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Accounting, Auditing &Accountability Journal,Vol. 13 No. 2, 2000, pp. 130-155.# MCB University Press, 0951-3574

Submitted January 1998Revised March 1999Accepted July 1999

Constructivism and accountingresearch: towards a

trans-disciplinary perspectivePaolo Quattrone

Manchester School of Accounting and Finance, The University ofManchester, Manchester, UK

Keywords Accounting research, Research methodology, Multidisciplinary research

Abstract This paper speculates about the potential of the constructivism of Piaget and Morin tooffer a framework which might go beyond dualisms and fragmentation in accounting research.These, it is argued, are because inter-disciplinary research is still embedded in a hierarchicalorganization of human knowledge (`̀ Encyclopaedia''). In pursuing this aim, this paper seeks toreformulate the subject-matter of accounting in the trans-disciplinary terms of the `̀ knowledge ofknowledge''. Such a theoretical framework will introduce the issues of trans-disciplinarity,evolution and reflexivity into accounting research. Such issues have already been the concern ofother disciplines within and outside the field of managerial studies, providing new insights forunderstanding organizational problems. However, they have not yet been given enough attentionwithin accounting research.

Time never dies, the circle is not round, ...Time doesn't wait because the circle is not round.

(from Before the Rain, by Milcho Mancevsky, 1994)

IntroductionThis paper speculates about the potential of the constructivism of Piaget(1967a, 1967b, 1970, 1977) and Morin (1977, 1985) to offer a framework whichgoes beyond dualisms and fragmentation in accounting research. Such aframework is timely because it is apparent that accounting research andknowledge have splintered into many divergent and incommensurableperspectives, each with their own epistemologies (Kuhn, 1970)[1].

In accounting research, these range from new cost accounting techniques formanagement (e.g. Mackey and Thomas, 1995) to philosophical works such ascritical accounting (e.g. Laughlin, 1987; Cooper and Hopper, 1987, 1990); orfrom economic perspectives such as agency and transaction cost theories (e.g.Baiman, 1982, 1990) to postmodernist histories of cost accounting (e.g. Hoskinand Macve, 1986; Hopwood, 1987). Moreover, several accounting studies haveillustrated sharp contrasts within the literature: rational (or scientific) versus

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available athttp://www.emerald-library.com

I am grateful to the reviewer of the 1997 IPA Conference where an earlier version of the paper waspresented and to the two anonymous referees for the constructive comments provided. I also wish tothank my PhD supervisor Professor Claudio Lipari and Professor Trevor Hopper for their constantsupport in revising the paper. I would also like to acknowledge those who gave me advice andsuggestions on earlier drafts of the manuscript: Professors Mahmoud Ezzamel, Anthony Hopwood,Keith Hoskin, Norman Machintosh, Lee Parker, Bob Scapens, Luca Zan, Dr Marcia Annisette, DrJohn Burns, Dr Chris Westrup. Responsibility for mistakes and omissions remains mine.

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natural (or naturalistic) models (Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya, 1979, 1983; Bolandand Pondy, 1983; Tomkins and Groves, 1983); conventional versus naturalisticresearch (e.g. Hopper et al., 1987); objectivist versus subjectivist research (e.g.Boland, 1989); positive versus normative research (e.g. Tinker et al., 1982).

As a result, each perspective yields only a narrow slice of the accountingworld. Publications trying to bridge these oppositions and avoid fragmentation(e.g. Birkin, 1996; Johnson, 1995; Machintosh and Scapens, 1990) are increasingin number. This paper constitutes a further attempt in this direction. Itsuggests that reasons for the existence of these narrow perspectives can befound in their epistemology and in its link with the institutionalisedorganization of human knowledge (i.e. the Encyclopaedia).

It is argued that accounting theories have been constructed through the useof methodologies which can be defined as:

(a) intradisciplinary, which considers accounting as a distinct field,hierarchically ordered in the `̀ Encyclopaedia'', and uses economiccategories to interpret the accounting world;

(b) interdisciplinary, which draws on disciplinary fields besides accounting,although these are still embedded in a hierarchical organization ofknowledge, and uses heuristic tools developed within the realm of socialsciences[2].

Constructivism is selected because it is a form of epistemology that can link thesundry camps. Moreover, it can be used to analyse how the camps emerged andto explain how it is possible to engender a constructive dialogue between thevarious perspectives. The aim is to go beyond fragmentation using a trans-disciplinary methodology.

The paper is organised as follows. In the next section intra-disciplinary andinter-disciplinary methodologies are analysed, placing accounting as anacademic subject within the organization of human knowledge. Piaget'sequilibration theory is then used to illustrate the passage from intra-disciplinaryto inter-disciplinary research, and to argue that inter-disciplinary accounting,although it has helped broaden the subject-matter of accounting, continues tomaintain a separation amongst diverse fields of knowledge. In order toovercome this fragmentation, the tenets of constructivism are illustrated andthen used to `̀ re-de-fine'' accounting, using the Morinian terms of the `̀ knowledgeof knowledge'' (Morin, 1986) and creating a `̀ non-discipline''[3]. Accounting as a`̀ knowledge of knowledge'', it is argued, may constitute a framework that is:

(1) trans-disciplinary (i.e. able to cross conventional disciplinary boundariesrather than taking them for granted);

(2) evolutionary (i.e. able to consider the change of perspectives in theorisingabout accounting), and

(3) reflexive (i.e. able to provide a self-critique to accounting theoriesexplicitly positioning epistemology within accounting frameworks).

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The organization of the `̀ Encyclopaedia'' and the need for a newresearch framework in accounting studiesAccording to several historians and sociologists of science (e.g. Bocchi andCeruti, 1981; Latour, 1991; Oldroyd, 1986), the contemporary organization ofhuman knowledge has been characterised by a twofold process ofinstitutionalisation. Such a process has been engendered by a progressive trendtowards fragmentation, which gives preference to analysis as one of the mainmethodological features of modern sciences. It has been structured according tothe division between natural and social science. Following the distinction madeby Dilthey between Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften, thisseparation has mainly constituted a methodological divide. On the one hand,there is the realm of nature, which can be studied through a methodology thatproduces objective knowledge. On the other hand, there is the realm of culture,which can be studied through a methodology that produces subjectiveknowledge and is incommensurable to that adopted by natural scientists.However, as Latour argues:

All the sciences (natural and social) are now mobilised to turn the humans into so manypuppets manipulated by objective (natural or socially constructed) forces ± which only thenatural or social scientist happen to know (1991, p. 53).

Researchers or academic disciplines aiming to become `̀ scientific'' have adoptedthe epistemology of the natural sciences, even though they deal with humanand not exclusively with non-human issues. The result of this twofold processis a very hierarchical `̀ Encyclopaedia'' (see Figure 1).

