Democratic Republic of Congo - Establishing Capacity for ... · Web viewIMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT(IDA-H7210) ON A GRANTIN THE AMOUNT OF SDR19.2 MILLION(US$29.9

Document ofThe World Bank

Report No: ICR00004032

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT(IDA-H7210)

ON A

GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR19.2 MILLION(US$29.9 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

FOR AN

ESTABLISHING CAPACITY FOR CORE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT PROJECT

July 15, 2017

Governance Global PracticeAfrica Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective January 15, 2017)

Currency Unit = SDRSDR 1.00 = US$ 1.35US$ 1.00 = SDR 0.74

FISCAL YEARJanuary 1 to December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AfDB African Development BankAPL Adjustable Program LoanARMP Agence de Régulation des Marchés Publics (Procurement Agency)CAS Country Assistance StrategyCDRF Capacity Development Results FrameworkCOREF Comité d’Orientation de la Réforme des Finances Publiques (Public

Sector Reform Orientation Committee)CPS Country Partnership StrategyCSO Civil Society OrganizationCTR Comité technique de la réforme (Technical Reform Committee)DAF Direction des Affaires Fiscales (Tax Directorate)DEP Direction des Etudes et de la Plannification (Directorate for Study and

Planning)DfID UK Department for International DevelopmentDRC Democratic Republic of CongoECOREC Economic and Reconstruction CommissionENF Ecole Nationale des Finances (National School of Finance)ERR Economic Rate of ReturnESW Economic and Sector WorkETD Entités territoriales décentralisées (decentralized territorial entitities)FM Financial ManagementFY Fiscal YearGCEP Governance Capacity Enhancement ProjectGDP Gross domestic productHIPC Highly indebted poor country ICR Implementation Completion and Results ReportICT Information and Communication TechnologyIDA International Development AssociationIP Implementation ProgressISR Implementation Status and Results ReportMISDAC Ministère de l'Intérieur, de la Sécurité, de la Décentralisation et des

Affaires Coutumières (Ministry of the Interior, Security, Decentralization and Customary Affairs)

MTR Mid-Term ReviewM&E Monitoring and EvaluationPAD Project Appraisal DocumentPAP-REC Programme d’Actions Prioritaires – Renforcement des Capacités

(Priority Action Program – Capacity Building)PDO Project Development ObjectivePFM Public Financial ManagementPIU Project Implementation UnitPRONAREC Programme National de Renforcement des Capacités (National

Capacity Building Program)PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy PaperPSRRP Public Service Reform and Rejuvenation ProjectRBM Results based managementROSC A&A Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes – Accounting and

AuditingRRI Rapid Results InitiativeRRM Rapid Results MethodologySCD Systematic Country DiagnosticSDR Special Drawing RightsSENAREC Secrétariat National de Renforcement des Capacités (National Capacity

Building Secretariat)SG Secretariat GeneralTA Technical AssistanceTTL Task Team LeaderUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUOM Université Officielle de Mbuji-Mayi (Official University of Mbuji-

Mayi)US$ United States Dollar

Senior Global Practice Director: Deborah WetzelSector Manager: Hisham Waly

Project Team Leader: Boris WeberICR Team Leader: Klaus Decker

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGOEstablishing Capacity for Core Public Management Project

CONTENTS

Data SheetA. Basic InformationB. Key DatesC. Ratings SummaryD. Sector and Theme CodesE. Bank StaffF. Results Framework AnalysisG. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRsH. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes3. Assessment of Outcomes4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance6. Lessons Learned7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/PartnersAnnex 1. Project Costs and FinancingAnnex 2. Outputs by ComponentAnnex 3. Economic and Financial AnalysisAnnex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision ProcessesAnnex 5. Beneficiary Survey ResultsAnnex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and ResultsAnnex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICRAnnex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/StakeholdersAnnex 9. List of Supporting Documents

MAP

A. Basic Information

Country:Congo, Democratic Republic of

Project Name:DRC Establishing Capacity for Core Public Management

Project ID: P117382 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-H7210

ICR Date: 05/23/2017 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: TAL Borrower:MINISTRY OF FINANCE

Original Total Commitment:

XDR 19.20M Disbursed Amount: XDR 18.10M

Revised Amount: XDR 19.20MEnvironmental Category: CImplementing Agencies: SENAREC Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:

B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s)

Concept Review: 09/23/2009 Effectiveness: 10/25/2011

Appraisal: 01/25/2011 Restructuring(s):01/22/201509/12/2016

Approval: 06/28/2011 Mid-term Review: 02/28/2014 03/17/2014 Closing: 09/15/2016 01/15/2017

C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower

Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance IndicatorsImplementation

Performance Indicators QAG Assessments (if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

YesQuality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

YesQuality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual

Major Sector/Sector Public Administration Other Public Administration 100 100

Major Theme/Theme/Sub Theme Private Sector Development Enterprise Development 21 21 MSME Development 21 21 Public Sector Management Public Administration 67 67 Transparency, Accountability and Good Governance

67 67

Public Finance Management 12 12 Public Expenditure Management 12 12

E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Ahmadou Moustapha Ndiaye Marie Francoise Marie-Nelly Practice Manager/Manager:

Hisham Ahmed Waly Anand Rajaram

Project Team Leader: Boris Weber Antonius Verheijen ICR Team Leader: Klaus Decker ICR Primary Author: Klaus Decker

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)To strengthen core public administration functions of selected central and provincial institutions.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)There was no change to the Project Development Objective.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Targeted units with approved performance plans that are formally reviewed (and results verified) at least once a year

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

0 6 11 27

Date achieved 03/30/2011 09/15/2016 01/15/2017 01/15/2017Comments (incl. % achievement)

Exceeded. Target raised during first restructuring.

Indicator 2 : Rapid results initiatives focused on key performance improvements for targeted institutions fully achieving stated goals


0 percent 60 percent

Date achieved 03/30/2011 09/15/2016Comments (incl. % achievement)

The wording of this indicator was revised during first restructuring.

Indicator 3 : Rapid results initiatives achieving at least 90 % of the goals set in the performance contract


0 60 62.6

Date achieved 03/30/2011 01/15/2017 01/15/2017Comments (incl. % achievement)

Exceeded. This is the reworded PDO indicator 2 that maintained its initial target.

Indicator 4 : Targeted central and provincial units with full complement of qualified staff in key function areas


0 percent 60 percent 0 percent

Date achieved 03/30/2011 09/15/2016 12/31/2013

Comments (incl. % achievement)

Dropped at first restructuring. Not achieved at that time, because activities related to central units had not been launched yet.

Indicator 5 :

Targeted ministries and provinces submitting internal audit reports within 12 months and budget performance reports within 6 months from end of the financial year




Dropped at first restructuring. Not achieved at that time, because the relevant CFOs have not been put in place in the respective ministries.

Indicator 6 : Public contracts (above agreed threshold) awarded through open competitive process in selected ministries and provinces


0 percent 70 percent

100 percent at central level. No data on provincial level.

Date achieved 03/30/2011 09/15/2016 12/31/2013


Dropped at first restructuring. By that date it was partially achieved. The actual value was 100 percent at central level. Data was not available for the provincial level.

Indicator 7 : Direct project beneficiaries


0 Target not set in PAD. 5,000 8,238


Exceeded.

Indicator 8 : Female beneficiaries


0 percent 35 percent 25 percent 23 percent


Partially achieved: 92 percent of target. The actual share of relevant female civil servants in the workforce was estimated at 21.9 percent.

Indicator 9 : Female beneficiaries (professional level civil servants trained under the

project)


0 percent 35 percent 25 percent 23 percent


Duplicates PDO indicator 9

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Targeted units with approved performance plans

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 50 12 51

Date achieved 03/30/2011 09/15/2016 01/15/2017 12/30/2016


Achieved. The target revised during the first restructuring from 50 to 12 is an error reflecting the actual (12) at the moment of restructuring. The initial target of 50 was achieved.

Indicator 2 : Targeted ministries/provincial authorities issuing executive orders aiming to facilitate the application




Achieved and exceeded.

Indicator 3 : Certified level 1 RRM coaches available to accompany RRM teams


0 10 13



Indicator 4 : RRI teams satisfied with the coaching support




Achieved and exceeded. Indicator dropped at first restructuring.

Indicator 5 : RRIs coached by teams led by DRC-national coaches


0 85 163



Indicator 6 : Key central and provincial units with required equipment and resources to perform key procurement functions


10 percent 60 percent 66.6 percent



Indicator 7 : Key central and provincial units to strengthen professional staff performance (1) prepared and (2) implemented


0 18 32



Indicator 8 : Macro-fiscal model refined


No Yes No


Dropped at first restructuring. Not achieved at that time.

Indicator 9 : Training Centers with detailed work plans on how accredited programs will be developed


4 8 8


Achieved.

Indicator 10 : Permanent accredited programs on Managing for Results, PFM and Procurement offered by Training Centers


0 8 22



Indicator 11 : Contracts implemented by local providers with satisfactory results




Dropped at first restructuring. Data was not available at that time.

Indicator 12 : Institutional improvement plan targets achieved within the agreed timeframe


20 percent 90 percent 96.7 percent



Indicator 13 : Centers and institutions assessed annually for accreditation


0 15 18



Indicator 14 : The number of staff who state that they have used the training that they received on the job


0 800 2,668


Achieved and exceeded. Added at first restructuring.

Indicator 15 : Competitive allocation of grants to training centers. Competition held and grant allocated.


0 6 6


Achieved.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO IP

Actual Disbursements(USD millions)

1 02/18/2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.76 2 09/22/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.63 3 05/15/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.69

4 01/06/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 7.99

5 07/05/2014 Moderately Unsatisfactory

Moderately Unsatisfactory 10.68

6 02/06/2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 14.82 7 09/03/2015 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 20.12 8 03/25/2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 23.68 9 10/18/2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 25.08

10 01/19/2017 Satisfactory Satisfactory 26.17

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes MadeDO IP

01/22/2015 N MU MU 14.82 Simplify design, reallocation between components, and align activities to increase its

Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in USD

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes MadeDO IP

impact

09/12/2016 MS MS 25.08Four months extension to finalize activities

I. Disbursement Profile

Executive SummaryPrepared to strengthen core public administration functions of selected central and provincial institutions in Democratic Republic of Congo at a time when the country was struggling to emerge from more than a decade of conflict, the project was approved in 2011 and became effective later that year. Its four components supported (1) the strengthening of government capacity in results-based management; (2) the strengthening of core functions of public administration; (3) local training, implemented by selected training centers; and (4) the strengthening of National Capacity Building Secretariat.

Although the project design was based on analytical work and aimed at supporting reform champions in the government, the implementing structure with three separate implementation agencies soon turned out too complex given the implementation capacity. Implementation progressed unevenly across components and the project was slow to disburse. The 2014 mid-term review assessed the relevant challenges and informed a restructuring that became effective in early 2015. It simplified and updated the implementation arrangements by reducing the number of implementation agencies from three to one. The sole remaining implementing agency was significantly strengthened. The restructuring also sharpened the project focus and increased coherence. The activities under all four components were aligned to contribute to the same two related objectives: (1) introducing a results-based culture through performance contracts at the central and provincial level; and (2) providing the government with a sustainable public sector training infrastructure of eight training centers to help implement these performance contracts and institutionalize this type of training.

As a result, the performance of the project improved drastically. Its closing date was extended by four months to January 15, 2017. At that time, the disbursement rate reached around 95 percent. With the exception of one Project Development Objective-level sub-indicator that was substantially achieved at 90 percent, all Project Development Objective-level indicators exceeded their end targets. Moreover, out of twelve intermediate results indicators two were fully achieved and ten exceeded their targets by up to 334 percent.

The Implementation Completion and Results Report concludes that the overall project outcome rating is Satisfactory. The project was highly relevant to the government’s objectives and needs. Overall, Project Development Objective-level and intermediate results indicators were achieved and most of them exceeded their targets. The project achieved significant impact in introducing a results-based culture through performance contracts at the central and provincial level. Performance contracts (lettres de mission) became an established practice at the central level government and are likely to continue after project closing without further support. The Prime Minister concludes them annually with all Ministers. The project supported government entities in achieving them and thus made sure the performance contracts would not remain a dead letter. The numerous rapid results initiatives produced tangible achievements and contributed to a culture of managing towards results, resulting in both better external performance, in terms of service delivery, as well as internal performance. In terms of impact on behavior, the governments at central and provincial level fully adopted the deployment rapid results initiatives as a management tool to unblock reform bottlenecks, supported by a network of international accredited coaches put in place by the project. These results, the client satisfaction, demand for more, and the institutionalization of the approach through the network of certified coaches that will remain available after project 1

closing is evidence of a change in institutional culture achieved through the project. The project also provided the government with a sustainable public sector training infrastructure to pursue capacity building and established the SENAREC as the government’s lead agency for coordinating development planning.

