Copyright 2012 1 I.T. Challenges to Information Law Roger Clarke Xamax Consultancy, Canberra Visiting Professor in Cyberspace Law & Policy, U.N.S.W. Visiting

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I.T. Challenges to Information Law

Roger ClarkeXamax Consultancy, Canberra

Visiting Professor in Cyberspace Law & Policy, U.N.S.W.

Visiting Professor in Computer Science, A.N.U.Chair, Australian Privacy Foundation (APF)

Secretary, Internet Society of Australia (ISOC-AU)

http://www.rogerclarke.com/EC/AGS-121116.ppt

NPG, Canberra, 16 November 2012

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AgendaSome Obvious Things• Cloudsourcing• Jurisdictions of

Convenience• Extra-Territorial Reach

Some Less Obvious Things

• Transaction Assurance• Identity Threats

Some Non-Solutions• Technology Neutrality• Privacy Law

Some Solutions• Misinformation• PETs, Obfuscation• Social Media?

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Cloudsourcing from the User Perspective

A service that satisfies all of the following conditions:1. It is delivered over a telecommunications network2. The service depends on virtualised resources

i.e. the user does not know which server(s) running on which host(s) is/are delivering the service, nor where the host(s) is/are located

3. The service is acquired under a relatively flexible contractual arrangement, at least re the quantum used

4. The user organisation places reliance on the service for data access and/or data processing

5. The user organisation has legal responsibilities

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Shortlist of Major Cloudsourcing Risks

Reliability – continuity of operation• Availability hosts/server/db

readiness/reachability• Accessibility network readiness• Usability response-time,

consistency• Robustness – the incidence of

unavailability (97% up = 5 hr pwk)

Service Survival, e.g. supplier withdrawal

Data SurvivalLateral Compatibility – multi-

sourcing

Authentication, Authorisation• Convenient client access• Denial of access to imposters

Compliance• Evidence Discovery Law• Financial Regulations• Security Treaty Obligations• Confidentiality

Strategic, Commercial, Governmental

• Privacy. esp. Use and DisclosureSecond-Party (service-provider abuse), Third-Party ('data breach')

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Consumer Computing

Email clients, usingsmtp/pop/imap

Personal Web-Sites

Dedicated Devices

Office on the Desktop

FTP-server and -client

Functions Applications 1975-2005/08

Email

Personal Galleries

Personal Music

Doc Prep

File-Sharing

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Consumer Computing

Email clients, usingsmtp/pop/imap

Personal Web-Sites

Dedicated Devices

Office on the Desktop

FTP-server and -client

Webmail, usinghttp / https

Flickr, Picasa

iTunes

Zoho, Google Docs

Dropbox

Functions Applications ==>> Services 1975-2005/08 2000-

Email

Personal Galleries

Personal Music

Doc Prep

File-Sharing

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Results from a Survey of Terms of Service

• Consumers dependent on C.C. Services are at dire riskService malfunctions, loss of data, provider exploitation of their data, low standards of accessibility and clarity of Terms, largely unfettered scope for providers to change the Terms

• Consumer Protections are essential, but seriously inadequateTransnationality of Internet commerce, dominance of US marketing morés, pro-corporate and anti-consumer stance of US regulators, meekness of regulators in other countries, the lack of organised resistance by consumer reps, advocacy bodies

• Serious consumer disappointments are inevitable• Recriminations against cloud-sourcing are inevitable

http://www.rogerclarke.com/EC/CCC.html

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Cloudsourcing of Email• ANU recently announced adoption of MS 365• MS 365 is hosted in Singapore and Hong Kong,

but can be hosted anywhere• The data is subject to the PATRIOT Act

• ANU has a high concentration of staff and students who have families at risk in un-free nations

• Some of those un-free nations are (from time to time) friends of the US Administration

• There are some nervous ANU staff and students

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Transaction Assurance

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Transaction AssuranceCheck the Critical Assertions

