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Constraints and Adjustmentsin Portugal's Policy towardIsraelJacob AbadiPublished online: 24 May 2006.

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Constraints and Adjustments in Portugal’sPolicy toward Israel

JACOB ABADI

Throughout most of its existence the State of Israel had only a handful of

friends and allies. However, even during the era of pan-Arabism, when Arab

nationalism held sway over the Middle East, engulfing the Third World and

the non-aligned nations, Western European countries, with the exception of

those of the Iberian Peninsula, had already established diplomatic relations

with the Jewish State. Despite its small size and its distance from Israel,

Foreign Ministry officials in Jerusalem attached considerable importance to

Portugal. This was largely due to its strategic location at the entrance to the

Mediterranean basin. Already prior to Israel’s establishment, the Jewish

Agency considered the Portuguese coast essential in facilitating illegal

immigration of Jews to Palestine.1 Whilst many Israelis tended to dismiss the

importance of diplomatic relations with Portugal, others rejected the idea on

the grounds that Israel need not associate itself with dictatorships. Never-

theless, some Foreign Ministry officials remained steadfast in their conviction

that ties with Portugal were essential and continued advocating greater efforts

in order to earn Lisbon’s goodwill.

This article argues that the Israeli–Portuguese rapprochement that began by

the mid 1970s, was not possible until the demise of the dictatorship and the

rise of a socialist government in Portugal, many of whose members were

sympathetic to the socialist enterprise of the Zionist Labour movement. In

addition, the article argues that Portugal’s withdrawal from its African

colonies accelerated the normalization process. This was largely because

Portuguese withdrawal had considerably reduced criticism from Arab and

other Third World countries, which tended to regard both Portugal and Israel

as imperialist countries. At the same time, however, there were other factors,

which deterred the new socialist regime in Lisbon and delayed the

normalization process. Foremost among these was Portugal’s overwhelming

dependence on Arab oil. Some members of the Portuguese socialist

government were loyal to the Soviet Union and did not wish to promote

foreign policy ventures that were not in Moscow’s interest. Moreover, the

Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.40, No.5, September 2004, pp.83 – 108ISSN 0026-3206 print/1743-7881 onlineDOI: 10.1080/0026320042000265684 # 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd.

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existence of a large communist party led by the militant Alvaro Cunhal who

remained fanatically loyal to Moscow, discouraged any initiative aimed at

normalizing relations with Israel.2

Torn between the need to maintain cordial relations between the USA

and to avoid antagonizing the oil-producing Arab countries, the socialist

regime in Portugal was forced to delay its decision to mend fences with

Israel, despite the pro-Israeli sentiments among many of its members.

Eventually, it was the need to rely on US aid, which prompted Lisbon to

mend fences with Israel.3 With the onset of the Middle East peace process,

most of the constraints, which prevented the Portuguese government from

coming closer to Israel were gradually removed. Arab opposition to Israeli–

Portuguese rapprochement had considerably diminished by the early 1990s,

as a result of the Middle East peace process and thus made the

normalization process less risky from Lisbon’s viewpoint. The subsequent

lack of progress in the peace process and the outbreak of the Al Aqsa

Intifada in September 2000, compelled the Portuguese government to keep

a low profile in its dealings with Israel and so far the two countries

remained on good terms.

During the early years of Israel’s existence bilateral relations were marred by

the memory of Portuguese ill treatment of Jews in the distant past. Like their

Spaniard neighbours, the Portuguese were associated in the Israeli mind with

intolerance and persecution of Jews.4 The Portuguese never relished being

reminded of their treatment of the Jews who suffered persecution both by the

government and the Catholic Church. Jews attempting to find refuge in

Portugal, following their expulsion from Spain in the late fifteenth century,

were forced to convert to Christianity. Although Portugal admitted the

evicted Jews, it forced them to convert to Christianity with inhuman cruelty,

after separating children from their parents. In 1601, the forcefully converted

Marranos of Spain and Portugal, which were united at that time, were given

permission to sell their property and leave the country. Those who remained

in Portugal were excluded from normal government protection and suffered

discrimination, but refused to assimilate. Some Jews, like Duarte Nunez da

Costa, played an active part in Portugal’s struggle for independence from

Spain in 1640.5

Portuguese treatment of Jews did not improve significantly even in modern

times. Its unwillingness to take extraordinary measures in order to save Jews

during the Holocaust left a negative impression among Jews and Israelis

alike. During the Second World War, Mossad agents were engaged in an

attempt to save Jewish refugees from Romania. When they asked the

Portuguese consul to register their ship as Portuguese, the government

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refused the request. Consequently, all 769 Jewish refugees aboard the ship

perished. The Portuguese government did not attempt to rescue Jews and

discouraged individuals from doing so. For example, when the Catholic

lawyer, Aristides de Sousa Mendes gave shelter and provided visas for Jews

fleeing from occupied Vichy France, he was dismissed from his position. His

property was confiscated and he was declared an outcast. And when the papal

legate to Turkey, Angelo Cardinal Roncalli, who later became Pope John

XXIII, sought to save Jewish children by sending them to Portugal, he

encountered many obstacles. Prime Minister Antonio de Oliveira Salazar

refused to let the ship bring the children to safety. Consequently, Roncalli had

to turn to a Portuguese diplomat in Turkey, whose child he had christened,

and thus managed to save their lives.6 There were other cases in which

Portuguese individuals became involved in such rescue operations. For

example, Consul Salvador de Sampayo Garrido provided shelter to 25 Jews

in his legation in Budapest during the Second World War. Also famous was

Aristides de Soza Mendes, the Portuguese Consul-General in Bordeaux who

against the orders of his government issued transit visas to more than 10,000

Jewish refugees during the Vichy era. The Portuguese government dismissed

him, deprived him of his rights, and it was only in May 1987 that President

Mario Soares posthumously awarded him the highest civilian medal.7

Portugal’s reputation as a country whose leaders refrained from providing

shelter to persecuted Jews turned it into a pariah in the eyes of many Israelis

and discouraged efforts by Israeli Foreign Ministry officials to mend fences

with its regime. Adding to this negative image were the reports that Portugal

was the second largest buyer of Nazi gold after Switzerland.8

Whereas Israel refrained from establishing cordial relations with Spain’s

dictator Francisco Franco, it regarded Salazar’s regime as a benign

dictatorship with which it would be possible to cultivate friendship. But

while the ruling Mapai (Israel’s Labour Party) sought to expand Israel’s ties

with all countries willing to do so, the radical left-wing parties had

reservations about reaching countries with a colonial reputation, such as

Portugal whose continued occupation of African colonies they regarded as

exploitive. Such attitude had often embarrassed Mapai whose actions were

motivated by pragmatic considerations. Both the Communists and the left-

wing Mapam (United Labour Party) opposed relations with Portugal on the

ground that it suppressed the independence movements in Angola and

Mozambique. Articles, which often appeared in the Communist publication

Kol Ha’am were highly critical of Portuguese colonial policy. Likewise,

Mapam had aversion to what it regarded as Portuguese imperialism. It

criticized the Portuguese regime and maintained contacts with the Portuguese

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Socialist Party, hoping that Portuguese forces would be withdrawn when the

Socialists come to power.9

Generally, the Israel General Federation of Labour (Histadrut) refrained

from commenting about the Foreign Ministry’s attempts to normalize

relations with Portugal. Its leaders had often expressed solidarity with all

nations under colonial rule but avoided mentioning Portugal by name. The

Histadrut had often sent letters expressing solidarity with African and Asian

nations in their struggle for independence. For example, in one of the

messages to the Mozambique Liberation Front, the Histadrut’s General

Secretary A. Becker wrote, ‘On behalf of Israel workers we greet the

Mozambique Liberation Front on its first annual conference. We are

confident that through your devoted efforts the day of liberation for your

land will soon come.’ 10 Concerned about Portuguese reaction, Israeli

government officials refrained from giving publicity to such letters. However,

even Mapai’s leaders had affinity with the Portuguese socialists whom they

met on several occasions. Shimon Peres, who later became Israel’s prime

minister, spoke fondly of Mario Soares, who was among his close comrades

in the Socialist International, and who ‘rose to prominence within our ranks’.

The general union of Portuguese workers occasionally invited their Israeli

comrades in the Histadrut to participate in their meetings. Histadrut officials

regarded such invitations as valuable in improving the bilateral relations.11

From the beginning, Israeli Foreign Ministry officials kept in touch with

their Portuguese counterparts and asked for recognition as soon as the Jewish

State was established. When Chaim Weizmann was elected Israel’s first

president, they took the opportunity to inform the Portuguese and to interest

them in ties with Israel. The Israeli official who pressed the issue with vigour

was Avraham Darom, who joined the Foreign Ministry shortly after the

state’s formation. Despite his aversion to Francisco Franco, he joined the

advocates of normalization with Spain, believing that rapprochement with

Madrid would have a salutary effect on Israeli–Portuguese relations.12 He

strongly recommended that Israel should strive to establish normal relations

with both countries. He explained that the Iberian Peninsula had strategic

importance, which Israel could not afford to ignore. Many officials shared his

view, believing that normalization with Portugal would be a springboard to

rapprochement with Spain. This becomes evident from a letter from the

Israeli Ambassador in London to Walter Eytan, which reads in part:

Portuguese recognition. . .would add another Catholic country to our

list, as well as another maritime country on Israel’s periphery. . .More-

over, if later on we should establish relations with Spain, the fact that

Portugal has already recognized us would make things comfortable for

us.13

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Israeli efforts seemed futile in the beginning. According to Eytan, there

were several reasons for Portugal’s reluctance to mend fences with Israel.

