Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Cristicism...david christensen Disagreement, Question-Begging, and Epistemic Self-Criticism philosophers’ imprint – 2 – vol

volume11,no.6 march2011

Disagreement,

Question-Begging and

Epistemic Self-Criticism

David ChristensenBrown University

© 2011 DavidChristensen <www.philosophersimprint.org/011006/>

S ubtleties aside, a look at the topography of the disagree-mentdebate reveals amajordivide separatingpositions thatare generally hospitable to maintaining one’s confidence in

the face of disagreement, and positions thatwouldmandate exten-sive revision toouropinionsonmanycontroversialmatters.Letuscallpositionsofthefirstsort“Steadfast”andpositionsofthesecondsort “Conciliatory”.1The fundamental theoreticaldifferencebetweenthesetwocamps,itseemstome,liesintheirdifferingattitudestowardevaluatingtheepistemiccredentialsofopinionsvoicedbypeoplewithwhomonedisagrees.

Allpartieshold that theproperresponse to learningofanother’sdisagreementdependsonone’sepistemicevaluationof thatperson.Allpartiesholdthatone’sbeliefsabouttheotherperson’sintelligence,intellectualdiligence, acquaintancewith theevidence, and freedomfrombias, fatigue,or intoxicationarerelevant towhether (andhowmuch) that person’s disagreement should occasion one’s changingone’sbelief.Thecampsdiffer,though,onthisquestion:Inevaluatingtheepistemiccredentialsofanopinionexpressedbysomeonewhodisagreeswithmeaboutaparticularissue,mayImakeuseofmyownreasoningaboutthisveryissue?Clearly,totheextentthatImay,itwillfavorSteadfastness incertaincases.For thereasoning thatsupportsmyownviewaboutthedisputedmatterwillalsosupportthinkingthattheotherpersonhasgottenitwrong,atleastthistime,andthusthatIneednotworryaboutherdissent.

Tosimplifythediscussion,letusfocusoncaseswhereI’vearrivedatacertaindegreeofcredence inPandsubsequentlydiscover thatanotherpersonhasarrivedatadifferentdegreeofcredence.Appliedto this simple sort of case, the principle separating the two campsamountstosomethinglikethis:

Independence: In evaluating the epistemic credentialsof another’s expressedbelief about P, in order to deter-minehow(orwhether)tomodifymyownbeliefaboutP,

1. Itakethelabel“Conciliatory”fromElga(2010).

ImprintPhilosophers’

davidchristensen Disagreement, Question-Begging, and Epistemic Self-Criticism

philosophers’imprint –2– vol.11,no.6(march2011)

Conciliationism in general, aiming to show that the putting aside ofone’soriginalreasoningmandatedbyIndependenceleadstounaccept-ableconsequencesinothersortsofcases.

Below, I’ll first defend Conciliationism by arguing that Indepen-dencedoesnothavetheunappealingconsequencesthatsomehaveworriedabout.HavingmaderoomforaConciliationistaccount,I’llde-scribesomeissuesthatconfronttheprojectofdevelopingafullCon-ciliationistaccountofrationallyrespondingtodisagreement.I’llthenargue that these issuesmustbe faced evenby reasonable accountsthatrejectIndependence.Theissuesflowfromacertainfeatureofthewiderepistemologicalterritorythathasnotyetbeenwellexplored:ra-tionalaccommodationofevidencethatonehasmadecognitiveerrors.

1. Does respecting Independence amount to throwing away evidence?

ThefirstproblemI’dliketoconsiderisgivenforcefuldevelopmentbyThomasKelly(2010).KellyarguesagainstaparticularversionofCon-ciliationismhecallstheEqualWeightview:thatwhenIhavereasontothinkmyfriendisanepistemicpeer(thatis,thatsheisgenerallyequallyreliableinthedomaininquestion),andhavenoreason(inde-pendent of my own reasoning about P)tothinkherlessreliableaboutP,IshouldadjustmylevelofcredenceinPsoastosplitthedifferencewithher.Hisargumentproceedsviaaseriesofcases,twoofwhichIwilladaptheretomyterminology.

RightandWrong:RightandWrongaremutuallyacknowl-edgedpeersconsideringwhetherP.Att0,Rightformsa0.2credenceinP,andWrongformsa0.8credenceinP.Theevidenceavailabletobothofthemactuallysupportsa0.2credenceinP.2RightandWrongthencomparenotes,andrealizetheydisagree.

2. For the sakeof argument,Kellygrantsaprinciplehe thinks false: thatevi-dencewilldictateauniquevalueforrationalcredenceinaproposition.

Ishoulddosoinawaythatdoesn’trelyonthereasoningbehindmyinitialbeliefaboutP.

Themotivationbehind theprinciple isobvious: it’s intended topre-ventblatantlyquestion-beggingdismissalsoftheevidenceprovidedbythedisagreementofothers.ItattemptstocapturewhatwouldbewrongwithaP-believersaying,e. g.,“Well,so-and-sodisagreeswithmeaboutP.ButsincePistrue,she’swrongaboutP.Sohoweverreli-ableshemaygenerallybe,Ineedn’ttakeherdisagreementaboutPasanyreasonatalltoquestionmybelief.”

Thereisclearlysomethingworrisomeaboutthissortofresponsetothedisagreementofothers.Usedasageneraltactic,itwouldseemtoallowanon-experttodismisseventhedisagreementoflargenumbersofthosehetooktobeexpertsinthefield.AndConciliationism’srejec-tionofthissortofmoveallowsittodeliverintuitivelyattractivever-dictsinmanycasesinvolvingapparentparityofepistemiccredentials.Aparadigmexample(adaptedfromChristensen[2007])is:

MentalMath:Afteranicerestaurantmeal,myfriendandIdecide to tip20%andsplit thecheck, roundingup tothenearestdollar.Aswehavedonemanytimes,wedothemath inourheads.Wehave longandequallygoodtrackrecordsatthis(inthecaseswherewe’vedisagreed,checkingwithacalculatorhasshownusrightequallyfre-quently);andIhavenoreason(suchasthoseinvolvingalertnessortirednessordifferentialconsumptionofcof-feeorwine)forsuspectingoneofustobeespeciallygood,orbad,atthecurrentreasoningtask.Icomeupwith$43;butthenmyfriendannouncesthatshegot$45.

Insuchcases,evenopponentsofConciliationismtypicallyconcedethatIshouldbecomemuchlessconfidentthatmyshareis$43,andindeedshouldnotbesignificantlymoreconfident in$43than in$45.Never-theless,severalphilosophershaverecentlyofferedargumentsagainst



problemposedby thecasewouldaffectnot just theEqualWeightviewas definedbyKelly, but anyConciliatory view that reliedonIndependence.

Beforeassessingthisargument,letusexaminearelatedcasethatKellyusestosharpenhispoint:

WrongandWronger:WrongandWrongeraremutuallyacknowledgedpeersconsideringwhetherP.Att0,Wrongformsa0.7credenceinP,andWrongerformsa0.9cre-denceinP.Theevidenceavailabletobothofthemactual-lysupportsa0.2credenceinP.WrongandWrongerthencomparenotesandrealizetheydisagree.Theyfollowthedictates of EqualWeight, and at t1 they compromise at0.8.3

3. TheEqualWeightviewmayofcoursebedefinedtorequirethissortofdiffer-ence-splitting(andthisisindeedanaturalandinitiallyappealingformforaConciliationistviewto take).But it’s important tosee thatConciliationismneednotbecommittedto thisgeneralpolicy. In fact, Iwouldarguethat itactuallyrunscountertothemotivatinginsightbehindConciliationism:thatwemusttakeaccountofthepossibilitythatwe’vemadecognitivemistakes,andthatthebeliefsofothersserveaschecksonourcognition.ConsideracasewhereIcometohavefairlyhighcredence—say,.92—inP,asfollows:myinitialinclinationistobeevenmorecertainofP,butIscalebackmyconfi-denceabitbecauseIknowImakesomemistakes.Ithenlearnthatmyfriend,whomI taketobemypeeronsuchmatters,hasalsoconsideredthe issueandhasbecome.91confidentinP.Isupposethatshearrivedathercredenceinmuchthesamewayas Idid.But it seemsthat learningofhercredenceshouldmakememoreconfidentthatIdidn’tmakeamistake.Ifthat’sright,I should raisemy credencebeyond .92,not lower it asdifference-splittingwould dictate. This verdict is entirely consistent with Independence. It isalsoconsistentwith(intheintuitivesense)givingmyfriend’sopinionequalweight,andevenwiththeviewadvocatedinElga(2007),whencetheterm“EqualWeightView”derives.Moreover, therearetechnicaldifficultieswiththeuniformdifference-splittingformulationofConciliationism(seeShogenji[2007]andJehleandFitelson[2009]).Butwhile I thinkthat it’s importanttonotethatneitherConciliationismingeneral,norgivingone’speer’sopin-ionequalweightinparticular,requiresuniformdifference-splitting,neitherKelly’sargument,normydiscussionofit,turnsonthispoint.TheimportantissueisaboutIndependence.

Kellynotes that theEqualWeight view counsels themboth to splitthedifference,eachendingupatt1withcredence0.5.Butthis,Kellyar-gues,iscounterintuitive.Beforetheirepistemiccompromise,RightandWrongwereinstronglyasymmetricalsituations.But,Kellysays,“ForanadvocateoftheEqualWeightview,thisseeminglyimportantasymme-trycompletelywashesout”onceRightandWrongadjusttheirbeliefs:

Whatisquiteimplausible,Ithink,isthesuggestionthat[RightandWrong]arerationallyrequiredtomakeequally extensiverevisionsin[their]originalopinions,giventhat[Right’s]originalopinionwas,while [Wrong’s]wasnot,areasonableresponseto[their]originalevidence.Afterall,whatisreasonablefor[them]tobelieveafter[they]meetatt1presumablydependsonthetotalevidencethat[they]possessatthatpoint.(Kelly2010,123)

ItseemstomethatKellyisentirelycorrectinsayingthatweshouldnot see Right and Wrong as being in epistemically symmetricalsituationsatt1.Totheextentthatwedid,we’dbeoverlookingthebearingoftheoriginalevidenceonwhatRightandWrongshouldbelieve.AndthisisinfactthetrapKellyseestheEqualWeightviewasfallinginto:“Withrespecttoplayingaroleindeterminingwhatis reasonable for [them] to believe at t1, [the original evidence]getscompletelyswampedbypurelypsychologicalfactsaboutwhat[RightandWrong]believe”(ibid.,124).ThegeneralproblemKellylaysatthefeetoftheEqualWeightversionofConciliationism,then,is that itmakes rationalbelief indisagreementsituationsdependcompletelyonthe“psychologicalevidence”—evidenceaboutpeo-ple’sbeliefs.

