2

T h i f Ethi

STEPHEN L DARWALL

Ethi i t i l d i i d d i t t t t t h i d ti thi ithth l t t b i d i i d d f t h i t ti th d " l i d t h i " th

ith h i h d i thi l Thi l t t t b i l lt h i it t l t i t ti th lik t h t f l i d t

t h t i h t h i d i d i d d t l d l th l i dto cases When it comes to normative ethics theories are often formulated andevaluated by reflecting on the ethically relevant features of cases Thus some phil

h i t i t h t i t th l l l f di t iti b t killi d l t t i di ( ll t b t i il

d l t t i th h ) b f l t i ifi lik J d i t h T h 'f " t l l b l " i h i h d i h b t l t t i hi

t i kill t i b f l d d i t i it t t k h itld kill ll b (Th 1976) I t h i k i b t thi it

to be relevant that by diverting the train the driver would be killing people orcausing their deaths himself whereas if he let the train continue undiverted hewould only be allowing deaths to occur By seeing this in a specific case it is

d i t d i t i t i f l t h t i l l A t h t f " t i l t h i " id th i t i b t i i l d i i d i f f t i it t t h t th l f i t t

t i l ti f h t t d F t l h t t t k i t h t h l d d ( h l d h d ) b t h t t t h i k f l b t

' h t b t hi h i d thi t f t i tiA d th th t h i l ti t h t t i i l t i l itheven if they have practical implications: do all living species have intrinsic worth? Isaesthetic appreciation a more valuable form of human experience than the relief ofa scratched itch? And so on

C Ethi

A b t t t f i h t b " t h i " J t th i " l "th fidi f j d b t th i b h t b f th i l d i i l l

17

STEPHEN L DARWALL

ratio

morality

obligations

make

THEORIES OF ETHICS

t d t t i t d ht t h A l i l tt h thi b true only if something has other properties: the reasons for valuing it And suchreasons cannot simply consist in the property that it is good since that is itself theproperty of there being such reasons Unlike say the property of yellowness which

i h t t t h t thi ll b i t l f it t h i l ti i b t h it l t i b f t h ti t h t t h i d If I

j d t i i t b l b l I t t h i k it h t t h t k t d f t t h t th d f it l O if I t h i k t h t t i ti i

ll i d I t t h i k th t i h t i t i f th ti d thi t t i t h t k it ll b l i t f t t h t th d f it bli

toriness And these thoughts commit me to the existence of background normativetheories I am committed to thinking there are truths that relate an experience'shaving certain properties to its value such that any experience that had exactlyth ( d th t h i l l l t ) ti ld b l b l l ththi b i l O i i l l I i t t d t t h i k i th i t

lid l i i l t h t l t t i ' h i t i f t t it b ill i d

I thi b d th th i t i t i f ti t h i l t h i i avoidable if we are to think about ethical issues with any care Any udgment wemake about an individual case will be no better than the background theorieswe commit ourselves to in making it Moreover there are special considerationst h t it t ti t h i f d i t i t i l b t t h th d

t k ti f l i h t d Thi i b I t d b i f l b th t f thi ll lit i d l d l if

th t t W h t i i h t i t l h l d t b lf d i h t t bl l h d t P t i f

tbil i t i t h i t d i t i d f t l i A ithj d ' l l fidi t h f l f l t t i l t i ciples (or theories) that are capable both of justifying our judgments and of beingpublicly addressed to and accepted by other members of the moral community

Someone we hold accountable for wrongdoing we think should be capable n f ti j d t f b i b h t t t h t it i

bl j d t t h d Thi i d i f f t f th t h i l t h f l f l d i d i f d h l d

h it t b l th th th D i d i f di d ' t t t t t d i t th d t h l d hi t b l d b th i

i t i l i b t l i i t i l t th i t h h t t h t d i d i i i ate only if its object should be able to accept it and see things the same way Tothe contrary disdain may only increase if its object can't "get i t " If however wejudge someone to be incapable of assessing his own conduct morally this canl d t t h i k t h t h i t ft b j t f l l t i i h i i b l f t i i t t l l t b l l it It i t h f

bl t t b d f b i bl t f l t bli t i f i t i f j d t f l i h t d t h t i i i l t i d 'l l f i d i N t i l th i i thi t d l f bli

l di

19

STEPHEN L DARWALL

M t t h i

O i i t t i thi h t ill b ith th j ti t h i l t h it t l i t i l i d t l d i t th Bf d i i

these however we need first to introduce briefly the other main area of ethicaltheory: metaethics Unlike normative theories which concern themselves withsubstantive normative questions such as "What is valuable?" and "What is mor

ll b l i t ? " t t h i l t h i d ith b t t hilh i l i t h t d l i th W d i t i i h f d i f f t k i d ( )

ti i th h i l h f l i th i d t t f t h i l j d t (b) l t d i i th h i l h f i d i h t

t l t t t h i l j d t h t it i t h l d t h i l i ( )t h i l i i th ibilit d t f t h i l t t h d (d)

epistemological questions concerning the possibility and nature of ethical knowledge and how we can justify our ethical views

Why however should we care about metaethics? Some people think that casethi b d i d t i l f t t h i Th t t h t l it h i l l t i t l ll normative th b t h l d t h t thi i t i l

i d d t f t t h i I t h i k thi i i i t k d t h t th h ti ti d b t t t h i l d ti t h h t i d i t t i

b t h f h th t t t i t h i l t h i k (lik A i t t l K t ) d dll f h d d h l d d i t l d b t

Consider for example issues that arise in environmental ethics concerning themoral claims that other living species make on us How much should we weighharm to other species either to individuals or to the species themselves in our

l d l i b t i ? It i i i b l t t h i k f l l b t h ti i t h ti t t h i l i O th t f h T b bl t b

h d thi t h d lf B t h t i it f thi t b d b d for b i ?

