed by rele-vant/competent parties.Confirm that fabrication acceptance criteria are in accordance with the specifica-tion for fabrication, installation and testing.Adequacy of following items shall be checked:

— dimensions and tolerances (should be within design assumptions)— material specification compliance— pre-stressing and post-tensioning systems (anchorages, forces, sequence of

stressing), if relevant— forming and forming removal, if relevant— construction joints, if relevant— embedment’s, if relevant— coatings (liquid/vapour barrier for concrete)— corrosion protection (steel outer tank and roof)— welding qualification— non-destructive testing (NDT) of welds.

Design basis/speci-ficationsDrawingsTesting, commis-sioning records

Commission-ing

Confirm that following operations are performed according to the requirements of the applicable and recognised code or standard for the project and the design basis:Testing including: hydrostatic testing, liquid tightness testing, pneumatic testing, pressure and vacuum testing.Purging into service, cool-down operation, and LNG tank filling.Purging out of service and warm up.Records of all the previously mentioned operations shall be kept.

Note:If needed during the course of the project and evaluation, DNV has an extensive database containing data, formulae, etc pertaining to the risk and evaluation of different types of LNG tanks and configurations.



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Table P6 – Open hazardous drainsHSE CRITICAL SYSTEM: PROCESS CONTAINMENTOpen Hazardous Drains


OBJECTIVES: To remove hydrocarbon and hazardous spillage from process and utility areas and to prevent the spread of hydrocarbon spilled inventory to adjacent areas. LIMITS and BOUNDARY:Open Hazardous Drains System. RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONSNFPA 59EN1473Drainage Systems



Open drainage system to remove del-uge, rainwater and spills from all open areas where hydrocarbons may be present, terminating either at an open drains tank or the contaminated fire water pond.

Hazardous Drains Design Specifica-tionsHazardous Drains Dwgs. P&IDsPlot Plans

DesignConfirm by review of the project studies that the hazardous drains system is consistent with the project requirements and fire zone lay-out philosophy

DesignReview utility P&IDs to confirm that open drains are specified for all open areas where hydrocarbons may be present, and that the drains terminate either at an open drains tank or the contaminated fire water pond.

DesignReview open drain system design to confirm that it is sized to remove spills, deluge water and rainwater from all open areas and drain lines are sloping as specified with no pockets.

P&IDs ConstructionConfirm by survey that the bunds are installed where required and have connections to the open drainage system in accordance with the P&IDs.

Impounding basins shall prevent cry-ogenic liquid from damaging impor-tant equipment, structures or flammable fluids entering the sur-face water drainage system.An LNG spill within the process and transfer areas shall be confined in the vicinity of or remote from the spill collection area. The spill collection area and the impounding basin shall be connected by open channel(s)

Plot PlansGA DrawingsHazardous Drains Dwgs.

Design

Confirm by survey that impoundment basin(s) are consistent with project requirements. Areas of concern are:

— process areas— vaporization areas— transfer areas for LNG, flammable refrigerants and flammable

liquids— areas immediately surrounding flammable refrigerant and flam-

mable liquid storage tanks.

Design Review project documentation that the spill collection area and the impounding basin is connected by open channel(s)

P&IDsPlot Plans Construction

Confirm by survey that the impoundment basins are installed where required and have connections to channels in accordance with the P&IDs/Plot Plans.

Segregate hazardous and non haz-ardous open and closed drains to pre-vent migration of vapour between systems.

P&IDs DesignConfirm by review of P&IDs that the design of hazardous and non hazardous open and closed drains prevents the migration of vapour between systems.

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Table P7 – Pressure relief systemsHSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: PROCESS CONTAINMENTPressure Relief Systems


OBJECTIVES: The role of relief systems is to protect process systems from over-pressurisation.To reduce to ALARP the probability that a pressure vessel or associated pipe-work will fail under excess pressure owing to pressure control device failure, isolated and “locked in” equipment, overheating or fire impingement. To safely dispose of hydrocarbons released from the proc-ess as a result of operation of certain pressure control valves, lifting of relief valves, draining and maintenance depressurisation.

LIMITS and BOUNDARY:Relief/ safety valves Relief system network (included in relief system activities) Flare header and flare system are not part of this HSE Critical SystemRELEVANT SPECIFICATIONSAPI RP 520 Sizing, selection and installation of pressure-relieving devices in refineriesAPI 521 Pressuring relieving and de-pressuring systems (equivalent to ISO 23251 Petroleum and natural gas industry – Pressure-relieving and de-pressuring systems

Guidance note: The following specifications can be useful:ISO10418 Petroleum and natural gas industries -- Offshore production installations -- Analysis, design, installation and testing of basic sur-face process safety systemsAPI 14C Recommended Practice for Analysis, Design, Installation, and Testing of Basic Surface Safety Systems for Offshore Production Plat-forms



The maximum allowable back pres-sure and minimum design tempera-ture of the relief system shall be suitable for the highest identified flow rate.

P&IDsRelief System Design BasisRelief Sizing Calcs.

Design

Confirm by review of the relief study and process simulations that the maximum allowable back pressure and minimum design tem-perature of the relief system shall be suitable for the highest identi-fied flow rate.

The hydrocarbon containing system shall be served with sufficient, ade-quately sized, relief devices such that the system may not be over-pressured.

P&IDs Design Confirm by review of P&IDs that sufficient relief devices have been provided such that the system may not be over-pressurised.

Relief Valve Siz-ing Calcs.Relief Valve Data Sheets

DesignConfirm by review of process calculations and data sheets that PSVs capacity sizing basis and inlet pressure drops are such that they will relieve pressures in excess of system design pressure, with reference to applicable specifications.

Vendor Data Design

Confirm by review of manufacturer’s data sheet and calculations that PSVs have adequate capacity for the required flow rate to ensure that they will relieve pressures in excess of system design pressure and that selection of device is appropriate for the specified conditions (suitable for flow, fluid phase, back pressure, etc.)

ITPs ConstructionConfirm by inspection and review of mechanical completion records that the PSVs are of the correct type and sizing as per the P&IDs/data sheets.

ITPs ConstructionConfirm by inspection that inlet pipe-work to relieving devices is located satisfactorily in relation to potential restrictions (e.g. above liquid levels, vessel internals, etc.).

It shall not be possible to simultane-ously obstruct all relief routes from any protected equipment to the dis-posal system (e.g. by locking off both isolation valves at once)

P&IDs DesignConfirm by review of P&IDs that isolation valves for relieving devices are specified as per the project specifications and that no protected equipment may be isolated from the disposal system.

ITPs Commis-sioning

Confirm by sample inspection that all isolation valves for relieving devices are installed as verified in the above activity.

Hydrocarbon liquids shall not be discharged from relieving devices or vents such that they are a hazard to personnel.

P&IDsEquipment Plant LayoutsPiping Isometrics

DesignConfirm by review of all vent locations (atmospheric vent from drums or equipment seals) that they vent to safe location and in the event of liquid carry over will not discharge to areas that may cause a hazard to personnel.

Relief Sizing Cal-culationsData SheetsP&IDs

DesignRelief drum sizing shall be sufficient to ensure no liquid carry over to the flare system under highest identified flow rate conditions

P&IDsEquipment Plant LayoutsPiping Isometrics

ConstructionConfirm by visual inspection that vent locations are in safe loca-tions.

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Table C1 - Ignition prevention and control systemHSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: IGNITION CONTROLIgnition Prevention and Control Systems


OBJECTIVES: To reduce to ALARP, the probability that a release of flammable gas will encounter a source of ignition by:

— applying hazardous area classification and specifying the degree of protection required for electrical apparatus to be used in hazardous areas.