Note that thisapparentproblemseems toflowdirectly fromIn-dependence. If Right could have relied on her reasoning about PinassessingWrong’sopinion,she’dhavehadareasonforthinkingWrongunlikelytobecorrectaboutP.Andinthatcase,Rightwouldnothavebeen required to compromise in theway shedid.So the



tellsuswhattheproperresponseistooneparticularkindofevidence.Thus the Equal Weight Conciliationist is committed to holding, inKelly’scases,thattheagentshavetakencorrectaccountofaparticu-lar bit of evidence—the evidenceprovidedby their peer’s disagree-ment.Buthavingtakencorrectaccountofonebitofevidencecannotbeequivalenttohavingbeliefsthatare(evenpropositionally)rational,allthingsconsidered.Ifonestartsoutbybotchingthingsepistemically,andthentakescorrectaccountofonebitofevidence,it’sunlikelythatonewillendupwithfullyrationalbeliefs.Anditwouldsurelybeask-ing toomuchofaprincipledescribing thecorrect response topeerdisagreement todemand that it includeacomplete recipe forundo-ingeveryepistemicmistakeonemightbemaking inone’s thinking.IfConciliationismisunderstoodintherightway,then,itisnotcom-mittedtodeemingthepost-compromisebeliefsinWrongandWrong-erautomatically rational.And inallowingus tocriticizeWrongandWronger’spost-compromisebeliefs,Conciliationismthusunderstooddoesnotentail,orevensuggest, thatWrongandWronger’soriginalevidencehasbecome irrelevant to the rationality of their post-com-promisebeliefs.4

AsimilarpointappliestotheasymmetryintheRightandWrongcase.Conciliationismdoesnot entail thatRight andWrong endupwithequallyrationalbeliefs.Nordoesitentailthattheywererational-lymandatedtomakeequallyextensiverevisionstotheiropinions.Ofcourse,itdoeshavetheconsequencethattherevisionscalled for by the

4. IshouldnotethatwhenIsaythatWrong’smovingto.5istakingcorrectac-countofonepieceofevidence,Idonotmeanthatmovingto.5iswhatWrongepistemicallyshoulddo,allthingsconsidered,uponreceivingthatevidence.ThedisagreementevidenceexertsrationalpressureonWronginthatdirec-tion,buttheoriginalevidenceexertsdifferentrationalpressure.It’snotcleartome that there is anoption forWrong that’s fully rational,holdingfixedhis initialerror.Ofcourse, there’sasense inwhich themaximally rationalresponseforWrong,andwhatheshoulddo,allthingsconsidered,istocor-rectlyassesstheoriginalevidence,andundohisinitialmistake.Butthecasesupposesthathedoesnotdothis.AskingwhatWrongshoulddo,holdingfixeda certainirrationalityonhispart,isdifferentfromsimplyaskingwhatheshoulddo.ThankstoStewCohenforpointingouttheneedtobecleareraboutthis.

Kellywrites:

On the Equal Weight view, [their] high level of confi-dencethat[P] is trueat time1 is theattitudethat is rea-sonablefor[them]totake,despitethepoorjobeachof[them]hasdoneinevaluating[their]originalevidence…However, it isdubious that rationalbelief is so easy tocomeby.(Kelly2010,126)

Again,Kelly’sintuitiveverdictonthecaseseemscorrect:weshouldnot see Wrong and Wronger’s post-compromise beliefs as ratio-nal.Again,todosowouldbetotreattheiroriginalevidenceasifitdidn’tmatter.

Thusitwould,Ithink,beverydamagingtoConciliationistviewsiftheirinsistenceonIndependenceamountedtoinsistingthatone’soriginalevidencewas irrelevant to the rationalityof thebeliefsoneendedupwithaftermakingone’sconciliatoryepistemiccompromise.Nevertheless,itseemstomethat,fortwoseparatereasons,theCon-ciliationistpositiondoesnothavethisconsequence.

Thefirstreasonturnsondistinguishingdoxasticfrompropositionalsensesofrationalbelief.IfmyevidencesupportsP(sothatPis,inthepropositionalsense,rationalformetobelieve),andIinfactdobelievethatP,mybeliefmayyetfailtobe(doxastically)rational.Itwillfail,forexample,ifIformmybeliefbecauseofwishfulthinking,andnotatallonthebasisofmyevidence.AnditwillalsofailtoberationalinthissenseifIinferitfrommyevidencebutbotchtheinferentialthinkingbadlyandonlyhappen toarriveatbelievingPbymakingmutuallycompensatingerrors.Nowit isclear thatoneof theagents inRightandWrong,andbothoftheagentsinWrongandWronger,basetheirbeliefs(atleastinpart)onbotchedinferencefromE.SothereshouldbenodifficultyfortheConciliationistinexplainingwhytheseagents’beliefsfallshortrationally.

Thesecondreasonis,Ithink,moreinteresting.Toseeit,letusfocusonwhatConciliationismisdesignedtodo(forthepresent,I’llworkwithKelly’sEqualWeightversionofConciliationism).Conciliationism



Andifeachofthemhasintheendreachedthesamecredenceonthebasisof the sameevidence,howcanwe say thatWrong’s credencefallsshortrationally,whileRight’sdoesnot?7

Tobeginthinkingaboutthispuzzle,supposeweapproachedtheexample by considering a third party confronted with E1–E3, andaskingwhat,fromaConciliationistpointofview,sheshouldbelieveaboutP. In fact, it seems tome that suchanagent confrontedwithE1–E3shouldnotendupgivingP0.5credence,asI’veclaimedthattheimpeccablyrationalRightshould.SuchanagentshouldofcoursetaketheimportofE1tobetorationalize0.2credenceinP.Butthenshe’dseethatoneotheragentagreesandonedisagrees.TheundercuttingpowerofWrong’sbeliefisdilutedbythesupportingpowerofRight’s.Sotheagentshouldendupwithcredencesomewherebelow0.5.8AndthisisinfactwhereKellythinksRightshouldendup.

ButdoesourconclusionaboutthethirdpartycarryovertoRight?Interestingly, I think, itdoesnot.And thereason for this involvesafacetoftheepistemologyofdisagreementthathasn’tbeenfullyarticu-lated:thattheevidentialforceoftheinformationexpressedinclaimslikeE2andE3dependscruciallyonwhethertheagentrespondingtotheevidenceisidenticaltooneoftheagentsmentionedinE2andE3.Inordertoseehowthisdependenceworks,letusfirstconsiderasim-plercaseinvolvingevidenceofpossiblecognitivemalfunction.

SupposeI’mparticipatinginplacebo-controlledtrialsofareason-distortingdrug.Thedrughasbeenshowntocausepeople tomakemistakes inalgebraic reasoningbut to leavemostof their cognitivefacultiesunscathed.Moreover,thoseaffectedbythedrugdonotnotice

7. ThiswayofdescribingtheevidenceisfromKelly(2010).ThepuzzleisalsoduetoKelly,inconversation.

8. This assumes that the agent has some reason for epistemically respectingRightandWrong,sosheshouldtaketheirviewsintoaccount.ItalsoassumesthattheagentdoesnotseeRightandWrongassuchexperts(relativetoher-self) that sheshouldnoteven try tofigureout the importof theevidencedirectly,butinsteadshouldjustbaseherbeliefsonRight’sandWrong’s.Onewayofavoidingbothissues:stipulatethattheagenthasexcellentevidenceofpeerhoodwithRightandWrong.

disagreement evidenceareequallyextensive.Butthisdoesn’terasethefactthatWronghadotherreasonsforrevision,reasonswhichwouldmandategreaterchangesinhisbelief.

EqualWeightConciliationismis committedtoholdingthat(atleastinsomeversionsofthissortofcase),5.5isthecredencemostrationalforRighttoadopt(supposingnootherbackgroundirrationalityinthecase).Butthisstrikesmeasroughlycorrect.6Rightreactedcorrectlytotheoriginalevidence.Shethenencounteredfurtherevidence,which(asitturnedout)wasmisleading.Butrespectingmisleadingevidenceisnorationaldefect.SotheConciliationistshouldbeperfectlycom-fortablewithgivinghersealofapproval toRight’smakingmajoral-terationstoheroriginalrationalbelief.

It turns out, then, that Conciliationism’s respecting of Indepen-dencedoesnotafterallrenderirrelevantthereasoningandevidenceonwhichConciliatoryagentsbasetheirinitialbeliefs.

2. A Follow-Up Objection and Agent-Specific Evidence

TheargumentoftheprevioussectionshowsthatrespectingIndepen-dencedoesn’tentail throwingawayevidence.Butthesecondof theaboveresponsestoKelly’sfirstcasemayseemtolayConciliationismopentoadifferentdifficulty.Afterall, itwouldseemthatRightandWronghaveexactlythesamethreebitsofevidence:

E1: TheoriginalevidencerelevanttoP.

E2: ThefactthatRightreachedcredence0.2onthebasisofE1.

E3: ThefactthatWrongreachedcredence0.8onthebasisofE1.

5. I have in mind cases where Right’s dispute-independent evaluation ofWrong’sbeliefwouldprovideextremelystrongreasontobelievethatWrongisequallywell-informed,andequally likely tohave reasoned fromtheevi-dencecorrectly,asintheMentalMathcaseabove.(SeeSections6and7formoreonthis.)

6. Thereasonforthequalification“roughly”willbeexplainedbelow.



Right’sevidenceis:


E2r: ThefactthatIreachedmypresentcredence0.2onthebasisofE1.

E3r:Thefactthatmypeerreachedcredence0.8onthebasisofE1.

Wrong’sevidenceis:


E2w:Thefactthatmypeerreachedcredence0.2onthebasisofE1.

E3w:ThefactthatIreachedmypresentcredence0.8ontheba-sisofE1.

NowhowshouldthedifferencebetweenRight’sandWrong’seviden-tialsituationsaffecttheirrespectivecredencesinP?Theanswertothisquestiondependsonhowtheidentityoftheagentsfiguresintotheepistemicimportofthebitsofevidencedescribedabove.

Considerfirsthowanagentshouldregardtheinformationthatsheherselfhasreachedacertainconclusionfromherevidence.SupposeIdosomecalculationsinmyheadandbecomereasonablyconfidentoftheanswer43.IthenreflectonthefactthatIjustgot43.Itdoesnotseemthatthisreflectionshouldoccasionanychangeinmyconfidence.Ontheotherhand,supposeIlearnthatmyreliablefriendgot43.This,itseems,shouldmakememoreconfidentinmyanswer.Similarly,ifIlearnthatmyfriendgot45,thisshouldmakemelessconfident.9

The fact that thefirst-personpsychological evidence is relativelyinertinthisrespectisexactlywhatonewouldexpect,giventhemain

9. I do not expect these judgments to be very controversial. Evenmost non-Conciliationistphilosophersconcedethatincaseslikethis,thedisagreementofafriendshouldmakemelessconfident;andtakingagreementofafriendtojustifyincreasedconfidenceisjusttheothersideofthesamecoin.

thattheiralgebraicreasoningisimpaired;infact,theyseemtothem-selvestobethinkingasclearlyanddistinctlyastheyeverdo.I’vebeenthroughseveraltrials,somewiththedrugandsomewiththeplacebo,andI’veneverseemedtomyselftohavebeenaffected;butwatchingthe tapes ofmyself in previous trials, I seemyself earnestly—evenheatedly—insistingonthepatentlymistakenconclusionsI’vedrawnontheassignedproblemswhenIgot theactivepills. It seemsclearthat,insuchasituation,ifI’mgivenapillandthenaskedtodrawaconclusionfromsomeevidencethatrequiresalgebraicinterpretation,IshouldbefarlessconfidentofmyanswerthanIordinarilywouldbe.

