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June 27th 2016 DANU Strategic Forecasting Group PMESII: Libya

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June 27th 2016

DANU Strategic Forecasting Group

PMESII:!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !! ! Libya

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Foreword

DANU Strategic Forecasting GroupDANU SFG is a student run multinational Think Tank that seeks to forecast future developments in security and intelligence related fields. Our mission is to facilitate discussion surrounding conflicts, their current developments and their future trajectories. We aim to increase public awareness of con-flicts that receive less coverage in the media, or that are generally less understood, but nevertheless pose potential risks for their region. Through the use of clear and concise conflict intelligence fore-casts, easily digestible by the expert and layman alike, we see our products assisting our consumers by informing them of potential future conflict scenarios and their likelihood. By consistently and sys-tematically producing our forecasts we strive to become one of Europe’s leading student led Think Tanks.

For more work by the DANU SFG, visit comprehensiveanalysis.com. Further analysis on Libya and Mali will be published, as well as a strategic forecast.

PMESIIThe following document consists of a PMESII study on relating to Libya and Mali. PMESII is military acronym listed in several joint and service publications, which evolved from a systems perspective, and equates to the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information systems of states. Members of the DANU SFG research a specific areas of interest to help identify key indica-tors. These indicators will be used in further analysis to generate the strategic forecast for the next ten years in Libya and Mali.

The PMESIIs were edited by Sana Chaudhry and Ewan Gordon.

Formatted by Adrienne Ruth.

For more information please visit comprehensiveanalysis.com

May 27th 2016

Regensburg, Germany

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Table of Contents

Foreword....................1

Table of Contents....................2

PMESII....................6

- Political ....................7

- Military..................9

- Economic and Infrastructure....................11

- Social....................14

Resources....................26

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1PMESII

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AbstractThe situation in Libya is dynamic and continues to evolve. So do the policies of Libya’s international and regional neighbours who have been involved in helping Libya manage a very difficult transition from war to peace. Since 2014, Libya has been caught up in chaos with its congress deadlocked between two rival administrations: Government of National Accord (GNA) & House of Representatives (HoR). The UN backs the Government of National Unity (GNA) and receives political and humanitarian support from institutions such as the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU). While the HoR covertly receives military and financial backing from countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia & United Arab Emirates. Thus, there is a unique situation of a growing synergy between political discussions and military recommendations in Libya. With such diverging international interests and the threat of violent extremist organisations (specifically the Islamic State), the two main political factions, the HoR and GNA are on a potential collision course within Libya. in the presence of violent extremist organisations (such as IS) in Libya places the two main political factions, the HoR and GNA, on a potential collision course.

Section 1

The Political Situation! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! By Adrienne Ruth and

Orbunde Terver Daniel Key Points• The activities of certain individuals like General

Haftar (head of the Libyan National Army and for-mer military general under Gaddafi) could place Libya in a risky position as none of the other fac-tions are ready to accept an agreement that leaves him in his current position. Although aligned with the HoR, he represents the interest of the Arab States who heavily fund his activities. This means that unless a change is made, Libya could see the emergence of a ‘Neo- Gaddafi’.

• Al Bunyan Al Marsoos operation led by the Libyan National Army (LNA) to free the areas, like Sirte and Derna, currently held by the Islamic State (IS). If they succeed, the capacity of IS will be reduced or completely depleted. This would alter the cur-rent political arrangement as without IS there could be very little opposition to General Haftar if he decides to take the capital of Tripoli.

• The resolution of the UN-proposed Libyan Politi-cal Agreement (LPA) is critical to Libya’s political stability. Specifically one of the final provisions, “Clause 8,” which transfers all military powers to the Presidency Council who would then decide on new military appointments within 50 days. This would mean a reshuffling of the military leadership and more importantly, the possible remove of Gen-eral Haftar has the head of the armed forces.

• The rise and fall of oil prices in the international market will continue to play a pivotal role in financ-ing the activities of various factions.