The organization of universities into academic departments and faculties isa very informative example of this ongoing process. The medieval meaning of`̀ university'' as Universitas Studiorum (i.e. the universe of the wholeknowledge) has been heavily undermined. Each academic discipline, ratherthan being connected and related to the universe of knowledge, constitutes adistinct camp with its own history and epistemology. It happens that in some ofthe branches of the tree of knowledge theories have been developed usingsimilar concepts and methodologies (for example, the use of contingencytheories in biology and in accounting) but in different periods of time. As aresult of this, quite often theories imported into a given branch have alreadybeen questioned in the discipline from which they originated (see below anexample drawn from accounting research). Thus, each academic subject yieldsonly a narrow slice of the world, dealing with its own epistemology andcreating incommensurability and difficulty of dialogue amongst researchers aswell as academic disciplines.

Although there is an increasing number of `̀ experiments'' to overcome such aseparation (e.g. inter-disciplinary departments, journals, conferences, and so on),the separation between natural and social sciences in the organization of humanknowledge is so institutionalised that it can still be considered as affectingresearch. Indeed, for a social science researcher the choice of a particularmethodology is not completely free, but it is dictated by her/his position within a

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certain discipline and ontological viewpoint (see [1]). Such a discipline, in turn, isinserted into a rigid organization of knowledge, which has placed accounting (asan academic subject), for example, below economics.

This paper does not call for a renewed holistic and complete view of theworld. Rather, it calls for an increasing dialogue amongst distinct disciplinaryfields because it seems evident, as illustrated in the introduction, thataccounting research is experiencing increasing difficulty in coping with the riseof a plurality of theoretical and methodological approaches. The influence ofthe organization of the `̀ Encyclopaedia'' in creating such a difficulty is theconcern of the next section.

Methodological issues in accounting research: the importance ofmarket exchange versus the importance of the contextTinker et al. argue that a methodological feature of `̀ marginalist economics''was:

(the) attempt to remove a number of social policy issues from the agenda of economics,mainly by expunging (politics) and (sociology) from political economy. This was achieved byconfining economics to the study of the sphere of market exchange (here defined as theeconomic-transactive sphere; 1982, p. 182; emphasis added).

Part of the `̀ intra-disciplinary'' accounting literature has been inspired by theepistemological position of marginalist and neo-classical economics[4,5], which

The Universe of Knowledge

NaturalSciences

SocialSciences

Chemistry SociologyPhysics Economics

Accounting

FinancialAccounting

ManagementAccounting

………… …………

Figure 1.The hierarchical

organization of the`̀ Encyclopaedia''

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has been seen as a useful framework for giving objectivity to accountingresearch. In this sense, Jensen (1983, p. 320) stated that: `̀ purposeful decisionscannot be made without the implicit or explicit use of positive theories'',thereby paradoxically calling for the objectivity of the information thataccounting should provide. According to Donzelli (1986; but see also Nagel,1963, 1968; Salmon, 1989) one of the main epistemological dimensions of neo-classical economics is `̀ methodological individualism''. It can be defined as amethod which grants ontological status to the single parts of a system (e.g. anorganization or the entire economic system), using them as building blocks toconstruct knowledge about the whole[6].

Methodological individualism is related to the organization of the`̀ Encyclopaedia'' (discussed above) which relegates accounting theory to a `̀ sub-discipline'' of economics, which in turn, uses methodologies developed in therealm of natural sciences. Tinker et al. (1982, p. 183), for instance, observed thatin marginalist economics Jevons used `̀ the principle of the equilibrium seekingtendencies found in the study of Statical Mechanics''. The same point can bemade for accounting theories using neo-classical economics. What isproblematic in the `̀ importation'' of such a framework in accounting studies isthat it does not consider that Statical Mechanics and its epistemology wereseverely challenged by Quantum physics at the beginning of this century. Thisproduced major epistemological implications for disciplines other than physicsitself and, moreover, it questioned the very realist ontology of many `̀ scientific''approaches (Oldroyd, 1986).

However, accounting research has progressed since Tinker et al.'s statementin the quotation above, which, paraphrased, could now be mischievouslyinverted to read as follows:

Attempts to reintroduce political and sociological issues have been realised in recent yearsmainly by expunging the sphere of market exchange from accounting theories. Such attemptshave been achieved by privileging another sphere of relationships (here defined as `̀ socio-structural'', see below).

In this socio-structural `̀ sphere'' the emphasis is on non-transactiverelationships rather than on transactive and economic ones[7]. As Mouritsennoted:

Accounting is an institution inasmuch as it is a cultural object which transmits criteria ofappropriateness across different organizational and social contexts [...]. Accounting systemsthus bind social contexts since they are media that carry general notions of formal rationality,productivity and profit maximisation across particular organizational contexts (1994, p. 205).

From such a perspective the cultural and linguistic aspect of accountingpractices (Arrington and Schweiker, 1992) becomes a methodological tool inconstructing accounting theories:

Environments create organizational elements such as accounting and accountants make iteasy and necessary for organizations to use them [...]: the rules of wider environmentsdetermine not only what organizations do, but which organizations can exist at all (Meyer,1986, p. 346).

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Interpreting accounting within organizations and society through the socialstructures in which it is located can be named `̀ contextualism''. As Woolgaraffirms:

Specifically sociological (as opposed to psychological or economic etc.) interest in knowledgearises in the virtue of conceptualizing sources of variation in terms of social context orattributes (1988, p. 22).

Contextualism interprets single actions and human behaviour within theunique context which `̀ determines'' them (Sparti, 1995, pp. 175-80). Such amethodological position imported in accounting studies explains the role ofaccounting within organizations via a strategy which privileges thestructures (e.g. language, cultural settings) in which individuals andorganizations find themselves embedded. The passive conditioning exertedby institutions upon individuals represents the cornerstone on which suchtheories can be built, and constitutes a way of constructing theories that iscompletely opposite to that adopted by methodological individualism.Interdisciplinary accounting has tended to position itself explicitly in therealm of social sciences and thereby adopts its methodology. However, theseparation between natural and social sciences is informed by an old-fashioned debate (e.g. Tomkins and Groves, 1983; Abdel-khalik andAjinkya, 1979, 1983; Morgan, 1983; see also Chua, 1986b) regarding theunity of methodology, which was a matter for dispute at the beginning ofthis century (see Cohen, 1993). Interdisciplinary accounting does not realisethat keeping `̀ nature'' and `̀ culture'' separate has hardly been questioned inmore recent times. Academic fields other than sociology have started theprocess of trans-disciplinary cross-fertilisation (e.g. bioethics, socio-biology,cognitive sciences and so on) rather than the simpler inter-disciplinaryfertilisation.

In summary, the methodological choice made by `̀ intra-disciplinary'' and`̀ inter-disciplinary'' accounting is closely linked to the set of disciplines theydraw from in constructing their accounting theories. Moreover, it does notplace such a choice in the historical evolution of the `̀ universe ofknowledge''.