Nowsupposewerepresentedmyevidenceasfollows:

E1: The evidence presented as part of the experimentalproblem

E2: dchada50%chanceoftakinganactivepill

Clearly,arationalthirdpartypresentedwithE1andE2wouldnotbemuchbotheredbyE2.Infact,E2seemslikeitshouldbecompletelyevidentiallyirrelevanttothebeliefoneshouldendupwithaboutthealgebra problem—for everyone except dc. (More precisely, E2’s rel-evanceforanagentwilldependonthedegreetowhichtheagentbe-lievessheisdc.Onemightevenwanttofactorinwhethertheagent’sconfidence that she’sdc is rational.But letus leave these complica-tionsaside, and just consider caseswhereagentshave rationalandcorrectbeliefsabouttheiridentities.)Sointhissortofcase,theratio-nalimportofevidenceisagent-specific.

Now,whenI’mconfidentthatP,andfindoutthatmyfriendiscon-fident that not-P, the evidenceprovidedbydisagreement is at leastpartlyofasimilarsort.GiventhatmyfriendandIhaveaccesstothesamefirst-orderevidence,herdisagreementwithmeisalsoevidencethatI’vemisconstruedtheimportofthatfirst-orderevidence.Inthisrespect,it’sliketheunderminingevidenceinthedrugexample.ThissuggeststhattheevidenceRightandWronghaveinthecaseabovemightbedescribedmoreperspicuouslyasfollows:



disagreementshouldtypicallyoccasionsomechangeofbelief.Still,ina case likeRight andWrong,Kellynotes that thepsychological evi-denceisbalanced:Right’sbeliefpointstowardnot-PjustasstronglyasWrong’sbeliefpointstowardP.Suchbalancedpsychologicalevidence“tends to pushwhat it is reasonable for us to believe about the hy-pothesisinthedirectionofagnosticism”(2010,143).Thus,giventhatthenon-psychologicalevidencestronglyfavorsnot-P,it’sreasonabletoexpectthatthetotalevidenceintheexamplefavorsnot-P,thoughlessstronglythandoesthenon-psychologicalevidencealone.Ifthis“balancingargument”isright,thenevenifweadmitsomeconciliation,thecorrectcredenceinPtoadoptherewouldseemtofallwellbelowRight’s0.5,contraEqualWeightConciliationism.

Aswesawabove,thisverdictisinawayexactlycorrect:itnicelydescribeshowathirdpartyshouldevaluateE1–E3.Butifwedescribethecaseinawaythatabstractsfromwhetherthepersonconfrontingtheevidenceisathirdparty,or isoneofthesubjectsofthepsycho-logicalevidence,wewillmissanimportantdeterminantofrationalbe-lief.TheproponentofEqualWeightConciliationismshouldconcurinKelly’sverdictonathird-partyversionoftheexample.ButsheshoulddissentifthedescriptionismeanttoapplytoRight’sbeliefs.ForRight,ifshetakesaccountofthetotalevidenceassheoughtto,willtakepsy-chologicalinformationaboutherfriend’sbeliefstobeimportantevi-dence,inawaythatpsychologicalinformationaboutherownbeliefsisnot.Forher,then,thebalancingargumentdoesnotapply.11

11. Analoguesofthebalancingargumentclearlyfailincasesnotrelatedtodis-agreement.SupposethatJockovisitsanartmuseumtoseethenewexhibit,(unde)r(min)ed!Uponentering,JockobeholdsStudy: 4b,thefirstpaintinghecomes to. It appears tohim tobe a simple red rectangle. Jocko concludesthat(a)Study: 4bisaredrectangle,and(b)themuseum’scurrentexhibitisunlikelytoproverewardingforhim.Asheleaves,henoticesanartist’sstate-mentexplainingtheshow.Theartisthaspainted50%ofthecanvassesred,and50%white,andthenlit thewhiteoneswithdeceptivelightingsothattheylookjustliketheredones.ConsideringJocko’stotalevidenceastoStudy: 4b’sredness,wenowhave:

E1:theappearanceofStudy: 4b E2:theinformationonthesign

intuitive rationale for adjustingone’sbeliefs in the faceof disagree-mentwith anequally informed friend. Since I recognize that Imaysometimesmisconstruetheimportofevidence,Iseethatmyfriend’sreactiontothesameevidencemaywellconfirmordisconfirmmyhav-ingassessedthatevidencecorrectly.Butclearly,Icannotusemyownreactiontotheevidenceasacheckinthisway.Thusforme,psycho-logicalreportsaboutothersserveasakindofepistemicresourcethatpsychologicalreportsaboutmyselfdonot.

Thereisasense,then,inwhichRightandWronghavedifferentevi-dencetoreactto.10Ineachcase,wemaytakethefirst-personpsycho-logicalevidencetobeincapableofprovidingthesortofcheckonone’sreasoningthatthird-personevidenceprovides.Inthissense,itisrela-tivelyinert.Sotheimportantdeterminantsofwhat’srationalforRighttobelievearetheoriginalevidenceE1(whichshould,anddoes,moveher toput0.2credence inP),andWrong’sdissent(whichdoesand,accordingtotheEqualWeightConciliationist,shouldmoveherfrom0.2to0.5).Incontrast,thedeterminantsofwhatWrongshouldbelieveareE1(whichshouldmovehimtowardhaving0.2credenceinP),andRight’sbelief(whichalsoshouldmovehimtoward0.2).Lookedatthisway, it’snotsurprisingthathisarrivingat0.5rather than0.2 is lessthanfullyrational.

The upshot is this: Right’s andWrong’s evidential situations arenotsymmetrical.Uponcloserexamination,itturnsoutthattheirtwosituationsdonotrationalizethesamedegreeofconfidenceinP.AndthuswhenRightandWrongarriveatthesamedegreeofconfidenceinP,theConciliationistneednotconsidertheirdegreesofconfidenceequallyrational,orequallysupportedbytheevidence.

Understandingthepowerofdisagreement-basedevidenceinthiswayalsodisarmsarelatedworryabouttheEqualWeightversionofConciliationismvoicedinKelly(2010).Supposewegrantthatthecor-rectresponsetodisagreementisnotcompletelySteadfast—thatpeer

10. I’mnotsurethatit’squiterighttosaythattheyhavedifferentevidence,ratherthanthattheirdifferentpositionsmaketherationalimportoftheircommonevidencedifferent.Idon’tthinkanythingimportanthangsonthis.



through theproblem. I thencarefullycheckmyanswer,anditchecksout.Ithentakeoutmywell-testedcalculator,andredotheproblemandchecktheresultinafewdiffer-entways.AsIdoallofthisIfeelfullyclearandalert.EachtimeIdotheproblem,Igettheexactsameanswer,$43,andeachtimeIcheckthisanswer,itchecksoutcorrectly.Sincethemathproblemissoeasy,andI’vecalculatedandcheckedmyanswersocarefully inseveral independentways, I nowhave an extremely high degree of rationalconfidencethatoursharesare$43.Thensomethingverystrangehappens.Myfriendannouncesthatshegot$45!

Here,many people feel that I should not reducemy confidence in$43veryfaratall.AndthisintuitionholdsevenifwestipulatethatIcouldseemyfriendwritingnumbersonpaperandpushingcalculatorbuttons,andthatmyfriendassuresmethatshedidhercalculationsslowlyandcarefully,feltclearwhiledoingthem,andgothersamean-swerrepeatedly.ItseemsthatI’dbereasonableinthiscasetosuspectstronglythatsomethingscrewymustbegoingonwithmyfriend.12

Thisintuition—whichtoalargedegreeIshare—seemstocutdi-rectlyagainstConciliationism,andparticularlyagainstIndependence.Why,afterall,doIsuspect thatsomethingscrewywentonwithmyfriend? It’s just because she reported getting $45.And the only rea-sonthatthatwouldindicateanythingamissisthatI’mquitesurethatthe answer is not $45.Yetmy reason for being so sure that the an-swerisnot$45isjustmyownmeticulousreasoningshowingittobe$43!Thus,indescribingasimilarcase,Sosawrites:“NowIamintheMoore-likepositionofhavingtosaythat ifhisprocedurehasledtothatresult,theremustbesomethingwrongwithhisprocedure…Istill

12. SosaandLackeyalsodiscusssomewhatmoreextreme,butlessrealistic,ver-sionsofthistypeofexample:disagreementaboutmaximallyclearperceptualbelief(e. g.,whenIseesomeonesittingatthetablewithus,andmyfriendclaimsthatthere’snoonethere),anddisagreementaboutelementarymath(e. g.,myfriendinsiststhat2+2=5).Iworryabitaboutintuitionsbasedonsuchfar-fetchedexamples.Nevertheless,IthinkthatthediscussionbelowofCarefulCheckingwillapplytothemaswell.

Insum:AstronglyConciliationistviewisperfectlyconsistentwithourjudgmentsaboutrationalresponsestothetotalevidenceincaseslikeRightandWrong.Infact,ithelpsconnecttheepistemologyofdis-agreementtoamoregeneralepistemicphenomenon:thespecialwayinwhichevidenceofacertainagent’spossiblecognitivemalfunctionshouldinformthatparticularagent’sbeliefs.

3. Hard Cases: Extremely High Rational Confidence

Iwouldlikeinthenextfewsectionstoturntoexaminequiteadif-ferentsortofworryaboutConciliationism:thatitgetscertaincasesclearlywrong.Thefirstsortofhardcasesareoneswhereanagentbeginswithextremelyhighrationalconfidenceinherbelief.Invari-oussuchcases,itseemswrongtoholdthatsheshouldreviseherbe-liefmuchatall,eveniftheagent’sfrienddisagreessharply,andevenif,beforediscoveringthedisagreement,shewouldhaveconsideredthefriendherepistemicpeeronthesortof issueinquestion.Thissuggests that it is, after all, legitimate for the agent todemoteherfriend’sdissentingopiniononthebasisofherownreasoningonthematterunderdispute.Inotherwords,itsuggeststhatIndependencefailsinthesecases.

LetmebeginwithanexamplebasedonsimilarexamplesinpapersbyJenniferLackey,ErnestSosa,andBryanFrances:

CarefulChecking:Iconsidermyfriendmypeeronmat-tersofsimplemath.SheandIare inarestaurant,figur-ingoursharesofthebillplus20%tip,roundeduptothenearestdollar.Thetotalonthebillisclearlyvisibleinun-ambiguousnumbers.Insteadofdoingthemathonceinmyhead,Itakeoutapencilandpaperandcarefullygo

Clearly,whenJockohadjustE1togoon,hewasreasonableincomingtobelievethatStudy: 4bwasred;E1byitselfstronglyfavorsthisconclusion.AndE2isbalanced, inthesensethat itpushestherationalbelievertowardsag-nosticismregardingStudy: 4b’sredness.ButitclearlydoesnotfollowthatthetotalevidenceE1andE2favorshavinggreaterthan0.5credencethatStudy: 4bisred.



isthatoneofushasexperiencedsomebizarrementalmalfunctionresultinginerrorsthatsomehowledtothesamewronganswerinalltheindependentwaysofdoingandcheckingtheproblem.Anotheris thatoneofus isactuallyexhausted,ordrunk,or tripping,orex-periencingaconfusingpsychoticepisode,andisreallyonlymanag-ingtogothroughtheexternalmotionsofrecalculatingandchecking,without actuallypaying clear attention.Still another is thatoneofusisjustjoking,ormessingwiththeother’sheadforfun.Anotheristhatoneofusisdeliberatelymakingfalseclaimsabouthisorheranswer,forthepurethrillofbald-facedlying,oraspartofapsycho-logicalorphilosophicalexperiment,orperhapsinanearnestattempttoproblematizethehegemonyofphallogocentricobjectivitybyanactofperformanceart.