Relevance Efficacy: Objective Efficiency Overall outcome

Objectives Design

High Moderate SatisfactoryHigh High

Averaged to High

On performance, the Bank performance is rated as Moderately Satisfactory (Quality at entry Moderately Satisfactory; and Quality of supervision: Moderately Satisfactory) due to shortcomings in the initial design and sub-optimal effectiveness of implementation support prior to the restructuring.

Overall Bank PerformanceQuality at entry Quality of supervision

Moderately Satisfactory Moderately SatisfactoryModerately Satisfactory

Borrower performance is rated as Moderately Satisfactory. The government demonstrated ownership and commitment to the project and cooperated well with the Bank to achieve the PDO, which results in a Satisfactory rating. In terms of implementing agency performance, the performance of the initial implementation agency had significant shortcomings and was therefore rated as Moderately Unsatisfactory. After the restructuring the performance of the sole remaining implementing agency was rated as Satisfactory, resulting in an overall implementing agency performance of Moderately Satisfactory.

Overall Borrower PerformanceGovernment performance Implementing agency performance

SatisfactoryModerately

UnsatisfactorySatisfactory

Moderately SatisfactoryModerately Satisfactory

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

Country Context

1. At the time of project conception, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was struggling to emerge from more than a decade of conflict. Despite its vast reserves of natural resources as well as being home to the second most powerful potential source of hydroelectricity, the country remained one of the poorest in the world with a per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of less than US$291. It was ranked 168 out of 194 countries in the 2010 Human Development Index. State building and reform efforts were facing complex challenges in the DRC, many of which arose from a prolonged period of public sector mismanagement, starting in the early 1990s. Recent political developments and reform efforts had created conditions for a reengagement on institutional reform and capacity building processes. The Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative completion point was attained in July 2010.

Sector Context

2. DRC was facing formidable governance challenges. Achieving the objectives of the Government’s post-conflict program required strengthening governance, institutional reform and capacity building processes as conditions sine-qua-non for the exceptional resource endowment to be translated into long term and sustainable growth. However, for the different drivers of change to have a real impact, the efforts of Government needed to be accompanied by support to connect the political and administrative sections of the administration, as well as to create and sustain critical capacity in the public service, in particular in the fulfilment of cross-cutting functions.

3. The Government took noteworthy steps to re-launch the process of building a functioning administration. It issued government decrees and inter-ministerial regulations in 2010 and gave new impetus to the decentralization process (from central Government to provinces) as one of the main enabling factors in advancing public sector reform. An important aspect of that was the administrative rejuvenation process to facilitate the retirement of some 60 percent of public servants that had passed the mandatory retirement age. Several agreements were reached on important aspects of this decentralization process in 2011 with transfer of civil servants in some sectors to the provinces. At the same time, principles guiding intergovernmental fiscal relations, which had been a key element of contention, were integrated in the new organic public finance law.

4. Capacity building in the DRC had been a challenge. The evaluation of the implementation of the first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), conducted in 2010, concluded that previous, external technical assistance (TA) driven and fragmented efforts had effectively failed. To deal in a sustainable manner with both the short and long term challenges, the Government redesigned the National Capacity Building Program

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(Programme National de Renforcement des Capacités – PRONAREC). A detailed first phase Action Plan (Programme d’Actions Prioritaires – Renforcement des Capacités – PAP-REC) was approved in 2011. Based on this program, the Bank and several other development partners (UNDP, AfDB, DFID, Coopération Française) pledged their support to a revamped capacity building agenda.

Rationale for World Bank Support

5. The World Bank, conscious of the fact that improved public service performance was a prerequisite for development effectiveness, committed to play a lead role in key aspects of the institutional reform process. The Bank already supported, through the Governance Capacity Enhancement Project (GCEP), key aspects of the legislative reform agenda, such as the organic public finance law and related legislation on provincial and local financial management (FM), the package of core decentralization laws, the package of core public service reform legislation, and research on the impact of decentralization. In order to accompany the rejuvenation of the civil service, a phased investment operation (Adjustable Program Loan - APL) financed by the World Bank was under preparation. In this context, it was critical to accompany the envisaged long term support to administrative modernization by a shorter term facility to build critical capacity, including in particular the continuation and consolidation of public financial management (PFM) and procurement reform and institutional reform in a small number of ministries.

6. World Bank funded analytical work informed support in the sector through a series of policy notes on decentralization and public sector wage reform (2008 and 2009), analytical notes underpinning the PFM Action Plan (2009), the Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes – Accounting and Auditing (ROSC A&A, 2010), policy notes on public service retirement (2010), the Economic and Sector Work (ESW) on the „découpage‟ (2010), and the ESW on the relations between the provinces and decentralized territorial entities (EDT, 2011).

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

7. The project development objective (PDO) in the original financing agreement was: to strengthen core public administration functions of selected central and provincial institutions in DRC.

8. The key PDO outcome indicators were: (i) Number of targeted units with approved performance plans that are formally reviewed (and results verified) at least once a year; (ii) Percentage of Rapid Results Initiatives (RRIs) focused on key performance improvements for targeted institutions fully achieving stated goal; (iii) Percentage of targeted central and provincial units with full complement of qualified staff in key function areas; (iv) Percentage of targeted ministries and provinces submitting internal audit reports within 12 months and budget performance reports within six months from end of the financial year; (v) Percentage of public contracts (above agreed threshold) awarded through open competitive process in selected ministries and provinces; (vi)

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Number of direct project beneficiaries; (vii) Percentage of female beneficiaries; and (viii) Percentage of female professional level civil servants trained under the project.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

9. While the PDO remained unchanged, a level two restructuring approved in January 2015 made changes to PDO-level and intermediate results indicators. The objective of the restructuring to simplify project design and to focus on the project’s core. It raised the target for PDO-level indicator 1 to be more ambitious. It adjusted the wording of PDO-level indicator 2 and lowered its requirement from fully achieving stated goal to achieving 90 percent of the stated goal. PDO-level indicators 3, 4 and 5 related to staffing, audit, and procurement were dropped, because they did not measure what the restructuring defined as the core of the project. PDO indicators 6, 7 and 8 remained unchanged, but the restructuring set a target for the number of beneficiaries where the PAD had not identified any. It also lowered the target for female beneficiaries from 35 to 25 percent to make it more realistic. This remains an over-representation compared to the 21.9 percent of actual female civil servants and aligned the target with the one adopted by the Public Sector Reform and Rejuvenation Project (PSRRP), another World Bank supported public sector reform project.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

10. The primary beneficiaries identified by the PAD are the Government overall and those ministries that initiated a leadership and results-based management (RBM) initiative in 2011. The latter include the Ministries of Finance, Budget, Planning, Decentralization, Public Service, Infrastructure and Telecommunications, Health, Regional and International Cooperation, and Primary and Secondary Education. Other primary beneficiaries were participants in training, with a particular focus on female civil servants.

11. Secondary beneficiaries comprised the large segment of the population benefitting from improved public service delivery and the positive social impact, resulting from the Project’s emphasis on demand side accountability through increased civil society organizations (CSO) access to the policy process.

1.5 Original Components (as approved)

12. The original project had four components:

13. Component 1: Strengthening Government’s Capacity in Results-based Management (US$4.0 million), implemented by the Ministry of Planning

14. Sub-component 1 (US$2 million) provided support to the nine ministries involved in the leadership initiative to spearhead critical reforms. Support was provided in the related sectors, at national and provincial level and across the hierarchy in the government, from high-level leadership to the core administration (Secretariat General -

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SG, Fiscal Affairs Directorate - DAF, Directorate for Studies and Planning - DEP). Activities were designed to secure high level leadership commitment, the application of the Rapid Results Methodology (RRM) and RBM tools, and policy level reengagement. These activities would be supported by a network of national and provincial training institutions (component 3) and their pool of results coaches. The sub-component was further going to put in place an integrated capacity-monitoring mechanism based upon the Capacity Development Results Framework (CDRF).

15. Sub-component 2 (US$2 million) provided support to build human and institutional capacity to leverage change and sustain capacity development in leadership for results. It aimed to create a network of national coaches affiliated with training centers through regionally-based coach trainers. Using a curriculum customized to the needs of different levels of the administration and articulated around prioritized thematic areas, the national coaches would learn to master and deliver learning programs in RBM and RRM and also provide real-time coaching support to government initiatives. The same would be applied to the provincial level.

16. Component 2: Strengthening Core Functions of Public Administration (US$7.0 million), implemented by the Ministry of Finance (sub-component 2.1) and the Procurement Regulation Agency (ARMP) (sub-component 2.2).

17. Sub-component 2.1 (US$3.5 million) supported PFM by: (i) strengthening macro and revenue forecasts to prepare credible multi-year planning; (ii) reinforcing internal financial control; (iii) improving budget execution, reporting and analysis; and (iv) strengthening public sector accounting capacity.

18. Sub-component 2.2 (US$3.5 million) supported the strengthening of procurement through: (i) support to the new procurement institutions, including minor refurbishment of offices and purchase of equipment; (ii) training program design including the implementation of the training program of trainers; (iii) capacity building for the whole procurement system including the implementation of the training program; (iv) first independent audit of the procurement system; and (v) support to independent training institutions for creating and implementing procurement training programs.

19. Component 3: Support to Local Training, implemented by selected Training Centers (US$12.4 million), implemented by selected training centers

20. Sub-component 3.1 (US$11.2 million) supported selected institutions in terms of facilities and capacity. This component’s main objectives were to support emerging training centers as training and education institutions at national and provincial training and education centers by: (a) providing sub-grant to support the development of training and coaching modules in RBM, PFM, procurement and human resources management and other core public finance and public management areas, including training of trainers; and (b) providing critical goods and equipment and carrying out refurbishment works of their facilities.

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21. Sub-component 3.2 (US$ 1.2 million) aimed at bringing in high level international expertise. It was designed to facilitate selection of national and international experts, including Congolese expatriates, with relevant qualifications and experience to provide capacity building activities in public finance management and procurement and matching these experts to selected ministries on the basis of an assessment of the technical assistance needs of these ministries.

22. Component 4: Strengthening the National Capacity Building Secretariat (SENAREC) and building a quality control system (US$5.0 million), implemented by SENAREC.

23. Sub-component 4.1 (US$4.0 million) supported the strengthening of SENAREC’s capacity to implement projects and manage donor supported programs by reinforcing its staffing, providing essential office rehabilitation and office equipment, and establishing south-south twinning arrangements with relevant institutions to build up capacity in program management and accreditation.

24. Sub-component 4.2 (US$1.0 million) provided support to enable SENAREC to design and manage a quality control and accreditation mechanism to support the validation of standard training modules; to evaluate the first cohort of programs offered; and to ensure continuous quality of these modules by periodic reevaluations.

1.6 Revised Components

25. The January 2015 restructuring aimed at simplification of project design and implementation arrangements, and increased focus on its core. It simplified implementation arrangements by reducing the number of Project Implementation Units (PIUs) from three to one, increased coherence amongst the four components, enhanced their focus on achieving results, detached them from outdated Government programs such as the PRONAREC and PAP-REC that were not fully implemented, and organized the project around activities that had already proven to produce results attributable to project inputs.

26. Component 1: Strengthening Leadership and Creating Basic Results-Based Management Capacity (US$5.2 million)

27. The additional allocation for this Component supported the development of review of performance contracts. It also supported building a more robust monitoring and evaluation system at the level of the training centers that analyzed the impact of training on the institutional change process within trained agencies to support the strengthened results focus of the project. The restructuring added a sub-component 1.3 to support a rapid results approach (RRA) and RBM training to support the implementation of the Economic Governance Matrix Action Plan in Bas Congo and other provinces, working with the Comité Technique de la Réforme (CTR).

28. Component 2: Strengthening Core Functions of Public Administration in Support of Performance Plans (US$6.0 million)

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29. Activities under this revised component included PFM and procurement training to support those client agencies that are implementing performance contracts. These training modules were integrated into the curricula of supported training centers.