— providing adequate ventilation— isolating electric power supplies to apparatus which might provide a source of ignition.— preventing hot surfaces causing ignition.— providing earthing continuity. LIMITS and BOUNDARY:All electrical equipment and instrumentation which must function within a potentially flammable atmosphere; All exposed surfaces;Earthing continuity for all equipment, structures and piping;Fire dampers in all “rated” fire divisions and boundaries.RELEVANT CODES AND SPECIFICATIONSIP Code Part 15 (Area Classification of Petroleum Installations)IEC 60079 -10-1, Classification of Areas – Explosive Gas AtmospheresIEC 60529 Degrees of protection provided by enclosures (IP Code)API RP 500 Recommended Practice for Classification for Electrical Installations at Petroleum FacilitiesISO13732-1 Ergonomics of the thermal environment – Methods for the assessment of human responses to contact with surfaces Part 1:Hot surfacesBuilding Safety RegulationsNon-Hazardous Area VentilationCertified Electrical EquipmentCargo Tank Inert Gas SystemEarthing and Bonding SystemsIgnition Control ComponentsATEX 99/92 (for EU projects only)ATEX 94/9 (for EU projects only)



Areas where potentially hazardous concentrations of flammable gas may occur shall be an electrically classified Hazardous area, in accordance with specifications.

Table of Hazard-ous SourcesHazardous Area Classification LayoutsHazardous Area Classification Cri-teria

Design

Review the area classification layouts and associated studies to confirm that:all possible Hazards have been appropriately considered, (includ-ing possible migration)the hazardous area drawings correctly account for the actual loca-tion of the sources of release the hazardous areas have been appropriately defined and all areas have sufficient ACPH in accordance with the chosen design code.

Vent inlets and outlets are correctly located in accordance with code requirements.

Guidance: Design documentation relevant to the review will include but not limited to: Gas release and dispersion study; Schedule of hazard-ous releases; FERA study; and CFD study as applicable

Hazardous Area Classification LayoutsEquipment Lay-outs

Construction

Confirm by Survey: the hazardous area drawings correctly account for the actual loca-tion of the sources of release vent inlets and outlets are correctly located in accordance with design documents

Mechanical & Electrical equipment installed in areas where an accumu-lation of accidentally released haz-ardous flammable gas or vapours can occur shall be appropriate for the area classification.

Hazardous area equipment regis-terHazardous area layout drawings Equipment Haz-ardous Area Certi-ficationSchedule of haz-ardous releases

Design

Confirm by review of appropriate data that electrical and mechan-ical equipment is correctly certified for the hazardous area in which it is to be located and that a complete Hazardous Area Equipment Register has been developed.

Guidance: Appropriate documentation will include independent third party Hazardous Area Certification, compliance review reports Engineering & Procurement Contractors.

Guidance: For compliance to IP Code Part 15 (Area Classification of Petroleum Installations), all fire and gas detection equipment, ESD Process Field Devices and ESD Driven actuating devices shall be certified for use in a Zone 1, Gas Group IIA temperature class T3 Hazardous Area

Hazardous area equipment regis-terHazardous area layout drawings ITPs

Construction

Confirm by review of independent third party ATEX or equiva-lent compliance review reports (Construction Contractors) that instrument & electrical equipment is correctly certified for the hazardous area in which it is installed and it has been installed in accordance with any special conditions of use. Confirm that a complete and accurate as built ATEX Register has been devel-oped (for EU projects).

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All externally located Instrument and Electrical equipment is compli-ant with the project requirements in meeting specifications.

Vendor Data Design

Confirm by review of independent third party Ingress protection compliance review reports (Engineering & Procurement Contrac-tors) that instrument & electrical equipment is correctly certified for the minimum project requirement e.g. IP Rating 56. or NEMA 4/4X.

All equipment shall be isolated on confirmed gas detection. All exter-nal electrical equipment that is to remain live shall be suitable for Zone 1 hazardous area use.

Hazardous area equipment regis-terShutdown Philos-ophy

Design

Confirm by review of the philosophy that all external electrical equipment that is to remain live following a confirmed gas release is suitable for Zone 1 hazardous area use and that all other equip-ment is isolated on confirmed gas detection

ITPs Commission-ing

Confirm by survey and function test that the installed equipment is either appropriate for zone 1 use or isolated on confirmed gas detection.

All structures, equipment and pip-ing shall be suitably earthed to pre-vent a potential ignition source, by build up of a differential potential between adjacent equipment and/or structures

Earthing philoso-phy for all produc-tion equipment including piping.Frame/structure drawings

Design

Confirm by sample design review that equipment and structures are suitably earthed and comply with requirements of specifica-tions. Review to include but not be limited to:

— electrical earthing specification— electrical earthing drawings— electrical earthing typical detail drawings.

ITPs Construction Confirm by sample survey that the installed equipment and struc-tures are correctly earthed

Surface temperatures of exposed equipment and pipe-work where flammable vapours or gas may accumulate shall be less than the minimum temperature as defined by the hazardous area temperature clas-sification in accordance with speci-fications.

Guidance: All exposed parts of equipment or surfaces having sur-face temperatures of more than 70°C or less than -10°C shall be protected to avoid direct contact with personnel.

P&IDsPiping Isometrics Design

Confirm by design review of the equipment data sheets, piping schedule / list; piping lagging schedule and P&IDs that equipment and pipe-work located where flammable vapours or gas may accumulate shall have exposed surface temperatures lower than the hazardous area temperature classification.

Insulation Specifi-cationP&IDs

DesignConfirm by review of the insulation specification and P&IDs that appropriate equipment and piping protection is specified and meets specifications.

ITPs Construction

Confirm by survey that all equipment or pipe-work which is expected to have a high surface temperature is correctly lagged such that the exposed surface temperature meets design and spec-ifications.

HVAC systems shall provide posi-tive air pressure within each enclosed area to inhibit gas ingress; a reduction in differential pressure below 50 Pa shall alarm in a nor-mally manned area or agreed for the project.

D&IDs Design Confirm by review of D&IDs that HVAC is provided to enclosed areas and that it is specified to provide positive air pressure.

F&G Cause and EffectsD&IDs

Design

Review Cause and Effects to confirm that there is an alarm in a normally manned area on reduction of the differential pressure below the threshold pressure.

Guidance: threshold pressure should be 50 Pa.

ITPs Commission-ing

Confirm by survey and witness Function tests, that the HVAC systems provides positive air pressure within each enclosed area and that a reduction in differential pressure below the threshold pressure, alarms in a normally manned area.

Guidance: threshold pressure should be 50 Pa.

Fire dampers to close on fire detec-tion and be fail safe on loss of con-trol signal

Safety ConceptVendor DataF&G Detection Criteria

DesignConfirm by review of safety studies and detector specifications that temperature set point specified for each damper is appropriate

Note: all dampers in rated fire divisions and boundaries

ITPs Commission-ing

Confirm by sample witness function test, that fire dampers auto-matically close on fire activation of the frangible bulb / fusible loop or similar and fail safe on loss of control signal

HVAC dampers to close and all HVAC fans to trip within the speci-fied maximum duration of con-firmed smoke or gas detection at the ventilation inlet to enclosed areas.

F&G Cause and EffectsVendor DataD&IDs

DesignReview Cause and Effects to confirm that HVAC dampers are specified to close within the specified maximum duration on con-firmed detection of smoke or gas at the ventilation inlet

ITPs Commission-ing

Confirm by witness function test that the HVAC dampers close and all HVAC fans trip within the specified duration or less on confirmed detection of smoke or gas at the ventilation inlet.



