Desert watchers: MINUSMA's intelligence capabilities · 2017-06-12 · Desert watchers: MINUSMA's intelligence ... companies to be deployed in different areas of northern Mali to

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Desert watchers: MINUSMA's intelligence capabilities

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The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is

currently the only UN peacekeeping operation with an organic military intelligence-

gathering and processing capability. Erwan de Cherisey reports

MINUSMA's military intelligence structure is unique in UN history, setting a precedent that could

influence future peacekeeping operations by making intelligence capabilities an integral

component of UN military deployments. The mission comprises a mix of field units tasked with

reconnaissance, human intelligence, and air surveillance, and includes an analysis component

responsible for centralising and processing the information generated by these assets.

A background to MINUSMA's intelligence system

The relationship between the UN and intelligence gathering has never been a dispassionate one.

Although as early as 1961, as part of the UN operation in the Congo (ONUC), a military

intelligence cell was created, there was no formal blueprint for intelligence as part of UN

operations until 2000.

That same year the so-called Brahimi report, formally known as the Report of the Panel on United

Nations Peace Operations, was presented, which recommended a complete reassessment of the

need for efficient intelligence-gathering and processing capabilities.

As Colonel Mike (full name withheld for security reasons) of the Royal Netherlands Air Force

(RNLAF), who commanded MINUSMA's All Source Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU) from mid-

2016 until early 2017 explained to Jane's , the Brahimi report served as the basis for a progressive

reassessment of the value of intelligence as part of UN operations.

Its conclusions on intelligence were firmly taken into consideration when, in 2013, the UN decided

to establish MINUSMA and to provide it with a dedicated organic intelligence gathering and

processing capability.

While the UN agreed that MINUSMA required an in-house intelligence capability, supported by

specific force multipliers, including ground reconnaissance units and unmanned aerial vehicles

(UAVs), the latter having been first used by the UN in 2013 in the Democratic Republic of Congo

as part of the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the

Congo (MONUSCO), the concept for a dedicated intelligence unit for MINUSMA was put forward

by a number of European countries.

As Col Mike told Jane's , Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden played a central role

in turning the idea of an intelligence unit within MINUSMA into an implementable concept.

He further explained that the initial concept envisaged in 2013 for the intelligence unit was for a

headquarters (HQ) at Bamako and three intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)

companies to be deployed in different areas of northern Mali to carry out short- and long-range

patrols, and collect imagery (IMINT), as well as human intelligence (HUMINT).






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Col Mike noted that in early 2014 a final concept was drawn up, with an HQ in Bamako and two

ISR units to be based in Timbuktu and Gao. The HQ, which would exercise control over the

operational ISR assets and generate the intelligence products required by the MINUSMA

leadership to support its decision-making process, was named ASIFU. It was placed under the

command of a Dutch colonel with a Swedish lieutenant-colonel as deputy, since the Netherlands

and Sweden had both agreed to provide the necessary troops to staff the ISR units in the field.

[Continued in full version…]

Swedish troops are seen here conducting a foot patrol in the streets of Timbuktu with Denel RG-32 armoured vehicles providing support. These sorties allow Swedish forces to make contact with the local population and get valuable information on the security situation in the area. (Erwan de Cherisey)

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An evolving structure

Col Mike told Jane's that until January this year ASIFU was only one of the components within

MINUSMA's intelligence system.

Each of MINUSMA's three sector HQs (West: Timbuktu, East: Gao, and North: Kidal) also had

their respective intelligence staff (G2), who were responsible for centralising the intelligence

provided by the operational units in the field (infantry battalions, engineering companies, etc) and

passing it on to the Force HQ (FHQ) intelligence staff (U2).

However, as Col Mike pointed out, intelligence officers at the field unit level (S2), as well as at G2

and U2 levels, were found to be often inappropriately trained for their function, which resulted in

poor results on the part of this specific component of MINUSMA's intelligence system.