O i b t th d f h b i ' d i ti th t i f t i f d i ( l t t i l th d i h ld h if f l linformed or would if fully informed have for herself as she actually is) (Railton1986) This view is sometimes put forward not just as a normative claim but as a metaethical position concerning what personal welfare or benefit is But such a

t t h i f lf l t th ibilit t h t i l k i d i b b f i t d h d R h l thi ill b d b d for b i l itt b d b d to it ( it i h t t h h d i ) I b l i thi t t h i l th t b th i t k lt f li f t h h t t h t t k it f t d

t h t ' d i h t h i t i f h i t i l O t h tth t f lf b f i t h h i i l d t t f th tiof an agent deliberating about what to do but is one we require rather when wecare for some being or thing for its sake (ourselves included) we can appreciate whyh d b f i t t t i t d t b i ith d i ( D l l 1997 2002)T h f b f th i j t i t d i f their

20

THEORIES OF ETHICS

sake that they do well or flourish We can sensibly regard a species as capable ofbeing benefited or harmed therefore if we can care for them for their sake

But again what sort of claim does harm make when we understand it n thisway? Do we have a moral obligation not to harm members of any species? Or is thefact that an action would harm another person relevant to its being wrong in a way that harm to other species is not? Here again we cannot answer this questionwithout taking a stand on meta-ethical issues concerning what morality and moralobligation are if only implicitly If we understand moral questions broadly enoughthen it may seem that harm is harm and is no less morally relevant whether thebeing harmed is a person or a snail darter If however we think of morality as a system of reciprocity or mutual accountability where norms of right and wrongmediate a moral community of free and equal moral persons then harm to otherpersons will seem to have an intrinsic moral relevance that harm to other speciesdoes not For then what is morally wrong will be what one can be held accountableby others for doing in accordance with norms that must in some sense be accept-able to all from a perspective of equality So viewed harm to persons is not simplyharm to members of a certain species but harm to a member of the moral commu-nity to whom norms of right and wrong must be justifiable

This is only one example of how questions of meta-ethics are implicitly involved inissues of normative ethical theory and therefore in case ethics Ultimately we have noalternative but to pursue philosophical ethics, that is to attempt to work out a compre-hensive outlook that integrates normative ethics and meta-ethics (Darwall 1998)

Contractarianism/Contractualism

We can turn now to a review of different normative theories and begin with onethat can be grounded in the meta-ethical theory of morality as reciprocity ormutual accountability just mentioned This is the idea that whether an action isright or wrong depends on whether it accords with or violates principles that wouldbe the object of an agreement contract or choice made under certain conditions bymembers of the moral community The general idea can be developed in a variety ofways depending on how the choice or agreement the parties who make it and theconditions under which it is made are characterized One broad distinction is be-tween contractarianism, under which the choice of moral principles is self-interestedand contractualism, which grounds it in a moral ideal of reciprocity reasonablenessor fairness

It may seem strange to think that moral principles can in any respect be agreedupon or chosen How can a moral proposition be made true by any choice oragreement? Only rarely however do contractarians or contractualists claim hatright and wrong are determined by actual choices or agreements (Harman 1975)More frequently what they hold is that moral principles are those that would berationally or reasonably chosen or agreed to under certain (frequently counterfac-tual) conditions

21

STEPHEN L. DARWALL

C t t i i

Contractarianism was initially formulated by Thomas Hobbes (see Hobbes 1994)Hobbes begins by considering the situation of an agent deliberating independently

f th f th ti f hi d i i t t E h h t h i k h t h d i d i i hi t k it B t h t

lt if ll f t t h ti d i d i t t ? A l t h hh ' d i t l l lt i hi i t t b i b t t d

i th d t f th it d ' t f l l t h t ' i hi tii t t th th ' i th i tiprinciple other than selfinterest will actually result in everyone's (or even anyone's) interests or desires being best promoted In situations where this is not thecase where the collective pursuit of selfinterest leads to an outcome that is worsef h h h t i k llti ti bl

Thi i i l l t t d b th t h t i l k th P i ' Dil i h i h t i d i i d l j i l d i i f bb Th d i t i t

tt t l l h t h t h l k h id t i t ith hi hit f bb b t il i t h f b k i d t i i i

each a sentence of one year He offers each a deal: if one confesses and his partnerdoesn't the confessor will go free and the partner will get twenty years If bothconfess both get five years

S t h t h l b t d i th l t ti Th t t f thi t t i th i f l l If A f b t B d t th A t hi fit

k d t d B hi f t h k d ( t ) A d i if B f b tA d t f t h k d f A fitkd f B If b t h f b t h t t h it h i d k d t A d if b t h d ' t f b t h t t h i d k d

W h t h l d h d ? R fit f A' ti B ill t i d d t lf A d ith f t It t h f t h t A h l d f i

whatever B does A will do better if he confesses If B confesses then A will get histhird as opposed to his fourthbest outcome by confessing And if B doesn't confessthen A will get his first as opposed to his secondbest outcome by confessing SoA h l d f A ill d b t t b f i h t B d