First, there was administrative lethargy in the Portuguese Foreign Ministry,

where no official had enough motivation to deal with the issue. Second,

Portugal did not wish to take a step that was liable to anger Spain. Third,

Portugal was discouraged by the fact that the Vatican was not favourably

disposed toward Israel. Eytan’s observations were confirmed by Portuguese

sources. Professor Amzalek, Rector of Lisbon University, told the Israeli

Ambassador that Lisbon avoided the issue on purpose for the following

reasons:

a Portugal’s need to coordinate its foreign policy with Spain, without

jeopardizing the interest of Great Britain, its traditional ally.

b The impact of the Catholic sentiment and the fact that Portugal attached

great importance to the Vatican’s decision not to establish formal ties

with Israel.

c Portugal’s fear that recognition of Israel would anger its numerous

subjects in Angola and Mozambique.

d Portugal’s tendency to delay serious and risky decisions.

Portuguese officials tended to dismiss Israel’s claims that their government’s

policy was influenced by outside factors. Portugal’s Ambassador to Buenos

Aires and Montevideo argued that Salazar’s policy was by no means

influenced by Franco or by Portuguese–British relations. He admitted,

however, that it was possible that the tension in Israeli–Vatican relations was

a factor.14 A Portuguese Foreign Ministry spokesman told leaders of the

Jewish community in Lisbon that the absence of diplomatic relations with

Israel did not mean lack of good will on Portugal’s part. He argued that

Portugal had already demonstrated its good will toward Israel, not only by

commercial ties, but also by voting in its favor in international organizations.

The fact that the leaders of the Jewish community in Portugal seemed to

lack the courage and the fortitude necessary to persuade the Portuguese to

change their policy had a delaying effect on the normalization process. While

persisting in their efforts to expand the commercial and economic contacts,

Israeli officials were compelled to avoid the issue of diplomatic recognition.15

Portugal’s tendency to follow the Spanish in foreign affairs had a

considerable impact on its relations with Israel. The early 1950s witnessed a

major Spanish campaign to improve relations with the Arab states. This

‘bridge to Islam’ policy was first announced by Spain’s Foreign Minister

Martin Artajo, on 12 December 1950. Artajo’s tour to the Middle East in April

1952, had demonstrated to the Portuguese that cordial relations with the Arab

states loomed large in the eyes of the Spanish government. Consequently,

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officials in Lisbon were in no mood to antagonize Franco, particularly when

diplomatic relations with Israel were not high on their government’s agenda.

Aware of this limitation on Portuguese foreign policy, the Israelis maintained

informal ties with Lisbon, using both British and French intermediaries. By

the end of 1953, the prevailing attitude in the Israeli Foreign Ministry was that

Portuguese foreign policy was hopelessly tied to that of Spain, and therefore

concluded that there was little sense in renewed efforts to obtain Portuguese

recognition.16 When Portugal’s Ambassador to Turkey, Bivar Brandeiro

expressed sympathy toward the Arabs in their conflict with Israel, the Israeli

Ambassador expressed his disappointment, saying that it was impossible ‘to

turn him into a friend of ours’.17

Nevertheless, officials in the Israeli Foreign Ministry persisted in their

efforts to persuade the Portuguese government to recognize Israel, hoping

that Portugal’s need for international support in its struggle against India over

Goa would lead to a better attitude toward Israel.18 Ironically, it was precisely

the Goa issue which prevented rapprochement between the two countries.

Realizing that the Arabs had many votes in the UN, the Portuguese

government played its cards with remarkable skill. It maintained contacts

with Israel in an unobtrusive manner, and refrained from official statements,

which implied a willingness to recognize Israel. When approached by Israeli

officials, the Portuguese argued that considerations of raison d’etat prevented

them from upgrading the bilateral relations. For example, in a conversation,

which he held with an Israeli Foreign Ministry official, Portugal’s Foreign

Minister said that his government did not wish to antagonize the Arab states

as long as the Goa issue remained unresolved.19

By the end of 1954, Israeli Foreign Ministry officials came to the realization

that their assumption that Portuguese foreign policywas inextricably tied to that

of Spain was inaccurate. Portuguese tendency to take Spain’s interests into

consideration was challenged both in the government and the foreign ministry.

The Israeli Ambassador to Brussels had informed the Foreign Ministry that in

his talks with the Portuguese Ambassador, Eduardo Vieira Leitao, the latter

strongly criticized Spain’s Middle Eastern policy and reassured him that

nothing other than the Goa issue stood in the way of normalization.20

In his report to the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, the Israeli Ambassador

to Brussels argued that apart from the years of the Spanish Civil War, in

which Portugal recognized Franco’s regime, no identity of interests existed

between the two countries. This was largely because Portugal was never

resigned to the loss of Olivenza, a city occupied by Spain since 1802. Nor did

Portugal approve of Spain’s pro-Arab policy. The Ambassador had also

refuted the argument that deference to Vatican opinion was a reason for

Portugal’s refusal to normalize relations with Israel. He remained firm in his

opinion that administrative lethargy in the Portuguese foreign office was the

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main reason for the absence of diplomatic relations and strongly

recommended that Israel embark on a new diplomatic offensive in Lisbon.21

Israeli Foreign Ministry officials continued to convince their Portuguese

counterparts that recognition of Israel could earn them sympathy in the west

and diplomatic support on the Goa issue. However, the pessimist outlook in

the Israeli Foreign Ministry remained overwhelming. Key Foreign Ministry

officials remained convinced that Portugal’ fear of Spanish reaction to its

Middle Eastern policy still prevailed in Lisbon, and therefore argued that it

was pointless to persist in pressuring the Portuguese.22 In a letter of 22

February 1955 to Israel’s Ambassador to Ottawa, Eytan said, ‘the Portuguese

haven’t fallen in love with us yet, and the remote possibility of exchanging

consuls offers hopes of only the most platonic relationship.’ 23

In their meetings with their Israeli counterparts, Portuguese officials tended

to be apologetic regarding the issue. A Portuguese diplomat said that Portugal

could not overlook the fact that the Arabs had so many votes in the UN and in

the Asiatic bloc. Nevertheless, he said that this did not prevent the Portuguese

government from recognizing Israel, and that Lisbon was simply waiting for

an opportune time to upgrade bilateral relations. He went on to explain that

what the Portuguese government had in mind was a gradual approach; first a

de facto recognition with consular ties, and later a de jure recognition and

diplomatic relations.24

When asked by the Israeli Ambassador in Paris why his country did not

extend diplomatic recognition to Israel, Marcello Mathias, Portugal’s former

ambassador to Paris said, ‘It seems to me that they [the Israelis], did not

present the issue properly.’25 Yet despite the absence of diplomatic relations

Portugal did not refrain from cooperating with Israel in matters which it

considered vital for its national interests. This was the reason why its

intelligence services maintained close contacts with the Mossad.26

Initially, the Portuguese stated that their policy was pro-western. General

Lopez, who ran for the presidency in the summer of 1951, declared that his

country’s objective was to maintain close relations with all countries

committed to western defence.27 However, such a favourable attitude toward

western countries did lead to greater interest in Israel.

Concerned about antagonizing the Arab states, Lisbon did not upgrade its

relations with Israel. It avoided the issue, arguing that it could not extend

recognition to Israel due to the fact that its borders with the Arab states were

not determined yet. At the same time, the Portuguese government

endeavoured to strengthen its ties with the Arab states. By the mid 1950s,

the Saudis asked and obtained permission to land their US-made aircraft in

Portuguese air bases.28

Israel’s collusion with Britain and France during the Suez Affair of 1956

kept the Portuguese away from Israel. The Portuguese Ambassador was said

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to have been concerned about the oil supplies to his country and he expressed

his concern to the British prior to their invasion of Suez.29 The fact that Third

World countries sympathized with Egypt and tended to accuse Israel of

collaborating with the imperialist powers discouraged the Portuguese. In

March 1957, Portugal joined the 16 countries that signed a declaration

guaranteeing their right of free passage through the Straits of Tiran.30 In a

speech to the General Assembly, on 4 March 1957, Portugal’s representative

Dr Garin said:

On this occasion we wish also to state that the assumptions and

expectations with which the government of Israel has announced its

decision are considered by my delegation, in a general way, as

understandable. . .both as regards the question of innocent passage in the

Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran, and the temporary arrangements

for the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the Gaza strip.31

However, it was Portugal’s fear that closure of the straits would have an

adverse effect on its communications with Goa, rather than a desire to

demonstrate solidarity with Israel, which led to this action.32

Unlike some countries with large Jewish populations capable of motivating

their governments to upgrade relations with Israel, the Jewish community in

Portugal remained small. In 1959, there were no more than 630 Jews in

Portugal.33 Among the Jews who had influence in Portugal was Shmuel

Kantor whose attempts to interest the Portuguese government in a dialogue

ended in failure.34 Intense efforts by the Arab states to discredit the Jewish

community kept it under suspicion and slowed the normalization process.