Accounting and `̀ ontological gerrymandering''The fragmentation of accounting studies is not only embodied in the dividebetween natural and social sciences. The hierarchical organization of theEncyclopaedia has also distinguished between levels of knowledge (see Bocchiand Ceruti, 1981).

A general distinction between levels of knowledge may consider thefollowing categories:

(1) meta-theoretical (i.e. epistemology);

(2) theoretical (i.e. accounting theories);

(3) practical (i.e. accounting practices).

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Arrington and Schweiker, for example, state that:

The philosophy of science is frequently evoked in methodological discussion both inside andoutside accounting [...]. There seems to be a sort of (fishing for authority) as accountingresearchers appeal to the philosophy of science, a practice that sociologists of science havecalled (ontological gerrymandering) ± making one (science) problematic by making someothers unproblematic (1992, p. 527)[8].

In this sense, epistemology has been used within accounting research as a toolto assess the validity or the `̀ truth'' of accounting knowledge, therebyconceiving it as a superior form of knowledge.

It has also been noted that:

More recent contributions to accounting theory [...] have shifted their focus away from(theories of accounting) to theories about accounting theorizing (i.e. the production ofaccounting knowledge) (Tinker et al., 1982, p. 190).

Tinker et al.'s statement referred to Watts and Zimmerman's positive theory.However, it can be argued that the recent `̀ inter-disciplinary'' approaches havethe same focus on `̀ accounting theorising'', although it has been pursued with avery different epistemology. Inter-disciplinary accounting research has soughtto interpret the `̀ practices of theorising'' of both individuals who act insideorganizations (e.g. investigating how organizational actors make sense ofaccounting techniques) and of academics who theorise `̀ about accounting'' (e.g.criticising positive accounting theory). In so doing, interdisciplinary researchhas started to address the triplicity of levels, although their reflexivity is stillmissing from accounting theories because the use of epistemology is seen as acase of ontological gerrymandering (see Arrington and Schweiker's quotationabove). This paper intends to construct a framework which concerns not onlythe `̀ practice of theorising'' but also other levels of knowledge, giving each ofthem the same importance in making sense of accounting.

Summarising the above analysis, it can be argued that accounting researchseems to be experiencing three related sets of problems. First, although inter-disciplinary research has certainly brought new useful insights into accountingresearch addressing some issues neglected by economic and managerialapproaches (e.g. the multiplicity of perspectives), its contribution has beenmade within the hierarchical scheme of the `̀ Encyclopaedia'', avoiding anintegration with the prior conventional perspectives. As a result of this, it hascontinued to maintain the fragmentation between areas of knowledge,generating some new problems, such as the incommensurability amongstdiverse theoretical positions (even within the `̀ critical'' side of accountingresearch) and the lack of dialogue with the economic and managerialapproaches.

Second, although inter-disciplinary research has recognised the multi-facednature of accounting practices, it has not been able to cope with the continuouschange of ways of theorising about accounting. `̀ Intra-disciplinary'' and `̀ inter-disciplinary'' studies have constructed theories that assume the `̀ individual'' orthe `̀ context'' as a cornerstone for explaining organizational practices, thereby

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privileging one perspective amongst many. However, if this cornerstone oftheorising changes over time, then understanding `̀ how'' and `̀ why'' it changesbecomes even more important than the cornerstone itself.

Third, although inter-disciplinary research has created a variety oftheoretical frameworks which have questioned the epistemologicalunderpinnings of traditional accounting research (see the introduction), it hasshown a lack of self-critique by avoiding a historical analysis of the linksbetween the theories imported and the universe of knowledge. Moreover, therelationships between the epistemological, theoretical and practical issuesrelated to accounting have been overlooked.

To overcome the problems illustrated above the following sections seek to`̀ re-de-fine'' accounting research in the trans-disciplinary, evolutionary, andreflexive terms illustrated in the Introduction.

Going beyond intra- and inter-disciplinarity in accounting researchThe need for a renewed approach within accounting studies can be bestunderstood by using Piaget's equilibration theory (1977). This justifies the needfor trans-disciplinarity (as different from intra- and inter-disciplinarity).

Piaget's equilibration theory explains the development of thought by tracinghow cognitive subjects (such as individuals or scientific disciplines) go througha recursive equilibration process. This process, far from leading to a stableequilibrium (see below), is characterised by an equilibration between`̀ assimilation'' and `̀ accommodation''. In Piaget's terms, the development of acognitive system is characterised by the acquisition of new knowledgefollowing a `̀ disturbance'', which undermines the balance of cognitivestructures. With respect to `̀ scientific'' knowledge, Piaget affirms:

A scientist is by no means motivated by the considerable field of his ignorance (gap in hisknowledge) because most questions do not concern him. On the other hand, a gap becomes adisturbance when it indicates the absence of an object, the lack of conditions necessary toaccomplish an action, or want of knowledge that is indispensable in solving a problem (1977, p.19, emphasis added) [9].

When this `̀ disturbance'' occurs, it creates a pressure to search for new elementsto be incorporated into the previous existing scheme (assimilation). Onceassimilation has incurred, then the new incorporated elements go through amodification (accommodation) to accommodate the force that stimulatedchange. The process is successful only when assimilation and accommodationfind a new equilibrium and can solve the problem that originated the process.This process may seem very similar to a cybernetic adjustment to an externalstimulus. In fact, on the contrary Piagetian equilibration process illustrateshow the subject is essential in defining what is and is not relevant asdisturbance (in this sense, Piagetian approach is `̀ constructivist'' (Piaget, 1977,p. 17)).

Accounting research has already experienced the passage from intra-disciplinarity to inter-disciplinarity. Literature published by journals likeAccounting, Organizations and Society, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability

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Journal, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, has provided many rationales forthe assimilation and accommodation of works generated in other disciplinaryfields into accounting research, in order to overcome the mono-dimensionalperspective adopted by `̀ intra-disciplinary'' studies. Indeed, interdisciplinaryaccounting research has opened up new research issues and themes, but hasalso created new problems. The recent debate hosted by Accounting,Organizations and Society on the use of postmodernism (rather than historicalmaterialism) in interpreting managerial accounting practices is a clear exampleof the insights and problems generated by inter-disciplinarity (see Arnold,1998; Froud et al. 1998; Miller and O'Leary, 1994, 1998). If there is a lack ofdialogue and a fragmentation within accounting research, then there is a needfor undergoing a new equilibration process, in Piagetian terms. In the nextsection, it is argued that the tenets of constructivism may bring some usefulinsights into accounting studies.

The use of constructivism in accounting studies: a case of`̀ ontological gerrymandering''?The following appeared in an editorial to Organization (a relatively new journalthat is devoted to `̀ cross-fertilising'' approaches):

We want to engage with the world we face today, with a complex net of understandingsarriving from different locations and probably moving into different destinations. But it is inthe space of the journal (journey?) where we find each other and exchange our differences,hopefully becoming better through these encounters. Thus, from this `̀ non-place'',organizational analysis moves towards a different space located nowhere but beingeverywhere... a space we would like to call `̀ neo-disciplinary''.