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Analysis of Indicators:Tribal Politics & Islamic State:

At the centre of the Libyan conflict is the struggle between two centres of power, composed of net-works of towns, tribes and militias. Although under Gaddafi, they were suppressed these tribes have always had diverging political and economic agendas ranging from more political autonomy to smalls arms proliferation and human/drug trafficking. These agendas feature prominently in the cur-rent political negotiations and form an intricate network of allegiances around the various political factions. The current political instability and low oil prices could result in the drastic increase of the traditional tribal trans-Sahara trade of drugs, counterfeit products, migrants and arms. The profit would be distributed among the traffickers and tribes with most of it used to arm militant groups which could then be used in further destabilising Libya and its Sahel neighbours including Mali, Ni-ger, and Chad. IS is capitalising on the swathes of ungoverned territory in Libya to spread its influ-ence. As IS continues to spread their influence, they may be able to form an alliance with tribes like the Tuaregs or Ubari to access more political control. This is capable of slowing down the political negotiations between the GNA and HoR.

International & Regional Politics:

There is a thin line between Libya’s deteriorating security and the threat it poses to its neighbours’ national security and the international community's priorities. The continuing military support by re-gional partners such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates undermines the chances for a political resolution for Libyans by Libyans. The United Nations Support Mission for Libya (UN-ISML), European Union, African Union have focused their activities on ensuring a democratic transi-tion t by promoting and providing technical advice and assistance to form a single, inclusive and transparent national government. However, it has also been counter-productive that the GNA has been recognised and installed as the legitimate authority for Libya due to general security instability.

Forecast:Worst case scenario: Short term Political stalemate, long term worsening of the situation. There could be a gradual decline in the intensity of the conflict as different groups adopt a more defensive stance and entrench themselves in their local area. This could lead to an agreement on a constitu-tion that doles significant powers to the various regions. As such, in the short term the Al Bunyan Al Marsoos operation attempts to push IS out of Sirte and Derna. However, the willingness of some tribes, like the Tebus in the south, to increase their fighting power could lead to the formation of new allegiances which could further instability and violence throughout the country.

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Most likely scenario: Fragmentation of Libya into a decentralised government. From current activi-ties, we could see agreement between limited numbers of key militias, whereby these militias use the force that they have to impose their own version of security on the country, maintain a certain level of energy production flow by setting up a black market for crude oil and use the combination of weapons and funding to achieve a minimal level of stability.

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AbstractLibya exhibits a fractured and overcrowded military landscape. The power vacuum following Gaddafi’s overthrow has resulted in widespread chaos, through the emergence of numerous militias. Although the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), headed by Fayez Serraj, recently assumed responsibility in Tripoli, it is highly unlikely to gain extensive support from the entirely of militia groups across Libya.

Section 2

The Military SituationBy Nicola Fedeli and Sana Chaudhry

Key ScenariosShort Term

May 2016 until May 2017

It is likely that the number of IS militants and Libyan militias will increase. If the House of Representatives en-dorse the GNA, General Haftar will have to accept Fayez Serraj’s leadership. However, if Haftar continues his of-fensive against IS, it is likely that he may be able to liberate Sirte, and gain political legitimacy.

Medium Term

May 2017 until May 2021

There is likely to be a stabilising effect in Libya if the GNA succeeds in generating Libyan unity and improving the economy, and if Haftar’s support from external actors decreases. However, unity is dependent upon Fayez Serraj’s leadership, and the outcome of Haftar’s offensive in Sirte.

Long Term

May 2022 until May 2026

If the GNA fails, Libya could become a failed state, divided between three states, or split into smaller spheres of influence. If the GNA succeeds, there could be increased stability in Libya. Further scenarios could include a coup instigated by General Haftar, or the assassination of Haftar by either external actors, or the HoR.

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Short-Term Forecast: May 2016 until May 2017The extent of Islamic State (IS) intrusion in Libya is unclear, however there are at least 3000 (esti-mated between 4500 and 6000) IS fighters in Libya, largely concentrated in Sirte, Sabratha, and the surroundings of Derna. Libya’s neighbours are legitimately concerned about IS spillovers. IS re-mains a threat owing to the growing instability in Libya, which escalated due to foreign interference. Therefore, one solution may be for all external actors to refrain from involving themselves militarily in Libya’s internal affairs. Neighbouring countries could instead strengthen their own border controls to bolster local stability.

The number of militias fighting in Libya is unknown because the Sahara remains an intelligence black hole. However, as illustrated in Figure 1, many militias are clashing one against the other for the control of the most important centres, namely Tripoli, Benghazi, Misurata, Sabratha, Sirte, Ajd-abiya, Derna and Tobruk. One front is constituted by the cooperation between IS and jihadist groups such as Ansar al-Sharia and The Benghazi Shura Council Revolutionaries. On the other side, par-ticularly active in Cyrenaica, are General Haftar’s Libyan Military Forces, together with their main ally, the Zintan militia operating in Tripolitania. Besides these forces, a multitude of Islamist and non-Islamist militias are fighting against IS or Haftar.