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A number of specialist units were also part of the intelligence chain, although they fell directly

under the purview of MINUSMA's Force Commander. These comprised the Dutch Helicopter

Detachment (HELIDET) in Gao, which has now been replaced by the German HELIDET; the

Salvadoran Helicopter Unit in Timbuktu; the Bangladesh Utility Aviation Unit (BANUAU) in Kidal;

the Ghana Aviation Unit (GHAV) in Gao; the Portuguese Aviation Unit in Bamako; the German

Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) UAV unit in Gao; and the Dutch Long Range

Reconnaissance Patrol Task Group (LRRPTG) staffed by regular army soldiers that replaced the

Special Operations Land Task Group (SOLTG): a special forces unit tasked with long-range

reconnaissance duties throughout northern Mali in January.


The ISR task forces






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The Swedish ISR task force's main armoured vehicle is the Denel RG-32, which saw action in Afghanistan before being deployed in Mali. The type can embark four soldiers. Some of the vehicles in Mali are fitted with a remotely operated weapon station fitted with a 12.7 mm heavy machine gun. (Erwan de Cherisey)

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The Dutch force had been operating since April 2014, conducting land reconnaissance as well as

air surveillance sorties with Boeing Insitu ScanEagle tactical UAVs from its base in Gao. In 2016,

in accordance with the initial Dutch commitment to MINUSMA, the unit was withdrawn and its

responsibilities transferred to a new German ISR unit, which has since expanded into a full task

force.

As Lieutenant-Colonel Jonas Nilsson, commanding officer of the Swedish ISR task force (SWE

ISR TF) in the second half of 2016 explained to Jane's , his unit's mission is to collect information

to support the military and civilian decision making process within MINUSMA. The commander of

the German ISR task force later made a similar statement when interviewed by Jane's .

The Swedish ISR task force's reconnaissance company conducts primarily motorised short- and long-range patrols using Denel RG-32 armoured vehicles. Such operations can last for only a few hours if taking place in Timbuktu and its immediate surroundings, or for several days when they are conducted further into MINUSMA's Sector West area of responsibility. (Erwan de Cherisey)

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Both ISR task forces are organised along similar lines, with the SWE ISR TF comprising a

command element, a reconnaissance company, and a combat support company, while the

German ISR TF comprises a command element, an ISR company, and a support component,

which includes a force protection unit. The MALE UAV unit is part of the ISR task force but its

tasking falls under the Force Commander.






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The Swedish reconnaissance company has a strength of close to 100 troops that are spread

between a reconnaissance platoon, which is tasked with conducting motorised patrols, both short-

and long-range, using Denel RG-32s armoured patrol vehicles and Polaris Sportsman 6x6 light all-

terrain vehicles; an electronic warfare team; a weapons intelligence team; a small UAV team that

operates the AeroVironment Puma AE and Wasp III and supports the motorised patrols with a

close-in reconnaissance capability; and a tactical UAV team, which fields several Textron Shadow

200s and operates from Camp Nobel: the Swedish military's enclave in Timbuktu. The latter is

able to carry out reconnaissance flights at distances of up to 120 km for six hours.

The Swedish ISR task force operates the Textron Shadow 200 tactical UAV in surveillance missions around Timbuktu. The aircraft is flown from Camp Castor, the Swedish base in Timbuktu, and is not forward deployed to other locations in Mali. (Erwan de Cherisey)

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As one Bundeswehr officer explained to Jane's , the German ISR company is staffed by 180

troops, including 19 foreign personnel from Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, the Netherlands, and

Switzerland. It is organised in several platoons and is supported by specialist personnel from the

Bundeswehr Civilian-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) centre of Nienburg and HUMINT experts from

the German Air Force. The ISR company is a multisensory unit that comprises RMMV Fuchs

armoured personnel carriers (APCs), KMW Fennek reconnaissance vehicles carrying electro-

optical (EO) and infrared (IR) sensors, Mowag Eagle IV tactical vehicles, AirRobot AR-100B

Mikado quadcopter micro UAVs, EMT Aladin small UAVs, and EMT LUNA tactical UAVs. The

Mikado and Aladin are primarily used for short range 'over the hill' reconnaissance and perimeter

surveillance, while the LUNA, with its range of 80 km and endurance of six hours, covers larger

areas.






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The AeroVironment Puma AE small UAV is used by Swedish troops in Mali for short-range reconnaissance in support of motorised patrols in the field. (Erwan de Cherisey)

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Each ISR task force primarily operates within its corresponding sector (West or East), although, if

the circumstances demand it, it can deploy to another sector. The task forces conduct several

types of missions, from covert surveillance to HUMINT collection through foot patrols, which also

allow them to remind the population of MINUSMA's presence and purpose. While the task forces

have a long-range reconnaissance capability, they are not intended to conduct very-long-range

reconnaissance operations, because these duties are handled by the LRRPTG.







