Creating an Effective Regional Alignment Strategy for the U.S. Army

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CREATING AN EFFECTIVE REGIONAL ALIGNMENT STRATEGY

FOR THE U.S. ARMY

Officer Corps Strategy Monograph Series

Raven Bukowski

John Childress

Michael J. Colarusso

David S. Lyle

Volume 7

Carlisle Barracks, PA and

UNITED STATES

ARMY WAR COLLEGE

PRESS

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The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army WarCollege and is the strategic-level study agent for issues relatedto national security and military strategy with emphasis ongeostrategic analysis.

The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conductstrategic studies that develop policy recommendations on:

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i


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Strategic Studies Instituteand

U.S. Army War College Press

CREATING AN EFFECTIVE REGIONALALIGNMENT STRATEGY

FOR THE U.S. ARMY

Raven Bukowski John Childress

Michael J. ColarussoDavid S. Lyle

November 2014

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors anddo not necessarily reect the ofcial policy or position of theDepartment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) andU.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy fullacademic freedom, provided they do not disclose classiedinformation, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresentofcial U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them tooffer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the inter-est of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared forpublic release; distribution is unlimited.

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This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code,Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not becopyrighted.


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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and shouldbe forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 AshburnDrive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010.

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This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army WarCollege External Research Associates Program. Information onthis program is available on our website, www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil , at the Opportunities tab.

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The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army WarCollege Press publishes a monthly email newsletter to updatethe national security community on the research of our analysts,recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming confer-ences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also providesa strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If youare interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on theSSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter.

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The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions ofLieutenant Colonel Chris Danbeck, former 2nd Brigade Combat


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Team/1st Infantry Division S3; and Mr. Mike Knippel, ForcesCommand Regionally Aligned Forces Staff Integrator.

*****

Monographs in the “Ofcer Talent Management Series” (2009-10) include:

1. Towards a U.S. Army Ofcer Corps Strategy for Success: A Pro- posed Human Capital Model Focused upon Talent, March 31, 2009. 2. Talent: Implications for a U.S. Army Ofcer Corps Strategy,

October 28, 2009. 3. Towards a U.S. Army Ofcer Corps Strategy for Success: Re-taining Talent, January 15, 2010. 4. Accessing Talent: The Foundation of a U.S. Army Ofcer CorpsStrategy, February 19, 2010. 5. Towards a U.S. Army Ofcer Corps Strategy for Success: Devel-oping Talent, March 29, 2010. 6. Towards a U.S. Army Ofcer Corps Strategy for Success: Em- ploying Talent, May 5, 2010.

ISBN 1-58487-654-9


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FOREWORD

This monograph focuses upon “regional align-ment,” viewed by many as critical if the Army is toremain both relevant and effective in the 21st centurysecurity environment. Despite its title, the monographis part of the Strategic Studies Institute’s ongoing “tal-ent management” series. In fact, the authors arguethat world class talent management is a necessary pre-condition to creating an effective regional alignmentstrategy for the Army. They identify several seriouschallenges to creating a workable regional alignmentof Army units, most of which hinge upon understand-ing and liberating the unique talents of individual sol-diers and civilians. They also argue that the Army’scurrent Force Generation Model is not conducive tocreating and maintaining regionally expert units and

must be adjusted accordingly.As the Army’s most senior leaders are focused

upon regional alignment to maximize unit effective-ness in a time of scal austerity and global uncer-tainty, the ideas discussed in this monograph meritclose attention.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. Director Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press


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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

MAJOR RAVEN BUKOWSKI is an Assistant Professorof International Relations at the United States MilitaryAcademy, West Point, NY. Her research interests in-clude civil-military relations, near-peer strategic cul-ture, intelligence policy, and security and developmentstrategies for countries in transition. Major Bukowskiholds a B.S. from West Point and an M.A. in interna-tional economics and strategic studies from the JohnsHopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

MAJOR JOHN CHILDRESS is an Assistant Professorof American Politics and a member of the U.S. Army’sOfce of Economic and Manpower Analysis at theUnited States Military Academy, West Point, NY.His research interests include reforms to the Army

Human Resources employment model, Veterans’ Af-fairs, and Grand Strategy. Major Childress holds a B.S.from West Point and an M.A. in public policy from theGeorgetown Public Policy Institute.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL (RET.) MICHAEL J.COLARUSSO is a Senior Research Analyst in theArmy’s Ofce of Economic and Manpower Analysisat the United States Military Academy, West Point.Lieutenant Colonel Colarusso recently co-authored“Senior Ofcer Talent Management: Fostering Insti-tutional Adaptability,” published by the U.S. ArmyWar College’s Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) (2014).His previous SSI publications include the monographseries “Ofcer Talent Management Series” (2009-10).