Arab sources had often depicted the Jews as treacherous and attributed to

them power, which they did not actually possess. For example, the Egyptian

statesman Muhammad Ali Aluba attributed the Portuguese coup of 1905 to

Jewish manipulation.35

In December 1959, Conde Querida, a Portuguese businessman and a

Rotary Club representative close to the Portuguese government paid a visit to

Israel. The Israelis took the opportunity to ask him to intervene on their

behalf in Lisbon. Querida reported to the Israelis that Foreign Minister

Marcello Mathias informed him that his government was not inclined to

change its policy toward Israel in the foreseeable future due to its fear of Arab

reaction. Initially, Mathias considered the possibility of appointing an

honorary consul in Israel, but later changed his mind and preferred to appoint

a career diplomat at a later date. Mathias explained that apart from voting

against Portugal in the Goa issue, the Arabs had done nothing harmful that

warranted unfriendly reaction by Lisbon. Nevertheless, Mathias could not

hide his disappointment with the Arabs whom he described as canaille

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[rabble], and said that they were capable of causing political and economic

difficulties which Lisbon would find hard to deal with.36

In March 1960, the Israeli representative in Lisbon reported that although

Israel managed to establish solid commercial and cultural relations with

Portugal, his appeal to foreign ministry officials to discuss the state of the

bilateral relations had fallen on deaf ears. He complained that senior

Portuguese officials ignored his invitations to visit Israel, and that there was

general reluctance to discuss the possibility of normalization. He noted that

his efforts to invite the head of the Portuguese National Assembly to Israel

ended in failure, as did his attempt to invite the Archbishop of Lisbon and the

head of the Portuguese church. In addition, his request that the Portuguese

dispense with all diplomatic passports was rejected. Foreign Ministry officials

in Lisbon made numerous promises to discuss the possibility of improving

relations with Israel but failed to keep them.37 In his discussions with Israeli

representatives, Foreign Minister Norton de Matos announced his govern-

ment’s decision to exchange diplomatic representatives with Israel. He said

that Portugal was highly impressed with Israel’s willingness to cooperate in

technical matters and welcomed its decision to provide financial assistance

for the building of a sugar factory in Angola.38 However, the Portuguese

Foreign Minister refrained from making any commitments to move the

normalization process forward.

What accounted for these mild expressions of solidarity with Israel was the

fact that Portugal’s relations with the Arab states suffered a great deal in

those days. Angry over their criticism of Portuguese policy in Africa, Salazar

lashed out at the Arab countries, saying that they had no right to interfere in

Portuguese affairs. In a meeting with the British Ambassador, in April 1961,

he remarked that ‘The Africans in our overseas territories were quiet and

happy until they were got at from outside. Ghana and the United Arab

Republic lead the attack but we are sure the Communists are at the bottom of

all our troubles.’ 39 At the same time, however, Portugal’s relations with

Israel were also marred by reports that Israel supported the FNLA (National

Front for the Liberation of Angola) whose leader, Holden Roberto visited

Israel, and whose members were being trained there.40 At the same time,

there were also reports that Israel was involved in supplying arms to

Portuguese troops in Africa. On 21 January 1962, the Soviet publication

Kommunist Tadjikistan had published a Tass report from Tel Aviv, which

quoted a Yediot Aharonot correspondent as saying that Israel supplied

weapons bearing Bundeswehr markings to Portuguese troops in Angola and

Mozambique. According to Tass, communists and other liberal groups in

Israel demanded that the Knesset investigate the reports about ‘the deal

between Jerusalem, Bonn and Lisbon’. The report also mentions that deputy

D. Midjuna demanded that the government ‘examine and annul their deals

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with Bonn about the supply of arms’.41 Deputy Defence Minister Shimon

Peres explained that after Portugal failed to buy the weapons from Israel it

applied to a Belgian firm, which had an Israeli licence to produce them.42

Likewise, the Germans denied that any Israeli arms had been sold to the

Portuguese. An official in the British Foreign Office had commented that if

the Soviets were so sure about their facts they would have published the story

in a publication commanding a wider audience.43

Egypt’s President Gamal Abd al Nasser’s commitment to Africa’s

liberation was bound to lead to tension in Egyptian–Portuguese relations.

In his Philosophy of the Revolution, Nasser claimed that Egypt had a major

role to play in Africa’s liberation from colonial rule. Consequently,

Portugal’s attempt to mollify Nasser by keeping Israel at a distance did

little to assuage the Egyptian leader who sought to win the sympathy of the

African nations by adopting a hostile attitude toward Lisbon. Consequently,

Cairo severed its diplomatic relations with Portugal in 1963. It hosted

meetings of African liberation movements and all the organizations that

fought Portuguese rule in Africa had offices in Cairo.44

At a meeting of the Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa, in May

1963, Algeria’s Prime Minister Ahmed Ben Bella made a passionate appeal

to its members to support the freedom fighters in Angola, Mozambique and

South Africa. And when the UN discussed apartheid on 9 December 1966,

Algeria’s representative equated Israel’s policy to that of South Africa and

blamed both for encouraging Portuguese imperialism in Mozambique.45

Reacting to Algeria’s decision to sever its diplomatic relations with his

country, Portugal’s Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira described it as a purely

demagogic measure. But whereas Portuguese officials remained indifferent to

Algeria’s rhetoric, they were quite sensitive about Nasser’s opinion. Cordial

relations with Egypt loomed large in the eyes of officials in Lisbon, not only

due to Nasser’s undisputed leadership of the Arab world, but also because the

two countries maintained normal relations despite his rhetoric. Nasser

modelled the United Arab Republic’s political constitution on that of

Portugal. Moreover, in his meetings with Portuguese officials he agreed to

stop criticizing Portuguese policies in Africa if Lisbon refrained from

recognizing Israel.

According to the British Ambassador in Lisbon, it was not his hostility that

led Nasser to sever diplomatic relations with Lisbon but his desire not to be

outpaced by Ben Bella. Indeed, Nasser’s decision had no serious

consequences on the future of Egyptian–Portuguese relations. Portuguese

vessels continued to clear the Suez Canal and there was no reason to suppose

that Nasser would block their passage.46 However, Nogueira did not refrain

from criticizing Nasser when Portuguese interests were at stake. He told the

British Ambassador in London that both Egypt and Algeria were fighting for

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influence in Africa, and that they were bent on controlling the Congo. He was

particularly critical of Ben Bella who was tolerant toward British colonialism

in South Africa while criticizing Portugal’s occupation of Angola.47 At the

same time, his comments about Israel’s involvement in Africa were far less

critical.

As for the moderate Arab countries, they also found it necessary to criticize

Portuguese occupation of African territories. Referring to Portugal’s

occupation of Angola and Mozambique, Tunisia’s President Habib

Bourguiba had once told a French journalist, ‘We agreed to denounce

colonial oppression, which still persists in the world.’ 48 Similarly, Morocco’s

Ambassador to the UN, Muhammad Benhima, told the General Assembly on

7 October 1965 that ‘South Africa. . . had been encouraged by the

indifference of the great powers, and Portugal even today is still encouraged

by their complicity’.49 Even smaller Arab states felt compelled to adopt anti-

Portuguese measures. On 25 July 1966, the Kuwaiti government announced

its decision to sever its diplomatic relations with Portugal due to its colonial

policy. The announcement came as a surprise to the Portuguese since they

had no such relations and did not even consider establishing them.50

Portugal’s policy in Africa had a negative implication not only for its

relations with the Arab states but also with the USA.51 The friction between

Portugal and the western countries encouraged the Arab states whose leaders

felt free to criticize Portugal. There is little wonder therefore that Israel’s

arguments that diplomatic relations could be beneficial to Portugal had fallen

on deaf ears in Lisbon. So sensitive was the Portuguese government that the

Arabs might accuse it of being pro-Israeli that it even refused to allow an

Israeli national football team to visit Portugal in February 1973.52

Arab attempts to equate Portugal and Israel and portray their regimes as

suppressive culminated in the Declaration of the Struggle for National

Liberation, which emanated from the Algiers summit of non-aligned nations

in September 1973. While the declaration was sympathetic to the

Palestinians, it condemned both Israel and Portugal. It described Israel as a

participant in the Pretoria–Salisbury–Lisbon military alliance against all

national liberation movements. On 6 September 1973, Egypt’s President

Anwar Sadat compared Portuguese rule in Africa to South Africa’s racial

policy and Israel’s conduct in the occupied territories.53 Sadat’s negative

view of Portugal was also reflected in his address to the Central Committee of

the Arab Socialist Union. He told the delegates that the Arabs needed unity in

order to avoid what happened in Portugal ‘which jumped into the darkness of

political parties after 40 years of dictatorship’.54

The Portuguese were in a dire predicament in the early 1970s. When the

Yom Kippur War of October 1973 erupted in the Middle East. Marcello

Caetano’s government was under US pressure to allow it to use the Azores in

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order to transfer arms and equipment to Israel.55 The reason for Portuguese