30. Component 3: Support to Regional Training Centers to Institutionalize Training Programs for the Public Sector (US$12.2 million)

31. In addition to reallocations between existing activities, the restructuring added a sub-component 3.1. with sub-grants to strengthen and internalize the results-based culture by rewarding training centers participating in grant competitions with additional grant funds. Moreover, the roll out of training to other training centers was dropped to reduce complex additional activities that were not core.

32. Component 4: Strengthening SENAREC and Building a Quality Control System (US$6.5 million)

This component received an additional allocation to allow the main and renewed PIU to fully function and to assume responsibilities of the phased out additional two PIUs.

1.7 Other significant changesIn September 2016 a second level two restructuring was approved to extend the closing date from September 15, 2016 to January 15, 2017, so as to successfully finalize activities under implementation.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

33. The project supported the Government’s redesigned PRONAREC and implementation of the PAP-REC. It was in line with the PRSP for the period 2006-2010 as well as PRSP 2011-2015 that was under preparation. The project supported the first pillar of the World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) 2008-2011 to promote good governance and consolidate peace. Subsequently, it supported the first strategic objective of the CAS 2013-2016 to increase state effectiveness and improve governance.

34. The project drew on existing analyses and incorporated lessons learned from previous capacity building approaches. On the substance, the findings of analytical work on decentralization and public sector wage reform, PFM, accounting and auditing, public service retirement, the découpage, and the relations between the provincial level and the decentralized territorial entities were utilized to design project components. The capacity building approach of the project to avoid fragmented efforts in the future and to ensure government capacity for implementation of reforms was based on the revised PRONAREC and PAP-REC addressing shortcomings identified by the evaluation of the implementation of the first PRSP.

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35. Project design was broad and complex. The PDO was formulated to cover a broad range of activities and to provide flexibility for adjustment of activities during implementation. Cohesion was further weakened by complex implementation arrangements consisting of multiple implementing agencies with differences in focus, responsibility and lines of hierarchy. SENAREC, under the Ministry of Planning, was in charge of the implementation of component 1. The Public Sector Reform Orientation Committee (Comité d’Orientation de la Réforme des Finances Publiques, COREF) under the Ministry of Finance was responsible for procurement activities and management of training activities under component 2.1, as well as for technical, administrative, financial, social and environmental matters, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of component 2 overall, while ARMP under the Primature was in charge of implementing the other aspects of component 2.2. SENAREC was further responsible for the implementation of components 3 and 4.

36. Overall, government commitment was strong, albeit uneven. At preparation stage, it requested a project preparation facility and obtained US$0.8 million (October 2011 to December 2012) to carry out preliminary activities and to train implementing agency staff. The fragmented implementation arrangements led to a variety of entities being in charge. While coordination between them was foreseen, the mechanism was cumbersome and there was not one single entity accountable for driving the entire project. The project aimed at supporting champions of reform within the government. Ultimately, implementation progress would largely be a factor of commitment and capacity of the respective agencies. While the preparation involved consultations with a broad range of government stakeholders, the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) and other project documentation do not offer evidence of consultations with civil society before Board approval.

37. The overall risk was appropriately rated as High and remained Substantial after mitigation. The PAD identified the security and political instability at country level as a High risk to achieving the PDO. The events following the 2011 Presidential election and the overall context of fragility in the DRC confirms the realism of this assessment although achievement of the PDO was not affected in the end. The assessment of fiduciary risks as High was also reasonable. At project level, the internal coordination capacity in the government had been identified as weak and did indeed present an obstacle to smooth implementation. Mitigation measures within the existing project structure were not very effective. In the end, the first restructuring was able to address these challenges adequately.

2.2 Implementation

38. The project was implemented in two phases. Based on shortcomings identified by the 2014 mid-term review (MTR), the project was restructured in January 2015. It subsequently overcame implementation challenges and deployed significant momentum until closing in January 2017.

2011-2014

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39. Implementation progressed unevenly across components and the project was slow to disburse. While some project indicators were fully on target, others were not moving. Roughly two years after effectiveness, the overall disbursement rate was 23 percent. Component 1 had performed well from the beginning and its disbursement rate was 36 percent, followed by component 4 with 35 percent disbursement. While component 2.2 was being successfully implemented, implementation of component 2.1 was lagging, which resulted in a low disbursement rate of 19 percent. Component 3 had only disbursed 2.4 percent. This implementation and disbursement profile continued until the MTR. At that time, the overall disbursement rate had reached 34 percent.

40. By the time of the MTR, there was a sense that the project was overly ambitious and not sufficiently focused. While the project had produced significant results in some respects, it aimed at solving too many challenges at the same time: strengthening of capacity for leadership and RBM; increasing capacity for core functions, addressing procurement and FM challenges at central and provincial level, establishing a training infrastructure at central and provincial level, and strengthening of government capacity to coordinate capacity building initiatives across the country. This multiple focus led to a loss of an overall vision and project coherence.

41. Implementation capacity was weak. This was not only reflected in the lack of implementation progress and realization of project indicators. Management of human resources in the implementing agencies, in general, was assessed by the MTR to be poor. Moreover, the procurement function in the implementing agencies was found to lack capacity and, therefore, to negatively affect the implementation schedule. Capacity to communicate project results to stakeholders and the general public was also seen as insufficient. In addition to being weak, implementation capacity was fragmented across three different agencies.

42. The complexity of implementation arrangements exacerbated the capacity challenge. The three implementing agencies were embedded in different ministries with their own lines of hierarchy. Effective project implementation would have required them to closely work together in order to generate synergies. However, communication and collaboration between the three implementing agencies was not effective. For example, FM and procurement training, implemented by the Public Sector Reform Orientation Committee (COREF) and ARMP respectively, were carried out in parallel rather than in coordination with the training provided by the training centers that SENAREC was in charge of.

43. Some project structures had become obsolete by 2012 and others did not function effectively. For example, the Economic and Reconstruction Commission (ECOREC) was in charge of providing strategic guidance to the project. The Interministerial Technical Committee (Comité Technique Interministeriel) under ECOREC had to clear annual work plans and the project budgets at national level. However, both institutions had been abolished in the meantime. The Project Steering Committee was supposed to meet four times a year and had only had two meetings altogether by the time of the MTR.

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44. Discontinuity of Task Team Leaders (TTLs) also negatively affected the first phase of project implementation. The project had four TTLs over roughly the first two years. The first hand-over to an acting TTL occurred in September 2011, shortly before effectiveness. A second hand-over took place in early 2012. The hand-over to the TTL who would remain in charge of the project until closing occurred in late 2013. This discontinuity weakened the effectiveness of World Bank implementation support during the starting phase of the project.

45. Given the challenges of the project, the government proactively carried out an evaluation at mid-term and requested a restructuring. This prepared the ground for the MTR. The government also took action in anticipation of the restructuring and proceeded with the strengthening of SENAREC, which would become the sole implementing agency. In the second half of 2014 it established a new team at SENAREC with increased project management, procurement, and FM capacity through a competitive and merit based recruitment process.

46. In the end, the restructuring was slightly delayed. While the MTR was carried out in March 2014 and foresaw the restructuring to be finalized by June 30, 2014, it was approved on January 22, 2015. At that point 50 percent of project funds had been disbursed. The reason is that the government initially resisted a restructuring that would drop two of the three implementation agencies. This resistance was ultimately overcome in a policy dialogue between the World Bank and the government.

2015-2017

47. The restructuring simplified and updated the implementation arrangements. It reduced the number of implementing agencies from three to one, thus overcoming fragmentation. The renewed and strengthened SENAREC remained as sole implementing agency, while AMRP and COREF became beneficiaries. The choice of SENAREC was based on its function under the Ministry of Planning and its mandate that was in line with the core of the project. The restructuring also replaced obsolete project institutions: A Technical Advisory Committee was created to replace ECOREC that had been abolished by the new Government in 2012.

48. The restructuring also sharpened the project focus and increased coherence. The activities under all four components were aligned to contribute to the same two related objectives: (1) introducing a results based culture through performance contracts at the central and provincial level; and (2) providing the government with a sustainable public sector training infrastructure of eight training centers to help implement these performance contracts and institutionalize this type of training for the long run. Project resources were reallocated accordingly. This strengthened component 1 (leadership, rapid results, and RBM) and aligned component 2 on technical training (FM and procurement) with this vision to support the implementation of performance contracts developed under component 1. The other two components related to the delivery mechanism (component 3: training centers) and the support to the PIU (component 4) were enhanced by adding performance based incentives such as competitively allocated grants to training centers based on achieved results. The sharpened focus was reflected in the results framework,

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among others by dropping indicators unrelated to this new core. The dropped FM activities were continued under another World Bank funded project (Democratic Republic of Congo - Strengthening Public Financial Management and Accountability Project, P145747).

49. As a result of these measures taken together, the performance of the project improved drastically. Disbursement accelerated and reached around 95 percent in the end. The improved results framework allowed for better management of indicators towards their full achievement by SENAREC, including a renewed focus on gender. While the gender target would only be achieved by 90 percent, all other PDO-level and intermediate results indicators either fully achieved or have exceeded their targets. At restructuring, the project was rated Moderately Unsatisfactory for both progress towards achieving the PDO and implementation progress (IP). By closing, all four components were Satisfactory and so was the rating for PDO and IP.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

50. Overall, despite minor shortcomings, the rating of the design, implementation arrangements and utilization of M&E is Substantial. The shortcomings relate primarily to the initial design and implementation prior to the restructuring. They were effectively addressed following the recommendations of the MTR.

51. Shortcomings of the initial M&E framework related to the weaknesses of the original project design. Reflecting the complexity and the broad range of initial project activities, the M&E framework was too complex and some indicators unrealistic. Overall, it was not sufficiently focused. The sharpened focus after restructuring was adequately reflected in the results framework. The restructuring kept and strengthened those PDO-level and intermediate results indicators related to building the capacity for RBM and to implement agreed performance contracts, and it dropped indicators that had not moved and had pulled the project into too many directions.

52. M&E implementation was initially weak and became robust following the restructuring. By the time of the MTR, M&E was rated as Moderately Unsatisfactory. While there was a dedicated expert in SENAREC, implementation was suboptimal. Data for some indicators was not available. For others it was collected late, for example the PDO-level indicator related to gender, was not measured before June 2013. The renewed capacity in SENAREC and the changes made through the restructuring brought significant improvements in implementation. Data was collected and reported on a regular basis. At project closing, M&E was rated as Satisfactory.

53. Through the restructuring, the utilization of M&E improved significantly. There was an increased focus on achieving project results and communicating them. There was also a concerted effort to reach the gender target of 25 percent female beneficiaries, even if the target was substantially achieved at 90 percent in the end. Project management actively used M&E targets and data to set priorities and manage towards their achievement.

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2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

54. While the fiduciary risk was rated as High, both FM and procurement arrangements were rated as Moderately Satisfactory through most of the project’s life-span. Things never went entirely without issues. Many of them were relatively minor. They were appropriately identified during implementation support missions and shortcomings were addressed adequately based on agreed upon action plans, but often not without delay.

55. In the initial project phase, capacity for FM and procurement was weak. The procurement rating was downgraded to Moderately Unsatisfactory prior to restructuring, due to what the World Bank assessed as an absence of procurement expertise with SENAREC, and related discrepancy between project dates and actual implementation of the procurement plan. Coordination was ineffective. With consolidation of the procurement function in one PIU and strengthened capacity in the second phase the situation overall improved, but without ever reaching a Satisfactory rating.

56. The MTR found the SENAREC in violation of FM rules with respect to salaries. Some SENAREC staff were paid simultaneously by the State budget and the project for the same work. While SENAREC management defended this practice, it is not permissible under International Development Association (IDA) rules. The issue was resolved after the renewal of SENAREC.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

57. The World Bank has prepared an additional financing for the Public Service Reform and Rejuvenation Project to leverage what this project has achieved, in particular the strengthened SENAREC, the network of rapid results coaches and the infrastructure of training centers. These institutions are a valuable asset for the rejuvenation reform, as it generates high demand for training, which these institutions can respond to. The training needs are generated at several levels: (i) initial training of young professionals under the Public Sector Reform and Rejuvenation Project (PSRRP, P122229) supported young professionals program; (ii) continuous training for mid-career civil servants taking on new responsibilities (e.g. directors becoming secretary generals); (iii) transition training for retirees; and (iv) retirees providing coaching to active civil servants. The training centers are being used for all four areas while the PSRRP also supports the sustainability efforts of the centers (e.g. attracting new public sector clients).

