Crim pro cases and rules

Case Issue Rule

Powell v. Alabama Right to counsel In a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel and is incapable of adequately defending himself, the Due Process Clause requires that effective counsel be appointed for him.

Patterson, Plaintiff v. Former Chicago Police Lt. Jon Burge

Importance of procedures

Modern case showcasing the importance of procedures.

Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago

Incorporation The 14th Amendment prevents taking of property by the government without just compensation.

Twining v. New Jersey Incorporation The Supreme Court first expressly discussed applying the Bill of Rights to the states through the process of incorporation

Gitlow v. New York Incorporation the 1st Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech applies to the states through its incorporation into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Duncan v. Louisiana Incorporation The 14th Amendment due process guarantees the right of a jury trial in all state criminal cases “which, were they to be tried in federal court, would come within the 6th Amendment’s guarantee [of a jury trial].”

McDonald v. Chicago Incorporation The right to bear arms (2nd Amendment) is a fundamental right.

Williams v. Florida Incorporation states need not use 12-person juries in criminal cases.

Apodaca v. Oregon andJohnson v. Louisiana

Incorporation States need not have a unanimous jury in a criminal trial.

Whorton v. Bockting Watershed rule Rule must implicate "fundamental fairness and accuracy" of proceeding

Gideon v. Wainwright Right to counsel Criminal defendant have a right to counsel at trial in any case where the sentence potentially includes imprisonment.

Searches

Katz v. United States(phone booth case)

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy (REP)

Katz test: Did the government action violate a person's subjective and reasonable expectation of privacy? The 4th Amendment protects a person from search

and seizure if, under the circumstances, he has a justifiable expectation of privacy, regardless of whether an actual physical trespass occurred.

Oliver v. United States

(growing marijuana in a field hidden from the public)

REP - Open Fields No reasonable expectation of privacy (REP) in activities conducted outside in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home (the curtilage).

“The special protection of the Fourth Amendment afforded to homes and curtilage is not given to open fields and is not considered an ‘unreasonable search’.”

United States v. Dunn

(drugs in barn)

REP - Curtilage The question of the extent of curtilage should be resolved with reference to 4 factors:

a. The proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home,

b. Whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home,

c. The nature of the uses to which the area is put, and

d. The steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.

(determine by process of elimination. If it's not the house, and it's not the curtilage, then it's an open field)

California v. Ciraolo

(plane in navigable airspace)

Aerial search (1000 ft.) There is no REP in what a person knowingly exposes to the public

Florida v. Riley(helicopter in navigable airspace)

Aerial search The Fourth Amendment does not require the police traveling in the public airways at 400 feet to obtain a warrant to observe what is visible to the naked eye.

Kyllo v. United States

(growing marijuana in attic; thermal imaging of outside of home)

Thermal imaging Thermal imaging of the home is an intrusion subject to 4th Amendment protection

Where the government uses a device that is not in general public use to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a “search” and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.

California v. Greenwood

(trash can case)

Searches of trash There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in what a person chooses to discard. (trash)

United States v. Knotts

(tracking device in vat led to cabin)

Observation and Monitoring of public behavior

There is no expectation of privacy when driving on public roadways.

There is a lesser expectation of privacy when traveling in an automobile. The dwellings expectation of privacy did not extend to the police observation of while watching from the air. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibits augmenting the sensory faculties of birth with technological enhancements.

United States v. Karo

(beeper in container left on into residence)


The installation of a beeper in a container did not violate 4th Amendment protections.

The delivery of an electronic tracking device in a container of chemicals to a buyer without knowledge of the device does not violate the 4th Amendment

(not a search because it did not reveal intimate details of the home)

Smith v. Maryland

(pen register case)


Pen registers do not violate 4th Amendment protections; there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in numbers dialed.

An individual does not harbor a legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.

U.S. v. Place (1983) Drug dogs The use of drug dogs in an airport is not a search.

Illinois v. Caballes

(stopped for speeding, 2nd officer brought drug dog)

Drug dogs A dog sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop does not violate the 4th Amendment where the dog sniff reveals no information other than the location of contraband.

Conducting a dog sniff does not change the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner.

There is no REP in possessing contraband.

The Warrant Requirement

Carol v. U.S. Probable cause Ask whether "the facts and circumstances before the officer are such to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been committed."

Illinois v. Gates

(hairdresser gave

Sufficient belief for probable cause

A magistrate may issue a search warrant if the “totality of the circumstances” presented in the affidavit indicates probable cause for the search. The

information to police) (test: totality of the circumstances)

“veracity” and basis of knowledge” are highly relevant, but are not separate and necessary elements of probable cause.

o Standard: a fair probability Test for probable cause: that there is a fair

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.