B t B' i t t i i tl l t A' f A t f l ll t B S if A ld d b t t f th ld B It

b i d t h thi i l l d l l t i ti bl A' d B' til t h h l i k l i t t hi th b t t f h h t k i d i i d l l

t k t t h i l d t t h t i f h If b t h i d h twould be best for him given the actions of the other both will confess But thatyields each one's thirdranked outcome whereas they could have both achievedtheir secondranked outcomes by not confessing Although the ailhouse context

k thi d t t f i i t l l th ti t t f A d B If A d B ld t t t h i t l d t th ld b t h t f d d ith t h i d k d t th th th t h i d k d

t t h t i d d t l ti t h i i t t ill hiP l t h th f th it f t h i i d d t i t td f l l l l th l l t i f l l i f h i h t '

22

THEORIES OF ETHICS

i t t b t t th ld h b d b i t h i i tests independently. Obviously cooperation is required for many many things thatare valuable in life perhaps especially in complex modern societies n which wecannot assume that genuinely common interests shaped by common cultural or

l i i t d i t i ill t t h ll f i i f t i t t i Morality b t h h t f i l l b d d i f f ti P i

i l f l i h t d ld th b h t l i f i i t i i d f t i th b d t ibl f f ti

l ti i l i t j t thi t h t it l i t i lit b t ll t t h t ( A t l l H b b ' i t h t

ation among large groups was impossible without political authority since otherwise uncertainty of others' participation would undermine the assurance necessaryfor it to make sense for one to do one's part)

A d i t t t i i th h t h ti i i h t i d t i d b l f ti f th b d t t t h t i b t ll h

l t T k f l th l t h t it i t t t th id f th i d l th ifi i l d i t t t ( l it i

t b l l a d/ th ti f if t d i t b l l(3) Arguably there exist some a and p such that it would promote everyone'sinterests more for everyone to follow the resulting rule than it would for everyoneto pursue their own interests independently If that is so then for starters contract i i ill h l d t h t it ld b t t f l l thi l

T fit i t i t t i i h l d t h t h t it i i h t t d d d h t l it ld b i ' i t t f t t d b i d d b i t h i d l i b t i d l ti H h t f i different ibl l f i k i d f i t t i h th t t h t ' i t t ld b t d b t t b ' f l l i t h t l th th

ld b if t t t d t t t h i i t t i d d t l ? H is where the idea of an agreement or contract enters the contractarian pictureTaking as a benchmark the "no agreement" point in which all regard themselvesas bound by nothing but their own interests and values contractarians treat the

ti f h i h i i l t l l ll b d b th l t i t t i l b i i bl f thi b h k i h i h ll h t

i t t i i t t l l d t i i l t h b idi th" t" i t b t h diff i i t t i tl h i h i i l

t l l d ( G t h i 1986) H f b l th l t t i i l t t thd i f f t t i t i t ill d d h h th t t l if th i agreement Consider for example what principle of mutual aid would be agreed toIf those with fewer resources and greater vulnerabilities have more to lose from thelack of agreement than those with greater resources and fewer vulnerabilities then

t i l b i i l d t l i i l f t l id th ldlt if l b l th ith l

Thi th i t t i i ' b i f k f i l i T k t l b l i t i i ifi th b l i t i f i h d

t i i d i l b l i h t t h i k b t h tt i i l f d l i ith th i ld lt f t i t i f

23

STEPHEN L DARWALL

th " t" i t i h i h h t t t t t d it i tests and values In acting on the principles that would be agreed however theparties are not simply promoting their interests; they are cooperating Cooperationpromotes everyone's advantage but as in the Prisoner's Dilemma it does so by

i i i d i i d l t f ti t h i i t t E h ld f h i h i h th if b i t b th

b t h t i d t d it t i d b i i l f tit h t ld t i l l t

Contractualism

Contractualism has a similar structure It too understands principles of right conduct as the object of a rational agreement But whereas contractarianism takes

l i i l t lt f t i l b i i t t l i tht i i l d b l i d l f l t t h t ld b

i i t t ith b i i f d t l t f i t i F t t l i ' i t f i th bl ith t t i i i t h t it t t h t i d i i d l h i f f t l l i t th th ld h f th d l f ti O t h i th l t h t lt b b gaining from that position will have no moral force But why assume that peoplehave such a moral claim? From a moral point of view this seems entirely arbitraryunless some background theory of natural rights is assumed And contractarianism

't j t i f that ti i it l f ld h l d t d d it

Thi bl f th d i t i if id h i d i i d li h t t f l f i t t d t i l i t t t i l i

If h t i t f h i d d t i t t th f i t t i i h i h th t b l i h d l f ti h ill t h i k it

rational to bargain to an agreement with others to be bound by certain rules Buthow can this give her a reason actually to follow the rules? The reasons of nterestshe has for agreeing to follow the rules can't give her a reason actually to followth i th h l i t d f t i f l f ti i t h t thconstrain h it f h i t t F h t b bl t th l

i h t l d t l f ti It b t h tit i i h i t t t b h d t t t i l f

ti b t hil thi ld i h t want t t th l h l d ' t accept th l for these reasons.

The animating idea of contractualism is implicit in Kant's "kingdom of ends"formulation of his Categorical Imperative Kant maintains that anyone subject tothe moral law must be able to be regarded also as "making the law" (Kant 1998)O l th th l l b t h h t f l f it f f l t b j t l t l th l i l t t h l Thi i i f R ' id f l i t i t l i t i l it i t i i h i h

h " h i l iti ith ll t h l b l h i l f " (R 1987)A d i t R thi i l ibl if l h t h ll th "

l i l l" th ill f h as f d l b S i i l l K t i f

24

THEORIES OF ETHICS

l l " d " b h l t h h ld " l i l t " it as f and equal member of the "kingdom of ends" Here we have the central differencewith contractarianism Moral principles of right are not rules that individuals wouldprescribe and attempt to gain acceptance for from their different individual perspecti b i i t f l f i t t Th th l i d i i d l ld

ib ( d t ) f ti f d l th

B t h i f i l l i thi ti t b d t d ? K t i h i t i t h t i " t t i i f t i l b i d

b j t i l " l if " b t t f th l diff b trational beings and also from all the content of their private ends" (Kant 1998)This suggests the contemporary contractualist John Rawls's idea that principles ofjustice are those it would be rational to choose in an "original position" behind a " i l f i " di f t t h t i d i i d t d i f f t t h i

i t i ( R l 1971 1 3 6 4 2 ) I t i l th h i ti i t f t h i i d i i d l biliti t l t d i i itiand t h i i t t i d i i d l l R l t h t th ti h

i t t i t l h i d i t h i i t t ( h t thturn out to be) and therefore that they value the "primary goods" that are necessary for these: freedom opportunities wealth and the "social bases" of selfrespect