Thisisnotanexhaustivelistofexplanationsforthedivergenceofourannouncedanswers.Butitisenough,Ithink,toshowwhyIaminapositiontobelievethattheanswermyfriendannouncedislesslikelytobecorrectthanmineis.Forexample,whileIcandefinitivelyruleoutthepossibilitythatI’vedeliberatelyannouncedanincorrectanswerforrecreational,experimental,orperformance-artisticreasons,Icannotbenearlysosureofrulingoutthesepossibilitiesformyfriend.Similarly,whileIcanbeverysurethatIwasactuallypayingattentionratherthangoingthroughthemotionsofcheckingmyanswer,Ican-notbenearlysosurethatmyfriendwas.Andwhilethereareconceiv-ablesortsofmentalmalfunctionthatwouldaffectmyreasoningwith-outmyhavinganysignoftrouble,mostreason-distortingmentalmal-functions comewith clear indicationsofpossible trouble:dizziness,seeingpatternsmovingonthewall,memoriesofrecentdrug-takingorofpsychoticepisodes.AndI’minamuchbetterpositiontoruletheseoutformyselfthanIamformyfriend.LetmeputtheinformationI’mdependingoninallthesecasesunderthecommonlabel,takenfromLackey, of “personal information”. The personal information I haveaboutmyselfinCarefulCheckingprovidesaperfectlyreasonableba-sisformycontinuingtothinkthatoursharesofthebillaremuchmore

lack independent reason to downgrademy opponent’s relevant judg-ment andhis epistemic credentials on the question that divides us.OnlybasedonourdisagreementcanInowdemotehim”(forthcom-ing,ms.18–19).AndLackeysaysthatcasesinvolvingextremelyhighjustifiedconfidence“showpreciselywhycondition(1)[aformulationofIndependencefromChristensen(2007)]shouldbeeliminatedfromChristensen’saccount”(forthcoming,ms.45,fn.33).

I think that, on closer inspection, cases involving ultra-high ini-tialrationalconfidencedonotendupunderminingIndependence.13 LetusbeginbyconsideringwhatIshouldthinkofmyinitialopinioninCarefulChecking.Beinggenerallycompetentatelementarymathproblems,havingdonethecalculationsrepeatedlyandcarefullybothon paper andwith a well-tested calculator, having checked the an-swerinmultipleindependentways,andfeelingveryclear-headedandalertthroughout,Ishouldthinkthatitwouldbeextremely unlikelyforsomeoneinmysituationtohavegotten(andverified)thesamewronganswereachtime.Thatgoeshand-in-handwiththelegitimacyofmyhavingultra-highconfidenceinmyanswer.

Butifthat’sright,here’ssomethingelsethatwouldbeextremelyunlikely:twopeople,bothgenerallycompetentatelementarymath,whoworked on the same problem, each having done the calcula-tionsrepeatedlyandcarefullybothonpaperandwithawell-testedcalculator,eachhavingcheckedtheanswerinmultipleindependentways,eachfeelingveryclear-headedandalertthroughout,andeachrepeatedlycomingupwith(andverifying)adifferentanswer.Thisisimportant,becauseitmeansthat,inthestrangescenariodescribedin Careful Checking, I have good reason to think that somethingscrewyhasgoneon.

Whatpossibleexplanationsarethereforthedivergencebetweenourannouncedanswers inCarefulChecking?Well,onepossibility

13. MyexplanationforthisfollowsthestrategybrieflysketchedinChristensen(2007,200–203).ItalsodrawsheavilyonLackey’s(forthcomingand2010)insightful analysis of this type of example. The conclusion I’ll draw aboutIndependence,however,isoppositefromhers.



sincerelyannounceabeliefthatwasformedbyahighlyreliablemethod.

NoticethatthisreasoningdoesnotevenrefertotheparticularanswerIgot. In fact, the reasoningcouldhavebeen formulated inadvanceofmydoinganycalculation,orevenseeingthebill!Thisshowsthatwhilethereasoningreliesoncertainfactsabout the reasoning I use, itdoesnotrelyonmyreasoningitself.Ittakesintoaccountthefactthatwedisagreed,butitdoesnotdependonthesubstanceofthedisagree-ment.Soitdoesnotbegthequestionagainstmyfriend’sbeliefinthewayIndependenceisdesignedtoprevent.

Thusmyreason formaintainingmybelief in thiscase isentirelyconsonant with the sort of positions advocated by Conciliationistwriters.Itisobviousthatinconsideringtheepistemicimportofone’sfriend’s expressed beliefs, onemust take into account certain factsaboutone’s reasoning. If Iknowthat I’vebeenreasoningwhile trip-ping,or if Iknowthat the reasoningmethod I’veused isonlymod-erately reliable, that givesme reason to accordmoreweight tomyfriend’sdisagreement(to theextent,ofcourse, that Idoubt thatherownreasoningsuffers fromthesesortsofweaknesses).Similarly, totheextentthatIknowmyownreasoningtohavebeenofaparticularlyreliable sort, that givesme reason togivemy friend’sdisagreementlessweight(totheextent,again,thatIdoubtthatherownreasoningisofthissameparticularlyreliablesort).AndImaybringthesesortsofconsiderationstobearwithoutrelyingonmyowninitialreasoningconcerningthedisputedmatter.

Itseemstomethatthissortoftreatmentappliesparticularlynicelytotheabove-mentionedextremeexamplesofferedbycriticsofInde-pendence:caseswhereone’s friendclaimstobelievethatthere’snooneelseatthetable,orthat2+2=5.Ifsuchabizarresituationwereactually tooccur, I thinkonewould reasonably take itasextremelyunlikely thatone’s friend(a)was feelingasclear-headedasoneself;(b)hadnomemoriesofrecentdrug-ingestionsorpsychoticepisodes;andmostimportantly,(c)wasbeingcompletelysincere.Thus,touse

likelytobe$43than$45,despitediscoveringthedisagreementofmyheretoforeequallyreliablefriend.14

Ifthisismybasisformaintainingmybelief,haveIviolatedInde-pendence?ItseemstomethatIhavenot.True,insupportingmysus-picionthatsomethingscrewyhasgoneonwithmyfriend,IreliedontheclaimthatIarrivedatmyanswertothemathproblembyaveryreliablemethod.Butmy reasoningdidnot relyon the resultsofmycalculationsatall.Ididnotsay,“WellI’mverysuretheansweris$43.Myfriendsaysit’s$45,sosomethingscrewymusthavegoneonwithher.”ThatsortofreasoningwouldindeedviolateIndependence.ButthereasoningIusedwasquitedifferent.Itwasmorelikethis:

Iarrivedatmyanswerbyanextremelyreliablemethod.Itisveryunlikelythattwopeopleemployingsuchmethodswouldendupsincerelyannouncingincompatiblebeliefs.Thebeliefmy friendannouncedwas incompatiblewiththeoneatwhich Iarrived.This is strongevidence thatoneofusdidnotarriveathisorherbeliefinahighlyreli-ableway,orthatoneofusisnotsincerelyannouncinghisorherbelief. Icaneliminate(viapersonal information)manyof theways that I couldhave failed touse a reli-ablemethod,aswellasthepossibilitythatmyannounce-mentwasnotsincere.ButIcannoteliminateanalogouspossibilities formyfriend.Soit’s likelythatshedidnot

14. Myusageof ‘personal information’hereencompassesawider rangeofex-amplesthanthosementionedbyLackey.Sheincludesinformationrelevanttovariouspossibilitiesofcognitivemalfunction;I’veextendedittoincludeinformationrelevanttopossibilitiesofinsincereassertion.ButIthinkthatmyusageofthephrase,aswellastheroleIgivepersonalinformationinassess-ingtheevidentialforceofmyfriend’sdisagreement,isverymuchinthespiritofLackey’sanalysis.

Frances (2010)andFumerton(2010)alsoargue that incertaindisagree-mentswhereonebeginswithultra-highrationalconfidence,onewillreason-ablysuspectthatone’sfriendisjokingorcrazy,andthusoneneedn’treviseone’sbelief.Neithermakesthispoint inthecontextofevaluatingIndepen-dence(thoughinotherpartsoftheirpapers,Francesseemssympatheticto,andFumertonseemstodeny,somethinglikeIndependence).



everydaysortofslip.Unfortunately,mypersonalinformationdoesnothelpmetoeliminatethispossibility formyself.Ofcourse, therearealso theexoticpossibilities consideredabove: thatoneofus is trip-ping,psychotic,joking,lying,etc.Andmypersonalinformationdoesallowmetoeliminatevariousexoticpossibilitiesformyselfandnotformyfriend.Butsincetheseexoticscenariosaresounlikely,thefactthatIcaneliminatesomeofthemhasonlyatinyeffectontheplausibilityofexplainingthedisagreementinawaythatinvolvesthefalsityofmyfriend’sclaim.ThatiswhyIshould(incategoricalterms)suspendbe-lief,or(ingradedterms)comeclosetosplittingthedifferencewithmyfriend,inthesenseofseeingthetwoanswersasaboutequallylikelytobecorrect.15

InCarefulChecking,bycontrast,thehighdegreeofrationalconfi-denceIhaveinmyinitialbeliefiscorrelatedwithmyrationallytakingmyreasoningmethodtobeextremelyreliable.Anditistheextremereliabilityof thismethod,amethodwhicheliminates the “everydaymentalslip”explanationofourdisagreement,whichbothmakesthissortofdisagreement sounusualandmakes theexoticexplanationsvastlymoreprobable,shouldadisagreementoccur.(Thisiswhyit’sonlyinthesecasesthatI’llthinkthatsomethingscrewymustbegoingon.)Atthispoint,whenpersonalinformationallowsmetoeliminateseveralexoticpossibilities formyself,butnot formy friend, thebal-anceofprobabilityisshifteddramaticallyovertoexplanationsinvolv-ingthefalsityofmyfriend’sexpressedbelief.

Thusitturnsoutthatmyhighdegreeofinitialrationalconfidenceiscorrelatedwithmylegitimatelymaintainingmybeliefincertaincas-es.It’scorrelatedbecausewhenhighinitialconfidenceisappropriate,onegenerallymaytakeone’sreasoningmethodtobeextremelyreli-able,whichinturneliminateseverydayexplanationsforthedisagree-ment,andmakesexoticexplanations—whichtendtobesensitiveto

15. It’sworthnotingthateveneliminatingafewhighlyimprobableexoticscenar-iosallowsmetofavormyownbeliefatinybit.SotheavailabilityofpersonalinformationdoesmeanthatIshouldnotexactlysplitthedifference,eveninMentalMath.ButConciliationismshouldnotbeseenassayingotherwise.