Replaced Aguilar-Spinelli 2-prong test with totality of circumstances to establish probable cause for obtaining a warrant.

Aguilar-Spinelli Sufficient belief for probable cause

1. Veracity : is the informant credible?2. Basis of knowledge : Did the informant obtain this

information in a reliable way? (Was the informant reliable?)

Maryland v. Pringle

(front seat passenger arrested for cocaine in back seat)

Sufficient belief for probable cause

A search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person.

The passenger of a vehicle, even if separated from the drugs, has sufficient constructive possession of drugs located in the vehicle to give rise to probable cause for the passenger’s arrest.

Whren v. United States

(unmarked car; Defendant had drugs in lap)

Probable cause - objective test

The test for probable cause is objective and focuses on whether the reasonable officer could have found probable cause under the circumstances;

The subjective intent of that officer does not matter. The decision to stop an automobile is reasonable

where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.

Andresen v. Maryland

(real estate; officers seized extra files)

Form of the warrant The warrant must describe items to be seized Evidence of crimes which relate to or are relevant to

proving the crime under which a warrant is issued may be validly seized under the warrant.

Groh v. Ramirez

(warrant didn’t describe person or thing to be seized; it was in an affidavit that wasn’t taken with the warrant)

Form of the warrant A warrant without a description of things to be seized is invalid. (A warrant that fails to describe with particularity the person or thing to be seized is unreasonable and violative of the 4th Amendment.)

The warrant itself must describe the things to be searched and cannot be “saved” because of other documents unknown to the person whose home is being searched nor available for her inspection.

Michigan v. Summers Executing a warrant Michigan v. Summers rule: officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority "to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is

conducted."

Muehler v. Mena

(detained while house was searched; asked about immigration status while detained)

Executing a warrant It is not a violation of the 4th Amendment to handcuff residents of premises for the duration of a search of the premises for armed and dangerous individuals and contraband.

Questioning a suspect regarding immigration status is not a separate search where doing so does not prolong the search.

Wilson v. Arkansas

(drug warrant; announce/no knock)

Executing a warrant - knock and announce

A search or seizure of a dwelling that is otherwise reasonable might violate the 4th Amendment if police officers fail to “knock and announce” before entering.

Under some circumstances, announcement is not required since it could put officers in jeopardy when defendants are known to possess a gun

U.S. v. Banks Executing a warrant - knock and announce(note case)

Knock and announce 15 - 20 seconds is enough waiting time if officers have

reason to believe that waiting longer would provide the opportunity for the suspects to destroy contraband

Hudson v. Michigan Executing a warrant - knock and announce

The exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence gained after police violate the knock and announce requirement.

Maryland v. Garrison

(3rd floor apartment; searched wrong one)

Executing a warrant - excusable mistake

The warrant requirement of the 4th Amendment requires that the place to be searched must be described with particularity to ensure a search does not become a wide-ranging, exploratory search.

Los Angeles County, California v. Rettele

(naked couple in bed)

Executing a warrant - excusable mistake

Officers searched a house on a warrant where subjects had moved three months prior to the search.

When officers execute a valid warrant and act in a reasonable manner to protect themselves from harm, the Fourth Amendment is not violated, even where innocent residents may experience frustration, embarrassment, or humiliation.

Exceptions to the Warrant Three factors to analyze exceptions to the warrant: officer and public safety, destruction of evidence, the

need for a bright-line rule.

Use the balancing test (governmental interest v. nature of the intrusion) for the analysis of the special needs exceptions (balancing test applies when there is no suspicion)

TLO/Quon test: legitimate purpose? -> justified at its inception? -> within the scope? (useful for when a person is being targeted, whether it’s drug testing or reading pages)

Chimel v. California

(coins case; “grab area”)

Exceptions to the warrant requirement - search incident to arrest (SILA)

Grab area When there is probable cause to search and there are

exigent circumstances making it “impracticable” to obtain a search warrant, a warrantless search is reasonable under the 4th Amendment.

A search of the entire home without a warrant is unreasonable.

Knowles v. Iowa

(citation, no arrest)

Exceptions to the warrant requirement - search incident to arrest (SILA)

Officers may not conduct a full search of a car and driver when the police elect to issue a citation instead of making a custodial arrest.

A search incident to citation is unreasonable when officers have no reasonable belief that their lives are in danger or evidence relevant to the citation is about to be destroyed.

No search without arrest.

Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden

(hot pursuit; looking for an armed man)

Exceptions to the warrant - searches in hot pursuit

The 4th Amendment is designed to protect privacy, and a search directed at purely evidentiary objects is no more intrusive than one for instrumentalities of a crime.

As long as the requirements of the 4th Amendment are followed (i.e., probable cause and the intervention of a neutral and detached magistrate) there is no viable reason for maintaining the “mere evidence” limitation.