Rawls's idea then is that justice is determined by whichever principles the partiesld h f b h i d th il f i t h t i as f d l

th R l d t h t thi h i i l f i t t d ithith t i t l d b th il b t thi d t d l i t

l f i t t i T thi th ti t i t d t b lfi t t b t b f i l th i d i i d l Si th il f i d i th f i f t i t h t ld l t th t i l i i l t any t i l ' i t t th i f t i l diff b t i thparties to be selfinterested and assuming them to be trustees for another individualThe original position is in effect the perspective of a that is an arbitrary free andequal individual

R l t h t th t i l h i i th i i l iti ld b t i i l f j t i k d i d f i i t fit t h t i th i t f t i b i i i l d l i t i l i h t d f d d d th "diff

i i l " h i h f i lit f t i t d t h t i i i d h lth d i t i b t d b th b i i t i t t i f i t

t h t k t th t t d t f th h l t d t d I f f tthis says that inequalities are justifiable only to the extent that they work as a socialresource (for example by providing incentives) from which everyone benefits n cluding the least advantaged If we take seriously the possibility that we could be

d h f t i t i bbiliti f di i t i liti th t i l thi ld b t t t i t th t ibiliti b

h i th t i i l i l d i th diff i i lR l t th id f d th f j t i " j t i f i " h l l d it M tl h h t d t h t it i t b d t d l i t i lth th l l th ( R l 1993) I hi li k

25

STEPHEN L DARWALL

h h t d t h t it i h t l b i d l th " i h tas fairness" (Rawls 1971: 111) To do this we would have to ask: what principlesof individual conduct (or of the conduct of groups nation states and so on) wouldit be rational to choose to govern everyone's conduct (as well as moral criticism and

ti f tbil i t i it) f th i i l iti Thi ldth i f k ithi h i h t id h i h i i l ht t l t if i h t h d d i i

A d t t l i t h b t i t d b t h i k i b t h t itt k l i l Wh l i thi i thi h t t t t i th b d h d equal It is as if she says "This is a reasonable claim for you to grant to me as youcan see were you to put yourself in my shoes and consider that it would be reasonable for you to make it of m e " Such a claim implicitly invokes the idea of principlesf d t t h t i l l i i l t t l t t bl j t I d l i h t t l i t h T M S l

it h b i h t b bl t j t i f t h i d t t h thb i i l t h t th ld t bl j t i f th l h thi

i ( S l 1998 1 4 7 2 5 7 ) P i i l f l i h t d th b thought of as norms that structure a mutually accountable community of equals

To apply this criterion we must make judgments about what is reasonable Howcan we make these? There seems no alternative to putting ourselves into others'h d i h t h ld d t i l i b j t i i t

d i i l ld bl k if i t h i i t t i Thi i l j d t It i t i l th d i t i t h t ld k th

l i b j t i W i h t t h i k ld b t t h t it ld b blT k th i i t j d t it t t t t t t i t th t h '

ti i t i l l t h t h ld d th l ib j t i bl t k t th i l l i i l

Suppose for example we are trying to determine what principles should governreduction in nations' use of fossil fuels to combat global warming Contractualismwill hold that developed and developing countries alike should govern their conductb i i l t h t f th ld bl j t If d t d d i f t j t d b d l i t i f i t it i th t d

h t h thi ld b bl b j t i t k i t h i h A di f t d d t h t i h t t l l b j t d b d l d t i

Consequentialism

Wh t t i i d t t l i b i f ithi ti f lit t l l d t ti i i t b t l t i l t i l i b i ith l it h l d t b prior t lit

E if th l i h t d thi ld till b d d th b d Wh j d th i d f f i d b t l i th

k t b b d f l t ki l l t i ifj d t h i l i t i f lit N i t h th i th t h k d

26

THEORIES OF ETHICS

h i l d h t i R t h d i t h t itis a bad thing that the suffering happened that such suffering is a bad state of affairsa bad thing to happen The idea is not just that suffering is bad for the sufferer butthat it is a bad thing to occur period As these values and disvalues are independent

f lit th l l d non-moral C t i l i t l t h i t t ith non-moral value theory: ti

th f h i h t t f th ld (thi t h t h ) h i t i i l h i h h d i l d t f h th l ith ith

d i l ki ith d i l t i W h t k th l l i i t h t th t l t i f l h t b t f

outcomes or states ways the world might be Of course such states might ncludeagency and character But even here the evaluation of the state (as something thathappens) can be distinguished from the evaluation of the act or character trait thati t i t t f t h t t t Th i h t i t t l t h i k it ld h b

d if Hitl h d b i t d t h t t h t ld h b d thi t h h d b f th li it ld h d if h

i t i ld h h b ll A illt i l i t i h t d t h t h killi ld b b t th i t i t h t thwould be no incoherence in holding it to be wrong and at the same time thinkingthat the state of the world of Hitler's being assassinated would on balance havebeen a good thing to have occurred