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

Relevance of PDO

58. Judged by DRC’s current development priorities and circumstances, the project is highly relevant. The project remained important to achieving country and Bank development objectives. Improving governance in general, and capacity of public sector institutions, in particular, continues appearing prominently in the first part of

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DRC’s National Strategic Plan for Development 2050. In 2017, the Prime Minister’s office developed a strategy to prioritize the country’s reform efforts in a document called “dashboard to monitor priority reforms” (tableau de bord de suivi des réformes prioritaires), which highlights the governance reforms supported by this project as part of the first eight priorities.

59. The World Bank is currently in the process of carrying out a Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) for DRC in preparation of the next Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) scheduled for FY2018. Scheduled to be finalized in July 2017, the SCD puts an emphasis on institutions, governance and infrastructure as centerpieces of development. It is therefore anticipated that governance will remain key and center for World Bank support to the country’s development agenda. The project was the only one countrywide that supported the government in building its own public service training infrastructure at both the central and provincial level. It complemented the PSRRP, which built on the project’s achievements and leveraged its assets as part of a restructured project with additional financing approved by the Board on May 16, 2017.

Relevance of Objectives Rating: High

Relevance of Design

60. The design of the project components was consistent with the project objectives. It reflected available analytical work and was based on client priorities as well as needs. The range of activities was broad though, which was challenging in terms of project cohesion under the PDO. Also, the initial design of the implementation arrangements was overly complex, especially given the implementation capacity that had adequately been assessed as weak.

61. The restructuring adequately ensured that project design would remain relevant. Drawing on the findings of the MTR, it identified a solution that was agreed upon with the government and successfully implemented. It improved design relevance in two respects. One, it addressed the dysfunctions of the original implementation arrangements. Two, it focused the project on its core while pursuing two related objectives that were highly relevant in the DRC context: (1) introducing a results based culture through performance contracts at the central and provincial level; and (2) providing the government with a sustainable public sector training infrastructure to help implement these performance contracts and institutionalize this type of training for the long run.

Relevance of Design Rating: High

62. Overall, the relevance of the project is rated as High, based on the combination of high relevance of objectives and high relevance of design.

Overall project relevance: High

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

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63. Since the PDO was not formally revised, the assessment of achievement of project development outcomes is carried out in one step for the entire project duration. The PDO was to strengthen core public administration functions of selected central and provincial institutions. The results framework was revised in the 2015 restructuring to focus the project on its core and to align all activities with two objectives: (1) introducing a results based culture through performance contracts at the central and provincial level; and (2) providing the Government with a sustainable public sector training infrastructure of eight training centers to help implement these performance contracts and institutionalize this type of training for the long run.

64. Overall, the project exceeded its development objectives as defined by the revised results framework. The final Implementation Status and Results Report (ISR) therefore rates the progress towards achievement of PDO as well as the overall implementation progress as Satisfactory. In terms of achievement of PDO indicators, three out of four exceeded their targets (1: 245 percent; 2: 104 percent; 3: 165 percent. One PDO level sub-indicator was substantially achieved (90 percent)).

65. Moreover, out of twelve intermediate results indicators two have been fully achieved and ten exceeded by up to 334 percent of their end targets (1: 102 percent; 2: 180 percent; 3:130 percent; 4: 192 percent; 5: 111 percent; 6: 178 percent; 7: 100 percent; 8: 275 percent; 9: 107 percent; 10: 120 percent; 11: 334 percent; and 12: 100 percent).

66. In terms of introducing a results based culture through performance contracts at the central and provincial level, project outputs had a significant impact. The capacity building activities carried out under component 2 succeeded in establishing a culture of systematic performance plans that are now being used at both central and provincial levels. Performance contracts (lettres de mission) became an established practice at the central level government and are likely to continue after project closing without further support. The Prime Minister concludes them annually with all Ministers. The process starts with a template provided by the Prime Minister’s Office asking each Ministry to identify strategic objectives, expected results, indicators to measure them, and a timeline. The achievement of these performance contracts is subsequently monitored and evaluated by the Prime Minister’s Office. Activities under component 1 supported government entities in achieving them and thus made sure the performance contracts would not remain a dead letter. The numerous RRIs produced tangible achievements and contributed to a culture of managing towards results, resulting in both better external performance, in terms of service delivery, as well as internal performance. Examples for improved service delivery include the increase in issuing birth certificates in Kasai Oriental, the review of prison sentences and subsequent release of imprisoned population in the same province, and the reduction of processing times at the port of Matadi in the Bas-Congo province. An example of improvement of internal performance is the significant increase in resource mobilization for the governments of Katanga and Orientale provinces. These results align with provincial level priorities. In terms of impact on behavior, the governments at central and provincial level fully adopted the deployment rapid results initiatives as a management tool to unblock reform bottlenecks, supported by a network of coaches put in place by the project. The coaches

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are internationally accredited through a two-year assessment and examination process, where they had to demonstrate their capacity to accelerate reforms in the field and achieved results. These results, the client satisfaction, demand for more, and the institutionalization of the approach through the network of certified coaches that will remain available after project closing is evidence of a change in institutional culture achieved through the project. In 2016, 96.7 percent of institutional improvement plans achieved their targets within the agreed timeframe, compared to 20 percent in 2011.

67. In terms of providing the government with a sustainable public sector training infrastructure to help implement performance contracts and institutionalize this type of reforms, the achievements are also substantial. Eight training centers were established, staffed, equipped and made operational throughout the country. They concluded conventions with provincial governments and the coordinating central government agency (SENAREC) to further align training offerings with training needs. Sustainability of the training centers was strengthened by the establishing of business plans for each of them to explore additional partnerships and funding mechanisms allowing to transition towards full cost-recovery. In addition, 22 training programs were accredited, while 18 training centers are now accredited and annually assessed. The country-owned training infrastructure is available to train a larger number of civil servants in-country and will limit the requirements of costly trainings abroad. Their equipment with videoconference capability and the required bandwidth now allows them to operate as a true network further creating synergies and increasing their development impact. These training centers will also continue providing the basis for capacity building through development partners, among others supported by the PSRRP under additional financing.

68. The strengthening of the SENAREC further contributed to effectiveness of capacity building efforts. Prior to the project, SENAREC had weak capacity and was not in a position to live up to its mandate as the country’s one stop shop for capacity development. Through the project it positioned itself as the government’s lead agency for coordinating development planning.

69. Due to the decisive action taken through the restructuring, synergies and renewed momentum, the project has delivered beyond its targets. At the time of the MTR, the performance of the project was assessed as Moderately Unsatisfactory. Only component 1 was satisfactory and sub-component 2.2 moderately satisfactory. All others were Unsatisfactory or Moderately Unsatisfactory. Arguably the restructuring also decreased project ambition by lowering two PDO-level indicator targets (PDO-level indicator on ‘rapid results initiatives achieving at least 90 percent of the goals set in the performance contract’ instead of ‘fully achieving targeted goals’; and PDO-level indicator on gender from 35 to 25 percent of female beneficiaries), and dropping three PDO-level and two intermediate results indicators related to activities that were no longer considered at the core of the project. But it also increased the target for another PDO-level indicator. However, the driver of the restructuring was not to lower targets, but to focus the project on its core in order to improve effectiveness, achieve synergies between components and have more and lasting impact.

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70. Overall, the project has overachieved its objectives. Even though one PDO-level sub-indicator was substantially achieved at 90 percent, the other three PDO-level indicators have exceeded their end targets (achievement of 104, 165 and 245 percent respectively) and out of twelve intermediate results indicators, two have been fully achieved and ten overachieved by up to 334 percent. The extent to which the operation achieved its development objectives therefore had no shortcomings and is rated as High.

3.3 Efficiency

71. Project efficiency was Moderate according to an assessment of the extent to which the costs involved in achieving project objectives were reasonable in comparison with both the benefits and with recognized norms (‘value-for-money’). While it is too early for the economic rate of return to be positive, its trend is positive and there is significant non-quantifiable impact. For details, see annex 3.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome RatingRating: Satisfactory

72. The overall outcome of the project is rated Satisfactory due to the High relevance of project objectives and design; the High efficacy in reaching the PDO, and the Moderate efficiency of the project.

Relevance Efficacy: Objective Efficiency Overall outcome

Objectives Design

High Moderate SatisfactoryHigh High

Averaged to High

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

73. The renewed focus of SENAREC on gender to achieve the PDO-level sub indicator has contributed to a change in institutional culture. When the implementing agency looked into the numbers, they found that women are underrepresented at higher levels in public administration. While gender aspects under training activities were not prioritized previously, there is now awareness and the data is collected in a disaggregated way to allow for tracking and therefore for corrective action.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

Nothing further to add.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative

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Nothing further to add.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Stakeholder Workshop

74. SENAREC held a half-day stakeholder workshop during a World Bank ICR mission on November 15, 2016. Participants included government officials, civil society representatives, and World Bank staff. The Project Coordinator gave an overview of the project (context, objectives and components) and its key achievements. He then presented the results of the project based on the M&E framework, the evolution of the disbursement rate, challenges, opportunities and recommendations. Following the presentation workshop participants provided additional perspectives.

75. Overall, the project was considered a big success by workshop participants. They mentioned the long list of achievements. This was followed by an open discussion about aspects where, in hindsight, the project could have done better and related lessons learned: complexity of the initial project design, sequencing between the establishment of training centers and the trainings, the anchoring of most training centers at universities leading to a lack of ownership by Government, the initial discontinuity of TTLs, the challenge of sustaining the training centers, and continued support to capacity building based on the project’s achievements by the World Bank through the PSRRP.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development OutcomeRating: Substantial

76. The overall risk to development outcomes not to be maintained or realized is Substantial. The project has achieved significant results. The introduction of a performance culture through performance contracts and rapid results initiatives carried out by a pool of coaches was an important achievement that needs to be sustained and further developed. This change in culture in public administration may backslide if reforms are no longer actively pursued or if the public administration is directly impacted by increased fragility and new conflict. The eight training centers across the country also constitute a major output and asset for future capacity building. The risk related to their sustainability is higher. For them to operate as a network and to fully utilize their potential, they need to have and maintain costly video-conference technology and the required bandwidth that the project provided. Their basic infrastructure also needs to be maintained. Moreover, most training centers are anchored at universities, which decreased ownership of the government. The requirement for the training centers to develop business plans for full cost recovery has raised awareness to some extent, but a transition period with initial (co-) funding by the State or development partners is likely to be required. The PSRRP additional financing provides for such sustained funding to mitigate this risk. While many public officials have been trained under the project, the risk remains that a sizeable share of them will leave the public administration to explore more attractive job opportunities. The overall risk is therefore rated as Substantial.

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5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

77. As described in section 2, the project design was based on available analytical work. It identified champions for reform in the government and supported these through the various components. While carried out in a fluid country environment, project component design proved pertinent, survived changes in government and remained relevant throughout implementation and beyond. Essentially, the core of the project will transition into the PSRRP to be continued and scaled up with additional financing for that project.

78. Quality at entry also had shortcomings. The project’s implementing structure with three separate PIUs was very complex. This was challenging in light of implementation and coordination capacity of the agencies in charge. The low level of cohesion between project components under a general PDO that could accommodate all of them can be criticized for not being sufficiently focused. This was even reflected in a relatively high number of PDO-level indicators to cover the breadth of activities. At the same time, this design enabled corrective actions and a reduction in scope to focus on a core once implementation would start and show where there was true momentum and capacity to build on.

79. Readiness for implementation was uneven. While components 1 and 2.2 were quick at getting started and producing initial results, others were not ready for implementation. These components therefore faced difficulties in the start-up phase of the project.

80. Overall, however, the shortcomings to the quality at entry are moderate, given the fragility and the fluid country environment at time of preparation. The rating therefore is Moderately Satisfactory.

(b) Quality of SupervisionRating: Moderately Satisfactory

81. The quality of supervision improved throughout implementation. Over the first two years, there were four TTLs and quality of supervision suffered accordingly. The TTL who had prepared the project handed over to an acting TTL just before effectiveness. The new TTL was not experienced in task management of investment lending operations at that time. Around half a year later, another TTL took over for a year and a half. The TTL put in charge in September 2013 was not yet experienced in task management of investment lending operations either. Given the country and sector challenges, this discontinuity negatively affected the effectiveness of World Bank implementation support. The continuity in TTL responsibility between September 2013 and project closing in early 2017 has made a significant difference in this respect. The World Bank’s supervision increasingly focused on supporting implementation and

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achieving development impact. The quality of supervision was further strengthened by having a locally based co-TTL. Implementation support was continuous, proactive, and aimed at solving challenges. This also applied to the effective handling of fiduciary challenges. When issues were identified, action plans were prepared and the follow-up overall was thorough.