Hot pursuit is reasonable and not a 4th Amendment violation;

Must be in pursuit of the suspect from the scene

Payton v. New York

(NY statute that violated const. rights; went into house without D there)

Exceptions to the warrant - searches in hot pursuit

The 4th Amendment, made applicable to the states by the 14th Amendment, draws a firm line at the entrance to the house.

Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.

Arizona v. Hicks Exceptions to the warrant - plain view doctrine (note case)

Incriminating character must be "immediately apparent."

Coolidge v. New Hampshire

Exceptions to the warrant - plain view doctrine (note case)

Examples of the exception1. Police have a warrant to search a given area for

specified objects, and in the course of the search

come across some other article of incriminating character

2. Where the initial intrusion that brings the police with in plain view of such an article is supported, not by a warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the seizure is also legitimate. (police come inadvertently come across evidence while in "hot pursuit" of a fleeing suspect)

3. An object that comes into view during a search incident to arrest that is appropriately limited in scope under existing law may be seized without a warrant.

4. Where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.

Horton v. California

(rings case)

Exceptions to the warrant - plain view doctrine

Plain view doctrine Seizing property not specified on a warrant but in

plain view is permissible. There is no danger of officers using specific warrants

or exigent circumstances to conduct general searches because the scope of the search is proscribed by the warrant’s description of the place to be searched or the exigencies which justify the intrusion.

Minnesota v. Dickerson

(crack rock in pocket during pat down; plain touch)

Exceptions to the warrant - plain view doctrine

Establishes the plain touch or plain feel doctrine If an officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s clothing

and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search for weapons.

The officer cannot manipulate the item to determine it is contraband. It’s incriminating nature must be immediately apparent

Carroll v. U.S.

Exceptions to the warrant - automobile (note case)

Must have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence of crime in automobile search an automobile

California v. Carney

(motor home; sex for drugs)

Exceptions to the warrant - automobile

a motor home qualifies as a "motor vehicle" for purposes of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

The reasons the automobile exception applies to motor homes:1. Autos are inherently mobile and can be taken

away before a warrant is issued2. Autos, unlike homes, are subject to regulations

that lower the owner’s expectation of privacy.

California v. Acevedo

(officers watched D put a bag of marijuana in trunk)

Exceptions to the warrant - automobile

Police officers may search closed containers within an automobile without a warrant, pursuant to a valid search of the vehicle. (i.e., the police may search without a warrant if their search is supported by probable cause)

New York v. Belton Exceptions to the warrant - automobile SILA

Per se rule allowing search of passenger compartment and any containers.

An extension of Chimel (grab area)

Thornton v. United States

Exceptions to the warrant - automobile SILA

Belton rule applies to "recent occupants" of cars.

Arizona v. Gant

(suspended license; cocaine in pocket of jacket in back seat)

Exceptions to the warrant - automobile SILA

Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.

South Dakota v. Opperrman

(impounded car; found marijuana in glove box)

Exceptions to the warrant - inventory search (special needs)

The Fourth Amendment permits a routine police inventory search of the closed glove compartment of a locked automobile

Illinois v. Lafayette

(arrestee in booking; drugs in cigarette box)

Exceptions to the warrant - inventory search (special needs)

It is reasonable, as part of the routine procedure incident to incarcerating an arrested person.

Police may search any container or article in his possession, in accordance with established inventory procedures.

United States v. Flores-Montano

(border search; 81 lbs of marijuana in gas tank)

Exceptions to the warrant - border crossings

The Government's authority to conduct suspicionless inspections at the border includes the authority to remove, disassemble, and reassemble a vehicle's fuel tank.

United States v. Ramsey

(heroine by mail)

Exceptions to the warrant - border crossings

International mail may be searched when there is reasonable cause to suspect that there is merchandise being imported contrary to law.

United States v. Montoya-Hernandez

(alimentary drug smuggler; drug mule)

Exceptions to the warrant - border crossings and checkpoints

The detention of a traveler at the border, beyond the scope of a routine customs search and inspection, is justified at its inception if customs agents, considering all the facts surrounding the traveler and her trip, reasonably suspect that the

traveler is smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal.

Reasonable suspicion is required to go beyond the scope of the search

Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz

(sobriety checkpoint)

Exceptions to the warrant - checkpoints

Brief suspicionless seizures at highway checkpoints for the purposes of combating drunk driving and intercepting illegal immigrants are constitutional.

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond

(vehicle narcotics checkpoint)

Exceptions to the warrant - checkpoints

Highway checkpoints for illegal drug activity are virtually indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control, violating the Fourth Amendment. (look at intent)

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte

(driving brother’s car)

Exceptions to the warrant - consent

The State has to prove that consent was voluntary based on the totality of circumstances, but it does not have to prove that the suspect knew of his right to refuse consent.