C t i l i t l t h i ll t h t th l i h t d f t d t i d b th l d f relevant consequences Th

h t k i d f i h i h t i l i t t h i d i id F i td t b i l th di b b i b d d i f f t t h i f

l l A t i l i t ith h d i t l th di t h i hl i th l i t i i d ill di f l ith h h l d

t h t i i h h i t i l l t l t b d thiin themselves Second consequentialist theories can also disagree by holding hatconsequences of different sorts are relevant to determining moral right and wrongAct-consequentialism holds that whether a given act is right depends on the value ofth f that act d ith th l f th

f th t th t ld d i th i t A d i t rule-consequentialism th th h d th i h t f t d d th

t f th t b t f th i l t f l i i f b idd iitti th t d ith th f ti th ibl

l f t h t k i d f If ti l i i t f t h t k i d ldhave the best consequences then the act is morally required And consequentialismcan take other forms too

All forms of consequentialism however understand moral evaluation to be ant f instrumental extrinsic l t th t f d t l l l All

b d t h i f th i t i i l l f t d ll thl t t f t d h t b d t i i h i h t i l l t i t

f h t th b t i t t f ti th t l b l t t F t t i l i ll i h t t i th t' b t i lb l i t t f d i l l A d l t i l i d th i h t f t

27

STEPHEN L DARWALL

b th d i t f i l l l i b l l t h t i t h i t i i t i i i lpractices of moral reasoning and criticism the best instruments of that kind forproducing nonmoral value

In principle virtually any theory of outcome value can be harnessed to a conset i l i t l th H i t i l l h t i l i h b d d t f t l b h i l h h h t h h t t h t l b l t

t h i l th li f i b i W i h t ll benefit conse-quentialism th i t h t l b l t t ll th d lf f b i th d t h t l t t l t i t l b b d thi It i

ibl t b l i h t h t thi b f t h b i b affecting something other than the quality of its experience or conscious mentalstates For example perfectionists sometimes assert that a being's approximating anideal for its kind is intrinsically beneficial to it This is what leads to the conclusion

f A i t t l ' f " f t i " t t h t h d f l i h i i ti l l t d i t i t i l h t i i t ( A i t t l 1998) B d l h b f t t i l i t h t d d t h l d t h t l b f t d h d

t i l b h t i t i l t i l f f t t h i t l li t h t i t h l d ith hedonistic desire-based f f t i l i

The most popular form historically has been utilitarianism which is distinguishedby three features First utilitarians are benefit consequentialists who because theyhold either hedonistic or desirebased conceptions of benefit maintain either hedoni t i d i b d t i l i S d t i l i t i h l d t h t th l

l f t i d t i d b i th b f t d t t ll f f t dti A d th id t i l i t i b l i t h t th l i h t f ti th

I d f h t t i t d d h t ld d th t tII l d t i d b h Th l i l hedonistic t i l i t i f

l t i i B t h f l h l d t h t h i i i d t t d t h t l b b f t d l b th i t i i liti f t h i i i that is by the degree of pleasure that they experience compared to their pain orsuffering (Bentham 1970) A different kind of utilitarianism based as much perhaps on a freestanding value of autonomy as on a conception of happiness holdst h t i d i i d l ' lf i d t i d b hi d i d f Si

l h f f thi th th th i t i i liti f t h ii t t thi desire-satisfaction f f t i l i t i i h th d i f f t

i l i t i f h d i t i F l i h t t l d ith i l f t i ild A d i t i f t i f f t i l i t i i

ld i h thi f t i f f i th if i it d t i btion to the quality of any being's experience (say because the individual in questiondid not know anything about the area's survival)

Although consequentialists have usually been utilitarians or benefit consequent i l i t f t th i thi i th l i f t i l i t h t t i t itt th i P h i l h h f t l d t h t h thi k l d d t d i f i d h i l b t d t i t i d th l t l tiit d ti h i t i i l t h t t b d d t th b f t thb i t h ( th t i t ) lif Aft ll f d t t i f t i

t h l t i l th appreciation f th l th l t

28

THEORIES OF ETHICS

STEPHEN L DARWALL

Th id t h t th l b l i t i t h t t l t i i thihallmark of moral theories According to deontologists agency andaction are not simply instruments for producing valuable states Rather actions arebased on reasons and principles and some important moral principles cruciallyi l th t' l t i t i ( th b i ) i th t h f f t It i l t h h t t b ki f t f ti f

l t h t it ill i l ( t h t i ) h i th b t if i d b k i i d i l i fd d

S t i l i t t h i l t h h t ll ith th t f l R l t i l i ill if d l if it d

the greatest overall value (assessed agentneutrally) for there to exist social practices of moral criticism and psychological patterns of moral reasoning that arethemselves guided by agentrelative rules according to which it is a wrongmakingf t f ti t h t it i l ' (th t ' ) h i th b t if i d d M it i i d l d t i l i t t h t thi i

C t i l i t ll t h t th t f f t i t d tht t ll l i W t b i d d b t t i l

i i t h i d l i b t i d l i t i i th lt ld b h f many different reasons Shared rules are necessary to coordinate complex cooperation establish reliable expectations diminish selfserving rationalizing and specialpleading when the longrun effects of particular actions are unclear and so on Inth d h l t i l i t ill t h t th f d t l

f ti h t l t i l d i i l i t h t thi i i tt l l f l i ti t t h l i t t l

Dtl

Deontological theories depart from consequentialism on this fundamental pointThey hold that what is morally right and wrong is not determined at any level of

l i b h t ld t th b t t t t d t t l l Th b k t i l f th ibilit f l l t i f t t t h t b t h t t l d ll l t D t l

di ith t t i l i i h l d i t h t d i d b d t i t th l thi t h t t d t k t i h t D t l

l di ith l t i l i i h l d i t h t th h thii t t h t b l i i it t b i t l f d th b t t D t l i t h l dthat at least some fundamental moral principles or ideas are agentrelative "all theway down"