The positive steps undertaken in Tripoli seem unmatched in Tobruk. General Haftar has consistently been an obstacle to UN negotiations, which is significant given that the GNA has recently estab-lished itself in Tripoli. However, Haftar is not recipient to unified support in Tobruk, and his leader-ship has been the cause of friction within the army itself. The strength of Haftar remains to be seen, but in the past weeks his forces have adopted a strong offensive posture, launching a military cam-paign against the Shura Council Mujahedeen in the city of Derna and preparing a big offensive against IS in Sirte. Haftar’s military operations are made possible by support provided by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar who, despite the UN arms embargo, continue to send military hard-ware and armoured vehicles to General Haftar.

The imminent offensive in Sirte is also aided by the fact that General Haftar has recently orches-trated command of oil fields. Given the scenario that the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk endorses the GNA, Haftar will have to accept the Fayez Serraj’s leadership. Given the more likely scenario that Haftar continues his offensive, it is probable that he will gain strongholds around Sirte, whilst the GNA are organising themselves in Tripoli. It is more likely that Haftar will make gains due to the significant economic backing from his major allies in Cairo, Riyadh, Amman and Abu Dhabi. One course of action could be that these external actors decrease their involvement in Libya’s inter-nal affairs, switch their support to Serraj, and cease arming Haftar and publicly referring to him as the only legitimate actor for a Libyan Unity Government.

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Fig.1 Mapping Libyan Militias using Analyst Notebook i2The graphic is obtained by importing quantitative data taken from the ACLED Database. It describes battle events and episodes of remote violence that took place in Libya in 2016 involving the most sig-nificant armed groups. The colour of the lines describes the nature of the interaction (allies/enemies) while the thickness indicates the frequency (number of occurrences) and intensity (fatali-ties) of interactions. The different frame colours provide an overview of the factions and alliances in-volved. Critical Developments show more recent, relevant trends that are useful to understand the evolution and future prospects of the Libyan military environment.

Medium- Term Forecast: May 2017 until May 2021Unless the GNA succeeds in generating Libyan unity, there is unlikely to be a decrease in the num-bers of militias and armed civilians. Militant groups who once fought Gaddafi are now fighting each other as a means to seize power, arms, and oil wealth. Although Gaddafi was able to control tribal tensions with an iron fist, following his overthrow, opportunistic militias appeared regardless of tribal affiliations.

The GNA has a challenging task in persuading militias to either disband or join the national army. In order to effectively integrate militias, disarmament, reconciliation, and reintegration are likely neces-sary. If tribes who sided with Gaddafi are marginalised in the upcoming political processes, there is a high likelihood that they may align themselves with IS, as occurred in Iraq with the exclusion of Sunnis which resulted in increased IS recruits.

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Long- Term Forecast: May 2022 until May 2026Libya will likely become a failed state in ten years, torn between territorial militias and IS. The mostly likely scenario could be of a divided Libya: split internally, perhaps not officially, between three states: Tripolitania, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica. Libya could also be split into smaller spheres of influ-ence, as different groups entrench themselves in their local area. If fragmentation were to occur, it may make the conflict more difficult to resolve through external intervention. In one possible sce-nario, the GNA would add to Libya’s disarray, as opposed to bringing about stability. The result may be the complete breakdown of law and order in Libya.

On the other hand, most militias cooperated when Fayez Serraj arrived in Tripoli. It appears that these Tripoli-based militias largely accept that there is a powerful public desire for the GNA to suc-ceed. If there is effective governance by the GNA, there may be increased stability, popular support, and socio-economic prospects. The resulting situation could be the political inclusiveness of all tribes. Moreover, under these conditions, and given the support provided by Misurata brigades to the GNA, the liberation of Sirte from IS would become more probable and would constitute a unify-ing factor for the political future of the country, rather than a reason for division and polarisation.

If Haftar succeeds with his offensive in Sirte, there is a wildcard scenario of potential stability under his military rule. The authority of the GNA may weaken to a point that General Haftar is able to exe-cute an effective coup d’état against the GNA. In this scenario, the GNA would be ousted and the HoR would to take control of Libya. The wildcard of a coup within the HoR, following the assassina-tion of Khalifa Haftar, can also be considered. In this case, a new, more moderate leadership could increase the chances of reconciliation with the GNA.