“Whether consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined by the totality of the circumstances, and while the person’s knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent. “

Georgia v. Randolph

(separated spouses)

Exceptions to the warrant - consent

A physically present co-occupant’s refusal to allow entry prevails, and renders the warrantless search unreasonable and invalid as to him.

Nothing independent of one co-occupant’s consent – like need for protection inside the house – justifies the search.

United States v. Knights

(probation; G & E fire)

Exceptions to the warrant - a person on probation

No more than reasonable suspicion is needed to search a probationer’s home. (less than reasonable suspicion might be enough, also.)

The 4th Amendment does not limit searches pursuant to such probation condition to those with a “probationary” purpose.

Probation, like incarceration, is a form of criminal sanction imposed by a court upon an offender after a verdict, finding, or plea of guilty. Inherent is the very nature of probation is that the probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.

Samson v. California Exceptions to the The 4th Amendment does not prohibit a police officer

(parolee in possession of Meth)

warrant - a person on parole

from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee. Reasonableness is determined by balancing the

degree to which a search intrudes upon an individual’s privacy against the degree to which the search promotes legitimate government interests. Parolees are on a continuum of state-imposed punishments, and have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation.

Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco

(Defendant refused inspection of house)

Special needs - administrative searches

Where a citizen refuses to admit a housing inspector into his home, the inspector must get a search warrant to inspect the dwelling.

Probable cause for the search warrant to inspect a building for code violations exists if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to the building

Probable cause need not depend upon specific knowledge of the conditions of the particular building.

New York v. Burger

(auto junkyard)

Special needs - administrative searches

Administrative inspections of closely regulated businesses fall within an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding

(13-year-old suspected of giving out Ibuprofen)

Special needs - drug testing

Reasonable suspicion of danger (risk vs. intrusion) Reasonable suspicion that student hiding evidence or

contraband in undergarmentso Scope: Means must be reasonably related to

objectives of the search o Not excessively intrusive in light of the age

and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.

Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton

(athlete urine test; parents refused to consent)

Special needs – drug testing

Taking into account the decreased expectation of privacy, the relative unobtrusiveness of the search, and the severity of the need met by the search, we conclude Vernonia's Policy [authorizing random urinalysis drug testing of students who participate in the District's school athletics program] is reasonable and hence constitutional.

Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County


The district's requirement that all students who participate in competitive extracurricular activities submit to drug testing serves the School District's important interest in detecting and preventing drug use

v. Earls

(extracurricular activities urine test)

among its student so it is constitutional.

Ferguson v. City of Charleston

(drug testing pregnant patient hospital program)


Drug testing pregnant women when they enter the hospital is unconstitutional because the purpose of the drug test is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control.

O'Connor v. Ortega Special needs - employer searches

A government employer's warrantless search is reasonable when

conducted for non-investigatory, work related purpose or (legitimate purpose)

for the investigation of work related misconduct if1. It is justified at its inception2. Measures adopted are reasonably related to

the objectives of the search (scope)3. Not excessively intrusive in light of the

circumstances giving rise to the search. (scope)

(same language as TLO)Legitimate purpose? -> justified at inception? -> within scope?

City of Ontario v. Quon

(SWAT member and text messages; pen register)

Special needs - employer searches

A search motivated by a legitimate work-related purpose, and not excessive in scope, is reasonable and not a violation of an employee's 4th Amendment rights.

Welsh v. Wisconsin

(wrecked car in open field; driver walked home)

Warrantless entry – exigent circumstances

An important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is made.

Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart

(police peer through back window; injured juvenile, 4 adults restraining her)

Warrantless entry – exigent circumstances

Police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury.

Emergency aid exception

Michigan v. Fisher

(broken stuff outside; defendant inside screaming and throwing things)

Exigent circumstances If it is objectively reasonable to believe that another person in the home or the enraged person is in danger, then an officer’s warrantless entry is reasonable and no warrant is required.

Seizures and Arrests

Arrests require probable cause, but a person may be stopped with only reasonable suspicion.

United States v. Watson

Seizures and Arrests – Is a warrant needed for arrest?

A warrant is not necessary for a police officer to make an arrest in a public place, so long as he has probable cause to believe a felony has been committed.

United States v. Mendenhall

(airport; consented strip search)

When is a person “seized”?

A person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.

Factors to consider:o The threatening presence of several

officers,o The display of a weapon by an officer,o Some physical touching of the person of the

citizen, oro The use of language or tone of voice

indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.

California v. Hodari C.

(ran when he saw police; threw drugs)

When is a person “seized”?

A seizure occurs “when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.”

Until the person has actually been literally restrained somehow, no seizure occurred.

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista

(woman driving with unbuckled kids)

For what crimes may a person be arrested?

If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.

Virginia v. Moore

(suspended license; SILA -> crack)

For what crimes may a person be arrested?

When officers have probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime in their presence, the Fourth Amendment permits them to make an arrest, and to search the suspect in order to safeguard evidence and ensure their own safety.

Stop and Frisk

Terry v. Ohio

(guys casing store)

The authority for police to stop and frisk

An officer needs reasonable suspicion to “stop and frisk”

“where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.”

Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada

(stopped on side of the road, suspected of domestic violence)

What may police do when they stop an individual?

If a request for identification is "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified" the stop, then a person must provide the information.

Police may ask, and the person must provide, identification (at least a name)

United States v. Arvizu

(minivan stopped at border)

What is sufficient for reasonable suspicion? – for stopping cars

Reasonable suspicion may be determined by the totality of circumstances.

o Police may consider facts “susceptible of innocent explanation”.

o Need particularized and objective basiso Inferences from specific facts based on

officer’s experience and training.Alabama v. White

(anonymous tip; police stopped car, found marijuana)

What is sufficient for reasonable suspicion? – based on informants’ tips

Police may rely on informants (even anonymous ones)

Less demanding in quantity and quality of information than for probable cause. (Gates light)

Predictive information strengthens tipFlorida v. J.L.

(anonymous tip that person would be carrying a gun)

What is sufficient for reasonable suspicion? – based on informants’ tips

An informant’s tip must contain predictive information

A generalized anonymous tip is insufficient for reasonable suspicion.

Courts refuse to create a firearms exception.Illinois v. Wardlow

(police caravan in neighborhood; defendant ran when he saw the police)

Reasonable suspicion on a person’s trying to avoid a police officer

Officers may detain a person trying to avoid a police officer in a high crime area.

United States v. Sokolow

(black jumpsuit with gold chains; Miami to Hawaii)

Reasonable suspicion based on profiles

Reasonable suspicion based on a profile does not detract from the evidentiary significance as seen by a trained agent.

Profiles may establish reasonable suspicion.

Exclusionary Rule

Hudson v. Michigan The exclusionary rule does not apply to a violation of the knock-and-announce rule

Weeks v. United State The origins of the exclusionary rule

Applies the exclusionary rule to federal cases

Mapp v. Ohio The origins of the exclusionary rule

Applies the exclusionary rule to the states

Who can object to the introduction of evidence and raise the exclusionary rule?

Jones If a person is legitimately on the premises at the time of the search, then that person can object to the evidence.

Rakas v. Illinois Who can object to the introduction of evidence and raise the exclusionary rule?

The person objecting must be the one whose 4th Amendment rights were violated.

Overturned Jones.

Minnesota v. Carter Who can object to the introduction of evidence and raise the exclusionary rule?

Mere visitors do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in someone else’s home.

No REP, no violation

Brendlin v. California Who can object to the introduction of evidence and raise the exclusionary rule?

When a car has been stopped, the passenger is likewise seized and can challenge the constitutionality of the stop.

Exceptions to the exclusionary rule

Murray v. United States

(police illegally entered warehouse, saw marijuana, then re-entered with search warrant and seized drug)

Independent source Allows admission of evidence that has been discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation.

The "independent source" exception to the exclusionary rule may justify admitting evidence discovered during an illegal warrantless search that was later "rediscovered" by the same team of investigators during a search pursuant to a warrant obtained immediately after the illegal search.

Key question: was the source truly independent?Nix v. Williams

(guy tells cop where little girl’s body is so she can have a proper Christian burial)

Inevitable discovery If the police can demonstrate that they inevitably would have discovered the evidence, even without a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule does not apply and the evidence is admissible.

Unconstitutionally obtained evidence may be admitted at trial if it inevitably would have been discovered in the same condition by an independent line of investigation that was already being pursued when the constitutional violation occurred.

Prosecution has the burden of proving inevitability by the preponderance of the evidence.

Brown v. Illinois

(officers in apartment; Mirandized 2 times; confessed)

Inadequate Causal Connection – Attenuation of the Taint

Miranda warnings, by themselves, do not necessarily purge the taint of an illegal arrest.

Brown factors:o Miranda warnings;o Temporal proximity of the arrest and the

confession (time gap);o The presence of intervening circumstances

(tend to be of the defendant’s actions); o The purpose and flagrancy of the official

misconduct;o The voluntariness of the statement o The burden of showing admissibility rests on

the prosecution.United States v. Leon

(facially valid search warrant; narcotics found)

The good faith exception

When police act under a warrant that is invalid for lack of probable cause, the exclusionary rule does not apply if the police acted “in objectively reasonable reliance” on the subsequently invalidated search warrant.

Herring v. United States

The good faith exception

The exclusionary rule only applies to police conduct that is deliberate or reckless or grossly negligent, or the result of systemic department

(neighboring county didn’t update records; invalid warrant)

violations. (the “Barney Fife” exception) Evidence will not be excluded when the violation is

the result of isolated negligence apart from the arrest.

Police Interrogation and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

Voluntariness is to be determined by the totality of the circumstances:1. The length of the interrogation 2. Whether Defendant was deprived of basic bodily functions3. The use of threats or force4. Psychological pressure tactics5. Deception6. The age, level of education, and mental condition of a suspect

Hope v. People of Territory of Utah

(note case) A confession should not go to the jury unless it appears to the court to have been voluntary

Bram v. United States (note case) Involuntary confessions violate the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment

Brown v. Mississippi

(tortured by mob and deputy until he confessed)

The Requirement for Voluntariness

Confessions gained involuntary are inadmissible as violating the 5th Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.

Jackson v. Denno Determining Whether a Confession is Voluntary

The prosecution has the burden of proving a confession is voluntary in order to admit it into evidence.

Crane v. Kentucky Determining Whether a Confession is Voluntary

Even if the judge deems the confession to be voluntary and it is admitted, a defendant still can argue to the jury that the confession was obtained under circumstances and conditions that make it unreliable.

Arizona v. Fulminante

(killed step-daughter in AZ; informant said he would provide protection if he confessed to informant)

The Use of Force and Threats of Force

A confession obtained after a defendant is physically coerced or threatened with physical force is not voluntary.

A finding of coercion need not depend upon actual violence by a government agent; a credible threat is sufficient.

Coercion can be mental as well as physical

Spano v. New York

(boxer took D’s money; D goes home, gets gun, and kills boxer)

Psychological Pressure Tactics

Confessions procured through the use of psychological pressure may not be admitted into evidence.

Petitioner's will was overborne by official pressure, fatigue and sympathy falsely aroused after considering all the facts in their post-indictment

setting. Leyra v. Dennis Deception Telling a suspect that his accomplice has already

confessed is not deception requiring suppression of a confession.

Frazier v. Cupp Deception (note case) An officer acting as a friend to a suspect and expressing sympathy for his or her plight is not deception requiring suppression of a confession.

Payne v. Arkansas The Age, Level of Education, and Mental Condition of a Suspect (note case)

In finding a confession involuntary, the Court stressed that the suspect had a fifth-grade education

Culombe v. Connecticut

The Age, Level of Education, and Mental Condition of a Suspect (note case)

The Court emphasized that the suspect was illiterate and of low intelligence

Crooker v. California The Age, Level of Education, and Mental Condition of a Suspect (note case)

The Court noted that the suspect had completed a year of law school

Colorado v. Connelly

(voluntarily walked up to uniformed officer and announced killing a woman)

Condition of a Suspect A confession is to be deemed involuntary, regardless of the defendant's mental condition, only if it is the product of police misconduct.

o Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not "voluntary" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.

o The taking of respondent's statements, and their admission into evidence, constitute no violation of that Clause.

Fifth Amendment Limits on In-Custodial Interrogation: Miranda v. Arizona Unwarned statement -> leads to witnesses

o Exclusionary rule does not apply (Michigan v. Tucker) Unwarned statement -> later statement (after new warnings)

o Exclusionary rule does not apply (Oregon v. Elstad)o Exception: Gov’t deliberately evades Miranda (Missouri v. Seibert)

Unwarned statement -> physical evidenceo Exclusionary rule does not apply (U.S. v. Patane)

Involuntary statement -> statements, physical evidenceo Exclusionary rule applies, subject to exceptions such as attenuation of the taint.

Miranda v. Arizona

(man was interrogated in special room, not told about rights)

Miranda v. Arizona and Its Affirmation by the Supreme Court

A person must be advised of his rights before interrogation.

Dickerson v. United States

(man made statement at an FBI field office when interrogated, but before Mirandized)

Miranda v. Arizona and Its Affirmation by the Supreme Court

Miranda is a constitutional rule and may not be overruled by an Act of Congress.

Chavez v. Martinez (note case) Four justices: No violation of Miranda unless the confession is admitted at trial.

Five justices: Miranda is a rule concerning police behavior under the Fifth Amendment.

Orozco v. Texas When is a Person “In Custody”? (note case)

A person who has been arrested is in custody and Miranda warnings must be given, even if the questioning occurs in a person’s home.

Oregon v. Mathiason

(Police questioned D at station without Miranda; D confessed; police let him leave; police later arrested D)

When is a Person “In Custody”?

A person who is free to leave is not in custody and no Miranda warnings are required.

Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime.

Police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question.

Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him “in custody.”

Beckwith v. United States When is a Person “In Custody?” (note case)

A special agent of the IRS, investigating potential criminal income tax violations, in an interview with a taxpayer, not in custody, is not required to give the warnings called for in Miranda v. Arizona.

Minnesota v. Murphy When is a Person “In Custody?” (note case)

Statements made in a meeting with a person’s probation officer were not

uttered in a custodial context and no Miranda warnings were required.

Stansbury v. California When is a Person “In Custody?” (note case)

An officer’s subjective and undisclosed view concerning whether the person being interrogated is a suspect is irrelevant to the assessment whether the person is in custody.

The initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.

Yarborough v. Alvarado

(17 ½-year-old boy questioned at station while parents waited in the lobby)


Voluntariness of a statement depends on whether “the defendant’s will was overborne.”

The determination of whether a person is in custody is an objective one, not a subjective one focusing on the individual’s or the officer’s state of mind.

Berkemer v. McCarty

(man stopped for erratic driving; admitted drinking a couple of beers and smoking a few joints)


Ordinary traffic stops do not require Miranda warnings.

The noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda.

Rhode Island v. Innis

(Defendant killed a cab driver and robbed another at gunpoint; hid gun by school for handicapped kids; told cops where gun was)

What is an “Interrogation”? Must be "express questioning" or "functional equivalent"

Test: words or actions that "police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response" (it's an objective test; the reasonable officer)

Intent/motive of police does not matter under this test.

“Guilt trip” by officers in front seat of patrol car. “It would be a shame if a little girl at the (handicap) school found the gun and hurt herself.”

Arizona v. Mauro What is an “Interrogation”? (note case)

The purpose of Miranda is to protect against coercive government action.

Here the wife spoke to her husband (not government action)

Illinois v. Perkins What is an “Interrogation”? An undercover law enforcement officer must not give Miranda warnings to an

(undercover agent and cellmate got information; didn’t Mirandize him)

incarcerated suspect before asking him questions that may elicit an incriminating response.

No Miranda warnings were required because it was not a police-dominated atmosphere.

California v. Prysock

(kid Mirandized; later mom asked if he could have a lawyer)

What is Required by the Police?

Exact language is not required for a valid Miranda warning.

Warnings must reasonably convey to a suspect his Miranda rights.

Duckworth v. Eagan

(D signed form that said can’t afford a lawyer now, but one would be provided for court)

What is Required by the Police?

Exact language is not required for a valid Miranda warning.

Warnings must reasonably convey to a suspect his Miranda rights.

Oregon v. Elstad

(In his living room, D admitted being at the house of a burglary; Mirandized, then made and signed a statement)

What of the Consequences of a Violation of Miranda?

Absent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion.

A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admissions of the earlier statement.

First step is voluntary, then Miranda, then question: the first statement is out, but the subsequent statement is in.

Missouri v. Seibert

(Murder suspect questioned, Mirandized, questioned; confessed at first questioning, made process illegal)


Midstream recitation of warnings after interrogation and unwarned confession does not effectively comply with Miranda’s constitutional requirement and a repeated statement after a warning is inadmissible.

Interrogate, confess, warn, interrogate violates Miranda

o Deliberate attempt to evade Miranda through continuous interrogation

United States v. Patane

(D stated he knew his rights,


Violations of Miranda result in testimony (verbal statements) being suppressed, but does not apply to

would not let officers finish the warnings; told police location of the gun)

physical evidence retrieved as a result. The 5th Amendment applies to self-

incrimination by testimony. It does not apply to evidence.

Miranda exceptions*Impeachment *Emergency *Booking * Waiver

Harris v. New York

(undercover offcer testified to D’s narcotic sales)

Impeachment Exception to Miranda

Statements gained from a criminal defendant are admissible for impeachment purposes if the defendant chooses to testify at trial.

Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury.

New York v. Quarles

(rapist in supermarket)

Emergency Exception to Miranda

Public safety exception Statements obtained by police from

suspects during emergency situations could be used against a criminal defendant even if Miranda warnings were not properly administered.

Police officers may ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety.

o Objective test: “Reasonable officer” test

Pennsylvannia v. Muniz Booking Exception to Miranda (note case)

Routine booking questions are not considered interrogation (administrative, not investigatory)

“…the slurred speech that was evident on the videotape did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination because it was not testimonial.”

North Carolina v. Butler

(D said he understood Miranda, but wouldn’t sign a waiver)

What is Sufficient to Constitute a Waiver?

Silence is not enough to constitute a waiver.

Express written or oral statement can be strong proof.

Waiver may be express or implied.Fare v Michael C. (note case) The totality of the circumstances approach

is adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even when interrogation of juveniles is involved.

Colorado v. Connelly (note case) Miranda protects defendant from

government coercion but goes no further than that.

Moran v. Burbine (note case) Events occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.