Contractualism is one example of a deontological theory since it holds that morali i l d d i th f d t l t l t i id f l i i ith tht f t l t A thi h t i l i i i

Th i t t i i hl f l l D t l d t i l id f i th t l l l i d h t i f ti t h i f

l i h t d G l l t t l i d t t i i d tl i l t h i f l i d i thi h Vit t h i i d

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THEORIES OF ETHICS

b S d d t moral t h i t ll b t l t i cases as replacements when put forward as part of a critique of morality (see"Virtue Theory" below) Some are deontological theories And some are consequentialist in at least some important respects Thus Francis Hutcheson (see below)

d d i t th di t h i h i l b l th h i h ti t d d f t t i l i t i i th d t h t thi th t ith th d l i b t i i i l d i thi h i h t i t B t d t l i l

t h i d i i l ft d f d d d i t l i t h t t t t i t d th i th id t h t i h l d t b h b i H i t i l lth i f d t l h b l l d intuitionist i f intuitionism. What characterizes intuitionism in general is the view that there is an irreducibleplurality of different right or wrongmaking features whose moral relevance cannotbe derived from some more fundamental principle or reasoning but can only be

fid b l f l t i " i t i t i " Thi i h t b d d i t l h f l it b i f l t i t h t th f t t h t ti ld

t t b t l b k i t t i t it ll O iti t h i k i b t l i ifi f i t h

f l t th " t l l b l " it i d t t h t i h d allowing it to happen are morally different

Another example defended by some deontologists is the "doctrine of doubleeffect" according to which there is a moral difference between causing harm or evil

i t d d i d f f t f i t d d ti li d i t d i th h il d i t l ith d t d Th l t h h it i

t i b l thi h i t i i l i di d i ti f l h b b i ilit t t ll b f lti it ld t b t t t kill th b f i i l i d i t l if d i ld

d th l b l d f i t i i i O i f thi i h i h thi i i l h l d i t t l i thcontroversial issue of abortion Since abortion aims directly at the death of the fetusit is sometimes argued that it is morally worse than another action would be whichcaused the fetus's death only as an unintended sideeffect While it might be permisibl t f d i l d t h t i t t '

lif t th i k f killi th f t it i d t h t b t i f t t th' lif i ll th l b it i i i i b l t

t i l killiD t l i l i t i t i i t h d f d d id i t f i d d t i i l

d t i f i h t ki f t f d t I dditi t the doctrine of double effect and the distinction between "doing and allowing"there have been claimed to be: duties of beneficence or mutual aid duties of nonmaleficence ("do no harm" along with the idea that these are weightier otherthi b i l th d t i f b f i ) d t i f t i t d f b lh d t i f t i t t i f d i j i d d t i f fidlit l t i

t i d t t d t i f l l t i h i ( i l d i th f f i dt hild f i l b d t k l l ) f i l

d t i d t i i t d t ( h t l d ) d t i f i i t d f il f t h d t i f j t i d t i t th i l (t th t t t h t th h

31

STEPHEN L DARWALL

t b i l d d l d ) d t i t l d i th Of i titionists do not agree about every doctrine or principle not even about all we havementioned But they are none the less agreed that some such list of independentprinciples or doctrines is correct and that the principles on the list cannot be derivedf f d t l i i l th h t t l i

t i l iB t h i t i t i i t d t t l i t d t l i t h l d t h t th i h t i R l '

h " i t th d" ( R l 1971 3 0 3 ) Th b l i t h t t t t t d i th i h t f t t l t l i b d t f i l i thti f h t it i i h t t d i t h t f t f l ithi the world defined by a complex set of relations to others who make widely varyingclaims on us owing to these different relations What states of affairs would be goodto exist considered as from some agentneutral observer's standpoint may f there

h l b th i d t i t h t l t t h t l t h l d d B t d t i d d l ithi th t t b

i h t t l t i f l l th i d l t i t d i d t h tti b i t t d i t th t d t i t t t t t

th h i t i f th ith h i t t d Many of these relations were listed in passing above but we should have them

before us more explicitly We cannot begin to exhaust them but it will be helpful togive some idea of their range

(1) Dti f bf d lf Lik t i l i t d t l i t b l i t h t h ti f f t th d f th ( t h t

l t d h th b i h h lf d) l h l t h t h l d d ll B t th l i i t j t

t h t th l b l d i l b l t t t It l tt h t t d t l t i h t th f f t d ti ( d h t l

ti ti b i t h ) H i th i ( i j d t the other) other things being equal than forbearing to benefit It is not ust thecausing of a disvaluable state; it is doing harm to some being Doing harm is worsealso than failing to prevent it And directly intending harm is worse than causing it

i t d d i d f f t(2) Dti f il V i i l l t i f t k i i i t i l

b l i t i f b f i Th t h b l i t i t t th lf f t h i hild t h t h t th th d t i f b f h t

th i l A d i i l l f t t d th l t i f i l i dh d t t h d h ibl f t h i

tients' or students' medical or educational welfare(3) Duties of honesty and fidelity Obligations not to lie or intentionally mislead to

keep promises not to violate contracts and more generally not to encouraget t i i t d t t t ll fit d th l t f k i

f i th d t i l t i t t V i l l t i h i lik th f f i dl d b l d d thi b i ll

(4) Dti d i i f t' d t i t ' hiti f dt Whd i j th i d t i t th t k l d f l t d ff t i t t i