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The RMMV Fuchs is the main armoured personnel carrier in service with the German ISR task force. The vehicles are specifically outfitted to transport some of the unit's UAVs, mainly the AirRobot AR-100B Mikado and EMT Aladin. (Bundeswehr)

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Special Operations Land Task Group and Task Group Desert Falcon

The need for a long-range reconnaissance capability was the primary reason that prompted

MINUSMA to request the deployment of a Special Forces unit that could perform intelligence-

gathering missions in the north of Mali with only limited external support. Unlike the ISR units, the

Special Forces component was always envisioned as an asset that would be placed under the

control of the Force Commander.


The KCT provided the majority of the personnel for the SOLTG until April 2015 when the Dutch

navy's Maritime Special Operations Forces (MARSOF) took over. The MARSOF notably

conducted a night parachute insertion during their time in Mali to covertly monitor a village in the

Tilemsi Valley where terrorist presence had been reported. The MARSOF left Mali at the end of

2015 and were replaced by a new group of KCT personnel who were subsequently relieved by

other KCT troops as well as Danish, and Czech Special Forces operatives in early 2016.

The primary duty of SOLTG, which operated between the second half of 2014 and December

2016, was to conduct long-range reconnaissance, either by vehicle or on foot after being inserted

by helicopter. While the unit was based in MINUSMA's Sector East, it also operated in Sector

North and Sector West when required. Mobility was provided by a fleet of Suzuki 750 KingQuad

all-terrain vehicles, heavily modified Mercedes G280 CDI tactical 4x4s, Thales Bushmaster and

KMW Fennek armoured vehicles fitted with ISR equipment, and Boeing CH-47D Chinook transport

helicopters, which also acted as medical evacuation platforms. As part of their reconnaissance

operations, SOLTG teams were often forward deployed to Kidal, deep in northern Mali, from where

they conducted patrols that sometimes lasted more than a week and required that resupply by

airdrops be conducted from MINUSMA cargo aircraft. Despite SOLTG's primary focus on

reconnaissance and intelligence duties, air assault, cordon and search, and other related duties

were also part of the unit's activities.

There were only few instances where the SOLTG undertook such assignments, however. In

Timbuktu Jane's witnessed part of the logistics effort undertaken to support the insertion of

SOLTG operatives in the vicinity of the village of Inadiatafane, near Bambara-Maoudé, as part of

Operation 'Medica', which took place between 16-19 August 2016. According to former Force

Commander Maj Gen Lollesgaard, the aim of the operation was to search Inadiatafane and its

surroundings, because the area was known for being a hotbed of terrorist activity, as well as to

secure the roads between Douentza-Bambara-Maoudé-Timbuktu and between Douentza-

Hombori-Gossi-Gao. As part of the operation, SOLTG teams were inserted by Dutch CH-47D

Chinook and Indonesian Mi-17V5 transport helicopters near Inadiatafane to gather intelligence on

terrorist presence and to try and apprehend suspected terrorists.

At the time, the Dutch military was considering its future contribution to MINUSMA, having already

decided to withdraw its helicopter detachment at the beginning of 2017. The Netherlands remained

the main contributor to the SOLTG. However, as KCT personnel detailed to Jane's , the need to

provide troops continually to support the deployment in Mali was stretching the limited human

resources of the Dutch Special Forces community. According to these operatives and Col Mike of






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ASIFU, the missions undertaken by the SOLTG were not, strictly speaking, special operations, and

the Dutch military felt that regular units with adequate training and equipment could perform them

with equal efficiency.