• 'Value Authentication'Liquid assets are of appropriate quality and quantity

• 'Data Authentication'The key data accurately reflects reality

• 'Attribute Authentication'The entity has the relevant attribute, especially:- eligibility for a subsidy, concession or tariff,

or to purchase age-restricted goods or services- the power to perform acts on behalf of another entity

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Transaction AssuranceCheck the Critical Assertions

• 'Value Authentication'Liquid assets are of appropriate quality and quantity

• 'Data Authentication'The key data accurately reflects reality

• 'Attribute Authentication'The entity has the relevant attribute, especially:- eligibility for a subsidy, concession or tariff,

or to purchase age-restricted goods or services- the power to perform acts on behalf of another entity

• '(Id)entity Authentication'The data is associated with the correct (id)entity

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The Huge Quality Problemswith Biometric Applications

Dimensions of Quality

• Reference-Measure• Association• Test-Measure• Comparison• Result-Computation

Other Aspects of Quality

• Vulnerabilities• Quality Measures• Counter-Measures• Spiralling

Complexity

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Consequences of the Quality Problems

• There is never 'a perfect match'; it's fuzzy• A Tolerance Range has to be allowed• 'False Positives' / 'False Acceptances' arise• 'False Negatives' / 'False Rejections' arise• Tighter Tolerances (to reduce False Negatives)

increase the rate of False Positives; and vice versa• The Scheme Sponsor sets (and re-sets) the Tolerances• Frequent exceptions are mostly processed cursorily• Occasional ‘scares’ slow everything, annoy everyone

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Identity-Related CrimesUse of an identifier and/or authenticators for:• Identity Fraud

to financially advantage or disadvantage someone ...• Identity Theft

... to such an extent, or with such a negative impact, as to effectively preclude further use by the person who previously used the identity

• Identity-Facilitated Criminal ActsProceeds of crime laundering, tax avoidance, trafficking ...

The identity that is compromisedmay be someone else's, may be

'fictional', or may even be the person's own

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Responses to Identity-Related Crime

Strategy• Piggy-back on, reinforce

national security extremism

'Real Names Policies'• Denial of Nymity• Denial of Multiple

Separate Identities• Imposition of a Singular

Identity per Person• Consolidation, Re-

Purposing of Personal Data

Hardened Id Requirements

• Identity Declarationdemanded more often

• Identity Authenticationimposed

• Biometrics imposed(Entity, not Identity)

Social Networks• Exploitation• Inferencing

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Responses to Identity-Related Crime

The Consequences

• Greatly increased scope for Id-Related Crime !

• Many more high-value / soft-target datasets

• Routinisation of id capture• Exposure of Persons-at-Risk

• Destruction of Social Trust• Encouragement to Lie, Cheat and

Obfuscate

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Technology Neutrality is Harmful Mythology

• Japanese legislators and regulators comprehensively apologised to the Japanese people because:Nuclear power stations were subjected to generic regulatory measures when they should have imposed regulations specific to the nuclear context

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• Software is a 'literary work'. Oh, really??Okay, we need a (sort-of) sui generis arrangement

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The Accidental Extension of Copyright-Owner Power

• There has never been any right to preclude people from accessing copyright-objects, whether to read them, listen to them, look at them, or watch them

• But the act of accessing digital copyright-objects involves the making of copies

• Because of the wording of copyright law, this intermediate step generally represents a breach of an copyright, and requires a licence

• This simple accident gave copyright-owners a great deal of lobbying power

• The principle of balance has been subverted

http://www.rogerclarke.com/EC/ETCU.html (1999)

'Copies ain't Copies'

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Letters were:• anonymous• secret in transit• untracked

And the postman wasn't responsible for their contents.

eLetters should be no different.

(And especially not if the purpose is to prop up dying business models for publishing industries).