acquiescence was not that Israel’s survival was at stake, but the fact that

Lisbon was interested in obtaining modern weapons from the USA in order to

deal with the sophisticated Soviet arms, including surface-to-air missiles,

used by the guerrilla movements in the Portuguese colonies. This was also an

opportunity for the Portuguese to ask the US to pay more for the American-

built Lajes bases in the Azores. In order to pressure Portugal to agree to

provide facilities for its airlift to Israel, the US had to use both carrot and

stick.56 On 13 October 1973, President Richard Nixon warned Caetano that

refusal to comply with the US request would lead to American retaliation,

which Portugal in its isolated situation could hardly afford. In December

1973, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was in Lisbon where he

promised the Portuguese government to supply it sophisticated ground-to-air

‘red-eye’ missiles, and other equipment for its use in Africa. This

commitment violated the US embargo on arms sales to Portugal.57 Realizing

the importance of earning the good will of the Israeli lobby in Washington the

Portuguese finally agreed to allow the US to use the bases in the Azores.58

Pleased with Portugal’s decision to allow the US to use its base in the

Azores in order to supply the IDF (Israel Defence Forces) the much needed

arms and equipment, which helped turn the tide of the war, officials in the

Israeli Foreign Ministry decided to intensify contacts with their Portuguese

counterparts. In December 1973, General Chaim Herzog who later became

Israel’s president suggested that Portugal and South Africa, the only two

countries that remained friendly to Israel during the Yom Kippur War, should

be Israel’s allies in the future.59

Following the Yom Kippur War the Arab oil ministers announced that

Portugal was one of the countries, which they decided to put on their boycott

list. They argued that Portugal had to be punished for its colonial policy in

Africa and its collaboration with the US.60 Alluding to the US airlift to Israel,

Algeria’s former foreign minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika had once argued that

Egypt and Syria had proof that both Portugal and South Africa supported

Israel during the Yom Kippur War. Arab criticism was a source of

considerable embarrassment for Portugal. By the early months of 1974 the

energy crisis compounded Portugal’s problems and inflation soared to an

annual rate of over 60 per cent.61 Nevertheless, Portugal’s willingness to

allow US aircraft to use its facilities in the Azores earned it handsome

dividends in Israel.62

Palestinian commandos who began operating against Israeli targets

throughout Europe during the 1970s, found Portugal a convenient base for

their operations. Like other European countries, which became target of

terrorism, Portugal could not condone such activities. But neither could it

afford to be regarded as hostile to the Palestinian cause. On 13 November

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1973, members of the radical Palestinian group led by Abu Nidal carried out

an abortive assassination attempt against Israel’s Ambassador to Portugal

Efraim Eldar. Concerned about its image in the Arab world, the Portuguese

government yielded to pressure exerted by the group and sentenced the

conspirator, Muhammad Hussein Rashid to three years imprisonment, a light

sentence that infuriated the Israelis.63

US officials had repeatedly warned that Salazar’s demise would have an

adverse effect on Portugal’s attitude toward the Middle East.64 The Israelis,

however, were convinced that such development could have a salutary effect

on Israeli–Portuguese relations. Indeed, the coup ushered in a new period in

bilateral relations, but it was not until the rise of the socialist regime under

Soares that the relations began to improve.

In April 1974, a group of officers overthrew the dictatorship and a junta of

seven, under president General Antonio Spinola, ruled the country until

September, when he resigned following a clash with the military. Officials in

the Israeli Foreign Ministry believed that the time was ripe for a new

diplomatic offensive in Lisbon. However, Socialist Foreign Minister Mario

Soares said that he had great admiration for the Israeli Labour Party, and

Golda Meir in particular. He added, however, that while Portugal was willing

to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, it had to normalize relations with

the Arab states first, ‘because of the importance of the Arab states in the

world in general, and in particular because of their influence among liberal

movements in Africa.’ 65

The Israelis were concerned that due to the influence exerted by the

powerful communist Alvaro Cunhal, Portugal’s foreign policy would fall

under Moscow’s influence and thus become pro-Arab.66 That the new regime

had become more pro-Arab than its predecessor was evident from the fact

that it stated that it no longer wished to grant to the USA the right to use the

Azores in a future war. This was obviously a result of the Arab oil embargo,

which virtually crippled the Portuguese economy. Besides, the new regime

seemed to have a sincere desire to mend fences with the Arab world. As one

Portuguese minister put it, ‘Our present policy is to open up to the Arab

countries.’ 67 Accordingly, Portugal’s Prime Minister Vasco Goncalves told

the magazine Beirut Al-Massa that his government’s objective was to

establish ‘the strongest and most sincere relations’68 with the Arab world.

And in order to satisfy Arab demand for a pro-Palestinian policy he said, ‘We

want the Middle East conflict to be solved peacefully in a manner that takes

into consideration the legitimate interests of the peoples of the region,

particularly the Palestinians.’ 69 Several days later, he reiterated that Portugal

would honour its commitments to NATO, but made it clear that ‘We will not

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allow our bases to be utilized against the Arabs.’70 The Israelis were

disillusioned by such statements and their disappointment intensified when

the Portuguese socialist leader Raul Rego cancelled his visit to Israel after

being invited by the Labour Party.71

Following an abortive communist coup in Portugal new elections were

held in April 1975. Under Soares the Socialists obtained a majority, and a

new regime which obtained partial support from the military came to power.

The new regime was somewhat more sympathetic to Israel, but Soares was

still unwilling to embark on a bold foreign policy initiative. He agreed to

mutual establishment of embassies, but while welcoming the Israeli

Ambassador, he refrained from sending his own envoy to Israel.72

Despite its willingness to mend fences with Israel the Portuguese regime

continued to court the Arabs. OPEC’s oil embargo caused economic

problems, which continued to haunt the revolutionary government in the

following years. The problem was compounded by the militant worker’s

movement, whose leaders assailed the capitalists and blamed the government

for protecting their interests. Between January and April 1975, Portugal’s

national deficit was estimated at 13,548 million escudos. Gold reserves

dwindled. Economic dependence on the EEC (European Economic Com-

munity), which accounted for 45 per cent of Portugal’s imports and 16 per

cent of its exports, was critical and there was dire need for financial aid.73 It is

little wonder, therefore, that the new regime was unwilling to jeopardize its

relations with the Arabs even at the expense of alienating Israel.

On 10 November 1975, the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Melo Antunes,

joined the Arab states in the vote for the resolution equating Zionism with

racism. He sought to eliminate OPEC’s objection to his attempt to reach an

agreement with the Iraqis for the supply of cheap oil. His tactic paid off when

the Iraqi Foreign Minister promised to begin negotiating a new economic

agreement with Portugal.74 However, while many Portuguese officials

realized that for pragmatic reasons there was need to maintain cordial

relations with the Arabs there was no unanimity regarding the need to keep

Israel at a distance. Many socialists were still sympathetic to Israel’s

experiment with socialism and still maintained contacts with the left wing

parties in Israel as well as with the Histadrut. Some even went to the extent of

expressing misgivings about the government’s policy toward Israel. For

example, Parliament member Jaime Gama openly condemned Portugal’s vote

on the Zionism–racism resolution.75 Critics of the government’s pro-Arab

policy increased shortly after Soares came to power. Sensing that Soares had

a ‘warm spot’ for Israel, his critics did not refrain from speaking their minds.

Foreign Ministry officials in Jerusalem who met their Portuguese counter-

parts sensed that Soares’ regime might be willing to go further in upgrading

the bilateral relations. Consequently, two members of the Portuguese

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Socialist Party were invited to visit Israel by the beginning of June 1976.

Sources in the Labour party talked about the visit as a prelude to the

establishment of diplomatic relations with Portugal. Thereafter, the normal-

ization process gained remarkable momentum. In a statement introducing his

new cabinet on 4 August 1976, Soares said: ‘We are currently faced with the

issue of establishing diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China and

with Israel, and we feel that there is no reason to hinder us from establishing

relations with all the nations of the world without regard to domestic

policies.’ The Israelis responded with alacrity by inviting Soares to visit

Israel. Later that year the signs from Lisbon were even more encouraging.

