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A. CIR vs Campos Rueda

Political Law – Definition of State

Maria Cerdeira died in Tangier, (an international zone [foreign country] in North Africa), on

January 2, 1955. At the time of her demise, she was married to a Spanish Citizen and a

permanent resident of Tangier from 1931 up to her death, on January 2, 1955. She left

properties in Tangier as well as in the Philippines. Among the properties in the Philippines

are several parcels of land and many shares of stock, accounts receivable and other intangible

personal properties. On the real estate the respondent Antonio Campos Rueda, as

administrator of her estate, paid the sum of P111,582.00 as estate tax and the sum of

P151,791.48 as inheritance tax, on the transfer of her real properties in the Philippines, but

refused to pay the corresponding deficiency estate and inheritance taxes due on the transfer of

her intangible personal properties, claiming that the estate is exempt from the payment of said

taxes pursuant to section 122 of the Tax Code and that he could avail of the reciprocal

provisions of our Tax Code. The Collector of Internal Revenue in a decision assessed the estate

of the deceased, as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes, the sum of P161,874.95 including

interest and penalties, on the transfer of intangible personal properties of Maria Cerdeira..

ISSUE: Whether or not Rueda is rightfully assessed those taxes.

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HELD: “Foreign Country” used in Sec 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a

government of that foreign power which although not an international person in the sense of

international law, DOES NOT impose transfer of death taxes upon intangible personal

properties of citizens not residing therein. Or whose law allows a similar exemption from such

taxes. It is not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our government in

order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits provided by our Tax Law. But since

such law has not been alleged, this case is to remanded to the lower court for further trial.

B. MAGALLONA VS. ERMITA

655 SCRA 476 – Political Law – National Territory – RA 9522 is Constitutional

In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines

was enacted – the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with

the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified

by the Philippines in February 1984.

Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among

others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is

unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:

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a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties –

this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;

b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, terms the Philippine waters a “archipelagic” waters

which, in international law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage

by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine

sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and

damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions;

c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo

de masinloc), as a “regime of islands” pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large

maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to

acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the

acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it

comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle on occupation,

accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the

regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit

maritime zones and continental shelves.

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The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old

law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the

Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 nautical miles2. But under 9522, and with the

inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime are increased to 586,210

nautical miles2.

If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the

maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.

C. BACANI VS NACOCO

Political Law – Two-fold Function of the Government

Bacani and Matoto are court stenographers assigned in the CFI of Manila. During the

pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs. NACOCO,

Alikpala, counsel for NACOCO, requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of

the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request

by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter

submitted to him their bills for the payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation

paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said

transcript at the rate of P1 per page. On January 19, 1953, the Auditor General required the

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plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts on the strength of a circular of the DOJ it was expressed

that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in

question. Petitioners counter that NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of

section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Defendants set up as a defense that the NACOCO is

a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of

1917 and, hence, it is exempt from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules

of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not NACOCO is a government entity.

HELD: GOCCs do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under

the classification of municipal or public corporation. Take for instance the NACOCO. While it

was organized with the purpose of “adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent

of trade preferences in the United States” and of providing “Facilities for the better curing of

copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products”, a function which our

government has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry, however, it was given a

corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it was made subject to the

provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it

may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be

sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity

different from our government.

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** President Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as follows:

“‘(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from

violence and robbery.

‘(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children.

‘(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the

determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime.

‘(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.

‘(5) The definition and punishment of crime.

‘(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.

‘(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens.

‘(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external

danger or encroachment and the advancement of its international interests.’”

The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education, public

charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry. The principles

deter mining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these optional functions

are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those things which private capital

would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do these things which by its

very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private

individual or group of individuals.

D. PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION VS CIR

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Petitioner: Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration

Respondent: Court of Industrial Relations

FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services (in

excess of their 8 regular hours a day) and the failure to pay for said compensation in accordance

with Commonwealth Act No. 444.