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AbstractLibya’s oil-dependent economy has not been able to recover from its ongoing recession. The nation’s GDP per capita continues to fall and there is not enough money to invest in the infrastructure which was mostly destroyed during the civil war in 2011. The low oil prices are further aggravating the situation as Libya is unable to collect enough revenues through its oil exports. However, higher oil prices would not necessarily improve the situation as they would make oilfields and refineries more valuable and move the conflict inland towards the oilfields. Thus, the the conflict would become even more complex and create incentive for more parties to join the fight over Libya’s oil infrastructure.

Section 3

The Economic and Infrastructural Situation

By Stuart Green and Johana Franz Palacios

Key Points• Libya’s economy has been in recession for the

last three years.

• Its GDP per capita has fallen to half of its value of 2013.

• Libya’s economy is entirely oil dependent and the oil industry is mostly controlled by the state-owned National Oil Corporation (NOC).

• Civil wars, strikes and fights over the oil fields have destroyed the infrastructure.

• Low international oil prices further worsen the economic situation, while oil price spikes have caused battles in Libya.

• High oil prices create higher incentive to target oil-related sites.

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Libya is currently in its third year of economic recession. While its GDP per capita in 2013 was 21,100 USD, it is now at 15,100 USD. The country’s current account showed a deficit of -24.6% of GDP in 2015. Libya has natural resources such as petroleum, natural gas and gypsum. However, the country has failed to diversify its economy. Investments in agriculture and non-petroleum related industry have not helped the country reduce its dependency on the oil infrastructure. Its oil revenues contribute around 97% of its export earnings and over half of GDP. Overall, oil receipts have de-clined to less than 15% of the 2012 level and the economic problems are primarily caused by this decrease.

Libya’s infrastructure, which had previously received investments from oil revenues, was severely damaged due to the civil war of 2011. The country is suffering from lack of water, sanitation, health infrastructures and electricity. In 2013, the seizure of power and oil revenues by the Muslim Brother-hood caused rebels activities such as the blocking of power stations, oil fields and terminals which has caused the reduction of the oil production. The strikes have further led to violent fights over the oil infrastructure by the militias, rebel groups and opposing governments. In total, the production of oil has fallen to around 0.4 million barrels per day (bpd). This is a less than half of the pre-2011 pro-duction and Libya’s oil production has not recovered.

Owing to the deficits in revenues from oil, there is no money for investing which is needed in public provisions for health, education, electricity, water, sanitation and the communication systems. Also, there are national power outages as there is not enough fuel for power generation.

The low economic prospects have driven various groups to criminal activities. While illegal trade al-ready existed before the 2011 civil war, Libya is now becoming a hub for criminal economies in which drugs (cocaine and cannabis), products (cigarettes, alcohol, medicine) and migrants are smuggled across the borders, as can be seen in figure 1. Moreover, weaponry illegally imported is fuelling the conflicts which have not stopped since 2013, which in turn makes the improvement of the economy more problematic.

The economic development is further haltered by low oil prices. Current Libyan oil exports are not enough for budget expenditures and imports. The centrality of oil means the country’s political and economic stability is reliant on the stability of oil prices. The beginning of the conflict in Libya coin-cided with a period of high global oil prices. In the beginning of 2009, oil prices were 50 USD per bar-rel (p/b). Prices then steadily rose until 2011 where they peaked at 110 USD p/b before stabilising at 100 USD p/b for the subsequent 3 years. The Gaddafi regime managed to remain in control of the country while oil prices were rising, but lost control when prices peaked and plateaued in 2011 as previous oil price spikes have resulted in battles in Libya. Oil prices previously rose rapidly, from 60 USD p/b to 140 p/b between 2007 and 2008, before declining again. This oil price spike coincided with battles between the government and Toubou militias in the south of Libya.

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The important oil-related sites in Libya are its oil fields, pipelines and refineries as Libya’s oil depend-ence makes them strategically important locations within the conflict. Ras Lanuf and Sidra refineries were closed in 2014 after Tobrouk government forces fought with Libya Dawn forces at the sites. The pipeline between El Sarir oil field and Port Hariga in Tobrouk was sabotaged by an unknown group in 2015, one of many pipeline attacks. Also in 2015, Islamist militias gained control over Bahi and Mabruk oilfields. In 2016, despite the closure of Ras Lanuf, IS set fire to the storage tanks at Ras Lanuf.