Soares wrote to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin who congratulated him on

assuming the office of prime minister, and stated that he was looking forward

toward the establishment of friendly ties between the two countries.76

However, Portuguese fear of Arab response delayed the normalization

process. Officials in Lisbon feared that Libya might renege on its promise to

provide Portugal with financial assistance. Uneasy about this state of affairs,

they made it clear that they did not like to be pushed into ties with Israel

prematurely. In his conversation with the General Director of the Israeli

Foreign Ministry, Shlomo Avineri, Soares said that Portugal’s aim was to

establish relations with Israel ‘at its own pace’.77 He even went to the extent

of reassuring the Arabs that his government would not allow the USA to use

the base in the Azores in case of another war in the Middle East. However,

US officials were told a different story altogether.78 Officials in Lisbon had

flatly denied US intelligence reports that the Portuguese government received

from the Arab countries $400 million and a promise to restore oil supplies in

return for its refusal to renew US air base rights in the Azores.79

The Portuguese felt more secure in dealing with Israel in commercial and

cultural matters, which seemed harmless and less damaging to Arab interests.

Thus when Foreign Minister Yigal Allon met his Portuguese counterpart Jose

de Madeiros Ferreira in September 1976, the two discussed the possibility of

closer ties and joint commercial and cultural projects.80 During his visit to

Israel in October 1976, Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries Antonio Lopez

Cardoso said that the change in government in his country had led to a

reappraisal in foreign policy and a determination to expand Portuguese

contacts with the rest of the world on the basis of mutual respect. Cardoso

stated that his government had decided to recognize Israel and described his

visit as ‘a first step in the process of normalization of relations between

Portugal and Israel, which our leaders announced this year’. He said that his

government respected and recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace and

security and that it had dissociated itself from the stand taken by the previous

government with regard to supporting the Arab campaign against Israel at the

UN on the Zionism–racism equation. Cardoso showed great interest in Israeli

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agricultural communities and hinted that his government would request

Israel’s aid in agricultural and water management. Thereafter, visits by

Portuguese officials to Israel became more frequent. When the Portuguese

socialist leader, Francisco Salgado Zenha visited Israel in February 1977, he

announced that his country would soon establish diplomatic relations with

Israel. An agricultural pact was signed between the two countries on 18 April

1977, and both sides announced that diplomatic ties were imminent.81

In a joint communique issued on 13 May 1977, both governments

announced that they had agreed to establish diplomatic relations at the

ambassadorial level and that the Portuguese government would open an

embassy in Israel in due course. Accordingly, the Israeli Consulate-General

in Lisbon turned into an embassy on that day.82

When the Israeli–Portuguese agricultural pact became known in the Arab

states, their ambassadors were summoned home for consultation. North

Yemen severed its diplomatic relations with Portugal in response.83 Libya

reacted by withdrawing its ambassador from Lisbon and Saudi Arabia

decided to freeze its political and diplomatic relations with Portugal. This

pressure resulted in Portugal’s decision to delay the nomination of an

ambassador to Israel.84 Compelled to ward off Arab criticism, Soares decided

to appear more sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. He said, ‘There is

nothing to impede the PLO from opening a legation in Lisbon as in any other

European country.’ Soares’ statement was criticized by some members of his

cabinet and according to sources in Lisbon his willingness to allow the PLO

to open a legation in Lisbon led to his foreign minister’s resignation.85

Soares’ statement did little to ward off Arab criticism and their diplomats

persisted in their efforts to dissuade the Portuguese from upgrading their

relations with Israel. The Arab League’s Assistant Secretary-General, Sayed

Nofal, asked Portugal’s ambassador in Cairo, Roberto Perieira de Sousa, to

try to persuade his government to reverse its decision to upgrade relations

with Israel to ambassadorial level. Moreover, the Arab ambassadors in

Madrid threatened that they would boycott all official functions for visiting

Portuguese President Antonio Ramalho Eanes.

Despite Arab pressure government officials in Lisbon stated that the

decision to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel would not be

reversed. This bold stroke of diplomacy earned Portugal handsome dividends

in Israel and ushered in a new period in bilateral relations. At the same time,

however, the Portuguese reaffirmed their support for the Palestinian cause.

Portugal was among the twelve European countries which participated in the

Euro–Arab symposium held on 20–22 September 1977 in Paris. The

participants reaffirmed the right of the Palestinian people to a homeland in an

independent and sovereign state to be established following the total and

unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories.

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Moreover, they insisted on reconvening the Geneva Conference with PLO

participation, and proposed that the General Assembly impose sanctions on

Israel, until it withdrew from the occupied territories. They also discussed the

serious consequences of Israel’s invasion into Lebanon.86 Foreign Minister

Carlos Freitas Cruz denounced Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and the

construction of Jewish settlements there. He called for the establishment of a

‘fatherland for the martyred Palestinian people’. But he stressed that Israel

has a ‘right to exist as a state’. Cruz made these statements on the occasion of

PLO leader Yasser Arafat’s arrival in Lisbon in November 1979. He

denounced the Camp David accords as ‘imposing a new slavery on the

Palestinian people and the Arab nation as a whole’,87

Since the Palestinians had already gained the support of most countries

Portugal saw little risk in promoting their cause. Indeed, its support for the

Palestinians did not seriously jeopardize its relations with Israel apart from

the fact that Peres protested against Arafat’s ‘royal reception’ and

complained about the Palestinian attempt to assassinate the Israeli

ambassador.88

Hit hard by OPEC’s oil embargo, Portuguese industry suffered a serious

blow, which continued throughout the 1970s.89 Portugal had already

purchased 45 per cent of its daily needs of oil from Iraq but it needed

much more. This was the reason why it struck a deal with Baghdad, which

supplied it 120 tons of uranium oxide in return for increased supplies of oil.90

The deal, which provided Iraq the uranium it needed for its nuclear reactor

did not go unnoticed in Israel.91 However, anxious to promote better relations

with Lisbon the Israelis preferred not to rile the Portuguese who tried to

appease the Arabs by official statements of solidarity with their cause.

Portugal condemned Israel’s raid on the Iraqi nuclear facility on 7 June

1981, by saying that it represented a flagrant violation of the basic principles

of international law.92 Shortly after Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, Prime

Minister Balsemao visited the USA and met President Ronald Reagan and

both sides agreed to pressure the Israelis to withdraw from Lebanon.93 In

October 1985, Portugal joined Spain in endorsing the EEC’s condemnation of

Israel’s raid in Tunisia.94 Unwilling to antagonize the Portuguese the Israelis

continued to show restraint and reacted mildly. Cordial relations with

Portugal were deemed essential in the eyes of the Israeli Foreign Ministry not

only because Israel could count on one more potential vote in the UN, but

also because the Israeli security and intelligence services needed Portuguese

cooperation in their anti-terrorist campaign in Europe. Mossad, whose agents

were in pursuit of Palestinian radicals who found refuge in Portugal, needed

the government’s cooperation.95

Apart from Portugal’s fear of antagonizing the Arabs, there were other

obstacles that stood in the way of completing normalization of bilateral

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relations. The Portuguese were not pleased to see the Israelis involved in

their colonies. In 1975–6, Israel cooperated with the CIA in the war in

Angola, where it supported UNITA (National Union for the Total

Independence of Angola) under Jonas Savimbi. The Israelis transferred

arms first to the FNLA in the mid-1970s, and to then to UNITA in the

1980s. William Casey, who visited Israel soon after his nomination as a

CIA director insisted and apparently received Israel’s promise to support

him in his quest to help the anti-Communist Renamo insurgency

movement in Mozambique.96

Apart from Portugal’s attempts to accommodate the Arabs and Israel’s

involvement in the Portuguese colonies there were still other matters, which

stood on the way of better understanding between the two countries. Most of

all, Portugal’s entry into the Common Market was of particular concern for

the Israelis as it put Israel at a disadvantage. Israel had long complained that

Portugal did not grant it the same measure of liberalization, which it gave the

European countries. Following the entry of Spain and Portugal into the

Common Market, Israel pressed for low tariffs to compensate for that loss.

However, EEC members delayed the implementation of that agreement due

to Israel’s policy in the occupied territories. Infuriated at their response,

Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir protested, saying that the act was ‘surrender

to Arab blackmail’.97

Following Portugal’s entry to the Common Market, Israel began

complying with the demands of Claude Cheysson, the EEC Commissioner,

who for more than two years had been trying to persuade the Israeli

government to permit Palestinian farmers to sell their produce directly to

European importers. Israel did not comply until the Intifada began in

December 1987.98

Despite these difficulties, diplomatic relations had momentum of their

own, and by 1988 the normalization process was near completion. Israel’s

highest-ranking female diplomat, Colette Avital, was nominated as Israel’s

Ambassador to Portugal and later Portugal’s first ambassador to Israel, Rui

Eduardo, who was also accredited to Rome, presented his credentials to

President Chaim Herzog.