Section 1: The legal working day for any person employed by another shall not be of more than

eight (8) hours daily.

Petitioner denies allegations for lack of a cause of action and jurisdiction.

Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising

governmental functions and is therefore exempt from CA No. 444 which was denied and

dismissed by RTC and CA. Motion for Reconsideration were also DENIED.

ISSUE: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions and is

exempt from CA No. 444.

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HELD: It is an inherent state function which makes government required to support its people

and promote their general welfare. This case explains and portrays the expanded role of

government necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare.

The Court held that the distinction and between constituent and ministrant functions, which

the Chief Justice points out, is already irrelevant considering the needs of the present time. He

says that "The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional

classification of the functions of government obsolete." The distinction between constituent

and ministrant functions is now considered obsolete.

The Court affirms that the Petition as well as the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration be

DENIED.

Constitutional Law 1: State Functions / Concept of State (Constituent and Ministrant)

(Textbook: Cruz, Professor, Atty. Usita)

Facts:

This case involves the expanded role of the

government necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare.

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1. In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime

services and the petitioner’s failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with CA

No. 444.

2. Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and lack of

jurisdiction. Judge Martinez issued an order, directing petitioner to pay. Hence, this

petition for certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental

functions and is therefore exempt from Commonwealth Act No. 444.

3. PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising

governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act

No. 444.

Issue: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.

YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government

has become obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare of its people.

RA No. 2265 providing for a distinction between constituent and the

ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of the present time:

“The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional

classification of the functions of government obsolete.”

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The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant

consideration.

There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency. As such, the

petitioner can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading ACCFA case. The

objection of private respondents with its overtones of the distinction between constituent and

ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v. Nacoco, is futile. It does not

necessarily follow, that just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than

proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now

defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner does not come within the

coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.

A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders clear the

differentiation that exists. If as a result of the appealed order, financial burden would have to

be borne by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not have required private

respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that one of its chief

problems is paucity of personnel. That would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It would

appear, therefore, that such an objection based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a

reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be sustained.

E. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS EL MONTE DE PIEDAD

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On June 3, 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in the Philippines. The Spanish Dominions

then provided $400,000.00 as aid for the victims and it was received by the Philippine

Treasury. Out of the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched; it was then invested in the Monte de

Piedad Bank which in turn invested the amount in jewelries. But when the Philippine

government later tried to withdraw the said amount, the bank cannot provide for the amount.

The bank argued that the Philippine government is not an affected party hence has no right to

institute a complaint. Bank argues that the government was not the intended beneficiary of

the said amount.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the

respondent bank?

HELD: The Philippine government is competent to institute action against Monte de Piedad,

this is in accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector

of the rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will

promote the public interest. No other party has been entrusted with such right hence as

“parents” of the people the government has the right to take back the money intended for the

people.

FE. Co Kim Chan vs Valdez tan Keh

FACTS:

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The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the proceedings in a civil case which were

initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued

by General MacArthur that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in

the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect

in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” had the effect of invalidating

and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines during

the Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take

cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic

of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority.

During the Japanese occupation, no substantial change was effected in the organization and

jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned during the Philippine Executive

Commission, and in the laws they administered and enforced.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not under the rules of international law the judicial acts and proceedings of the

courts during a de facto government are good and valid.

2. Whether it was the intention of the Gen McArthur to annul and void thereby all judgments

and judicial proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines during the Japanese

military occupation.

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3. Whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same court existing prior

to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, may continue

those proceedings pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and

liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines

were reestablished in the Islands.

HELD:

1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the

legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and

valid. The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on

International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): “The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the

territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows

directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political

institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the

enemy in his possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers

of such government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived

directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the of the world, and confirmed by

the writings of publicists and decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The

municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in

force during military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts

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of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de factogovernment, and can at his

pleasure either change the existing laws or make new ones.”