82. The MTR was carried out in adequate depth and prepared the way for a successful restructuring. The sensitivity around the renewal of SENAREC was handled appropriately. The task team effectively worked together with the client to identify and address project shortcomings that had become manifest over time. It took decisive action from both sides to focus the project on its core, drop some activities, reshape others, and establish the renewed SENAREC as sole implementing agency. The government was initially reluctant to engage in a restructuring that would drop two implementing agencies and reaching a consensus on this required careful negotiations. The challenge was successfully addressed, but led to a slight delay in the restructuring: the MTR was carried out in March 2014 and SENAREC renewed shortly thereafter, but the restructuring was not approved until January 2015.

83. Overall, the task team adequately tracked progress, identified challenges, reported and addressed them. Shortcomings were minor. The documentation of project progress roughly followed the standard cycle of implementation support mission and subsequent update of the ISR. Mission findings were adequately captured in Aide Memoires and consistently reflected in the ISRs. Over an implementation period of five years and three months, ten ISRs were submitted. Eight of them were late by up to seven and a half weeks (twice), especially the early ones. Their content focused on relevant issues and was sufficiently substantiated. Challenges and actions to address them were identified and followed up on. Progress or lack thereof was adequately tracked and explained in the results framework.

84. The shortcomings in the extent to which the World Bank proactively identified and resolved threats to the achievement of relevant development outcomes and the World Bank’s fiduciary role were increasingly minor, but given the initial shortcomings moderate overall. The quality of supervision is thus rated Moderately Satisfactory.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank PerformanceRating: Moderately Satisfactory

85. The rating of overall Bank performance is based on the quality at entry (Moderately Satisfactory) and the quality of supervision (Moderately Satisfactory). The overall rating is therefore Moderately Satisfactory.

Overall Bank PerformanceQuality at entry Quality of supervision

Moderately Satisfactory Moderately SatisfactoryModerately Satisfactory

5.2 Borrower Performance

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(a) Government PerformanceRating: Satisfactory

86. The central government ownership and commitment to achieving the development objectives was strong overall, albeit slightly uneven. Ownership of and demand for activities under component 1 were very strong from the beginning. It increased over time for the other components, especially after the restructuring. The government was proactive and carried out an evaluation of the project prior to the restructuring to assess the causes and options for corrective actions. This also allowed the government to take an active role in the MTR. The government then took prompt and decisive action to follow up on its findings. It requested a restructuring and did not wait for its approval by the World Bank to move ahead and replace the staff of SENAREC through a competitive and merit-based recruitment process so the renewed SENAREC could effectively serve as the sole remaining implementing agency. This combined with the sharpened focus through the restructuring was able to turn the project around and to ensure its success at closing.

87. Overall and throughout the preparation and implementation of the project, the central government supported the project and provided an enabling environment to achieve its objectives. There was central government support to the PIUs and key staff were appointed in time. While the capacity of the initial PIUs was suboptimal, especially in light of the complexity of the initial implementation arrangements, this relative weakness is not primarily imputable to the borrower.

88. The shortcomings in the extent to which the central government ensured quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, toward the achievement of development outcomes are minor and the rating is therefore Satisfactory.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies PerformanceRating: Moderately Satisfactory

89. The performance of the implementation agencies needs to be assessed separately for the two phases of the project. Prior to the restructuring, there were three implementing agencies. While there were differences between them, the overall rating for project management deteriorated from initially Satisfactory to Moderately Unsatisfactory. Their implementation capacity was insufficient, especially in light of the complexity of implementation arrangements and the effort required to compensate for that. The FM and procurement reviews also continued identifying challenges with some of them. During this first phase of the project, the shortcomings in the extent to which the implementing agencies ensured quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, toward the achievement of development outcomes are therefore significant and the rating thus Moderately Unsatisfactory.

90. Following the renewal of SENAREC and even prior to the restructuring, the performance of what would become the sole remaining implementing agency improved significantly. It was able to quickly accelerate implementation, while

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successfully addressing some of the earlier shortcomings of FM and procurement compliance. There was a noticeable shift towards management for results based on the M&E framework and a tangible determination to implement activities in order to achieve and exceed the targets set by project indicators. SENAREC also improved its approach to communicating project results. During this second phase of the project, the shortcomings in the extent to which the implementing agencies ensured quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, toward the achievement of development outcomes are therefore minor and the rating thus Satisfactory.

91. In terms of overall rating of implementing agency performance, the combination of the two sub-ratings of Moderately Unsatisfactory for the first phase and Satisfactory for the second phase results in an overall rating of Moderately Satisfactory.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower PerformanceRating: Moderately Satisfactory

92. The ratings for borrower performance as Satisfactory and for implementation agency performance Moderately Satisfactory need to be combined into an overall rating. The shortcomings in the extent to which the borrower (including the government and implementing agency) ensured quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, toward the achievement of development outcomes are more than minor and the rating is therefore Moderately satisfactory.

Overall Borrower PerformanceGovernment performance Implementing agency performance

SatisfactoryModerately

UnsatisfactorySatisfactory

Moderately SatisfactoryModerately Satisfactory

6. Lessons Learned

93. Ownership of the Borrower is higher when the project is implemented by a permanent structure established by the government. The renewed SENAREC as a permanent institution under the Ministry of Planning ensured quality implementation and contributes to sustainability of project outcomes.

94. Accountability for performance is higher when one single agency is in charge of implementation. The initial arrangement with three implementing agencies led to finger pointing to justify delay. Putting one agency in charge addresses this challenge and makes performance accountability more effective.

95. Complexity of implementation arrangements needs to match implementation capacity. Fragmentation of implementation responsibilities among different agencies reduces the “One Project” vision and, in itself, reduces project momentum. Creating

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synergies that would naturally occur under a unified PIU would require a coordination, collaboration and communication effort that is likely to exceed implementation capacity.

96. While a low level of cohesion of project components may under-utilize potential synergies, it may also offer advantages in fluid environments where flexibility is needed. Initially, there was a broad range of activities with only loosely connected components under a general PDO that was not much more than the sum of its parts. This allowed for identification at implementation stage of areas where there would be a particular drive in a context that remained fluid in many respects. But for this approach to be successful, it did require proactivity and strategic decisions at MTR stage through a restructuring. The MTR correctly identified these areas with high momentum, focused the project on these, and brought it to a successful closing.

97. A simple results framework which is clearly aligned with the PDO helps galvanize implementation efforts around specific targets, especially when the implementation capacity is fragmented across different ministries. The restructuring addressed this challenge effectively by specifying the objectives, aligning components with them, and simplifying the results framework. The implementing agency then utilized this opportunity for proactive and effective management towards results.

98. Achieving gender targets requires realistic objectives, awareness, disaggregated data, and deliberate actions. The project shows how the gender target was not realistic to start with. Considering that the 21.9 percent female civil servants were mostly found in lower grade levels and that grade levels targeted by the project had much lower percentages, such as 2 percent of Secretary Generals, 35 percent was unrealistic. With a reduced target of 25 percent and increased focus on achieving 25 percent, the project achieved 23 percent. Having realistic targets encourages projects to not “give up” on an indicator The target was also not taken seriously initially, echoing the above mentioned point of lack of focus on management for results at earlier stages of implementation. Data related to training participants could have easily been disaggregated by gender if there had been awareness and willingness. Once willingness and data were there, it took specific actions to include female participants to reach the target as much as possible.

99. For training centers to be effective and accepted, establishing a close relationship with their beneficiary institutions to focus on their needs is key. Ownership of training are undermined when curricula are not driven by client needs, but other considerations such as trainer capacity. Support through targeted training for the achievement of an agency’s particular development objectives is an effective way of ensuring ownership by the government, even when the training institutions are housed by universities.

100. Enabling training centers to operate as a network exponentially increases development impact. The network approach with adequate physical, technical and intellectual infrastructure enables each training to reach a much broader audience across the country, for example through videoconferencing. This also impacts the quality of trainings and exchanges between participants. It facilitates the discussion of firsthand

23

experience with good practices or pitfalls in different places. It also allows for specialization among different centers. At the same time, the effective functioning of a network requires an adequate governance and management structure as well as sustainable funding.

101. Sustainability of training institutions requires a combination of factors. Ownership by the client is a major determinant. It is higher when the training and the tools provided enable authorities to respond to institutional incentives. In the case of the training centers supported under this project, the use of performance contracts at the highest political level set incentives for line ministries to perform. The rapid results initiatives and the quality of the accredited local and international coaches enabled the line ministries to better achieve their objectives and the demand for their services remains high. The business plans developed to enable the training centers to transition away from donor funding therefore have a chance to implemented and start mobilizing state budget for their continued operation.

102. Discontinuity of TTL responsibility is likely to undermine quality of supervision. The frequent changes of TTLs at critical phases of project implementation prevented the World Bank from addressing challenges more effectively at earlier stages. Operational experience of the TTLs is also a significant factor affecting effectiveness of World Bank implementation support.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies

No comments received so far.

(b) Cofinanciers

Not applicable.

(c) Other partners and stakeholders

Not applicable.

24

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost

Table 1: Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent)

Components Appraisal Estimate

Estimate at Restructuring

Actual/Latest Estimate

Percentage of Estimate at Restructuring

Component 1 4.3 5.2 5.1. 98.1%Component 2 7.1 6.0 2.5 41.7%Component 3 13.3 12.2 10.5 86.17%Component 4 5.2 6.5 7.3 112.3%Total Financing Required

29.9 29.9 25.1 84.0%

Table 2: Project Cost by Expenditure Category (in US$ million equivalent)

Category Amount estimated at appraisal

Amount estimated at restructuring

Actual Percentage of last estimate

Goods, works consultants’ services, including Training and audits, and Operating Costs for Component 1 of the Project

4.3 3.5 4.9 138.6%

Goods, and consultants’ services, including Training and audits, and Operating Costs for Component 2.1 of the Project

3.6 1.9 1.8 95.3%

Goods, and consultants’ services, including Training and audits, and

3.5 1.9 1.6 85.3%

25

Operating Costs for Component 2.2 of the Project

Sub-grants for Component 3.1 (a) of the Project

2.2 3.0 4.2 138.3%

Goods and works for Component 3.1 (b) of the Project

9.9 4.2 5.8 139.8%

Goods and consultant services and Operating costs for Component 3.2 and 4

5.6 4.2 5.8 139.8%

General conditions of the Financing Agreement

0.8 0.8 0.4 50.0%

Total 29.9 29.9 25.1 84.0%

(b) Financing

Table 3: Project Financing (in US$ millions)

Source of Funds

Type of Cofinancing

Appraisal Estimate

Actual/Latest Estimate

Percentage of Appraisal

Borrower N.A. 0.00 0.00 N.A.IDA Grant TAL 26.62 25.10 94.3%

26

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Component 1

1. Capacity to lead administrative reforms in selected ministries and provinces

- Support to the development of review of performance contracts in 51 targeted units- Support to building a more robust monitoring and evaluation system at the level of 5

targeted ministries and provincial authorities to facilitate the application of RBM/RRM

- Analysis of Article 10 of the DRC Constitution on voting rights and other diaspora rights

- Monitoring of implementation of the portfolio management of the government- Launch of 1st Cycle of IRRs-Bas Congo; Kasai- Launch of 2nd Cycle of IRRs-Kisangani; Bukavu; South of Kivu- Launch of 3rd Cycle of IRRs-Kinshasa; Katanga- Support on RRIs to Central Government of Kinshasa; Kasai-Oriental; South Kivu;

Province Orientale; Katanga; Bas Congo; Kinshasa- Animation of training of trainers for national coaches at the provincial level-