Lackey’sterm,one’spersonalinformation(thatonewasfeelingclear,lackedmemoriessuggestingmentalmalfunction,andwasbeingsin-cereinone’sassertion)wouldintroducearelevantasymmetry,andonecouldreasonablymaintainone’sbelief.Eventhesinglepossibilitythatmyfriendwasobnoxiouslymessingwithmyhead,inpartpreciselybyassuringmerepeatedlyandwithastraightfacethatallwasclearandsincereonherend,wouldbefarmorelikelythanthepossibilitythatthetwoofuswereengagedinasoberandearnestdisagreementoverwhethertherewasanotherfriendatthetable,orwhether2+2addedupto4.ButnothinginthisreasoningunderminesIndependence.

4. An Objection to this Analysis

Itisworthconsideringoneobviousobjectiontotheclaimthatmain-tainingbeliefintheabovecasesisconsistentwithIndependence.Theobjectionisbasedonacomparisonbetweenthecaseswe’vebeendis-cussing and cases involving significantly lower degrees of initial ra-tionalconfidence.Onemightpointoutthatthepersonalinformation,whichprovides the independentbasis formy thinkingmyselfmorelikelytoberightinCarefulChecking,isalsopresentinMentalMath,whereoneclearlyshouldreduceone’sconfidencedramatically.AndasLackeypointsout,theobviousdifferencebetweenthiscaseandCare-fulCheckingissimplythedegreeofrationalconfidenceIhaveinmyinitialopinion;soinsomeway,myhighinitialrationalconfidenceen-ablesthepersonalinformationtoplayitskeyroleinCarefulChecking.Thismightleadonetosuspect,then,thatmymaintainingmybeliefinCarefulCheckingmustafterallrely onmyreasoningconcerningthedisputedmatter.

Ithink,though,thatacloselookathowrationalconfidenceandtheefficacyofpersonalinformationarerelatedrevealsthatthisisnotso.Considerhowonewouldexplainmyfriend’sexpresseddisagreementinMentalMath.Iknowthatdoingaproblemonceinmyheadisnotanextremelyreliableprocess,becausepeoplecommonlymakeunde-tectedslipsinmentalcalculation.Sotheoverwhelminglylikelyexpla-nationforourdisagreementobviously lies inoneofusmakingthis



confident inP.But as the conversationdevelops, I findthatStrangerandIdisagreeequallysharplyaboutQ,R,S,T,andsoon—ahugelistofclaims.Andtheseclaimsarenotpartofsometightlyinterconnectedsetofclaimsthatwouldbeexpectedtostandorfalltogether:they’relargelyindependentofoneanother.DoInowhavetobe-comesignificantlylessconfidentaboutallofthem?

Here, itmightwellseemintuitivelymorereasonable formetostopputtingsomuchstockinStranger’sclaims.AsKellynotes(2010,164–165),itseemsthatIshouldinsteadreevaluatemyoriginalopinionofStrangerandbecomeincreasinglyconfidentthatI’mbetteratevaluat-ingevidenceinthisfield.Infact,itseemsthatthereasonableresponsetotherepeateddisagreementswillincludemovingbacktobeingquiteconfidentinP.16

ThismightseemtocutagainstConciliationism.Afterall,ifConcili-ationismrequiresmetobecomemuch lessconfident inPwhenwedisagreeaboutP,itmightseemthatitcannotthenallowmetousere-peateddisagreementsbetweenusasymmetricallytolowermygeneraltrustinStranger’sbeliefsandregainmyconfidenceinP.

Itturnsout,though,thatConciliationismdoesallowexactlythistohappen.Thisisshownbythefollowing(fairlyrealistic)fillingoutoftheSeminarcase:

Seminar, Continued: In addition to believing anteced-entlythatI’mquitereliableinmeteorology,andthatthevastmajorityofothersareaboutequallyreliable, Ialsobelievethatthereareaveryfewpeople—callthemmete-orologicallyderanged—whoarehorriblyunreliable.I’m

16. ThestructureoftheexampleisKelly’s,thoughI’vefilledinorchangedvariousaspectsofthecase.KellypressesthisexampleasacounterargumenttoElga’s(2007)bootstrappingargument forhisEqualWeightview.Kellyalsospeci-fiesinhisexamplethatasamatteroffact,myinitialopinionontheissuesunderdisputeisinfacttherationalone.Butitseemstomethatevenwithoutmakingthisassumption,theexampleelicitstheintuitionsinquestion.

personalinformation—muchmoreprobable.Butnoneofthisunder-mines Independence. For in adjudicating explanations for our dis-agreementinanyofthesecases,Idonotrelyonmyreasoningaboutthedisputedmatter.

Beforeleavingdiscussionofcasesinvolvingextremelyhighratio-nalconfidence,it’sworthemphasizingapointabouthowthesecasesrelatetoConciliationismingeneral.It’sobviousthatmostoftheissuesthat are subject to controversy are nothing like the issue ofwheth-erourfriendisbeforeus,orwhether2+2=4.Ahallmarkofthelattercases—whichis intimatelyrelatedtotheir involvingextremelyhighlevelsofrationalconfidence—isexactlythatbeliefsformedinthesewaysarevirtuallyneversubjecttodisagreement.Soit’sworthnotingthateveniftheConciliationistsharestheSteadfastview’sverdictoncasesinvolvingextremelyhighrationalconfidence,thereisnoreasontothinkthattherationalpermissibilityofmaintainingone’sbeliefinthesecaseswillbleedoverintothecontroversialcaseswhichgivethedisagreementissuesomeofitsurgency.Thisisthereasonthatthethe-oreticaldiagnosisof theextremecases—and inparticular, theques-tionofwhethertheyrequireviolationofIndependence—isimportant.

5. Hard Cases, Cont’d: Multiple Disagreements

ThereisanotherkindofcasewhichputsatleastprimafaciepressureonConciliationism.LetmeillustrateitwithanexamplebasedononefromKelly(2010):

Seminar: I’m in a meteorology graduate seminar withStranger, another graduate student. I don’t know himvery well, but his first few comments seem quite sen-sible tome. I takemyself tobeaprettyreliable thinkerinmeteorology,thoughnotmorereliablethanmostgradstudents.Atthebreak,Idiscoverthatwe’vebothreadafairamountaboutissueP,butwhileI’mquiteconfidentthatP,Strangerexpressesequalconfidencethat~P.I,be-ingagoodConciliationist,thenbecomesignificantlyless



aninitialasymmetrybetweenmyassessmentofmyselfandmyassess-mentofothers:I’mmoreconfidentthatI’mnotderangedthanIamthatanarbitraryotherpersonisnotderanged.Buttheexampleshowsthatthisisquiteconsistentwithmytakingothers,aboutwhomIknowlittle,tobeaboutaslikelyasIamtogetparticularclaimsright.ItisthislatterattitudewhichisbehindConciliationism’srecommendationsinmanycasestosuspendbeliefonlearningofaparticulardisagreement.

ThewayI’veexpressedtheagent’sattitudesinthecaseabovedis-tinguishesbetween“singleclaims”and largeconjunctionsofclaims.It’s worth noting that this convenient classification need not bearheavy theoreticalweight.Tobring thispointout, supposesomeoneobjectedasfollowstotheaboveanalysis:

You say that if Stranger disagrees about just one claimP, you should become agnostic on P. But suppose thatStranger’s initial claim is (~P&~Q&…&~Z),wheretheconjunctsarethenegationsofalltheparticularclaimsinvolved in the repeated disagreement you describedabove. Does Conciliationism now say you should givesignificantcredencetothisclaim?Thatwouldmeantak-ingitasreasonablylikelythatallofP,Q,R,etc.arefalse,whichwould require your becoming agnostic (at best)abouteachindividualclaim.

Toanswerthisquestion,weshouldnotethatit’snopartofConcili-ationismthatonetakesimilarattitudestoallofthepropositionsonebelieves.Imay,asstipulatedinSeminar,havefairlyhighconfidenceineachofPthroughZ.ButthereareotherclaimsIhavemuchgreaterconfidence in.Givenmy fairlyhighconfidence inP throughZ,andgiventheirrelativeindependencefromoneanother,Ioughttohaveextremelyhighconfidencethatthey’renotall false, i. e., that~(~P&~Q&…~Z).ThisisjustanotherwayofsayingthatI’mextremelycon-fidentthatI’mnothorriblyscrewedupepistemicallyinmeteorology.SoifStrangerhadassertedhisbigconjunctionrightatthebeginning

extremelyconfidentthatI’mnotoneofthem.AndItakesuchpeopletoberareenoughthatmyestimationofmyownreliabilityisnotmuchdifferentfrommyestimationofthereliabilityofarandompersoninthefield.

Giventheseassumptions,whenIfirstfindoutthatStrangerandIdis-agree about P,Conciliationismwould counselme to becomemuchlessconfidentinP.Butwhenwediscusstwodozenmoreclaims,andhedisagreeswithmeaboutallofthem,Ishouldnowthink:giventheextentofourdisagreements,it’sincrediblyunlikelythatStrangerandI arebothvery reliableat all.Themoredisagreementswediscover,themorelikelyitisthatoneofusisderanged.SinceI’mmoreconfi-dent(independentof thedisagreement) that I’mnotderangedthanthatStrangerisn’t,IshouldbecomemoreconfidentthatI’mbetteratevaluatingtheevidencethanStranger is.17 If this isright, Ineednotbecomemuchlessconfidentaboutall thethingswedisagreeabout.Thus,evenontheConciliationistview,Ineednotbedriventowide-spreadagnosticismbyStranger’srepeateddisagreement.Andindeed,IshouldregainmostofmyoriginalconfidenceinP.18

It’simportanttoseethatmyreevaluationofStrangerhereisentire-lyconsistentwithIndependence.I’mnotusingmybeliefsthatP,Q,R,etc.aspremisestoshowthathe’swrongaboutmanythings,andhenceisunreliable.I’mjustusingfactsaboutourreasoning:thatthewideextentofourdisagreement indicates thatoneofus isseriouslymal-functioningepistemically.Ofcourse, theendresultdoesdependon

17. White (2009, 247–249) contains a somewhatmore formal discussion of asimilaridea.

18. Ishouldemphasizeapointabout theasymmetrythatfigures inthisexam-ple. It is crucial thatmyextreme confidence that I’mnotmeteorologicallyderangedheredoesnotjustderivefrommylowestimateoftheproportionofderangedpeople;thatwouldnotproduceanyasymmetrybetweenmeandtheStranger.TheideaisthatIbeginbybeingmoreconfidentthatI’mnotderangedthanwouldbejustifiedsimplybythelowproportionofderangedpeople,justasImightbelievethat1%ofadultsareparanoidschizophrenics,butbemuchmorethan99%surethatI’mnotoneofthem.Thankstoaref-ereeforPhilosophers’ Imprintforbringingtomyattentiontheneedtoclarifythispoint.



inPshoulddropdramatically.Thisisbecauseinsingle-claimmatch-upsbetweenmyalmanacandarandomlyselectedone, Ishouldex-pectminetobewrongina fairproportionof the(rare)caseswhentheydisagree.However, if I lookup16more factsat random inmyalmanac,andtheStranger’salmanacdisagreesoneveryoneoftheseclaims,Ishouldnotdramaticallylowermyconfidenceinall17claims.Instead,IshouldconcludethattheStranger’salmanacisverylikelyanAcme,andinfactIshouldthengobacktotrustingwhatmyalmanacsaysabouteven thefirstof the17claims.This isbecause, inmatch-upsbetween twoalmanacs,when theydisagreeoneveryoneof 17claims lookedup, theoverwhelmingly likelysituation is thatoneofthemisanAcme(althoughAcmesaresomewhatrare,thechanceoftwohighlyreliablealmanacsdisagreeing17timesinarowisincred-iblyminuscule).Andwe’vestipulatedthatI’minitiallyextremelysurethatmine’snotanAcme.Thisinitialasymmetry—analogoustomybe-ingmuchmoreconfidentthatI’mnotmeteorologicallyderangedthanthattheStrangerisn’t—isallthat’sneededtoproducetheConciliatorystructuredescribedabove.19,20

19. Variousassumptionswouldbeneededforapreciseversionofthisexample,e. g.,thedegreetowhichmistakesindifferentalmanacsareindependentofoneanother,ortheprobabilitythatwhenmistakesaremade,differentalma-nacswillmake thesame falseclaim.But theexampleseemsclearenoughwithoutgettingintodeeptechnicaldetails.