( t f l t ) Wh th b f i t i d t i f t i t d t d th

32

THEORIES OF ETHICS

{patient-benevolence) A ' t d t ll f i tsponse especially from those who have special responsibilities to respond appropriately to merit and desert such as judges of various kinds (patient desert)

(5) Duties of reciprocity and fair play There is a duty to do one's part in mutuallyd t ti i l l h l t i l t ti

b f i t C t t i / t t l i t thi d t f d t l F t i t ii t it i i l i d d t l i t t d t th

(6) Further duties of justice V i f t h d t i f j t i d i f l i t i ll t i f l f t h t f l i t i h i H h d t i t

t j t l i t i l d t h t t b l i h d t t b i i h t d hidistributive justice Where actual political relations are lacking as in the nternational context justice may require that we do our part to help establish usticemore widely through more extensive political forms

(7) Duties to other species H i d t i d d l l t i I dditi t d t i f b f d l f i i i l bliti t b f t i i i t h i t f i t t i ith th

E if th i l t b f l l t i ti h i d t i t th i t th i h i h h i l d th i

lives and ourselves in theirs Pets are an obvious example but no less significantmay be cases where species are themselves shaped and cultivated for human purposes in ways that give them special needs and vulnerabilities

Thi l i t i i h d l h t i It h l d b b i t thi i th t h t th d i i f i t l ill i i t b l i l t j t

i l i i l i h t ki i d t i b t l biti f i i l i d t i Si i t i t i i t i d t l j t th id

t h t hi i i l id f i i t i t f h i h th i i l i d t i i h t b i t t d i i t i d h d

i t i t i i t b l i t h t th b i f l f l t i i t d thinking about concrete cases?

W D Ross distinguished between the claim that a given duty or right or wrongmaking consideration holds prima facie that is other things being equal and he

iti t h t i t l i t thi th i l d t ll thi i d d h t it sans phrase (R 1963) (Si " if i " t thi i t l i l h i l h d i k l t

th t "pro tanto" [" f it "] Th t l id i t h t i h tki i d t i i t h t k t i h t other things

being equal h t h t t h t th l ll l t f t th th tiwould be right or wrong all things considered or "sans phrase") It was claims ofthe former sort that Ross held to be selfevident to intuition To render a moraljudgment in any actual case however it is necessary to reflect on all of the morally

l t f t d h th i t t T t k f i l i k i d f h i d t d thi f l t i l d i t

l t fid lf l d i iti t i th id i t h t h i h h h di H b t h i d d ti t h i h t b t i

i h t i d id It ld b t t d l i f i i tb t th l f f th i ti i i i t i d l b l i t i t

33

STEPHEN L DARWALL

t th i i B t thi i t th l i h i h l considerations can interact Sometimes one consideration can wholly defeat another When for example a benefit one is in a position to provide is tainted byinjustice this may cancel the positive reason to provide the benefit and not ust

t i h itU l t i t l i t i t i i t i t th i i l b t i t t t f l l

i d i t h i l i ll f t h i l i t A l i " f t i "i t i riht ki f t i f i d t i i i t t

t f th B t h b th i t t i t h t i ti t i i t b l i d f l f l t i d b t t th t t grips with these complex interactions in a way that leads to a reflective sense ofwhat moral verdict they will ultimately support

Vit Th

C t t r i i / t t l i t i l i d d t l ll l t h i M i thi i d i t l d ith t i lquestions we have been considering these theories as accounts of morally right conduct An approach called virtue ethics frequently associated with Aristotle isorthogonal to these theories in both respects First virtue is concerned primarily

ith h t th th d t ith h h l d be th th h th l d d A d d i t thi i f t l d d t l th

b t t f th t h i l l d t f h lif t h t it i ti d t t i l i l t d h l t f lit d itd i t i t i f Th ti f lit t f i l d f i l lt h r i t t i l b h i h ll l t t r i l l obligated i far from the only form that ethical reflection can take (Anscombe 1958; Maclntyre1981; Williams 1985; Slote 1992) The modern idea of morality derives from a distinctive historical tradition the JudeoChristianIslamic idea of divinely ordainedl t h i h it i l S h i l h h d t h t thi

ti f lit i i l d f t i i ri d t h t t h i lf l t i ld fitbl t k th f S l h h d thi

t h l k d t A r i t t l ' Nicomachean Ethics f i i t h i lti F A i t t l th f d t l ti i t f Mill Hbb

K t "Wht i th f d t l i i l f l riht d t d h i h tthi b d f d d h i l h i l l ? " Ar i t t l k th "Wht i th l f human life?" "What kind of life is best for human beings?"

Aristotle's is a distinctive kind (a paradigm perhaps) of non-moral virtue ethics "nonmoral" again because although Aristotle's translators frequently use "morali t " t i l t h t h i tlki b t ll f h t t h t d ith h i A i t t l d t l t th i t t ti f l

l d h i h ll t b l l Vit f A i t t l diiti t h h t i fi bl (kalori) f it k d t id h ti b Th ti ti i h t N i t h l ld " k d i " ideal

ith t t h i h b b t t t l t h t

34

THEORIES OF ETHICS

li ith i l t F A i t t l th ti t h i l ti h esteem pride and disdain or contempt not guilt respect selfrespect and moralindignation