Kisangani/Province Orientale- Review of financial sector programs under the review framework of national

programmatic and strategic cadres 2012-2014- Review of environmental programs under the review framework of national

programmatic and strategic policies 2012-2014- Review of security and governance programs under the review framework of national

programmatic and strategic policies 2012-2014- Review of foreign investment programs under the review framework of national

programmatic and strategic policies 2012-2014- Review of social programs under the review framework of national programmatic and

strategic policies 2012-2014- Review of economic governance programs under the review framework of national

programmatic and strategic policies 2012-2014- Review of national productive sectoral programs under the review framework of

national programmatic and strategic policies 2012-2014- Review of political governance programs under the review framework of national

programmatic and strategic policies 2012-2014- Review of macro-economic programs under the review framework of national

programmatic and strategic policies 2012-2014- Review of fiscal programs under the review framework of national programmatic and

strategic policies 2012-2014- Review of employability programs under the review framework of national

programmatic and strategic policies 2012-2014- Review of M&E programs under the review framework of national programmatic and

strategic policies 2012-2014- Review of poverty and inequality programs under the review framework of national

programmatic and strategic policies 2012-2014

27

- Review of infrastructure programs under the review framework of national programmatic and strategic policies 2012-2014

- Support to Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation on the development of draft text on national structure of coordination of international development aid to DRC

- Support to provincial governments on implementation of performance plans- Development of a roadmap for Ministry of the Interior, Security, Decentralization and

Customary Affairs (Ministère de l'Intérieur, de la Sécurité, de la Décentralisation et des Affaires Coutumières, MISDAC)

- Elaboration of strategic plan on institutional capacity strengthening- Operation support for implementation of performance plans at the provincial level- Support implementation of RRM with SENAREC- Support to government central units for development of performance plans for staff- Development of roster of DRC diaspora experts to support implementation of PRC-

GAP/SENAREC project- Support to central and provincial governments for RRM implementation

2. Coaching Support to the administration by RBM/RRM Coaches

- Mobilization of 17 Certified Level 1 RRM Coaches to accompany RRM teams- Coaching of 163 RRIs led by DRC-national coaches- Coaching of 50 select trainers from the Francophone Network- Delivery of 8 governmental workshops- Training of DEP and DAF units on public financial reforms- Animation of governmental seminar Kasai Occidental- Completion of institutional audit of the secretariat of the Office of the Prime Minister- Animation of leadership and change management workshop for Portfolio Ministry- Technical support for RRIs in the Ministries of the Provincial Government-Province

Orientale- Completion of internal assessment of RRIs-Province Orientale- Completion of management of accounting tasks-SENAREC- Completion of final assessment of RRIs-South Kivu- Animation of leadership seminar for Government-North Kivu- Animation of governmental seminar-Kinshasa- Development of project document on national strategy or capacity building- Development of mapping of capacity building projects at the national level- Completion of execution manual for PRC-GAP- Animation of provincial governmental seminar-Kinshasa- Certification of coaches in RRM- Support to Prime Minister’s office for development of performance framework of

governmental action by sector and plan of action DEP for M&E of mission statements 2015-2016

- Evaluation of applications for the grants competitions at the level of training centers- Archiving of documents and training on archiving for PRC-GAP- Support to Technical Department of PRC-GAP

Component 2

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1. PFM and procurement training support to client agencies that are implementing performance contracts

- Rehabilitation and equipment of 8 governmental buildings- Training of 5000 government employees on PFM and procurement modules and

Managing for Results- Strengthening of resources and equipment capacity of the central and provincial units to

perform key procurement functions- Operationalization of 32 plans, at the central and provincial units, to strengthen staff

performance- Facilitation of governmental workshop in Zongo- Moderation of governmental workshop in South Kivu- Moderation of training of trainers in Kinshasa- Facilitation of the Public Administration Workshop for Secretaries Generals- Moderation of the governmental workshop-Katanga -Capacity building in RRI to Ministries by 4 coaches-Kinshasa- Capacity building in RRI to Ministries by 4 coaches-Katanga- Capacity building in RRI to Ministries by 3 coaches-South Kivu- Technical support to Government by RRM coach to support the RRI assessments-

Katanga- Technical support to Government-Province Orientale-for the implementation for the

2013 Action Program- Communications and Logistical support to the dissemination workshop for PRC-Gap- Technical support to Government-Bas Congo-for the implementation for the 2013

Action Program - Animation of governmental seminar-Province Orientale- on efficiency of governmental

action- Capacity building in RRI to Ministries by 4 coaches-Province Orientale and Kinshasa- Technical support to CPM Unit on procurement contracts selection for renovation of

training centers- Technical support to CPM Unit on procurement contracts relating to the project PRC-

GAP

2. Improved financial management tools and systems

- Enhancement of the budgetary reporting calendar- Enhancement of the macroeconomic projections- Refinement of macro-fiscal model- Enhancement of Budgetary Analysis to improve staff performance- Institutional Support to SENAREC for the preparation of capacity building plans- Completion of first independent audit of public procurement system- Operationalization of improved procurement structures- Evaluation of 20 training modules on improved financial management systems

Component 3

- Capacity building of beneficiary training centers for effective training delivery

29

- Renovation and equipment of 8 training centers- Development of training of trainers curriculum- Delivery of training of trainers to beneficiary training centers- Training of 55 coaches on leadership, RBM, ICT- Capacity strengthening of 2 provincial training institutions for effective training

delivery- Creation of 8 work plans, at the level of the training centers, to inform the development

of accredited programs- Development of 20 permanent accredited programs, at the level of the training centers,

on Managing for Results, PFM, and procurement- Allocation of 6 additional grants to training centers participating in grant competitions

to strengthen and internalize the results-based culture- Provision of technical support to consultants in the accredited centers- Provision of institutional support to training centers, at the provincial level- Development of roster of Congolese expertise in Diaspora for use by the training

centers in the framework of the PRC-GAP project implementation- Evaluation of applications to the training center grant competitions- Support to provincial government on performance plan implementation –South of Kivu- Renovation of training center-Official University of Mbuji-Mayi (Université Officielle

de Mbuji-Mayi, UOM)- Monitoring of renovation of training center National School of Finance (Ecole

Nationale des Finances, ENF)- Support to the training center UOM and provincial government-Kasai Oriental- Finalization of project document on national strategy of capacity strengthening - Infrastructure evaluation for the renovation of training centers

Component 4

- Training of SENAREC members on financial management- Signature of twinning arrangement with a counterpart, at the institutional level- Provision of technical assistance to manage the implementation of the PIU- Recruitment of external experts to join SENAREC PIU, comprising:- Recruitment of Quality Control System team- Recruitment of accreditation team to assess accreditation of centers and institutions- Recruitment of technical assistant for mission support- Renovation and equipment of building for PIU- Development of the Quality Control System- Development of the accreditation mechanism for assessments of training centers- Delivery of annual assessments for accreditation of 18 centers and institutions- Realization of institutional improvement plan targets in line with the agreed project

timeframe- Technical support to the SENAREC Unit on procurement- Coaching to SENAREC for PRC-GAP project implementation- Training of SENAREC PIU on project management- Evaluation of implementation of PRC-GAP Project- Animation of provincial governmental seminar-Bas Congo- Elaboration of operational strategy of PRC-GAP Project Components I & III

30

- Monitoring of renovation of SENAREC PIU and Training Centers- Organizational support to SENAREC PIU- Completion of legal procedures re: SENAREC- Legal Support to SENAREC on legal transactions with training centers and government

ministries- Support to SENAREC PIU on institutional communication for training centers- Technical support to SENAREC for instating accreditation mechanism and quality

control of modules in training centers- Moderation of workshop on status of reforms of public enterprises- Completion of financial audit of PRC-GAP for 2015, 2016- Accounting support to PRC-GAP- Financial Review of SENAREC/PRC-GAP Network Centers- Final Evaluation of PRC-GAP Project

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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

Efficiency rating: Moderate

I. Realized Cost and non-quantifiable impact by component

Three out of four PDO indicators exceeded their targets (1: 245 percent; 2: 104 percent; 3: 165 percent; one PDO level sub-indicator was substantially achieved (90 percent); see table 1). Still, it is too early for the ERR (quantifiable costs versus quantifiable benefits; see table 2) to show positive results (table 2). However, positive trend combined with the non-quantifiable impact

However, there are non-quantifiable benefits that have resulted from project activities. Overall, results based culture was introduced through performance contracts at both the central and provincial level. Also the government has been equipped with a sustainable public sector training infrastructure of eight training centers to help implement these performance contracts and institutionalize this type of training for the long run. The positive trend of the ERR combined with the non-quantifiable project impact leads to an efficiency rating of Moderate.

Specifically, the non-quantifiable benefits resulting from various activities of each project component have been the following:

1. Leadership, rapid results, and results-based management (US$5,107,391):

Policy makers and administrative authorities of 5 Ministries have been trained in RBM;

A number of performance plans have been developed and applied; A network of 17 coaches has been recruited, trained and put in place

developing a nation-wide network of mentors for change management; 8 national training centers have been developed for MRR, Leadership and

GAR, and are used for mentoring public administrators; 50 trainers from a selected pool of centers have been trained; DEP and DAF have been strengthened and administrators have been trained to

carry the reform in public finance.

Overall, activities under component 1 supported the government and its entities in achieving capacity building and thus made sure the performance contracts would not remain a dead letter. In particular, various leadership and coaching activities within the public institutions have been organized at both the central and provincial level. Among the direct results are: (a) better external performance, in terms of service delivery such as more birth certificates issued in Kasai Oriental, the release of imprisoned population in the same province, and reduced processing times at the port of Matadi in the Bas-Congo province; (b) better internal performance such as significantly increased resource mobilization for the governments of Katanga and Orientale provinces. While

32

there was consensus among interviewed client representatives about these achievements, quantitative data on improved performance is not available.

In terms of impact on behavior, the governments at central and provincial level demonstrate their capacity to accelerate reforms in the field and achieved results. These results, the client satisfaction, demand for more, and the institutionalization of the approach through the network of certified coaches that will remain available after project closing is evidence of a change in institutional culture achieved through the project.

2. Financial management and procurement (US$2,524,358):

The forecast gaps between revenues and expenditures are now zero resulting in more credible and more realistic public expenditure budget;

Better resource management: the transparency of the budget is improved; The budget reporting schedule is being now respected; Traceability of public expenditure has been ensured and accounting and

financial data are available in real time; Procurement structures are now fully operational and public expenditures have

been streamlined; Training programs are now available creating a critical mass of available

trainers; The public procurement reform has been supported resulting in an improved

quality of public spending; The use of the public procurement code has been enhanced resulting in more

transparent procurement assurance; 20 training modules have been evaluated resulting in the development of

accredited training modules.

Overall, the capacity building activities carried out under component 2 succeeded in establishing a culture of systematic performance plans that are now being used at both central and provincial levels. Performance contracts (lettres de mission) became an established practice at the central level government and are likely to continue after project closing without further support. The Prime Minister concludes them annually with all Ministers. In addition, new public procurement mechanisms and methods based on transparency and fair competition have been established in the country.

3. Support to regional training centers to design and implement programs of excellence (US$10,537,504):

8 training centers have been renovated and equipped strengthening the public sector administration;

50 trainers have been trained and a critical mass of available trainers has been developed;

2 provinces have benefited from capacity building strengthening the public sector administration;

33

The operation of 8 centers was maintained throughout the duration of the project The centers are prepared for resource mobilization;

The capacity of trainers has been strengthened and training provided by the centers has been improved.

Overall, training offerings have been aligned with training needs, especially at the local level. Sustainability of the training centers was strengthened by creating local business plans to explore additional partnerships and funding mechanisms instead of just the mechanism of foreign technical assistance. In addition, 22 training programs were accredited, while 18 training centers are now accredited and annually assessed. The country-owned training infrastructure is available to train a larger number of civil servants in-country and will limit the requirements of costly trainings abroad. Their equipment with videoconference capability and the required bandwidth now allows them to operate as a true network.

4. Strengthening SENAREC and building a quality control system (US$7,295,730):

Project experts have been recruited to mentor PRONAREC; SENAREC interventions have been improved; 1 technical assistant has been recruited to carry out SENAREC missions; SENAREC’s office has been renovated and equipped resulting in improved

working conditions; A team has been set up to develop a Quality Control System resulting in the

provision of training certified centers; An accreditation team has been set up to provide accredited training programs.

Overall, through the project SENAREC has positioned itself as the government’s lead agency for coordinating development planning.