Rick Falkvinge4 November 2012

http://torrentfreak.com/why-offline-privacy-values-must-live-on-in-the-digital-age-121104/

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Telecommunications 'Interception' Powers

• The PSTN has given way to:• Mobiles• VoIP incl. Skype

• Change was/is needed to sustain some powerssuch as named-person / many-'line' warrants

• Some of the AGD's demands of the Parliament have been warranted

• If the AGD consulted with public advocacy groups, and sought support, they would get it

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Telecommunications 'Interception' Powers

• PSTN: Call Records cf. Call Content• DigitalEra: 'Metadata'?? cf. 'Call' Content

• Ephemera have become recorded data, asas audio, text (email, IM, SMS), and video

• 'Interception' has become 'I & Access'• The carefully protected has become unprotected• The principle of balance has been subverted

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• Software is a 'literary work'Okay, we need a (sort-of) sui generis arrangement

• Copying is a breach, until it's part of network functionality

• Telecomms Interception has to be continually re-defined(but not in ways that abuse civil freedoms!)

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Privacy Law is Adaptive, Right?• The OECD Guidelines are predicated on the

computing of the 1970s, not the IT of the 2010s(They were also designed to facilitate business and government, not to protect privacy)

• Australian law is a very weak implementation• Australian law has been subverted by myriad

subsequent statutes• Australian Privacy law may shortly be ripped

to shreds by the current, consumer-hostile Bill• There is no right to sue, no criminal sanctions,

no enforcement action by the PC'er, and the PC'er actively avoids the creation of case law

• Any adaptive function is negative, not positive

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Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs)

1. PIT Countermeasures

• Cookie-Cutters• Cookie-Managers• Personal Data Managers (e.g. 'eWallets')• Personal Intermediaries / Proxies• Data Protection Tools• Client-Side Security Tools• Channel, Server and Proxy/Firewall Security

Tools

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2. Savage PETs

Deny identityProvide anonymity

Genuinely anonymous ('Mixmaster') remailers,

ToR, web-surfing proxies,

ePayment mechanisms, value authentication,

attribute authentication

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3. Gentle PETs

Balance nymityand accountability

through Protected Pseudonymity

Intermediary Tools and Proxies, Client-Side Agents,

Pseudonymous Connection, Remailers, Web-Surfers

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Will Consumers Come to be Banned From Owning General-Purpose

Computing Devices?Some powerful groups might like to achieve it

• Copyright-Dependent Corporations• Government Censors• The Moral Minority, who want governments to extend

censorship to whatever content the moral minority thinks the majority shouldn't have access to [Stop Press?]

• (Dominant) Computing Device Providers• Law Enforcement & National Security Agencies

(LEANS)• 'Fraud Experts'

Re 'fraud experts': http://www.itnews.com.au/News/263042,jailbroken-phones-not-safe-for-banking.aspx – 8 Jul 2011

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Consumer-Oriented Social Media

To Address the Catalogue of Social Media Privacy Concerns

1 Privacy-Abusive Data Collection

2 Privacy-Abusive Service-Provider Rights

3 Privacy-Abusive Functionality and User Interfaces

4 Privacy-Abusive Data Exploitation

http://www.rogerclarke.com/II/COSMO-1211.html

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Location – from Added-Extra to Intrinsic

• Physical Address / Geo-Location• knowledge of the cell that a mobile-phone is in,

is intrinsic to the service’s operation• more precise geo-location is increasingly feasible• location is becoming readily available to the device• location is being acquired by service-providers

• Location-based services can be valuable to users• A primary use is in consumer marketing• For most current-round SMS, location is an extra• For the coming round, Geo-Location is intrinsic• Privacy sensitivity about Social Media will leap

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The Primary Geolocation Technologies

QuickTime™ and aTIFF (LZW) decompressor

are needed to see this picture.

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Roger ClarkeXamax Consultancy, Canberra

Visiting Professor in Cyberspace Law & Policy, U.N.S.W.

Visiting Professor in Computer Science, A.N.U.Chair, Australian Privacy Foundation (APF)

Secretary, Internet Society of Australia (ISOC-AU)

http://www.rogerclarke.com/EC/AGS-121116.ppt

NPG, Canberra, 16 November 2012

Documents

Copyright 2012 1 I.T. Challenges to Information Law Roger Clarke Xamax Consultancy, Canberra Visiting Professor in Cyberspace Law & Policy, U.N.S.W. Visiting