Darab Cases

8/10/2019 Darab Cases

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G.R. NO. 142628 February 6, 2007

SPRINGFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC. and HEIRS

OF PETRA CAPISTRANO PIIT, Petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF

MISAMIS ORIENTAL, BRANCH 40, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY,

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD

(DARAB), DAR REGION X DIRECTOR, ROSALIO GAMULO,

FORTUNATO TELEN, EMERITA OLANGO, THERESA

MONTUERTO, DOMINGO H. CLAPERO, JOEL U. LIM, JENEMAIR

U. POLLEY, FIDELA U. POLLEY, JESUS BATUTAY, NICANOR

UCAB, EMERIA U. LIM, EMILITO CLAPERO, ANTONINA RIAS,

AURILLIO ROMULO, ERWIN P. CLAPERO, EVELITO CULANGO,

VILMA/CRUISINE ALONG, EFREN EMATA, GREGORIO

CABARIBAN, and SABINA CANTORANA,Respondents.

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The principal issue presented forresolution is whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has

jurisdiction to annul final judgment of the Department of

Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

The antecedent facts:

Petra Capistrano Piit previously owned Lot No. 2291 located in

Cagayan de Oro City which measured 123,408 square meters

under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-62623. Springfield

Development Corporation, Inc. (Springfield) bought Lot No.

2291-C with an area of 68,732 square meters, and Lot No.


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2291-D with an area of 49,778 square meters.1 Springfield

developed these properties into a subdivision project called

Mega Heights Subdivision.2

On May 4, 1990, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),

through its Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, issued a Notice

of Coverage,3 placing the property under the coverage of

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian

Reform Law of 1988. There being an opposition from the heirs

of Petra Piit, the case was docketed as DARAB Case No. X-305.

On August 27, 1991, DARAB Provincial Adjudicator Abeto A.

Salcedo, Jr. rendered a decision declaring the nature of the

property as residential and not suitable for agriculture.4 The

Regional Director filed a notice of appeal, which the Provincial

Adjudicator disallowed for being pro forma and frivolous.5The

decision became final and executory6 and Springfield

proceeded to develop the property.7

The DAR Regional Director then filed a petition for relief fromjudgment of the DARAB Decision, docketed as DARAB Case No.

0555. In its Decision dated October 5, 1995, the DARAB granted

the petition and gave due course to the Notice of Coverage. It

also directed the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office to proceed

with the documentation, acquisition, and distribution of the

property to the true and lawful beneficiaries.8

The DARAB also issued an Order dated May 22, 1997, ordering

the heirs of Piit and Springfield to pay the farmer-beneficiaries

the amount of Twelve Million, Three Hundred Forty Thousand,

Eight Hundred Pesos (P12,340,800.00), corresponding to the
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value of the property since the property has already been

developed into a subdivision.

On June 13, 1997, Springfield and the heirs of Piit (petitioners)

filed with the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 40, a petition

for annulment of the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995

and all its subsequent proceedings. Petitioners contend that

the DARAB decision was rendered without affording petitioners

any notice and hearing.9

On motion filed by the farmer-beneficiaries, the RTC issued an

Order dated June 25, 1997, dismissing the case for lack ofjurisdiction.

10

On July 2, 1997, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals (CA)

a special civil action for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition

with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction

and/or temporary restraining order, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.

44563.11

Petitioners alleged that the RTC committed graveabuse of discretion when it ruled that the annulment of

judgment filed before it is actually an action for certiorari in a

different color. According to petitioners, what it sought before

the RTC is an annulment of the DARAB Decision and not

certiorari, as the DARAB Decision is void ab initio for having

been rendered without due process of law.12

In the assailed Decision13

dated July 16, 1998, the CA dismissed

the petition for lack of merit, ruling that the RTC does not have

jurisdiction to annul the DARAB Decision because it is a co-

equal body.14
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However, on January 12, 1999, the CA ordered the elevation of

the DARAB records before it, declaring that it "overlooked the

fact that petitioners likewise applied for a writ of prohibition

against the enforcement of the DARAB decision which theyclaim to be patently void."

15 Forwarded to the CA were the

records of the original case filed with the DARAB-Region X, and

it appearing that the petition for relief from judgment and its

pertinent records were forwarded to the DARAB Central Office,

the CA issued another Resolution on December 20, 1999,16

requiring the DARAB Central Office to forward the records of

the case. But after receipt of the records, the CA simply deniedpetitioners' motion for reconsideration per Resolution

17 dated

February 23, 2000 without specifically resolving the issues

raised concerning the prayer for a writ of prohibition.

Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A CLEAR ERROR OF

LAW IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY

TO JUSTIFY ITS CONCLUSION DIVESTING THE REGIONAL

TRIAL COURT OF ITS JURISDICTION VESTED BY LAW OVER

CASES WHERE THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION WAS NOT

EXPRESSLY GRANTED TO ANY OTHER COURTS [SIC] OR

TRIBUNAL, IN EFFECT, MODIFYING THE APPLICABLE LAWON THE MATTER.

II
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THE COURT OF APPEALS IRREGULARLY DISMISSED

PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AFTER IT

HAD RESOLVED TO ENTERTAIN PETITIONERS' PETITION

FOR PROHIBITION AND TO REVIEW THE DARABPROCEEDINGS, THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE USUAL

COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.

III

THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT, BEING THE HIGHEST

TEMPLE OF RIGHTS, AND TO AVOID SERIOUS

MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE AND NEEDLESS DELAYS, IS MOSTRESPECTFULLY URGED TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE

PETITION FILED IN CA-G.R. SP No. 44563 IN THE EXERCISE

OF ITS CONCURRENT JURISDICTION, AS IF THE PETITION

WAS ORIGINALLY LODGED BEFORE IT.18

Petitioners argue that under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129,

there is no provision that vests with the CA jurisdiction overactions for annulment of DARAB judgments. Petitioners,

however, contend that the RTC may take cognizance of the

annulment case since Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 vests the RTC

with general jurisdiction and an action for annulment is covered

under such general jurisdiction. According to petitioners, "this

is but a logical consequence of the fact that no other courts

were expressly given the jurisdiction over such actions."19

Petitioners further argue that the CA was in error when it

summarily ignored their application for a writ of prohibition, as

it was necessary to restrain the DARAB from enforcing its void

decision; and even if the DARAB decision was valid, the writ of
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prohibition could have enjoined the execution of the DARAB

decision since there have been changes which will make the

execution unjust and inequitable.

In their Joint-Comments, the farmer-beneficiaries and the

DARAB (respondents) refute petitioners' allegation that they

were not afforded due process in the DARAB proceedings,

stating that petitioners were impleaded as a party thereto, and

in fact, they attended some of the hearings although their

counsel was absent. Respondents also adopt the CA's ruling

that the RTC is not vested with any jurisdiction to annul the

DARAB decision.