The Dutch SOLTG was tasked with long-range reconnaissance in northern Mali. The unit has now been replaced by the LRRPTG, which uses the same Mercedes G280CDI, Thales Bushmaster and KMW Fennek vehicles as the Special Forces did. (Dutch MoD)

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Therefore, in late 2016 the Dutch military announced that a new unit would be set up in lieu of the

SOLTG. Known as Task Group Desert Falcon (TGDF) or LRRPTG, it was stood up in late

December 2016 with the arrival in Mali of reconnaissance troops from the 11 Luchtmobiele

Brigade (11th Airmobile Brigade). As Colonel Jos van der Leij, Dutch ministry of defence

spokesman, explained to Jane's at the time, while the personnel from the brigade are not Special

Forces, they have a number of special operations capabilities, which is one of the reasons why the

unit was chosen to provide the troops for TGDF. The unit has retained most of the vehicle

inventory used by the SOLTG and conducts similar assignments, gathering intelligence in remote

areas of northern Mali, reaching out to the local population to bring the message of peace of the

UN and waving the MINUSMA flag. The first TGDF rotation concluded its deployment in May and

has been replaced by a new detachment.

The capabilities brought to MINUSMA in terms of long-range reconnaissance and intelligence

gathering by the SOLTG, and its successor the TGDF, are essential, as Maj Gen Lollesgaard told

Jane's when in command of MINUSMA. These units are the only ones within MINUSMA that

routinely deploy within terrorist-controlled areas where neither MINUSMA, nor the Malian

government have any permanent presence, allowing them to gather essential intelligence,

particularly by interacting with the locals living in the area.







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Air recce

The Ghanaian Air Force's C295 normally based in Gao is primarily tasked with transport duties but has a secondary visual reconnaissance capability. (Erwan de Cherisey)

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Aircraft are another element in MINUSMA's intelligence-gathering network. The mission currently

has three military helicopter units: the German HELIDET in Gao with four Airbus Helicopters Tiger

UHT attack helicopters and four NH90 utility aircraft; the Salvadoran Aviation Unit in Timbuktu with

three MD500E light attack helicopters; and the BANUAU in Kidal, with three Mi-171Sh transport

helicopters.

MINUSMA also comprises two fixed-wing military transport units, which are the Portuguese

Aviation Unit with a single Lockheed C-130H based at Bamako and the GHAV with one Airbus DS

C295 normally based in Gao, which is currently undergoing repairs in Ghana after being damaged

by a terrorist attack against Gao's airport in November 2016.

Of all these units, only the German HELIDET and the Salvadoran Aviation Unit are primarily

tasked with intelligence-gathering duties. Like the Dutch Boeing AH-64D Apache flight, which was

withdrawn from Mali in January, the German Tiger flight is expected to perform reconnaissance

sorties rather than attack sorties using its sophisticated sensor suite, including its rotor-mounted

Sagem Osiris sight to locate and track potential elements of interest. The Salvadoran helicopter

unit is tasked with performing similar duties but lacks the sensors of the HELIDET and thus works

in co-ordination with the SWE ISR TF when performing reconnaissance sorties. As one

Salvadoran officer explained, in such instances a Swedish operator boards one of the aircraft in

the patrol with a digital camera fitted with a long-range lens. Salvadoran pilots are also able to

perform reconnaissance flights on their own, including at night, using night-vision goggles.






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The Dutch helicopter detachment operated four Boeing AH-64D Apache attack helicopters until the type was withdrawn from Mali in January 2017. Despite their attack capabilities, the aircraft were primarily used in intelligence-gathering duties, a task that the German Tiger UHTs have now taken over. (Erwan de Cherisey)

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Transport helicopter units can be called to perform reconnaissance flights occasionally, as Jane's

learned during a visit to Timbuktu in August 2016. At the time, pilots from the Indonesian Medium

Utility Helicopter Unit (INDO MUHU), which withdrew in October 2016, explained that, while their

unit's primary role was transport and logistics, they were tasked from time to time with performing

visual reconnaissance sorties and had done so as part of Operation 'Medica'.







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The Salvadoran MD500Es based in Timbuktu often work with the Swedish ISR task force for air reconnaissance missions. Here a helicopter is seen in August 2016 ready to fly out on a reconnaissance sortie during Operation 'Medica'. (Erwan de Cherisey)

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Enter the MALE UAVs

MINUSMA's first MALE UAVs were not fielded by the mission's military component but by its

civilian branch, which contracted Thales UK in December 2015 to deploy and operate three Elbit

Systems Hermes 900 UAVs from Timbuktu. Operational flights with the type began in July 2016.

While the Hermes 900 provides a persistent surveillance capability, it is not tasked for military

operations and the intelligence it generates is not processed by ASIFU or its successor IIU.