However, the process of becoming neo-disciplinary is not transparent. It needs to begin, inour estimation, by building upon interdisciplinary approaches (Burrell et al., 1994, p. 9,emphasis added).

Similarly, the `̀ journey'' towards trans-disciplinarity, evolution and reflexivityin accounting studies needs to be based upon the inter-disciplinary research ofthe last 20 years or more. `̀ Inter-disciplinarity'' cannot exist without `̀ intra-disciplinarity'', and `̀ trans-disciplinarity'' cannot exist without `̀ inter-disciplinarity''. Inter-disciplinary research is a necessary point of departure inorder to escape from some of the controlling aspects of the idea of an academicsubject as a `̀ discipline'' (Burrell et al., 1994, p. 11). However, neither inter-disciplinarity nor its successor trans-disciplinarity must be seen as the point ofarrival. Returning to Piaget:

We must stress that cognitive equilibration never reaches a stopping point, even on atemporary basis [...]. The fact that states of equilibrium are always exceeded is the result, onthe contrary, of a very positive force. Any knowledge raises new problems as it solves thepreceding ones (Piaget, 1977, p. 30, emphasis added).

The use of constructivism in accounting research does not constitute anexception to the above statement.

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The tenets of constructivist epistemologyThe philosophy of science has offered various ways of coping with trans-disciplinarity, evolution and reflexivity to escape the fragmentation ofknowledge and to re-establish a dialogue amongst various camps ofknowledge. One is represented by the tenets of constructivism (e.g. Bateson,1972; Bocchi and Ceruti, 1981, 1985; Morin, 1977, 1985, 1986; Piaget, 1967b,1970; Watzlawick, 1981). There are so many versions of constructivism (seeFruggeri, 1998 for an attempt at classifying them) it is virtually impossible tostrictly stick to one of them[10]. This paper mainly refers to Piagetian geneticepistemology and its developments, although insights from other streams (e.g.radical constructivism) are also utilised as well. Genetic epistemologyaddresses: `̀ The study of the diachronic, temporal dimension of knowledge''(Ceruti, 1986, p. 46), to overcome the dualities characterising `̀ modernist''approaches. Trans-disciplinarity, evolution and reflexivity constitute the mainfeatures of Piagetian genetic epistemology and constructivism tout court.

Trans-disciplinarity is elaborated through the concepts of `̀ internalepistemology'' and `̀ derived epistemology''. `̀ Internal epistemology'' refers tothe `̀ group of theories having as an object the research of the foundations or thecritique of the theory of the conceptual dominion'' (Piaget, 1967b, p. 1175,quoted in Bocchi and Ceruti, 1981, p. 56). `̀ Derived epistemology'' refers to theevaluation `̀ of the most general epistemological implications of the resultsobtained in the science under consideration, comparing them to those of theother sciences'' (ibidem). In this sense, the role of epistemology in theorising isthreefold. First, through a trans-disciplinary research strategy, it contributes tore-establish the multiplicity of relationships amongst different disciplinaryfields, including those developed separately during the `̀ modern'' era. Second, itmakes theoretical frameworks evolutionary, because the critique and thecomparison provided by a trans-disciplinary approach allow them to take intoaccount changes in perspectives within and outside each academic discipline.Third, epistemology provides a meta-theoretical framework with an adequatereflexivity by highlighting how various theoretical categories (such as thedistinction in levels and areas of knowledge) are constructed through the co-production between the observer and the observed. In this sense, it can also bedeconstructive (i.e. de-institutionalising consolidated theoretical practices andmodifying the confines of a discipline).

However, even the use of genetic epistemology and, more generally,constructivist approaches as a `̀ solution'' to the epistemological problems of`̀ intra-disciplinary'' and `̀ inter-disciplinary'' accounting may be charged with`̀ ontological gerrymandering''.

Constructivism and `̀ ontological gerrymandering''There is at least one reason why `̀ ontological gerrymandering'' does not applyto the research strategy of constructivism put forward in this paper. This isrelated to the epistemological meaning of GoÈdel's proof (see Nagel andNewman, 1959; Hofstadter, 1979), which implies that the coherence of a formal

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system of knowledge can only be found through reference to a broader system.Such a process is recursive and implies an ongoing evolution of all streams ofthought ± constructivist epistemology and accounting included. Arrington andSchweiker, for example, argue that rhetoric (Rorty, 1979) is a pragmaticinstrument for understanding `̀ the practice of accounting research and, in turn,the knowledge (which) such practice produces'' (1992, p. 511, abstract; emphasisadded). Rhetoric, they argue, has

Nothing outside of argumentative procedures within a particular research community thatcan possibly justify knowledge ± there is no particular language, no ex ante rule of method, nosingular (logic) to which (truth) or (knowledge) universally correspond (Arrington andSchweiker, 1992, p. 530).

However, the use of rhetoric as an argument to justify knowledge is part of abroader set of interpretations based on the role of language and discourses. Inthis sense:

As a sign system, language has the quality of objectivity. I encounter language as a facticityexternal to myself and it is coercive in its effect on me. [...] Language provides me with aready-made possibility for the ongoing objectification of my unfolding experience. [...]Language also typifies experiences, allowing me to subsume them under broad categories interms of which they have meaning not only for me but also for my fellowmen (Berger andLuckman, 1966, p. 53).

The quality of objectivity given to language would imply the presence ofstructuralist problems highlighted by others (for example, Barley and Tolbert,1997) and denied by some constructivists to escape such problems (e.g. vonGlasersfeld, 1996). Beliefs that nothing can exist `̀ outside'' the knowledgeproduced renders such approaches as fundamentalist because only the internalargumentative procedures can explain how such knowledge is obtained.Theoretical frameworks developed following this methodology do not leaveroom for any alternative explanation and/or methodology.

Arguing that epistemology is a solution for the problems experienced byaccounting research would be a case of ontological gerrymandering if theepistemological framework adopted maintained the separation amongst levelsof knowledge (meta-theoretical, theoretical and practical; see Table I). Instead,genetic epistemology and parts of constructivism argue that theirinterpretations are found both outside and inside the knowledge that theyinvestigate. Regarding genetic epistemology, Ceruti noticed that:

[it] proposes itself [...] as a sort of comparative epistemology of levels of knowledge [...]. Inparticular, its objective is to clarify the relationships, the genetic filiations, and theinteractions between levels of natural thought, between the intellective structures of intellectbelonging to all knowing subjects as such, and those of formal thought which realizes some ofits own potentials in every process of cognitive development (1986, pp. 47-8; emphasis inoriginal) [11].