Bilateral relations continued to improve despite the fact that sources in

Lisbon complained that Portuguese workers in Israel were victims of fraud by

their Israeli employers. Even Portugal’s reluctance to open an embassy in Tel

Aviv did not stop the normalization process. Trade between the two countries

expanded. Exports to Portugal totalled $9.5 million for the first five months of

the year 1988, a 25 per cent increase over the same period in 1987, while

imports increased by 13 per cent to $12.5 million. This led Israeli

manufacturers to fear that unrestricted entry of Portuguese textiles would

lead to dumping.99

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Depsite its resolve to mend fences with Israel the Portuguese government

continued to guard its relations with Iraq with extreme care. When the USA

began soliciting allied support in its campaign to force Sadam Hussein out of

Kuwait, the Portuguese prime minister said that although his country was

ready to provide ‘humanitarian aid and logistical support’ for the multi-

national troops in the Gulf, ‘we will not send military forces to the war

zone’.100 The Portuguese government adopted a similar position to that of

Spain, insisting that its ships be not used beyond the reinforcement of the

embargo against Iraq.101 Seeking to maintain cordial relations with Israel

without offending the Arabs, the Portuguese government found it prudent to

encourage the Middle East peace process and to appear as a mediator. In May

1992, Portugal invited representatives from all parties participating in the

peace talks to meet in Lisbon, in order to discuss the progress made and to

reach decisions on future negotiations.

The progress in the Middle East talks allowed the Portuguese to continue

the normalization process without recriminations. By December 1993, Lisbon

announced that Israeli tourists would no longer need visas to enter

Portugal.102 Bilateral relations continued to warm up and in 1995 Soares

came to Israel. His statements indicated willingness to bring the normal-

ization process to a successful end. In a speech to the Knesset on 1 November

1995 he said:

While it is true that the solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict is the

Palestine question, there is a need to give priority to Israel’s right to

live in peace and security within its boundaries.’

Moreover, he went to the extent of apologizing for the persecution, which

Portuguese Jews suffered during the Inquisition era. He said, ‘All my

intention is to awaken the conscience of my countrymen and bring them to

take responsibility and reconciliation by means of a righteous deed.’ 103

The turmoil in Algeria and the fear that militant Islam would spread to

other North African countries led to greater Israeli–Portuguese cooperation.

By the of 1996, Portugal joined France, Italy and Spain in a joint proposal to

create a body called Eurofor, whose task was to combat the danger of Islamic

movements coming from the southern Mediterranean. Portugal’s participa-

tion caused anger in the Arab world. Egypt, Tunisia and Libya all protested

that they were not consulted and complained about interference in Arab

domestic affairs. However, despite these expressions of discontent there was

little danger that Israeli–Portuguese relations were under serious threat. Israel

did not wish to jeopardize its relations with Portugal. Its representative had

taken great care to earn Portugal’s good will and refrained from cancelling its

plan to participate in the Expo 98 international fair in Lisbon, despite the

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cost. By the beginning of 1998, Israel’s Communication Minister Limor

Livnat visited Lisbon with leading industrialists and signed a memorandum

of understanding with Portugal in the fields of telecommunication and mail

services. Economics Minister Joaquim de Pina Moura said that his country

regarded Israel as its ‘target market’ for stronger economic ties and mutual

investment.104

The Portuguese government continued acting as a dispassionate observer

of Middle Eastern affairs. It called for the implementation of Security

Council Resolution 425, asking for Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, and

agreed to participate in future in a Euro-Mediterranean conference designed

to increase European involvement in the peace process.105 On 1 July 1999,

Portugal’s Foreign Minister Jaime Gama told Arafat that his country would

open a diplomatic mission in the territory controlled by the Palestinian

Authority. Moreover, Gama and Arafat signed a $2.6 million agreement to

help in rebuilding Bethlehem and other sites in the West Bank.106

The outbreak of theAlAqsa Intifada in theWest Bank in September 2000 left

the Portuguese government in an awkward position. Its officials refrained from

radical statements favouring any side and called for resumption of the peace

process. The issue was discussed in joint meetings with US officials who

expressed their desire to see Washington exerting greater influence in the

region.107 In a speech outlining Portugal’s foreign policy on 18 June 2002,

Foreign Minister Martinez da Cruz said that his government attached

considerable importance to its ties with the countries of the southern

Mediterranean shore, which supply Portugal its economic and energy needs,

and that ‘wecannot allow thePeaceProcess in theMiddleEast to freezedialogue

between the twoMediterranean shores and. . .we are compelled to contribute, in

every possible manner, towards facilitating the peace process itself’.108

Portugal’s desire to maintain good relations with all countries of the

Middle East manifested itself clearly in its low-profile diplomacy in the

winter of 2003, when the US was preparing for war against Iraq. Unlike

France and Germany, which opposed war on Iraq, the Portuguese government

was in no position to identify with either side of the conflict because its

security continued to depend on close cooperation with NATO and the US,

and on uninterrupted supply of oil from the Arab world. At the same time, the

Portuguese government deemed it necessary to maintain a low profile in its

reaction to the intifada because it has no interest in losing the connection with

Israel, which it considers capable of exerting influence on its behalf in

Washington.

This article surveys the course of Israeli-Portuguese relations from the

establishment of the Jewish State in 1948, to 2003. Its main argument is that

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normalization in bilateral relations was not possible prior to the fall of the

dictatorial regime in Portugal. The emphasis is also on other constraints,

which made it impractical for Lisbon to mend fences with Israel. In addition

to its dependence on Arab oil, Portugal’s reluctance to normalize relations

with Israel was closely connected to its desire to maintain cordial relations

with the countries of the Third World. This factor weighed heavily in

Portuguese foreign policy and cannot be underestimated. According to

Foreign Minister Gama, the fact that Portugal is a small country seeking

cooperation with great powers and wishing to become a member of large

organizations ‘must not diminish the importance of Portugal’s relations with

the third world’.109

Other factors, such as Portugal’s desire to follow the Spanish example and

its sensitivity to the Vatican’s opinion all played a role. The most important

factor, however, was that there was no compelling reason for Portuguese

Foreign Ministry officials to promote normalization with Israel. For pragmatic

reasons, both Portugal and Israel promoted cordial relations. While the

Portuguese were motivated by the need to remain on good terms with the

USA, the Israelis had no desire to keep a western country at a distance.

Despite the absence of diplomatic relations the two countries maintained

cordial relations and several agreements were signed. In July 1959, a bilateral

trade agreement was reached. In 1977, another agreement was signed

whereby Israel agreed to provide agricultural and technological assistance to

Portugal. And in October 1984, EL AL Airlines signed an aviation agreement

with the Portuguese National Airlines.

Despite the existence of anti-Israeli groups in Portugal such as Partitdo

Communista International Esparataco, the FP-25 (Popular Forces of April

25), and the Azores Liberation Army, bilateral relations continued to develop.

At the same time, Portugal maintained cordial ties with the Arab states and

was tolerant toward the several thousand Muslims living in the country.110

That the Portuguese regime managed to mend fences with Israel was not only

a result of the peace process, but also due to its tactful diplomacy, which

managed to gain Arab confidence while strengthening ties with Israel. While

it is difficult to predict the future of the bilateral relations, it seems unlikely

that the Portuguese government will turn its back on Israel, unless the

circumstances of the post Yom Kippur War, when it experienced a serious oil

shortage, reappear.

NOTES

1. ‘The Mossad Machine: Confounding Military Intelligence 1946–7’ in Walid Khalidi (ed.),From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem until 1948(Beirut: The Institute of Palestine Studies, 1971), p.618.

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2. Barnet J. Richard, The Alliance: America, Europe, Japan – Makers of the Postwar World,(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p.351.

3. Howard M. Sacher, Israel and Europe: An Appraisal in History, (New York: Knopf, 1999),p.221.

4. Deeply ingrained in the Jewish mind was the case of the Jewish physician Garcia de Ortawho lived in the 16th century in Portuguese Goa and who was an expert in tropicalmedicine and a pioneer of pharmacology. De Orta was the first to provide a scientificexplanation of the cholera disease and his treatise Conversations on Medicinal Plants andMedications in India was published in Goa in 1563. After being buried as a Christian theInquisition exhumed his grave and burned his bones. Amnon Ginzai, ‘Marranos onPortuguese Coins’, Ha’umma, [Hebrew], (Winter 1992–3), p.159.

5. H.H. Ben-Sasson (ed.), A History of the Jewish People (Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1994), pp.570, 638, 721, 734, 737.

6. Dalia Ofer, Escaping the Holocaust: Illegal Immigration to Israel, 1939–1944, (New York:Oxford University Press, 1990), pp.156–7; Abram L. Sacher, The Redemption of theUnwanted: From the Liberation of the Death Camps to the Founding of Israel (New York:St. Martin’s/Marek, 1983), pp.92–3, 96.

7. Lapid to Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives (hereafter, ISA), 2596/20, 10 May 1954;Jerusalem Post, 28 June 1987.