II. Quantifiable achievements by PDO indicators

The project has maintained its momentum and globally achieved its results both towards the overall Implementation Progress (IP) and the Project Development Objectives (PDO). All three PDO-level indicators have been met, with only the sub-indicator on gender at 90 percent of its end target (table 1).

a. Component 1:

The overall planned cost was set at US$4 million in 2011. As of January, 2017, the realized cost was slightly higher than the projected cost. In particular, the realized cost was US$5.1 million. Still, all the targets of sub-components of Component 1 have been overachieved:

The ‘number of targeted units with approved performance plans’ was set at 11 in 2011, and reached 27 units at the end of 2016;

The percentage target of ‘targeted ministries/provincial authorities issuing executive orders aiming to facilitate the application of RBM/RRM’ was set at 50% in 2011, and reached 90% in 2016;

34

The percentage target of ‘RRI teams satisfied with the coaching support’ was set at 60% in 2011, and reached 62.6% in 2016;

The target number of ‘RRIs coached by teams led by DRC-national coaches’ was set at 10 in 2011, and reached 13 in 2016, and;

The number target of ‘direct project beneficiaries’ was set at 5,000 in 2011, and reached 8,759 in 2016.

b. Component 2:

The overall planned cost was set at US$7 million in 2011. As of January, 2017, the realized cost was significantly lower than the projected cost. In particular, the realized cost was US$2.5 million, and most of the targets for sub-components of Component 2 have been overachieved:

The percentage target of ‘key central and provincial units with required equipment and resources to perform procurement functions’ was set at 60% in 2011, and reached 66.6% in 2016;

The number target of ‘key central and provincial units with plans to strengthen professional staff performance prepared and implemented was set at 18 in 2011, and reached 32 in 2016, and;

Macro-fiscal model has been refined.

c. Component 3:

The overall planned cost was set at US$13.4 million in 2011. As of January, 2017, the realized cost was lower than the projected cost. In particular, the realized cost was US$10.5 million, and most of the targets for sub-components of Component 3 have been overachieved:

The target number of ‘training centers with detailed work plans on how accredited programs will be developed’ was set at 8 in 2011 and reached this target in 2016;

The number target of ‘permanent accredited programs on managing for results, PFM and Procurement offered by training centers’ was set at 8 in 2011, and reached 22 in 2016;

A total of 6 merit-based grants were awarded to the best-performing training centers of an overall value US$ 650,000: Grant 1 of US$300,000; Grant 2 of US$100,000; Grant 3 of US$100,000; Grant 4 of US$50,000; Grant 5 of US$50,000; and Grant 6 of US$50,000.

d. Component 4:

The overall planned cost was set at US $5 million in 2011. As of January, 2017, the realized cost was higher than the projected cost. In particular, the realized cost was US$7.3 million. Still, most of the targets for sub-components of Component 4 have been overachieved:

35

The percentage target for ‘institutional improvement plan targets achieved within the agreed timeframe’ was set at 80% in 2011, and reached 96.7% in 2016, and;

The number target for ‘centers and institutions assessed annually for accreditation’ was set at 15 in 2011, and reached 18 in 2016.

Table 1: Achievement of PDO

Baseline (2011)

Actual (2013)

Target

Mid-term review (2014)

Final result (2016) Result

1. Targeted units with approved performance plans that are formally reviewed at least once a year (number) 0 10 11 13 27

Overachieved

2. Rapid Results Initiatives achieving at least 90% of the goals set in the performance contract (%) 0% 22.5% 60% 36% 62.6%

Overachieved

3. Direct project beneficiaries 0 3395 5000 3395 8759

Overachieved

4. Female beneficiaries 0 7% 25% 7% 26.5%Overachieved

Intermediate Results Indicators

Baseline (2011)

Actual (2013)

Target

Mid-term review (2014)

Final result (2016) Result

5. Targeted units with approved performance plans (number) 0 12 50 13 51

Overachieved

6. Targeted ministries/provincial authorities issuing executive orders aiming to facilitate the application of RBM/RRM (%) 0% 21% 50% 60% 90%

Overachieved

7. Certified Level 1 RRM coaches available to accompany RRM teams (number) 0 0 10 0 13

Overachieved

8. RRIs coached by teams led by DRC-national coaches (number) 0 85 85 57 163

Overachieved

9. Key central and provincial units with required equipment and resources to perform key procurement functions (%) 10% 20.8% 60% 20% 66.6%

Overachieved

10. Key central and provincial units with plans to strengthen professional staff performance (1) prepared and (2) implemented (number) 0 0 18 0 32

Overachieved

11. Training centers with detailed work plans on how accredited programs will be developed (number) 4 0 8 5 8 Achieved

36

12. Permanent accredited programs on Managing for Results, PFM and Procurement offered by Training Centers (number) 0 0 8 0 22

Overachieved

13. Institutional improvement plan targets achieved within the agreed timeframe (%) 20% 67.7% 90% 80% 96.7%

Overachieved

14. Centers and institutions assessed annually for accreditation (number) 0 0 15 0 18

Overachieved

15. The number of staff who state that they have used the training that they received on the job. 0 0 800 0 2668

Overachieved

16. Competitive allocation of grants to training centers. Competition held and grant allocated (number) 0 0 4 0 6 Achieved

Source: Project documents.

III. Realized total project cost, benefit, net benefit, and ERR

a. Main net benefits achieved

Since 2014, the Project has marked 8,759 direct beneficiaries. The estimated US$ value per each beneficiary is US$196.03. Also, additional merit-based grants were awarded to six best-performing training centers. The overall US$ value of the grants was US$650,000. Therefore, up to date, the overall direct project benefits amount to US$2,367,027. Adding cumulative efficiency gains of 15 percent per year, the overall direct project benefits are US$2,586,559 (table 2).

The overall realized project costs are US$25,032,000 (table 2), while the planned project costs were of US$26,880,000 resulting in contingencies of US$1,848,000 (table 2). Specifically, the realized project costs per year per component are depicted in table 3.

Hence, the net project benefits remain still negative with no positive ERR so far (table 2).

Table 2: Consolidated project costs/benefits, and estimated up-to-date ERRUS$

Leadership, rapid results, and results-based management Base Benefit/Cost Streams

Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 TotalMinimum value from direct

0 0 0 171,702.68 128,777 128,777 429,257

37

beneficiaries (US$)Plus incremental Productivity Gain (15%) 0 0 0 171,702.68 148,093.56 148,093.56 467,890Incremental Project Costs (US$) 114,800 330,400 952,000 476,000 856,800 2,276,400 5,006,400

Total IDA loan cost (US$) 5,107,391

Total Incremental Net Benefits (US$) (114,800) (330,400) (952,000) (304,297) (708,706) (2,128,306) (4,538,510)

IRR #NUM!

Strengthening Core Functions of Public Administration in Support of Performance PlansBase Benefit/Cost Streams

Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 TotalMinimum value from direct beneficiaries (US$) 0 0 0 171,702.68 128,777 128,777 429,257Plus incremental Efficiency Gain (US$) 0 0 0 171,702.68 148,093.56 148,093.56 467,890Incremental Project Costs (US$) 57,400 165,200 476,000 238,000 428,400 1,138,200

2,503,200

Total IDA loan cost (US$)

2,524,358

Total Incremental Net Benefits (US$) (57,400) (165,200) (476,000) (66,297.32) (280,306.44) (990,106.44)

(2,035,310)

IRR #NUM! Support to Regional Training Centers to Institutionalize Training Programs for the Public Sector Base Benefit/Cost Streams

38

Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 TotalMinimum value from direct beneficiaries (US$) 0 0 0 388,369 345,444 345,444

1,079,257

Plus incremental Productivity Gain (15%) 0 0 0 388,369 397,260.23 397,260.23

1,182,890

Incremental Project Costs (US$) 235,340 677,320 1,951,600 975,800 1,756,440 4,666,620

10,263,120

Total IDA Grant Financing (US$)

10,537,505

Total Incremental Net Benefits (US$) (235,340) (677,320) (1,951,600) (587,431) (1,359,180) (4,269,360)

(9,080,230)

IRR #NUM!

Strengthening SENAREC and Building a Quality Control System Base Benefit/Cost Streams

Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 TotalMinimum value from direct beneficiaries (US$) 0 0 0 171,703 128,777 128,777 429,257Incremental Productivity Gain (15%) 0 0 0 171,703 148,093.56 148,094 467,890Incremental Project Costs (US$) 166,460 479,080 1,380,400 690,200 1,242,360 3,300,780 7,259,280

Total IDA Grant Financing (US$) 7,295,730

Total Incremental Net Benefits (US$) (166,460) (479,080) (1,380,400) (518,497) (1,094,266)

(3,152,686) (6,791,390)

IRR #NUM!

Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 TotalTotal Realized Project Benefit 0 0 0 903,477 841,541 841,541

2,586,559

Total Realized Project Cost 574,000 1,652,000 4,760,000 2,380,000 4,284,000 11,382,000

25,032,000

25,46

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4,985

Total Incremental Net Benefits (574,000) (1,652,000) (4,760,000) (1,476,523) (3,442,459) (10,540,459)

(22,445,44

1)

IRR #NUM!

Planned project costs and realized benefits

Total Project Benefit 0 0 0 903,477 841,541 841,541

2,586,55

9

Total Project Cost 657,471.80 2,412,997.2 4,923,191.23 6,832,232.43 7,668,186.04 3,743,104.22

26,23

7,183

Total Incremental Net Benefits (657,472) (2,412,997) (4,923,191) (5,928,755) (6,826,645) (2,901,563)

-23,65

0,624

IRR #NUM! Source: Author’s calculations based on project documents and PIU consultations.*Assumptions/facts: direct benefit per beneficiary US$196.03. Therefore, total direct project benefit so far is (US$196.03*8,759)=US $1,717,026.77. As there are 4 project components: Direct project benefits per component = (US$1,717,026.77 / 4)= US$429,256.69. In year 2014, we assume a weight of 40 percent, in year 2015 a weight of 30 percent, and in year 2016 a weight of 30 percent. Therefore, in year 2014, component 1 the direct project benefits were (40 percent * US$429,256.69)=US$171,702.68.**Also, 6 additional merit-based grants of total value US$650,000 were awarded to best-performing training centers: grant 1=US$300,000; grant 2=US$100,000; grant 3=US$100,000; grant 4=US$50,000; grant 5=US$50,000; and grant 6=US$50,000. Per year (from 2014 to 2016) the grant value is (US$650,000 / 3)= US$216,666.67. Therefore, in year 2014, component 3, the total direct project benefits were: (US$171,702.68 + US$216,666.67) = US$ 388,369.35.

Table 3: Project cost per year by component XDR (mil) US$ (mil) % of component final 2011

I. 0.41 0.574 0.1148 114,800

II. 0.41 0.574 0.0574 57,400

III. 0.41 0.574 0.23534 235,340

IV. 0.41 0.574 0.16646 166,460

Total 574,000

XDR (mil) US$ (mil) % of component final 2012

I. 1.18 1.652 0.3304 330,400

II. 1.18 1.652 0.1652 165,200

III. 1.18 1.652 0.67732 677,320

IV. 1.18 1.652 0.47908 479,080

Total 1,652,000


I. 3.4 4.76 0.952 952,000

II. 3.4 4.76 0.476 476,000

III. 3.4 4.76 1.9516 1,951,600

IV. 3.4 4.76 1.3804 1,380,400

Total 4,760,000

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I. 1.7 2.38 0.476 476,000

II. 1.7 2.38 0.238 238,000

III. 1.7 2.38 0.9758 975,800

IV. 1.7 2.38 0.6902 690,200

Total 2,380,000


I. 3.06 4.284 0.8568 856,800

II. 3.06 4.284 0.4284 428,400

III. 3.06 4.284 1.75644 1,756,440

IV. 3.06 4.284 1.24236 1,242,360

Total 4,284,000


I. 8.13 11.382 2.2764 2,276,400

II. 8.13 11.382 1.1382 1,138,200

III. 8.13 11.382 4.66662 4,666,620

IV. 8.13 11.382 3.30078 3,300,780

Total 11,382,000

XDR (mil) US$ (mil) % of component remaining

I. 1.32 1.848 0.3696 369,600

II. 1.32 1.848 0.1848 184,800

III. 1.32 1.848 0.75768 757,680

IV. 1.32 1.848 0.53592 535,920

Total 1,848,000

Total baseline cost Contingencies Total

25,032,000 1,848,000 26,880,000 Source: Author’s calculations based on project documents and PIU consultations.