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Table C2 - Emergency shutdown systemHSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: SHUTDOWN SYSTEMSEmergency Shutdown System


OBJECTIVES: To provide facilities which detect abnormal conditions and initiate appropriate shutdown and isolation actions to minimise the likelihood of escalation into a major hazardous event and to minimise the duration of any such event.LIMITS and BOUNDARY:ESD System (including field initiation devices and output driven executive action safety function devices)ESD Valves – Incoming and recirculation piping and other ESD valves considered criticalRELEVANT SPECIFICATIONSEN1532 Installation and Equipment for Liquefied Natural Gas – ship to shore interface (move to control and ESD) IEC-61508 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systemsIEC 61511 Functional safety - Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sectorANSI/ISA-91.00.01-2001 Identification of Emergency Shutdown Systems and Controls that are Critical to Maintaining Safety in Process IndustriesSIGTTO ESD Systems & Linked Ship/Shore Systems on Liquefied Gas Carriers (for Marine Transfer Facilities)



The ESD System shall continuously monitor all instrumentation and devices associated with the system to provide a systematic means of processing the signals and carrying out necessary automatic alarm and executive actions. The system shall be resistant to sin-gle fault failure, and the system as a direct consequence of any single accident or fault shall not be disa-bled and shall remain capable of identifying the hazard for which it has been provided.

ESD Shutdown PhilosophyESSAESD and F&G Cause and Effect Safety ConceptHAZOPsP&IDs

Design

Confirm by review of the ESD system hierarchy and project Safety Concept that all types of scenarios, associated hazardous condi-tions and required executive actions have been identified correctly.

Initiators and shutdown levels shall be in compliance with project requirements.

Guidance: In the case of LNG facilities, consideration shall be given to combined shutdown operations of LNG vessel during loading/unloading and the shore based facilities.

P&IDsSafety Concept Design

Confirm by review of P&IDs and system architecture that appro-priate process and utility inputs are specified for the appropriate hazards identified in the ESD system hierarchy and Safety Con-cept. Confirm the compliance of process and utility causes for ESD shutdown according to project requirements.

ESD and F&G Cause and EffectsESD Hierarchy Logic

DesignConfirm by review of ESD and F&G Cause & Effect diagrams that the appropriate executive actions are undertaken by the ESD sys-tem in response to the detected hazard. Consideration should be taken of the conclusion identified in preceding activities.

ITPs Commission-ing

Confirm by witness of function testing that the ESD control system undertakes appropriate executive actions in response to the detected hazard in accordance with the ESD and F&G Cause & Effect diagrams

There shall be means of manually initiating an ESD from a normally manned area.

Ship to Control Schematic ESD Cause & EffectESD pushbutton layout

Design

Confirm by design review of the ESD control system, jetty control panel arrangement drawing and Ship to Control schematic that the means of manually initiating an ESD from a normally manned area has been specified.

ITPs Commission-ing

Confirm by Survey and function test, that the means of manually initiating an ESD from a normally manned area has been provided

All ESD devices shall move to their safe condition on loss of system out-put, hydraulic power or instrument air.

P&IDsFunction testing Design

Confirm by design review of ESDV hydraulic & Instrument P&IDs that all ESD devices move to their safe condition (fail safe) on loss of system output or electrical / hydraulic power or instru-ment air.

ITPs Commission-ing

Confirm by witness sample of function tests and review of records that all ESD devices move to their safe condition (fail safe) on loss of system output or electrical / hydraulic power or instrument air.

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All ESDVs and actuators shall remain functional following an explosion or under fire conditions for a sufficient time period to per-form their intended function.

Vendor dataHAZIDEquipment Lay-outsP&IDs

Design

For ESDVs specified on the PIDs, review the safety studies and layouts to confirm that the fire and explosion scenarios which may affect the ESDVs or their actuators have been identified and con-firm which ESDVs and actuators will require protection.

Vendor data and calculations Design

Review the design and fabrication data for ESDVs which require protection to ensure that they are suitably protected against rele-vant hazards

Guidance: Where protection or PFP or other protection is required for either valves or actuators then review vendor draw-ings, calculations, test data and relevant certificates [including explosion survivability calculations for the actuators] provided by vendor to confirm that the specified protection is suitable and suf-ficient for the applicable fire and explosion scenarios.

ITPs Construction Survey all ESDVs and actuators to confirm that they are installed in the correct location and protected as required

ESD system cables shall be fire resistant to Specifications. As far as is reasonably practical, ESD system cables shall be protected from mechanical damage.

Safety ConceptCable specificationCable scheduleCable requisition and vendor data

Design

Confirm by review of the cable specification, cable requisition, vendor data sheets and cable schedule that all cables associated with the ESD system are fire resistant.Cable supports / racks shall offer equal rating as a minimum to maintain availability of the system.

Cable specificationCable Certification Construction

Confirm by sample survey that the cables installed are fire resist-ant. Cable markings and certification shall be verified as being compliant.Routing of cables shall also confirm they are, as far as is possible, protected from mechanical damage.

ESD panels and associated equip-ment shall be protected against fire, blast and dropped objects, such that its ability to function is not impaired until ESD is complete.

HAZIDFERAEquipment layouts

DesignReview the safety studies to determine that credible event scenar-ios which may affect the ESD Panel and associated equipment along with the time required to complete ESD have been clearly identified.

HAZIDFERABuilding structural calculationsJCR, SS and ITR equipment room(s) heat rise studyEquipment layouts

Design

Confirm by documentation review that the ESD panel and associ-ated equipment is protected from the identified credible event sce-narios. All aspects of the building design relevant to maintaining the integ-rity of the ESD system (to fulfil its function in an emergency situ-ation for the required duration) shall be confirmed as being acceptable for the identified hazard conditions.

The ESD System shall have a mini-mum SIL rating and meet the requirements of the SIL Classifica-tion Study.

Guidance: Hazard Studies are used to decide SIL rating

Safety ConceptSIL Assessment StudySIL Classification StudySIL Verification ReportVendor Verifica-tion Report

Design

Confirm by review of vendor data and SIL Assessment Study that the ESD System and associated loops are based on a probability of failure on demand as defined in the relevant specifications.

Hydraulic / Pneumatic vent lines from ESDV valve actuators to be located so they are not (as far as practicable) vulnerable to mechani-cal damage

ITPs Construction

Confirm by Inspection that the Hydraulic / Pneumatic vent lines from ESDV actuators have been located so they are not (as far as practicable) vulnerable to mechanical damage.



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Table C3 – Blowdown systemHSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: SHUTDOWN SYSTEMSBlowdown System


OBJECTIVES: To enable rapid depressurisation of the gas inventory so as to minimise the potential for escalation of the initiating event. To reduce the probability that a pressure vessel or associated pipe-work will fail under excess pressure owing to pressure control device failure, isolated and “locked in” equipment, overheating or fire impingement. To safely dispose of hydrocarbons released from the process as a result of operation of certain pressure control valves, lifting of relief valves, opening of emergency blow-down valves and manual purging, draining and maintenance depressurisation.LIMITS and BOUNDARY:Functionality of relief valves / blow-down valves; Knock out drum; HP & LP system Note, hydrocarbon containment of relief, flare and vent lines is covered by the hydrocarbon containment performance requirementRELEVANT SPECIFICATIONSISO 4126 Safety devices for protection against excessive pressureEN 764-7 Pressure equipment Safety systems for unfired pressure equipmentAPI 521/ISO2351 Pressure relieving and de-pressuring systemsAPI520 PT 1&2 Sizing, Selection and Installation of Pressure Relieving Devices in Refineries Sizing and Section and Installation



Inventory shall be blown-down to a sufficiently low pressure within a time period suitable to ensure that no significant escalation of the inci-dent occurs.

Blow down study to incorporate results of FERAHAZOP Report

DesignConfirm by review of the safety studies and HAZOP Report that a suitable blow down time has been derived accounting for, but not limited to, the balance between potential for escalation, PFP require-ments and material selection.

DesignConfirm by review of the blow-down study and process simulations that the inventory shall be blown down within a time period suitable to ensure that escalation of the incident does not occur.

