APPROVE^ FOR RELEA

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM John N, McMahon Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): A Massed Nuclear Strike uurlng a"Front dffensive Operation -

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on t h e SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication. Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thou , The beginning of tne article is iievoted to 'defining th m "massed nuclear strike" [in the context of a front-offensive operation) and other related terms

- such as "concZEZted massed strike", "grouped nuclear strike", "dispersed massed strike", etc, In the main body of the article the authors discuss the specific goals of a massed strike, the procedure for organizing one, the targeting for such a strike, and the coordination of troop actions in its delivery. This article appeared in Issue No, 1 (68) for 1963, - I 1

2 , Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled o n ' a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies, reference, reports from this publication have been assigned r:J

For ease of

I b

ohn N. McMahon

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Distribution:

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Director of Intelligence and ResearchDepartment of State

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for IntelligenceDepartment of the Army

The Assistant Chief of Staff, IntelligenceU. S. Air Force

Director, National Security Agency

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center

Director of Strategic Research

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DATE

13 April 1978

SUBJECT

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Intelligence Information Special ReportPage 3 of 19 Pages

COUNTRY/mil

DATE OFINFO. Early 1963

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): A Massed Nuclear Strike During aFront Offensive Operation

SOURCE DocumentarySummary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of anarticle which appeared in Issue No. 1 (68) for 1963 of the SECRETUSSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles ofthe Journal "Militar Thomght". The Tritnors bf this article areColonel S. -Begunov an oronel V. Glazov. The beginning of thearticle is devoted to defining the term "massed nuclear strike"(in the context of a front offensive operation) and other relatedterms such as "concenT7M1 massed strike", "grouped nuclearstrike", "dispersed massed strike", etc. In the main body of thearticle the authors discuss the specific goals of a massedstrike, the procedure for organizing one, the targeting for sucha strike, and the coordination of troop actions in its delivery.

11.1.2LIHIZILLComment:

ilie b(12T version of Military Thought was published threetimes annually and was disthouted daNn to the level of divisioncommander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.

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A Massed Nuclear Strike During a Front Offensive Operation

by

Colonel S. BEGUNOVColonel V. GLAZOV

A great deal of attention is being devoted in militarytheory and in operational training practice to the organizationand delivery of massed nuclear strikes. And this is fullyunderstandable, since only through the massed use of nuclearmeans is it possible to achieve the most decisive results.

In theoretical elaborations and in training exercises in thelast few years, special emphasis has been placed on investigatingproblems regarding the delivery of an initial massed nuclearstrike. There has been a tendency here to use as many nuclearwarheads as possible in this strike, sometimes even against veryquestionable targets. Such an inclination in exercises hasfrequently been unjustified, either by the tasks facing the Fronttroops or by the situation, In our opinion, this has come a76177on the one hand, because of the stereotyped distribution ofnuclear warheads which has become established practice and is toa certain extent legitimate, i.e., as a rule twice as many ormore nuclear means have been allotted for the immediate task asfor the subsequent task, and on the other hand, because ofunderevaluation of the importance of the massed employment ofnuclear weapons in the depth, where the front troops mayencounter heavy resistance from large opTFITronal and strategicenemy reserves. A not inconsiderable role was also played by thecircumstance that the participants in operational exercises havenot always taken proper heed of the results of the initialstrategic missile strikes in the offensive zones of fronts. Thelack of data on these results has also made it necesnr7to acertain extent, to use a great part of the nuclear warheadsallotted to the front at the beginning of the operation whendelivering the inerrri massed strike and carrying out theimmediate task.

In the present article we shall attempt to briefly examineproblems regarding the delivery of massed nuclear strikes during

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an operation and to ascertain the capabilities for implementingthem and the conditions under which they can take place, Butbefore proceeding to the examination of our topic, we wish todwell on the concept of the "massed nuclear strike" itself, forwhich there is still no unanimous definition as of the presenttime.

At the beginning of the 1950's, when we adopted nuclearweapons into service, they could not, of course, be used in amassed manner in exercises, since not more than 25 to 30 nuclearbombs were allocated for a • front offensive operation. At thattime, however, in carrying FUT—To-called nuclear preparation,there was already a noticeable tendency toward delivery of themassed nuclear strike.