As stated at the outset, the main issue in this case is whether

the RTC has jurisdiction to annul a final judgment of the DARAB.

Note must be made that the petition for annulment of the

DARAB decision was filed with the RTC on June 13, 1997, before

the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which tookeffect on July 1, 1997. Thus, the applicable law is B.P. Blg. 129

or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, enacted on August

10, 1981.

It is also worthy of note that before the effectivity of B.P. Blg.

129, a court of first instance has the authority to annul a final

and executory judgment rendered by another court of first

instance or by another branch of the same court. This was the

Court's ruling in Dulap v. Court of Appeals.20

Yet, in subsequent

cases,21

the Court held that the better policy, as a matter of

comity or courteous interaction between courts of first instance
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and the branches thereof, is for the annulment cases to be tried

by the same court or branch which heard the main action.

The foregoing doctrines were modified in Ngo Bun Tiong v.

Sayo,22where the Court expressed that pursuant to the policy

of judicial stability, the doctrine of non-interference between

concurrent and coordinate courts should be regarded as highly

important in the administration of justice whereby the

judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be

opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent

jurisdiction.

With the introduction of B.P. Blg. 129,23

the rule on annulment

of judgments was specifically provided in Section 9(2), which

vested in the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now the CA)

the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of

judgments of RTCs. Sec. 9(3) of B.P. Blg. 129 also vested the CA

with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,

decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional TrialCourts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or

commissions, except those falling within the appellate

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the

Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph

(1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth

paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948." As

provided in paragraph 16 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines

implementing B.P. Blg. 129, the quasi-judicial bodies whose

decisions are exclusively appealable to the CA are those, which

under the law, R.A. No. 5434,24

or its enabling acts, are

specifically appealable to the CA.
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Significantly, B.P. Blg. 129 does not specifically provide for any

power of the RTC to annul judgments of quasi-judicial bodies.

However, in BF Northwest Homeowners Association, Inc. v.

Intermediate Appellate Court,25

the Court ruled that the RTCshave jurisdiction over actions for annulment of the decisions of

the National Water Resources Council, which is a quasi-judicial

body ranked with inferior courts, pursuant to its original

jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and

mandamus, under Sec. 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, in relation to acts

or omissions of an inferior court. This led to the conclusion that

despite the absence of any provision in B.P. Blg. 129, the RTChad the power to entertain petitions for annulment of

judgments of inferior courts and administrative or quasi-

judicial bodies of equal ranking. This is also in harmony with

the "pre-B.P. Blg. 129" rulings of the Court recognizing the

power of a trial court (court of first instance) to annul final

judgments.26

Hence, while it is true, as petitioners contend, that

the RTC had the authority to annul final judgments, suchauthority pertained only to final judgments rendered by inferior

courts and quasi-judicial bodies of equal ranking with such

inferior courts.

The foregoing statements beg the next question, i.e., whether

the DARAB is a quasi-judicial body with the rank of an inferior

court such that the RTC may take cognizance of an action forthe annulments of its judgments. The answer is no.

The DARAB is a quasi-judicial body created by Executive Order

Nos. 229 and 129-A. R.A. No. 6657 delineated its adjudicatory

powers and functions. The DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure


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adopted on December 26, 198827

specifically provides for the

manner of judicial review of its decisions, orders, rulings, or

awards. Rule XIV, Section 1 states:

SECTION 1. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Any decision,

order, award or ruling by the Board or its Adjudicators on any

agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application,

implementation, enforcement or interpretation of agrarian

reform laws or rules and regulations promulgated thereunder,

may be brought within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy

thereof, to the Court of Appeals by certiorari, except as

provided in the next succeeding section. Notwithstanding an

appeal to the Court of Appeals the decision of the Board or

Adjudicator appealed from, shall be immediately executory.

Further, the prevailing 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as

amended, expressly provides for an appeal from the DARAB

decisions to the CA.28

The rule is that where legislation provides for an appeal from

decisions of certain administrative bodies to the CA, it means

that such bodies are co-equal with the RTC, in terms of rank

and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.29

Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the

inevitable conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-equal body with

the RTC and its decisions are beyond the RTC's control. The CA

was therefore correct in sustaining the RTC's dismissal of the

petition for annulment of the DARAB Decision dated October 5,
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1995, as the RTC does not have any jurisdiction to entertain the

same.

This brings to fore the issue of whether the petition for

annulment of the DARAB judgment could be brought to the CA.

As previously noted, Section 9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 vested in the

CA the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment

of judgments, but only those rendered by the RTCs. It does not

expressly give the CA the power to annul judgments of quasi-

judicial bodies. Thus, in Elcee Farms, Inc. v. Semillano,30

the

Court affirmed the ruling of the CA that it has no jurisdiction to

entertain a petition for annulment of a final and executory

judgment of the NLRC, citing Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as

amended, which only vests in the CA "exclusive jurisdiction

over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial

Courts." This was reiterated in Galang v. Court of Appeals,31

where the Court ruled that that the CA is without jurisdiction to

entertain a petition for annulment of judgment of a final

decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Recent rulings on similar cases involving annulments of

judgments of quasi-judicial bodies are also quite instructive on

this matter.

In Cole v. Court of Appeals,32

involving an annulment of the

judgment of the HLURB Arbiter and the Office of the President(OP), filed with the CA, the Court stated that, "(U)nder Rule 47

of the Rules of Court, the remedy of annulment of judgment is

confined to decisions of the Regional Trial Court on the ground
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of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction x x x." The Court

further ruled, viz.:

Although the grounds set forth in the petition for annulment of

judgment are fraud and lack of jurisdiction, said petition cannot

prosper for the simple reason that the decision sought to be

annulled was not rendered by the Regional Trial Court but by

an administrative agency (HLU Arbiter and Office of the

President), hence, not within the jurisdiction of the Court of

Appeals. There is no such remedy as annulment of judgment

of the HLURB or the Office of the President. Assuming

arguendo that the annulment petition can be treated as a

petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, the same should have been dismissed by the Court

of Appeals, because no error of judgment was imputed to the

HLURB and the Office of the President. Fraud and lack of

jurisdiction are beyond the province of petitions under Rule 43

of the Rules of Court, as it covers only errors of judgment. A

petition for annulment of judgment is an initiatory remedy,

hence no error of judgment can be the subject thereof. Besides,

the Arbiter and the Office of the President indisputably have

jurisdiction over the cases brought before them in line with our

ruling in Francisco Sycip, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, promulgated

on March 17, 2000, where the aggrieved townhouse buyers

may seek protection from the HLURB under Presidential DecreeNo. 957, otherwise known as "Subdivision and Condominium

Buyers' Protective Decree."33

(Emphasis supplied)

In Macalalag v. Ombudsman,34

the Court ruled that Rule 47 of

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on annulment of judgments
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or final orders and resolutions covers "annulment by the Court

of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil

actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies

of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriateremedies could no longer be availed of through no fault of the

petitioner." Thus, the Court concluded that judgments or final

orders and resolutions of the Ombudsman in administrative

cases cannot be annulled by the CA, more so, since The

Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the remedy of an

aggrieved party from orders, directives and decisions of the

Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only, and theright to appeal is not to be considered granted to parties

aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in

criminal or non-administrative cases.