20.Insomeminorvariantsofthisexample,whereI’msurethatmyalmanacisslightlylessreliablethanthevastmajority,IshouldthinkmyalmanacandtheStranger’stobeexactlyequallylikelytohavegottenPrightafterthefirstdisagreement.OnemightwonderhowitcouldbethatIshoulddothis,yetregainmyconfidenceinPoncethesubsequentdisagreementsarise.Itmightseemthat,ifIshouldthinkafterthefirstdisagreementthatmyalmanacandStranger’sareequally likely tohavegottenP right, then thisdisagreementhasn’t favoredmyalmanac’saccuracyover theStranger’s, sowe’reback tosquareone.Butthisisn’tquiteright.EventhoughIshouldthinkthetwoal-manacsareequallylikelytoberightabout P,thedisagreementaboutPshouldalsosignificantlyreducehowaccurateIshouldexpecttheStranger’salmanactobe in general.That’sbecauseifhisiswronginthiscase—whichisaboutaslikelyasnot—itstandsafairchanceofbeingahorriblyinaccurateAcme(inthelongrun,about1/3offalseclaimsaremadebyAcmes).Ontheotherhand,ifmineiswrongaboutP,it’sstilla98%accuratealmanacwhichgotPwrong.

oftheconversation,Conciliationismwouldnothaverequiredmetosuspendbelief.

It’sclearthatthere’snothingunusualabouthavingthesortofdistri-butionofconfidenceamongthesortof“individual”and“conjunctive”claimsinvolvedinSeminar.Infact,itwouldseemquitethetypicalcase.SoitseemstomethatConciliationismcangivequiteaniceaccountofthecontrastbetweendisagreementaboutanisolatedparticularclaims,anddisagreementaboutmultiple(orhighlyconjunctive)claims.

In case the reader is suspicious about the structure of the Semi-narexample,here isamodelwith thesamestructure thatabstractsfromanycontroversiessurroundingdisagreement:Considerasitua-tion inwhicheachpersonhasanalmanac, andeachperson’s alma-nac isunique(they’renotcopiesof thesamebook).Suppose that Ihaveextremelygoodreasontobelievethatmyalmanacishighlyac-curate—that98%of thetimeit’scorrect(myreasonmightbethat Iboughtitfromaveryreliablepublisher).Moreover,Ihavegoodrea-sontobelievethatthevastmajorityofotheralmanacsareasreliableasmine.ButIalsobelievethatthereareasmallnumberofhorriblyin-accurateones(perhapstheAcmePublishingCompany—averyunre-liablepublisher—producedthemwithoutresearchinganyfacts).Thiscorresponds,inanartificiallysimplifiedway,tothesortdistributionofreliabilityamongpeoplesupposedinSeminar.SoItakethedistribu-tionofaccuracyinalmanacstobethis:

99%are98%accurate.

1%are1%accurate.

Ontheseassumptions,theaccuracyofmyalmanacisclosetotheav-erageaccuracyofalmanacsinthepopulationatlarge(theaverageac-curacyisabitover97%).

Inthissituation,ifmyalmanacsaysP,Ishouldinitiallybeverycon-fident thatP is true.But if I thenfindout thataStranger’salmanac,aboutwhichIhavenospecialinformation,disagrees,myconfidence



betooworriedbyfhg’sopinion.ButgivenConciliationsts’adherencetoIndependenceprinciples,howcantheyresistrecommendingexten-sivebelief-revisioninthissortofcase?

Weshould startbynoting that Independence,by itself,doesnotmandateanythingaboutbelief-change.Ittellsustoevaluatetheepis-temiccredentialsoftheotherperson’sbeliefinadispute-independentmanner.22 But it doesn’t saywhat to dowith the evaluation. To geta Conciliationist result, onemust add a principlemandating belief-revision in theevent that theevaluationyields certain results.Nowthissortofprinciplemightbedrawnupindifferentways.Letuscon-finediscussionatthispointtocaseswhereanotherpersondisagreessharplywithmyinitialbelief.

Onewayofdrawingupabelief-revisionprinciplewouldbe:

(A) Insofarasthedispute-independentevaluationfailstogivemegoodreasonforconfidencethatI’mbetterinformed,ormorelikelytohavereasonedfromtheevidencecorrectly,Imustrevisemybeliefinthedirectionoftheotherperson’s.

Anotheris:

(B) Insofar as the dispute-independent evaluation gives megoodreasontobeconfidentthattheotherpersonisequal-lywell-informed,andequallylikelytohavereasonedfromtheevidencecorrectly,Imustrevisemybeliefinthedirec-tionoftheotherperson’s.23

Clearly, thefirstsortofprinciple threatens to leadstraight toskepti-cism.Forsupposethattheotherpersondisagreeswithvirtuallyallmybeliefsabouttheworld.Thatwouldleavemewithvirtuallynothing

22. By“dispute-independent”,hereandbelow,Imeannotrelyingonthereason-ingbehindmyinitialbelief.Adispute-independentevaluationcould,forex-ample, take into account the fact that theotherpersondisagreeswithmeaboutP,aswesawinthinkingabout,e. g.,CarefulChecking.

23. The contrast between (A) and (B) bears strong similarities to that be-tween Harman’s (1986) Principles of Negative Undermining and PositiveUndermining.

Insum,then,itturnsoutthatConciliationismcaneasilyaccommo-datetheintuitionthat incertaincases,repeateddisagreementswitha stranger, particularly about relatively independent claims, shouldoccasion little change inbelief,while a singledisagreement shouldsignificantlyreducemyconfidence.Anditseemstomethatthisisnotamereformalpossibility.Inmanycases,thebackgroundassumptionsneeded to underlie this phenomenon are reasonable: one believesthatoneself,andpeoplegenerally,areprettyreliableaboutacertainfield;onebelievesthatthereareafewpeoplewhoareepistemicallyvery screwed up and thus terribly unreliable; and one is extremelyconfidentthatoneisnotoneofthosepeople.

6. Does Independence Lead to Wholesale Skepticism?21

Onemightthinkthattheanalysisgivenintheprevioussectionofre-sponses toapparentlyderangedstrangerswas tooeasy,by theCon-ciliationist’s own standards. After all, Independence requiresme toabstainfromrelyingonthereasoningunderdisputeinevaluatingtheepistemiccredentialsofanother.But it’sclearlypossibleforanotheragent to dispute a verywide swath ofmy beliefs—a swath that in-cludestheclaimsIwasrelyingoninthepreviousanalysis.SupposeImeetamanonthestreetwho,afterexpressingdisagreementwithmybeliefthatP,adds,“Mostpeoplearecompletelyscrewedup.Onlya fewofusaresane.There’smassivedelusionabout.”Supposehe’swearinganaluminum foilhat, andhe tellsmehe’s just seenElvis’simageinhismorningwaffle,andthatElvistoldhimthatonlythosewithfoilhatscanthinkstraightatall.Clearly,FoilHatGuyisdenyingaclaim(thatI’mnotincrediblyscrewedup)confidenceinwhichunder-laymyresponsetorepeateddisagreementinthelastsection.Andthis,combinedwithIndependence,seemstomeanthatIcan’tdismisshiswholesalechallengetomybeliefsbyrelyingonmyconfidenceinthisclaim.Ontheotherhand,it’salsointuitivelyobviousthatIshouldn’t

21. Theproblemconsideredinthissectionhasnottomyknowledgebeenraisedinprint.Versionsofithavecomeupindiscussionswithseveralpeople,butwerepressedonmeparticularlyeffectivelybyJoshSchechterandErnieSosa.



reasonsforthiswillbeexploredbelow.)Butsomethingalongtheselineswouldseemtobeapromisingwayofallowingustorespecttheanti-question-beggingmotivationsforIndependencewithoutslidingintoskepticism.

ThissortofapproachmayalsohelpConciliationismmeshwithan-otherintuitivejudgmentsomehavedefended.Ithasbeensuggestedthatwhenthepropositionindisputeispartofadeepnetworkofbe-liefs,allofwhicharechallengedbytheotherperson,therationalpres-suretorevisebeliefsshouldbeless.24Elga(2007,495ff.)considersthecaseofAnnandBeth,whodisagreenotonlyoverthemoralityofabor-tionbutaboutawholenestofrelatedmoral,religious,andordinaryfactualmatters.Elgasuggeststhatinthissortofcase,therewillbenofact of thematter abouthowAnn—independentlyofdisputedmat-ters—would evaluate Beth’s likelihood of being correct about abor-tion.I’mnotsurethisisright.Afterall,theremaybequiteabitthatAnndoesknowaboutBeth:thatshe’shuman,intelligent,familiarwithcertain arguments, honest, etc. Thismightwell yield some dispute-independent assessmentofBeth’s reliability.25 But evenputting thisworryaside,thephenomenoninquestionisintuitivelyagradualone:astheareaofdisagreementbecomesgreater,thepressureforconcili-ationdiminishes.AnditishardtoseehowthetransitionfromtherebeingafactofthematteraboutAnn’sdispute-independentopinionofBethtotherebeingnofactofthematterwouldbeabletoaccountforthisgradualphenomenon.

Bycontrast,ona(B)-styleview,as theareaofdisagreementgetswider, the basis for dispute-independent assessment gets narrower,andthusthestrengthofthereasonsprovidedbythatnarrowerbasiswilloftenbereduced,andinagradualmanner.Soinsofaraswefinditplausiblethattherationalpressuretoreviseone’sbeliefsdiminishesastheextentofdisagreementwiththeotherpersonincreases,aprin-ciplealongthelinesof(B)isanattractiveoption.