At the end of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's,with the significant increase in the quantity of nuclear warheadsallocated to the front for an offensive, delivery of a massednuclear strike became—the most important way of using nuclearweapons. It was considered that during nuclear preparationseveral massed nuclear strikes might be delivered, for each ofwhich a substantial number of nuclear warheads would be expended,launched simultaneously in order to destroy one major target orseveral targets situated in a particular area,

An opinion was expressed in the press regarding concentrated(on one target) and dispersed (against several targets) massedstrikes. By concentrated strike was meant a strike used todestroy targets of the same nature, namely: combat equipment andpersonnel in the battle formations of the attackers which arelocated on the line of deployment or in the area of concentrationof enemy troops. A dispersed massed strike included strikes ontargets of varied nature, on means of mass destruction dispersedalong the front and depth, on control posts, on troop combatequipment and personnel, especially tank troops, on large defenseareas,-etc, It was confirmed that a massed strike may bedelivered not at some particular mandatory moment but over thespan of a certain time interval, from 30 minutes to 2,5 hours.

Thus, a massed strike was regarded as a series ofconcentrated and dispersed massed nuclear strikes, delivered insuccession by a substantial number of nuclear warheads anddirected toward accomplishment of the general task assigned to

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the massed strike overall.

There also exists the opinion that the massed strike isbased on single and grouped strikes delivered within an extremelylimited time frame against the most important installations ofthe enemy grouping which is to be destroyed. In this case, agrouped nuclear strike, as distinguished from a single strikewhich is delivered by one nuclear warhead against one target, isdefined as a strike by several nuclear warheads delivered to aarget whose destruction or incapacitation cannot be assured withne nuclear warhead.

It must be noted that both in exercises and in the pressopinions differ as to the targets which should be destroyed whendelivering massed strikes. Thus, it is sometimes consideredinexpedient to destroy enemy reserves in concentration areas orenemy command posts; in other instances, conversely, thesetargets are to be destroyed first of all. Many differentinterpretations of this problem in our military literature couldbe cited.

It seems to us that the basis for determining a massednuclear strike should be the main task it is to accomplish. As arule, we understand massed nuclear strike to mean a powerful,

\•\ pre-planned surprise strike delivered simultaneously by all or

the greater part of the existing forces and means at the disposalof a front at a given moment (rocket troops, aviation, nuclearwarheads) against one or several enemy groupings or key targets.

The goal of a massed nuclear strike delivered at thebeqinning of an operation, ustation with strate icmeans,' must be to accomp ishthe maintaskofa -front -- oTR4acitate the main enemy grouping, to destroy'tn-Mostimportant enemy installations, and thus to set up favorableconditions for routing the surviving enemy forces and means,securing the territory, and achieving the ultimate goal of theoperation in the shortest possible time.

The goal of a massed nuclear strike delivered

kc\ during an ovration must be to carry out, with front troops,iMportant intermediate tasks (the rout of enemy groupingsblocking the commitment of the front second echelon or reservesto the engagement; the destructriri-Ef large enemy reserves

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allocated for delivering a counterattack; the rout of enemygroupings defending a wide water obstacle and preventing itsassault crossing by front troops from the march, etc.), taskswith whose fulfilmenT—TWorable conditions would be set up forachieving the ultimate goal of the offensive operation in minimumtime.

As regards the proposals that a massed nuclear strike betaken to mean a series of single and grouped nuclear strikes orseveral successive concentrated and dispersed nuclear strikesdirected toward accomplishing the overall task, here it is more aquestion not of what constitutes a massed strike but of how toimplement it. Indeed, is it possible to conceive of delivering amassed strike according to any given model? Under modernconditions the situation will change frequently and abruptly, andthe methods of delivering a massed strike must therefore be mostdiverse. In one instance this will be a series of single nuclearstrikes, in another a combination of single strikes with groupedstrikes, and in a third several grouped strikes. There can bemany such combinations. Each time they must correspond to thespecific tasks assigned to the massed nuclear strike.

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We cannot agree with the proposal to consider a massednuclear strike as a series of successive strikes on targetsdispersed within the most diverse areas of the zone in which thefront troops are operating, and, moreover, with these strikes........_spread over a period of time. Even disregarding the fact that thevery term "dispersed massed strike" clearly fails to correspondto the principle of massing, such a method of delivering a strike

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is in its very essence unequal to the goals and tasks which areplaced before it.