While these cases involve annulments of judgments under the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, still, they still find

application in the present case, as the provisions of B.P. Blg.

129 and the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, on

annulment of judgments are identical.

Consequently, the silence of B.P. Blg. 129 on the jurisdiction of

the CA to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions of

quasi-judicial bodies like the DARAB indicates its lack of such

authority.

Further, petitioners are also asking the Court to take

cognizance of their prayer for the issuance of a writ of

prohibition, which they claim was not acted upon by the CA,

citing the Court's action in Fortich v. Corona35

where the Court
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took cognizance of the petition previously filed with the CA due

to compelling reasons. The Court is not persuaded to do so.

Fortich involved a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente,

Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr.

Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC),

which was leased as a pineapple plantation to Del Monte

Philippines, Inc. for a period of 10 years. During the existence of

the lease, the DAR placed the entire 144-hectare property

under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at

P2.38 million. When the NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-

Industrial Development Association) filed an application for

conversion due to the passage of Resolution No. 6 by the

Provincial Development Council of Bukidnon and Ordinance No.

24 by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon,

reclassifying the area from agricultural to

industrial/institutional, the same was disapproved by the DAR

Secretary and instead, the property was placed under the

compulsory coverage of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform

Program for distribution to all qualified beneficiaries. This

prompted Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon to file an

appeal with the OP, while NQSRMDC filed with the CA a

petition for certiorari, and prohibition with preliminary

injunction.

The OP then issued a Decision dated March 29, 1996 reversing

the DAR Secretary's decision and approving the application for

conversion. Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denied the

DAR's motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond

the reglementary period of 15 days, and it was also declared


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that the OP Decision dated March 29, 1996 had already

become final and executory.

Because of this, the farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike

on October 9, 1997, protesting the OP's decision. In order to

resolve the strike, the OP issued a so-called "Win/Win"

resolution on November 7, 1997, modifying the decision in that

NQSRMDC's application for conversion is approved only with

respect to the approximately 44-hectare portion of the land

adjacent to the highway, as recommended by the Department

of Agriculture, while the remaining approximately 100 hectares

traversed by an irrigation canal and found to be suitable for

agriculture shall be distributed to qualified farmer-

beneficiaries.1awphi1.net

A petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the

Revised Rules of Court36

was then filed with the Court, which

was contested by the Office of the Solicitor General on the

ground that the proper remedy should have been to file apetition for review directly with the CA in accordance with Rule

43 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In resolving the issue, the Court recognized the rule that the

Supreme Court, CA and RTC have original concurrent

jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, prohibition, and

mandamus. However, due to compelling reasons and in theinterest of speedy justice, the Court resolved to take primary

jurisdiction over the petition in the interest of speedy justice,

after which the Court nullified the act of the OP in re-opening

the case and substantially modifying its March 29, 1996


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Decision which had already become final and executory, as it

was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that

accord finality to administrative determinations.

It must be stressed at this point that the Court, as a rule, will

not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired

cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional

and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national

interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the

extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or

mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.37

The Court finds no compelling circumstances in this case to

warrant a relaxation of the foregoing rule. The Fortich case is

not analogous with the present case such that the Court is not

bound to abandon all rules, take primary jurisdiction, and

resolve the merits of petitioners' application for a writ of

prohibition.

In the present case, the assailed DARAB Decision dated October5, 1995 granting the petition for relief from judgment and

giving due course to the Notice of Coverage was made pursuant

to a petition for relief from judgment filed by the DAR, albeit

petitioners are contesting the validity of the proceedings held

thereon. On the other hand, in Fortich, the OP's "Win/Win"

resolution dated November 7, 1997 was made motu proprio, as

a result of the hunger strike staged by the farmer-beneficiaries.

Further, the OP's "Win/Win" Resolution dated November 7,

1997 in the Fortich case is a patently void judgment since it was

evident that there was already an existing final and executory


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OP Decision dated March 29, 1996. In this case, the assailed

DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995 appears to be regular

on its face, and for its alleged nullity to be resolved, the Court

must delve into the records of the case in order to determinethe validity of petitioners' argument of lack of due process,

absent notice and hearing.

Moreover, the principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally

to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts,

the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues.38

The

question of whether the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995

is null and void and enforceable against petitioners for having

been rendered without affording petitioners due process is a

factual question which requires a review of the records of this

case for it to be judiciously resolved.

The Court notes that the CA, indeed, failed to resolve

petitioners' prayer for the issuance of the writ of prohibition,

which, significantly, focuses on the alleged nullity of the DARABDecision dated October 5, 1995. On this score, the CA found

that the application for the issuance of the writ of prohibition

was actually a collateral attack on the validity of the DARAB

decision. But, a final and executory judgment may be set aside

in three ways;39

and a collateral attack, whereby in an action to

obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is

nevertheless made as an incident thereof,40is one of these. This

tenet is based upon a court's inherent authority to expunge

void acts from its records.41

Despite recognizing the need to

resolve petitioners' application for the writ of prohibition in its

Resolution dated January 12, 1999, the CA nonetheless
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summarily denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration in its

Resolution dated February 23, 2000,42

leaving the matter

hanging and unresolved.

At first, the Court considered resolving the merits of

petitioners' motion for reconsideration concerning their

application for a writ of prohibition against enforcing the

DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995. Thus, in a Resolution

dated June 5, 2006, the Court directed the CA to transmit the

records of DARAB Case No. 0555, which was previously

required by the CA to be forwarded to it per Resolution dated

December 20, 1999.43

However, as of even date, the CA has not

complied with the Court's Resolution. Withal, upon re-

examination of the issues involved in this case, the Court deems

it more judicious to remand this case to the CA for immediate

resolution of petitioners' motion for reconsideration, re: their

application for the writ of prohibition.

Moreover, the radical conflict in the findings of the ProvincialAdjudicator and the DARAB as regards the nature of the subject

property necessitates a review of the present case. In this

regard, the CA is in a better position to fully adjudicate the case

for it can delve into the records to determine the probative

value of the evidence supporting the findings of the Provincial

Adjudicator and of the DARAB. In addition, the CA is

empowered by its internal rules to require parties to submit

additional documents, as it may find necessary to promote the

ends of substantial justice, and further order the transmittal of

the proper records for it to fully adjudicate the case. After all, it

is an avowed policy of the courts that cases should be


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determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties

for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on

technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the

ends of justice would be served better

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. This case is

REMANDED to the Court of Appeals which is DIRECTED to

resolve petitioners' prayer for the issuance of the writ of

prohibition in their Motion for Reconsideration.