Fig. 1 - USIP Map of Main trading routes, 2014

Fig.2 - EIA map of Libya’s oil in-frastructure

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Libya’s oil industry is still largely controlled by the National Oil Corporation (NOC). Established by the Gaddafi regime in 1970, the NOC is state-owned and maintains influence over all Libya’s oil pro-duction through its many subsidiaries or in joint enterprises with other Libyan oil companies. Recent UN sanctions, of which the NOC is supportive, have banned illicit oil exports from Libya meaning that entities attempting to export oil which are not connected to the UN backed government, the GNA, are subject to them. These sanctions prohibit the House of Representatives, the rival govern-ment in the east, from exporting oil.

As the price of oil changes, the value of targets changes. Population centres and cities are the most important focal point for the conflict due to the proximity of militia groups. However, with higher oil prices, conflict actors have greater incentives to target oil-related sites. This means that the centre of the conflict moves inland as oil sites, particularly oilfields and pipelines, become more valuable. This was true of 2013: when oil prices were higher, a greater proportion of battles occurred in the south of the country. This is contrast to 2016 when oil prices were lower; this can be seen in figure 3.  The south of Libya is also home to minority tribes. With higher oil prices they also become incen-tivised to join the conflict, as was the case in 2008 when Toubou militias fought government forces.

Fig.3 - Map of Conflict Locations above and be-low Latitude 29.5 for 2013 and 2016

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Oil dependency means that the health of Libya’s economy is decided by external factors, global oil prices, rather than domestic decisions. Low oil prices result in a shrinking economy and underdevel-oped infrastructure. However, high oil prices have the effect of instigating and worsening armed con-flict because groups become incentivised to attack oil sites as they become more valuable. A combi-nation of pre-existing armed conflict and current low oil prices will make it difficult for order to be re-stored in Libya.

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AbstractLibya’s social profile is shaped by three important dynamics: 1) immediate humanitarian challenges posed by the current conflict, 2) tribes and tribalism and 3) religion and religious divides. Thus, five years after the 2011 revolution, Libya still continues to be affected by tribal conflict and religious fragmentation, while human rights and civil right infringements remaining a crucial problem. Given this complex set of circumstances, changing these current practices that fuel the current scenario will be a long struggle. Considering all the dynamics and interrelated obstacles, the likelihood for peace and social stability seems questionable.

Section 4

The Social SituationBy Adriana Petre and Ewan Gordon

Key Points• Given the current instability, the Libyan peo-

ple have seeked security by grouping to-gether along tribal and ethnic lines;

• Tribalism is a powerful dynamic that contin-ues to shape the conflict in Libya;

• The overwhelming majority of Libyan popu-lation is Sunni Muslim, however fighting over religious difference continues ;

• Libya may unify if tribes are politically inte-grated into a working system of govern-ance.

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Analysis Tribalism in Libya is a powerful dynamic that has to be analysed in order to fully understand the po-litical situation within Libya. The tribal grievances created over time, as well as disputes over the ma-jor trade networks in the south are important variables in Libya’s ongoing civil war.

The majority of Libyans are Sunni Muslims. This can be a unifying factor for the Libyan state. The rise of radical jihadist groups has attracted many economically disadvantaged Libyans, causing more conflict. However, it is still uncertain how many Libyan will support a fundamentalist form of Sunnism.

For Libya to become a unified state a system of governance that takes advantage of existing social relationships instead of simply ignoring them, as often happens in fragile states. If tribes are ex-cluded from the political process, there is a high chance that they will form a parallel power structure that will undermine the formal institutions of the state. A form of decentralized government that gives tribes a role in the political system may lead to unification. To achieve this, leaders may need to bal-ance the need to create a strong central authority with the need to integrate the country’s tribal groups into the state’s structures.

Current Condition of Libya The armed conflict in Libya is still continuing. Forces associated with the two rival governments as well as armed militia thoughout the country have been accused of committing war crimes and violat-ing human rights.

Civilians are the main victims in this current unrest. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitar-ian Affairs estimates that 2.4 million people need humanitarian assistance and protection. The num-bers killed in the conflict is unknown, but between May 2015 -May 2016 an estimated 20,000 civil-ians were injured. There are an estimated 435,00 internally displaced people in Libya.