The solution proposed in this paper to escape from structuralism andontological gerrymandering assumes that genetic epistemology andconstructivism do not consider epistemology as a superior form ofknowledge because they consider `̀ science'' as a form of practice, although it

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is directed to the production of theories. Thus, epistemology does not differfrom any other form of knowledge (e.g. that obtained within organizationsby workers and employees). It is not a `̀ superior'' form of knowledge but justa different one.

Moreover genetic epistemology and constructivism do not assume that thestratification of the universe of knowledge exists in separate levels. Theyhighlight the links between `̀ levels of reality'' and the role of the observer indefining them[12]. Every observation and categorisation is the result of theobserver's choice (i.e. the reintegration of the observer into his owndescription; von Foerster, 1987; Morin, 1977, 1986, 1991; Bateson, 1972). Thisaddresses not only how human knowledge is structurally organized, but also(and even more so) the processes of change which affect it by relating the`̀ ontogenesis'' (i.e. changes in the structure of the `̀ object'' at the `̀ ontic'' level)to the `̀ sociogenesis'' (i.e. change in the structure of the `̀ subject'') (Bocchi andCeruti, 1981).

Following the constructivist viewpoint, epistemology does not seek to judgethe absolute `̀ truth'' or validity of a scientific theory but tries to escape fromlinguistic and social (or natural) structuralism, being, at the same time, outsideand inside the knowledge it investigates. In other words, what is valid inside asystem of knowledge is not/may not be valid out of the context that binds theobserver and his/her own observations. As Ceruti notes:

The observer's choice shows itself as being essential and constitutive in determining thishierarchy and stratification (of knowledge) (1986, p. 81).

Thus, the issue no longer seems to be:

that of rendering homogeneous and consistent differing points of view; it becomes that ofunderstanding how differing points of view are reciprocally produced (Ceruti, 1986, p. 26;emphasis in original).

According to the above arguments, the issue is not one of interpreting theworld by giving a metaphysical status to metatheories (i.e. the classicalargument of the early epistemologists), theories (i.e. the classical arguments ofthe `̀ ivory tower'' academics) or practices (i.e. the classical arguments of `̀ self-made'' entrepreneurs or practitioners). The issue seems to be one ofinvestigating how they are reciprocally defined.

In terms of accounting research, it can be argued that there is no need toclaim an absolute validity for a given interpretation of accounting theories andpractices. In other words, there is no need to privilege the `̀ individual'' or the`̀ context'' in constructing interpretations of the organizational world made by`̀ intra-disciplinary'' or `̀ inter-disciplinary'' interpretations, respectively.

The main problem faced by contemporary `̀ knowing subjects'' is that ofrendering strategies of knowledge (learning) as complex (i.e. trans-disciplinary,evolutionary, and reflexive). However, the greater part of contemporaryaccounting research has tried to make these strategies simple via differentforms of narrowness.

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The next section will investigate the implications of such a trans-disciplinary, evolutionary, and reflexive epistemological approach foraccounting research, seeking to offer a framework that transcends the doublefragmentation (in terms of divide between natural and social sciences and ofdistinction between meta-theory, theory and practice) in accounting studies.

A trans-disciplinary, evolutionary and reflexive framework foraccounting studies: accounting as `̀ knowledge of knowledge''Piaget, in describing research strategies in biology, stated that:

given the fact that every epistemology involves a theory of the relationships between theknower and the objects of knowledge, biological epistemology has two very distinct features.On the one hand, biology is a science like any other, and its epistemology therefore raises thequestion of the procedures of understanding the biological subject, as in the case ofmathematical and physical subjects. On the other hand, however, the living organism is theobject of biology, and as such, unlike any other physical object, it is also a subject ofknowledge, since he possesses a certain sensitivity, a capacity to learn, instincts orintelligence (1967a, p. 893).

When one passes from the living organism in general to man in particular, this duality ismuch more balanced. [...] Epistemology (is not only that) of the psychologist, of thesociologist, of the linguist, of the economist, etc. (it is also that) of the subject as possessor of alanguage, of the economic subject etc.; these are two problem groups (1967a, p. 1114-15;emphasis in original).

In disciplines which explore organizations (e.g. organizational theory andaccounting), an interesting paradox manifests itself (as in any human science):the object of study is the knowledge of a subject (man and/or an organization)which in turn is active in producing knowledge. The following statementillustrates this way of conceiving research about accounting:

accounting conceived asKnowledge of Knowledge(this regards both `̀ how'' (this regards both `̀ how''accounting theories are knowledge is produced inside andconstructed and `̀ why'' such by organizations and `̀ why'' suchtheories are built) knowledge is produced)

The Print Gallery, a famous lithograph by Escher, is an enlightening exampleof the complex way of conceiving the processes of knowledge construction (seeFigure 2).

Hofstadter made the following comments on Print Gallery:

What we see is a picture gallery where a young man is standing looking at a picture of a shipin a harbour of a small town, [...] with its little turrets, occasional cupolas and flat stone roofs,upon one of which sits a boy, relaxing in the heat, while two floors below him a woman ±perhaps his mother ± gazes out of the window from her apartment which sits directly above apicture gallery where a young man is standing looking at a picture of a ship in a harbour of asmall town [...]. What!? We are back on the same level as we began, though all logic dictatesthat we cannot be (1979, p. 776; Figure 142).

This lithography illustrates how the observer (the young man) is integrated inhis own description (the picture in the gallery). Moreover, it describes how the

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subject constructs levels of reality that are then conventionally supposed to beseparate and hierarchically ordered (the gallery, the picture, the view describedin it and so on) and illustrates how they can be conceived as reciprocally co-produced. Finally, the lithography is incomplete (the hole in the middle of it). Itneeds a broader system of knowledge (see Hofstadter, 1979 for a comparisonwith GoÈdel's theorem of incompleteness), which shows how different levels ofreality are defined by the co-production of the observer and the observed (i.e. itneeds a reflexive critique).

How does accounting (as the `̀ knowledge of knowledge'') relate to theepistemological implications entailed by Escher's lithograph and constructivistapproaches?

The previous sections have argued that accounting may profit by adoptinga trans-disciplinary, evolutionary and reflexive framework. Conceivingaccounting as the `̀ knowledge of knowledge'' provides such a framework. Thisframework integrates different levels of knowledge (meta-theoretical,

Figure 2.M.C. Escher,

Print Gallery, lithograph,1956

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theoretical, and practical) and different camps of knowledge through a two-stepprocess, namely: (1) the `̀ knowledge of knowledge'' as a `̀ how'' activity; and (2)the `̀ knowledge of knowledge'' as a `̀ why'' activity.

The `̀ knowledge of knowledge'' as a `how' activity concerns the ways in whichaccounting knowledge is produced. This concerns not only the theoretical levelof accounting as academic discipline (the first knowledge), but also the level ofpractices where such a knowledge is produced, for example, withinorganizations (the second knowledge), and the `̀ knowledge of knowledge'' as awhole, which concerns the epistemological level. Table I helps understand sucha complex way of conceiving accounting.