Upon finality of this Decision, let the records be remanded

forthwith to the Court of Appeals.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.


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G.R. No. 101974* July 12, 2001

VICTORIA P. CABRAL, petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ELIGIO P. PACIS,

REGIONAL DIRECTOR, REGION III, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN

REFORM, FLORENCIO ADOLFO, GREGORIO LAZARO,

GREGORIA ADOLFO and ELIAS POLICARPIO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:


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On January 16, 1990, petitioner Victoria Cabral filed a petition

before the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) for the

cancellation of the Emancipation Patents and Torrens Titles

issued in favor of private respondents. The patents and titlescovered portions of the property owned and registered in the

name of petitioner.

Petitioner alleged therein that she was the registered owner of

several parcels of land covered by Original Certificate of Title

(OCT) No. 0-1670 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan,1among

which is a parcel of land described therein as Lot 4 of Plan Psu-

164390. The petition further averred that as early as July 1973,

petitioner applied with the Department of Agrarian Reform

(DAR) for the reclassification or conversion of the land for

residential, commercial or industrial purposes. The application

for conversion, however, was not acted upon. Instead, on April

25, 1988, Emancipation Patents, and, thereafter, Transfer

Certificates of Title, were issued in favor of private

respondents.

Petitioner sought the cancellation of the TCTs on the grounds

that: petitioner had a pending application for conversion and

reclassification; the lots covered by the emancipation patents

included areas not actually tilled by private respondents;

private respondents had illegally transferred their rights over

the parcels of land covered by the emancipation patents;

private respondents are deemed to have abandoned their

rights over the properties; and the subject property was taken

without just compensation.


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On January 19, 1990, petitioner filed with the DAR itself

another petition for the cancellation of the same Emancipation

Patents and Torrens Titles.

On January 29, 1990, petitioner received a letter from the

Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Sta. Maria,

Bulacan, stating, among other things, that in order "that your

petition be given due process by this Office, your petition will

be forwarded to the legal section of this office for legal action."

On February 11, 1990, Regional Director Eligio Pacis issued an

order dismissing the petition2 for cancellation of EmancipationPatents, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office hereby

orders the DISMISSAL of the petition of Victoria P. Cabral

for lack of legal and factual basis' likewise, this office

request[s] that the annotation of the notice of lis pendens

on the original copies of Emancipation Patents issued topetitioners covering the subject landholdings be

CANCELLED by the Office of the Register of Deeds

concerned.

SO ORDERED.3

The Regional Director likewise denied petitioner's motion for

reconsideration dated July 11, 1990. Consequently, petitionerfiled a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals questioning

the jurisdiction of the Regional Director and claiming denial of

due process. On January 8, 1991, the appellate court dismissed

the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner's motion for


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reconsideration was likewise denied, prompting petitioner to

turn to this Court for relief, alleging that:

(a) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING

THAT THE DAR REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF REGION III ACTED

WITH JURISDICTION WHEN IT TOOK COGNIZANCE OF AND

RESOLVED THE CONVERSION APPLICATION AND/OR

CANCELLATION OF CLT/EP PETITION OF PETITIONER-

APPELLANT;

(b) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT

HOLDING THAT OUTSIDE OF THE BARANGAY AGRARIANREFORM COMMITTEE (BARC), IT IS THE DEPARTMENT OF

AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB) THAT

HAS JURISDICTION OVER AGRARIAN REFORM CASES,

DISPUTES OR CONTROVERSIES;

(c) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED DUEPROCESS AS ALLEGEDLY SHE LOST HER OPPORTUNITY TO

BE HEARD AFTER THE JUNE 27, 1990 HEARING.4-

On April 21, 1993, petitioner filed with this Court an urgent

motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.

Petitioner alleged that private respondent Gregoria Adolfo had

conveyed the land awarded to her to the Aqualand

Development Corporation and the Sta. Rita Steel Resources

Corporation. These corporations, in turn,

x x x converted the parcel of land from agricultural to

commercial and industrial and have constructed high


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adobe stone walls[,] commenced the construction of a

steel finishing plant and other structures for the

manufacture of steel products[,] and are putting in place

more installations to complete all facilities necessary fortheir business. As a matter of fact, they have just applied

for a building permit for the construction of a two (2)

storey office condominium/business office building. xxx5

In a Resolution dated May 17, 1993, the Court issued the

temporary restraining order prayed for. The Court enjoined Sta.

Rita Steel Resources and Aqualand Development Corporation,

its officers, agents, representatives and/or persons acting in

their place or stead from continuing the construction of

building and the like on the landholding of petitioner, pending

final resolution of the petition.6

Petitioner contended before the Court of Appeals that

jurisdiction over the case pertained to the Department of

Agrarian Reform Agrarian Board (DARAB), not the RegionalDirector. Addressing this argument, the Court of Appeals held

in its Decision:

Relevant to the issue raised is Ministry Administrative

Order No. 2-85, Series of 1985, effective July 24, 1985

(Annex 2, Comment) which empowers all DAR Regional

Directors to hear and decide cases which include theissuance of Decisions/Resolutions, the recall and

cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfers (CLTs) if such

is the necessary consequence of the facts and

circumstances of the case.


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A later directive, DAR Memo Cir. No. 5, Series of 1987

(Annex 3, Comment), clothed the Regional Directors as

titular regional heads, with powers to hear and resolve

cases involving lands in their respective jurisdiction inorder to achieve the expanded and comprehensive

agrarian reform program of the present administration,

and to tackle the issue of huge number and increasing

backlog or unresolved cases in the DAR Central Office.

Additionally, a memorandum dated September 14, 1987

(Annex 4, Comment) addressed to the Director, Bureau of

Land Acquisition Development, by the then Director,

Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance, contains a decisive

opinion regarding the question on order of cancellation

issued by the Regional Director, DAR Region III, to wit:

"The Regional Director is now authorized to

hear/investigate and hereby resolve cases arising

from the implementation of CLT pursuant to PD 27and amendatory and related decrees and letter of

instructions, rules and regulations as well as conflict

of claim in landed estates and resettlement areas and

such other lands as have been placed under the

administration and disposition of this Department."7

In its Resolution dated September 17, 1991, the Court ofAppeals also made reference to Section 13 of Executive Order

No. 129-A, which authorized the delegation of the adjudication

of agrarian reform cases to regional offices. It further cited

certain provisions of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure


25/62

providing for, among others, delegated jurisdiction, and

concluded that:

x x x the Regional Director cannot be faulted with

assuming jurisdiction over the case, considering that the

powers and functions of the DARAB may be delegated to

the regional office x x x.