Virtues are excellences {arete) traits that is that make something an excellenti t f it k i d It i i t i k i f f l t h t it h h d

t h t it t ll I l k h i h t i t ll ( l l tk i ) i l t i t t h i ' f t i (ergon) h t i t i t i i t A A i

t t l b l i t h t th h t i t i t i i t d i t i t i f h b i i ti( i ) t h t d i t i t i l h f f h i ( f ti l d i t h l bl fi (kl)) h l d t h t th i t t i t f character that is settled dispositions to choose certain actions and avoid others asintrinsically noble or base We might put his point by saying that human excellences are states of character concerned with choices that are themselves guided by

i d l f h llI l l i t thi i h ( l ) h i d l

A l t h h it b t i d i A i t t l ' t t l l i l f t i i t i f h t di t h i h th i thi t h t h b ii h t l f to b it d t b b d A l i t thi b put forward simply as a normative view about which traits in human beings areworthy of esteem (or disdain) Analogously a moral virtue ethics is a theory of whatis worthy of distinctively moral esteem that is traits that are worthy of esteem in a moral agent E l f h i b f d i L i b i d th i h t t h

t S t t i h h i l h F i H t h Th H t h d t h t thb i l h i t f b l th d i t b f i t th d

k th h M l t h h l d i t i r i l f t b t f ti t i t f h t l th d i t d d t f

h b i d th t i t b iTh i i h i h th f i t thi i h t b ti

of case or practical ethics First nonmoral virtue ethics reminds us that questions ofright and wrong are far from the only or perhaps even the most important ethicalquestions we can ask in specific cases Thus it might be that failing to providei i f i t l id t li ld h d ffri l t h h t i l

ll th l i f t i f l d l f t i f t i O if th i t i t thi t h t b d j t l

t t d l t t i till i f t i i t t t i t d t d th i t l l t i t t h t t dd ith l i i f l l t i f i h if

S d ti f th i t i i d d t h h taction it is appropriate to take in specific cases In considering what to do it may behelpful to ask what a virtuous person or someone with a specific virtue (say generosity) would do in that case This may simply be a useful heuristic but it may also

flt th A i t t l i i t h t th i f f l t i t h i l i h tt t h t b d d ll l i d b h l k th

i d " " f th i t A L i A t i t d t h id b t j "If h t k 'll k "Thid i t t h i i t t f d ti f i t t i l id

t i t ( ll i h t ) ti b t t f h t k ti

35

STEPHEN L DARWALL

i t ll i h t Th it b h l d t h t ti i th i h tor appropriate thing to do in some case or circumstance just in case it is what thevirtuous person would (characteristically) do in that circumstance (Hursthouse1999) Such a view might depart from the letter of Aristotle's position since hei d t i f d i t t t l d d i i t i t h ifi ti f t h i k ( b l ) Thi ld t k h i h t i t i t d d h i h

ti bl t i N t h l i it ld h l d t h t t th i t f ti i ibl t h h th i d d t f

i t h i ld i it l t A i t t l ' i f d t li i t W h t i t i t thi i th id t h t id t

sial questions of case ethics can be gained only by looking to the virtues or thevirtuous person as a model

Writers on case ethics therefore look to virtue ethics less frequently than they dot th t h i l t h i i l l h th d ith i f l i h t d If j d t f l b l i t i i l i i t l d i t i h l d ith t b l f li it ill b bl t d d t h t tifi

ti f th j d t b f l t d i t t h t th b j t t th d t i i i l t It i thi d d t h t h l d t th k i d f

normative moral theories that have been advanced by contractarian/contractualists consequentialists and deontologists In each case the goal has been to articulate actionguiding principles of right conduct that can be grasped and applied

i t h t i l i t th th th j d t f ll t t l t

R f

A b G E M (1958) M d l h i l h Philosophy 33 1 1 9Aristotle (1998) Nicomachean Ethics trans W D Ross New York: Oxford University PressB t h J (1970) Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation d J H B

d H L A H t L d AthlDancy Jonathan (1993) Moral Reasons Oxford: BlackwellD l l S t h (1997) S l f i t t d lf Social Philosophy and Policy 14

15878 Al i Ell F P l ( d ) Self-interest C b i d C b i d U i i t P (1998) Philosophical Ethics B l d CO W t i P (2002) Welfare and Rational Care Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press

G t h i D i d (1986) Morals by Agreement O f d C l d P H Gilbrt (1975) M l l t i i d f d d The Philosophical Review 84 3 2 2Hbb Th (1994) Leviathan d E M C l I d i l i EST H k t tHursthouse Rosalind (1999) On Virtue Ethics Oxford: Oxford University PressK t I l (1998) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals d d t M G

N Y k C b r i d U i i t P McDowell John (1979) Virtue and reason The Monist 62: 33150M l t A l d i (1981) After Virtue N t D IN U i i t f N t D Mill J h S t t (1957) Utilitarianism d Ok P i t I d i l i B b b M r i l lRilt P t (1986) M l li The Philosophical Review 95 163207Rawls John (1971) A Theory of Justice Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University

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THEORIES OF ETHICS

(1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University PressRoss W D (1963) The Right and the Good. Oxford: Clarendon PressRousseau Jean-Jacques (1987) The Social Contract. In The Basic Political Writings, trans

Donald A Cress Indianapolis IN: HackettScanlon T M (1998) What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard

UniversitySlote Michael (1992) From Morality to Virtue. New York: Oxford University PressThomson Judith (1976) Killing letting die and the trolley problem The Monist, 59: 204-17Williams Bernard (1985) Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge MA: Harvard Uni-

versity Press

Further reading

Darwall Stephen (ed) (forthcoming) Contractarianism/Contractualism. Oxford: Blackwell(forthcoming) Deontology. Oxford: Blackwell(ed) (forthcoming) Virtue (Ethics). Oxford: Blackwell

37