In this sense, `̀ accounting'' as the `̀ knowledge of knowledge'' is not only aform of the theorisation of praxis [box 5] (historically it has been considered so,with the development and `scientification' of medieval practices). It is also thepractice of undertaking accounting research [box 8], with all the implications ofconceiving a theory as a practice (e.g. the influence of institutional andacademic issues on creating accounting knowledge). Yet, accounting is a formof meta-theory [box 2] concerning the epistemological background ofresearchers who theorise (in terms of the reciprocal definition of their ontologyand methodology; see [1]). Moreover, accounting as `̀ knowledge of knowledge''is not only a practice [box 9], such as bookkeeping or cost accounting. It is alsothe theory that informs the activity of `̀ practising'' [box 6] and itsepistemological background [box 3]. Furthermore, accounting as the

Table I.The reflexivity of themeta-theoretical,theoretical andpractical levels ofaccounting as`̀ knowledge ofknowledge''[13]

Kind of knowledgeLevels of knowledge Epistemology Accounting Praxis

Meta-theoretical Epistemology as a formof meta-theorisation (i.e.epistemology of theories)e.g. the judgement of thevalidity of an accountingtheory

Accounting as a form ofmeta-theory (i.e.epistemology of theorising)e.g. researchers, beforetheorising, have theirideas about organizationalreality and practices

Practice as a form ofmeta-theorisation (i.e.epistemology of practices)e.g. organizational actorshave their ideas aboutorganizational reality andpractices

Theoretical Epistemology as form oftheorisation (i.e. theory oftheorising)e.g. creating principlesabout accountingtheorising

Accounting as a form oftheory (i.e. theory ofpractices)e.g. principles concerningaccounting practices

Practice as a form oftheorising (i.e. theory of`̀ practising'')e.g. organizational actorswho create techniques ofmanagement

Practical Epistemology as a formof practice (i.e. practicesof meta-theorising)e.g. building meta-theories

Accounting as a form ofpractice (i.e. practices oftheorising)e.g. undertakingaccounting research

Practice as such (i.e. theaccounting craft)e.g. the accountingprofession or accountingpractices withinorganizations

1 2 3

4 5 6

987

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`̀ knowledge of knowledge'' is also a form of epistemology, when it is concernedwith judging the validity of a given theory [box 1], such as in conventionalepistemological studies of accounting theories. Finally, it is also a form oftheorisation [box 4], when principles about accounting theorising are searched(as in this paper), and is a practical activity of meta-theorisation [box 7], when itis concerned with the search for the epistemological underpinnings of anaccounting theory. Accounting as `̀ knowledge of knowledge'' addresses old andnew accounting problems in a new, trans-disciplinary and reflexive way, andoffers a framework for analysing accounting issues traditionally observed bydifferent and incommensurable perspectives.

First, there are new technologies of production and control (e.g. BusinessProcess Re-engineering; World Class Manufacturing; Systems, Applicationsand Products in Data Processing [SAP], etc.), new forms of marketing (e.g.franchising) and new organizational forms and practices (e.g. networking)which transcend traditional categories and cross functional boundaries. Theworld of praxis has heavily questioned `̀ old'' categories such as: internal versusexternal; individual versus context, organization versus market, financialversus management accounting, and so forth. The issue is one ofunderstanding not only `̀ how'' new organizational structures and processesemerge, and how they are co-determined, but also `̀ why'' they are `̀ moreappropriate'' than previous ones (or how they are supposed to be moreappropriate). The increasing use of such managerial techniques and the rise ofdiscourses on national competitiveness (e.g. Miller and O'Leary, 1993) can beanalysed at different levels of reality (e.g. individual, organizational, societal)and through various interpretations (meta-theoretical, theoretical, practical).The new manner of conceiving accounting offered here permits them to beuntangled in the same approach, grasping the multifaceted nature of `̀ old'' and`̀ new'' organizational practices.

Second, if organizations are conceived as a locus in which the economic,social, and political interests of workers, entrepreneurs, the state, andshareholders are reconciled with each other and/or in conflict, then thesediffering aspects cannot then be interpreted in a way which privileges any ofthem. This has traditionally been the case in academic disciplines such aseconomics, sociology, politics, and so on. Then the issue becomes one ofunderstanding `̀ how'' and `̀ why'' one of these interests becomes dominant withinorganizations and researching new kinds of rationality, able to guideorganizations' behaviour (see Quattrone and Tagoe's, 1997, definition of `̀ a-centred'' organization). The `̀ quasi-object'' nature of many contemporary`̀ receipts'' for managing organizations (see Friedman and Lyne, 1998 onActivity Based Techniques and Westrup et al., 1998 on World ClassManufacturing) touches many social, political, and economic aspects, andentails an integrated framework for their study. Accounting as `̀ knowledge ofknowledge'' may constitute a possibility.

Third, like Escher's lithograph, accounting as `̀ knowledge of knowledge'' isnot like a closed circle between the subject (the theory or the meta-theory) who

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observes and the object (the practice or the theory, respectively), which isobserved. It is incomplete (the equivalent of the whole in the middle of thelithograph is the box in the top-left corner of Table I [14]). Its understandingrequires an external and bigger system which includes this system ofknowledge and which is incomplete itself. In other words, this system is in needof a critique. Both theories and meta-theories of accounting need to be reflexive(i.e. questioning of the conditions of the production of its knowledge). In thissense, the `̀ renewed'' accounting contributes to an understanding of thepreconditions of the production of accounting knowledge both within academicinstitutions and in practice. `̀How'' academics produce their type of accountingknowledge and `̀why'' (`̀ real'' or apparently) becomes an important andunexplored field of research. The influence of the concept of `̀ discipline'' (Burrellet al., 1994, p. 11) and its impact on the production of accounting knowledge, interms of what constitutes good/bad knowledge, becomes relevant to assessdissimilarities in space and time. The existence of apparently incommensurabledivergences in the content, methodology and contributions of researchtraditions, such as Anglo-American accounting, the French comptabilite , theItalian ragioneria, the Spanish contabilidad, to name but a few, becomes an issueto be investigated, rather than being taken for granted. However, this call forreflexivity does not concern only the academic world. Practitioners need to bereflexive as well, comparing their knowledge with that of their competitors orasking to be `̀ observed'' by academics. Both need to distance themselves fromthe knowledge they have produced looking for the `̀ knowledge of knowledge''.

Students, later becoming workers or managers within organizations oracademics within universities, are accustomed to learn in a `̀ disciplined'' way,be it `̀ functional'', `̀ departmental'' or whatsoever. There is an overall need for`̀ complex learning'' which overcomes the analytical and reductionist way ofdealing with organizational life, and with life tout court.