According to that well-known principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has

been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of

sovereignty, “does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an

invader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts

done under

his control, when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the

extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done

during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good.

That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments, which are not of a

political complexion, are and remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a

belligerent occupant, is confirmed by the Proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur

on October 23, 1944, which declares null and void all laws, regulations and processes of the

governments established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, for it would not

have been necessary for said proclamation to abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio.

2. NO. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only to the

judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes

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of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands

during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated,

according to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and judicial

proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments during the

Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied

territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it

was not, and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the

phrase “processes of any other government” in said proclamation, to refer to judicial

processes, in violation of said principles of international law.

3. YES. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is

suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the

invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues

the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined,

unless absolutely prevented, to respect. An Executive Order of President McKinley to the

Secretary of War states that “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated

but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals

substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as

possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.” And Taylor in this connection says: “From

a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to

substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative, executive and

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judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the

provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and

institution so far as military necessity will permit.” Undoubtedly, this practice has been

adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily

deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the government

established by the occupant of transient character.

If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military

occupation had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine

Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that

the same courts, which had become reestablished and conceived of as having in continued

existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of

postliminy, may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without

necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As

Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principles “a state or other governmental

entity, upon the removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and

duties substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the result of a law analogous

to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their original shape upon removal of the external

force, — and subject to the same exception in case of absolute crushing of the whole fibre and

content.”

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Three Kinds of a De Facto Government

1. In a proper legal sense, a government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force

or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains itself against the

will of the latter, such as the government of England under the Commonwealth, first by

Parliament and later by Cromwell the Protector.

2. One that is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the

enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force as

the cases of Castine in Maine which was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and

Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the US.

3. One that is established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in

insurrection against the parent state such as the government of the Southern Confederacy.

***But there is another description of a government called also by publicists as government de

facto but which might, perhaps be more aptly denominated as a government of paramount

force. It is characterized by:

1. That its existence is maintained by active military power with the territories, and against the

rightful authority of an established and lawful government

2. That while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private residents who, by acts

of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, or

wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by laws of the rightful government.

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G. People vs Gozo

Political Law – Sovereignty

Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation which is

within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the

Mayor’s Office and some neighbors, she demolished the house without acquiring the

necessary permits and then later on erected another house. She was then charged by the City

Engineer’s Office for violating Mun. Ord No. 14 Series of 1964 which requires her to secure

permits for any demolition and/or construction within the City. She was convicted in

violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo

has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a

foreign country.

ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base?

HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as

part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses

committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or

preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains

not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States

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Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of (Military Bases

Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State through the City of Olongapo

does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base.

H. Laurel vs Misa (?)

FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused

adhered to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for

treason since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he

cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were against the

Commonwealth which was replaced already by the Republic.

HELD: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to his

government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that the

Philippine government still had the power. Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is

either subsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per se wasn’t suspended; rather, it was

the exercise of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no suspended allegiance.

Regarding the change of government, there is no such change since the sovereign – the Filipino

people – is still the same. What happened was a mere change of name of government, from

Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines.

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I. RUFFY VS. CHIEF OF STAFF

Facts:

This was a petition for prohibition, praying that the respondents, the Chief of Staff and

the General Court Martial of the Philippine Army, be commanded to desist from further

proceedings in the trial of petitioners before that body. Preliminary injunction having been

denied by us and the General Court Martial having gone ahead with the trial, which

eventually resulted in the acquittal of one of the defendants, Ramon Ruffy, the dismissal of the

case as to another, Victoriano Dinglasan, and the conviction of Jose L. Garcia, Prudente M.

Francisco, Dominador Adeva and Andres Fortus, the last-named four petitioners now seek in

their memorandum to convert the petition into one for certiorari, with the prayer that the

records of the proceedings before the General Court Martial be ordered certified to the

Supreme Court for review.