Defendant’s sister had hired him an attorney without his knowledge and he waived his right to remain silent.

Spring v. Colorado (note case) The police have no duty to inform a suspect of the nature of the crime for which he or she is under suspicion.

The additional information could affect only the wisdom of a Miranda waiver, not its essentially voluntary and knowing nature.

Michigan v. Mosley

(D arrested for one crime, invoked right to counsel; later he was questioned for another crime)

How is a Waiver After the Assertion of Rights Treated?

Police may resume questioning of a suspect for a separate crime after the passage of significant time, giving a new set of Miranda warnings, and questioning is restricted to the crime that had not been subject of the earlier interrogation.

Test: was the suspect’s right to cut off questioning scrupulously honored?

Edwards v. Arizona

(man invoked right to counsel; a day later he was questioned again)


If the defendant invokes the right to counsel, then the police cannot initiate further interrogation unless the suspect initiates the communications.

Michigan v. Jackson (note case) If the police initiate interrogation after a defendant's assertion, at arraignment or similar proceeding, of the right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.

Minnick v. Mississippi

(after invoking right to counsel and meeting with attorney, he was questioned by police without attorney there; he confessed)


When counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney.

Davis v. United States How is a Waiver After the Assertion of Rights Treated?

The suspect must unambiguously request counsel.

(man being questioned about murder on a navy base never overtly asked for counsel)

After a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.

Maryland v. Shatzer

(2 ½ years after being questioned for sexually abusing his 3-year-old and invoking right to counsel, he was questioned again and confessed)

Waiver exception Once a person has invoked the right to counsel, police questioning must cease. This expires after 14 days.

Berghuis v. Thompkins

(man provided with written and verbal Miranda; man did not say he was invoking his right to remain silent, but didn’t say much during questioning)

Waiver exception The invocation of the right to remain silent must unambiguous.

Prosecution must show defendant understood the right to remain silent.

After that, an uncoerced statement is admissible. (uncoerced = voluntary)

The Sixth Amendment and the Right to Counsel and Police Interrogations

Gideon v. Wainwright Right to Counsel During Interrogation

The 14th Amendment imposes a duty on the states to grant defendants’ the rights enumerated in the 6th Amendment, specifically the right “to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”

Massiah v. United States

(criminal agrees to wear wire to talk to D after D invoked right to counsel)

Right to Counsel During Interrogations

The 6th Amendment right to counsel applies whenever a person is questioned after adversarial proceedings have begun.

Incriminating statements made by a Defendant may not be used against him.

Police may not cause to be done what they themselves may not do.

Escobedo v. Illinois Right to Counsel During Interrogations (note case)

The Court extended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to those who were questioned by the police but had not yet been formally charged.

Decided before Miranda

Kirby v. Illinois Right to Counsel During Interrogations (note case)

The 6th Amendment right to counsel at police identification procedures (such as a line up), applies only after the initiation of formal adversarial proceedings – whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment information, or arraignment.

Brewer v. Williams

(Christian burial speech)

Right to Counsel During Interrogations

Defendant was deprived of his 6th Amendment right to counsel when officers discussed the case of a missing girl in front of the defendant and caused him to confess and lead them to the girl’s body.

o right to counsel at pretrial stage is “critical”.

Christian burial speech Not an interrogation, but deprivation

of counselTexas v. Cobb Right to Counsel During

Interrogations – The Right to Counsel is Offense Specific

The 6th Amendment right to counsel is personal to the defendant and specific to the offense.

Blockburger test: does each offense require proof of a fact which the other does not. (burglary and kidnapping)

When the 6th Amendment right to counsel attaches, it does encompass offenses that, even if not formally charged, would be considered the same offense under the Blockburger test.

Montejo v. Louisiana Is waiver valid if police initiate?

Waiver possible even if defendant invokes sixth Amendment right to counsel and police initiate questioning

Edwards still applies if right to counsel under Fifth Amendment is involved.

United States v. Henry

(incriminating statements made to cell mate/paid police informant)

What is Impermissible Police of Statements?

Intentionally creating a situation likely to induce defendant to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, is a violation of Defendant’s 6th Amendment right to counsel.

Government informant cannot initiate conversation

Kuhlmann v. Wilson

(incriminating statements

What is Impermissible Police of Statements?

A defendant does not make out a violation of his 6th Amendment rights simply by showing that an informant

made to cell mate/police informant)

reported his incriminating statements to the police.

The defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.

Government informant can “keep his ears” open

Right to Counsel

Argersinger v. Hamlin When the Right to Counsel Applies

Absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial

5th Amendment 6th AmendmentRequires custody Initiation of judicial proceedingsInterrogation Deliberate eliciting of statementsNot offense specific Offense specific

Documents

Crim pro cases and rules