24. SeePettit(2006)andElga(2007).

25. SeeKornblith(2010)foranargumentalongtheselines.

on which to base a dispute-independent evaluation of the relativelikelihoodofhis reasoningcorrectly.But suchabaselessevaluationwouldclearlynotgivemeagoodreasonforconfidenceinmyhavingreasonedcorrectly;soprinciple(A)wouldrequiremassiverevisioninmybeliefs.Theproblemwith(A)isthatitineffectturnsouttorequirethatonehaveanon–question-beggingresponsetotheskeptic.

Ontheotherhand,thesecondsortofprincipledoesnotobviouslyhavethesamevulnerability.Foriftheotherpersonchallengesvirtu-ally all of my beliefs, an evaluation based on dispute-independentgrounds—i. e.,anevaluationbasedonvirtuallynothing—cannotpro-videgoodreasonformetobeconfidentabouteitherparty’slikelihoodofhavingreasonedcorrectly.

Onthesecondsortofview,whendisagreementunderminesone’srationalconfidenceinsomeclaim,theunderminingmustbebasedonone’sbeliefsabouttheotherperson.Whenthosebeliefsincludeexten-sivedispute-independentevidenceofintellectualandevidentialparity(asintheMentalMathcase),theunderminingpowerofdisagreementishigh.Butinsomecases,onehaslittledispute-independentreasontobehighlyconfident,onewayortheother,aboutwhethertheotherpersonisevenone’sapproximatepeer.Inthosecases,theundermin-ingpowerofdisagreementshouldintuitivelybeless.

Thusthe‘insofar’inprinciple(B)shouldbeunderstoodasindicat-ing that the undermining power of disagreement by apparent epis-temicequalsisnotall-or-nothing.Whenoneevaluatestheepistemiccredentialsofanother’sbeliefsinadispute-neutralmanner,onemaygetvaryingstrengthsofreasonsforthinkingthattheotherpersonisaswell-informedandaslikelytohavereasonedcorrectlyasoneisone-self.Thestrongerone’sreasonsforthinkingequallywelloftheother’sepistemiccredentials, themoreoneshouldreviseone’sbeliefs.Andthis,Ithink,ishowitshouldbeintuitively.

Isuggest,then,thattheConciliatorypositionshouldbeunderstoodasinvolvingaprincipleroughlyalongthelinesof(B).Ishouldempha-size,though,that(B)isfarfrombeingsufficientlypreciseorgeneraltoprovidearecipeforreactingtodisagreementevidence.(Someofthe



(1) One’s dispute-independent evidence supports an assess-mentofherepistemiccredentialsthatyieldshighestimatesfor:

a. thelikelihoodthatherexpresseddisagreementissincere,

b. herdegreeofwell-informedness,and

c. the likelihoodof her having reasoned correctly from theevidenceshehas;

and

(2) Thereasonsfortheseassessmentsofa–carestrong.

Incaseswhereone’sdispute-independentevidenceyieldsverystrongsupportfortheclaimthattheotherpersonissincere,aboutequallywell-informed,andaboutequallylikelytohavereasonedcorrectlyfromherevidence,oneshould cease to be much more confident that P thanthat~P.

Evenhere,however,manyquestionsremainopen:Howfar,ingeneral,shouldonereviseone’sbelief?Howdoestheprincipleextendtocaseswhere initial confidence is distributeddifferently—e. g.,wherebothparties aremore confident that P than ~P but to different degrees?Aswesawabove(fn.3),theinitiallyattractiveideaofuniformlysplit-tingthedifferenceincredencesdoesnotsitwellwiththemotivationsforConciliationism.

Sowearealongwayfromhavingaformula,orevenarecipewithquantities, describing in general how one should react to disagree-ment.Giventhecomplexityofthesubject,andtheearlystateofthediscussionofthisissue,thisshouldnotbesurprising.Andofcourse,Conciliationismisinnowayspecialhere;non-Conciliationistwritershavebeenequallyunabletocomeupwithprecisegeneraldirectionsfor accommodating disagreement evidence. But the burden of the

7. Unresolved Issues

Thus far,we’ve seen that severalworries that have been expressedabouttreatmentsofdisagreementbasedonIndependence-styleprin-ciplesmaybeassuaged.Thatis,ofcourse,alongwayfromofferingadetailedConciliationist recipe foraccommodating theevidencepro-videdbythedisagreementofothers.Inthissection,I’dliketonotetwoofthemajorissuesfacingthisConciliationistproject.

a. Formulating a principle for belief-revisionAsnoted above, Independenceneeds to be supplementedby someprincipledescribinghowthedispute-independentassessmentoftheotherperson’sepistemiccredentialsshouldinformone’sresponsetodisagreement.Andprinciple(B),asstated,isstillnothinglikeageneralprincipleofthissort.Foronething,itignoresthequestionthatwesawabovetobeimportant:whethertheotherperson’sexpresseddisagree-mentissincere.Moreimportantly,it’srestrictedtoevidencethattheotherpersonisone’sepistemicequal,andthisisobviouslyjustaspe-cialcase.Intuitively,totheextentthatthedispute-neutralassessmentgives reason to believe that the other person is one’s superior, oneshouldmoveone’sbelief farthertowardthatof theother.Andevenifthedispute-neutralassessmentgivesgoodreasonforthinkingtheotherpersononlyslightlylessqualifiedepistemically,somechangeofbeliefinthedirectionofherbeliefwilloftenbewarranted.Moreover,(B)saysnothingabouthowmuchrevisionisrequiredinanycase;asitstands,it’snotevenclearlyveryConciliatory.WemightcomeclosertoageneralConciliatoryprinciple(atleastforthemost-discussedcasesinwhichtheotherpersonexpressesanopinionsharplyopposedtoone’sown)asfollows:

Revision: In cases where one has strong confidencethat P, and another person expresses equally strongconfidencethat~P,oneshouldreviseone’sbeliefinthedirectionof theotherperson’sexpressedbelief totheextentthat



friend’sdissent?Surelynot:thatwouldleavemeunabletomakeanyassessmentofmyfriend’scredentials.

Onepossibleapproachissuggestedbythefollowingvariationontheexampleabove:Supposemyfriendagreeswithallofthestepsofmy reasoningup to and including that thepre-rounding amount is$42.87.Nevertheless,sheinsiststhattheansweris$45,not$43.Inthiscase,itdoesnotseemwrongformetousethestepsweagreeaboutinevaluatingherbelief.Infact,thecasethenseemsmuchliketheex-tremely-high-rational-confidencecasesconsideredabove.It’snotthatIhaveextremelyhighrationalconfidenceinP,butIdohaveextremelyhighrationalconfidenceintheconditionalofthelasttwostepsinmyreasoning,whichmy frienddenies.Thus Ihaveexcellent reason tothinkthatsomethingscrewyisgoingon.Asbefore,personalinforma-tionwillstronglyfavorthehypothesisthatthescrewinessaffectsmyfriendratherthanme.Sothecorrectresultwillbeachieved,andinanintuitivelyattractiveway.Thissuggeststhatweunderstandtheextentofthereasoningtobebracketedtobejustthatwhichisindispute(orperhapsbetter,thatwhichIhavegoodreasontobelieveisindispute).

This is, I should emphasize, a very rough pass. It doesn’t distin-guishbetweenstepswhicharedeniedbymyfriendandoneswhichsimplyaren’taffirmed.Italsoleavesopenquestionsabouthowtotreatclaimsaboutwhich Idon’t knowmy friend’s attitude: ifwehaven’tdiscussedthestepsofreasoning,Idon’tknowforsureifshegetsofftheboatatthelaststep,oratsomeearlierstep.Therearesomenaturalapproachesforfillingthesegaps,butfornow,Iwantonlytoacknowl-edgethecomplexitiesthatlieahead.

Again, it is important to note that the difficulty just describeddoesnotnecessarilycountagainstConciliationism.Thatwilldependonwhethernon-Conciliationist views can avoid encountering it, orwhethertheywillalsoneedtoaddressthesameproblem.I’llturntothatquestioninthenextsection.

argumentsabovewasnot toprovidesuchdirections. Ithasbeen toshow that there is room for a Conciliationist approach to disagree-ment; inparticular, to show that relianceonadispute-independentassessmentoftheother’sbelief’sepistemiccredentialsdoesnothavetheuntowardconsequencesitmightseemtohave.

b. Defining the scope of Independence26

AttheheartofConciliationism,I’veclaimed,istheinsightthatinre-spondingtotheevidenceofanother’sdisagreement,onemustavoiddismissingtheotherperson’sdissentinaquestion-beggingway.Thisis themotivationbehind Independence, therequirement that Ieval-uate theepistemic credentialsof thedissentingbelief inaway thatdoesn’trelyonthereasoning behindmyinitialbeliefthatP.

A simpler proposal for preventing question-beggingwould haverequiredindependenceonlyfromPitself.Butthatwouldleaveopenthepossibilityofdismissingone’sfriend’sbeliefsinwaysthatwouldstillintuitivelybegthequestion.Forexample,supposethatinMentalMathmy thinkingwent throughfivesteps (dividing thebillby two,takingtenpercentofthatfigure,multiplyingthatbytwo,addingtheresultofthistotheresultofstep1,androundinguptothenextdol-lar).Ishouldnotbeabletodismissmyfriend’sbeliefbythissortofreasoning:“Oursharesbeforeroundingare$42.87.So$45cannotbecorrect.”Yetsuchreasoningwouldnotdependonthebeliefmyfriendhasexplicitlydisagreedwith.

Unfortunately, thismore inclusive formulation raises a questionnotadequatelyansweredyet:Exactlywhat sortof reasoning ispartof “myreasoningbehindP”?Afterall,mybeliefsmaybesupportedindirectlybymanyfactors,especiallyincomplexcases.Holistswillin-sistthathugeportionsofmycorpusofbeliefarerelevantevidentially:theyhelpsupportorrationalizemybelief.EventhefactthatIdisbe-lievecertainclaimsthatwoulddefeatmyjustificationforPisrelevant.SodoIhavetoputeverythingasideinassessingthecredentialsofmy

26.TheimportanceofthisproblemwasmadeevidenttomebyJenniferLackey.



Thealternativewouldseemtobethat,insteadof(atleastpartially)bracketingmyoriginalreasoning,wewouldinsteadsimplycombinethereasonsforPthatsupportmyinitialbelieftogetherwiththereasonsforloweringconfidenceinPprovidedbythedisagreementofmyoth-erwisewell-qualifiedfriend.Onthiskindofview,myoriginalreasonsforbelief inParenotputasideatall indeterminingwhat I shouldbelieve.Totheextentthatbelief-changeisneeded,it’sbecausethoseoriginalreasonsarepartlyunderminedoroutweighedbythereasonsfordoubtingPprovidedbythedisagreement.