We would also like to emphasize the fundamental distinctionbetween a massed nuclear strike and a grouped strike. A groupednuclear strike is a strike directed toward the destruction orincapacitation of one large target, let us say a division, whenone nuclear warhead is not enough to attain the intended level ofdestruction or when the use of one higher-yield nuclear warhead,which would provide the necessary destruction of the target, isimpossible because of safety conditions for our own troops or isinadvisable because of the situation. A massed nuclear strike,however, is directed above all toward the destruction orincapacitation of a 1211g of targets, and its yield is determined

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by the number of targets comprising the group. (/

Let us examine in greater detail the situational conditionsunder which it may be required to deliver massed strikes duringan operation.

The advancing troops may, within the depth, encounter largeenemy reserves being moved up, without whose prompt destructionit will be impossible to continue the offensive at a rapid pace.In this case a meeting engagement will probably arise. In modernoperations, meeting engagements can sometimes arisesimultaneously on several axes or successively on one main axisbut at different depths, i.e., under the most diverse conditions.This requires skilful operating methods by the front troops. Insuch a situation it may be expedient to deliver—T—NTssed nuclearstrike. If so, it is very important to correctly determine theenemy grouping against which the massed strike should first bedelivered. This will usually be the grouping which representsthe greatest danger for the front troops on the main axis.

The enemy may also use his operational reserves for acounterattack. As is known, in order to break up a counterattackit is necessary to fight the enemy systematically deep in therear while his reserves, which are in transit by road, by sea, orby air, are being concentrated in their disposition areas, or arebeing moved up and deployed for the counterattack. An importantrole in this fighting will unquestionably be played by strategicmeans's. if the .enemyTiless succeeds in assemblingcounterattack grouping, it may become necessary to deliver amassed nuclear strike in order to rout the grouping and therebybreak up the counterattack.

In order to develop the operation, fresh front reserves mustbe committed, or even the second echelon (if there is one). Itis most advantageous to intensify efforts by committing reservesinto gaps which have formed between the advancing troops of thefirst echelon. The situation may develop in such a way that theenemy will also attempt to direct his forces toward these samegaps in order to come out on the flank or rear of our troops. Inthis case the commitment of the front reserves to the engagementmay be jeopardized. To avoid thir7-17t will be advisable todeliver a massed nuclear strike on the enemy troops, calculated

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to preempt _a strike by the enemy.

In order to halt the advancing troops, the enemy willextensively exploit large rivers. The most important task of afront in anticipation of their forced crossing is to rout theWETE7 forces directly defending the water line and the reserves.If several single strikes or one grouped strike are inadequatefor the accomplishment of this task, the front will be obliged toresort to a massed nuclear strike.

A massed nuclear strike may also be required duringcompletion of an operation, when the front troops must rout theenemy's counterattack grouping or his reserves moving up from thedepth, especially if he has been able to concentrate forces for acounteroffensive.

Thus, during an offensive operation the need for massednuclear strikes may arise more than once. This does not, ofcourse, mean that such strikes will be frequent, It should betaken into account that a massed nuclear strike is a very comnlexmeasure, requiring careful organization, the allocation of rockettroops, aviation, and other forces, and preparation of thenecessary quantity of nuclear warheads. A certain amount of timeis needed for concentrating and deploying the forces and meansallocated for the strike, assembling and bringing up the missilesand nuclear warheads, and possibly also regrouping the rockettroops. It must accordingly be assumed that such strikes willtake place only under those conditions in which the main task ofthe front cannot be accomplished by delivering single or groupednuclear strikes.

Massed nuclear strikes during an operation when carrying outthe most important tasks of the front, as well as at thebeginning of an operation, will UTUTrly be organized anddelivered by the front. This makes it possible to use the powerof the rocket troops and aviation with maximum effectiveness.Their joint participation in a massed strike demands theefficient coordination of their actions as to time andobjectives, which can only be attained with maximum thoroughnessand precision if there is centralized planning on a front-widescale. Centralized planning will make possible a more-57513erutilization of the yield of the nuclear warheads available in thefront and armies, allowing them to be neither overexpended nor

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underexpended (if it may be so expressed) when hitting any giventargets.