Despite the arrival of the Hermes 900, MINUSMA's military force still needed its own MALE UAVs.

In answer to this requirement, Germany decided to deploy three IAI Heron 1s to Gao. The aircraft

are provided by Airbus DS Airborne Solutions (ADAS), which has a contract with the German

Defence Procurement Agency to provide and support the Heron 1s, which have been leased from

IAI.

The aircraft began arriving in Mali in September 2016, and a first operational flight was carried out

on November 1 of that year, which lasted for six hours. Full operational capability (FOC) was

achieved in February 2017, allowing for flights to be conducted at a maximum range of 900 km, for

up to 27 hours, as one German officer in Gao explained to Jane's . Compared with the LUNA

UAV, the Heron's range allows it to reach all areas of northern Mali. The Heron unit comprises a

mix of civilian contractors from ADAS and German military personnel who operate the system.

The IAI Heron 1 MALE UAV is flown from Gao by a combined team of German military personnel and Airbus DS contractors. The aircraft's 900 km range allows it to reach most areas in northern Mali and provides MINUSMA with a unique persistent surveillance capability. (Bundeswehr)

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As Col Mike highlighted, the Heron brings a long overdue persistent surveillance capability to

MINUSMA. The aircraft were never a part of ASIFU though, because MINUSMA's Force

Command decided soon after their arrival in Mali to place the Heron under its direct control.


From ASIFU to the Interim Intelligence Unit

MINUSMA's intelligence system is currently undergoing a profound reorganisation that is intended

to improve its efficiency. The main element of this is the merger between ASIFU HQ and FHQ U2.

As a consequence, the two existing ISR units have become force assets and have joined the

LRRPTG, the Heron 1, and military aviation units under the direct authority of the Force

Commander.

As one UN military source explained, the decision for this merger came as a result of an

assessment made by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), which found

that while ASIFU was performing very satisfactorily at the operational level, tactical intelligence

within MINUSMA was lacking.

The UNDPKO and the Force Command, based on recommendations made in the UN Secretary

General's report on the situation in Mali released in May 2016, decided that the best solution to

this issue was to merge ASIFU with FHQ U2 and turn the two ISR task forces into force assets.

The countries contributing personnel and resources to ASIFU objected to the proposal, fearing that

a continuous intelligence output would be more difficult to maintain and questioning the viability of

the process because no consideration appeared to have been given to improving the S2/G2/U2

structure, which was the deficient component of the intelligence chain in the first place. However,

they were overruled.

Under this new restructuring, ASIFU HQ has been stripped of its all source fusion cell (AFC) and

collection co-ordination and intelligence requirement management (CCIRM) cell, which have been

merged into the FHQ as the new IIU, integrating with U2 in the process. Meanwhile, the ISR units

have been transferred under the control of the FHQ and their tasking will be co-ordinated by the

FHQ U3 (operations).

The IIU is also transitioning from using the Dutch supplied Titan-Red secure information network to

employing a tailored system developed by Thales for the UN.







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MINUSMA'S MANDATE MINUSMA is a peacekeeping mission operating under the guidelines set by Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which authorises the use of armed force to maintain or restore international peace.Few UN missions have been provided with a mandate to conduct offensive operations to enforce peace, and the majority of Chapter VII missions have very strict rules of engagement, which limit the use of armed force to very specific situations, mostly the self-defence of peacekeeping forces. MINUSMA's mandate requires it to monitor the ceasefire between the Malian government forces and armed rebel groups in the north of the country; to oversee and support the implementation of the peace agreement between the latter factions and Bamako; to protect civilians, promote human rights, provide humanitarian assistance; support cultural preservation; and protect UN personnel. The mandate does not clearly make provision for conducting offensive anti-terrorist operations and MINUSMA's military personnel can only use their weapons in self-defence, or to defend the mission's mandate. In 2016 the UN Security Council called for MINUSMA to adopt a more proactive and robust posture to implement its mandate, sparking a debate about whether this wording was an attempt to push offensive operations against terrorist forces.



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Desert watchers: MINUSMA's intelligence capabilities · 2017-06-12 · Desert watchers: MINUSMA's intelligence ... companies to be deployed in different areas of northern Mali to