8. ‘Singer named to Portugal Nazi panel’, Jerusalem Post, 1 June 1997.9. Peretz Merhav, The Israeli Left: History, Problems, Documents (New York: Barnes & Co,

1980), p.148.10. Becker to Mozambique Liberation Front, The Israel Labour and Pioneer Archives, Lavon

Institute, IV208–1537, 12 Sept.1962.11. Shimon Peres, Battling for Peace: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 1995), p.180;

Jerusalem Post, 10 Jan.1979.12. Memorandum by Avraham Darom, ISA FO /2413/24, 3 April 1950; Memorandum by

Avraham Darom, ISA FO /2413/24b, 18 Jan. 1953.13. Eilat to Eytan, ISA 2596/20, 4 June 1954. Ellipses are in the text.14. Eytan to Eilat, ISA 2596/20, 28 May 1954; Tsur to Foreign Ministry, ISA 2541/17/a, 2 July

1951.15. Gali to Foreign Ministry, ISA 2541/18/a, 9 March 1953; Tsur to Foreign Ministry, ISA

2541/17/a, 19 May 1954.16. Sasson to Foreign Ministry, ISA 2541/17/a, 15 Feb.1953; Comay to Foreign Ministry, ISA

2541/17/a, 17 Dec.1952; Darom to Avner, ISA 2541/17/a, 10. Sept.1951; Avner to Fisher,ISA 2541/17/a, 22 July 1951; Darom to Israel’s Ambassador to Brussels. ISA 2541/18/9, 29Nov. 1953.

17. Fischer to Foreign Ministry, ISA 2541/18/9, 16 Dec. 1953.18. Barromi to Israel’s Ambassador in Rome, ISA 2541/17/a, 29 Oct. 1954.19. Director of the Western European Section in the Israeli Foreign Ministry to Israel’s Foreign

Minister, ISA 2541/17/a, 22 Dec. 1954.20. Ariel to Foreign Ministry, ISA 2541/18/a, 2 Nov. 1954.21. Ariel to foreign Ministry, ISA 2541/18/9, 25 Jan. 1954; Ariel to Foreign Ministry, ISA

2541/18/a, 25 Feb. 1954.22. Ariel to Foreign Ministry, ISA 2541/18/a, 16 Nov. 1954; Najar to Israel’s Ambassador in

Brussels, ISA 2541/18/a, 10 Dec. 1954.23. Eytan to Comay, ISA 2541/17/b, 22 Feb. 1955.24. Ariel to foreign Ministry, ISA 2541/18/a, 21 Dec. 1954.25. Tsur to Foreign Ministry, ISA 2541/18/a, 14 March 1954. Parentheses are mine.26. Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, The Imperfect Spies: The History of the Israeli Intelligence

(London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1989), p.172.27. ‘General Lopez Outlines Foreign Policy’, Public Record Office, London, (hereafter, PRO),

FO/371, 96133, WP1022/1, 16 July 1951.28. Ronald to Evans, PRO FO/371, 111062, VR1023/1, 14 June 1954; Robert Lacey, The

Kingdom: Arabia & the House of Saud (New York: Avon, 1981), p.376.

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29. Report on a meeting between Mr Dean and the Portuguese ambassador who expressedconcern for the oil supplies. Minutes by P. Dean, PRO FO/371, JE1094/36, 2 Nov. 1956.

30. Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Edanim, 1976), p.425.31. Statements of Fourteen Maritime States Concerning Freedom of Navigation in the Strait of

Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, 1, 4, and 8 March 1957. The Arab–Israeli Conflict:Documents, John Norton Moore (ed.), (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp.67–4.

32. Anthony Eden, The Suez Crisis of 1956, (Boston: Beacon, 1968), p.81.33. ‘Report by Professor Dr Moses B. Amzalar, President Anglo Jewish Association’, PRO FO/

371, 144845, RP1571/1, 25 March 1959.34. There in no indication in the documents available in the Israel State archive that such

authorization was ever given. Kantor to Sharett, ISA 2541/17/9, 2 Sept. 1948.35. According to one story, an Egyptian scientist claimed that the Portuguese Jewish physician

Rodrigo Lopez was Queen Elizabeth’s personal physician and a Spanish spy at the sametime. According to the story, he was caught attempting to poison the Queen and summarilyexecuted. Raphael Israeli, Peace in the Eyes of the Beholder (Berlin: Mouton, 1985), p.58;Yehoshafat Harkabi, Arab Attitude to Israel (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972),p.253.

36. Miron to Foreign Ministry, ISA, 130.09/2324/6, 15 Jan. 1960.37. Miron to Foreign Ministry, ISA, 130.23/3338/31, 9 March 1960.38. Miron to Darom, ISA, 130.20/3338/31, 16 June 1960.39. Ross to Foreign Office. PRO FO/371, 155438, JP1018/8, 12 April 1961.40. Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, The Israeli Connection: Who Israel Arms and Why (New York:

Pantheon, 1987), p.64.41. Indeed, the left wing parties in Israel such as the Communists and Mapam were particularly

sensitive about this issue and questioned Deputy Defence Minister Shimon Peres in theKnesset about the veracity of these allegations. ‘Israel Refuses to Sell Arms to Portugal: ABBC telegram. PRO FO/371, 157798, ER1195/5, 9 Nov. 1961; Smith to Foreign Office.PRO FO/371, 164357, ER1195/1, 27 Jan. 1962.

42. The Times (London), 1 Dec. 1961.43. Foreign Office Minutes on the Sale of Arms by Israel. PRO FO/371, 164357, ER1195/1, 2

Feb. 1962.44. Middle East Record 1967, Vol.3 (Jerusalem: The Israeli Universities Press, 1971), p.71.45. Jerusalem Post, 26 May 1963; ‘Statement by Shlomo Hillel in Special Committee on

Apartheid’, ISA 3992/2, 9 Dec. 1966.46. Ross to Foreign Office, PRO FO/371, 169443, 18 July 1963.47. Burroughs to Brown, PRO FO/371, 180079, CP1021/1, 6 Jan. 1965; Evans to Foreign

Office, PRO FO/371, 173138, 24 April 1963.48. Samuel Merlin, The Search for Peace in the Middle East: The Story of President

Bourguiba’s Campaign for a Negotiated Peace between Israel and the Arab States (NewYork: Thomas Yoseloff, 1968), p.268.

49. United Kingdom Mission in the United Nations to Foreign Office. PRO FO/371, 190294,VM1051/4, 25 Feb. 1966.

50. Graham to Chamier, PRO FO/371, 185406, BK103136/1, 1 Aug. 1966; Fowler to Mallaby,PRO FO/371, 185406, BK103136/1, 10. Aug. 1966.

51. The Portuguese were displeased with the USA because of its insistence that its policytoward colonialism was ‘not negotiable’. Thomson to Jaimeson, PRO FO/371, 169462,CP1224/1, 23 Jan. 1963. In an interview with the New York Times on 16 March 1966,Salazar warned that the western powers should no longer expect ‘automatic cooperationfrom Portugal, even for the defence of ‘what they call free world’. He said that NATO wastotally ‘inadequate’ to the present needs and was a source of disastrous results. Heconcluded by saying that Portugal would cooperate only with those who fully cooperatewith it. New York Times, 25 March 1966; The Times (London), 29 March 1966.

52. ‘Israel barred from Portuguese soccer match’, Jerusalem Post, 22 Feb. 1973.53. Kemal Kirisci, The PLO and World Politics: A Study of the Mobilization of Support for the

Palestinian Cause (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), pp.73–5; ‘Address to the

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Conference of the Non-aligned Countries in Algiers. Radio Cairo, 6 Sept. 1967. The PublicDiary of President Sadat: The Road to War (Oct.1970–Oct.1973) Part I, Raphael Israeli(ed.) (Leiden, The Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1978), p.421.

54. ‘Address to the Central Committee of ASU. MENA, Cairo, March 27, 1976’, The PublicDiary of President Sadat: The Road to Pragmatism (June 1975–October 1976), Part III,Raphael Israeli (ed.), (Leiden, The Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1979), pp.1239, 1256, 1328.

55. ‘US raps Nato for hedging’, Jerusalem Post, 3 Oct. 1973; ‘The Day of the Ostriches’,Jerusalem Post, 8 Nov. 1973.

56. ‘US ends month-long airlift here of arms’, Jerusalem Post, 15 Nov. 1979; Portugal: naimprensa estrangeira-um ano depois (Lisboa: Publicacoes Dom Quixote, 1975), pp.79–80.

57. In an interview with Roy Licklider, a Portuguese official referred to Nixon’s note to thePrime Minister as ‘the toughest letter from one head of state to another that I have everseen’. Roy Licklider, Political Power and the Arab Oil Weapon: The Emergence of FiveIndustrial Nations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp.211–12; KennethMaxwell, The Making of Portuguese Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1995), p.55.

58. It was apparently for that reason that the Portuguese decided to send an ambassador to Israelwhen the negotiations with the USA about the uses of the Azores began. Kenneth Maxwell,The Making of Portuguese Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,1995), pp.214–5.

59. Beit-Hallahmi, p.159.60. J.B. Kelly, Arabia, the Gulf and the West (New York: Basic Books, 1980), p.400; Walter

Henry Nelson and Terence C.F. Prittie, The Economic War against the Jews (New York:Random House, 1977), p.142.