It should be noted that a massed strike during an operation,in its yield and the quantity of forces allocated for itsimplementation, may not only not be inferior to a massed strikedelivered by a front at the beginning of an operation but may

--lometimes even surpass it, Indeed, in those instances in which amajor portion of the tasks for destruction of the main enemygrouping and other important targets in the front zone will becarried out by strategic rocket forcps in the initial massednuclear strike at the beginning of the war, there will scarcelybe a need to allocate a large quantity of front means forparticipation in this strike, The front wirr—Use its ownoperational-tactical and tactical erglins and aviation,naturally within circumscribed limits, to hit only those targets,first and foremost the enemy's nuclear means and troops, whichfor one reason or another are not hit by strategic missiles,During an offensive, however, the situation may develop in such a

—' way that the strategic rocket forces will not be in a position tohit the targets in the front zone, but that the enemy will beable to concentrate larri-77serves for a powerful strike on theadvancing troops. Under these conditions, the front must be readyto inflict a decisive blow against the enemy r11777es by means ofa massed nuclear strike while utilizing in a timely manner themaximum quantity of our own rocket troops and aviation.

What forces may be drawn on by the front to deliver a massedstrike during an operation? In determinrrhis, our point ofdeparture must be, on the one hand, those tasks which must beaccomplished by the strike in accordance with the overall conceptof the operation, and, on the other hand, the availability andcapabilities of the forces.

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As is known, during the relocation of missile brigades andbattalions and the rebasing of aviation during an operation, notless than 50 percent of the rocket troops and about 70 to 80percent of their available aircraft must be kept ready at alltimes to deliver strikes, A front, operating in the WesternTheater of Military Operations, may have one to two front missilebrigades, one separate missile battalion, and two to tourarmymissile brigades and tactical missile battalions, depending on

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the number of divisions in the front. Thus, in a front there maybe a total of 51 to 79 launchers (not counting cruise—gissiles)of which 21 to 39 are operational-tactical launchers and 30 to 40are tactical missile launchers. Consequently, in order todeliver a massed strike with 50 percent of the launchers in useand one battery in each battalion left as a duty battery, whichis necessary for effectively opposing enemy nuclear attack means,the front may use about 10 to 15 operational-tactical missilesand approximately the same quantity of tactical missiles.

The determination of the number of rocket troops to beallocated to deliver a massed nuclear strike may be arrived at indifferent ways. For example, let us imagine that two armies areoperating on the main axis and that six to eight divisions areadvancing in their first echelon, In the gap which has formedbetween these armies, a third is committed, and it is on thisaxis that a massed strike is delivered, In this case, the frontwill be able to allocate for the strike six to eight launcETFT'from the divisions, up to six launchers from the army brigades,and three to nine launchers from the front brigades and theseparate battalion, a total of about TT —F6 20 launchers. Theremay, of course, be other variants as well.

The quantity of means allocated from the air army toparticipate in .a massed nuclear strike is also determinedaccording to the composition of the air army, It may have onebomber division, one or two fighter-bomber divisions, and one ortwo aviation engineer regiments of cruise missiles, A bomberdivision can put 15 delivery vehicles into use at the same time(two to four aircraft equipped for radioelectroniccountermeasures are required to support each delivery aircraft).A fighter-bomber division having one squadron in each regimentwhich is trained for toss bombing can deliver a strike with 30nuclear bombs, A cruise missile regiment is capable of launchingfour missiles at once, Therefore, an air army has the capabilityof putting 45 to 83 delivery vehicles into action simultaneously,However, experience from training exercises of recent yearsindicates that usually only part of the forces of an air army areallocated for 4 massed strike during an operation. As a possiblevariant of such an allocation we may utilize: one bomberregiment, one or two fighter-bomber regiments, and one cruisemissile regiment, a total of 19 to 29 delivery vehicles.

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In all, of course, if nuclear warheads are available, afront can put 34 to 49 missiles and delivery aircraft into actionTTErtaneously and can hit up to 26 to 38 targets (thecoefficient of technical reliability of the missiles is 0,(?):the probability for the delivery of a nuclear warhead by a cruisemissile and a fighter-bomber is 0.8; for a bomber it is 0.6).

Along with nuclear means, chemical and conventional meansalso will find very wide application in a massed strike during an

- operation, especially for incapacitating the personnel servicingradiotechnical systems and tactical means of nuclear attack.