This implies a need for trans-disciplinarity which involves, is produced by,and co-produces different individual and institutional levels (levels of reality),different political, economical, social interests (spheres of relationships) anddisciplinary fields (disciplinary contexts). Incorporating such different aspectsinto the `̀ new accounting'' makes possible the creation of an evolutionary,reflexive and trans-disciplinary framework, which may begin to redefine therole of accounting in contemporary times.

In summary, conceiving accounting as the `̀ knowledge of knowledge'' avoidsany form of hierarchy amongst the levels of knowledge, and facilitates adialogue between different perspectives in accounting research. Understandinghow accounting knowledge is produced requires a conception of the theoreticallevel, as neither subordinate to that of epistemology, nor superordinate to thatof praxis. Understanding why accounting knowledge is produced requires theuse of insights from different disciplines, and the continuous critique of theinterpretations provided.

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Concluding (but not final) remarksThe above has sought to demonstrate that the fragmentation and dualismswhich have characterised accounting research in recent decades can beexplained by placing accounting research within the hierarchical organizationof the `̀ Encyclopaedia''. It has been argued that both intra-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary research strategies have been unable to establish a dialoguebetween different perspectives in accounting research. In order to create such adialogue, this paper has sought to `̀ re-de-fine'' accounting in the trans-disciplinary, evolutionary and reflexive terms of the knowledge of knowledge,drawing on constructivist philosophy.

The paper has tried to incorporate within the evolutionary definition ofaccounting as knowledge of knowledge, different perspectives, which theauthor perceives as the `̀ state-of-the-art'' in accounting research. In so doing ithas implicitly sought to make sense of them all by boxing each into the`̀ container'' provided by the new definition of accounting. Thus, the frameworkillustrated in the paper may be considered as just a `̀ new bottle'' rather than`̀ new wine''. This claim is true and false at the same time.

It is true because the theoretical framework of accounting as knowledge ofknowledge is, in the first instance, a container in which a multiplicity ofresearch problems concerning the levels of reality, sphere of relationships anddisciplinary contexts find a new position. On the other hand, the claim is false.The author could be asked: `̀ Where does the `bottle' end and the (new) `wine'begin?'' However, it could be argued that `̀ bottles'' are as important as the`̀ wine'' they contain and, most significantly, that it is difficult to distinguishbetween the two: the distinction between `̀ formal'' and `̀ substantial'' issues arejust another example of a `̀ modern'' counterposition. In Piagetian terms thiswould mean: `̀ Does the paper assimilate changes in the way accountingresearch is made and accommodate them to constitute a broader and morecomprehensive theoretical framework?''

It is obvious that, if the author of this paper reveals his thoughts, then hebelieves that they are `̀ better'' than some others. However, such a proposal isconsidered superior by its proponent hic et nunc (i.e. in synchronical contexts,(Ceruti, 1986, p. 25)). Such a proposal needs to be contextualised as a practice ofundertaking research in that given space and specific time as interpreted by theresearcher who is making it. There is a need for rendering the epistemologicalunderpinnings of the paper (and of the author) more explicit[15]. However,given the epistemological approach adopted, the author cannot `̀ explain'' hisepistemological background because he does not have an epistemology ± he isthat epistemology. As stated by Bateson:

In the natural history of the living human being, ontology and epistemology cannot beseparated. His (commonly unconscious) beliefs about what sort of world it is will determinehow he sees it and acts within it, and his ways of perceiving and acting will determine hisbeliefs about its nature. The living man is thus bound within a net of epistemological andontological premises which ± regardless of ultimate truth or falsity ± become partially self-validating for him (1972, p. 342).

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The only thing the author can be asked to do is to explain where he thinks hisproposal arises from, relating his work (and life) to the subjects he is looking at.

Such a proposal arrives from a young `̀ non-tenured academic'' (see Burrellet al., 1994) who is external to the system of producing accounting knowledgein the Anglo-American context. Being as such, he has not taken part in thedebate between the `̀ intra-disciplinary'' (or `̀ conventional''?) and `̀ inter-disciplinary'' (or critical?) accounting. Yet, he has not taken part in the closureof this circle where the two opposite streams of accounting researchparadoxically coincide, because the narrowness which inter-disciplinaryperspectives sought to overcome is still there. Now he has the opportunity ofobserving the closure from the `̀ outside'' (momentarily positioning itself outsidethe picture described by Escher). He can fill the hole in Escher's picture butcannot be asked to look at himself, because he is, in turn, within a broaderpicture. This is because, at the same time but from a different point of view,such a `̀ non-tenured academic'' is internal to such a system. He is the `̀ product''of the trend towards crossing conventional boundaries which has characterisedboth academic research (with inter-disciplinarity) and practical life (with thetravelling of ideas and people) in the last 20 years and more.

So, the diversity of this proposal consists of the evolutionary conception ofknowledge, structures and processes, and their conception in a diachroniccontext. This proposal is a `̀ lay'' one, in the sense that it is not based on anystable, immutable, metaphysical and transcendental form of knowledge. Theonly form of `̀ religiousness'' (and reductionism) which the author concedes isthat of not believing in anything. In other words, that of believing in believingthat a stable equilibrium does not exist in the natural and social life of humanbeings, even though such an equilibrium is constantly being researched andpursued without any teleological aim.

Notes

1. The definition of the terms `̀ ontology'', `̀ methodology'' and `̀ epistemology'' used in thispaper is drawn from Laudan's concept of `̀ research tradition'' (1977, pp. 78-81) and fromtheir etymological analysis. As it is widely known, the etymology of the term `̀ ontology''(Chambers, 1990) derives from the Greek on, ontos (present participle of einai, to be) andlogos (discourse). Analogously, the etymology of the term `̀ methodology'' derives from theGreek meta (after), hodos (a way), and logos; that of `̀ epistemology'' from episteme(knowledge) and logos. Traditionally, these terms have been used to describe the researchof the true essence of the `̀ being'', of the best scientific method and of the `̀ true'' knowledge,respectively. But it might be argued that their etymology is not in contrast with `̀ weak''interpretations of them (Vattimo, 1983). According to the etymological analysis, thedefinition of `̀ ontology'' adopted in this paper is that of discourse on the object ofknowledge (entities and processes of a domain of study (Laudan, 1977, p. 81)).Analogously, the definition of `̀ methodology'' is that of discourse on the subject ofknowledge (ways in which theories are constructed in that domain (Laudan, 1977, p. 81)).The definition of `̀ epistemology'' can be considered as a discourse on knowledge (which isthe result of the reflexive co-production of the `̀ object'', i.e. the ontology, and the `̀ subject'',i.e. the methodology, of such knowledge). Thus these terms are deprived of theirmetaphysical and transcendental features which have characterised their birth but nottheir evolution and their contemporary use (see Vattimo, 1983, pp. 12-28). Therefore, the

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use of the term `̀ methodology'' in this paper does not refer to a tool (or a set of tools, e.g.mathematical, statistical, econometrical, and so forth) to undertake a kind of empiricalresearch. Methodology, as in the Laudanian model, concerns the meta-theoretical level ofprinciples and dimensions of `̀ scientific'' explanation (e.g. methodological individualism,contextualism, and so forth) used to build theories.