The breakdown of Libya’s state institutions and the absence of the rule of law has led to a rising crime rate. This violence perpetuated against civilians means aquiring food, medical care, water, sanitation and access to education is difficult. Civil rights such as freedom of expession, association and assembly are restricted. Detention without trail, torture and ill-treatment are widespread. Women, migrants and refugees face regular discrimination.

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Religious dividesAs of 2016 Libya is estimated to have a population of 6 million people, the majority of whom live along the northern coast. The overwhelming majority of the population (97%) identifies as Sunni Muslims, with the remaining 3% belonging to other religions, most noticeably Coptic Christians, Ro-man Catholics and Ibadi (ebadhis) Muslims.

Islam is the official state religion of Libya and Islamic law is the principle source of legislation. The interim constitution protects religious freedoms. However, despite these laws, the government is not able, or willing, to enforce this legislation. There have been reports of individuals being targeted due to their religious beliefs, such as the arson attack against the Coptic Christian church in Benghazi in 2013, attacks against Sufi shrines and the beheading of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians by jihadists earlier in February 2016. This signals a rise of religious intolerance within the country, partly fueled by the rise of extremist jihadist groups.

Tribal interactions with jihadists and other extremist groups seem to be driven more by economic ne-cessity rather than ideological sympathy. Jihadists can buy the loyalty of economically desperate tribespeople. Ultimately, Salafism and Libyan tribalism may be incompatible. The Tuareg and Berber (Amazigh) tribes practice a blend of Sunni Islam and West African witchcraft, that is not compatible with the fundamentalist Salafist doctrine. Additionally, loyalty to the family and tribe are important in Libyan tribalism, while Salafists see the primary loyalty to the global Muslim community, the Umma. This suggests an incompatibility between the two groups and may lead to a counterbalance to radi-calism.

Tribal and Ethnic Divides There are four main tribal groups in Libya; Arab, Berbers (Amazigh), Tuareg and Toubou. Ethnically they are Arab, Berber (Amazigh), and Toubou. Arab and Berber (Amazigh) tribes populate Northern Libya, with 90% of Libyans identifying as Arab or of mixed Arab-Berber heritage. The Tuareg (who are ethnically Berber) and Toubou tribes populate Western and Southern Libya.

There are an estimated 6 million people in Libya and the number of tribespeople is unknown, due to a lack of documentation. Estimates put the number of Berbers (Amazigh) in Libya at around 600,000, would mean that the Berbers could make up about 10% of the total population. Addition-ally, there are an estimated 100,000 Tuareg and 50,000 Toubou in Libya.

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Libya is made up of roughly 140 tribes or clans. Yet, only about 30 tribes hold real political or socie-tal influence. Links within the tribe extending beyond Libya’s national borders. Like a large majority of postcolonial states, it has borders that reflect the “Great Power” politics of the 19th and 20th cen-turies, rather than evolve to reflect ethnic, tribal and cultural divides.

In Libya, the structure of tribes is usually a qabila (tribe), encompassing buyut (sub-tribes) and lahma (family groups). Sheikhs (tribal leaders) offer guidance and usually implement state policies at regional and local levels, as was the case under King Idris rule. Nonetheless, loyalty is shown usu-ally to a tribesman’s lahma first. Tribalism is more like an ideology rather than a strict systematic structure.

The tribe and tribal system play a significant role in Libyan politics and society. It has been de-scribed as one of the most tribal nations in the Arab world. When Gaddafi seized power in 1970 he tried to suppress tribe identities by oppressing non-Arab tribes and promoting an Arab national iden-tity to unify the country. The Berber, Toubou and Tuareg tribes have been culturally suppressed, de-nied citizenship rights and lack political representation, which is a continuing source of contention today.

The Berber (Amazigh), Toubou and Tuareg tribes have all been marginalised and persecuted under Gaddafi’s regime, but have become more powerful since the 2011 revolution. Continuing protests over the issues of minority representation have been and will continue to be a contentious issue in the Libyan political process, and may even result in further political fragmentation, as evident by the calls to create an Amazigh parliament.

After Gaddafi was overthrown in 2011, the resulting power vacuum and instability was filled by these tribes taking control of their regions. The lack of a single centralized political authority has led to fighting between tribes for security, resources and power. If the country is unstable for an extended period of time, bonds are expected to grow as tribes provide the best protection against weak gov-ernment.