His primary areas of research are organizational de-sign, generational dynamics, human capital, andtalent management. Lieutenant Colonel Colarusso


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holds a B.A. in history from Saint John’s Universityand an M.A. in history from the Pennsylvania State

University.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID S. LYLE is an As-sociate Professor of Economics and Director of the Ar-my’s Ofce of Economic and Manpower Analysis atthe United States Military Academy, West Point, NY. His primary areas of research are labor economics,econometrics, human capital, and talent management.Lieutenant Colonel Lyle has published articles in the Journal of Political Economy, the Journal of Labor Econom-ics, the Review of Economics and Statistics, the AmericanEconomic Journal: Applied, the Economics of EducationReview, and the American Economic Association. He alsoco-authored “Senior Ofcer Talent Management: Fos-tering Institutional Adaptability,” published by SSI

of the U.S. Army War College (2014). His previousSSI publications include the monograph series “Of-cer Talent Management Series” (2009-10). LieutenantColonel Lyle holds a B.S. from West Point and a Ph.D.in economics from the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology.


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SUMMARY

As the war in Afghanistan draws to a close, the U.S.Army is increasingly focused upon “regionally align-ing” its forces. To do so effectively, however, it mustundertake several initiatives. First, the Army mustacknowledge and liberate the unique productive ca-pabilities (talents) of each individual. Second, it mustshift from process-oriented, industrial age personnelmanagement to productivity-focused, information agetalent management. Third, the Army must foster en-during human relationships between its organizationsand the governments, militaries, and populations towhich they are regionally aligned. Hand in hand withthis, it must redesign its Force Generation Model tocreate regional expertise at both individual and orga-nizational levels. Fourth, the Army must ensure that

regional alignment does not degrade the worldwide“ex” capabilities of its forces.


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CREATING AN EFFECTIVE REGIONALALIGNMENT STRATEGY

FOR THE U.S. ARMY

INTRODUCTION

Sometimes past is prologue. So it is with “regionalalignment,” a centerpiece of the U.S. Army’s emerg-ing strategy. In a way, it echoes Cold War practices,when Army units were habitually aligned to differ-ing theaters, immersed in local politics and culture,and trained and equipped to meet specic regionalthreats.1 While this experience certainly provides in-valuable insights for future regional alignment plan-ning, 21st century threats demand a signicantlymodied approach.

As Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno wrote

in 2012, “We’ve learned many lessons over the last 10years, but one of the most compelling is that . . . noth-ing is as important to [our] long-term success as un-derstanding the prevailing culture and values” of ar-eas in which the Army may operate.2 The Army’s 2013Strategic Planning Guidance contains similar themes,highlighting that “. . . success depends as much onunderstanding the social and political fabric of the situ-ation as it does on the ability to physically dominateit.”3 Other ofcial pronouncements express similarsentiments. For example, Army.mil recently ran a U.S.Army Central (ARCENT) Command story proclaim-ing “. . . the Future Hinges on Regional Alignments.”4

Clearly, the Army’s leadership believes that re-gionally aligned, culturally uent forces will improve

its ability to “prevent, shape, and win” as part of thelarger joint force.5 Because the concept departs fromthe “plug and play,” modular deployment approach


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of the last decade, it has generated signicant defensemedia attention.6 In 2012, for example, Stripes.com

reported “AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command] Firstto Test New Regional Brigade Concept.”7 In October2013, Defensenews.com announced “New Training toFocus on Regionally Aligned Forces Concept,”8 fol-lowed closely by an Army Times piece which theorizedthat “Regional Alignment May Boost Soldiers’ CareerStability.”9 Professional journal articles have also pro-liferated in the last 2 years, with pundits both insideand outside of the defense establishment weighing inon the topic.

Yet despite talk about regional alignment, theArmy has taken few concrete steps to prepare for thisdramatic change. While enormous in its implications,the Army’s current regional alignment plan seems tobe little more than directing units to “focus region-

ally” and aligning them with the appropriate combat-ant command. While regionally tailored equipmentpackages and deeper relationships with local alliesare likely to follow, creating formations with the ex-pertise to dominate in regional missions is a far largerchallenge—a human capital one.

Over the past decade, the Army has slowly recog-nized the need to change its people policies. Perhapsno clearer acknowledgment exists than that found inthe current Army Capstone Concept, which calls for theArmy to “. . . rene its accessions processes to attract,select and place people in ways that match talentsand skills to the tasks of any given specialty.”10 It alsostates that the Army must manage and apply talentmore effectively to maximize individual potential

and emphasize the value and necessity of investmentin the Army’s most valuable resource: its soldiersand civilians.11


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Despite this, current Army personnel practices re-main rooted in an industrial age approach that fails to

recognize the unique productive capabilities that eachsoldier or civilian brings to the force. Perhaps evenmore problematic, the Army has no mechanism toidentify relevant regional talents or experiences suchas cultural uencies, foreign contacts, or travel abroad.Nor can it identify which duties or assignments de-mand more regional expertise than others. Withoutthis information, the Army is unable to match soldiertalents with the demand for them. Today’s rigid per-sonnel management system continues to prioritize as-signment requirements over individual qualicationsand standardized career timelines over unit readiness.This will surely prevent regionally aligned units fromreaching their optimal operational capabilities.

These challenges are not the fault of any indi-

vidual soldier, ofcer, or command. Army HumanResources Command (HRC) professionals work tire-lessly to meet the Army’s needs, but they are trappedin an outmoded human resources (HR) system thatprevents them from managing talent most effectively.To succeed in regional alignment (or in any strategicendeavor, for that matter), the Army must redesign itshuman capital management system for the 21st cen-tury. Of course, changing personnel policy is toughfor any organization, particularly a large, tradition-focused bureaucracy bound by the sinewy muscles oftime-worn practices.

Historically, the greatest shifts in Army HR man-agement have coincided with force expansion ordrawdown, much like that occurring today. This is

why now is exactly the right time to adopt a talentmanagement approach in the Army’s human capitaldomain. Without it, talk of genuine regional alignment


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will remain just that—talk. Although organizationaland equipment tables may be rewritten, genuinely

enhanced regional capabilities will remain elusive.It doesn’t have to be this way. Five talent man-

agement and organizational design imperatives canmake effective regional alignment a reality. The Armymust: acknowledge and liberate the unique produc-tive capabilities (talents) of each individual; shift fromprocess-oriented, industrial age personnel manage-ment to productivity-focused, information age talentmanagement; create enduring human relationshipsbetween regionally aligned organizations and theirtarget nations, populations, and defense establish-ments; redesign its Force Generation (ARFORGEN)Model to provide the stability and tenure needed tofoster deep regional expertise at both the individualand organizational levels; and maintain the global

“ex” capabilities of regionally aligned units.

Acknowledge and Liberate the Unique Talents ofEach Individual.

Every person has a particular talent distribution—a unique intersection of skills, knowledge, and be-haviors that create optimal levels of performance,provided that person is employed against jobs thatliberate his or her particular talents.12 Unfortunately,the Army’s current personnel system is unable toalign talents against work requirements because ithas an incomplete picture of both. Essentially, theArmy employs a two-dimensional approach to HRmanagement, assigning individuals on the basis of

functional specialty (branch or career eld) and yearsof service (“time in grade,” or rank).13 Additionally,each job has a generic description such as “company


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commander” or “squad leader,” denoting little aboutthe position’s actual work demands. Such ambiguity

forces the Army’s personnel system to treat people asinterchangeable parts. This prevents optimal employ-ment, stymies professional growth, and hampers unitproductivity.

Consider Paul, for example, a Military Intelligence(MI) ofcer uent in Mandarin Chinese and possessinga top tier Master’s Degree in Economics and SoutheastAsia Studies. Having developed his language skillsand regional expertise through the Army’s AdvancedCivil Schooling (ACS) graduate school program, Paulcontinued to deepen his uency after school throughself-study. Not only does he possess broad intel-ligence expertise, he has developed deep regional expertise via the Army’s investment in him. Unfortu-nately, the investment was squandered when the cur-

rent personnel management system assigned Paul to a3-year recruiting command position in Ohio.14

This example is not meant to suggest that everyChinese speaking ofcer should be permanently post-ed to Southeast Asia. A truly regionally focused Army,however, should have at least considered Paul’s suit-ability for Pacic theater service. Today’s personnelmanagement system cannot do so, however, becauseit lacks both the information and policies necessary. Itdoes not know the specics of Paul’s graduate stud-ies, only that he has a Master’s degree. It cannot seehis self-study and resultant deep uencies, so Paul isinstead managed as an interchangeable part, availablefor reassignment to any intelligence or “branch imma-terial” vacancy requiring his pay grade. What is more,

the signicant taxpayer investments made in Paul’seducation may be lost if his regional expertise deterio-rates in Cleveland or if he is poached from the Armyby a more insightful employer.15


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In contrast, an information age, talent manage-ment approach leverages the unique talents of each

person to improve organizational performance. Truetalent management rejects the notion of “talent” as the“top 5 or 10 percent,” an elitist approach that managesa tiny fraction of the workforce while neglecting thedevelopment and employment of the majority. Thereare limitless dimensions and distributions of talent,and every person possesses a unique set of both.16 When an employer acknowledges this, it can beginto effectively manage its entire labor force, maximiz-ing productivity, development, worker satisfaction,and retention.