Design Confirm by review of the PIDs that isolatable sections are specified in accordance with the blow down requirements

DesignReview blow-down orifice data sheets and sizing calculations and confirm these comply with appropriate codes and process design data.

Commis-sioning

Confirm by witness of blow-down tests that the process inventory is to blow-down to a sufficiently low pressure within the correct time period, in the correct valve sequence and without exceeding the min-imum design temperature

Guidance: This is achieved by a full blow-down from operating pressures then making a comparison of the field data obtained with the process models and calculations developed for the design case to confirm the suitability of the latter. Special consideration is given to blow-down of liquid containers in LNG facilities.

The maximum allowable back pressure and minimum design tem-perature of the relief system shall be suitable for the highest identi-fied flow rate.

Design of relief systemBlow down study

DesignConfirm by review of the blow-down study and process simulations that the maximum allowable back pressure and minimum design temperature of the relief system shall be suitable for the highest iden-tified flow rate.

ConstructionConfirm by review of records that the blow-down valves, blow-down restriction orifice and blow-down/cold vent piping (including sizing and approximate routing) has been installed in accordance with the design.

Blow down will be primarily man-ually operated and if no operator intervention within the 3 minutes time period then will be automati-cally initiated on:- confirmed fire detection in a

hazardous area- confirmed gas detection- signal from the installation con-

trol room- manual push-buttons in control

room.

Cause and Effects Diagrams

Design

Confirm by review of Cause & Effect Diagrams that blow-down shall be primarily manually operated and if no operator intervention within a project specified time period then will be automatically ini-tiated on:

- confirmed fire detection in a hazardous area- confirmed gas detection- signal from the installation control room- manual push-buttons in control room.

ConstructionConfirm by witness of test that blow-down is initiated in accordance with the Cause & Effect Diagrams.

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The blow down system shall be designed and fabricated such that the risk of significant escalation due to failure to achieve blow down is according to the defined safety objectives.

Guidance: Scenarios to be consid-ered should include the potential for loss of actuating media and / or loss of signal from the ESD System.

Design calcula-tionsP&IDs

DesignReview to confirm that blow-down system has been designed such that the risk of significant escalation due to failure to achieve blow down is ALARP.

P&IDsITP Construction

Confirm by witness test and review of records that blow-down valves function as required by design.

Liquid accumulation shall be pre-vented in the relief and disposal system such that the route from protected equipment to the flare tip or vent shall not be impaired.

P&IDs DesignConfirm by review P&IDs and piping drawings that all flare, relief and blowdown lines are self draining, and where low points are una-voidable these have an appropriate drain connection with locked open isolation valve.

P&IDs ConstructionConfirm by sample inspection and review of records that all flare, relief and blowdown lines are self draining, and where low points are unavoidable these have an appropriate drain connection with locked open isolation valve.

Flare tip or the vent shall be located such that:It limits the risk of an un-ignited release from forming a flammable cloud in areas of the Installation where ignition may occurAn ignited release in the vicinity of the flare or vent does not exceed maximum allowable radiation lim-its in normally manned areas and on escape routes.

Guidance: Typical allowable lim-its are:(i) short term heat radiation 6.31 kW/m2(ii) continuous radiation not more than 1.58 kW/m2.

Operating philoso-phy;Flare tip selectionFlare vendor cal-culations

DesignConfirm by review of the Flare Design Report and Ventilation Stud-ies that the flare tip positions have been selected such that the risk of an un-ignited gas release resulting in a flammable cloud over the Installation is minimised.

DesignConfirm by review of the Flare Design Report and Flare Radiation Study that the radiation levels as specified in the performance requirement are not exceeded or that protection is provided.

SpecificationsDrawings Construction

Confirm by inspection that the flare tips are located in accordance with the design

Air ingress to the disposal system shall be prevented in order to pre-vent an explosion hazard in the sys-tem.

Flare system designP&IDs

DesignConfirm by review of P&IDs that a gas purge is specified for the flare system, and by review of calculations; confirm it is capable of pre-venting air ingress into the system.

Design Confirm by review of P&IDs that any valves in the purge gas supply are specified as either ‘locked open’ or ‘normally open’.

DesignConfirm by review of P&IDs that instrumentation is specified to alert the operator in the event of a loss of purge gas (low pressure or low flow)

P&IDs Construction Confirm by review of records that the gas purge system is installed in accordance with the design.

Commissioning reports

Commis-sioning

Confirm by review of commissioning records that the purge system functions in accordance with the design requirements, including means of alerting the operator of loss of purge gas.

Blow-down valves, including those with a time delay specified prior to opening shall remain functional following an explosion and under fire loading for a sufficient time to perform their intended function

Blow-down studyPurchase requisi-tionsVendor data

DesignBy reviewing the blow-down study in conjunction with the P&IDs and the purchase order data, confirm that all BDVs and actuators have sufficient protection measures specified for their intended pur-pose

DesignConfirm by review of calculations, certification or type test data that all blow-down valve and actuator assemblies will open following the maximum specified blast overpressure and under the appropriate fire loading.

Drawings Construction Confirm by survey that all specified protection measures are cor-rectly provided



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Table C4 - Fire and gas detection systemHSE CRITICAL ELEMENT: DETECTION SYSTEMSFire and Gas Detection System


OBJECTIVES: To detect flammable gas releases, fires and smoke in designated areas of the gas installation and initiate the appropriate emer-gency response. LIMITS and BOUNDARY:All fire and gas detection, logic and outputs to ESD SystemIncludes executive actions driven directly from the F&G systemExcludes: Control devices initiated by the ESD System as a result of outputs from the fire and gas detection system Including High Sensitivity Smoke Detection System in Control and Switch Gear Rooms. RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONSIEC 60331 Tests for electric cables under fire conditionsNFPA 72: National Fire Alarm and Signalling Code



The F&G system shall continually monitor for fire, smoke and flamma-ble gas in all areas of the berth where a risk of flammable gas accumulation may occur (including HVAC inlets and airlocks) and initiate appropriate status and alarm signals. Detectors shall be located, spaced and voted such that a hazardous con-dition is detected before significant damage or escalation occursAlarm signals shall be relayed to a normally manned area and appropri-ate actions taken.

F&G Detection LayoutF&G PhilosophyESD and F&G Cause & EffectHAZIDFERA studySchedule of haz-ardous releases Hazardous area drawings / layouts

Design

Confirm by review of the safety studies that all hazardous conditions which are required to be detected by the fire & gas system have been identified and dimensioned.

Guidance:

— distribute appropriate output signals to the ESD system for implementation of shutdown actions

— Installation and Jetty general alarm (GA) on confirmed fire or gas detection

— fire-pump start on confirmed fire detection in open areas

— Fire and Gas detection place-ment to be in accordance with project specifications

F&G Detection LayoutsDetector Vendor performance dataSchedule of haz-ardous releasesHazardous area drawings / layoutsFERA studyGas release and dispersion study

Design

Confirm by design review that the type and location, spacing and voting of detection devices is appropriate to the identified and dimensioned hazardous conditions.Type and location of all detection devices (including MACs, all Fire and Smoke detection (both indoor and outdoor) and hydrocarbon gas detection, including battery room) shall comply with the project requirements

F&G Detection LayoutFire and Gas Phi-losophyESD and F&G Cause & Effect

Design

Confirm by review of the Cause and Effect diagrams, in conjunction with the detector layouts that the appropriate executive actions and status / alarm signals are undertaken by the F&G control system in response to the detected hazard.

Guidance: Check interactions with ESD are appropriate and con-firm logic for the F&G actions is in compliance with the project requirements.

Design DrawingsITPs

Construc-tion

Confirm by Survey, that the detector coverage as installed meets the intent of the conclusions identified in design. All deviations from the accepted detector layouts to be justified.