It has not been ruled out that when a front delivers amassed strike during an operation, strategic rocket forces andstrategic aviation will participate in it.

It has already been noted that preparation for delivery ofmassed nuclear strikes during an operation is an exceptionallycomplicated task, It includes a series of measures to be takenby the command and staffs. It is very important to foresee inadvance the possibility of having to deliver massed strikes, ofadopting a decision without a delay in transmitting the tasks totheir executors, and of organizing cooperation, relocation ofmissile large units and units, stockpiling and transport ofnuclear warheads, control, and communications. In order toimplement all of these measures on a timely basis, the commandand staffs must be exceptionally well organized and efficient intheir work.

Judging by experience from training exercises, the followingwill be the most expedient procedure for organizing a massedstrike during an operation.

Upon receipt of situation data dictating the need to carryout the primary task of a front at a given stage of an operationby delivering a massed nucT717—strike, the commander of thefront, together with the chief of staff, the chief of the rocket176517s and artillery, the commander of the air army, and thechief of the intelligence directorate, will proceed to work out adecision for the strike. He must determine the possible enemytargets and the degree to which each must be incapacitated, theyield of the nuclear warheads and how many are to be expended forhitting each target as well as for the entire strike, the types

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and altitudes of the bursts, and the time of delivery of the

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strike; he must allocate the strike targets between the rockettroops and aviation; he must determine the degree to whichconventional means of destruction will participate in the strikeand the goals and methods of the combat actions of combined-armslarge units and units of the front that are to exploit theeffects of the massed nuclear-VS.7.1e; and he must lay thegroundwork for cooperation and control.

On the basis of these initial data, the front staff, thechief of the rocket troops and artillery, and ofthe air army will first of all assign tasks for the finalreconnaissance of the enemy by our own means and will determinewhat additional intelligence data must be received within whattime limits from the front intelligence directorate.

The operations directorate of the front staff, the staff ofthe rocket troops and artillery, the directorate of missile andartillery armament, and the staff of the air army will beassigned tasks for organizing the relocation and deployment ofrocket troops, preparing the aircraft, and preparing and issuingmissiles and nuclear, chemical, and conventional warheads.

Following this, the front staff, jointly with the staff ofthe rocket troops and art -37=y and the staff of the air army,will work out the operations procedure for the rocket troops,aviation, and combined-arms large units of the front. In thecourse of this activity, the necessary preliminary instructionswill be issued to the staffs of the armies, to the missile largeunits (units), and to aviation.

While this is taking place, the staff of the rocket troopsand artillery, having received additional intelligenceinformation on the enemy and data on the delivery of nuclearstrikes by aviation, will carry out the precise planning ofnuclear missile and chemical strikes against enemy targets (thenature and disposition of the targets, the required yields andtypes of bursts and the means of destruction will be preciselydefined, and the necessary commands to the missile troops will beprepared). The staff of the air army will carry out analogousactivity regarding the use of aviation.

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All measures for organizing a massed nuclear strike must becarried out within extremely restricted time limits. Thecapabilities to do this are available. Thus, for example, inpreparing such a strike in one of the command-staff exercisesconducted in 1962, the commander of the front spent 20 minutesadopting a decision and the staff of theinnet troops andartillery spent 11 minutes taking the target coordinates, fromtwo to ten minutes transmitting the orders, and from 33 to 37minutes preparing the missile units. Since several of themeasures indicated above were conducted at the same time, it tooka total of one hour and three minutes to prepare and execute themassed strike. Such a result was achieved thanks to the factthat the preparatory work for the strike was sufficiently wellthought out and organized. The commander of the front adoptedhis decision on the strike with the active DarticiFITion of thechief of staff, the chief of the rocket troops and artillery, thecommander of the air army, and chief of the intelligencedirectorate of the front staff instead of having to listen tolengthy information reports. This speed in adopting a decisionand issuing specific instructions by the commander of the frontfacilitated the work of the staffs and made it possible to—Vrecta substantial reduction in the time needed for working out andissuing the necessary combat instructions to the troops and forcoordinating questions of cooperation.