In the South of Libya, the balance of power over important strategic and economic sites, such as the el-Sharara oilfield and smuggling routes, has shifted towards the Toubou tribes, leading to an end of the Toubou -Tuareg Midi Midi (Friend Friend) truce and the outbreak of fighting between the two tribes. The Toubou and Tuareg present a challenging task for any Libyan government in its attempt to create an inclusive Libyan society. There may be a chance of reconciliation between both the Tu-areg and Toubou tribes if they agree to a new truce like their previous Midi Midi truce. This seems implausible however due to the continuing economic and security conditions these tribes live under.

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2Resources

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Political:

Al Jazeera English, 2015. Malian Rivals Sign Peace Deal. [Online]. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/malianrivalssignpeacedeal150620173301883.html [Accessed 06 May 2016].

Baché, David, 2016. Mali: Gatia Et CMA à Kidal, Les Enjeux. [Online]. Available at: http://www.rfi.fr/hebdo/20160212maligatiacmakidalenjeux [Accessed 06 May 2016].

British Broadcasting Corporation, 2013.  Mali Crisis: Key Players. [Online]. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica17582909 [Accessed 06 May 2016].

European Union External Action Service.  EU relations with Mali. [Online].  Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/mali/index_en.htm [Acessed 29 May 2016].

European Union External Action Service, 2011. Sahel Strategy. [Online]. Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf [Accessed 29 May 2016].  

Human Rights Watch, 2015.  World Report 2015: Mali, Events of 2014. [Online].  Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/mali [Accessed 29 May 2016]

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, 2013. Supporting political process and helping stabilize Mali. [Online].  Available at:http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/ [Accessed 29 May 2016].

Military:

Balzan, J. (2015). New divisions come forth as rival parliaments united against ‘imposed’ Libya government. MaltaToday. [Online]. Available at: http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/world/60393/new_divisions_come_forth_as_rival_parliaments_unite_against_imposed_libya_government#.V0lHyUxv6uX [Accessed on 28 May 2016];

Bell, A., Witter, D., (2011). Roots of Rebellion Part 1, Washington: Institute for the study of War

Dettmer Jamie, (2016) Will Arming Libya’s ‘Unity’ Government Escalate Conflict?, VOA Voice of America. [Online]. Available at: http://www.voanews.com/content/arming-libyan-unity-government-could-escalate-conflict/3333843.html [Accessed on 23 May 2016];

Handly, K. (2016). Op-Ed: Libyan National Army in Zintan, Libya, threatens Tripoli attack. Digital Journal. [Online]. Available at: http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/politics/op-ed-libyan-national-army-in-zintan-libya-threatens-to-attack-tripoli/article/466256 [Accessed on 31 May 2016];

Pack, J. (2016), Don't believe Libya's 'race to Sirte' rhetoric, Middle East Eye. [Online]. Available at: http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/dont-believe-libyas-race-sirte-rhetoric-690524639 [Accessed on 16 May 2016];

Pack, J. (2016), Race To Liberate Sirte More Likely to Strengthen Divisions Than Create Unity, Libya Observer. [Online]. Available at:  http://www.libya-analysis.com/ [Accessed on 27 May 2016];

Reardon, M. (2016), Libya, extremism and the consequences of collapse. [Online]. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/01/libya-extremism-consequences-collapse-160128054629594.html [Accessed on 23 May 2016];

Saleh, H.,  Jones, S. (2016), Isis in Libya: Stoking conflict. [Online]. Available at: https://next.ft.com/content/c06fb0d6-e1f7-11e5-8d9b-e88a2a889797 [Accessed on 25 May 2016];

Taher, M. I. (2016), Derna between Daesh and Dignity Operation, Libya Observer Opinions. [Online]. Available at http://www.libyaobserver.ly/opinions/derna-between-daesh-and-dignity-operation, [Accessed on 22 May 2016];

The Economist (2016), The scramble for Sirte, The Economist, Cairo. [Online]. Available at: http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21698671-libyas-armed-groups-take-aim-jihadists-and-each-other-scramble [Accessed on 24 May 2016];

Toaldo, M. (2016), Libya’s Political Stalemate. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. [Online]. Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=62656 [Accessed on 28 May 2016];

Section 1

Resources - Mali

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Economy and Infrastructure:

ACLED (2016). Africa Data: real-time 2016 All Africa File.csv [online]. Available at: http://www.acleddata.com/data/realtime-data-2016/ [Accessed on: 10 May 2106].