Itseemstomethatthissortofviewcannotquitebecorrect.Toseewhy,consideragaintheMentalMathcase.SupposemyfriendandIarefullyinagreementthatourtotalbillis$71.20,sotheonlyquestioniswhatoursharesofthisamountare,with20%tipandroundeduptothenearestdollar.AndsupposethatI’veinfactarrivedatthecorrectanswer, $43, by faultless appreciation of the relevantmathematicalreasons.Inthiscase,there’sasenseinwhichthereasonsformyinitialbeliefarecompletelydecisive:given theparametersof theproblem,there’ssimplynopossibilitythat$45couldberight,andnopossibilitythat$43 couldbewrong.Mathematical reasons cannotbeweighedagainstorunderminedbyadditionalevidenceinthewayordinaryin-ductivereasonscan.So insofaras I’mweighingmyoriginalreasonsin“atfullstrength”(i. e.,notputtingthemaside,atleasttosomeextent,inmycognitivedeliberations),andinsofarasIcombinealltheserea-sons togethercorrectly, it turnsout that theevidenceofmy friend’sdisagreementshould innowaydiminishmyconfidence in$43.ButthisisnottheresultthemoderatelySteadfasttheoristisafter.28

28.Onemightquestionwhethermy initial reasons in thiscasearereallydeci-sive.IfIrepresentthosereasonspurelysubjectively—e. g.,as“I,agenerallyreliable calculator, seem to remember getting $43,” or “I now seem to seethat$43isthecorrectanswer,” thenofcoursecountervailingevidencecangainsomepurchase.ButinsofarasoneacknowledgesthatmyinitialbeliefismaderationalinpartbytheactualmathematicalreasonswhichIcorrectlyappreciate,onemustacknowledgethatmybeliefissupporteddecisively.Therelationbetweenthe“data”—theamountofthebillandotherparametersoftheproblem—andthepropositionthatoursharesare$43isnotarelationthatcanbeoutweighedorunderminedbyanything.

8. Beyond Conciliationism

Themajorityofthispaperhasbeenconcernedtoargueforthedefen-sibility ofConciliatory approaches to thedisagreement problem. Indoingso,ithasexposedsomeproblemsthatafullyspelled-outCon-ciliationistaccountofdisagreementwouldhavetoface.Inthissection,Iwanttoarguethattheseproblems—withdefiningthescopeofInde-pendence, andwith incorporating the independentassessment intobelief-revision—will have to be faced by any reasonable view. Theproblems,then,shouldbeseenasindicatingthedifficultyofprovidingageneral accountof theepistemologyofdisagreement, rather thanasposinga specialobstacle toConciliationism.Moreover, I’ll arguethattheissuesraisedherearisenotonlyinthecontextofaccountingfortheepistemicsignificanceofdisagreement,butforawide,butun-derstudied,rangeofcases:thoseinvolvingevidencethatImayhavereasonedimproperly.

Ofcourse,forradicallySteadfastviews,onwhicheventhedisagree-mentofmyfriendintheoriginalMentalMathcasegivesnoreasonatallformodifyingmyconfidencein$43,thereisnoneedforworryingaboutwhatmustbeputasideinassessingmyfriend’scredentials,orwith how to take account of the resulting assessment. But such ex-tremeversionsofSteadfastnessarehighlyimplausible.27

SosupposeweconsideramoderatelySteadfastview:thatdisagree-ment,atleastincaseslikeMentalMath,shouldmakemesignificantlylessconfidentofmyoriginalbelief,butthat inmanyordinarycasesofdisagreement(say,inphilosophy),myoriginalreasoning(perhapsonly if it is in factcorrect) justifiesme in thinking thatmy friend issubstantiallymorelikelytobemistakenthanIam,andsonotmuchrevisionisrequired.Canweobtaintherightresultsonthissortofview,withoutrelyingatallonthesortofbracketingorputtingasideofmyoriginalreasoningmandatedbyIndependence?

27. CompleteSteadfastnesswouldholdthat(atleastincaseswheremyoriginalcalculationshappenedtobecorrect)I’dberationalinignoringevenhordesof friendswho all were proven calculatingwhizzes, and all agreed that Ihaderred.



feelingsofdizziness, tomemoriesofmypastepisodesofpsychosis,orrecentmealsofmagicmushrooms.Thesortofevidenceprovidedbydisagreementofothersisnotreallyanexoticorpeculiarepistemicphenomenon.Itjustinvolvesanotherkindofindicationonecanhavethatonemayhavemadeacognitivemistake.

Itshouldalsobenotedthatthenecessityofputtingasideone’sorigi-nalreasoningisnotlimitedtocasesinwhichthatreasoningisdeduc-tive. The example ofmy having doubts about arithmetic calculationmakesthepointparticularlyclearly,takingadvantageoftheconclusivenatureofdeductivereasoning.Butoncetheexampleisunderstood,itslessonsclearlyapplymoregenerally.Forwhatliesbehindourverdictinthecalculationcaseisourseeingthatfailuretoputasidethereasoningunderconsiderationamountstobeggingthequestionofwhetherthatreasoningwascorrect.Andthatissomethingwemustnotdo,ifwearetotakeseriouslythepossibilityofourowncognitiveerror.30

Thebottomline,then,isthis:RationalityrequiresthatItakeserious-lyevidenceofmyownpossiblecognitivemalfunctioninarrivingatmybeliefs.ButinsofarasI’mwillingtodothis,Imustevaluateevidenceforthatpossibilityinawaythatis(atleastsomewhat)independentofsomeofmyreasoning.AndImustthenusethisevaluationinarrivingatmyfinalbelief.Soanyreasonableepistemologymustfacetheproblemsweexaminedabove:accountingforwhichportionofmyoriginalreasoningImust(atleastsomewhat)putasideinassessingthelikelihoodofmyerror,anddetermininghowtointegratethisassessmentintomyfinalbeliefs.The twoproblemswesaw facing theConciliationist inevalu-atingandrespondingtodisagreement-basedevidence,then,botharehighlygeneral, intwodifferentways.Foronething,theyarenotjustproblemsforConciliationism;theyareproblemsforeverysensibleac-countoftheepistemologyofdisagreement.Foranother,theyapplyinareasquiteremovedfromthedisagreementissue.

Thedifficultyoftheseproblems,Ithink,flowsinpartfromastruc-tural oddity that’s inevitably involved in many sorts of epistemic

30.SeeChristensen(2010)foramoregeneraldiscussionofthisissue.

One might worry that something in this argument must bewrong.Afterall,evenbeforelearningofmyfriend’sdisagreementinMentalMath,Ishouldn’thavebeenabsolutelyconfidentinmyanswer.How,then,couldthosereasonsbeasdecisiveastheargu-mentsuggests?

TheanswertothisworryisthatIdidhavereasontoputmymath-ematicalreasoningpartiallyaside,evenbeforelearningofmyfriend’sdisagreement. After all, amajor reason for being initially less-than-absolutelyconfidentin$43isthatIknowthatIandotherpeoplefairlycommonlymakemistakesindoingmentalmath.Butagain,ifIweresimplytocombinethereasonsforcautionprovidedbythisfactwiththefull-strengthmathematicalreasons,thefactabouthumanfallibil-itywouldhavenoeffect.Nothingabouthumanfallibilityaffectstheconnectionbetweenthetotalbill’sbeing$71.20andmyshare(with20% tip, roundedup)being$43. If I didn’t at leastpartiallyput themathematical reasonsaside, thennoamountofadditionalevidencewouldhaveanyeffect.29

Thismakes it clear that thegeneral point about thenecessityof(at leastpartially)bracketingsomeofourreasoningapplies inwideareas outside the context of disagreement. There are countless pos-sible reasons forme tobeunsureofwhether I’vemadeacognitiveerror,andthusunsureofconclusionsI’vereached.TheyrangefromknowledgeofpasterrorsthatIorothershavemade,tounexplained

29.The contrast between reasoning in one’s head and careful calculation hasbeencitedbyanti-Conciliationistsassupportfortheirview.Aswe’veseen,for example, the effect of disagreement on mental-math-based beliefs isgreater than the effect of disagreement on beliefs based on careful papercalculations.Theanti-Conciliationist’ssuggestionisthatthedifferenceistobeexplained in termsof thedifferences in thestrengthof theoriginal rea-soning,andthusthattheoriginalreasoningcan’treallyhavebeenputaside,contra Independence. But the considerations reviewed above suggest thattheexamples reallypull inexactly theoppositedirection. For the stepsofreasoningonedoesinone’sheadmaybeexactlythesameasthestepsonedoesonpaper.Insofarasthosestepscountasreasonsforone’sconclusion,theyareequally(andmaximally)strong.Whatdiffersbetweenthecasesisthesecond-orderreasonsfordoubtingthefirst-orderreasoning.Andthosesecond-orderreasonscanonlyhavepurchasetotheextentthatoneputsthefirst-orderreasonsaside.



self-criticism.Ontheonehand,onemustevaluateone’sbeliefs inawaythatdoesnotsimplybegthequestionof theircogency.Ontheotherhand,onemustdoso fromwithin the frameworkofone’sbe-liefs—foronehasnootherwaytothinkaboutanything.31Thereisanobvious tensionbetween these requirements,and it’s far fromclearthattherewillbeanice,cleanrecipeforresolvingthattensioninanyarena.But resolving the tensionsomehow isan inescapablepartofreactingrationallytothepossibilityofourownrationalfailures,some-thingwe’rerequiredtodoallthetime.Understandinghowthetensionisproperlyresolved,then,isessentialtounderstandinghowtocoperationallywithacentralaspectofourepistemicpredicament.32

31. SeeEvnine(2008),Ch.6,forinterestingdiscussionofthisgeneralissue.

32.AncestorsorearlierversionsthispaperweregivenatSwarthmoreCollege,BrandeisUniversity,UniversityofPennsylvania,UniversityofToronto,MIT,andtheAlabamaPhilosophicalSociety;thankstoalltheaudiencesforstim-ulatingdiscussion. I’malsograteful forhelpfuldiscussionsof thepaper inTomKelly’sseminaratPrincetonandattheEpistemologyReadingGroupatBrown.Finally,I’mindebtedto(atleast)thefollowingpeopleforhelpfuldis-cussion,correspondenceand/orcommentsonearlierdrafts:NathanBallan-tyne,DanielBerntson,StewartCohen,JuanComesaña,AdamElga,TomKelly,JenniferLackey,AndrewRotondo,JoshSchechter,ErnieSosa,KatiaVavova,JonathanVogel,andthestudentsinmyseminaratBrown.



Lackey, J. (forthcoming), “A Justificationist View of Disagreement’sEpistemicSignificance”,inA.Haddock,A.Millar,andD.Pritchard(eds.),Social Epistemology(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress).

——(2010),“WhatShouldWeDowhenWeDisagree?”,inT.S.GendlerandJ.Hawthorne(eds.),Oxford Studies in EpistemologyIII(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress),274–293.

Pettit,P.(2006),“WhentoDefertoMajorityTestimony—andWhenNot”,Analysis66:179–87.

Shogenji,T.(2007),“AConundruminBayesianEpistemologyofDis-agreement”,http://fitelson.org/few//few_07/shogenji.pdf

Sosa, E. (forthcoming), “The Epistemology ofDisagreement”, in hisArmchair Philosophy(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2010).

vanInwagen,P.(1996),“ItisWrong,Everywhere,Always,andforAny-one,toBelieveAnythinguponInsufficientEvidence”,inEleonoreStumpandMichaelJ.Murray(eds.),Philosophy of Religion: the Big Questions,editedby.NewYork:Blackwell(1999).

White,R.(2009),“OnTreatingOneselfandOthersasThermometers”,Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology6:233–250.

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