61. Revolution into Democracy: Portugal after the Coup: A Report by Senator GeorgeMcGovern to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, August 1976.(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1976), p.13.

62. Jerusalem Post, 20 Nov. 1973; Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among the Nations: Israeland the World (London: Bantam, 1988), p.259.

63. Patrick Seale, Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire (London: Hutchinson, 1992), pp.170, 272.64. ‘US officials warn’, Jerusalem Post, 6 Oct. 1974.65. ‘Portugal ready to establish ties with Arabs – then Israel’, Jerusalem Post, 16 Oct. 1974.66. ‘Portugal sliding to the left’, Jerusalem Post, 22 Nov. 1974.67. Christopher Reed, ‘Lisbon against use of base for US airlift’, Jerusalem Post, 4 Dec. 1974.68. ‘Lisbon says it won’t allow use of the Azores against Arab states’, Jerusalem Post, 4 April

1975.69. Ibid.70. ‘Portugal to honor NATO commitments’, Jerusalem Post, 9 April 1975.71. ‘Portuguese socialist leader cancels trip’, Jerusalem Post, 5 May 1975.72. Gideon Raphael, Destination Peace, Three Decades of Israeli Foreign Policy: A Personal

Memoir (New York: Stein & Day, 1981), pp.358–9.73. John L. Hammond, Building Popular Power: Workers and Neighborhood Movements in the

Portuguese Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988), pp.57,101; Phil Mailer,Portugal: The Impossible Revolution? (New York: Free Life Editions, 1977), p.201.

74. ‘Portugal, Iraq condemn (Israeli) racism’, Jerusalem Post, 1 Jan. 1976.75. ‘Portuguese socialists visit here’, Jerusalem Post, 7 June 1976.76. ‘Portugal’s bid for ties greeted in Jerusalem’, Jerusalem Post, 4 Aug. 1976; ‘Soares thanks

Rabin, hopes for more friendly relations’, Jerusalem Post, 10 Aug. 1976.77. ‘Israel–Portugal ties discussed’, Jerusalem Post, 27 Aug. 1976; ‘Avineri had unscheduled

chat with Soares’, Jerusalem Post, 4 Aug. 1976.78. ‘Portugal may deny Azores for Israel aid’, Jerusalem Post, 30 Aug. 1976; When asked

whether Portugal would prevent the USA from using its bases in the Azores, Secretary ofState, Casper Weinberger said that he heard nothing to that effect. He said that in his talkswith the Portuguese they agreed that disturbances in the Middle East were likely to haveadverse effect on NATO’s vital interests in other theatres. ‘Transcript of a Press Conferenceby Secretary of Defence (Weinberger), Lisbon, 14 May 1981 (extracts), American Foreign

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Policy Current Documents 1981, (Washington: Department of State, 1984), Doc.192,p.527.

79. ‘Lisbon Denies report of Arab offer’, Jerusalem Post, 25 Aug. 1974.80. ‘Allon to confer with Lisbon FM’, Jerusalem Post, 1 Sept. 1976; ‘Portuguese contacts’,

Jerusalem Post, 7 Oct. 1976.81. ‘Portugal minister says visit is ‘a first step’, Jerusalem Post, 19 Oct. 1976; ‘Ties with

Portugal expected’, Jerusalem Post, 24 Feb. 1977; ‘Israel and Portugal to exchangeambassadors’, Jerusalem Post, 17 April 1977.

82. ‘Israel, Portugal make diplomatic ties official’, Jerusalem Post, 13 May 1977.83. ‘Israel–Lisbon agricultural pact signed’, Jerusalem Post, 3 June 1967; ‘North Yemen cuts

ties with Portugal over Israeli issue’, Jerusalem Post, 2 June 1977.84. ‘Libya stalls Portuguese ties’, Jerusalem Post, 13 June 1977; ‘Lisbon reneges on legation’,

Jerusalem Post, 5 Aug. 1977.85. ‘Lisbon sees PLO as ‘‘counter-balance’’’, Jerusalem Post, 14 Oct. 1977.86. ‘Arab ambassadors to boycott visit of Eanes to Spain’, Jerusalem Post, 25 May 1977;

‘Resolution adopted by Euro-Arab symposium affirming that recognition of the rights of thePalestinian people and the establishment of an independent sovereign state constitute thekey to the Middle East crisis.’ International Documents on Palestine 1977, (Beirut: Institutefor Palestine Studies, 1979), pp.248–9.

87. Jerusalem Post, Nov. 1979.88. Kameel B. Nasr, Arab and Israeli Terrorism: the Causes and Effects of Political Violence,

1936–1993 (London: McFarland, 1997), pp.11–9.89. Portugal depended on Arab oil for 75 per cent of its supplies. Cesar Oliveira, Portugal, dos

quarto cantos do Mundo a Europa: de descolonizacao (1974–1976), (Lisboa: EdicoesCosmos, 1996), p.50.

90. Hoag Levins, Arab Reach: The Secret War Against Israel (London: Sidgewick & Jackson,1983), p.199; ‘Portugal to Sell Iraq Unenriched Uranium’, Washington Post, 17 July 1981.

91. Israel continuously complained about Portugal’s lenient policy toward the Palestinians.Portuguese tolerance toward their activities was obvious in February 1986, when a memberof the Palestinian Abu Nidal faction who was responsible for the assassination of Arafat’sadvisor Issam Sartawi was released by the Portuguese. Jerusalem Post, 2 Feb. 1986.

92. Portugal’s Director General of Engery Sidonio Pais said earlier that year that the Iraqis hadpurchased 120 tons of uranium from Portugal in 1980. According to the state news agencyAnop, when Iraqi Foreign Minister Saadoun Hammadi visited Lisbon in March 1981, heasked the Portuguese to increase the sales. Jerusalem Post, 10 June 1981.

93. ‘Transcript of a White House Press Briefing, 15 Dec. 1982’, American Foreign PolicyCurrent Documents 1982 (Washington: Department of State, 1985), Doc.227, p.595.

94. Jerusalem Post, 2 Oct. 1985.95. The group was involved in an attempt to assassinate the Israeli ambassador on Portuguese

soil and it was there that Abu Nidal’s gunman assassinated Issam Sartawi on 10 April 1983.Jacques Degory and Hesi Carmel, Israel Ultra-Secret (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1989), p.276.

96. Beit-Hallahmi, p.64; Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal andAmerican Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991), p.13n.

97. Lourie to Stevens, ISA, 93.26/2713/18, 23 Feb. 1960; Rosemary Hollis, ‘The Politics ofIsraeli–European Economic Relations’, Peace in the Middle East: The Challenge for Israel,Efraim Karsh (ed.), (London: Frank Cass: 1994), p.128; Ha’aretz, 27 Dec. 1983; DonPeretz, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p.165.

98. F. Robert Hunter, The Palestinian Uprising: A War by Other Means (Berkeley: Universityof California Press, 1993), p.84.

99. Jerusalem Post, 21 July 1988, 6 and 7 Sept. 1988, 28 Aug. 1987.100. Cited in Dilip Hiro, Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War (New York:

Routledge, 1992), p.321.101. Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War

in the New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.357.

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102. Jerusalem Israel Television in Hebrew, 18 May 1992. FBIS-NES-92-097, 19 May 1992;Jerusalem New Channel 2 Television in Hebrew, 30 Dec. 1993. FBIS- NES-94-002, 4 Jan.1994.

103. ‘Portugal’s President in the Knesset: ‘It is necessary to awaken my countrymen to takeresponsibility for the injuries inflicted by the Inquisition and to bring reconciliation’,Ha’aretz, 2 Nov. 1995.

104. Middle East Mirror, 4 Dec. 1996; Jay Bushinsky, ‘Lack of funds may force Israel out ofLisbon expo’, Jerusalem Post, 28 Dec. p.2.; ‘News in brief’, Jerusalem Post, 29 Dec. 1997;Judy Siegel, ‘Communications deal with Portugal’, Jerusalem Post, 28 Jan. 1998, p.13.

105. ‘Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on Lebanon’, PressRelease, Embassy of Portugal, Washington DC, 9.Feb. 2000. http:/www.portugalemb.org/global.html

106. ‘News in Brief’, Jerusalem Post, 2 July 1999.107. ‘Remarks with Portuguese Director-General for Foreign Policy Ambassador Santana

Carlos’, Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Portuguese Ministry ofForeign Affairs, Lisbon, Portugal, 17 April 2002. http://www.state.gov/p/9608.htm

108. The Main Lines of Portuguese Foreign Policy: Speech at the Assembly of the Republic bythe Minister for Foreign Affairs and Communities, Martins da Cruz, 18 June, 2002. file://A:\Government%20 Portal%20%20The%20Main%20Lines%20of%20Potuguese%’. . .. p.3.

109. Jaime Gama, ‘Foreign Policy’, Portugal: Ancient Country, Young Democracy, KennethMaxwell and Michael H. Haltzel (eds.), (Washington DC: Wilson Center Press, 1990), p.79.

110. Jerusalem Post, 12 March 1986.

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