Design DrawingsITPs

Commis-sioning

Confirm by witness function test, that the F&G control system undertakes appropriate executive actions and status / alarm signals in response to the detected hazard in accordance with the Cause & Effect diagrams and within the time periods stipulated by the design [time to closure of ESDVs shall be confirmed through this activity].

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Fire and Gas Detector cables shall be fire resistant to project specificationsAs far as is reasonably practical, Fire and Gas Detector cables shall be pro-tected from mechanical damage.

Safety ConceptCable specifica-tionCable scheduleCable requisition and vendor data

Design

Confirm by review of the cable specification, cable requisition, ven-dor data sheets and cable schedule that all cables associated with the F&G detectors are fire resistant.Cable supports / racks shall offer equal rating as a minimum to maintain availability of the system.

Cable specifica-tionCable Certifica-tion

Construc-tion

Confirm by sample survey that the cables installed are fire resistant. Cable markings and certification shall be verified as being compli-ant.Routing of cables shall also confirm they are, as far as is possible, protected from mechanical damage.

The Fire and Gas Control System shall have a minimum SIL rating as specified for the Project.

Guidance: Hazard Studies are used to decide SIL rating

Safety ConceptSIL Assessment StudySIL Classification StudySIL Verification ReportVendor Verifica-tion Report

Design

Confirm by review of vendor data and SIL Assessment Study that the F&G System and associated loops are based on a probability of failure on demand as defined in IEC-61508 and IEC 61511, and meets Performance requirements.

The F&G system shall be protected against fire, blast and dropped objects, such that its ability to func-tion is not impaired either during a major accident event and/or for a specified minimum duration thereaf-ter.Control System shall include all sta-tus monitoring and actions to and from the Control Rooms.

Safety ConceptHAZIDFire & Blast studyBuilding Struc-tural DesignEquipment room(s) heat rise studyEquipment lay-outs

Design

Confirm by design review that the Fire and Gas Control System is appropriately protected [by location or otherwise].Review to include but not be limited to:

— HAZID— fire & blast study— building structural design— equipment room(s) heat rise study— equipment layouts.

This activity shall, if possible, be combined with similar activities where the protection of the ESD System is assessed.

Table M1 – Fire and blast protection systemsHSE CRITICAL SYSTEM: PROTECTION SYSTEMSFire and Blast Protection Systems


OBJECTIVES: To protect key items of the Installation or structure against fire and explosion, where failure of these items could result in major escalation of an initial event. To provide and aid in fire recovery by provision of equipment and devices allowing application of fire fighting agents for control or extin-guishing by automatically or manually controlled methods. LIMITS and BOUNDARY:To cover fighting of fire hazards at the Installation facilities including the following fire protection systems:Passive Fire Protection, Firewater Pumps, Deluge System, Foam and Water System, Water Curtains, Total Gaseous Extinguishing System (if provided for Building protection)RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONSFire-Zone LayoutHazardous Area classificationFire-Water systemsFire Extinguishing systemsPassive Fire ProtectionNFPA 2001NFPA 20 Fire Water Pumps



DET NORSKE VERITAS




All hydrocarbon containment equipment and piping with the potential to give rise to signifi-cant escalation hazards are to withstand the effects of an explosion followed by fire impingement with no loss of containment before the Installa-tion inventory has been reduced to a safe level (blowdown is complete) and personnel have escaped to a place of safety.

Basis of DesignSafety PhilosophyHAZIDQRA / FERAESSA

Design

Confirm that accident scenarios with the potential to cause esca-lation have been identified and dimensioned correctly.Review the safety studies to confirm that the proposed fire and explosion loadings are justified

Fire Protection Philos-ophyFire System Basis of Design

DesignReview the fire protection philosophy (or similar) to ensure that all the identified accident scenarios are correctly mitigated by an appropriate combination of active and passive fire protection

PFP SpecificationsMaterial CertificatesCalculations applica-tion scheduleDesign Drawings

Design

Ensure that correctly dimensioned PFP is specified for equip-ment and structures as required commensurate with the hazards.

Approved DesignCoating RecordsITP

ConstructionSurvey to ensure that PFP is installed in line with the design.

Fire Protection Philos-ophyFire System Basis of Design

DesignEnsure that deluge coverage and rates are appropriately speci-fied for the relevant hazards using appropriate extinguishing medium (water/foam).

Calculations – amount required and storage sizing calcs. Hydraulic analysisP&IDsLayouts & Calcula-tionsMaterial Specifica-tionsFabrication Specs

Design

Design review to ensure the fire water supply chain supply and distribution is adequate:Sufficient firewater and foam available Firewater pumps sized correctlyFirewater system sized adequatelyFirewater system routed correctly and adequately (proven by hydraulic analysis)Confirm the correct number, location and type of deluge nozzles (or other firewater application systems as specified) Suitable materials and fabrication process specified

Fabrication specifica-tionsCorrosion Protection DO studyISO DrawingsPiping GAsSurge AnalysisP&IDs Fire zone location plot plansEquipment layouts Pipe stress Analysis

Design

Design review to ensure firewater system is designed to survive foreseeable loadings and accidental eventsCorrosionSupply routed to avoid or be protected from dropped objects.Supplied by duplicated feeds from separated isolatable section of firewater ring main.Deluge valve sets located as far as practicable from the fire areas they serveFirewater system suitably design to be capable for withstanding all foreseeable extremes of operating, pressure and temperate (including water hammer and transient effects from surge or water hammer).

Approved Design DocumentationITPs

Construction

Survey to ensure the firewater system is fabricated and installed as specified in the design:PumpsRoutingSections/isolationNozzle layoutFabrication and workmanshipMaterialsDeluge Valve set locationsPipe supportsMechanical completion records

F&G / ESD C&EsF&G / ESD Specifica-tionsActive Fire Fighting Philosophy

Design

Design review to confirm the correct initiators, for active fire protection systems, are specified and included in the ESD exec-utive actions:F&G/ESD initiationManual initiationFusible loop initiationFail safe initiation (loss of IA or hydraulic pressure)Time from initiation to supply specified in design

ITPs CommissioningSurvey and witness test to ensure firewater/foam is supplied when initiated (check each initiator in every fire zone including fusible loop).

Firewater and Foam Protection LayoutsP&IDs

CommissioningSurvey to confirm the required coverage is achieved in each fire zone.

Visual Inspection Commissioning Test Reports

CommissioningConfirm the firewater is supplied within the time specified in the design.

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The reliability / availability of fire water system shall be com-mensurate with the identified hazards and in accordance with project requirements and fire protection philosophy

Active Fire Protection PhilosophyFire Water System Design Basis

DesignConfirm by review of the Fire Protection philosophy [or other relevant documents] that the hazards have been identified and the appropriate Reliability and Availability has been specified commensurate with the identified hazards.

Design Confirm the reliability and availability of fire water system in accordance with the project requirements.

Specified critical buildings and control rooms normally occu-pied by personnel shall survive blast loads defined by the project

DALS (design acci-dental load specifica-tion)

DesignConfirm by review of the DALS that critical buildings and con-trol rooms are in accordance with the project requirements.

ITP Construction Confirm by visual inspection that construction complies with the requirements of the design

Specified critical building and enclosure boundaries shall pre-vent passage of Fire & Smoke and maintain an acceptable tem-perature on the inner surface when subject to fire load expo-sure for the time specified

Building structural design documentation Design Confirm by review of building design that internal boundary

rated divisions comply with the project requirements.

ITPs Construction

Confirm by visual inspection that rated divisions comply with the requirements of the design. All penetrations through rated divisions shall maintain the rating of the division certification shall be reviewed for compliance.

Buildings and enclosures shall be protected by total flooding systems where required at con-centration levels and flow-rates in accordance with project requirements. The follow up flow shall be sufficient to com-pensate for leakage.