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Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/Specialty

Lending

Ousman Jah Program Coordinator SACPK-CMU

Macmillan Ikemefule Anyanwu Senior Country Officer SACAATshiya A. Subayi Operations Officer GHNDRAntonius Verheijen Country Manager ECCYU TTLDaria Goldstein Lead Counsel LEGLE LawyerJean Mabi Mulumba Senior Public Sector

Specialist GGO27Susan Opper Consultant GED06Thomas Jeffrey RaminBenjamina Randrianarivelo Senior Operations Officer GGELIFranke Hendrik ToornstraDenis Tshibombi Leta Governance Specialist GGO27 TTLErinn Wattie

Boris WeberSenior Public Sector Specialist

GGO27 TTL

Robert A. YunguSenior Public Sector Specialist

GGO13

Supervision/ICRBalume Alpha Abonabo Team Assistant AFCC2Sadia Aderonke Afolabi Consultant GGO2

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Edouard Al-DahdahSenior Public Sector Specialist

GGOS

Andrew Osei Asibey Consultant GGO19

Chiara Bronchi Practice Manager GGO13 TTL

Klaus DeckerSenior Public Sector Specialist

GGO17 ICR TTL

Daria Goldstein Lead Counsel LEGLE LawyerMichael Christopher Consultant GGO1

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Jelenic 9

Hirut M'cleodLeadership Development Specialist

GGELI

Jean Mabi Mulumba Senior Public Sector Specialist

GGO27

Jennifer Ngenyi WabidiaDumas Nguebou Jules

Evariste Niyonkuru Consultant GGO25

Danny Ndongala NsiesiBenjamina Randrianarivelo Senior Operations Officer GGELI

Tshiya A. Subayi Operations Officer GHNDR

Denis Tshibombi Leta Governance Specialist GGO27 TTL

Antonius Verheijen Country Manager ECCYU TTL

Boris WeberSenior Public Sector Specialist

GGO27 TTL

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project CycleStaff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)

LendingFY09 0 5013.01FY10 36.43 329719FY11 10.69 73591.48FY12 64.88 245960.3Total: 112 654283.8Supervision/ICRFY13 32.46 117404.6FY14 46.41 170298.9FY15 38.61 176280FY16 25.23 170189.6FY17 44.67 332932.6Total: 187.38 967105.7

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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

A beneficiary survey was not carried out.

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Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

Minutes of the stakeholder workshop that took place in Kinshasa, RDC, on November 15, 2016.

Agenda:1. Opening2. Presentation of the project3. Observations by the World Bank4. Discussion5. Closing

1. Opening

The workshop started at 10:45 AM with welcome remarks by M. Constant Mudekereza Koko, Project Coordinator at the SENAREC.

2. Presentation of the projet

The Project Coordinator then presented the project, its design and its implementation. He explained the realization of project indicators, identified the challenges as well as the opportunities and formulated recommendations.

3. Observations by the World Bank

M. Klaus Decker, Senior Public Sector Specialist, then presented the objectives of the workshop. Finally, M. Denis Tshibombi Leta, Senior Governance Specialist encouraged the participants to share their experiences with and impressions of the project so lessons for future projects can be identified.

4. Discussion

The workshop was rich in observations, questions and discussions. In general, there was a consensus that the project was a big success that was realized under difficult circumstances. The exchanges can be summarized around the following points:

Project design and preparation

There was consensus among the participants that the project as it was designed corresponded to the needs and remains relevant since the needs for strengthening capacity remain huge. Moreover, the introduction of RBM was a decisive step to improve the functioning of the public administration. Some participants referred to the project indicators and were wondering if they should have been even more ambitious.

Implementation in general

Some participants remarked that the initial project design was too complex. Implementation had therefore difficulty to gain momentum. Moreover, the sequencing

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foreseen by the project with first the establishment of the centers and then the carrying out of rapid results initiatives and trainings could not be followed because of the time it took to put in place the centers. The project and the teams have demonstrated flexibility and restructured the project in 2014 to solve issues.After a learning period during which there may have been some imbalances between means and results, for example overly large teams to implement rapid results initiatives, the handling of the related tools improved significantly and the project gained a lot of momentum.An aspect of the project that turned out suboptimal was the fact that the centers of excellence were anchored in universities and staffed by academics, mainly university professors. As a consequence, the availability of center staff is limited. The required profile is more that of practitioners and not academics. Moreover, the bonus paid in addition to the university salary does not create sufficient incentives for the heads to fully dedicate themselves to the centers. Some participants recommended full time staff to be allocated to the centers to address this challenge. The university context was further seen to create the perception that the centers were not really institutions for continuous training, because this is not what universities traditionally do. Moreover, some participants recommended to better analyze the needs to avoid a catalogue of trainings based on the expertise of the trainers rather than the needs of the public administration. Some participants expressed concerns about duplication of teaching modules. They should be prepared and taught by one center and be disseminated by the other centers.

Implementation – the role of the Congolese authorities (SENAREC/central government/provincial authorities)

The initial structure of the project with several implementation units was too complex. Once this responsibility was concentrated in the SENAREC, implementation was effective. It was supported by the central government and the provincial authorities.One aspect that could have been considered was to have an expert in continuous training at the SENAREC. The presence of such expertise would have enabled SENAREC to have a more targeted and proactive approach with respect to continuous training, covering all aspects allowing for a quality management approach for the centers.The differences in remuneration within the SENAREC did create some frictions with civil servants that were not paid beyond their base salary.

Implementation – the role of the World Bank

A major aspect undermining more effective implementation was the lack of continuity of TTLs on the World Bank side. It obviously takes time to develop ownership of a project and the discontinuity may have prevented, according the some participants, a more proactive decision to restructure the project. This being said, the role of the TTL following the restructuring was emphasized as being very positive.The procurement procedures triggered some remarks about the need, according to some participants, to sign contracts with local providers when it comes to furniture. There were problems with the quality of some of the furniture delivered in the provinces by a company from Kinshasa.

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Some participants asked for more flexibility of the World Bank on specific issues. According to them, the Bank should allow to fully pay for the leave of some of the members of SENAREC whose presence was essential, which prevented them from taking their leave and made them to lose it. Moreover, the World Bank should allow for the financing of contracts whose duration exceeds the closing of the project for gardening and cleaning services. Also, some ineligibilities caused problems. Even if there was a training plan, each training had to be approved individually by the World Bank.Some participants also saw the responsibility for donor coordination, especially with the AfDB, with the World Bank and would have like to see better coordination.

Results and impact

There was consensus among the participants that the results (centers of excellence, RRSs, RBM, governmental seminars) and the impact of the project represent a critical step in the strengthening of capacity in the public administration.

Sustainability

For many participants the centers of excellence are the core of the project and have absorbed around 30 % of project funds. Their sustainability remains a key concern. Some more recently established centers remain under-utilized. Their functioning as a true network remains embryonic. This is partly due to technical constraints. The bandwidth available at the centers does currently not allow for the utilization of the ICT equipment for videoconferencing, a challenge that is currently being addressed. Another aspect explaining why the centers do not yet fully operate as a network is that the exact structure and governance of such a network have not been determined yet. Some participants observed that the contracts with the heads of the centers and their bonus payments do not create sufficient incentives to take the initiative to ensure sustainability of the centers. The preparation of the business plans may have alerted some of these heads, but they will need support. A transition towards full cost-recovery could be achieved through decreasing co-financing by the World Bank and a contribution from the Congolese authorities. This would demonstrate ownership of the results of the project.

Transition arrangements towards PSRRP

There was consensus among the participants that there was a need to continue World Bank support, for example through the PSRRP. There was also consensus that despite the impact of the project the needs remain huge. In terms of geographic coverage, the project has reached important locations, but isolated parts of the country remain to be reached by capacity building measures in the future. Some participants recommended a satellite approach to spread across the country.According to the participants, the integration of activities of the project into the PSRRP will not be easy. This would require to manage a situation where the SENAREC operates within the Planning Ministry to implement its plan while the PSRRP operates within the Ministry for Public Administration to manage the funds under the component that would continue the activities under the project (PSRRP component 3). Moreover, there is a need to establish a baseline through a survey for the indicators capturing these activities and to adjust them compared to the ones under the project. Under the PSRRP some participants

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observed that the indicators will have to go beyond the simple output dimension to measure project impact.

5. Closing

The workshop closed over lunch at 2:00 PM.

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Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

The completion report submitted by the Government is structured as follows: (1) project context and objective, (2) analysis of project design, (3) project implementation, (4) analysis of implementation context, (5) project implementation challenges, (6) project performance, (7) project sustainability, and (8) lessons learned. This summary focuses on the evaluative aspects of the completion report.

With respect to project design, the reports concludes that the schedule turned out unrealistic. Weak implementation capacity combined with the complexity of the project activities caused delays. For example, the rehabilitation of the training centers was scheduled to be finalized within 18 months following project effectiveness. It ended up taking twice as long, i. e. 36 months. Moreover, political decisions, such as the establishment of new provinces, affected the project and required an extension of the closing date.

In terms of implementation, the restructuring addressed bottlenecks by establishing a single implementing agency, readjusting the activities, having the centers carry out specialized training on PFM and procurement, and aligning the results framework with 12 indicators. According to the report, all three PDO-level indicators and 12 intermediate results indicators are overachieved.

When it comes to the implementation context and implementation challenges, the partition of three of the target provinces led to the establishment of three new government teams in each province. In some cases, this caused a loss of institutional memory as some of the people trained under the project took over new responsibilities. Similarly, changes of ministers also affected implementation. Another implementation challenge was that the targets of people trained by center, by type of training and by type of beneficiary were not estimated prior to 2013-2015.

According to the report, the project, overall, achieved its objectives. All indicators are achieved and overachieved. The PDO remains relevant. Moreover, a cost benefit analysis shows that the results are highly satisfactory.

With regard to sustainability, this will require the centers and the government to assume full ownership of project outputs. The centers will need to implement their development plans. The central and provincial governments will have to provide funding for capacity building and, at the same time, pursue their efforts to reform public administration. Sustainability will require SENAREC to play a more normative role to ensure quality control, coordinate the national capacity building program and to monitor implementation of government priorities through performance plans.

In terms of lessons learned and recommendations, the completion report highlights the improved collaboration between the centers and the beneficiary governments as a good practice that needs to be continued. Another lesson is that ownership is stronger when the project is integrated into a permanent structure. Proximity between the centers and the

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beneficiary administration greatly contributes to better collaboration and achievement of government priorities. Also, the government seminars really contributed to a better understanding of RBM and the RRM. Another lesson is that when projects are implemented by multiple agencies, the modalities of their cooperation need to be defined. Lastly, project design should take into consideration foreseeable changes, such as the announced partition of provinces.

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Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

No comments have been received.

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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

In chronological order

Congo, Democratic Republic of – Country Assistance Strategy for the period FY09 – FY11 (Report No. 41474-ZR), dated November 16, 2007Project Appraisal Document, Report No. 58804-ZR – April 19, 2011Aide-Memoire Implementation Support Mission - June 9-17, 2011Implementation Status and Results Report: Sequence 1, February 18, 2012Aide-Memoire Implementation Support Mission – May 14-24, 2012Implementation Status and Results Report: Sequence 2, September 22, 2012Aide-Memoire Implementation Support Mission – September 24 – October 1, 2012Aide-Memoire Implementation Support Mission – November 25 – December 8, 2012Congo, Democratic Republic of - Country Assistance Strategy for the period FY13 - FY16 (Report No. 66158), dated April 12, 2013Implementation Status and Results Report: Sequence 3, May, 15, 2013Implementation Status and Results Report: Sequence 4, January 6, 2014Aide-Memoire Mid-Term Review Mission – February 28 – March 17, 2014Implementation Status and Results Report: Sequence 5, July 5, 2014Aide-Memoire Implementation Support Mission – September 22 – October 8, 2014Restructuring Paper (Report No. RES15040) – November 5, 2014Implementation Status and Results Report: Sequence 6, February 5, 2015Aide-Memoire Implementation Support Mission – February 26 – March 18, 2015Aide-Memoire Implementation Support Mission – May 25 – June 13, 2015Implementation Status and Results Report: Sequence 7, September 3, 2015Aide-Memoire Implementation Support Mission – September 16 – October 12, 2015Aide-Memoire Implementation Support Mission – November 26 – December 17, 2015Aide-Memoire Implementation Support Mission – March 21 – April 15, 2016Implementation Status and Results Report: Sequence 8, March 25, 2016Aide-Memoire Implementation Support Mission – July 4 – 29, 2016Restructuring Paper (Report No. RES24212) – September 1, 2016Implementation Status and Results Report: Sequence 9, October 18, 2016Aide-Memoire ICR Mission – November 4 – 17, 2016Implementation Status and Results Report: Sequence 10, January 19, 2017PIU Final Report, dated May 2017

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MAP

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