While it is true that the jurisdiction is vested with the

DARAB, the Regional Director took cognizance of the

instant case invoking the delegated powers and functions

upon him.8

Evidently, the DARAB, in the Court of Appeals' view, had

concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Director over the

case. Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the

jurisdiction of the DARAB is exclusive of the DAR Regional

Director.

Petitioner is correct. Whatever jurisdiction the Regional

Director may have had over the cancellation of emancipation

patents, it lost with the passage of subsequent laws.

Section 17 of Executive Order No. 229 (Providing for the

Mechanism for the Implementation of the Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Program)9 granted DAR quasi-judicial powers

to adjudicate agrarian reform matters, thus:

Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is

hereby vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine and

adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall have


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exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving

implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling

under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of

Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment andNatural Resources (DENR).

x x x

Executive Order No. 129-A (Modifying Executive Order No. 129

Reorganizing and Strengthening Department of Agrarian

Reform and for other purposes) subsequently provided for the

creation of the Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board, granting itthe powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of

agrarian reform cases:

SECTION 13. Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. There is

hereby created an Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board

under the Office of the Secretary. The Board shall be

composed of the Secretary as Chairman, two (2)Undersecretaries as may be designated by the Secretary,

the Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, and three (3)

others to be appointed by the President upon

recommendation of the Secretary as members. A

Secretariat shall be constituted to support the Board. The

Board shall assume the powers and functions with respect

to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases underExecutive Order No. 229 and this Executive Order. These

powers and functions may be delegated to the regional

office of the Department in accordance with the rules and

regulations promulgated by the Board.


27/62

Congress substantially reiterated Section 17 of E.O. No. 229 in

Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive

Agrarian Law of 1988 (CARL).11

Section 50 thereof states:

Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is

hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and

adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have

exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the

implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling


Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources (DENR).

x x x

CARL took effect on June 15, 1988, after it was published in two

newspapers of general circulation.

In order "to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive

determination of every action or proceeding before it," the DAR

is mandated "to adopt a uniform rule of procedure" (Second

par., Section 50, R.A. No. 6657), which is, at present, the DARAB

Revised Rules.12

The Rules were promulgated on December 26,

1988.

The provisions of Rule II (Jurisdiction of the Adjudication Board)

of the Revised Rules read:

SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction.

The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have

primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to


28/62

determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases,

controversies, and matters or incidents involving the

implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform

Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive OrderNos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as

amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree

No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing

rules and regulations.

Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be

limited to the following:

a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of

persons engaged in the cultivation and use of

agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other agrarian

laws;

b) Cases involving the valuation of land, anddetermination and payment of just compensation,

fixing and collection of lease rentals, disturbance

compensation, amortization payments, and similar

disputes concerning the function of the Land Bank;

c) Cases involving the annulment or cancellation of

orders or decisions of DAR officials other than the

Secretary, lease contracts or deeds of sale or their

amendments under the administration and

disposition of the DAR and LBP;


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d) Cases arising from, or connected with membership

or representation in compact farms, farmers'

cooperatives and other registered farmers'

associations or organizations, related to land coveredby the CARP and other agrarian laws;

e) Cases involving the sale, alienation, mortgage,

foreclosure, pre-emption and redemption of

agricultural lands under the coverage of the CARP or

other agrarian laws;

f) Cases involving the issuance of Certificate of LandTransfer (CLT), Certificate of Land Ownership Award

(CLOA) and Emancipation Patent (EP) and the

administrative correction thereof;

g) And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or

concerns referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR.

Provided, however, that matters involving strictly the

administrative implementation of the CARP and other

agrarian laws and regulations, shall be the exclusive

prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR.

SECTION 2. Delegated Jurisdiction.The Regional Agrarian

Reform Adjudicators (RARAD) and the Provincial Agrarian

Reform Adjudicators (PARAD) are empowered andauthorized to receive, hear, determine and adjudicate all

agrarian cases and disputes, and incidents in connection

therewith, arising within their respective territorial

jurisdiction.


30/62

SECTION 3. Functional Relationships. The Board shall

exercise functional supervision over the RARADs; and the

PARADs. For administrative purposes, however, the

RARADs and the PARADs are deemed to form part of theDAR Regional Office where they are stationed, and as

such, shall be given administrative support by their

respective Regional and Provincial offices, in terms of

office space, personal services, equipment and supply, and

other facilities.

SECTION 4. Role of the RARAD.The RARAD shall be the

Executive Adjudicator in his region directly responsible to

the Board. As such, he shall coordinate and monitor the

work of the PARADs in his region and see to it that their

dockets do not remain clogged. He shall receive, hear, and

adjudicate the following cases:

a) Cases that cannot be handled by the PARAD on

account of inhibition or disqualification;

b) Cases brought directly before him which for some

cogent reason, cannot be properly handled by the

PARAD concerned;

c) Cases of such complexity and sensitivity that the

decision thereof would constitute an important

precedent affecting regional or national interest; and

d) Such other cases which the Board may assign to

him.


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SECTION 5. Appellate Jurisdiction. The Board shall have

exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review, reverse, modify,

alter or affirm resolutions, orders, decisions, and other

dispositions of its RARAD and PARAD.

SECTION 6.Enforcement Powers. The members of the

Board and its RARADs and PARADs are empowered to

summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony,

require submission of reports, compel production of books

and documents and answers to interrogatories, and to

issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum, writs of

possession, writs of execution and other writs to enforce

its orders and decisions thru sheriffs or duly deputized

officers.

For such purpose, whenever necessary, it may call upon

the police and military authorities for assistance in the

enforcement and execution of its decisions, orders, writs

and other processes.

In Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board vs. Court

of Appeals,13

this Court observed that:

x x x the DAR's exclusive original jurisdiction [as set forth in

Section 50 of the CARL] is exercised through hierarchically

arranged agencies, namely, the DARAB, RARAD and

PARAD. The latter two exercise "delegated authority,"

while the first exercises appellate jurisdiction over

resolutions, orders, decisions and other dispositions of the

RARAD and the PARAD.


32/62

On the other hand, Executive Order 129-A, in Section 24

thereof, defines the functions of the Regional Offices as

follows:

SECTION 24. Regional Offices. The Department shall have

twelve (12) Regional Offices. Each Regional Office shall be

headed by a Regional Director who shall be assisted by an

Assistant Regional Director for Operations and an Assistant

Regional Director for Administration.

The Regional Offices shall be responsible for the

implementation of laws, policies, plans, programs,projects, rules and regulations of the Department in its

administrative region. For such purposes, it shall have the

following functions.

a) Prepare and submit plans and programs for the

regions on:

1) Land acquisition and distribution;

2) Information and education;

3) Land use management and land development;

4) Agrarian reform beneficiaries development;

b) Provide technical assistance to Provincial Officesand Municipal Agrarian Reform Offices in the

implementation of approved plans and programs;


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c) Conduct operations research and evaluation of

agrarian reform implementation within the region;

d) Coordinate with other government and private

agencies and farmers and farm workers' organizations

at the regional level, to carry out programs/projects

for the general welfare of agrarian reform

beneficiaries;

e) Maintain an information system in coordination

with the established monitoring system;

f) Review and evaluate reports and other documents

submitted by the Provincial Offices and Municipal

Agrarian Reform Offices and agrarian reform

clientele;

g) Submit periodic feedback as may be necessary in

the service of the Department's clientele.

In addition, the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, in

Chapter 5 (Field Offices), Book IV (The Executive Branch)

thereof, provides:

SEC. 26. Functions of a Regional Office. (1) A regional

office shall:

(a) Implement laws, policies, plans, programs, rules

and regulations of the department or agency in the

regional area;


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(b) Provide economical, efficient and effective service

to the people in the area;

(c) Coordinate with regional offices of other

departments, bureaus and agencies in the area;

(d) Coordinate with local government units in the

area; and

(e) Perform such other functions as may be provided

by law.

(2) x x x

SEC. 27. Duties of a Regional Director. The Regional

Director shall:

(1) Implement laws, policies, rules and regulations

within the responsibility of the agency;

(2) Implement agency programs in the region;

(3) Exercise the management functions of planning,

organizing, directing and controlling;

(4) Appoint personnel to positions in the first level

and casual and seasonal employees; and exercise

disciplinary actions over them in accordance with theCivil Service Law;

(5) Approve sick, vacation and maternity leaves of

absence with or without pay, for a period not beyond

one year;


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(6) Prepare and submit budget proposals for the

region to the central office, administer the budget of

the regional office, authorize disbursement of funds

pursuant to approved financial and work programs,and administer the budget control machinery in the

region;

(7) Approve requisition for supplies, materials and

equipment, as well as books and periodicals, and

other items for the region, in accordance with the

approved supply procurement program;

(8) Negotiate and enter into contracts for services or

furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to the

regional office involving an amount not exceeding

fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) within a given

quarter, provided that authority in excess of fifty

thousand pesos (P50,000.00) may be further

authorized by the proper department or agency head;

(9) Approve claims for benefits under existing laws;

(10) Approve requests for overtime services;

(11) Promote coordination among regional offices,

and between his regional office and local government

units in the region;

(12) Provide housekeeping services for the regional

office;


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(13) Approve application of personnel for permission

to teach, exercise a profession, or engage in business

outside of office hours, in accordance with standards

and guidelines of the Civil Service Commission;

(14) Issue travel vouchers authorizing employees to

travel on official days within the region for a period

not exceeding thirty days;

(15) Approve attendance of personnel in conferences,

seminars, and non-degree training programs within

the region;

(16) Authorize the allocation of funds to

provincial/district offices; and

(17) Perform such other duties and functions as may

be provided by law or further delegated by the head

of agency or other proper authorities concerned.

Title XI of Book IV of the same Code, dealing specifically with

the Department of Agrarian Reform, provides:

SEC. 18. Regional Office. The Regional Office shall be

responsible for supporting the field units and supervising

program implementation of the Department within the

region. It shall:

(1) Implement laws, policies, plans, rules and

regulations of the Department in the regional area;


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(10) Conduct operations research and evaluation of

agrarian reform program implementation within the

region;

(11) Coordinate with other government and private

agencies and farmer organizations at the Regional

level through the Agrarian Reform Coordinating

Council, to carry out programs/projects for the

general welfare of the agrarian reform beneficiaries;

(12) Coordinate para-legal services;

(13) Maintain a data-based information system in

coordination with the established monitoring system;

(14) Review documents submitted by the Provincial

and Team Offices or by the clientele;

(15) Submit periodic feedback and recommend policy

changes and/or modification of procedures onprogram implementation; and

(16) Perform such other functions as may be

necessary in the service of the clientele.

The foregoing provisions were already in effect when petitioner

filed her petition in the BARC in 1990. And it is amply clear from

these provisions that the function of the Regional Office

concerns the implementation of agrarian reform laws while

that of the DARAB/RARAD/PARAD is the adjudication of

agrarian reform cases.


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The first is essentially executive. It pertains to the enforcement

and administration of the laws, carrying them into practical

operation and enforcing their due observance.14

Thus, the

Regional Director is primarily tasked with "[i]mplement[ing]laws, policies, rules and regulations within the responsibility of

the agency," as well as the "agency program in the region."15

The second is judicial in nature, involving as it does the

determination of rights and obligations of the parties. To aid

the DARAB in the exercise of this function, the Rules grant the

Board and Adjudicators the powers to issue subpoenas16

and

injunctions,17

to cite and punish for contempt,18

and to order

the execution of its orders and decision,19

among other powers.

The Rules also contain very specific provisions to ensure the

orderly procedure before the DARAB, RARADs and PARADs.

These provisions govern the commencement of actions, venue

and cause of action,20

the service of pleadings,21

the

presentation of evidence,22

motions,23

appeals24

and judicial

review.25

Notable are provisions intended to prevent

multiplicity of suits such as the rules on one suit for one cause

of action,26

the joinder of causes of action,27

and the

assignment of all incidents of a case to the Adjudicator to

whom the case is assigned.28

No such powers were granted or

provisions adopted when the purported delegation was made

to the Regional Director or since. The DARAB Rules grantbroader powers to the Board and the Adjudicators and contain

more detailed rules on procedure than those provided by the

orders, circulars, memoranda and opinions cited by the Court

of Appeals delegating jurisdiction to the Regional Director.


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The Court of Appeals has underscored the fact that Section 13

of E.O. No. 129-A authorizes the DARAB to delegate its powers

and functions to the regional office in accordance with the rules

and regulations promulgated by the Board. The authoritypurportedly provides additional justification for the Regional

Office's jurisdiction over the case. Precisely, however, the

DARAB, through its Revised Rules, has delegated such powers

and functions to the RARADs and the PARADs, which, under

Section 3 of the Rules, "are deemed to form part of the DAR

Regional Office where they are stationed."

It is evident from the foregoing that the DAR, like most

administrative agencies, is granted with a fusion of

governmental powers, in this case, a commingling of the quasi-

judicial and the executive. The growing complexity of modern

life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental

regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws

have impelled this constantly growing tendency toward such

delegation.29

In delegating these powers, it would hardly seem practical to

allow a duplication of functions between agencies. Duplication

results in confusion between the various agencies upon whom

these powers are reposed, and in the public that the agencies

are supposed to serve. It divides the agencies' resources and

prevents them from devoting their energy to similarly

important tasks. The intention to avoid this very situation is

evident in the various laws' distinct delineation of the functions

of the DARAB/RARAD/PARAD and the DAR Regional Office.

Accordingly, the Court must reject the theory of concurrent


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Facts:

Petitioner alleged that she was the registered owner of several parcels of

land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-1670 of theRegistry of Deeds of Bulacan among which is a parcel of land

described therein as Lot 4 of Plan Psu-164390. As early as July

1973, petitioner had already purportedly applied for the

reclassification or conversion of the land for residential,

commercial or industrial purposes with the Department of Agrarian

Reform (DAR). The application for conversion, however, was not acted

upon. Instead, on April 25, 1988, Emancipation Patents and thereafter,Transfer Certificates of Title were issued in favor of private respondents.

Petitioner sought the cancellation of the TCTs with the BARC on January

16, 1990 and on January 19, 1990, filed another petition for the

cancellation of the said Emancipation Patents and Torrens Title.

The said petition was dismissed in an Order dated February 11, 1990 bythen Regional Director Eligio Pacis. Petitioner moved for reconsideration

but the same was denied. Consequently, petitioner filed a petition

for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the

jurisdiction of the Regional Director and claiming denial of due

process. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner moved

for reconsideration but the same was denied prompting the petitioner

toturn to the Supreme Court for relief. Also, on April 21, 1993,petitioner filed with the Court anurgent Motion for the issuance of

a temporary restraining order alleging that respondent GregoriaAdolfo

had already conveyed the land awarded to her to the Aqualand

Development Corporationand the Sta. Rita Steel Resources Corporation


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for the conversion of the land from agricultural tocommercial and

industrial purposes. In a Resolution dated May 17, 1993, the Court

issued thetemporary restraining order prayed for.

Issue:

Who has jurisdiction over the instant controversy, the Department of

Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) as contended by

the Petitioner or the Regional Director?

Held:

Petitioner is correct. Whatever jurisdiction the Regional Director may

have had over the cancellation of emancipation patents is lost with the

passage of subsequent laws.

Section 17 of Executive Order No. 229 (Providing for the Mechanism for

the Implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program)

granted DAR quasi-judicial powers to adjudicate agrarian reformmatters, to wit:"SECTION 17.

Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.

The DAR is hereby vested with quasi- judicial powers to determine

and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall have

exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involvingimplementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the

exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)."


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Executive Order No. 129-A (Modifying Executive Order No. 129

Reorganizing andStrengthening the Department of Agrarian Reform and

for other purposes) subsequently providedfor the creation of the

Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board, granting it the powers andfunctionswith respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform

cases:"SECTION 13.

Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.

There is hereby created an AgrarianReform Adjudication Board

under the Office of the Secretary. The Board shall be composed of

theSecretary as Chairman, two (2) Undersecretaries as may bedesignated by the Secretary, theAssistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, and

three (3) others to be appointed by the President uponrecommendation

of the Secretary as members. A Secretariat shall be constituted to

support theBoard. The Board shall assume the powers and functions

with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases under

Executive Order No. 229 and this Executive Order. These powers

andfunctions may be delegated to the regional office of the Departmentin accordance with the rulesand regulations promulgated by the

Board."

Congress substantially reiterated Section 17 of E.O. No. 229 in Republic

Act No. 6657, otherwiseknown as the Comprehensive Agrarian Law of

1988 (CARL). Section 50 thereof states:"SECTION 50.Quasi-Judicial

Powers of the DAR.

The DAR is hereby vested with primaryjurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform

matters and shall have exclusiveoriginal jurisdiction over all matters

involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except thosefalling



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Agriculture (DA) and the Departmentof Environment and Natural

Resources (DENR).

CARL took effect on June 15, 1988, after it was published in twonewspapers of generalcirculation.In order "to achieve a just,

expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action

or proceeding before it," the DAR is mandated "to adopt a

uniform rule of procedure" (Second par.,Section 50, RA. No. 6657),

which is, at present, the DARAB Revised Rules. The Rules

were promulgated on December 26, 1988.

The Court of Appeals has underscored the fact that Section 13

of E.O. No. 129-A authorizes theDARAB to delegate its powers and

functions to the regional office in accordance with the rulesand

regulations promulgated by the Board. The authority purportedly

provides additional justification for the Regional Office's

jurisdiction over the case. Precisely, however, the

DARAB,through its Revised Rules, has delegated such powers andfunctions to the RARADs and thePARADs, which, under Section 3 of the

Rules, "are deemed to form part of the DAR RegionalOffice where they

are stationed."

It is evident from the foregoing that the DAR, like most administrative

agencies, is granted with afusion of governmental powers, in this case, a

commingling of the quasi-judicial and theexecutive. The growingcomplexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects

of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering

the laws have impelled thisconstantly growing tendency toward such

delegation.


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In delegating these powers, it would hardly seem practical to allow a

duplication of functions between agencies. Duplication results in

confusion between the various agencies upon whomthesepowers are reposed, and in the public that the agencies are supposed to

serve. It divides theagencies' resources and prevents them from

devoting their energy to similarly important tasks.

The intention to avoid this very situation is evident in the various laws'

distinct delineation of thefunctions of the DARAB/RARAD/PARAD and

the DAR Regional Office. Accordingly, theCourt must reject the theory ofconcurrent jurisdiction between the former and the latter. We holdthat

the DAR Regional Office has no jurisdiction over the subject case

G.R. No. 142501 December 7, 2001

LEONARDA L. MONSANTO, petitioner,

vs.

JESUS AND TERESITA ZERNA AND COURT OF APPEALS,

respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:


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The filing of a criminal action carries with it the civil liability

arising from the offense. However, the trial court cannot

adjudge civil matters that are beyond its competence and

powers. Thus, while a court may have authority to pass uponthe criminal liability of the accused, it cannot make any civil

awards that relate to the agrarian relationship of the parties

because this matter is beyond its jurisdiction.

Statement of the Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, assailing the January 12, 2000 Decision1and the March16, 2000 Resolution

2of the Court of Appeals

3(CA) in CA-GR CV

No. 55440. The decretal portion of the challenged Decision

reads as follows:

"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, for lack of jurisdiction,

the assailed order of September 4, 1996 is hereby

RECALLED, SET ASIDE and DECLARED NULL and VOID. Theparties, if they so desire, should refer their dispute before

the agrarian authorities. No pronouncement as to costs."4

The assailed Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for

Reconsideration.

The Facts

Spouses Jesus and Teresita Zerna (herein private respondents)

were charged with qualified theft in Criminal Case No. 5896,

filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Norte,

Branch 6. This case was later re-raffled and transferred to


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Branch 4 of the same judicial region. The Information against

private respondents was amended on June 8, 1995. It is

reproduced hereunder:

"That on or about February 25, 1995, up to the following

month of March, 1995, in the City of Iligan, Philippines,

and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the

said accused, conspiring and confederating together and

mutually helping each other, being then the overseers of

some banana plants on the land owned by one Leonarda

Monsanto and principally devoted to coconut trees, and

having access to said land as such, with grave abuse of

confidence reposed [i]n them by the said owner, with

intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously take, steal, harvest and carry away coconuts

from the premises of the said plantation, which the said

accused then processed into copra with a total value of

P6,162.50, belonging to said Leonarda Monsanto, without

her consent and against her will, to the damage and

prejudice of said Leonarda Monsanto in the aforesaid sum

of P6,162.50, Philippine Currency."5

After trial on the merits, the RTC acquitted them of the charge

on July 24, 1996. It held as follows:

"x x x [T]he harvest in the land by the [accused] was done,not for the purpose of stealing the coconuts or the copra,

but more to confirm their claim that they are tenants of

the land. In fact the lack of intent to gain is shown by the

fact that they immediately deposited the proceeds with


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the barangay captain and did not even claim a share [in]

the proceeds of the copra.

x x x x x x x x x

"In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the

[accused] are not tenants of the land and the cash deposit

[from] the proceeds of the copra with the barangay

captain belongs to the private complainant, Leonarda

Monsanto. However, considering the lack of intent of the

[accused] to gain, no criminal liability for theft has been

committed by them."6

It then disposed of the case in the following manner:

"WHEREFORE, the criminal case for qualified theft against

the [accused] Jesus Zerna and Teresita Zerna is hereby

ordered dismissed and their bail bond cancelled. The

barangay captain of Buru-un, Iligan City is hereby ordered

to deliver the amount of P5,162.50, representing the

proceeds [from the] copra sold by the [accused] to the

private complainant, Leonarda Monsanto."7

The total proceeds of the copra sale alleged in the Information

was P6,262.50. However, the awarded amount was only

P5,162.50 which was deposited by private respondents with

the barangay secretary of Buru-un8 on March 2, 1995, afterdeducting P340 (harvesting cost) and P760 (labor cost). Thus,

petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration praying

that the remaining sum of P1,100 be returned to her.9


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In its September 4, 1996 Order, the trial court granted the

Motion and ordered private respondents to return the amount

of P1,100.10

It ruled thus:

"In his motion for reconsideration, the private prosecutor

prays that with respect to the civil aspect of the case, the

accused be made to return the amount of P1,100.00 which

they appropriated for themselves from the gross proceeds

of the stolen property.

"Opposing the said motion, counsel for the accused avers

that the amount P1,100.00 was due to the accused ascompensation for their labor and equity demands that

they [be] entitled to it.

"The Court has already adjudged that the accused are not

guilty of theft and therefore, they cannot be considered to

have stolen the coconuts. But the motion has raised

another issue.

"Are the accused entitled to the amount of P1,100.00 as

compensation for labor in harvesting the coconuts and

processing these into copra?

"The accused plead equity in their favor since [there]

appears to be no law applicable to the incident in

question. However, for equity to apply, good faith mustexist.

"From the findings of this Court, the harvesting of the

coconuts and processing of the same into copra were not


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with the consent of the private complainant. In fact, if the

proper criminal charge were made, which could be unjust

vexation, the accused could have been convicted as their

acts certainly vexed the private complainant by theirharvesting the coconuts and selling the copra. Therefore,

without good faith, since the Court found that they did the

acts complained of in an attempt to confirm their tenancy

claim, equity was wanting.

"The accused could not be entitled to compensation for

their labor done without the consent of the private

complainant since, obviously, there was no contract of

labor between them for the harvesting of the coconuts

and processing of these into copra.

"Even our laws on quasi-contracts do not allow

compensation [for] the accused.

"Without equity or any law in their favor, the accused aretherefore not entitled to compensation for their vexatious

acts."11

After a review of the records and the pleadings of the parties,

the CA, on appeal, ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction

to order private respondents to pay petitioner the amount of

P1,100. Because the dispute involved an agricultural tenancy

relationship, the matter fell within the primary and exclusive

original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform

Adjudication Board (DARAB). It added that inasmuch as the RTC

had no jurisdiction to rule on the civil aspect of the case ergo, it


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had no appellate authority over the matter under a writ of

error.

The appellate court thus "recalled, set aside and declared null

and void" the September 6, 1996 RTC Order requiring the

return of the P1,100 to petitioner.

Hence, this Petition.12

Issues

In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for

the Court's consideration:

I

"Is the Regional Trial Court automatically divested of

jurisdiction over a criminal case where an agrarian issue is

argued as a defense, no matter how flimsy?

II

"Does the Court of Appeals have any competence to

review an RTC Decision which ha[s] become FINAL as not

appealed from, on the basis of a Notice of Appeal which

was SPECIFICALLY and simply directed against an

adscititious ORDER issued subsequent to that Decision?"13

This Court's Ruling

The Petition is devoid of merit.


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First Issue:

DARAB Jurisdiction

Petitioner claims that the RTC was divested of its criminal

jurisdiction when the CA annulled and set aside the September

4, 1996 Order. We disagree.

A careful review of the CA Decision shows that it merely set

aside the September 4, 1996 RTC Order directing private

respondents to pay P1,100 to petitioner. It did not annul the

July 24, 1996 RTC Decision acquitting private respondents of

qualified theft. Being an acquittal, the judgment became "finalimmediately after promulgation and cannot be recalled for

correction or amendment."14

The trial court considered the return of the P1,100 as part of

the civil aspect of the criminal case. As petitioner did not

consent to the harvesting of the coconuts and the processing of

the same into copra, then there was no basis to award theamount to private respondents. In the words of the trial court,

"[w]ithout equity or any law in their favor, the accused are

therefore not entitled to compensation for their vexatious

acts."15

But what is the RTC's basis for ordering the return of P1,100

after it had already acquitted private respondents of qualified

theft? Does the amount constitute civil liability? Let us clarify.

Civil liability is the liability that may arise from (1) crime, (2)

breach of contract or (3) tortious act. The first is governed by


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the Revised Penal Code; the second and the third, by the Civil

Code.16

In the case at bar, there is no question that the RTC had

criminal jurisdiction to try private respondents for the crime of

qualified theft. In the normal course, it had authority to

determine whether they had committed the crime charged and

to adjudge the corresponding penalty and civil liability arising

therefrom.

On September 4, 1996, the RTC issued an Order requiring

private respondents to return the P1,100 to petitioner on theground that petitioner had not consented to the harvesting of

the coconuts or to their conversion into copra. Such order

appears inconsistent with the trial court's finding that private

respondents had not committed the crime of qualified theft. In

People v. Pantig,17

the Court held that where there is no crime

committed, there

Documents

Darab Cases