Building and Enclo-sure Extinguishing Specifications

DesignConfirm by review that all building areas and enclosures requir-ing protection have been correctly identified and that the correct extinguishing system has been selected.

Vendor Drawings and Discharge Calcula-tionsEquipment and Build-ing LayoutsSystem SchematicsSystem Logic and Control Drawings

Design

Review area protection plans and vendor data, and confirm that enclosures have been specified to be equipped with an appropri-ate flooding system as appropriately defined in the project spec-ifications and that total flooding extinguishing systems provided meet the specific discharge requirements (volumes, rates, type, etc.) of each protected area and the system requirements (inter-lock, discharge alarms, systems control, feedback, 100% back-up, etc…) of the applicable Flooding System Specification

ITP Construction Confirm by survey that the flooding systems have been provided as specified in design.



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Table E1 – Emergency power system supplyHSE CRITICAL SYSTEM: EMERGENCY RESPONSEEmergency Power System Supply


OBJECTIVES: To maintain power to the ESD and F&G Systems as well as the telecoms systems that requires power to function in an emer-gency and to allow the plant to be safely shut down and evacuated. The system shall be from a reliable source of electrical power and shall be available after the identified major hazard events. LIMITS and BOUNDARY:Includes emergency battery power supply for ESD system, FGS system, PA/GA audible and visual alarms and power to all other identified end users which must function under an emergency condition. RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONSCable Specifications (e.g. IEC60331)NFPA 110 Standard for Emergency and Standby Power SystemsEN 50091 Uninterruptable Power Systems



There shall be sufficient emergency battery power supplied to support all safety critical systems for the time required for each system to perform its intended function as noted below.F&G Control system – duration of the event (see guidance)ESD Control System – duration to be determined as long enough to com-plete all ESD actions (see guidance)PA/GA System – duration of the event

Guidance: 1hr to be considered as minimumFor emergency and escape lighting systems

Guidance: 1hr to be considered as minimum for other Safety Critical Systems – duration required to func-tion correctly.

UPS Load ScheduleLoad CalculationsVendor Battery Cal-culations

DesignConfirm by design review that the UPS emergency power system type is capable of supplying UPS emergency power to all identi-fied emergency systems for the required durations.

FAT Reports Design Review FAT Load & Discharge tests to confirm that UPS is of sufficient capacity to supply the specified equipment.

ITPs Commis-sioning

Confirm by survey and witness test that sufficient UPS capacity for the required duration periods has been provided and that it supports the equipment as required by their normal operations mode.

All emergency power systems are to be protected from fire, blast and acci-dental events such that the function is not impaired while there is a requirement for emergency power.

Safety ConceptHAZIDFire & Blast studyBuilding Structural DesignTR/Critical equip-ment room(s) heat rise studyEquipment layouts

DesignReview the design documents (safety studies etc) and layouts to confirm that all scenarios which may affect the emergency power system have been identified.

Design

Confirm by design review that the emergency power systems (UPS) is appropriately protected [by location or otherwise].Review to include but not be limited to:FERAFire & Blast studyTR / SCE equipment room(s) heat rise studyEquipment layouts

Guidance: This activity shall, if possible, be combined with sim-ilar activities where the protection of the ESD and FGS Systems are assessed. Main and emergency distribution equipment should be located in separate rooms.

Construction Confirm by Survey that the emergency power system is appropri-ately protected [by location or otherwise]

UPS field cabling to all Safety Criti-cal Systems (as listed above) should be segregated from main power cables and shall be fire resistant according to specifications.


Design

Confirm by review of the cable specification, cable requisition, vendor data sheets and cable schedule that all cables associated with UPS feed to HSE Critical Systems are fire resistant.

Cable specificationCable certification Construction

Confirm by sample Survey that the cables actually installed are fire resistant. Cable markings and certification to be verified for compliance.

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Table E2 – Escape and EvacuationHSE CRITICAL SYSTEM: EMERGENCY RESPONSEEscape and Evacuation


OBJECTIVES: To provide reliable, secure and effective systems for alerting personnel to the existence of an emergency and for communi-cating additional information to personnel during, or after, a major hazard incident. To provide routes and facilities which personnel can use to move away safely from the effects of a hazardous event in their vicinity and to continue their movement in safety along readily identifiable access routes to the Muster Areas and evacuation points.To provide reliable facilities which allow communication both internally and to external locations in the event of an emergency condition at the facility.To provide rescue of injured personnel LIMITS and BOUNDARY:Emergency LightingEscape routesPersonal protective equipmentRELEVANT SPECIFICATIONSTemporary Refuge/Muster AreaEmergency Lighting and signagePersonal Survival EquipmentEN1838 Lighting applications – Emergency lighting, EN50171 Central Power Supply Systems, EN50172 Emergency Escape Lighting Sys-tems, EN60598-2-22 Luminaries, Particular requirements Luminaries for emergency lighting



At least two unobstructed diverse escape routes shall be provided from all potentially manned working areas to the muster areas. All escape routes shall be provided to ensure that any area can be rapidly and safely evacu-ated in the event of an emergency. Escape route width and provision shall be as defined in project specifi-cations.

Guidance: Escape routes should be greater than 1m wide.

Safety ConceptBuilding Escape Route Layouts Plant Layouts

Design

Confirm by design review that escape route drawings show two correctly dimensioned escape routes from all normally manned areas and that the escape routes do not run through process areas containing hydrocarbons. Escape route widths and provision shall be confirmed as being compliant with project or national specifications.

Building Escape Route Layouts Plant Layouts

Construction

Survey the primary and secondary escape routes to confirm the actual dimensions meet the specified requirements.

All escape and access routes shall remain clear of obstructions. All escape routes including emer-gency exit doors to be readily acces-sible, non-slip, marked and signposted. Markings and signs to be clearly visible if there is loss of arti-ficial lighting outside daylight hours.

Building Escape Route Layouts Plant Layouts

Commission-ing

Survey the primary and secondary escape routes to confirm that they are non slip and free from obstruction and that mark-ing, and signposts are acceptable.

Guidance: This only applies to routes to muster areas.

All escape doors shall be of a type that can easily be opened in an emer-gency situation.

Building Escape Route Layouts Door ScheduleSecurity Door System Spec

Design

Confirm by design review that all escape route doors have been identified correctly and can be easily opened in the event of an emergency

Guidance: e.g. panic bar, fail safe for electrical locking sys-tems, integral key on egress side etc. Escape route doors which normally open outwards should be fitted with panic bars,

Rescue breathing apparatus sets and other equipment necessary shall be located at strategic locations around the facilities to allow prompt rescue of personnel.

Safety ConceptBuilding Escape Route Layouts Installation Safety Equipment Layouts

Design

Review Safety Equipment Layouts to confirm that breathing apparatus is provided in sufficient quantities and at locations appropriate to hazards envisaged.

Emergency lighting shall be pro-vided to permit safe egress during escape and evacuation in the event of loss of normal power, by means of emergency power generation and integral battery backed fluorescent fittings, located on/at: - main escape and evacuation

routes,- main access points- muster area- first aid station(s)- fire fighting area- stairways and landings.

Building Escape route LayoutsInstallation Safety Equipment LayoutsLighting Layout DrawingsLighting Vendor Data

Design

Confirm by design review that provision of emergency light-ing and illumination levels are sufficient to allow safe egress from building and installation locations. Minimum provision and lighting levels shall comply with project or national requirements.

Guidance: Emergency lighting should have a minimum capacity of 30 – 60 minutes

ITPs Commission-ing

Survey the escape route lighting by night to confirm the battery endurance period and measure the lux at ground level to ensure the escape routes are sufficiently lit or alternatively the testing of part of the Installation lighting may be extrapolated to other areas based on lighting layouts and analysis.