ACLED (2015). Africa Data: Version 6: 1997-2015 [online]. Available at: http://www.acleddata.com/data/version-6-data-1997-2015/ [Accessed on: 10 May 2016].

Al-Warfalli, A. and Elumami, A. (2016) Islamic State attack sets storage tanks ablaze in Libyan oil terminal, Reuters, Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-idUSKCN0UZ0P0 [Accessed on: 02 May 2016].

BBC News (2014) Libyan troops clash over oil ports Ras Lanuf and Sidra, BBC, Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30473357 [Accessed on: 02 May 2016].

BBC News (2015) Libya oil fields of Bahi and Mabruk ‘seized by militants’, BBC Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31719043 [Accessed on: 02 May 2016].

Chapin Metz, H. (1987) Libya: A Country Study, Available at: http://countrystudies.us/libya/57.htm  [Accessed on: 02 May 2016].

CIA World Factbook (2016) Libya, Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html  [Accessed on: 02 May 2016].

EIA (2015): Libya: Overview. EIA Beta. Available at: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=LBY [Accessed on: 10 June 2016].

Heritage.org (2016) Index of Economic Freedom: Libya, Available at: http://www.heritage.org/index/country/libya  [Accessed on: 02 May 2016].

Khan, M. and Milbert, S. (2014) Libya: Facing Economic Collapse in 2014, Atlantic Council, Available at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/libya-facing-economic-collapse-in-2014[Accessed on: 02 May 2016].

LA Times (2008) Libya: Fighting in southeast spreads, report says, Los Angeles Times, Available at: http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2008/11/libya-fighting.html [Accessed on: 02 May 2016].

Markey, P. and Elumami, A. (2015) ISIS Sets Its Sights on Libya’s Oil Infrastructure, Haaretz Middle East NEws, Available at: http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/1.682765 [Accessed on: 02 May 2016].

Markey, P. et al (2015) Libyan oil pipeline sabotaged, gunmen storm Sirte offices, Reuters, Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-idUSKBN0LI0KP20150214 [Accessed on: 02 May 2016].

Nasdaq (2016) Crude Oil, Available at: http://www.nasdaq.com/markets/crude-oil.aspx?timeframe=10y [Accessed on: 02 May 2016].

NOC (2016) NOC welcomes UN Security Council Resolution 2278 regarding illicit oil shipments, Available at: http://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/1407-noc-welcomes-un-security-council-resolution-2278-regarding-illicit-oil-shipments [Accessed on: 02 May 2016].

OPEC (2015) Libya facts and figures, Available at: http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/166.htm [Accessed on: 02 May 2016].

Rad, S. and Mansour, S. (2015) Libya, Available at: http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/country-notes/north-africa/libya/ [Accessed on: 02 May 2016].

Shaw, M. and Mangan, F. (2014). Illicit Trafficking and Libya’s Transition. Profits and Losses. Peaceworks, United States Institute of Peace, No. 96 [online]. Available at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW96-Illicit-Trafficking-and-Libyas-Transition.pdf [Accessed on 06 June 2016].

Stephen, C. (2013) Libya at a crossroads as strikes threaten oil supplies, The Guardian, Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/03/libya-oil-supplies-tripoli [Ac-cessed on: 02 May 2016].

The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (2015). Libya: a growing hub for Criminal Economies and Terrorist Financing in the Trans-Sahara. Policy Brief [on-line]. Available at: http://globalinitiative.net/download/global-initiative/Libya%20Criminal%20Economies%20in%20the%20trans-Sahara%20-%20May%202015.pdf [Accessed on 10 June 2016].

The World Bank (2016) Libya: Overview, Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/libya/overview [Accessed on: 02 May 2016].[Accessed 10 April 2016].

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Social and Information:

Arturo Varvelli, (2013) The Role of Tribal Dynamics in the Libyan Future, Institute for International Political Studies, Analysis No. 172

Helen Chapin Metz, (1987) Libya: A Country Study, Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress

Amnesty International (2016) Annual Report 2015/2016, Amnesty International Online

Jon Mitchell, (2015) War in Libya and its Future – Tribal Dynamics and Civil War (1), The Red (Team) Analysis Society Online

BBC News, (2015) Libya killings: Who were the 21 Copts?, BBC News Online

Karlos Zurutuza, (2015) Libya’s Berbers Fear Ethnic Conflict, Aljazeera Online

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DANU Strategic Forecasting Group