Issue:

Whether 93d Article of War is unconstitutional

Held:

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No. This article in question ordains “that any person subject to military law who

commits murder in time of was shall suffer death or imprisonment for life, as the court martial

may direct.” It is argued that since “no review is provided by that law to be made by the

Supreme Court, irrespective of whether the punishment is for life imprisonment or death”, it

violates Article VIII, section 2, paragraph 4, of the Constitution of the Philippines which

provides that “the National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original

jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life

imprisonment.”

Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities for the

ordering of courts martial has been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the

President as Commander in Chief, independently of legislation. Unlike courts of law, they are

not a portion of the judiciary. Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government, it

follows that courts-martial must pertain to the executive department; and they are in fact

simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress for the President as

Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing

discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military

representatives.

*

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FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at

designated camps or military bases all over the country. Japanese forces went to Mindoro

thus forcing petitioner and his band move up the mountains and organize a guerilla outfit and

call it the "Bolo area". A certain Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of their

position and duties in the "Bolo area" by the new authority vested upon him because of the

recent change of command. Capt. Beloncio was thus allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow

petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense was

committed, which was at the time of war and the Japanese occupancy.

HELD: The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to military law since members of

the Armed Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War and other

laws even during an occupation. The act of unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman is

considered as a defiance of 95th Article of War held petitioners liable to military jurisdiction

and trial. Moreover, they were operating officers, which makes them even more eligible for

the military court's jurisdiction.

In consideration of the foregoing, the petition has no merit and should be dismissed. Thus, the

petition is hereby DENIED.

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Constitutional Law 1: State Functions / Concept of State (Textbook: Cruz, Professor: Atty. Usita)

Facts:

- On February 27, 1942, Japanese forces landed in Mindoro. Instead of surrendering, Major

Ruffy retreated to the mountains and organized and led a guerilla outfit known as the Bolo

Area. Petitioners Prudente M. Francisco, Jose L. Garcia, and Andres Fortus joined Major

Ruffy's organization towards the latter part of 1942. Petitioner Dominador Adeva became a

member some time in 1943.

On June 8, 1944, a change in the command of the Bolo Area was effected by Colonel Jurado.

Due to that command, Major Ruffy was relieved of his position as Commanding Officer. On

October 19, 1944, Lieut. Col. Jurado was allegedly slain by the petitioners.

In response to the alleged murder committed by the petitioners, the General Court Martial

went on ahead with the trial, leading to the accquital of Ramon Ruffy, the dissmisal of the

cases of Victoriano Dinglasan, and the conviction of the petitioners, Jose L. Garcia, Prudente

M. Francisco, Dominador Adeva, and Andres Fortus.

The petitioners petitioned for prohibition, seeking to desist the respondents, the Chief of Staff

and General Court Martial of the Philippine Army. This is based on the grounds that the

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petitioners were not subject to military law at the time the offense was committed, and that

the 93d Article of War is unconstitutional.

Issue/s:

- Whether or not the petitioners are subject to military law at the time for which they

commited their offense?

- Whether or not the 93d Article of War is constitutional?

Held:

- No. Petition dismissed.

Summary of Ratio:

1) By the occupation of the Philippines by Japanese forces, the officers of the Philippine Army

did not cease to be fully in the service, though in a measure, only in a measure, they were not

subject to the military jurisdiction, only if they were not in active duty.

2) The rule that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered

suprseded or in abeyance during the military occupation, is intended for the governing of the

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civil inhabitants of the occupied territory. It is not intended for and does not bind the enemies

in arms. Enemy occupation does not relieve them from their sworn official duties.

3) The petitioners come within the general application of the clause in sub-paragraph (a) of the

2d Article of War. By their acceptance of appointments as officers in the Bolo Area from the

General Headquarters of the 6th Military District, they became members of the Philippine

Army amendable to the Articles of War.

4) The 93rd Article of War does not violate Article VIII, Section 2, Paragraph 4, of the

Constitution. Courts martial are agencies of executive character. Unlike courts of law, they are

not a portion of the judiciary.