TOPIC: SUCCESSIONG.R. No. L-44426 February 25, 1982SULPICIO CARVAJAL, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ** and EUTIQUIANO CAMARILLO and LIBERATA CACABELOS, respondents.

FACTS:One of the heirs sold his share to petitioners and respondents prior to the approval of the project of partition.

ISSUE:Whether respondent have the right to eject the petitioner.

RULING:Title to any specific part of the estate does not automatically pass to the heirs by the mere death of the decedent and the effect of any disposition by a co-heir before partition shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him upon the dissolution of the communal estate. What a co-heir can validly dispose of is only his hereditary rights.

The action for ejectment and recovery of possession instituted by herein respondents in the lower court is premature, for what must be settled frist is the action for partition. Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over a definite portion of the inheritance. Without partition, either by agreement between the parties of by judicial proceeding, a co-heir cannot dispose of a specific portion of the estate. For where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate such heirs. 1 Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left wtih respect to the part of portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate or co-heirs while it remains undivided.

G.R. No. L-17915           January 31, 1967TEODORO M. CASTRO, petitioner and appellant, vs.AMADO DEL ROSARIO as Commissioner of Civil Service, DOMINADOR AYTONA as Secretary of Finance, MELECIO R. DOMINGO, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and TOMAS C. TOLEDO, respondents and appellants.

FACTS:This is a proceeding in quo warranto, certiorari and mandamus originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The controverted position is that of Assistant Regional Revenue Director II, Manila, which became vacant on August 24, 1959, upon the promotion of its occupant, Alfredo Jimenez. Respondent Tomas C. Toledo was appointed in his place, and it is this appointment that is being questioned by petitioner Teodoro M. Castro in this proceeding.

ISSUE:Whether the eight other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors waived their rights to the position by their failure to complain against Toledo's appointment.

RULING:Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. The silence of the eight other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors does not amount to a waiver on their part. Waiver must be predicated on more concrete grounds. The evidence must be sufficient and clear to warrant a finding that the intent to waive is unmistakable.

Castro himself, when he testified, could not categorically state that the eight others were not interested in the position.6 Not having shown either seniority in rank among the nine Assistant Revenue Regional Directors outside the Manila District or waiver on the part of those who were senior to him Castro has failed to establish a clear right to the office which would entitle him to oust respondent Toledo.

G.R. No. L-6359        December 29, 1953CARMEN CASTRO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.FRANCISCA SAGALES, defendant-appellee.Roberto P. Ancok and Antonio S. Atienza for appellants.Lorenzo G. Valentin for appellee.

FACTS:Republic Act No. 772 effective June 20, 1952 conferred upon the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner "exclusive jurisdiction" to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, subject to appeal to this Supreme Court. Before the passage of said Act demands for compensation had to be submitted to the regular courts.

The fatal accident which befell Dioscoro Cruz, husband of plaintiff Carmen Cruz, having occurred in January 1952 and action having been commenced in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in August, 1952.

ISSUE:The proper forum: either the courts or the Workmen's Compensation Commission

RULING:It is true that the right arises from the moment of the accident, but such right must be declared or confirmed by the government agency empowered by law to make the declaration. If at the time the petition for such declaration is addressed to the court, the latter has no longer authority to do so, obviously it has no power to entertain the petition. Republic Act No. 772 is very clear that on and after June 20, 1952 all claims for compensation shall be decided exclusively by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court. This claim having been formulated for the first time in August,1952 in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, the latter had no jurisdiction, at that time, to act upon it. No constitutional objection may be interposed to the application of the law conferring jurisdiction upon the Commission, because the statute does not thereby operate retroactively; it is made to operate upon claims formulated after the law's approval. As attorney for appellee suggests, had the claim been filed before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 772 in a court of first instance, the question might be debatable whether such court should now continue hearing the matter or not. "A retrospective law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of transactions or consideration already past. Hence, remedial statutes, or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retrospective law, or the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes" (50 Am. Jur. p. 505).

G.R. No. 119761 August 29, 1996COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:RMC No. 37-93 reclassified cigarettes branded HOPE, MORE and CHAMPION as foreign brands.

ISSUE:Whether or not RMC No. 37-93 is an interpretative ruling or opinion?

RULING:Two kinds of administrative issuances — a legislative rule and an interpretative rule.

In Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc., vs. Department of Finance Secretary, 11 the Court expressed:

. . . a legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof . In the same way that laws must have the benefit of public hearing, it is generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there must be hearing.

In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.

A reading of RMC 37-93, particularly considering the circumstances under which it has been issued, convinces us that the circular cannot be viewed simply as a corrective measure (revoking in the process the previous holdings of past Commissioners) or merely as construing Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact and most importantly, been made in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion" within the classification of locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby have them covered by RA 7654.

EXPROPRIATION[G.R. No. 137152. January 29, 2001]CITY OF MANDALUYONG, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO N., FRANCISCO N., THELMA N., EUSEBIO N., RODOLFO N., all surnamed AGUILAR, respondents.

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING: