Beyond the pattern : corruption, hooligans, and football governance in Croatia

Loïc Tregoures PhD candidate, political science, University of Lille 2 (Ceraps Unit)

loic.tregoures@gmail.com +33 6 71 47 22 32

Whose Game is it? Supporters & Football Governance

FREE Conference Loughborough University, 24-5 October 2014

This paper is a work in progress. Please do not quote without the

explicit written permission of the author.

Loïc Tregoures, PhD candidate, political science, University of Lille 2 (Ceraps Unit)

loic.tregoures@gmail.com +33 6 71 47 22 32

Beyond the pattern : corruption, hooligans, and football governance in

Croatia

The question I’d like to raise is to what extent it is possible for rival football fan

groups to get united and what kind of repertoire of action they can implement in

order to fight against corruption and bad governance in football.

I have been especially following Dinamo Zagreb and Hajduk Split football fans in

Croatia, be it in their actions together against the Croatian football federation,

especially after the latter’s decision to restrict away fans from going to games, or

separately in their own fights in their respective clubs to advocate another model of

governance where football fans would be involved, through civic initiatives and

associations they created, Together for Dinamo (Zajedno Za Dinamo), and Our

Hajduk (Naš Hajduk).

First results seem to show that unity as a strategy, although unnatural, shall not be a

problem for them despite strong rivalries since the enemy, as well as the final goal,

are shared. Leaders from groups, though direct contact, manage to overshadow

internal and external rivalries as long as something bigger is at stake. However, time

does not play for them hence the authorities’ strategy to dismiss fans’ demands out of

hand hoping for rivalries and violence habits to surface on a longer term.

This tends to show that the question of fans involvement in football governance

strongly depends on both local and European contexts. Local specific situation, like

the one in Split where the Torcida is a social actor above football, can bring fans

enough strength to be somehow successful through pressure and public campaign,

but it will remain an exception, especially in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, as

long as it is not discussed as a viable and positive economic and social model of

football governance at the European level, namely UEFA, Council of Europe and the

European Union.

Keywords: football governance, football fans mobilization, Croatia, corruption,

rivalries, violence

From the Croatian case, I will try to bring some insights regarding the question

of football fans collective mobilizations. To what extent can football fan groups,

sometimes with bad reputation, claim legitimacy to have a say in football

governance? What kind of repertoire of action do they use to that end (Tilly, 1986)?

Under which conditions do they manage to mobilize, and under which conditions can

they succeed in their struggle?

My point here is to study football fandom and fan groups from a militant standpoint,

that is to take football fans and their causes seriously (Busset, 2014) by granting them

what Herbert Blumer (1971) calls “a depth of the cause”. Thus it is not about material,

specific and low-level claims, but rather about transforming not only the way football

is thought and sold as an entertainment business, but also the way football can

become a laboratory to a new form of participative democracy in which football fans

would be involved.

Due to its specific history throughout the experience of communism, a recent war and

an ending democratization process, not to mention the existence of important

football fan groups for more than thirty years, Croatia can be deemed a perfect

laboratory to analyse, out of Western Europe in which social mobilizations are more

usual and institutionalized, how and to what extent fans can mobilize for a cause in a

tougher context1.

Therefore, it is first necessary to focus on actors I am going to talk about, namely

football fan groups, and Croatian football federation.

Fan groups

Ther two most important fan groups in Croatia, from historical and numerical

standpoints, are Bad Blue Boys from Dinamo Zagreb, and Torcida from Hajduk Split,

which is why I will focus on them and their members. Their full-time involvement

and mobilization capacity explain why “random” fans would be dismissed here to give

a focus to so-called “extreme fans” (Hourcade, 2008) be it in their involvement

towards their group and their club or in their social practices connected with Italian

ultra style and English hooligan style of cheering.

Those two groups, like others in Croatia, were involved in the war that led to

independence of Croatia (1991-1995), during which many fans went to the front to

fight against the Serbs, hence monuments in front of numerous stadiums in Croatia2.

Needless to emphasize again the very famous fight that took place at Maksimir

stadium of Zagreb in may 1990 between BBB and Delije from Red Star Belgrade

1 To that extent, Turkey would be another very good case to study 2 The story of Arkan’s Tigers paramilitaries, among whom many hooligans from Red Star Belgrade

were, is very well known and documented, see Colovic (1999) and Stewart (2009)

(Djordjevic, 2012), nor the burning of a Yugoslavian flag in Split stadium of Poljud

just few months later (Sack and Suster, 2000).

Just before and during the war, BBB and Torcida would quiet their rivalry in order to

unite against the Serbs, be it in stadiums or on the battlefield. However, once the war

ended, the rivalry between the two groups boomed again, all the more since it became

the only relevant one in a small league with low level and passion.

Their long history and ability to cheer for their team all around Europe, including

throughout violence, granted them a huge reputation among fans in Europe, and a

rather bad reputation among sport authorities like UEFA who, throughout Michel

Platini’s voice, regularly puts pressure on Croatian football and political authorities to

fight against hooliganism, comparing it to Serbian one, wrongly according to me3.

The football federation

Until he died in 1999, the Croatian football federation (HNS), and football in general,

was President Tudjman’s toy given his passion for the Game, as well as for

propaganda reasons, as the world witnessed during 1998 world cup (Brentin, 2013).

After that, the HNS, under Vlatko Markovic’s presidency from 1999, as well as some

football clubs including Dinamo Zagreb, were involved several times in corruption,

crony capitalism and match fixing scandals4, for instance in the FIFPro black book on

Eastern Europe5.

The last presidential election at the HNS in 2010 ended in chaos after former player

Igor Stimac was defeated by one voice (25-24) to Vlatko Markovic6. After Stimac

contested the decision before a court, it turned out, in the court’s decision in 2013,

that the winning voice came from a delegate that shouldn’t have voted. This

manipulation is believed to be the result of Zdravko Mamic’s work, the executive vice-

president of Dinamo Zagreb and « behind the scene boss » of Croatian football7. After

he passed away in 2012, Markovic was substituted at the HNS presidency by former

legend Davor Suker, a close friend to Mamic.

3 While Serbian hooliganism still has strong political and criminal dimensions, Croatian hooliganism is

now much more sport-related and under control. On Serbian hooliganism and a comparison with Croatia, see my piece “Hooliganism as a standard measure of the rule of law in Serbia”, Regard sur l’Est, February 2014 http://www.regard-

est.com/home/breve_contenu.php?id=1480&PHPSESSID=af586d26b055457cf4215ff94b0ef17c 4 « La dynamite du Dinamo », Cahiers du football http://www.cahiersdufootball.net/article-la-

dynamite-de-zagreb-4622 5 http://fifpro.org/en/don-t-fix-it/black-book 6http://www.index.hr/sport/clanak/stimac-porazen-za-jedan-glas-nakon-kaosa-u-skupstini-markovic-ostaje-predsjednik-hnsa-/529035.aspx 7http://www.dnevno.hr/sport/nogomet/79873-upravni-sud-ponistio-izbor-vlatka-markovica-stimac-je-

trebao-biti-predsjednik-hns-a.html However, although the appeal went through positively for him, Stimac was the most sorry about it since the HNS in the meantime asked him to be the Croatia

national coach after Euro 2012, in a way to sort things out behind the doors.

Context of mobilization

Therefore, it can be argued that those two actors, given their background, interests

and social practices, belong more to a culture of opposition and conflict rather than a

culture of compromise and negotiation, be it on the part of powerful and immune

people ruling Croatian football, or on the part of football fan groups whose ultra

culture tends to valorise some kind of ethic of resistance towards any figure of

football or political authority.

Moreover, it should be kept in mind that Croatia is a rather young democracy with a

troubled recent history in which social dialogue, professionalized and framed social

mobilizations from unions or NGOs as well as culture of compromise from the

political and economic elite are in general less developed than in Western European

countries, which is one of the characteristics of Florian Bieber’s concept of

« constrained democracies », shaped to describe post-Yugoslav and some post-

communist states (Bieber and Ristic, 2012)8.

In this context, there is no such thing as a win-win situation which would be the

outcome of a serious negotiation between partners willing to work together. In

Zagreb, the struggle against crony capitalism and corruption embodied by Zdravko

Mamic is twofold: on the one hand, Bad Blue Boys boycott games9, or go to games in

order to boo and insult Mamic for 90 minutes while the latter, helped by police and

the HNS, manages to have more and more hostile fans banned from the stadium and

even pays loyal fans to fight his opponents.

On the other hand, older and among educated fans, helped by former players, created

the initiative Together for Dinamo (Zajedno za Dinamo) in 2003 in order to raise

public awareness about this situation through interventions in the media,

demonstrations, an online petition, as well as a legal work with the then political

opposition which came to power in January 2013 regarding the law on sport and the

law on conflict of interests10.

Their aim is to have the statute of public association of the club respected, namely

that the direction be elected by members of the association while today they don’t

have a say on it (given close relationship between Mamic and Zagreb mayor Milan

Bandic), hence their slogan « one member, one voice » (jedan clan, jedan glas). BBB

created in 2012 a fustal section to Dinamo, ruled according to « one member, one

voice » system, and recently organized an all-star game with former Dinamo players,

8 To the authors, this category also applies to actuel EU member states like Bulgaria and Romania 9 Especially for Champions League games so that all Europe can see and wonder why the stadium is almost empty on a Dinamo Zagreb-Real Madrid or Paris-Saint-Germain game. See my piece for

website sofoot.com http://www.sofoot.com/mais-pourquoi-le-stade-de-zagreb-sera-t-il-si-vide-pour-

accueillir-le-psg-163063.html 10 « Football : au Dinamo Zagreb, les supporters veulent prendre le pouvoir », Courrier des Balkans, octobre 2012, http://balkans.courriers.info/article20750.html

before more than 3000 fans11 while at the same time, Dinamo played before 450

people, the lowest attendance ever in the 35.000 seats Maksimir stadium12.

In Split, to make a long story short, Hajduk fans created in 2011 an NGO called Our

Hajduk (Nas Hajduk) and led several public campaigns in order, first to impose a

good behaviour code (Kodex) in the governance of the club after years of corruption-

ruling by managers chosen by Split municipality (Lalic, 2012), and second to strongly

oppose the sale of the club by the municipality to somehow mysterious American

investors13.

When compared, the rather more successful mobilization of Hajduk fans in both their

goals probably stems from the fact that the club represents a very significant element

of regional identity heritage in Dalmatia, hence the legitimacy recognized to Hajduk

fans, more numerous today than Dinamo ones, to mobilize even above classic football

fans in order to protect the « soul of Dalmatian identity » from foreign investors,

allegedly unaware and disrespectful of this crucial dimension of the club (Tregoures,

2014b).

Nevertheless, these are local mobilizations of each group, regarding a struggle with

the respective club. If Kodex can be deemed a model for every club’s governance, and

was even praised by sociologists and journalists as a model for other sectors of

economic and social life in Croatia to fight corruption (Lalic, 2012), it remains that no

global mobilization from fans all over Croatia emerged to have it implemented in the

respective club. Hence the question: under which conditions is a global fans

mobilization possible?

A common enemy

Is having a common enemy, namely the football authorities, the police, or the

government which backs the HNS, enough to trigger off a common mobilization? One

would assume it is yet a crucial distinction has to be drawn between passive and

active mobilization regarding the repertoire of action at stake.

What I would describe as a passive mobilization is in fact the usual, routinized

repertoire of action implemented by fans towards their common enemy, especially

during the national team games, in which all the groups usually agree on a truce

11 http://www.index.hr/sport/clanak/ovako-izgleda-invazija-boysa-vise-od-tri-tisuce-navijaca-doslo-podrzati-futsal-dinamo/769822.aspx 12 http://www.jutarnji.hr/srusen-maksimirski-rekord-na-tribinama-450-gledatelja--cuvar-nije-pustio-taravela-i-soudanija-/1219749/ 13 Due to its debts deepened by a corrupted management, the club was privatized in 2008 and debts

turned into shares which means that though private, the club still belongs to the municipality of Split which is the major shareholder. Local businessmen and former players also have minority shares in

the club. Nas Hajduk too has a tiny percentage of shares (less than 5%).

regarding their rivalries. Indeed, Croatia’s national team games are the occasion for

fans in huge number to sing14, or to show banners against the HNS in particular to

denounce its corruption. Bad Blue Boys, Torcida and other groups would do it as well

every week end during the respective clubs games15, but the result is not as powerful

and striking as it is when performed during national team games before wide national

audience.

These routinized expressions of protest have been regularly witnessed for a very long

time. It may thus be wondered, even above football, what is at stake with those types

of mobilizations which are unlikely to give any result but only militant and symbolic

retributions, which nonetheless matter (Gaxie, 2005).

Let’s think about workers demonstrations every 1st of May for the Labour day. This

routinized mobilization is its own end, whereas a demonstration or a strike

organized, say, to fight a specific law, aims at having it withdrawn. Therefore, what is

missing with routinized mobilizations, whatever the repertoire of action, is a specific

agenda thanks to which a mobilization can be successful.

The same thing goes for football fans and the evidence of it came after a specific

decision taken by the HNS against which ultras from every club decided to react

actively.

Active mobilization against HNS decision and success

On October 2013, serious incidents took place during a game between NK Rijeka and

Hajduk Split in the so-called Adriatic derby. Although those incidents were mostly

due to situational elements, namely police provocations and bad organization from

NK Rijeka16, the HNS reacted by issuing a decision according to which away fans

would no longer be allowed on games unless they were part of an official trip

organized by their club. Furthermore, being part of this trip implied to buy a special

card (voucher), to give many personal information, and to come to the club three days

before an away game to sign in and pay for the ticket17.

This very restricting system is familiar to the italian tessera del tifoso. Thanks to

testimonies on specialized forums as well as my own contacts among fans in Split and

Zagreb, it clearly appears that a global coordination between fans from all over the

country was immediately implemented in order to strike back. Although no official

statement was issued, information came out in the press regarding fans’

14 The slogan « HNS, faggot, you’ve destroyed football » (HNS pederi, nogomet ste sjebali) is very common on every game. 15 During my ethnographic fieldwork, I happened to be in Torcida’s end just behind a pornographic and somehow homophobic banner representing Igor Stimac and Zdravko Mamic. The club was

sanctioned after that. 16 “La violence engendre la violence: qui sont les vrais hooligans en Croatie?”, Courrier des Balkans, Octobre 2013 http://balkans.courriers.info/article23363.html 17 http://www.24sata.hr/nogomet/nove-mjere-hns-a-nema-vise-gostujucih-navijaca-u-hnl-u-337053

determination to circumvent the voucher measure, and prove it both absurd and

ineffective as a way to deal with football fans.

Therefore, first games following the decision were highly and feverishly expected. To

make things even spicier, Dinamo Zagreb was playing the second Split club, RNK

Split, a small club without fans. Then, Torcida of Split basically managed to buy

tickets for this game they did not intend to assist anyway, in order to sell them back

to Bad Blue Boys once they arrived in Split18. This way, the voucher measure was

made useless. Meanwhile, other Bad Blue Boys managed to buy tickets for the

Lokomotiva Zagreb-Hajduk Split game in Zagreb, which they similarly sold back to

Torcida fans.

This first active mobilization against HNS decision proved very successful, and was

reproduced all over the country, including during games opposing two rival groups

such as Demoni of Pula and Armada of Rijeka in the Istria derby.

However, the most important mobilizations organized by fans took place on

December 1st and December 17th for Dinamo-Hajduk, and Hajduk-Dinamo games.

Ever since the HNS decision was made public, fans from both sides met in order to

turn these specific games, closely scheduled, into a decisive public relations

operation, allowing for huge pressure and expectations from the HNS, the police and

the UEFA who would send some delegates.

The first game in Zagreb was thus preceded by calls from Torcida and Bad Blue Boys

to ignore police provocations and to ban any kind of violence before, during and after

the game. While police stopped every cars coming from Dalmatia on the highway

before Zagreb, Bad Blue Boys even called their members to give Torcida guys a

shelter for the night for those who could come a day before in Zagreb.

Knowing that Torcida fans would come in a huge number, Zdravko Mamic banned

the West tribune for which they intended to get tickets bought by BBB fans. Besides,

he then offered Torcida to go in the South tribune, devoted to away fans, even

without the voucher system, which Torcida refused19.

Finally, BBB and Torcida agreed to share the same East tribune, for which BBB had

tickets. Therefore, for the first time in 20 years, the two rival groups stood by

together, first around the stadium before the game, then in the stadium, without big

club banners, nor security cordon between them.

During the game, groups agreed to sing only slogans against the HNS and Mamic (as

well as other nationalist well known slogans), groups answering to one another,

18 http://www.curva1899.com/2013/10/rnk-split-dinamo-zagreb-600-ultras-de.html#more 19 This offer says a lot on the power of a man able to dismiss a decision taken by the football federation, and deemed crucial by both the government and the UEFA. That the HNS didn’t react

negatively to this offer also says a lot on Croatian football’s governance.

under applause of the rest of the stadium20. This active mobilization was a huge

surprise among the police and the press, which commented afterwards how

responsible and smart fans had been to deal with the HNS measure21.

Two weeks later, the same scenario happened in Split for a cup game between Hajduk

Split and Dinamo Zagreb. Torcida managed to buy tickets for 500 BBB in the East

tribune, close to Torcida’s North tribune, while away fans use to go in the South

tribune in Hajduk stadium. BBB could hold a demonstration in Split streets before

the game without any incident, and once again slogans against the HNS and Zdravko

Mamic were sung for 90 minutes22.

Eventually, soon after the winter break ended, the HNS decided to withdraw its

decision on vouchers on the ground that it was too complicated to organize for clubs

and fans23, a decision deemed a great success by fans all over the country, a

consequence of their active and endless mobilization.

Despite the HNS’ explanations, it may be argued that they soon realized how their

decision had unexpectedly fed solidarity and determination among fans usually torn

by their own rivalries. In other words, while they intended to spread their control on

stadiums and fans counting on their inability to organize together and without

violence, the decision backfired at them with a unified fans mobilization which was

becoming more and more legitimate and popular game after game, especially after

the two December derbies. Therefore, although this active mobilization resulted in a

drop regarding football violence, the HNS decided to end its experience.

Although specificities of football governance in each national context shall not be

dismissed, it may be argued that from this localized experience of active mobilization,

lessons can be learnt on a broader European football fans scale regarding reasons and

criteria that make a mobilization of football fans both possible and effective.

On what grounds is a global mobilization from football fans possible?

From the Croatian experience, I would emphasize three crucial and complementary

conditions to make a global fans’ mobilization possible24.

20 Videos are available here: http://www.curva1899.com/2013/12/dinamo-zagreb-hajduk-split-

torcida.html 21 Live-report of the day http://www.index.hr/sport/clanak/torcida-i-bbb-rame-uz-rame-na-tribinama-pogledajte-navijacki-mars-na-maksimir/714158.aspx « BBB and Torcida have written a new chapter

of our football history » reads this report http://sportski.net.hr/nogomet/hnl/scena-za-povijest-bbb-i-torcida-zajedno-protiv-mamica 22 http://www.curva1899.com/2013/12/chroniques-de-croatie-torcida-et-bad.html#more 23http://www.hrsport.net/vijesti/471043/nogomet-maxtv-prva-liga/hns-priznao-poraz-ukidaju-se-

vauceri-za-gostujuce-navijace/ « HNS acknowledges its failure : the voucher system for away fans is

abrogated » reads the title 24 By global I mean a large coalition of fan groups united behind the same demands, and coordinating

a common mobilization above their own local issues and rivalries.

First of all, a global mobilization is possible when it immediately answers a

direct and concrete attack (or considered this way in a large consensus) against

the fans in general, mainly from the football authorities25. The voucher decision

overnight was made without any dialogue with the fans, which made it possible for

them, above routinized mobilization, to react actively and immediately. Indeed, a

mobilization can hardly take place if it aims at fighting a decision made months or

years ago; it has to be a hot topic, highly discussed on forums and in specialized press

in order to maintain a high level of interest and above all a minimal hope of success in

the mobilization.

Secondly, a global mobilization is possible if it doesn’t last for too long. Indeed,

not only is it hard to maintain a high intensity level of mobilization of numerous

actors, but it is all the more problematic when these actors are rivals who use to fight

each others. Therefore, if an active global mobilization has to last for a long time, it is

highly probable that it will lose actors and thus get weaker and weaker. Of course, no

one knows whether or not a mobilization will last long, hence the usual authorities’

strategy to ignore the mobilization until it dies by itself because of rivalries, or

impatience of rather young fans who would finally be tempted to use violence as a

frustration answer, which would kill the mobilization and delegitimize the fans as

serious interlocutors.

On the other hand though, a long and high intensity level of mobilization is possible

for groups on their own, on a local level, as is exemplified by specific Torcida or Bad

Blue Boys struggles for better and democratic governance in their respective clubs. In

their struggle, they may look at what the other does, but there is no coordination

between them.

Thirdly, a global mobilization is possible provided the repertoire of action

remains rather classic (songs, banners, street demonstrations) and the

coordination flexible. It seems indeed all the harder to keep a global mobilization

alive if an official association has to be created, juridical actions implemented, a

bureau, a president, a spokesperson elected etc. given rivalries between fans groups.

This problem can be considered to be a weak point for fans since a government or

sport national authorities, provided they are willing to, have grounds for asking a

delegation of official interlocutors to negotiate with.

An official structure aimed at having a regular dialogue with authorities (government,

federation, TV broadcaster, and clubs’ managements and owners) is nevertheless

possible once fans’ legitimacy as a football actor has been recognized by the

aforementioned actors, and all the more probable if social dialogue in general is

developed in a given country26.

25 Instead, a decision taken against a specific club or a specific group will hardly entail a global and

immediate high intensity mobilization. The case of Bad Blue Boys and their struggle with Dinamo governance and the HNS is rather clear on that matter : they are on their own. 26 To that extent, Germany is a good example.

However, that conditions are reunited to make a global mobilization possible does

not mean that it will be successful. Therefore, conditions for success might be

highlighted.

Conditions for a successful global mobilization

As tautological as it may sound, a global mobilization’s success first depends on how

quick it can get some results. Once again, time is essential to this kind of

movement since the longer it lasts, the lower are chances to be successful because of

rivalries and fatigue. As a matter of fact, once the HNS withdrew its decision on

vouchers, fan groups agreed to end their truce. Few weeks later, dozens of BBB and

Torcida would fight in a highway station27, which shows evidence that a global

mobilization can hardly have success if things don’t move forward in the short term.

The first result can be to get the media’s attention and sympathy, which is very

helpful when football or/and political authorities are unwilling to consider fans to be

legitimate and serious interlocutors to discuss with28. Therefore, winning a

negotiation margin, a statute of serious interlocutor thanks to an active mobilization

can be the beginning of a second phase. Besides, getting results on a short term

obviously boosts fans’ motivation to go ahead.

As a complement, success can hardly be achieved without establishing and

winning the battle of public image in the media and public opinion. I would

argue that this depends on two main factors. The first one is related to the image

public opinion and the press have of football fans and of football/political authorities.

In this case, national context is of great importance. In Croatia, given their history,

Bad Blue Boys and Torcida are very well known organizations that have enjoyed a

good image in the 1990, which somehow deteriorated afterwards because of their

extensive use of violence, especially for BBB who, historically and unlike Torcida, are

more influenced by the English hooligan model than by the Italian ultra model.

However, they still are in the public picture as occasional social actors.

On the other hand, Croatian public opinion has a very bad image of its politicians,

and is very well aware of how corrupted football ruling is, therefore, football fans in

Croatia would not suffer that much of an image deficit compared to their opponents.

It is not so often the case in Europe given the way fans are usually described in the

media, and given that they are dealt with by European authorities (Council of Europe,

UEFA, European Parliament) mainly from a security standpoint, as a potential threat,

27 http://gol.dnevnik.hr/clanak/hnl/krvavi-obracun-huligana-kod-otocca-dvojica-tesko-pet-lakse-ozlijedjenih---332073.html 28 This situation is the most widespread if we consider the 54 UEFA football federations

(Tsoukala, 2011) rather than as football actors able to be part of football

governance29.

The second factor is related to the legitimacy of the fans’ demands to the public

opinion eyes. Fighting against widespread corruption, against possible abuses related

to personal data, or for respectful games schedules is deemed more legitimate than

demanding the legalization of the use of pyrotechnic devices or lower prices for

tickets.

Eventually, regarding the repertoire of action implemented, no matter how various it

is, there is no chance that a mobilization can be successful if it turns violent. The

use of violence would entail an irreparable loss of credibility and legitimacy for the

fans who would no longer be able to present themselves as reasonable interlocutors

to discuss with. Even though authorities are not willing to negotiate, as is often the

case, fans can still win the case through the battle of image, and impose their

demands, so long as they impede any of them to use violence, despite decay strategies

and police provocations aimed at pushing them to make mistakes and delegitimizing

them.

Therefore, the use of violence or at least its acceptation as a legitimate mean among

most football fan groups is probably their blind spot. In the case I have developed, fan

groups all over Croatia, especially the two most important and archrivals agreed to

quiet their rivalries, ban the use of violence in order to win the battle of image and

have the HNS decision finally withdrawn. Yet just few weeks after, they were fighting

each other again, thus throwing away their capital of sympathy and legitimacy,

instead of capitalizing on it. Thu it is questionable whether they can once again be

successful in a similar case in the future.

This goes for any group since football or political authorities will always have every

right to refuse to discuss anything with fan groups in which violence is used or

legitimized. This is probably the biggest challenge for ultras in the years to come in

order to really do something about governance of what they would call “modern

football” instead of routinely denouncing it. The issue of violence questions their own

identity, their own social practices.

Scales of football governance

Fanprojekte model in Germany, and the statute of clubs regarding owners structure

tends to validate the hypothesis according to which the more fans are involved in

football governance, the more they will be responsible, and the less they will use

violence, and the more clubs will be financially and socially healthy. Therefore, a

reflexion has to be drawn on different scales in order to address both complementary

29 This tends to change in the last years thanks to dialogue initiated by UEFA and European authorities with fans organisations like Football Supporters of Europe (FSE) and Supporters Direct although their

legitimacy to talk in the name of most fans in Europe is questionable.

questions of fans and violence on the one hand, and football governance in the age of

globalized capitalism on the other.

To that extent, an interaction is needed between three levels: local, national and

European ones. Groups can easily mobilize on local issues regarding the own club,

and experiment things, but this level can be all the more legitimate and successful

since a global dialogue on football governance, and the role football fans can play in

it, is launched as a priority on the European level, be it in the European commission30

or within the UEFA in the frame of Financial Fair Play. Then it might be hoped that

the addition of local initiatives, pressures, experiments and mobilization on the one

hand, and the legitimating of fans as football actors on European scale on the other

will result in national debates which is the accurate change scale through the law,

neither too small, nor too far.

It is thus a circular movement that all in all requires at least two things: that sport

and political actors at each level (UEFA, Council of Europe, European Commission,

national football federations and leagues, sport ministers, clubs owners) agree on

fans’ legitimacy to be involved in football governance, including in clubs, and to take

legal steps on European and national scale in that direction31; and that fan groups in

Europe complete a U-turn from ethic of resistance to Weberian ethic of

responsibility, which would imply a long and tumultuous debate among fans

regarding their culture (many groups in Europe tend to have rather nationalist and

homophobic orientation), their social practices such as violence, their repertoire of

action, and their purpose.

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