EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

I M P A C T S O F E X E C U T I O N S O NH O M I C I D E S

Deterrence and the Death PenaltyA New Look at Some Recent Findings

Sonja E. SiennickF l o r i d a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y

Between 1977, after the Supreme Court essentially reinstated capital punishment

with Gregg v. Georgia (1976), and the end of 2010, nearly 8,000 people were

on death row in the United States (Snell, 2011). More than 1,200 were executed(Snell, 2011). The post-Gregg era is only the latest chapter in this country’s centuries-old use

of capital punishment and in the ongoing debates over its impact, fairness, and morality.

Policy makers and scholars have been especially interested in whether the death penalty

serves a crime-control function by deterring prospective murderers. The ongoing interestin and dialogue about this potential effect of capital punishment are important because it

behooves us as a society to understand exactly what impact we have when we administer

the ultimate punishment.

Expectations of deterrence follow from the basic idea that potential murderers decidewhether to kill after considering the benefits and costs of killing. Because death is a great

cost, the threat of execution could tip the decision in favor of not killing. Yet there is very

mixed evidence on whether that happens, and definitive conclusions are further hampered

by the use of data and methods that are several steps removed from the offender decision-making processes of interest (National Research Council, 2012). A review of the available

evidence recently led a National Research Council committee to conclude—again—that

we still do not know whether the legal status or use of capital punishment has any influenceon homicide (National Research Council, 2012).

On the heels of the committee’s report comes Land, Teske, and Zheng’s (2012, this

issue) extension of their earlier work (Land, Teske, and Zheng, 2009)—previous work that

Radelet (2012, this issue) notes has been cited approvingly by death penalty supporters.

Direct correspondence to Sonja E. Siennick, College of Criminology & Criminal Justice, Florida State University,325 Hecht House, 634 W. Call Street, Tallahassee, FL 32306–1127 (e-mail: ssiennick@fsu.edu).

DOI:10.1111/j.1745-9133.2012.00833.x C© 2012 American Society of Criminology 535Criminology & Public Policy � Volume 11 � Issue 3

Editor ia l Introduction Impacts of Executions on Homicides

Then, and now, their data come from Texas, the state with the greatest number of post-

Gregg executions (Snell, 2011) and the state that our policy essayists note seems to drive

past findings of deterrent effects. Using monthly time-series data on executions, felonyhomicides, and non-felony homicides, Land et al. (2012) discover that their previously

found short-term deterrent effect apparently holds only for non-felony homicides and

that some of those homicides are displaced to the following month. Felony homicides

actually increase slightly after an execution. Yet the felony homicides are the homicidesthat are eligible for the death penalty. This poses an interesting problem for the deterrence

interpretation. Not only is the apparent deterrent effect driven by Texas, but even there it

seems to be driven by reductions in the wrong type of murder.

What, if anything, does this tell us about deterrence and the death penalty? Land etal. (2012) suggest that their findings point to subtypes of potential murderers who might

respond differently to the threat of execution. Perhaps non-felony murderers are sensitive

to the threat of execution, even if they are confused about which crimes are capital offenses,

whereas the thought of sanctions actually makes hardened criminals’ offenses more deadlyby motivating them to eliminate witnesses. As Land et al. note, they can only speculate

about these mechanisms because researchers have yet to open the black box of homicide

offender decision making (National Research Council, 2012). Given this black box, can we

call the observed effects deterrence and brutalization?The policy essayists recast Land et al.’s (2012) findings in light of key elements of

classic and modern deterrence and choice perspectives, namely information, risk, and other

aspects of the sanction regime. First, a deterrent effect of capital punishment would depend

on potential murderers’ consideration of its authorized and actual uses, and we know almostnothing about their knowledge and perceptions (Fagan, Geller, and Zimring, 2012, this

issue). How would they know what the execution time series looks like, so that they could

adjust their behavior accordingly? Hjalmarsson (2012, this issue) suggests that they could

learn through word-of-mouth—which she reasons would be more, not less, likely for moreserious offenders—or through the media. Yet by her calculation, only one third of Texas

executions are covered by major media outlets. Radelet (2012) suggests that this could be

compounded by potential murderers’ below-average knowledge of current events. If word

of executions never reaches potential murderers, then their association with homicide couldnot be deterrence (National Research Council, 2012).

Second, notions of deterrence direct attention to both statutory and practical risk.

Fagan et al. (2012) suggest that nearly half of death penalty-eligible homicides in Texas

may fall in the non-felony homicide category (e.g., killings of young children and contractkillings), and our interpretation of the findings could hinge on whether declines in those

homicides are producing the apparent deterrent effect. In addition, Fagan et al. note that

murderers’ real risk of execution is low, raising the possibility that even perfect knowledge

of the risk would not be sufficient for deterrence.

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Siennick

Finally, Radelet (2012) and Fagan et al. (2012) note that the key issue for policy is the

marginal deterrent effect of execution over the next worst punishment, which in Texas in

2005 became life without the possibility of parole. This policy change occurred at the tailend of Land et al.’s (2012) time series. For deterrence to occur under this new condition,

some potential murderers must be willing to risk life without the possibility of parole but

be unwilling to risk execution (Radelet, 2012). Fagan et al. (2012) suggest that although

life without parole seems to be changing the nature of sentencing in Texas, these changesmay not be affecting homicide rates.

Together, this collection of papers suggests that if executions have deterrent effects at

all, they are not the ones we might expect, and the currently available evidence cannot tell

us why. By identifying an important contingency in their previous findings, Land et al.’s(2012) work leads us to think carefully about the relatively unstudied mechanisms linking

capital punishment with homicide and to consider new and creative ways of studying the

impact of executions.

ReferencesFagan, Jeffrey, Amanda Geller, and Franklin E. Zimring. 2012. The Texas deterrence

muddle. Criminology & Public Policy. 11: 579–591.

Hjalmarsson, Randi. 2012. Can executions have a short-term deterrence effect on non-felony homicides? Criminology & Public Policy. 11: 565–571.

Land, Kenneth C., Raymond H. C. Teske, Jr., and Hui Zheng. 2009. The short-termeffects of executions on homicides: Deterrence, displacement, or both? Criminology,47: 1009–1044.

Land, Kenneth C., Raymond H. C. Teske, Jr., and Hui Zheng. 2012. The differentialshort-term impacts of executions on felony and non-felony homicides. Criminology &Public Policy. 11: 541–563.

National Research Council, with D. S. Nagin and J. V. Pepper, eds. 2012. Deterrence andthe Death Penalty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.

Radelet, Michael L. 2012. The death penalty in Texas: On failing to acknowledge irrelevance.Criminology & Public Policy. 11: 573–578.

Snell, Tracy L. 2011. Capital Punishment, 2010 – Statistical Tables. Washington, DC: U.S.Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

Court Case CitedGregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).

Sonja E. Siennick is an assistant professor in Florida State University’s College of

Criminology & Criminal Justice. Her current research interests include the interpersonal

causes and consequences of crime and deviance at various points in the life course.

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