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Table E3 – Emergency CommunicationsHSE CRITICAL SYSTEM: EMERGENCY RESPONSEEmergency Communications


OBJECTIVES: To maintain an uninterrupted and reliable means of indicating alarm and implementing effective communication with per-sonnel working on or around process equipment during a major incident SCE LIMITS and BOUNDARY:Emergency Communication to/from Control RoomPA/GA SystemRELEVANT SPECIFICATIONSProject StandardsISO 7240-19 Fire Detection and alarm systems



Effective communication, both internal and exter-nal shall be provided for emergency situations.The systems shall be protected by, location of equipment, spatial diversity and equipment redun-dancy.Internal and external telecommunications in order to perform the emergency function defined by project requirements shall be confirmed between the Control Room, vessel/s and storage / pumping locations and Muster area

Safety Concept/EERSTelecommunications Sys-tem PhilosophyTelecommunications Equipment Layouts

Design

Confirm by design review that emergency commu-nication systems equipment shall provide both nor-mal and emergency communications between the emergency response team and the team managing the situation

Telecommunications Schematics / DiagramsTelecommunications Specification

Design

Confirm by design review of telecoms block dia-gram and specification that the telecommunica-tions systems meets the project requirements in terms of protection, location, diversity and redun-dancy.

PA/GA system shall provide a means of alerting all personnel to the existence of an emergency sit-uation, provide the means to communicate addi-tional information to personnel during an emergency and shall be capable of operating with-out impairment for the minimum time required to escape to muster locations and then to evacuate to a place of safety after the start of a major accident. The provision and minimum alarm noise level above local ambient shall be in accordance with project requirements. In areas with greater ambi-ent noise levels, visual alarms shall also be pro-vided.

Guidance: Audible alarms should be provided in all areas with minimum of +6dBA above local ambient and visual alarms in high noise areas (>85 dBA)

Telecommunications Schematics / DiagramsTelecommunications Specification

DesignReview amplifier loading to ensure that the number of speakers on a speaker ring does not exceed the amount which the amplifier can drive,

PA/GA Layouts / Arrangement drawingsSystem architectural drawingsSystem block diagramsSystem specificationNoise study and LayoutsITPs

Commis-sioning

Confirm by witness test that the GA System pro-vides clear communication between the Control Room and all Installation areas to alert personnel of potential hazardous or emergency conditions. The PA/GA system shall be in accordance with the project requirements. The minimum alarm noise level above local ambient shall meet the project requirements.

Emergency communications equipment shall not be adversely affected by the operation of other devices/equipment in close proximity (electro-magnetic compatibility).

Design

Confirm by review of the vendor data pertaining to the GA system that it will not be adversely affected by, nor adversely affect, the operation of nearby equipment.

Guidance: Review of vendor technical file, EC Declarations of Conformity and associated techni-cal file for individual equipment as well as data pertaining to the compatibility of all nearby equip-ment

Emergency communications equipment shall not create additional hazards during an emergency sit-uation

DesignConfirm by review of the vendor data pertaining to the emergency communication system that it can be operated in situations where a flammable gas mixture is present.

GA control systems to be protected against fire, blast and credible accident events, by location or otherwise, such that its ability to function is not impaired for the time taken to muster after a major accident event.

Design

Confirm by design review that GA Control System shall be protected by location or otherwise, such that its ability to function is not impaired.

Note: Secondary method is hand held radios or fixed intercom system.

PA / GA cables should be located so that they are protected against accidental loads as far as possi-ble and shall be fire resistant to specifications


Design

Confirm by review of the cable specification, cable requisition, vendor data sheets and cable schedule that all cables associated with the PA / GA system are fire resistant.Cable supports / racks shall offer equal rating as a minimum to maintain availability of the system.

Cable specificationCable certification

Con-struction

Confirm by sample survey that the cables installed are fire resistant and are protected against acciden-tal loads as far as possible. Cable markings and cer-tification shall be verified as being compliant.

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Table N1 – EnvironmentHSE CRITICAL SYSTEM: ENVIRONMENTEnvironmental Control Systems


OBJECTIVES: To limit the emissions to the air, limit the discharge to water, limit the generation of waste and spill prevention. SCE LIMITS and BOUNDARY:Complete Gas Installation or Process PlantRELEVANT SPECIFICATIONSProject and National RegulationsISO 14001 (environmental management system)Council Directive 96/61/EC (Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control)NORSOK S-003



During the development of the project, technically and finan-cially feasible and cost effective options should be evaluated to reduce or offset project related GHG (Green House Gas) emissions during the design of the project.

Environmental Management System

Design

Review project documentation that takes into account options such as energy efficiency/conservation (e.g. combined heat and power and waste heat recovery) use of alternative energy resources, alter-ations of project and system design, reduction of VOCs (Volatile Organic Compound) and reduction of gas flaring.

Facilities with the potential to generate e.g. process waste water, sanitary sewage or storm water should incorporate necessary pre-cautions to avoid, minimize and control adverse impacts to health, safety or the environment

Environmental Management SystemProject and national regulations

Design

Review project documentation pertaining to the following:

— discharge to surface water— discharge to Sanitary Sewer Systems— discharge to Storm Water— cooling water discharge.

to ensure that impacts to health, safety and the environment are as low as possible.

Water conservation programs should be implemented in con-junction wit the magnitude and cost of water use.

Environmental Management SystemProject and National Regulations

Design

Confirm by review that measures have been addressed and taken to reduce water consumption e.g.:Water monitoring and managementProcess water recyclingSanitary Water conservation

Plans shall be developed that considers prevention, reduction, reuse, recovery, recycling, removal and disposal of wastes (including hazardous waste) generated during all project phases and modes of operation.

Waste Management PlanNational Regulations

Design

Confirm by review that operations have developed a Waste Man-agement Plan to define categories of all types of waste and plans for treatment, disposal and shipment.

The project to address potential environmental impacts on existing conditions such as surface, groundwater and soils.

Environmental Management System

DesignReview project documentation of existing land conditions, the proximity to ecologically sensitive or protected areas, check if strat-egies are in place that contribute to improvement of local conditions and evaluate project location alternatives.

Plans shall be developed to mini-mize or reduce emissions as far as reasonably practicable, resulting from commissioning and testing activities

HSE (Health Safety and Environmental) System Environmental Management System

Construction

Confirm by review of the vendor data pertaining to emissions that they will be according to project or regulatory levels.Review to include but not limited to:Air emissions (SO2, NOx, Particulate Matter (PM), Ozone, Ozone Depleting Substances)Noise and vibration emissions (traffic, turbines, compressors and other major equipment

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Service Specification DNV-OSS-315, April 2010 App.C – Page 51

APPENDIX C EXAMPLES OF VERIFICATION DOCUMENTS

A. Verification DocumentsA 100 Validity of verification documents101 Verification documents are, in principle, documentsconfirming that an examination has been carried out, and arevalid only at the time of issue.

A 200 Statement of Compliance 201 A Statement of Compliance can be issued on completionof each particular project phase, or natural part thereof, andshall be based on a dedicated verification report.202 A Statement of Compliance shall be issued as a formalstatement confirming that verification of documents and oractivities, has found that the onshore gas installation, a partthereof, or a verification activity, complies with the require-ments applicable for that particular project phase.203 The technical information on a Statement of Complianceshall contain:

— onshore gas installation description and item number, ifrelevant

— application (operational limitations and conditions of use)for which the onshore gas installation is intended

— codes and standards with which the onshore installationhas been found to comply

— level of verification— an appendix containing the accompanying dedicated veri-

fication report.

204 A Statement of Compliance shall be signed by the DNVProject Manager.An example of a typical Statement of Compliance is shown atthe end of this appendix.