2. One example of what in this paper is defined as intra-disciplinary research is the use ofagency theory in accounting (e.g. Baiman, 1982, 1990; Jensen, 1983; Watts andZimmerman, 1979, 1990), which is grounded in the epistemology of `̀ hard'' sciences,using the epistemological underpinnings of neo-classical economics (see Scapens, 1994;Ryan et al., 1992). Examples of inter-disciplinary research are more heterogeneous in theirepistemological underpinnings, drawing on various strands in critical philosophy (e.g.Neimark and Tinker, 1986; Chua, 1986a; Hopper et al., 1987; Neimark, 1990; Broadbentet al., 1991; Arrington and Puxty, 1991; CPA, 1994), hermeneutics and postmodernistphilosophy (e.g. Arrington and Francis, 1989; Hoskin, 1994; Miller and O'Leary, 1987), thesociology of knowledge (e.g. Boland, 1979; Carruthers 1995; Carruthers and Espeland,1991), neo-institutionalism in sociology (e.g. Meyer, 1986; Carruthers, 1995; Covalesky andDirsmith, 1988). What all the inter-disciplinary perspectives have in common is, bycontrast, a strong grounding in the epistemology of the `̀ soft'' sciences.

3. The problem seems to be one of creating a theoretical category which is self-evolving (i.e.which is capable of changing all the time) thus taking on board the continuous change ofpractices and rationalities within organizations. It seems that, on the one hand, there is aneed to `̀ de-fine'' the boundaries of accounting, in order to create categories that makesense of organizational reality. However, on the other hand, there is a need to leave theseboundaries open (`̀ de-fining'' the discipline (see Quattrone and Tagoe, 1997)).

4. The relationships between accounting and economics have been well highlighted in theliterature. For example, Tinker et al. (1982, pp. 188-9) cited Paton (1922), Paton andStephenson (1918), Paton and Littleton (1940) and Littleton (1928) as providing us withexplicit neo-classical frameworks in accounting. Hopper and Powell (1985, pp. 433-4)similarly compared scientific management and Solomons' (1968) standard costing withneo-classical economics and marginal costing. Chua (1986a, pp. 605-07) has noted howrealism has been increasingly adopted in the literature of accounting, itself grounded intransaction cost economics and agency theory (e.g. Baiman, 1990). Even the debatebetween positive accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1979, 1990; Jensen, 1983) andits critics (Christenson, 1983; Whitley, 1988; Williams, 1989) testifies how positivistphilosophy and neo-classical economics still have considerable influence in accountingstudies.

5. Other examples of narrowness (and reductionism) are: a) a `̀ managerial/organizationalperspective'' which implies a `̀ teleological'' approach similar to that found in standard costvariance analysis (Puxty, 1993; p. 10-11); this perspective is reflected in the different formsof `̀ tripartition'' in hierarchical levels (Anthony, 1967; Anthony and Dearden, 1980); b) theanalytic strategy pursued in cost allocation techniques or investment assessment (e.g. costallocation based on cost centres is inspired by a marginalist principle (see Johnson, 1981;Solomons, 1968, pp. 36-48; the `̀ return on investment'' ratio (ROI) Kaplan, 1984; Williamson,1970, p. 134; Johnson and Kaplan, 1987, pp. 107, 114-20)); c) the `̀ arithmomorphism'' of mostof accounting research (i.e. the reduction of every phenomenon to numbers).

6. Other definitions (e.g. Hodgson, 1988) limit `̀ methodological individualism'' to the rolegiven to individual agencies in constructing economic theories.

7. Meyer and Rowan note that: `̀ Quite beyond the environmental interrelations suggested inopen systems theories, institutional theories in their extreme forms define organizations asdramatic enactments of the rationalized myths pervading modern societies, rather than asunits involved in exchange ± no matter how complex ± with their environments'' (1977, p. 47,emphasis added).

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8. The definition of `̀ ontological gerrymandering'' has been provided by Woolgar (1988, pp.98-100). He states that: `̀ The success (or, at least, the plausibility) of critiques of science isthat they suppose (and present) themselves to be something separate (distant) from thescience which is being deconstructed. [...] The practice of establishing and manipulating adistinction between arguments which are and are not susceptible to relativism has beencalled `̀ ontological gerrymandering'' (1988, p. 99).

9. The equilibration process described by Piaget (1977) might be easily charged with `̀ naõÈve''realism. Indeed, Piaget (1977, pp. 12-41; see also Piaget, 1970, pp. 13-19), writes about`̀ levels'' and `̀ better'' knowledge, and this might lead the reader to think of an `̀ objective''reality to be compared to the knowledge gained (as in the Popperian ascent of themountain). Whether Piaget was a realist or not is not an issue for my paper, of course. Heobserves (Piaget, 1977, p. 17) whether the equilibration process is a success is a decision ofthe observer who judges whether or not the `̀ new'' knowledge s/he has constructed is`̀ better'' than the previous one. However, this by no mean implies that there is a reductionof the subject. The object is `̀ there'' (although it might be a construction of the subject!).The objectivity (or subjectivity) of this object is not a matter that can be treated withoutmaking a metaphysical or religious claim (see von Glasersfeld, 1979, pp. 120-21, 1981,1996).

10. The recent literature is so vast that it is impossible to provide here a complete list ofreferences. In addition to this, the same word `̀ constructivism'' has been used in manydisciplines (e.g. architecture, economics, sociology) and under different, and sometimescontrasting, epistemological canons. It is then useful, at least for the aims of this paper, inmaking the distinction between `̀ constructivism'' and `̀ social constructivism'' clearer. Thelatter presents some structuralist problems due to the emphasis placed on language and itsobjectivity (e.g. Berger and Luckmann, 1966); the former, instead, tries to escape theseproblems as it is argued in the remainder of this section.

11. Ceruti also states that: `̀ The field of the science of the subject is constituted by a pluralityof research levels [...]. (Historically), every single discipline (has been) specificallyconcerned with a single level or, better, (has) construct(ed) its own domain of discoursewhich (has) determine(d) a particular level'' (1986, p. 47).

12. Piaget, for example, states that: If we take epistemology to mean, not just the causal orpsycho-phylological study of factors enabling a piece of knowledge to function [...] but theanalysis of the condition of the truth [...] of the things known, the relaying of informationbetween subjects and object, it will be seen that (the) epistemological problem is to beconfronted at every level (1967b, quoted in Ceruti, 1986, p. 48).

13. The grey boxes represent the conventional way of interpreting epistemology, accountingand practices.

14. I am grateful to Keith Hoskin for this insightful comparison.

15. As suggested by one of the referees.

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