When adopting a decision on a massed nuclear strike, themost crucial question is determining the targets to be hit. Outof all the targets detected, those which must be selected fordestruction are the ones whose destruction will bring thegreatest success, In all instances, it is necessary to destroyfirst of all the_Ankmy's missile/nuclear attads—atans, bomber aviation at airfields, and bases at which nuclear warheads andmissiles are assembled. Along with nuclear attack means, it isalso necessary to destroy staffs and command posts of fieldformations and large units, troops_direotly, aircraft and missilecontrol and guidance centers, and, -Irpossible s main roadjunctions, bridges •over wfae rivers, and other important targets.

Regarding the question of destroying nuclear attack means,different points of view exist at the present time, Somecomrades consider it necessary to first of all attack the meansof employment of nuclear weapons (missile launchers and deliveryaircraft); others maintain that primary attention must be

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directed toward eliminating depots and bases for the assembly ofnuclear warheads, The simplest decision, of course, would be todestroy both types of objectives simultaneously. But under theactual conditions of a combat situation, this will not always beattainable either because of insufficient means or warheads, orfor other reasons, In our view s therefore, primary attentionmust be concentrated on destroying those targets which, at thegiven moment, represent the greatest immediate danger. If, forexample, a launcher, a cruise missile, or a nuclear cannon isdetected, ready for delivery of a strike, and if at the same timea depot of nuclear warheads is discovered, then if it is notpossible to hit these targets simultaneously, fire should beconcentrated first' of all an_the_nuclear meansiand ithen on the Jepot,) However, when the exact coordinates of a depot orassembly base of nuclear warheads are available and when at thesame time, let us say, only the concentration area of nuclearattack means is known, it is better to destroy the depot or basefirst and to hit the nuclear means second after completingreconnaissance of them. Thus, the most rational resolution of theproblem can be found by considering all aspects of the specificd. of the situation.

When destroying nuclear means situated over a small area,the probability of destruction must in all instances be broughtto 90 percent, as indicated by calculations and experience fromexercises. Combined-arms targets, depending on their importanceand whether they are disposed on those axes on which motorizedrifle and tank divisions are advancing, may be destroyed invarying degrees. From 30 to 40 percent of the total areaoccupied by such targets can be reliably destroyed (with 90percent probability). In single instances, the level ofdestruction may be even higher, From 30 to 40 p ercent of thearea of control posts must be reliably destroyed,

To achieve high effectiveness of a massed strike requiresthe organization of efficient cooperation among missile units,aviation, and combined-arms large units, Particular attentionmust be given to coordinating the use of nuclear weapons and theactions of the advancing troops. These weapons must inflictdecisive damage on the enemy and create conditions for our owntroops to advance rapidly and to quickly complete the rout of theOpposing grouping.

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In order to ensure coordinated troop actions in delivering amassed strike, it is necessary first of all that the armycommanders, division commanders, and commanders of missile largeunits and units know when, against what target, at what time orwith the arrival at what line, with charges of what yield, withwhat type of burst, with what means, and by whose order themissile launching or aviation strike will take place.

Organizing cooperation between rocket troops and aviationlarge units consists of coordinating their strikes with regard toplace, time, and types of bursts. —Front aviation, in addition tothe direct delivery of strikes, is Tinti the task ofreconnaissance and final reconnaissance of the targets to bedestroyed, of providing air cover to the battle formations ofrocket troops, and of determining and monitoring the results ofbursts. The rocket troops, in support of aviation, disorganizethe enemy air defense, destroy enemy antiaircraft means andfighter aircraft at their airfields, and disrupt control. Toprovide for the safety of our own aircraft flights, restrictedzones are established above the disposition of missile units whenmissiles are being launched, and provision is also made formeasures preventing the launching of missiles against targetslocated in the zone of air action.

Commanders and staffs of cooperating troops will be able toachieve the greatest success only when they correctly understandthe aim of the massed strike, the tasks of the forces and means,and when they have a good knowledge of the situation andcontinuous reliable communications with one another.

A massed nuclear strike during an operation is carried outat a previously established signal which is given by thecommander of the front. To ensure timeliness in delivering thestrike, all participating forces are brought to full combatreadiness beforehand, also at a single signal or upon command ofthe commander of the front.

Upon receipt of the appropriate order, the missile andaviation units and subunits prepare the missiles for launchingand the aircraft for takeoff. The missiles and aircraft can bebrought to full readiness either immediately, skipping theintermediate stages of readiness, or by degrees.