A 300 Verification Reports301 Verification Reports are issued to confirm that the rele-vant product or service has been completed in accordance withspecified requirements.302 The report shall include information such as:

— product or service description and item number, if relevant— application (operational limitations and conditions of use)

for which the product or service is intended— codes and standards with which the product or service has

been verified against— safety objectives and performance requirements— clear statement of the conclusion from the verification

(does it or does it not meet the specified requirements)— codes and standards used as reference— documentation on which the verification report is based

(documents, drawings, correspondence, including revisionnumbers)

— project-specific scope of work tables— any comments— identification of any non-conformances.

303 The Verification Report shall always be dated and havetwo signatures, the originator and the DNV internal verifier.

A 400 Verification Comments 401 Reviews of documents shall be reported using Verifica-tion Comment Sheets (often called VerComs). These docu-ments give details to the client of aspects of onshoreinstallation design and construction that DNV:

— considers do not meet the specified requirements— does not have enough information to make a decision— offers advice based on its own experience.

402 Only in the first two instances does DNV expect aresponse from the Client or its contractors.403 An example of a typical Verification Comment sheet isshown at the end of this appendix.

A 500 Audit report501 Audit reports are issued to confirm that a company’squality management system has been reviewed to confirmcompliance (or not) with the nominated standard and projectrequirements. In addition, the audit reports confirm compli-ance with the documented procedures and that these proce-dures are effective.502 Audit reports shall contain information such as whether:

— The company has a documented quality system.— This quality system been certified by an accredited Certi-

fication Body for the product (or service) in question.— The quality system covers the following quality assurance

elements adequately for the product:

— organisation— authority and responsibility— job descriptions for key persons— internal quality audits— documentation change control— job instructions and procedures— non-conformance and corrective action.

— There are adequate procedures for activities such as:

— calibration of equipment— material identification and marking— control of special processes such as welding, NDT

PWHT— non-conformance identification and handling— inspection status— final inspection.

— The company’s facilities are, in general, considered ade-quate for the scope of supply.

— A quality plan been prepared for the order concerned.— The purchaser or their appointed inspection agency are

planned to attend the works.— There are any problem areas identified.

A 600 Survey Reports601 Survey reports are documentation and recording ofattendance activity by DNV.

Guidance note:Survey reports are and may be called by different names. Exam-ples are Inspection Release Note, Visit Report, Inspection Certif-icate, Site Report, etc.


602 A survey report shall contain enough information toidentify clearly the product or service that has been examined,the operating conditions or specifications to which it has beenexamined and the conclusion reached by DNV.603 The survey report shall be printed on the relevant formand shall contain as much information as possible in accord-ance with the standard headings in the form. In addition, thereport number shall be shown.

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Service Specification DNV-OSS-315, April 2010 Page 52 – App.C

604 An example of a typical Survey Report is shown at theend of this appendix.

B. Use of quality management systems

B 100 General101 The assurance of onshore gas installation integrity andfunction requires that gross errors during design, constructionand operation be minimised. The likelihood of gross errorsshall be reduced in a systematic manner by the operation of aquality management system adequate for the work being car-ried out. 102 Quality management systems frequently are docu-mented at three levels:

— The quality manual and related procedures document howthe organisation, as a whole, manages the quality of all itsproducts and services.

— The quality plan documents the specific proceduresrelated to a particular project.

— The inspection and test plan documents how the qualitycontrol activities for a particular project shall be carriedout and recorded.

B 200 Quality plans201 The basic function of a quality plan is to be a memoryaid in the management of a project. In an organisation withmany quality procedures for a variety of functions the qualityplan states those that are applicable to that particular project.The quality plan acts as a route map through the complexitiesof management of the project and highlights those activitiesrelevant to quality management.202 The project quality plan normally consists of two parts;firstly, a narrative description of the means of controlling theproject, and secondly, a tabular description of the inspectionsand tests to be carried out during the work.203 The quality plan should address:

— organisational details of the project— authorities and responsibilities of key personnel— interfaces between, the client, contractors, sub-contractors

and third parties— quality assurance activities placed on sub-contractors— cross references to existing company procedures.

204 The narrative part of the quality plan should include adescription of:

— the applicable standards— project organisation and responsibilities— review of the contractual requirements— project planning and progress reporting— procedures for such activities as design control, purchas-

ing, construction, installation, commissioning, interfacecontrol and auditing

— procedures for inspection and maintenance as well as nor-mal operation

— emergency response issues.

205 Additionally, the narrative part of the plan shoulddescribe the documentation requirements. It should be speci-fied:

— what documents are required— at what stage these documents are required

— who is responsible for preparing the documents— relevant parties to whom documents are submitted— how any necessary approvals are acquired— who has originals and who has copies— if copies have to be certified copies— the length of time documents are to be retained and by

whom.

B 300 Inspection and test plans301 The tabular description of the inspections and tests to becarried out during the work is frequently known as the inspec-tion and test plan.302 The following items should be checked for inclusionwithin the inspection and test plan:

— each inspection and test point and its relative location inthe production cycle should be shown

— the characteristics to be inspected and tested at each pointshould be identified

— the use of sub-contractors should be indicated and detailsof how the verification of sub-contractor’s quality shall becarried out should be shown

— hold points established by the constructor, the operator ora third party, where witness or review of the selectedinspection or test is required, should be shown.

B 400 Review of quality management programme401 The contractor’s quality manual shall be reviewed forcompliance with ISO 9001 or 9002 as appropriate. The con-tractor’s operations should be audited to establish compliancewith the documented system.402 If the contractor has a quality system certified by anaccredited third party certification body, this may be taken asevidence of a satisfactory quality system provided the certifi-cate is relevant to the contractor’s scope of work for theproject. However, the last two years’ periodical audit reportsshall be reviewed to identify if any recurring non-conformitieshave been revealed.403 Any weaknesses revealed during this audit, or review ofperiodical audit reports, shall be considered when planning thecontractor monitoring activities.404 Surveillance of the continuing acceptability of the con-tractor’s quality management system is carried out by observ-ing a selection of audits carried out by the contractor as part ofits internal audit system. The audits to be observed should beselected over the length of the project at suitable intervals andshould cover as wide a selection of activities as possible.405 Contractor’s inspection and test plans for the variousactivities undertaken during their scope of work for the pipe-line shall be reviewed and accepted, if adequate.

C. Document forms

C 100 Introduction101 The end of this appendix includes example forms for useby DNV in verification. 102 The following forms are included:

a) Statement of Compliance.b) Verification Comments Sheet.c) Survey Report.

DET NORSKE VERITAS


C 200 Statement of Compliance

DET NORSKE VERITAS

Service Specification DNV-OSS-315, April 2010 Page 54 – App.C

C 300 Verification comments sheet

DET NORSKE VERITAS


C 400 Survey report

If any person suffers loss or damage which is proved to have been caused by any negligent act or omission of Det Norske Veritas, then Det Norske Veritas shall pay compensation to such person for his proved direct loss ordamage. However, the compensation shall not exceed an amount equal to ten times the fee charged for the service in question, provided that the maximum compensation shall never exceed USD 2 million.

In this provision "Det Norske Veritas" shall mean the Foundation Det Norske Veritas as well as all its subsidiaries, directors, officers, employees, agents and any other acting on behalf of Det Norske Veritas.

DET NORSKE VERITAS AS, Veritasveien 1, NO-1322 Høvik, Norway, Telephone: +47 67 57 99 00, Telefax: +47 67 57 99 11, Org.No. NO

945 748 931 MVA

Form No.: 40.91a Issue: January 2008 Page 1 of 1

Folder:Cert. No.:

DET NORSKE VERITAS

SURVEY REPORT

Client :Order/Project. No. :Item Description :Survey Location :Date: :

SURVEY SCOPE

Verification Activity No.:

Description of Verification Activities:

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Specifications:

Drawings:

VERIFICATION COMMENTS

NON-CONFORMITIES

Report Ends

Signed for Det Norske VeritasSignature:

Name:Title:

Date:

DET NORSKE VERITAS