These are worthy outcomes to pursue in today’s s-cally austere defense environment. Instead of repeat-edly missing the chance to leverage its own humancapital investments, a talent management approach

will allow the Army to better “manage, train, anddevelop soldiers to support regional alignment . . .”in accordance with the leadership’s vision.17 It willcapture the regional expertise a soldier possesses orgains from experiences both inside and outside ofthe Army.

Adopt Information Age Talent ManagementPractices.

With the right data, supporting policies, and ro-bust information management systems, the Army canmore effectively manage soldier talents across the fullspectrum of land-combat demands. Whether the fu-ture ght is conventional, shifts towards space and

cyber, or demands the newest warghting function of“engagement,” talent management can align the rightexpertise against any challenge and at minimal cost.18


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Even during the heyday of Cold War regionalalignment, however, the Army failed to leverage

the abundant expertise present in its labor force. Al-though the Army has maintained a regional focus onthe Korean Peninsula for over 60 years, its personnelmanagement policies have remained inimical to theaccession, retention, development, or employment ofregional expertise. For example, only 27 percent of allsoldiers assigned to Korea in the 1990s ever returnedfor a follow-up assignment.19 Rapid personnel churnin the name of tour “equity” exacerbates the problem,degrading cultural uency and personal relation-ships with allies while creating cyclical gaps in theinstitutional knowledge of forward deployed units.20 The Army must do more than apply its Cold War,Korean model of regional alignment to the rest of theforce. It must develop and align the right talents to

each region.Army Special Forces (SF) already practice much

of this approach. Its regionally focused units employa systematic procedure for evaluating candidatesagainst job-related dimensions that are specic to theSpecial Forces Group and the operational environ-ments in which they serve.21 For example, the regionalexpertise of each SF candidate is evaluated via toolssuch as the Defense Language Aptitude Battery andDefense Language Prociency Tests. In a nation ofimmigrants, this is sound practice, as many soldierspossess heritage language skills.

SF units then deepen cultural uency via special-ized language, culture, terrain, environment, climate,and social-political training. Once qualied as an SF

soldier, an individual’s particular regional uencydrives assignments. SF teams also remain together forextended periods, fostering unit cohesion and pro-


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viding the time and experience necessary to developthe functional expertise that complements regional

expertise. Another benet of fewer changes of stationis family stability, providing both families and singlesoldiers with greater opportunities to build long-termrelationships that increase personal and professionalwell-being. This is a retention incentive, allowingthe Army to get a greater return on its investment ineach soldier.

There is no reason why the larger Army cannotscale several of the SF’s regional talent managementpractices to the larger force. In fact, a recent, multi-year ofcer talent management pilot program demon-strated how effectively this can be done. In 2010, theCommanding General of the Training and DoctrineCommand (TRADOC) and the Assistant Secretary ofthe Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs jointly

directed the piloting of an ofcer talent managementinformation system called “Green Pages.”22

Green Pages was constructed with a talent market-place at its center, a mechanism that was key to thesystem’s piloting success. While better talent matcheswere a signicant side benet, the purpose of the pilotwas to capture accurate, granular, and timely infor-mation on every ofcer and every duty position, fa-cilitating the future management of each. Ofcers inthe reassignment window built personal proles andprovided information, heavily augmenting their of-cial les, while units with pending vacancies simulta-neously built job proles, detailing the specic talentsneeded to excel in each ofcer position. Participatingofcers reviewed job vacancies and expressed prefer-

ences for them, while units reviewed available ofcersand expressed their preferences as well.


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As ofcers and units expressed preferences andcommunicated directly with one another, preferences

on both sides of the market shifted, often dramati-cally. Units reordered their ofcer selections and of-cers reordered their unit choices. In fact, half of allparticipating ofcers changed their initial assignmentpreference while exploring the job market. What hap-pened was simple. Units clearly signaled their laborneeds, and ofcers who could meet them were attract-ed accordingly. Conversely, ofcers revealed hiddentalents, and units who might not have otherwise con-sidered them suddenly took notice. Green Pages alsorevealed deeper expertise as well. As Figure 1 shows,for example, hidden within this same pilot popula-tion were 78 professional engineer certications thatwould conservatively cost $16 million to produce.23

Figure 1. Green Pages Revealed over $16Min Certifcations.

78 of our 730 Engineers (11% of the Pilot Population)

Revealed over $16 Million in Hidden Certifcations


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As Figure 2 indicates, Green Pages pilot resultsare also germane to the Army’s regional alignment

efforts. Of the 870 ofcers in the pilot, ofcial Armydata bases, such as the Total Army Personnel DataBase (TAPDB), revealed cultural uencies spanning just 28 percent of the globe. Yet Green Pages revealedadditional uencies spanning 72 percent of the world,everything from advanced language skills to studyabroad, religious or humanitarian missions, ofcialtemporary duty, military-to-military exchanges, ex-tended leisure travel, familial connections, etc. HRCthen used the granular talent data gathered by GreenPages to optimize ofcer assignments to the mutualbenet of both individuals and organizations. Scaledacross the force, a tool such as Green Pages would bea critical enabler to the Army’s regional alignment ef-forts, provided it was accompanied by appropriate

policy changes.

Figure 2. Army Green Pages Pilot CulturalFluency Data.


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Create Enduring Human Relationships betweenParticular Units and Regions.

When describing the complex operational environ-ment, the Army Strategic Planning Guidance outlinesthree Army requirements extending beyond the threatenvironment. They are: shape relationships with non-hostile rivals, avoiding misunderstandings that couldescalate to conict; partner with friends and allies tocreate favorable regional conditions (social, economic,political, military, etc.); and work with developingstates to prevent disorder that could escalate to majorcombat operations or strategic strike options.24 Suc-cess in each of these depends heavily upon mature,trusting, and enduring human relationships. In fact,the Army believes that such relationships “. . . playa critical role in shaping the strategic environment.”25

Enduring human relations must be nurtured be-tween an organization and the population it operatesin or around. Consider a sports franchise, for example.Yankees fans are not just enamored with pinstripesor the iconic, interlocking “NY” logo. First and fore-most, they feel a special relationship to the team be-cause of its abundance of enduring stars. Across thedecades, they have become familiar with Babe Ruth,Lou Gehrig, Joe DiMaggio, Mickey Mantle, andDerek Jeter. They feel that they “know” these men,even though not personally acquainted with them.If, however, the Yankees were nothing but a collec-tion of journeyman ballplayers that came and wentannually, the public’s afnity for the team would besignicantly diminished.

By the same token, the Army’s Soldiers need timeto build strong interpersonal relationships with re-


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gional populations, to represent more than a shoulderpatch or unit guidon. During the recent wars in Iraq

and Afghanistan, for example, one of the most daunt-ing challenges for a newly deployed brigade combatteam (BCT) was establishing effective relationshipswith local tribes, governments, police, military lead-ers, and their own higher headquarters. Although theprevious BCT had cultivated and nurtured these rela-tionships, each newly deployed brigade had to startbuilding its own relationships from scratch.

As already discussed, SF regional alignment poli-cies signicantly ameliorate these challenges. TheArmy National Guard (ARNG) provides another ex-ample of effective, long-term partnering to produceenduring human relationships. For over 20 years, theNational Guard State Partnership Program (NGSPP)has successfully developed 65 unique security partner-

ships involving 71 nations worldwide.26

The success ofthis program is due in large part to the fact that thereis little personnel change within ARNG units. Whenthese units deploy to conduct partnership activities,the same soldiers work with the host nation’s militarypersonnel, who develop an afnity for the ARNG unitbecause it is more than a patch—it is people.

Simultaneously, low personnel churn allows theseARNG units to build deep regional expertise throughcultural immersion during repeated deployments tothe same country. As Major General Rick Waddell,Deputy Commanding General for Mobilization andReserve Affairs for U.S. Southern Command, recentlyobserved, “These [ARNG Soldiers] . . . stick aroundfor a long time, and long-term relationships may pay

off in unforeseen circumstances in the future.”27 While there are fundamental differences between

Regular Army and ARNG units, active component


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regional alignment could readily adopt some of thepractices that make the NGSPP so successful. Wartime

conditions may have made it impossible to deployunits for multiyear tours, but peacetime conditions inmany regions afford the Army with opportunities toincrease soldier assignment length, reducing the per-sonnel churn so destructive to establishing and main-taining enduring human relationships.

Redesign the Army Force Generation Model.

Through the three phases of today’s ARFORGENModel cycle, modularity calls for “locking down” thepopulation of each BCT as it moves from the “train/ready” force pool to the “available” force pool. Theintent is to enhance unit cohesion and operational ef-fectiveness during deployment.28 Redeployment then

shatters that cohesion as soldiers move en masse totheir next assignments. Instead of the incremental per-sonnel churn that allows units to retain a modicum ofinstitutional memory and regional expertise, currentARFORGEN practices create “all or nothing” unitswhipsawing in and out of the proverbial “band ofexcellence.” While the integrative efforts of joint andArmy component commands offset this to an extent,they, too, are challenged to build and maintain region-al expertise and relationships due to personnel churnwithin their own headquarters.

ARFORGEN fails to appreciate that despite stan-dardization, each BCT is a unique collection of indi-viduals. Its outsized focus upon “plug and play” in-terchangeability fails to leverage that uniqueness. As

a result, ARFORGEN is ill-suited to producing stable,culturally uent, mission-tailored forces to meet re-gional challenges.29 According to the Army Strategic


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Planning Guidance, deployment by BCT is likely to be-come a thing of the past anyway, as regionally aligned

forces are organized into “squad to Corps-sizedformations empowered by soldiers.”30

For example, the entire 2nd BCT, First Infantry Di-vision, did not deploy to Africa. Instead, this “rst”regionally aligned brigade deployed one infantry bat-talion to execute split-based operations in multiplelocations, thousands of miles apart.31 Despite this, thebattalion’s standardized pre-deployment training wasidentical to that of its parent BCT and that of non-Africa aligned BCTs.32

Two lessons emerge from this example. First, mod-ular brigades should no longer be the centerpiece ofthe force generation model, at least not in peacetime.The Army should recognize that smaller teams aremore likely to be called upon to meet regional chal-

lenges. Second, certain sub-units required a higherlevel of regional expertise than others, and withinthose smaller teams, certain individuals needed deep-er expertise as well. In other words, a unit can becomefundamentally more effective in region-specic mis-sions if leavened with genuine regional experts whoare afforded extensive tenure, regionally focused civil-ian or professional military education, and recurringregional assignments. Given that smaller elementswithin the BCT—or, “teams within teams”—willhave unique mission requirements for regional align-ment, the Army should liberalize the ARFORGENcycle to man, train, and resource each of these teamsaccording to its specic mission requirements.

To create sound human relationships and deepen

regional expertise, the Army must redesign its forcegeneration model, particularly its personnel compo-nent, in four ways. First, command teams, intelligence,


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operations and logistics staffs, and special staff suchas chaplains, staff judge advocates, and civil affairs or

medical personnel are more likely to require regionaluency than other unit members. They represent the“front facing” part of the unit that interacts most ex-tensively with regional partners. These teams requir-ing regional expertise will require more time to trainthan those teams with a primarily functional mission,which may only require regional familiarity and canacquire it within a shorter amount of time.

Next, the Army must assign personnel to teamsthat either possess regional expertise or have the po-tential to develop it. With talent management, theArmy can “see” language prociency and aptitude,cultural uency, pertinent academic qualications,and functional specialties pertinent to the mission-tailored requirements of the region. To build effective

teams, regionally oriented skills and skill levels can becombined in a manner that can facilitate professionaldevelopment for all team members.

Third, the Army must allow regional experts timeto deepen their expertise before arriving at a unit.This may involve 6 months to 1 year spent conductinglanguage training or advanced civil schooling. Talentmanagement will also help the Army select the mostappropriate candidates for these advanced trainingopportunities. Intensive regional training prior to ar-rival at the unit provides the commander with trainedand ready regional and functional experts.

Finally, the Army must lengthen the time for whichpersonnel with regional expertise are assigned to units.By extending the amount of time regional experts are

assigned to a unit, commanders will have at their dis-posal deeper regional knowledge and experience thatwill serve the unit well beyond just one ARFORGEN


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or one and a half cycles. Arrival and departure timesfor regional experts must be carefully managed to

prevent the movement of trained regional experts atthe same time. Different timelines for different teamsallow the brigade to be constantly ready, regardlessof the phase of the ARFORGEN cycle in which func-tional teams may be. With a critical mass of regionalexperts constantly resident within the unit, the morerapid arrival and departure of functional experts willhave less of an effect on overall brigade readiness.

Maintain the Global “Flex” Capabilitiesof Regionally Aligned Units.

As the nation’s principal land force:

. . . the Army is globally responsive and regionally-

aligned; it is an indispensible partner and provider ofa full range of capabilities to combatant commandersin a Joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multi-national environment.33

Regionally aligned units cannot allow their corecompetencies to atrophy. In other words, over spe-cialization could leave the Army unable to respond to

unforeseen contingencies. The pace of global changeand the ambiguity the global threat environment maydemand units to rapidly pivot from one region to an-other and from one mission set to another.34

Consider that the greatest number of BCTs areregionally aligned to the Middle East, yet these unitsshould be able to perform in the Pacic region, partic-ularly if leavened with the appropriate experts. This

is not unlike the Army’s experience in World War II.After defeating Germany, dozens of Army divisionsin Europe began preparation for the invasion of Japan,


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and hundreds of ofcers and soldiers from the Pacictheater were rapidly transferred to these units to pre-

pare them for new terrain and a new adversary. Whilethe use of the atom bomb halted these preparations,they nonetheless provide an excellent lesson.

Within its overarching regional alignment plan,the Army should also try to anticipate the size andduration of certain contingencies and develop threecorresponding response packages: small/short-term,small/long-term, and large/any term.

For small/short-term contingencies, forces alreadyaligned to the region should be sufcient. Initial align-ment plans have allocated forces based on the projectedprevent-shape-win requirements of each theater. Ide-ally, with the expertise gained from deployment plan-ning, training, and sustainment coordination for mul-tiple engagement missions, teams within the aligned

brigade(s) are at the highest level of readiness torespond to the contingency.

When faced with small contingencies of longerduration, the Army should establish a rotation systemfor elements of brigades aligned to that region. Muchlike the SF Group rotations during Operation IRAQIFREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM,right-sized, regionally expert teams can rotate in andout of the contingency zone, providing a sustainableow of forces to appropriately resource the mission.

Last, for major regional contingencies (MRC) re-quiring more forces than are aligned to a region, theArmy will need to quickly redirect brigades fromother regions. In this case, forces aligned outside thecontingency region should form the MRC’s strate-

gic reserve. Regionally expert units should also trainthese units prior to their employment, and againduring reception, staging, and onward integrationactivities in theater.


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CONCLUSIONS

In a recent memo to the service chiefs and combat-ant commanders, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen-eral Martin Dempsey expressed his desire to providecommanders with “deep regional expertise to executetheir missions, starting in the Phase 0 shaping environ-ment.”35 He then said that today, such “deep regionalexpertise exists [only] by chance.” With this in mind,and facing a strategic pivot to the Pacic, the Chairmanhas called for the creation of an “Asia-Pacic Hands”program to build a “deep bench” of regionally expertag ofcers. While this might redress a perceived ex-pertise shortage in one corner of the globe, it neglectsthe rest of the world and cannot assure that newlycreated Pacic experts will actually be employed togood effect.

For any regional alignment efforts to yield fruit, theArmy must rst overhaul its industrial age personnelmanagement system. It must recognize the unique tal-ents possessed by each of its soldiers. The Army mustthen move toward an information age talent manage-ment paradigm, enhancing its abilities to build unitswith genuine regional expertise. Simultaneously, itmust redesign its force generation model, providingan increased share of soldier with the ongoing educa-tion and regional tenure required to promote endur-ing human relationships with regional partners.

Perhaps most importantly, in order for the Armyto truly “prevent, shape, and win,” it must maintainits ability to respond to contingencies around theglobe. Regionally tailored doctrine, equipment, orga-

nization, and intelligence are only part of the solution.Appropriately expert human capital is the lynchpin to


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regional success, and only a genuine talent manage-ment system can provide it.

ENDNOTES

1. “North Atlantic Treaty,” Brussels, Belgium: The North At-lantic Treaty Organization, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/na-tolive/ofcial_texts_17120.htm. The Army’s current posture on theKorean Peninsula mirrors this practice, albeit on a smaller scalethan being proposed by the Army today.

2. General Raymond Odierno, “Regionally-aligned Forces: ANew Model for Building Partnerships,” Army Live, The OfcialBlog of the United States Army, March 22, 2012, available fromarmylive.dodlive.mil/index.php/2012/03/aligned-forces/ .

3. Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2013, Washington, DC: De-partment of the Army, 2013, p. 4, available from usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e2/rv5_downloads/info/references/army_strategic_planning_ guidance.pdf . Italics are the authors’.

4. Gary Sheftick, “ARCENT Says Future Hinges on RegionalAlignments,” www.Army.mil: The Ofcial Homepage of the Unit-ed States Army, October 28, 2013, available from www.army.mil/ article/114027/ .

5. Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2013, p. 5.

6. The Regionally Aligned Force Concept explicitly acknowl-edges that the forces will be “regionally aligned, mission tailored force organized by leaders into squad- to corps-sized formationsempowered by Soldiers.” [Emphasis added.] Army Strategic Plan-ning Guidance 2013, p. 5.

7. John Vandiver, “AFRICOM First to Test New RegionalBrigade Concept,” Stripes.com, May 17, 2012, available fromwww.stripes.com/news/africom-first-to-test-new-regional-brigade- concept-1.177476.

8. Antonieta Rico, “New Training to Focus on Region-ally-aligned Forces Concept,” Defense News, October 23,


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2013, available from www.defensenews.com/article/20131023/ SHOWSCOUT/310230019/New-Training-Focus-Regionally-Aligned-Forces-Concept.

9. Lance M. Bacon, “Regional Alignment May Boost Soldiers’Career Stability,” Army Times Online, December 10, 2013, availablefrom www.armytimes.com/article/20131210/CAREERS/312100016/ Regional alignment-may-boost-soldiers-career-stability.

10. The U.S. Army Capstone Concept: Training and Doctrine Com-mand (TRADOC) Pamphlet (PAM) 525-3-0, Fort Eustis, VA: TRA-DOC, 2012, p. 18, available from www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/ tp525-3-0.pdf .

11. Ibid.

12. Casey Wardynski, David S. Lyle, and Michael J. Colarusso,Talent: Implications for a U.S. Army Ofcer Corps Strategy, Carlisle,PA: Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, 2009, p. 5,available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=948.

13. Expressing rank as a measure of experience within agiven functional specialty is, in fact, an inaccuracy since ofcerscan move between branches and still maintain their rank. In thissense, rank does not measure functional expertise in all cases, andbecomes an even more arbitrary metric for how an individualshould be employed.

14. Paul Peters, interview by Raven Bukowski, West Point,NY, February 5, 2014. This example is one of hundreds that weuncovered during our research and seems to be the impetusfor recent articles bemoaning the loss of talent from the Army’sofcer ranks.

15. Ibid.

16. Wardynski, Lyle, and Colarusso, Talent: Implications for aU.S. Army Ofcer Corps Strategy.



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18. The U.S. Army Capstone Concept: Training and DoctrineCommand Pamphlet, p. 34.

19. This number includes all Soldiers who were assessed intothe military between 1991 and 2000 and is generated from theTAPDB. Ofce of Economic and Manpower Analysis, “All Sol-diers Re-deployed to Korea as a Percentage of those DeployedOnce 1991-2000,” Total Army Personnel Data Base, February20, 2014.

20. Jim Garamone, “Three-Year Korea Tours Good for Sol-diers, Alliance, Commander Says,” American Forces Press Service,March 23, 2009, available from www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=53601.

21. 2013 Academic Handbook, Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army JohnF. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 2013, p. 28, avail-able from www.soc.mil/swcs/_pdf/AcademicHandbook.pdf .

22. Army Green Pages: Proof-of-Concept Pilot Report, West Point,NY: Ofce of Economic and Manpower Analysis, 2012, p. 2.

23. Army Green Pages: Proof-of-Concept Pilot Report, pp. 24-26.


25. Ibid., p. 5.

26. “The National Guard State Partnership Program,”Washington, DC: U.S. National Guard, available from www.nationalguard.mil/Leadership/JointStaff/J5/InternationalAffairs Division/StatePartnershipProgram.aspx.

27. Major General Rick Waddell, “Remarks to National Secu-rity Seminar Students,” classroom discussion, National SecuritySeminar, West Point, NY, February 27, 2014.

28. Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-0.1: The Modular Force, Wash-ington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, January 28,2008, p. 2-2, available from fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-0-1.pdf.


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29. Over time, Army forces will not only be regionally aligned,but “mission-tailored,” which means forces are not only procientin the fundamentals of unied land operations, but also possessspecic capabilities tailored for one or more of the 10 missionsspecied in the Army Strategic Planning Guidance. These missionsspan the range of military operations and include power projec-tion, the deterrence and defeat of aggression, countering weaponsof mass destruction, providing a stabilizing presence, disaster re-lief, and operating effectively in cyberspace. The Army, as part ofthe joint force, must provide the land component forces necessaryto accomplish each of these missions.


31. Lieutenant Colonel Chris Danbeck, phone interview byMajor Raven Bukowski, September 5, 2013.

32. Prior to deployment, the 2nd Brigade of the 1st InfantryDivision created a partnership with Kansas State University thatprovided Soldiers with 3 weeks of country-specic classroomtraining. Ibid.


34. Department of the Army G3/5/7, Regional Alignment ofForces, PowerPoint Presentation, Washington, DC: U.S. Depart-ment of the Army, September 10, 2013, p. 5.

35. General Martin Dempsey, “Asia-Pacic Hands Program:CM-0301-13,” memorandum for Chiefs of the Military Servicesand Commanders of Combatant Commands, December 5, 2013.


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Major General William E. RappCommandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

andU.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

DirectorProfessor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of ResearchDr. Steven K. Metz

AuthorsMajor Raven BukowskiMajor John Childress

Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Michael J. ColarussoLieutenant Colonel David S. Lyle

Editor for ProductionDr. James G. Pierce

Publications AssistantMs. Rita A. Rummel

*****

CompositionMrs. Jennifer E. Nevil


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Creating an Effective Regional Alignment Strategy for the U.S. Army