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If the forces and means are brought to full combat readinessby degrees, it will be possible to define precisely thecoordinates of the points of aim specified earlier for destroyingthe targets or to set up the tasks for destroying newly detectedtargets in line with the instructions of the commander of thefront.

The front staff, the chief of the rocket troops andartillery, the commander of the air army, and the commanders ofthe missile large units and units will monitor the carrying outof the orders (signals) issued and will report on the readinessfor a massed strike against the existing communications means bytransmitting specially worked out coded signals or bytransmitting them directly (automatically) to an illuminateddisplay panel set up at the front staff.

A massed nuclear strike is carried out, if possible, by asingle salvo at a precisely established time. A salvo should notbe considered as a strike produced instantaneously in the literalsense of the word. It is difficult in actual practice to attainsuch a thing. A salvo should be understood here as a strikedelivered over a short time interval which suffices for carryingout all of the intended missile launchings and bombing strikes.Nor should this time interval be extended, either, since thisleads to a reduction in the overall effectiveness of the strike.

In order to carry out a massed strike in a more or lessshort interval of time, it is very important that all forces andmeans be at full readiness simultaneously and that severalcommunications channels be available for transmitting the signalsfor the launching of missiles and the takeoff of aircraft. Inthe period preceding delivery of the strike, all measures must betaken to keep the forces participating in the strike at highcombat readiness.

The subsequent actions of the front troops will depend to agreat degree on the results of the ITIVITEd nuclear strike. Themassed strike, in turn, can reach maximum effectiveness only ifit is fully exploited by the advancing troops in order tocomplete the rout of the opposing grouping, take possession ofthe enemy territory, and deprive the enemy of freedom to maneuverhis reserves in the depth and of the opportunity to restore theforces neutralized by the strike.

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While the strike is being carried out, the main efforts 0';the command and staffs are directed toward determining itsresults and exploiting them immediately with the troops. It isvery important to find out quickly which targets have not beendestroyed for one reason or another and to take appropriatemeasures in time. For this purpose, each nuclear burst must bepinpointed by intersection as soon as the strike is delivered, inorder to determine their actual ground zeros (centers) andaltitudes. If the ground zero (center) of a burst deviatessignificantly from that initially assigned, or if the intendedburst at a given target has, for technical or other reasons,failed to occur, the front commander can, depending on howimportant it is to den767 this target at the given moment, adopta decision to deliver a second nuclear strike against itimmediately, using duplicate or reserve means, If it is notedthat a nuclear burst has occurred closer to the ground surfacethan the established distance, the necessary corrections aremade, by order of the commander, in the plan for the upcomingactions of front troops, thus eliminating the possibility oftheir being contaminated by radiation.

Simultaneously with the pinpointing of the ground zeros(centers) and altitudes of the nuclear bursts, the level ofdestruction of the targets is determined. These data areimmediately transmitted to the troops; based on the data, adetermination is made of the most expedient actions for thetroops to exploit the effects of the massed strike; and measuresare taken to knock out undestroyed or only partially neutralizedtargets by means of conventional, chemical, or nuclear warheads,

Mobile enemy targets can change their deployment areas,disperse, or move prior to the delivery of a massed strike oreven during it. They must all be put under special observation byreconnaissance elements so that a timely change can be made, ifnecessary, in the type of delivery vehicle and the number andyield of the nuclear warheads for their destruction. In general,however, it is better to assign fighter-bomber aviation todestroy mobile targets,

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It cannot be ruled out that in the period preceding a massedstrike, or at the moment of implementation, the enemy may delivera strike on some of the launching positions of the rocket troopsor on airfields. In this case, the command and staffs will takethe necessary measures for immediate restoration of the combateffectiveness of the units and of their control. At the sametime, the strike targets are redistributed among the units, themissile batteries are relocated to alternate siting areas or toalternate positions, and the aircraft are rebased. All of thismust be done within the shortest possible time.

When the situation does not permit extending the time periodover which the massed strike is delivered, it must be carried outeven with weakened forces. The destructive capabilities ofnuclear weapons are such that they can, even when restricted innumber, bring about significant enemy losses and thereby exert afundamental influence on the accomplishment of the main fronttask.